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14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS

Symbol of the 14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division
Active 28 April 1943 - April 1945
Country Nazi Germany Nazi Germany
Branch Flag Schutzstaffel.svg Waffen SS
Type Infantry
Size Division
Engagements World War II
Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive
Slovak National Uprising
Vienna Offensive
Walther Schimana
Fritz Freitag

The 14th Grenadier Division of the Waffen SS (popular named SS-Galizien, later 1st Ukrainian) was a World War II German military formation during made up of volunteers initially from the region of Galicia. Ethnically it was made up mainly of volunteers of Ukrainian ethnic background from Galicia[1 ] but also incorporated Dutch volunteers and officers[2] of Slovaks and Czechs[1 ][3] and incorporated Dutch volunteers and officers[2]. Formed in 1943, it was largely destroyed in the battle of Brody, reformed, and saw action in Slovakia, Yugoslavia and Austria before being renamed the first division of the Ukrainian National Army and surrendering to the Western Allies by 10 May 1945.



After World War I and the dissolution of Austria–Hungary, the territory of eastern Galicia, populated by a Ukrainian majority but with a large Polish minority, was incorporated into Poland following a Polish–Ukrainian War. During this conflict the Polish advantage in trained soldiers, particularly officers, played a significant role. Between the wars, the political allegiances of Ukrainians in eastern Galicia were divided between moderate national democrats and the more extreme Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. The latter group itself splintered into two factions, the less extreme OUN-M led by Andriy Melnyk with close ties to German intelligence (Abwehr) and the more extreme OUN-B led by Stepan Bandera. When Poland was divided between Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939, the territory of eastern Galicia was annexed to Soviet Ukraine. In 1941 it was conquered by Germany.

Ukrainian leaders of various political persuasions recognised the need for a trained armed force. The German had earlier considered the formation of an armed force made up of Slavic people, but they decided this to be unacceptable as they regarded Slavs as subhumans. At the beginning of 1943, growing losses[4] inclined Nazi leaders to alter their initial opinions.

Organizing the Division

The idea to organize a division of volunteers from Galicia was proposed by the German Governor of District Galicia, Dr. Otto von Wächter. He suggested creation of a Waffen-SS division composed of Galician volunteers and designed for regular combat on the Eastern Front. The creation of 14th Voluntary Division SS Galizien was announced in April 1943 at huge ceremonies throughout Galicia. At least 50 documents including comtemporary newspaper clippings, radio broadcasts and speeches etc record the date of 28 April. By June 1943 the first phase of recruitment had taken place. Initially wachter's, which he was certain would be supported by Ukrainian circles was rejected. After travelling to Berlin, Wächter was able to get support, however Himmler made the stipulation that the division could not be only made up uniquely of Ukrainians, but Galicians[5]. The terms "Ukrainian", "Ukraine", could not be used when addressing the division[6]. David Marples suggests that the division was titled "Galicia" either to ensure stricter German control or avoid direct use of inflammatory "Ukrainian".[7]

Poster calling for volunteers to the Galizien Division The poster reads, "Stand up and fight against Bolshevism in the ranks of the Galician Division"

Wächter approached the Ukrainian Central Committee, a nonpolitical social welfare organization headed by Volodymyr Kubiyovych which supported the idea of the formation of the division[8] The Ukrainian Catholic Church supported the embeddeded clerics in the division.

Although the Germans made no political concessions, the division was unique among SS divisions in that its oath of allegiance to Hitler was conditional on the fight against Bolshevism and in the fact that Christian (mostly Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian Orthodox) chaplains were integrated into the units and allowed to function (in the German Army, only the Sturmbrigade Wallonien had a minimal clerical presence). The latter condition was instituted at the insistence of the division's organizers in order to minimize the risk of Nazi demoralization amongst the soldiers.[9] Indeed, Nazi indoctrination was absent within the Division.[10]

The creation of foreign SS units had been carried out previously in the name of fighting against communism; with French, Dutch, Latvian, Estonian, Croatian, and Belarusian units, among others, had been created.[11] The creation of a Ukrainian SS division was perceived by many in Ukraine as a step towards the attainment of Ukrainian independence and attracted many volunteers.

