14 July Revolution: Wikis


Note: Many of our articles have direct quotes from sources you can cite, within the Wikipedia article! This article doesn't yet, but we're working on it! See more info or our list of citable articles.


From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



The July 14, 1958 Coup in Iraq marks the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy established by King Faisal in 1932 under the auspices of the British. In 1958, the coup overthrew King Faisal II, the regent and Crown Prince Abd al-Ilah, and Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, all of whom were perceived as minions of the British. The coup established an Iraqi Republic and was a result of a number of different grievances with Hashemite Iraqi policies. One of the most salient themes that the Free Officers, the group that engineered and executed the coup, represented was anger at Western imperialist control of Iraq through its monarchic mediators. This article explores the complaints that agitated the governmental status quo and motivated the Free Officers to carry out their coup.

Pre-Coup Grievances

Regional (Middle East) Agitations: During and after World War II, Iraq housed a growing presence of Arab nationalist sympathizers. The Arab nationalists aimed, in part, to remove British imperial influence in Iraq.1 This sentiment grew from a politicized educational system in Iraq and an increasingly assertive and educated middle class.2 Schools served as instruments to internalize Pan-Arab nationalist identity because the leaders and the designers of the Iraqi educational system in the 1920s and 1930s were Pan-Arab nationalists who made a significant contribution in the expansion of that ideology in Iraq as well as the rest of the Arab world.3 The nationalist directors (Sami Shawkat and Fadhil al-Jamal) of the educational system in Iraq employed teachers who were political refugees from Palestine and Syria.4 These exiles fled to Iraq because of their roles in the anti-British and anti-French contentions, and subsequently fostered nationalist consciousness in their Iraqi students.5 Institutions like school added to the general awareness of Arab identity and generated criticism of imperialism.

Similarly, Pan-Arab sentiment circulated in the Middle East and was proliferated by a rising politician and a staunch opponent of imperialism, Gamel Abdel Nasser of Egypt. As such, Hashemite Iraq confronted and cradled those sentiments as well. At the same time, Nuri al-Said, Iraqi Prime Minister, was interested in pursuing the idea of a federation of Arab States of the Fertile Crescent, but reserved his enthusiasm about a pan-Arab state. Al-Said joined the Arab league in 1944 on Iraq’s behalf seeing it as a providing a forum for bringing together the Arab states, leaving the door open for a possible future federation.6 The charter of the League enshrined the principle of the autonomy for each Arab state and referenced pan-Arabism only rhetorically.

Economic Climate: The Iraqi economy fell into a recession and then a depression following World War II; inflation was uncontrolled and the Iraqi standard of living was dropping.7 Al-Said and the Arab Nationalist regent, Abd al-Ilah, were continually in opposition to each other. Instead of cooperating to improve the quality of life among the Iraqi citizens, the regent and al-Said did not agree on a cohesive economic policy, infrastructure improvements, and other needed internal undertakings.8

In 1950, Nuri al-Said persuaded Iraqi Petroleum Company to increase the royalties paid to the Iraqi government. Al-Said looked to Iraq’s growing oil revenues to fund and propel development.9 Al-Said determined that 70 percent of Iraq’s revenue from was to be set aside for infrastructure development by a Development Board, which consisted of three foreign advisors, out of six members in total. This foreign presence provoked popular disapproval on al-Said’s policy because of its reliance on decision-making by foreigners.10 Despite anti-Western sentiments toward oil and development, al-Said’s hired economist Lord Salter to investigate the prospects for development in Iraq because al-Said’s oil revenue reallocation seemed to be ineffective.11 Salter continued to make suggestions as to how to implement development projects regardless of massive Iraqi dislike of his presence.

