1964 Brazilian coup d'état: Wikis

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The 1964 Brazilian coup d'état was a coup d'état (though self-denominated Revolution) against President João Goulart by the Brazilian military on the night of 31 March 1964.[1] Democratically elected as vice-president to Jânio Quadros, João Goulart (a moderate nationalist also known as "Jango") had acceded to the presidency upon Quadros' 1961 resignation under difficult circumstances.

At the time, the Brazilian military forced Jango into a compromise with the Congress, where his powers would be reduced through the approval of a constitutional amendment changing Brazil to a Parliamentary Democracy with Jango as a weakened head of state in order to halt his plan Plano Trienal.

In 1963, however, Jango successfully re-established the presidential system through a referendum. His reforms, contemporaneously interpreted as socialist in a world increasingly polarized by the Cold War, went against the interests of the military and right-wing sectors of society.[2]

The coup thrust Brazil into a military dictatorship lasting until the election of Tancredo Neves in 1985. The coup is widely understood as being part of the Cold War and a response to the perceived threat of communism. It was the first military intervention in Latin America during the Cold War, followed by the 1973 Chilean coup d'état and the 1976 Argentine coup.

Contents

Conspiracy against Jango

Goulart and wife Maria Teresa during the March 13, 1964 speech.

Jânio Quadros resigned on August 25, 1961.[3] At the time of his resignation, João Goulart was in the People's Republic of China on a foreign relations trip. On August 29, the Brazilian Congress heard and vetoed a motion to stop Goulart from being named president, brought by the heads of the three branches of the military and some politicians, who claimed Goulart's inauguration would place the country "on the road to civil war".[4] A compromise was reached: Brazil would become a parliamentary democracy, with Goulart as President. As such, he would be head of state, but with limited powers of head of government. Tancredo Neves was named as the new prime minister.

On January 6, 1963, Goulart successfully changed the system of government back to presidential democracy in a referendum won by a large margin. Goulart found himself back in power with a rapidly deteriorating political and economic situation.[4] During this period, Goulart was politically isolated, with a foreign policy which was independent of any alignment (he openly criticized the Bay of Pigs invasion by the US, but criticized the Cuban regime of Fidel Castro during the Cuban Missile Crisis).[2] The country's economic situation deteriorated rapidly, with attempts at stabilizing the currency being financed by aid packages from the International Monetary Fund. His failure to secure foreign investment and domestic inflation put the country in a difficult situation with exacerbated social conflicts.[4]

On March 13, 1964, Goulart gave a speech where he promised to nationalize the country's oil refineries, as well as carry out "basic reforms" including rent controls. This was followed by a large demonstration on March 19, where a conservative group marched on Praça da Sé in a demonstration called "March of Families for God and Freedom" against Goulart and his policies.[5]

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The Sailors' Revolt

The friction between the military and João Goulart boiled over with his intervention in a revolt by sailors of the Brazilian Navy led by José Anselmo dos Santos, historically known as Corporal Anselmo, and later exposed as an agent provocateur. On March 25, 1964, nearly 2,000 sailors assembled in Rio de Janeiro, petitioning for better living conditions and pledging their support for Goulart's reforms. The Minister of the Navy, Sílvio Mota, ordered the arrest of the sailors leading the assembly. Mota sent a detachment of marines to arrest the leaders and break up the assembly, led by Rear Admiral Cândido Aragão. These marines ended up joining the assembly and remained with the other sailors.[6]

Shortly after Aragão's refusal to arrest the leaders, Goulart issued orders prohibiting any invasion of the assembly location (the headquarters of the local metalworker's union), and sacked Sílvio Mota as Minister of the Navy. The following day, March 26, the Minister of Labor, Amauri Silva, negotiated a compromise, and the sailors agreed to leave the assembly building. They were promptly arrested for mutiny.[7]

João Goulart pardoned the sailors shortly after, creating a public rift with the military.[2] Soon after, on March 30, 1964, the day before the coup, Goulart gave a speech to a gathering of sergeants, where he asked for the military's support for his reforms.[2].

