From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
|
1964 Gabon coup d'état |

Map of Gabon |
| Date |
17 February – 18 February 1964 |
| Location |
Gabon |
| Result |
Provisional government toppled;
Léon M'ba
reinstated as president |
|
The 1964 Gabon coup d'état was staged between
17 and 18 February 1964 by Gabonese military officers who rose against Gabonese President Léon M'ba. Before
the coup,
Gabon was seen as one of the most politically stable countries in
Africa.[1]
The coup resulted from M'ba's dissolution of the Gabonese
legislature on 21 January 1964, and during a takeover with few
casualties 150 coup plotters arrested M'ba and a number of his
government officials. Through Radio Libreville, they asked the
people of Gabon to remain calm and assured them that the country's
pro-France foreign policy would remain unchanged. A provisional
government was formed, and the coup's leaders installed Deputy Jean-Hilaire Aubame, who was M'ba's
primary political opponent and had been uninvolved in the coup, as
president. Meanwhile, M'ba was sent to Lambaréné,
250 kilometres (155 mi) from Libreville. There was no
major uprising or reaction by the Gabonese people when they
received word of the coup, which the military interpreted as a sign
of approval.
After being informed of the coup by Gabonese Chief of Staff Albert-Bernard Bongo,
French President Charles de Gaulle resolved to restore
the M'ba government, honoring a 1960 treaty signed between the
deposed government and France when Gabon became independent. With
the help of French paratroopers, the provisional government
was toppled during the night of 19 February and M'ba was reinstated
as president. Afterward, M'ba imprisoned more than 150 of his
opponents, pledging "no pardon or pity" but rather "total
punishment". Aubame was sentenced to 10 years of hard labor
and 10 years of exile, a sentence that was later commuted. During this time, the
ageing president became increasingly reclusive, opting to stay in
his presidential palace under the protection of French troops.
Within three years, M'ba was diagnosed with cancer; he died on 28
November 1967.
Background and origins
Gabonese and French military officers, 1959
Gabon gained its independence from France on 17 August 1960.[2] The
country had a relatively high standard of living and was
considered one of the more stable countries in West Africa, both
politically and economically.[1]
At the time of the coup, the country had an estimated US$200 average
annual income[3] and was
one of the few countries in Africa with a positive trade balance,
with exports exceeding imports by 30 percent.[4] As of
1964, the country was among the largest producers of uranium and manganese in French Africa,
which Time suggested was one of the
reasons for France's response to the coup.[5] It
also had petroleum, iron, and logging interests stationed in
Gabon.[6]
M'ba was also one of the most loyal allies to France in Africa,
even after the country's independence.[5] In
fact, France maintained 600 paratroopers and an air force unit,
which included Mirage V and Jaguar jet fighters, at the Camp de
Gaulle military base until at least 1987, a warning to any Gabonese
coup plotters.[7] M'ba
famously commented during a 1961 visit to France that "[a]ll
Gabonese have two fatherlands: France and Gabon",[a] and Europeans enjoyed
particularly friendly treatment under his regime.[8]
French journalist Pierre Péan asserted that M'ba secretly
tried to prevent Gabonese independence; instead, he lobbied for it
to become an overseas territory of France.[9] He went
so far as to say that "Gabon is an extreme case, verging on
caricature, of neocolonialism."[10]
M'ba aspired to establish Gabon as a democracy, which he
believed was necessary to attract foreign investors. At the same
time, he attempted to reconcile the imperatives of democracy with
the necessity for a strong and coherent government.[11]
In practice, however, M'ba showed a weakness in attaining his
goal—by this time he was known as "the old man",[12]
or "the boss"—to have a high degree of authority.[13]
On 21 February 1961, a new constitution was unanimously
adopted,[14]
providing for a "hyperpresidential" regime.[15]
M'ba now had full executive powers: he could appoint ministers
whose functions and responsibilities were decided by him; he could
dissolve the National Assembly by choice or prolong its term beyond
the normal five years; he could declare a state of
emergency when he believed the need arose, though for this
amendment he would have to consult the people via a referendum.