Political Grievances:

During World War II, the British reoccupied Iraq and in 1947, through the treaty at Portsmouth on January 15, 1948, Salih Jabr negotiated British withdrawal from Iraq. However, this agreement consisted of a joint British and Iraqi joint defense board that oversaw Iraqi military planning. Additionally, the British continued control of Iraqi foreign affairs.12 Iraq would still be tied to Great Britain for military supplies and training. This treaty was to last until 1973—a twenty-five-year time period that Arab nationalists in Iraq could not accept.13 As a staunch reaction to the Portsmouth Treaty, Arab nationalists led the Wathbah Rebellion a year later in protest of a continued British presence in Iraq.14 Al-Said repudiated the Portsmouth Treaty as a concession offered to the Iraqi and Arab nationalists who rebelled.15

In 1955, Iraq entered into the Baghdad Pact with Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. The pact was a defense agreement between the four nations and endorsed by the UK and US as anti-communist Cold War strategy, but was greatly resented by Iraqis in general.16 Egypt saw the Baghdad Pact as a provocation and a challenge against its regional dominance. In 1956, when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, Iraqi-Egyptian relations further exacerbated. The British, French, and Israelis invaded Egypt. Iraq, as a British ally, had to support the invasion.17 The fact that imperial ties dragged Iraq into supporting invasion of Arab lands led to wide disapproval within the Iraqi populace, which largely sympathized with Egypt and responded to pan-Arab ideology. They felt that the invasion of Egypt was another sign of Western aggression and dominance in the region.18

Similarly, when Egypt and Syria united to make the United Arab Republic under the banner of pan-Arabism in 1958, Iraqi politicians found themselves in a vulnerable position. Iraqi leaders had no interest in uniting with Egypt and instead proposed and ratified their own pan-Arab union with Hashemite Jordan in May of 1958.19 Great Britain and the United States openly supported this union. Many Iraqis however were suspicious of the purpose of this union regarded the Arab Union of Iraq and Jordan as another “tool of their Western overlord.”20

Direct Precursors to the coup: The primary goal of the coup was to liberate Iraq from its imperial ties with the British and the US. The Western powers dominated all sectors of Iraqi governance: national politics and reform, regional politics with its Arab and non-Arab neighbors, and economic policies. As a general rule, many Iraqis were resentful of the presence of Western powers in the region, especially the British. Furthermore, Hashemite monarchic rule could not be divorced from the image of imperial masters behind the monarchy.


Discord mounts

A growing number of educated elites in Iraq were becoming enamored with the ideals espoused by Nasser’s pan-Arabism movement. The ideas of qawmiyah found many willing adherents, particularly within the officer classes of the Iraqi military. The policies of Said were considered anathema by certain individuals within the Iraqi armed forces, and opposition groups began to form, modeled upon the Egyptian Free Officers Movement which had overthrown the Egyptian monarchy in 1952. Despite efforts by Said to quell growing unrest with the military ranks (such as economic benefits designed to benefit the officer class, and brokering deals with the U.S. to supply the Iraqi military)[1] his position was significantly weakened by the events of the Suez Crisis. Said was to suffer for his association with Britain; the latter’s role in the Crisis seeming a damning indictment of his wataniyah policies[2][3] Despite Said’s efforts to distance himself from the crisis, the damage had been done to his position. Iraq was to become isolated within the Arab world; a fact highlighted by her exclusion from the ‘Treaty of Arab Solidarity’ in January 1957[4]. The Suez Crisis benefited the Nasser’s pan-Arabism cause, whilst simultaneously undermining those Arab leaders who held a pro-Western policy. Said’s fell firmly within the latter camp, and covert opposition to his governance steadily grew in the wake of Suez.