The Division's Support

The formation of the division was encouraged by the Melnyk faction of the OUN and discouraged by the Bandera faction. The Division's prime organizer and highest ranking Ukrainian officer, Dmytro Paliiv, had been a leader of a small legal political party in the Second Polish Republic and many of his colleagues had been members of the pre-war moderate, left-leaning democratic UNDO movement [12][nb 1] that before the war had been opposed to the authoritarian Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. The Division was also strongly supported by Andriy Melnyk's moderate faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, who saw it as a counterweight to the extremist Banderist-dominated UPA. The Division also obtained moral support from officers of the exiled Polish-allied Ukrainian National Republic such as General Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko.[10] It also had the support of both the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Among its members was a son of Mstyslav Skrypnyk, the Orthodox Bishop of Kiev.[10]

The Bandera faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B) strongly opposed the idea of creating the division, in part because it was an organization outside of its control, and claimed in its propaganda that the division was to be used by the Germans as cannon fodder. [nb 2] Nevertheless, it did not interfere in its formation and once the Division was formed it sent some of its members, a number of whom would obtain prominent positions, into the Division in order for them to gain military training and to prevent it from completely getting out of their hands. Despite this infiltration, Bandera's OUN failed to gain control over the Division.[10]

Divisonal Chaplain

The Division



The Division SS "Galizien" was commanded by German and Austrian officers [13] who were delegated to the division.

The divisional commander was first SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Walter Schimana (until October 1943), then from 20 November 1943 SS-Brigadeführer Fritz Freitag,[13] while Sturmbannführer Wolf Heike was the chief of staff. All regimental commanders were Germans. Standartenführer, Rudolf Pannier commanded the 31st Waffen-Grenadier Regiment der SS .

The soldiers

SS Galizien Recruitment Poster in German and Ukrainian, General Government, (Distrikt Krakau, Kreishauptmannschaften Sanok), May 1943.

Originally soldiers were selected who were no shorter than 1.65 metres, however this requirement was later lowered to 1.63 metres[14] in height and between the ages of 18 and 35.[14] Members of the OUN Bandera faction were prohibited from joining[14] but infiltrated the division in significant numbers nonetheless. The uniform was a standard German Wehrmacht uniform. On the right shoulder was a depiction of the Galician Lion and three crowns. The inclusion of the Ukrainian Trident was not allowed. The Galician Lion was a regional symbol rather than a national one. Blue and Yellow Ukrainian national colours were incorporated into the design[14].

As of 23 July 1943 the Recruiting Commission had checked 26,436 inductees. Of these only 3,281 were found physically fit for duty in the division.[15]

Hauptfuhrer K. Schultz reported to Berlin the following:

  1. 80,000 volunteers had enlisted
  2. 53,000 had been accepted
  3. 42,000 had been added from the lists of conscripts.
  4. 27,000 had been accepted
  5. 1,400 had inquired about joining if they could be released form other duties.
  6. 25,600 had received draft documents.
  7. 19,047 of the conscripted from work.
  8. 13,245 - actual number of new recruits
  9. 1,487 - released because of health
  10. 11,578 - are incarcerated in camps[16].

A sober analysis of these figures reveals that ultimately of 80,000 men who enlisted approx 3/4 could not serve. It should be noted that there were never enough 'Volunteers' for the formation so the Germans introduced a mandatory requirement for certain categories to enlist including • All those born in the years 1920 to 1925 (i.e. those aged 18 –23) • All non-commissioned officers up to the age of 40, who have served in any army whatsoever. • All officers and those cadets who have graduated from military academies but have not yet obtained a commission, as well as military officials up to the age of 45 • Doctors and veterinary surgeons up to the age of 45 In the case of university students near the end of their courses the obligation to register was to be deferred until after completion of their course.

Of the total number who enlisted only 27,000 were passed as medically fit and of these the best 11,578 reported for and actually began their training. With the exception of 6,150 who were due to be called up in November, 62,272 men were unable or unwilling to serve. As well as those rejected on medical grounds, the report also highlighted the problem of the large number of draft dodgers who signed the enlistment forms and received the summons but declined to report to the drafting boards. Dr. Schulze attributed this phenomenon to the fact that the Ukrainians were unwilling to serve in an SS formation and the great influence of the OUN on the youth who preferred to serve in UPA.

These facts are continuously ignored by those who continually claim "80,000 men volunteered", giving the erroneous impression that the Division was widely supported and over-subscribed, whereas the figures quoted above demonstrate the exact opposite to be the case.

Hans Frank and Dr. Hofstetter of SS Galizien enter a Ukrainian Greek Catholic church prior to the installation of volunteers in Sanok, 1943.
SS Galizien volunteers march on Kosciuszko Street in Sanok, 1943 May

In Action

The division was sent to the front at the beginning of 1944. Although it lacked combat experience, it was well-equipped and most of its members had undergone more rigorous training than the average German drafted into the Wehrmacht in 1943–44.[9]

Anti-partisans actions with Kampfgruppe Beyersdorff

In early February 1944 the Division received an order to form 2 battle groups which were used together with the SS Kampfgruppe Beyersdorff (a German combat formation) in actions against Soviet and Polish partisans. The first group operated in the Zamosc area together with the 5th Regiment while the second group operated in the Brody area with the 4th regiment.[17] The SS Kampsgruppe performed its duty well enough that it earned the rare praise of German Field Marshal Walter Model.[18]