The coup

The run-up

The coup was foreseen by both pro- and anti-Goulart forces. In Rio de Janeiro, Leonel Brizola, a Goulart ally (and brother in law), had organized as far back as in October 1963 so-called "Groups of Eleven", or groups of eleven people who would work in supporting Goulart's reforms,[8] but could theoretically be converted to a form of militia to defend Goulart's presidency.[9] On the other side, on March 20, 1964, some 10 days before the coup, Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco, chief of staff for the army, circulated a letter to the highest echelons of the military warning of the dangers of communism.[10]

On March 30, the American military attaché in Brazil, Colonel Vernon A. Walters, telegraphed the State Department. In that telegraph, he confirmed that Brazilian army generals had committed themselves to acting against Goulart within a week of the meeting, but no date was set.[11]

March 31

Generals Antônio Carlos Muricy (left), commander of the 7th Military Region and Olímpio Mourão Filho (right), commander of the 4th Military Region.

In the first of hours of March 31, 1964, General Olímpio Mourão Filho, Commander of the 4th Military Region, headquartered in Juiz de Fora, Minas Gerais, ordered his troops to start moving towards Rio de Janeiro.[12] The move was not coordinated with the other main generals in the plot, namely General Amaury Kruel of the 2nd Army (based in São Paulo) and Castello Branco, the deposed army chief of staff. The troop movement took them by surprise, as they felt it was too soon for a successful coup. Less than two hours after receiving news of Mourão's march, Kruel was reported saying "This is nothing more than a quartelada (Portuguese for military adventure, from quartel (Portuguese for "barracks") by General Mourão, and I will not join it."[13]

In the morning, Castello Branco would twice try to stop Mourão's march on Rio. At the same time, news of the march had reached General Argemiro Assis Brasil, João Goulart's military aide, who felt confident he could put the rebellion down.[14] As the day progressed, minor revolts and military actions ensued, such as Castello Branco's barricades at the Ministry of War building, and at the Escola de Comando do Estado Maior, in Rio de Janeiro. Despite this, the crucial support needed for the coup (that of General Kruel's 2nd Army) had not yet been implemented.[15]

At around 10:00PM, General Kruel called João Goulart. In the call, Kruel asked the president to break with the left-wing by sacking his Minister of Justice and Chief of Staff and outlaw the Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores (Worker's General Command), a major workers' organization. Goulart replied that doing so would be a humiliating defeat for him, making him a "decorative president". Goulart told Kruel: "General, I don't abandon my friends. (...) I would rather stick with my grassroots. You should stick to your convictions. Put your troops out on the street and betray me, publicly."[16]

General Amaury Kruel, of São Paulo's 2nd Army.

After the 10:00PM call, Kruel called Goulart twice more, repeating his demands, and receiving the same answer from Goulart.[17]

Goulart's attempt to countermand the Generals was disastrous. Two of his three military chiefs of staff were out of action for various reasons. His personal military aide was a newly-promoted Brigadier General, General Assis Brasil. His greatest base of military support was located in his native Southern Brazil. His reaction, orchestrated by Assis Brasil, consisted of shifting a general from the southern 3rd Army to the southeast, to replace Castello Branco (he never arrived). Of his other generals, in the states of Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul, four were on vacation, while two others were returning to their posts in Curitiba when they were forced to land in Porto Alegre due to bad weather, and thus away from their commands.[17]

April 1

Soldiers on guard duty at the Guanabara Palace in Rio de Janeiro.