Building to a crisis

On February 1 1958, Egypt and Syria were to boost the pan-Arabian movement immeasurably with the announcement that they had unified under the title of the United Arab Republic (UAR)[5]. The move was a catalyst for a series of events that culminated in revolution in Iraq. The formation of the UAR and Nasser’s lofty rhetoric calling for a united Arab world was to galvanize the pan-Arabism movement within Iraq and Jordan. The governments in Iraq and Jordan attempted something of a riposte with the creation of the Arab Federation on February 14 [6]- a union of the two states- yet few were impressed by the knee-jerk reaction to the UAR. The UAR quickly found another member in the form of Yemen soon after its formation: attention was soon to shift to Lebanon where Syria was to sponsor the Arab nationalist movement in its civil war campaign against the pro-Western government of Camille Chamoun[7]. Said recognised that defeat for Chamoun would leave Iraq and Jordan isolated. As such he made moves to bolster Chamoun’s government with aid throughout May and June[8] More fatefully he attemptted to bolster Jordan with units from the Iraqi army, a move that was a direct catalyst for the coup d’état.

July 14th

Plot Overview: On July 14, 1958, a group that identified as the “Free Officers,” a secret military group led by General Abd al-Karim Qasim, overthrew the monarchy. This group was markedly Pan-Arab in character. King Faisal II, the regent and crown Prince Abd al-Ilah, and Nuri al-Said were all executed.21

Free Officers: Origins and Motivations: The Free Officers were inspired by and modeled after the Egyptian Free Officers who overthrew the Egyptian Monarchy in 1952.22 The Free Officers represented all parties and cut across political factions and were led by General Abd al-Karim Qasim.23 Qasim was a member of the generation that had launched the revolution in Egypt, and had grown up in an era where radicalism and Pan-Arabism were circulating in schools, including high schools and military academies.24 As a group, most of the Free officers were Sunni Arabs that came from a modern middle class.25 Iraqi Free Officers were inspired by a number of events in the Middle East the decade before 1952. The 1948 War against Israel was an experience that intensified the Egyptian Free Officers’ sense of duty.26 They understood their mission as deposing the corrupt regimes that weakened a unified Arab nation and thrown their countries into distress.27 The success of the Free Officers in overthrowing the Egyptians monarchy and seizing power in 1952 made Nassir into a source of inspiration for the Iraqi Officers.28

The Iraqi Free Officer group was, in fact, an underground organization and so much of the planning and timing rested in the hands of Qasim and his associate, Colonel Abdul Salam ‘Arif.29 The Free Officers sought to ensure Nassir’s support and the assistance of the UAR to implement the overthrow, because they feared the members of the Baghdad Pact would subsequently overthrow the Free Officers as a reaction to the Coup.30 Nassir only offered moral support, whose material significance remained vague and so Egypt had no practical role in the Iraqi revolution.31

The dispatching of Iraqi army units to Jordan played into the hands of two of the key members of the Iraqi Free Officers movement: Colonel Abdul Salam Arif and the movement’s leader, Brigadier General Abdul Karim Qasim. The Iraqi 19th and 20th Brigades (the former under the command of Qasim and the latter featuring Arif’s battalion) were dispatched to march to Jordan, along a route that passed Baghdad. The opportunity for a coup was thus presented to, and seized upon, by the conspirators. Arif was to march on Baghdad with the 20th Brigade-which he had seized control of with the help of Colonel Abd al-Latif al-Darraji- while Qasim would remain in reserve with the 19th at Jalawla.[9] In the early hours of July 14 1958, Arif seized control of Baghdad’s broadcasting station (which was to become his H.Q.) and broadcast the first announcement of the revolution by radio. Arif “…denounced imperialism and the clique in office; proclaimed a new republic and the end of the old regime…announced a temporary sovereignty council of three members to assume the duties of the presidency; and promised a future election for a new president.”[10] Arif then despatched two detachments from his regiment; one to al-Rahab Palace to deal with King Faisal II and the Crown Prince 'Abd al-Ilah‎, the other to Nuri al-Said’s residence. Despite the presence of the crack Royal Guard at the Palace, no resistance was offered by order of the Crown Prince. It is uncertain what orders were given to the palace detachment, and what level of force they detailed. However, at approximately 08.00am, the King, Crown Prince, Princess Hiyam ('Abd al-Ilah‎'s wife), Princess Nafeesa ('Abd al-Ilah‎'s mother), Princess Abadiya (Faisal's aunt), other members of the Iraqi Royal Family, and several servants were executed as they were leaving the palace.[11] With their demise, the Iraqi Hashemite dynasty ended. Meanwhile, Said was able to temporarily slip the net of his would-be captors, by escaping across the Tigris after being alerted by the sound of gunfire.