In July the division was sent to the area of Brody, where heavy combat was under way, and attached to the 13th Army Corps.[9] Together with six under-strength German infantry divisions, the Galicia Division was responsible for holding a frontage of approximately 80 kilometres.[9] On 8 July, the 13th Corps was transferred to the 1st Panzer Army.[9] The Galician Division was placed in reserve. Deployed at Brody were the Division's 29th, 30th, 31st regiments, a fusilier and engineering battalion, and its artillery regiment. The 14th SS Field Replacement Battalion was deployed fifteen miles behind the other units.[19]

On 13 July, Soviet forces under the command of Marshal Ivan Konev launched their attack. By the next day, they routed a German division to the north of the 13th Corps and swept back an attempted German counter attack. On 15 July, the 1st and 8th Panzer Divisions along with the Galicia Division bore the brunt of a fierce assault by the Soviet Second Air Army, who in only a five hour period flew 3,288 aircraft sorties and dropped 102 tons of bombs on them as they attempted a counter attack.[20] On 18 July, the Division's Field Replacement Battalion was destroyed with its remnants fleeing west, whilst the remainder of 13th Corps, consisting of over 30,000 German and Ukrainian soldiers, was surrounded by the Soviets within the Brody pocket.[19]

Within the pocket, the Galician troops were tasked with defending the eastern perimeter near the castle and town of Pidhirtsy and Olesko.[19] The Soviets sought to collapse the Brody pocket by focusing their attack of what they perceived to be its weakest point, the relatively inexperienced Galician Division, and on 19 July attacked.[19] The 29th and 30th regiments of the Division, supported by the Division's artillery regiment, put up unexpectedly fierce resistance. Pidhirtsy changed hands several times before the Galicians were finally overwhelmed by the late afternoon, and at Olesko a major Soviet attack using T-34 tanks was repulsed by the Division's Fusilier and Engineer battalions.[19]

On 20 July, the German divisions within the pocket attempted a breakout which failed despite early successes.[19] The Division's 31st regiment was destroyed in fighting. A second German breakout attempt that began at 1:00 A.M. on 21 July ended in failure. Ten miles to the west of the pocket, however, a German Panzergrenadier Regiment broke through Soviet lines and briefly established contact with the Brody pocket, resulting in the rescue of approximately 3,400 soldiers, including approximately 400 Galicians, before being repulsed.[19] By the end of that day, in the face of overwhelming Soviet attacks, the 14th Division as a whole disintegrated.[19] Its German commander, Fritz Freitag, resigned his command and decreed that everyone would be on their own during the breakout. He and his staff formed their own battle group and headed south, abandoning the Division.[19] Some Ukrainian assault groups remained intact, others joined German units, and others fled or melted away. The Ukrainian 14th SS Fusilier battalion, still intact, came to form the rearguard of what was left of the entire 13th Corps. Holding the town of Bilyi Kamin, it enabled units or stragglers to escape to the south and was able to withstand several Soviet attempts to overwhelm it. By the evening of 21 July, it remained the only intact unit north of the Bug river.[19]

In the early morning of 22 July, the 14th Fusilier battalion abandoned Bilye Kamin. The Brody pocket was now only 4–5 miles long and wide. The German and Galician soldiers were instructed to attack with everything they had by moving forward until they broke through or were destroyed.[19] Fighting was fierce and desperate. The German and Ukrainian soldiers surging south were able to overwhelm the Soviet 91st independent tank brigade "Proskurov" and its infantry support, and to escape by the hundreds. The remaining pocket collapsed by the evening of 22 July.[19]

Despite the severity of the fighting, the division maintained its discipline and most of its members were ultimately able to break out of the encirclement. Of the approximately 11,000 Galician soldiers deployed at Brody, about 3,000 were able to almost immediately re-enter the division. Aprrox 7,400 were posted as "Missing in combat".

Soviet statistics give the German losses at Brody as 2 Generals, 30,000 men killed and 17,000 captured (which was more than the number in the entire Corps)[21].