On April 1, at 12:45PM, João Goulart left Rio for the capital, Brasília, in an attempt to stop the coup.[18] At the same time, General Kruel and the 2nd Army began to march towards the Vale do Paraíba, between São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.[19] In the southeast, only the 1st Army, commanded by General Âncora and based in Rio de Janeiro, had not enlisted in the coup. General Artur da Costa e Silva called Âncora and demanded his surrender. Âncora replied he would honor a promise to Jango and first meet to discuss the situation with General Kruel, who was marching in his direction. The meeting would take place later in the day at the Academia Militar de Agulhas Negras, in Resende, between Rio and São Paulo. At that meeting, Âncora surrendered the 1st Army.[20] Goulart had no military support outside of the south.

When he reached Brasília, Goulart realized he lacked any political support. The Senate president, Auro Moura Andrade, was already articulating for congressional support of the coup. Goulart stayed for a short time in Brasília, gathering his wife and two children, and flying to Porto Alegre in an Air Force Avro 748 aircraft. Soon after Goulart's plane took off, Auro Moura Andrade declared the position of President of Brazil "vacant".[21]

Altogether seven people would die during the events of April 1. Casualties included two students who were shot amidst a demonstration against the troops encircling the Governor's palace in Recife, three in Rio and two in Minas Gerais.[22]

Aftermath

In the first hours of April 2, Auro Moura de Andrade, along with the president of the Supreme Federal Tribunal swore in Pascoal Ranieri Mazzilli, the speaker of the house, as president. This move was arguably unconstitutional at the time, as João Goulart was still in the country.[22]

At the same time, Goulart, now in the headquarters of the 3rd Army in Porto Alegre, (still loyal to him at the time) contemplated resistance and counter-moves with Leonel Brizola, who argued for armed resistance. In the morning, General Floriano Machado informed the president that troops loyal to the coup were moving from Curitiba to Porto Alegre, and that he had to leave the country, risking arrest otherwise. At 11:45AM, Jango boarded a Douglas C-47 transport for his farm bordering Uruguay. Goulart would stay in his farmlands, until April 4, when he finally boarded the plane for the last time, heading for Montevideo.[23]

Mazzilli would continue as president while the generals jockeyed for power. On April 11, 1964, General Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco was elected as president by the national congress. Upon taking power, Castello Branco promised to "deliver, in 1966, to my successor legitimately elected by the people, a united nation." In 1967 he delivered what journalist Elio Gaspari dubbed "a fractured nation" to a president elected by 295 people.[24]

American Involvement

The US ambassador at the time, Lincoln Gordon, and the military attaché, Colonel Vernon A. Walters, kept in constant contact with President Lyndon B. Johnson as the crisis progressed. Johnson urged taking "every step that we can" to support the overthrow of João Goulart helping the Brazilian military authorities against the "left-wing" Jango's government.[25]

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Operation Brother Sam

Declassified transcripts of communications between Lincoln Gordon and the US government show that, predicting an all-out civil war, Johnson authorized logistical materials to be in place to support the coup-side of the rebellion. These included ammunition, motor oil, gasoline, aviation gasoline and other materials to help in a potential civil war in US Navy tankers sailing from Aruba. About 110 tons of ammunition and CS gas were made ready in New Jersey for a potential airlift to Viracopos Airport in Campinas. Potential support was also made available in the form of an "aircraft carrier (USS Forrestal) and two guided missile destroyers (expected arrive in area by April 10), (and) four destroyers", which sailed to Brazil under the guise of a military exercise.[26]

CIA involvement

In the telegraphs, Gordon also acknowledges US involvement in "covert support for pro-democracy street rallies…and encouragement [of] democratic and anti-communist sentiment in Congress, armed forces, friendly labor and student groups, church, and business" and that he "may be requesting modest supplementary funds for other covert action programs in the near future.".[27] The actual operational files of the CIA remain classified, preventing historians from accurately gauging the CIA's direct involvement in the coup.[25]