By noon, Qasim had arrived in Baghdad with his forces and set up headquarters in the Ministry of Defence building. The conspirator’s attention now shifted towards locating al-Said, lest he escape and undermine the coup’s early success. A reward of 10,000 Iraqi dinar was offered for his capture[12], and a large scale search began. On July 15 he was spotted in a street in the al-Battawin quarter of Baghdad attempting to escape disguised in a woman’s abaya.[13] Said and his accomplice were both shot, and his body was buried in the cemetery at Bab al-Mu’azzam later that evening.[9]

Mob violence was to continue even in the wake of Said’s death. Spurred by Arif’s urges to liquidate traitors[14], uncontrollable mobs took to the streets of Baghdad. The body of 'Abd al-Ilah was taken from the palace, mutilated and dragged through the streets, finally being hung outside the Ministry of Defence. Several foreign nationals (including Jordanian and American citizens) staying at the Baghdad Hotel were killed by the mob. Mass mob violence didn’t begin to die down until Qasim imposed a curfew, yet this did not prevent the disinterment, mutilation and parading of Said’s corpse through the streets of Baghdad the day after its burial.[15]


On March 9, 1959, The New York Times reported that the situation in Iraq was initially “confused and unstable, with rival groups competing for control. Cross currents of communism, Arab and Iraqi nationalism, anti-Westernism and the ‘positive neutrality’ of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic have been affecting the country.”
32 After the rebellion, Qasim assumed the position of prime minister.33 By March 1959, Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact and created alliances with left-leaning countries and communist countries, including the Soviet Union.34 Because of their agreement with the USSR, Qasim’s government allowed the formation of an Iraqi Communist Party.35

Global Perceptions: Abd al-Karim Qasim’s suddent Iraqi coup took Washington aback. CIA Director Allen Dulles told President Eisenhower that he believed it was the hand of Nasser that implemented this coup. Additionally, Dulles feared that a chain reaction would occur throughout the Middle East, where the governments of Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran would be doomed.36Superscript text The Hashemite monarchy represented a reliable ally that the Western world could rely on thwarting Soviet advances. Naturally, the Coup in Iraq, which was in part inspired by Nasser, compromised Washington’s position in the Middle East.

Distribution of power

In the wake of the successful coup, the new Iraqi Republic was to be headed by a Revolutionary Council[16]. At its head was a three man sovereignty council, composed of members of Iraq’s three main communal/ethnic groups. Muhammad Mahdi Kubbah represented the Shi’a population; Khalid al-Naqshabandi the Kurds; and Najib al Rubay’i the Sunni population[17]. This tripartite was to assume the role of the Presidency. A cabinet was created, composed of a broad spectrum of Iraqi political movements: this included two National Democratic Party representatives, one member of al-Istiqlal, one Ba’ath representative and one Marxist[18].

Qasim was to reap the greatest reward, being named Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Arif was to become Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, as well as deputy Commander in Chief[19].

Thirteen days after the revolution, a temporary constitution was announced, pending a permanent organic law to be promulgated after a free referendum. According to the document, Iraq was a republic and a part of the Arab nation whilst the official state religion was listed as Islam. Powers of legislation were vested in the Council of Ministers, with the approval of the Sovereignty Council, whilst executive function was also vested in the Council of Ministers[20]