It has been mistakenly suggested that the losses for the 14th SS Division in Brody ran at 73%, higher than the rest of the Corps. The other battle-hardened German units which had formed XIII.A.K. produced similar casualty reports. In the region of 5,000 men of Korpsabteilung 'C' which formed the spearhead of the breakout forces escaped the encirclement with sidearms and without vehicles, horses and other weapons supplies and equipment. A total of 73 officers and 4,059 ncos and men were listed as killed or missing. By comparison, the 361st Infantry Division which deployed fewer troops at the beginning of the battle than the Galician Division and together with it formed the rearguard, suffered losses that equated directly with it. In the period between 16–22 July, it sustained almost as many casualties with total losses amounting to 6,310 officers and men (dead, missing or wounded). The necessary manpower required to rebuild this and the other German formations was not available and they were subsequently disbanded and the survivors incorporated into other divisions. As for XIII.A.K., the final report of the Corp's liquidation commission (applicable to its regular army units only) recorded 21,766 killed or missing in action, which together with the 7,000 killed or missing men from the Galician Division brings to the total lost to approx. 29,000. This figure corresponds with General Lange's own estimate of a total of 25-30,000 killed in the encirclement. On the other hand the recently declassified secret Soviet General Staff report states that during the course of the battle their forces destroyed more than 30,000 soldiers and officers, 85 tanks and self propelled guns, over 500 guns of various calibres, 476 mortars, 705 machine guns, 12,000 rifles and submachine guns, 5,843 vehicles, 183 tractors and trailers and 2,430 motorcycles and bicycles. It also claims that over 17,000 soldiers and officers were taken prisoner, 28 tanks and self-propelled guns were captured, as were over 500 guns of various calibres, more than 600 mortars, 483 machine guns, 11,000 rifles and sub-machine guns, over 1,500 vehicles, 98 tractors and trailers, 376 motorcycles and bicycles, in excess of 3,000 horses and 28 warehouses full of military goods. An estimated total number of survivors of all XIII.A.K. units has been given by the adjutant of the 349th Infantry Division as 15,000 officers and men, while a slightly lower figure of 12,000 was subsequently given by Oberst Wilck.

The 3000 survivors of the Galician Division were used as a nucleus for the rebuilt 14th SS division. Those that were captured were either executed or sent to slave-labour camps. Approximately 2,000 + are thought to have joined up with the UIA[22].

The Division in Slovakia

The Germans rebuilt the division over several months using reserve units. From the end of September 1944, the division was used against the Slovak National Uprising.

The first unit, the 29th regiment with auxiliary units, arrived 28 September 1944. Eventually all Divisional units was transferred to Slovakia. From 15 October 1944 they formed two Kampfgruppe, Wittenmayer (which included 3 battalions) and Wildner. The Division acted against rebels together with the 18th SS Volunteer Panzer Grenadier Division Horst Wessel, the SS-Sturmbrigade Dirlewanger SS, the Vlasov detachment and other SS and SD formations until 5 February 1945 .[17] Jan Stanislav, the director of the National Uprising Museum in Slovakia, denied that the Division or that Ukrainians took part in any brutalities committed against the Slovak people at this time.[23]

Anti-partisans actions on the Slovenia-Austrian border

In the end of January 1945, it was moved to Slovenia, where from the end of February until the end of March 1945, it together with other SS and SD formations fought Yugoslav Partisans in the Styria and Carinthia (province) areas near the Austrian-Slovenian border.[24] While fighting the Communist partisans, the Division maintained friendly relations with Serbia's anti-communist Chetnik guerrillas. During this time, the Division absorbed the 31 SD Schutzmannschafts Battalion, also known as the Ukrainian Self Defense legion.[25 ] When on 31 March Soviet forces commenced an attack from Hungary into Austria that ruptured the German front, the Division was ordered to advance northward to Gleichenberg in a desperate attempt to halt the Soviet advance.[9]


From 1 April until the end of the war, with a strength of 14,000 combat troops and 8,000 soldiers in a Training and Replacement Regiment, the division fought against the Red Army in the region of Graz in Austria [26] where in early April it seized the castle and village of Gleichenberg from Soviet forces (including elite Soviet airborne troops from the 3rd Guards Airborne Division) during a counterattack and on 15 April repulsed a Soviet counterattack. The division at this time maintained a 13-km front.[9][27] During one critical situation, Freitag became so alarmed by the developments at the front, that in the presence of the commander of the 1st Cavalry Corps General de Kavallerie Harteneck, he reacted instinctively and announced his abdication as Divisional commander and responsibility for its performance in action - as he had done at Brody. General Harteneck refused Freitag's resignation and ordered him to remain at his post. Due to his performance during the battles surrounding Gleichenberg, Waffen-Obersturmführer Ostap Czuczkewycz was awarded the Iron Cross, 1st class.[28] The Division suffered heavy casualties while in Austria, with an estimated 1,600 killed or wounded.[29]

1st Ukrainian Division UNA

On 17 March 1945, Ukrainian émigrés established the Ukrainian National Committee to represent the interests of Ukrainians to the Third Reich. Simultaneously, the Ukrainian National Army, commanded by general Pavlo Shandruk, was created. The Galician Division nominally became the 1st Division of the Ukrainian National Army, although the German Army's High command continued to list it as the Ukrainian 14th SS Grenadier Division in its order of battle.[30] The Division surrendered to British and US forces by 10 May 1945.[25 ]