See also

References

  1. ^ Kingstone, Steve (2004-04-01). "Brazil remembers 1964 coup d'etat". BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3588339.stm. Retrieved 2007-05-08. 
  2. ^ a b c d Arquivo Nacional: João Goulart. Brazilian National Archives. Retrieved on August 20, 2007.
  3. ^ Arquivo Nacional: Jânio Quadros. Brazilian National Archives. Retrieved on August 20, 2007.
  4. ^ a b c A Trajetória Política de João Goulart. Fundação Getúlio Vargas: Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil. Retrieved on August 20, 2007.
  5. ^ SÃO PAULO PAROU ONTEM PARA DEFENDER O REGIME Folha de S. Paulo. March 20, 1964 Retrieved on August 20, 2007.
  6. ^ Lamarão, Sérgio. A Revolta dos Marinheiros. Fundação Getúlio Vargas: Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil. Retrieved on August 20, 2007.
  7. ^ EM LIBERDADE PROVISORIA OS MARINHEIROS REBELDES Folha de S. Paulo. March 28, 1964. Retrieved August 20, 2007.
  8. ^ Brizola biography. PDT Website. Retrieved August 20, 2007.
  9. ^ Brazil: The Post-Vargas Republic, 1954-64. Library of Congress. Retrieved August 20, 2007.
  10. ^ Os Militares e o Governo João Goulart. Fundação Getúlio Vargas: Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil. Retrieved on August 20, 2007.
  11. ^ 192. Telegram From the Army Attaché in Brazil (Walters) to the Department of the Army United States State Department. March 30, 1964. Retrieved on August 20, 2007.
  12. ^ Olímpio Mourão Filho Fundação Getúlio Vargas: Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil. Retrieved on August 20, 2007.
  13. ^ Gaspari, Elio (2002). A Ditadura Envergonhada. São Paulo: Cia. das Letras. pp. 68–69. ISBN 8535902775. 
  14. ^ Gaspari, Elio (2002). A Ditadura Envergonhada. São Paulo: Cia. das Letras. pp. 69–70. ISBN 8535902775. 
  15. ^ Gaspari, Elio (2002). A Ditadura Envergonhada. São Paulo: Cia. das Letras. pp. 80–81. ISBN 8535902775. 
  16. ^ Gaspari, Elio (2002). A Ditadura Envergonhada. São Paulo: Cia. das Letras. p. 88. ISBN 8535902775. 
  17. ^ a b Gaspari, Elio (2002). A Ditadura Envergonhada. São Paulo: Cia. das Letras. p. 90. ISBN 8535902775. 
  18. ^ Gaspari, Elio (2002). A Ditadura Envergonhada. São Paulo: Cia. das Letras. p. 103. ISBN 8535902775. 
  19. ^ II EXERCITO DOMINA O VALE DO PARAIBA. Folha de S. Paulo. April 1, 1964. Retrieved August 20, 2007.
  20. ^ Gaspari, Elio (2002). A Ditadura Envergonhada. São Paulo: Cia. das Letras. p. 106. ISBN 8535902775. 
  21. ^ Gaspari, Elio (2002). A Ditadura Envergonhada. São Paulo: Cia. das Letras. p. 111. ISBN 8535902775. 
  22. ^ a b Gaspari, Elio (2002). A Ditadura Envergonhada. São Paulo: Cia. das Letras. p. 112. ISBN 8535902775. 
  23. ^ Gaspari, Elio (2002). A Ditadura Envergonhada. São Paulo: Cia. das Letras. p. 113. ISBN 8535902775. 
  24. ^ Gaspari, Elio (2002). A Ditadura Envergonhada. São Paulo: Cia. das Letras. p. 125. ISBN 8535902775. 
  25. ^ a b Kornbluh, Peter. BRAZIL MARKS 40th ANNIVERSARY OF MILITARY COUP GWU National Security Archive. Retrieved August 20, 2007.
  26. ^ 198. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil. Washington, March 31, 1964, 2:29 p.m. Retrieved on August 20, 2007.
  27. ^ 187. Telegram From the Ambassador to Brazil (Gordon) to the Department of State Rio de Janeiro, March 28, 1964. Retrieved on August 20, 2007

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