Iraq under Qasim

Power struggles

Despite the encouraging tones of the temporary constitution, the new government descended into an autocracy with Qasim at its head. The genesis of Qasim’s elevation to ‘Sole Leader’ began with a schism between himself and his fellow conspirator Arif. Despite one of the major goals of the revolution being to join the pan-Arabism movement and practice qawmiyah policies, the corrupting influence of power soon began to modify the views of Qasim. Qasim, reluctant to tie himself too closely to Nasser’s Egypt- and warned by various groups within Iraq (notably the communists) that such an action would be dangerous- instead found himself echoing the views of his predecessor, Said, by adopting a wataniyah policy of ‘Iraq First’[21][22]

Qasim’s change of policy aggravated his relationship with Arif. The latter, despite being the subordinate of Qasim, had gained great prestige as the perpetrator of the coup itself. Arif capitalised upon his newfound position by partaking in a series of widely publicised public orations, during which he strongly advocated union with the UAR, making numerous positive references to Nasser, while remain noticeably less full of praise for Qasim. Arif’s criticism of Qasim became gradually more profound leading the latter to take steps to counter his potential rivalry. Qasim began to foster relations with the Iraqi communist party, who attempted to mobilise support in favour of his policies. He also moved to counter Arif’s base of power by removing him from his position as deputy commander of the armed forces. On September 30 Qasim removed Arif’s status as Deputy Prime Minister and as Minister of the Interior[23]. Qasim attempted to remove Arif’s disruptive influence by offering him a role as Iraqi ambassador to the FDR (West Germany) in Bonn. Arif refused, and in a confrontation with Qasim on October 11, Arif is purported to have removed his pistol in the presence of Qasim; although whether it was to assassinate Qasim or commit suicide is a source of debate[24][25]. No blood was shed, and Arif agreed to depart for Bonn. However his sojourn to Germany was brief, as he attempted to return to Baghdad on November 4 amid rumours of an attempted coup against Qasim. He was promptly arrested, and charged on November 5 with attempted assassination of Qasim and attempts to overthrow the regime: he was sentenced to life imprisonment[23].

Although the threat of Arif had been negated, another took its place shortly afterwards in the unlikely form of Rashid Ali, the exiled former Prime Minister who had fled Iraq in 1941. Ali attempted to foster support amongst officers who were unhappy at Qasim’s policy reversals. A coup was planned for December 9, but Qasim was prepared and instead had the conspirators arrested on the same date. Ali was imprisoned and sentenced to death, although this was never carried out[26].

The Mosul uprising and subsequent unrest

Qasim’s growing ties with the communists served to provoke rebellion in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul by Arab nationalists in charge of military units. Qasim in an attempt to intimidate any potential coup had encouraged a communist backed Peace Partisans rally in Mosul on March 6 1959. Some 250,000 Peace Partisans and communists thronged Mosul’s streets by March 6[27], and although the rally passed peacefully, on March 7, skirmishes broke out amongst communists and nationalists. This degenerated into a miniature civil war in the days following. Although the rebellion was crushed by the military, it had a number of adverse affects that effected Qasim’s position. First, it increased the power of the communists. Second, it encouraged the Ba’ath Party’s (which had been steadily growing since the July 14 coup) ideas that the only way of halting the engulfing tide of communism was to assassinate Qasim. Such an attempt was carried out on October 7 1959 by a group of Ba’athists, including a young Saddam Hussein[28][29], it failed.

The growing influence of communism was felt throughout 1959. A communist sponsored purge of the armed forces was carried out in the wake of the Mosul revolt. The Iraqi cabinet began to shift towards the radical-left as several communist sympathisers gained posts in the cabinet. Iraq’s foreign policy began to reflect this communist influence, as Qasim removed Iraq from the Baghdad Pact on March 24, and later fostered closer ties with the USSR, including extensive economic agreements[30]. However communist successes encouraged attempts to expand on their position. The communists attempted to replicate their success at Mosul in similar fashion at Kirkuk. A rally was called for July 14: intended to intimidate conservative elements, it instead resulted in widespread bloodshed. Qasim consequently cooled relations with the communists signaling a reduction (although by no means a cessation) of their influence in the Iraqi government.