The Ukrainian soldiers were interned in Rimini, Italy, in the area controlled by Polish II Corps forces. The UNA commander Pavlo Shandruk requested for a meeting with Polish general Władysław Anders in London, and asked him to protect the army against the deportation to Soviet Union. Despite the Soviet pressure, Anders managed to protect Ukrainian soldiers, as the former citizens of the Second Republic of Poland. This, together with the intervention of the Vatican saved its members from deportation to the USSR. Bishop Buchko of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church had appealed to Pope Pius XII to intervene on behalf of the Division, whom he described as “good Catholics and fervent anti-Communists”. Due to Vatican intervention, the British authorities changed the status of Division members from POW to surrendered enemy personnel[31] and the Polish II Corps declined their deportation to Soviet Union. 176 soldiers of the division joined Władysław Anders's Polish army.[32][33] In 1947, former soldiers of SS “Galizien” were allowed to emigrate to Canada and to the United Kingdom.[34][35] The names of about 7,100 former soldiers of SS “Galizien” admitted to the UK have been stored in the so called "Rimini List".

Accusations of War atrocities

Although the Galizien Division has not been found guilty of any war crimes by any war tribunal or comision, numerous unproven accusations of impropriety have been leveled at the Division and at particular members of the Division from a variety of sources. It is difficult to determine the extent of war criminality among members of the Division.[36] If prior service in Nazi police units is a measure of criminality, only a small number were recruited from established police detachments. Among those who had transferred from police detachments, some had been members of a coastal defence unit that had been stationed in France, while others came from two police battalions that had been formed in the spring of 1943, too late to have participated in the murder of Ukraine's Jews. According to Howard Margolian there is no evidence that these units participated in anti-partisan operations or reprisals prior to their inclusion into the Division. However, a number of recruits, prior to their service within the police battalions are alleged to have been in Ukrainian irregular formations that are alleged to have committed atrocities against Jews and Communists. However, both the Canadian government and the Canadian Jewish Congress in their investigations of the Division failed to find hard evidence to support the notion that it was rife with criminal elements.[36]

It has been claimed that the Division destroyed several Polish communities in western Ukraine during the winter and spring of 1944.[37] Specifically, the 4th and 5th SS Police Regiments have been accused of murdering Polish civilians in the course of anti-guerrilla activity. At the time of their actions, these units were not under Divisional command but under separate German police command.[38]

Huta Pieniacka

For more information about the subject, see: Huta Pieniacka massacre

The Polish historian Motyka has stated that the Germans formed several SS police regiments (numbered from 4 to 8) which also had the territorial moniker "Galizien". These regiments later joined the Division in Spring 1944. Before being incorporated into the Division, two of them, the 4th and 5th regiments had participated in anti-guerrilla action at Huta Pieniacka on 23 February 1944 .[39] against Soviet and Polish Armia Krajowa partisans in the village of Huta Pieniacka, which had also served as a shelter for Jews.[38] as well as a fortified centre for Polish and Communist guerrillas [38] Huta Pieniacka was a Polish self-defence outpost against UPA[40] organized by inhabitants of the village and sheltering civilian refugees from Volhynia.[41] On 23 February 1944 two members of a detachment of the division were shot by armed self defense forces[42] Five days later, a mixed force of Ukrainian police, German soldiers and a contingent of forces from the SS Division, initially shelled the village with artillery before entering it and ordered all civilians to gather together. In the ensuing massacre, the village of Huta Pienacka was destroyed and between 500 [43] and 1,200 of the inhabitants were killed. Descriptions about what happened vary, depending on the source. According to Polish accounts, Polish civilians were locked in barns that were set on fire while those attempting to flee were brutally killed.[44] Sources differ on whether or not the perpetrators of the massacre were members of the Division at the time of this crime. The Institute of History of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences concluded that the 4th and 5th SS Police regiments did indeed kill the civilians within the village, but added that the grisly reports by alleged eyewitnesses in the Polish accounts were "difficult to believe" and noted that at the time of the massacre the regiments had been separated from the Division and were under German police rather than Divisional command.[45]

Timothy Snyder stated that the SS Division Galicia was responsible for the destruction of several Polish communities in Winter and Spring 1944 - the burning of Huta Pieniacka being best known. He also concluded that, despite these anti-Polish actions, the Division's role in the ethnic cleansing of Poles from western Ukraine was marginal.[37]

The weekly publication of the Polish Home Army – the Biuletyn Ziemi Czerwienskiej (Land of Czerwien Bulletin) for 26 March 1944 (№ 12) [216, p. 8] stated that during the Battle at Pidkamin and Brody, Soviet forces took a couple of hundred soldiers of the SS Galizien division prisoner. All were immediately shot in the Zbarazh castle on the basis that two weeks earlier they had apparently taken part in the killing of the Polish inhabitants of Huta Pienacka, and as a result could not be categorized as prisoners of war.

According to results of the investigation the action was committed by sub-unit of the SS Galizien Division. Witness accounts state that the SS Galizien were accompanied by Ukrainian nationalists (paramilitary unit under Włodzimierz Czerniawski's command),which included members of the UPA, as well as inhabitants of local villages who took property from the pacified households.[46]

On 2 March 1944, in the Division's newspaper and article appeared directed to the Ukrainian youth, written by the military commanders. They blamed all the murders of Poles and Ukrainians on Soviet partisans, and stated that "God forbid if among those who committed such inhuman acts, a Ukrainian hand was found, it will be forever excluded from the Ukrainian national community.[38]

Pidkamin and Palikrowy

For more information about the subject, see: Pidkamin massacre

The village of Pidkamin had a monastery where Poles sort shelter from the encroaching front. Around 2,000 people, the majority of whom were women and children, were seeking refuge there when the monastery was attacked on 11 March 1944, by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (unit under Maksym Skorupsky command), cooperating with an SS-Galizien unit.[47] The next day, 12 March the monastery was captured and civilians were murdered (at night the part of the population managed to escape). Other civilans were also killed in the town of Pidkamin from 12 to 16 March.[47]

Estimates of victims include 150 by Polish historian Grzegorz Motyka,[47], 250 according to the researchers of the Institute of History of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences[38].

For more information about the subject, see: Palikrowy massacre

Another sub-unit of SS-Galizien also participated in the execution of Polish civilians in Palykorovy located in Lviv oblast near Pidkamin (former Tarnopol Voivodeship). It is estimated that 365 ethnic Poles were murdered included woman and children.[47]

The Deschênes Commission

Former UPA and SS-Galizien members with children from the Ukrainian scout organization Plast pose for photos shortly after the Anniversary of the UPA ceremony in Berezhany, western Ukraine.

The Canadian "Commission of Inquiry on War Crimes" of October 1986, by the Honourable Justice Jules Deschênes concluded that:

The Galicia Division (14. Waffen grenadier division der SS [gal. #1]) should not be indicted as a group. The members of Galicia Division were individually screened for security purposes before admission to Canada. Charges of war crimes of Galicia Division have never been substantiated, either in 1950 when they were first preferred, or in 1984 when they were renewed, or before this Commission. Further, in the absence of evidence of participation or knowledge of specific war crimes, mere membership in the Galicia Division is insufficient to justify prosecution.


Division's names

The division during its short history changed its name a number of times, being known as:

  • SS Schuetzen Division "Galizien" or Galizien Division - from 30 July 1943 to August 1943 (during recruitment)
  • SS Freiwilligen Division "Galizien" - from August 1943 to 27 July 1944 (during training)
  • 14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (Galizische Nr.1) - from August 1944 to the Winter of 1944
  • 14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (ukrainische Nr.1)- from the Winter of 1944 to Spring 1945
  • 1st Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army - from Spring 1945.{{[5]}}


  • Waffen Grenadier Regiment der SS 29
  • Waffen-Grenadier Regiment der SS 30
  • Waffen-Grenadier Regiment der SS 31
  • Waffen-Artillery Regiment der SS 14
  • SS-Waffen-Füsilier-Battlion 14
  • SS-Waffen-Panzerjäger Company 14
  • SS-VolunteerFlak Battalion 14
  • Waffen Signals Battalion der SS 14
  • SS-Radfahr-Bataillon 14
  • Waffen-Pionier-Battalion der SS 14
  • SS-Versorgungs-Company 14
  • SS-Division-Signals Troop 14
  • SS Medical Battalion 14
  • SS-Veterinary Company 14
  • SS-Field post department 14
  • SS-War Reporter platoon 14|
  • SS Feldgendarmerie troop 14 [49]