Qasim’s position was to be further weakened in 1961, when Kurdish separatists under the leadership of Mustafa Barzani chose to wage war against the Iraqi establishment. Although relations between Qasim and the Kurds had initially proved successful, relations had deteriorated by 1961, with the Kurds becoming openly critical of Qasim’s regime. Barzani had delivered an ultimatum to Qasim in August 1961 demanding an end to authoritarian rule; recognition of Kurdish autonomy; and restoration of democratic liberties[31]. Qasim’s response was to sanction a military campaign against Barzani’s peshmerga forces in September 1961. This proved to be a grave mistake, as the anti-insurgency campaign become a drain upon Iraqi resources as well as further undermining Qasim’s esteem within the officer classes[32]

Foreign policy failures

Qasim was to further undermine his rapidly deteriorating position with a series of foreign policy blunders. In 1959 Qasim was to antagonize Iran with a series of territory disputes, most notably over the Arabic speaking Khuzistan region of Iran[33], and the division of the Shatt al-Arab waterway between south eastern Iraq and western Iran[34].

In June 1961, Qasim was to re-ignite the Iraqi claim over the state of Kuwait. On June 19, Qasim announced in a press conference that Kuwait was a part of Iraq, and claimed its territory. Kuwait, however, had signed a recent defence treaty with the British, who came to her assistance with troops to stave off any attack on July 1. This was subsequently replaced by an Arab force (assembled by the Arab League) in September, where they remained until 1962[35][36].

The result of Qasim’s foreign policy blunders was to further weaken his position. Iraq was isolated from the Arab world for her part in the Kuwait incident, whilst she had antagonised her powerful neighbour Iran. Western attitudes towards Qasim had also cooled, due to these incidents and his implied communist sympathies. Iraq was isolated internationally, and Qasim became increasingly isolated domestically, to his considerable detriment.


Rise of the Ba’ath

Qasim’s position was fatally weakened by 1962. His overthrow took place the following year. The perpetrators were the Ba’ath party, an Arab nationalist movement with a close knit structure and ties within the military. The Ba’ath had initially benefited from the 1958 Revolution, gaining increased support in its wake. The group had suffered after 1959 however due to the failure of the assassination attempt upon Qasim. This weakened their membership when the perpetrators were either imprisoned or exiled. The group also became disillusioned with Nasser after the establishment of the UAR, leading to splits within the group.

By 1962, however, the Ba’ath was once again on the rise as a new group of leaders under the tutelage of Ali Salih al-Sa’di began to re-invigorate the party. The Ba’ath Party was now able to plot Qasim’s removal.

The 8th February Coup

Qasim’s removal took place on February 8 1963, the 14th day of Ramadan and therefore called the 14 Ramadan Coup. The coup had been in its planning stages since 1962, and several attempts had been planned, only to be abandoned for fear of discovery. The coup had been initially planned for January 18, but was moved to January 25, then February 8, after Qasim gained knowledge of the proposed attempt and arrested some of the plotters.

The coup began in the early morning of February 8 1963, when the Communist air force chief, Jalal al-Awqati was assassinated and tank units occupied the Abu Ghrayb radio station. A bitter two day struggle unfolded with heavy fighting between the Ba’athist conspirators and pro-Qasim forces. Qasim took refuge in the Ministry of Defence, where fighting became particularly heavy. Communist sympathisers took to the streets to resist the coup adding to the high casualties. On February 9, Qasim eventually offered his surrender in return for safe passage out of the country. His request was refused, and on the afternoon of the 9th, Qasim was executed on the orders of the newly formed National Council of the Revolutionary Command (NCRC)[37]. His successor was his fellow July 14 conspirator, Arif.