See also


  1. ^ John A. Armstrong. (1963). Ukrainian Nationalism. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 18-19 Armstrong stated that the UNDO was "definitely democratic" in character, with varying amounts of Catholic, liberal, and socialist ideology embedded in its program"
  2. ^ Michael O. Logusz. (1997). Galicia Division: The Waffen-SS 14th Grenadier Division, 1943-1945. Altglen, PA: Schiffer Military History. Pg. 62. In an article entitled Around the SS Division Galiica published in the OUN-B's underground newspaper, the Division was claimed to be formed by the Germans in order to "deprive (the Ukrainian movement) of its active element" by "throwing it away as cannon fodder", emphasizing that the Division was to be "a typical colonial element, somewhat comparable to the British Army's Indian or New Zealand Divisions" and concluding that "today, we have no doubts that not a Ukrainian, but a German colonial element is forming. The attitude of the Ukrainian nation to it, as it was to all previous German experiments - negative."
  1. ^ a b Williamson Gordon, SS Hitler's Instrument of Terror, Amber books 1994, pp.123-4
  2. ^ a b Kleitmann K. G. Die Waffen SS; eine Dokumentation. Osnabreuck, Der Freiwillige, 1965 p. 183
  3. ^ IRikmenspoel Marc, Waffen SS Encyclopedia, Aberjona Press, 2004. p.90
  4. ^ Idzio, V. Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armiya - zhidno zi svidchenniamy nimetskykh ta radians'kykh arkhiviv, Lviv, 2005, p.82
  5. ^ a b Hajke Wolf-Dietrich The Ukrainian Division "Galicia" Toronto, 1970 p. 17
  6. ^ Idzio, V. Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armiya - zhidno zi svidchenniamy nimetskykh ta radians'kykh arkhiviv, Lviv, 2005, p.83
  7. ^ David R. Marples, Heroes and villains: creating national history in contemporary Ukraine, CEU Press, 2007, p. 184. [1]
  8. ^ Orest Subtelny. (1988). Ukraine: a History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. pg. 457
  9. ^ a b c d e f g Michael O. Logusz (1997). Galicia Division: The Waffen-SS 14th Grenadier Division, 1943-1945. Altglen, Pennsylvania: Schiffer Military History.  
  10. ^ a b c d John A. Armstrong. (1963). Ukrainian Nationalism. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 170-175
  11. ^ Mazower, Mark (2008) Hitler's Empire, pp 454-460
  12. ^ Timothy Snyder. (2004) The Reconstruction of Nations. New Haven: Yale University Press: pg. 218.
  13. ^ a b Mitcham, p162
  14. ^ a b c d * RUSSIAN:Chuyev, Sergei Ukrainskyj Legion - Moskva, 2006 p. 176
  15. ^ * RUSSIAN:Chuyev, Sergei Ukrainskyj Legion - Moskva, 2006 p. 178
  16. ^ Russian: Sergei Chuyev Чуев, С. - Украинский легион - М. 2006 с. 326
  17. ^ a b Michaelis, Rolf "Esten, Russen und Ukrainer in der Waffen-SS" ISBN 3938392258 Winkelried-Verlag 2006
  18. ^ Samual W. Mitchum Jr. (2007). The German Defeat in the East, 1944-1945. Stackpole Books, ISBN 0811733718. pg. 74.
  19. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Samuel W. Mitchum Jr. (2007). The German Defeat in the East, 1944-1945. Stackpole Books, ISBN 0811733718. pp. 74-86
  20. ^ cited in Michael Logusz's Galicia Division: the Waffen-SS 14th Grenadier Division, 1943-1945.
  21. ^ Landwehr Richard - Fighting for freedom - The Ukrainian Volunterr Division of the Waffen SS. Bebliophile Legion Books, (2nd edition), 1985. p. 84
  22. ^ Landwehr Richard - Fighting for freedom - The Ukrainian Volunterr Division of the Waffen SS. Bebliophile Legion Books, (2nd edition), 1985. p. 85
  23. ^ "Interview with Dr. Jan Stanislav May 2000". Archived from the original on 3 September 2009. Retrieved 3 September 2009.  
  24. ^ Karel Prusnik-Gasper, Gemsen auf der Lawine. Der Kдrntner Partisanenkampf (Ljubjana/Klagenfurt 1981)
  25. ^ a b WOLF-DIETRICH HEIKE.UKRAINISCHE DIVISION "GALIZIEN". Geschichte der Aufstellung und des Einsatzes (1943-1945) 1970
  26. ^ "ss galizien".  
  27. ^ On-line Ukrainian-language translation Of Wolf-Dietrich Heike's book THE UKRAINIAN DIVISION "GALICIA" THE HISTORY OF ITS FORMATION AND MILITARY OPERATIONS The English-language synapse mentions that the Division "distinguished itself" and maintained a sector of the front until German capitulation
  28. ^ Michael Melnyk. (2007). To Battle: The Formation and History of the 14. Gallician SS Volunteer Division. Helion and Company. ISBN 1874622191 pg. 262. Cited from Personal-Akte A3343-SSO-133 (ff. 25-26) NA.
  29. ^ Michael Melnyk. (2007). To Battle: The Formation and History of the 14. Gallician SS Volunteer Division. Helion and Company. ISBN 1874622191 pg. 268
  30. ^ Gosztony, Peter, Endkampf an der Donau 1944/45, Wien: Molden Taschenbuch Verlag, 1978. ISBN 3-217-05126-2
  31. ^ Howard Margolian. (2000). Unauthorized Entry: The Truth about Nazi War Criminals in Canada, 1946-1956. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000. ISBN 0-8020-4277-5. pg. 135
  32. ^ "DYWIZJA SS "GALIZIEN"". Instytut Pamięci Narodowej. 2001.  
  33. ^ "Personnel". [Galicia Division .com]. 2009.  
  34. ^ "Ukrainian SS 'Galicia' Division allowed to settle in Britain". UK National archives. 2005-08.  
  35. ^ "War criminals: The Deschenes Commission". [Library of Parliament (Canada)]. 16 October 1998.  
  36. ^ a b Howard Margolian. (2000). Unauthorized Entry: The Truth about Nazi War Criminals in Canada, 1946-1956. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000. ISBN 0-8020-4277-5. pp. 132-145
  37. ^ a b Timothy Snyder. (2004) The Reconstruction of Nations. New Haven: Yale University Press: pp. 165-166
  38. ^ a b c d e Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 5, p. 284. Accessed 9 September 2009. Archived 11 September 2009.
  39. ^ IPN-KŚZpNP - Sebastian Górkiewicz. "Instytut Pamięci Narodowej". Archived from the original on 4 September 2009. Retrieved 3 September 2009.  
  40. ^ G. Motyka, Ukraińska partyzantka, 1942-1960, PAN, 2006, p.383
  41. ^ Bogusława Marcinkowska, Ustalenia wynikające ze śledztwa w sprawie zbrodni ludobójstwa funkcjonariuszy SS "GALIZIEN" i nacjonalistów ukraińskich na Polakach w Hucie Pieniackiej 28 lutego 1944 roku, Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej, 1/2001 [2]
  42. ^ Michael James Melnyk. (2007). To Battle: The Formation and History of the 14th Waffen-SS Grenadier Division. Helion and Company. Chapter 5.
  43. ^ Ukrainian archives
  44. ^ (English) [3]. Accessed 3 September 2009. Archived 3 September 2009.
  45. ^ Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 5, pp. 283-285 . Accessed 3 September 2009. Archived 4 September 2009.
  46. ^ Polish Instytute of Membrance
  47. ^ a b c d Grzegorz Motyka, Ukraińska Partyzantka 1942-1960, Warszawa 2006, p. str. 181, 385
  48. ^ Gerald William Kokodyniak. "galiciadivision". Archived from the original on 4 September 2009. Retrieved 3 September 2009.  
  49. ^ Wendal, Marcus. "14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (ukrainische Nr. 1)". Axis History. Archived from the original on 30 April 2009. Retrieved 22 March 2009.  