Effects of Qasim’s rule

The 1958 Revolution can be heralded as a watershed in Iraqi politics, not just because of its obvious political implications (e.g. the abolition of monarchy, republicanism, and paving the way for Ba’athist rule) but due to domestic reform. Despite its shortcomings, Qasim’s rule helped to implement a number of positive domestic changes that benefitted Iraqi society.

Land reform

The revolution brought about sweeping changes in the Iraqi agrarian sector. Reformers dismantled the old feudal structure of rural Iraq: for example the 1933 'Law of Rights and Duties of Cultivators' and the Tribal Disputes Code were replaced, benefiting Iraq’s peasant population and ensuring a fairer process of law. The Agrarian Reform Law (September 30 1958[38]) attempted a large-scale redistribution of landholdings and placed ceilings on ground rents; the land was more evenly distributed amongst peasants who, due to the new rent laws, received around 55% to 70% of their crop[39]. Despite the positive intentions of the Agrarian Reform Law, its implementation proved relatively unsuccessful due to disagreements between the lower classes and the landed middle classes, as well as a time consuming implementation.

Women’s rights

Qasim attempted to bring about greater equality for women in Iraq. In December 1959 he promulgated a significant revision of the personal status code; particularly that regulating family relations[40]. Polygamy was outlawed, and minimum ages for marriage were also outlined, with 18 being the minimum age (except for special dispensation when it could be lowered by the court to 16[41]). Women were also protected from arbitrary divorce. The most revolutionary reform was a provision in article 74 giving women equal rights in matters of inheritance[42]. The laws applied to Sunni and Shi’a alike, yet despite their liberal intent they received much opposition and did not survive Qasim’s government.

Social reform

Education was greatly expanded under the Qasim regime. The education budget was raised from approximately 13 million Dinars in 1958 to 24 million Dinar in 1960 and enrollment was increased. Attempts were also made in 1959 and 1961 to introduce economic planning to benefit social welfare; investing in housing, healthcare and education, whilst reforming the agrarian Iraqi economy along an industrial model. However these changes were not truly implemented before Qasim’s removal.

Qasim was also responsible for the nationalisation of the Iraqi oil industry. Public Law 80 dispossessed the IPC of 99.5% of its concession territory in Iraq and placed it in the hands of the newly formed Iraq National Oil Company taking many of Iraq’s oilfields out of foreign hands[43].

See also


  • Barnett, Michael N.; Dialogues in Arab Politics Columbia University Press 1998
  • Choueiri, Youssef M.; Arab Nationalism: A History Blackwell 2000
  • Cleveland, William L.; A History of the Modern Middle East Westview Press 1994
  • Dawisha, Adeed: Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair Princeton University Press 2003
  • Kedourie, Elie; Politics in the Middle East Oxford University Press 1997
  • Lewis, Roger and Owen, Roger (editors); A Revolutionary Year: The Middle East in 1958 I.B. Tauris 2002
  • Marr, Phebe; The Modern History of Iraq Longman/ Westview 1985
  • Polk, William R.; Understanding Iraq I.B. Tauris 2006
  • Simons, Geoff; Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam Macmillan 1994
 1.Hunt, Courtney. The History of Iraq. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2005. page 72.
 2.Eppel, Michael. “The Elite, the Effendiyya, and the Growth of Nationalism and Pan-Arabism in Hashemite Iraq, 1921-1958.” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 30.2 (1998). page 233.
 3.Eppel “The Elite, the Effendiyya, and the Growth of Nationalism and Pan-Arabism in Hashemite Iraq, 1921-1958.” page 233.
 4. “The Elite, the Effendiyya, and the Growth of Nationalism and Pan-Arabism in Hashemite Iraq, 1921-1958.”  page 233.
 5. “The Elite, the Effendiyya, and the Growth of Nationalism and Pan-Arabism in Hashemite Iraq, 1921-1958.” page 233.
 6. Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. page 115. 
 7. Hunt page 73.
 8. Hunt page 73.
 9. Tripp page 124.
 10. Tripp page 125.
 11. Tripp page 134.
 12. “The Elite, the Effendiyya, and the Growth of Nationalism and Pan-Arabism in Hashemite Iraq, 1921-1958.” page 74.
 13. Tripp page 117.
 14. Tripp page 134
 15. Tripp page 134
 16. Hunt page 75.
 17. Hunt page 75.
 18. Hunt page 75.
 19. Hunt page 75.
 20. Hunt page 75.
 21. Tripp page 142.
 22. Hunt page 75.
 23. Tripp page 142, Hunt page 76.
 24. Eppel, Michael. Iraq from Monarchy to Tyranny. Tallanassee: University Press Florida, 2004. page 151.
 25. Eppel. Iraq from Monarchy to Tyranny. page 152.
 26. Eppel. Iraq from Monarchy to Tyranny. page 151.
 27. Eppel. Iraq from Monarchy to Tyranny. page 151.
 28. Eppel. Iraq from Monarchy to Tyranny. page 151.
 29. Eppel. Iraq from Monarchy to Tyranny. page 151.
 30. Eppel. Iraq from Monarchy to Tyranny. page 151.
 31. Eppel. Iraq from Monarchy to Tyranny. page 151.
 32. Hailey, Foster. “Iraqi Army Units Opposing Kassim Rebel in Oil Area.” The New York Times. 9 Mar 1959: L3.
 33. Tripp page 145.
 34. Hunt page 76.
 35. Hunt page 76.
 36. Lesch, David W. The Middle East and the United States Third Edition: A Historical and Political Reassessment. Boulder: Westview Press, 2003. page 173.


  1. ^ Ibid, page 108
  2. ^ Ibid, page 109
  3. ^ Barnett, Michael L.; “Dialogues in Arab Politics”, page 127
  4. ^ Ibid, page 128
  5. ^ Ibid, page 129
  6. ^ Ibid, page 131
  7. ^ Simons, Geoff; “Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam”, page 217
  8. ^ Ibid
  9. ^ a b Marr, Phebe; “The Modern History of Iraq”, page 156
  10. ^ Ibid
  11. ^ Ibid
  12. ^ Ibid, page 157
  13. ^ Simons, Geoff; “Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam”, page 218
  14. ^ Ibid
  15. ^ “At first he [Said] was buried in a shallow grave but later the body was dug up and repeatedly ran over by municipal buses ‘until in the words of a horror-struck eyewitness, it resembled bastourma, and Iraqi sausage meat.” Simons, Geoff; “Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam”, page 218
  16. ^ Ibid, page 220
  17. ^ Marr, Phebe; “The Modern History of Iraq”, page 158
  18. ^ Ibid
  19. ^ Ibid
  20. ^ Ibid
  21. ^ Polk, William R.; “Understanding Iraq”, page 111
  22. ^ Simons, Geoff; “Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam”, page 221
  23. ^ a b Marr, Phebe; “The Modern History of Iraq”, page 160
  24. ^ Ibid
  25. ^ Kedourie, Elie; “Politics in the Middle East”, page 318
  26. ^ Ibid
  27. ^ Ibid, page 163
  28. ^ Ibid, page 164
  29. ^ Polk, William R.; “Understanding Iraq”, page 113
  30. ^ Marr, Phebe; “The Modern History of Iraq”, page 164
  31. ^ Ibid, page 178
  32. ^ Polk, William R.; “Understanding Iraq”, page 114
  33. ^ Ibid
  34. ^ Marr, Phebe; “The Modern History of Iraq”, page 180
  35. ^ Ibid, page 181
  36. ^ Simons, Geoff; “Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam”, pages 223-225
  37. ^ Marr, Phebe; “The Modern History of Iraq”, pages 184-5
  38. ^ Ibid, page 170
  39. ^ Ibid
  40. ^ Ibid, page 172
  41. ^ Ibid
  42. ^ Ibid
  43. ^ Ibid, page 174

External references


Got something to say? Make a comment.
Your name
Your email address