  • (Polish) Jurij Kyryczuk, "Problem ukraińskiej kolaboracji w czasie II wojny światowej" in "Polska-Ukraina" vol 6. , Karta, Warszawa 2002, ISBN 8391511154, pp. 244–266
  • Caballero Jurado, Carlos. Breaking the Chains: 14 Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS and Other Ukrainian Volunteer Formations, Eastern Front, 1941-45. Halifax, West Yorkshire: Shelf Books, 1998 ISBN 1-899765-02-6
  • Davies, W.J.K. (1981). German Army Handbook 1939-1945 (Second U.S. Edition ed.). New York: Arco Publishing. ISBN 0-668-04291-5.  
  • Hieke, Wolf-Dietrich (1988). The Ukrainian Division 'Galicia', 1943-45, A Memoir. Shevchenko Scientific Society. ISBN 0-9690239-4-4.  
  • Logusz, Michael O. (1997). Galicia Division: The Waffen-SS 14th Grenadier Division 1943-1945. Schiffer Publishing. ISBN 0-7643-0081-4.  
  • Mitchum, Samuel W (2007). German Order of Battle: Panzer, Panzer Grenadier, and Waffen SS divisions in World War II. Stackpole books. ISBN 0811734382.  
  • Melnyk, Michael James (2002). To Battle, The History and Formation of the 14th Waffen SS Grenadier Division (second updated edition 2007 ed.). Helion and Co. ISBN 978-1-874622-19-2.  
  • Munoz, Antonio J. (1991). Forgotten Legions: Obscure Combat Formations of the Waffen-SS. Axis Europa. ISBN 0-7394-0817-8.  
  • Piotrowski, Tadeusz (1998). Poland's holocaust: ethnic strife, collaboration with occupying forces and genocide in the Second Republic, 1918-1947. McFarland. ISBN 0786403713.  
  • Quarrie, Bruce (1983). Hitler's Samurai: The Waffen-SS in Action. Arco Pub. 161 pp.. ISBN 0-668-05805-6.  
  • Williamson, Gordon (1995). Loyalty is my Honor. Motorbooks International. 192 pp.. ISBN 0-7603-0012-7.  

External links


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