This was, in fact, very similar to the constitution adopted in
favor of Fulbert
Youlou at roughly the same time.[16]
A report from the French secret service summarized the
situation:
He regarded himself as a truly democratic leader; nothing
irritated him more than being called a dictator. Still, [M'ba]
wasn't happy until he had the constitution rewritten to give him
virtually all power and transforming the parliament into
high-priced scenery that could be bypassed as needed.
[b][17]
M'ba's chief political opponent had been Jean-Hilaire Aubame, a
former protégé and his half-brother's foster son.[18]
M'ba was backed by the French forestry interests, while Aubame was
supported by the Roman Catholic missions and the French
administration.[19]
Aubame, a deputy of the opposition party l’Union démocratique
et sociale gabonaise (UDSG) in the National Assembly, had few
fundamental ideological differences with the M'ba-led Bloc
Démocratique Gabonais (BDG), including advocating less
economic dependence on France and faster "Africanization" of French
political jobs.[20]
However, the new constitution and the National Union (a political
union they founded) suspended the quarrels between M'ba and Aubame
from 1961 to 1963. Despite this, political unrest grew within the
population,[21] and
many students held demonstrations on the frequent dissolutions of
the National Assembly and the general political attitude in the
country.[22] The
president did not hesitate to enforce the law himself; with a chicotte, he whipped citizens
who did not show respect for him, including passersby who "forgot"
to salute him.[23]
Aubame served as foreign minister under the coalition
government, though in early 1963 he was dropped from the Cabinet
for refusing to create a single-party Gabon.[24]
To oust Aubame from his legislative seat, M'ba appointed him
President of the Supreme Court on 25 February,[25]
practically a powerless post.[24]
M'ba supporters tried to pass a bill that declared that a member of parliament could only hold a
single role in government.[12]
The president claimed that Aubame had resigned from the National
Assembly, citing incompatibility with the functions of the
assembly. Aubame, however, unexpectedly resigned from the Supreme
Court on 10 January 1964,[24]
complicating matters for M'ba.[26]
In a fit of rage, M'ba dissolved the National Assembly on 21
January 1964.[27]
The
New York Times speculates that this was due to it not
supporting M'ba in Aubame's removal.[1]
The electoral conditions were announced as such: The election 67
districts were reduced to 47. M'ba disqualified Aubame by
announcing that anyone who had held a post recently was banned. Any
party would have to submit 47 candidates who had to pay US$160 or none at
all. Thus, over US$7,500 would be deposited without considering
campaign expenses. M'ba's idea was that no party other than his
would have the money to enter candidates.[28] In
response to this, the opposition announced its refusal to
participate in elections that they did not consider fair.[27]
Planning
Little is known of the planning of the coup. No demonstrations
followed Mba's dissolution of the National Assembly, so the coup
could be classified as simply a "palace coup".[29]
The 1964–1965 edition of the Adelphi Papers speculates that the
continued presence of young French military officers in Gabon may
have been an inspiration to the plotters of the coup.[30] Much
of the 600-man Gabonese army had previously served in the French
army prior to independence, where they were paid modestly. Like
much of the rest of the country, they were displeased by M'ba's
actions against Aubame, a probable cause for involvement.[6]
U.S. Ambassador to Gabon Charles Darlington suggested that the
coup plotters may have tried to imitate the style of Colonel Christophe
Soglo.[31]
Soglo, a commander in Dahomey's 800-man army, had deposed President
Hubert Maga in
October 1963,[32] ruled
for about a month, then resigned in favor of Dahomey's
citizens.[31]
The plotters apparently did not consider French involvement, so
therefore didn't take any additional steps to prevent it. They
could have created protests to show public support,[33]
although the spokesman for the coup plotters, Sub-Lieutenant
Daniel Mbene, justified the coup by claiming in a broadcast that
the army had to act to avoid the rash of "uncontrollable
demonstrations that would have been difficult to halt".[34]
It is unlikely that Aubame participated in the planning of the
coup. It appears that he joined the effort after being recruited by
the new government. His nephew, Pierre Eyeguet, a former ambassador
to the United Kingdom, may have known of the plot beforehand and
notified his uncle, although it is unknown whether or not Aubame
established contact with the plotters.[35]
Lieutenant Valerie Essone only decided to participate on 17
February. This was a crucial decision for he led the First Company
of the Gabonese Army, the company of the other officers. Apparently
at that moment he told his troops to perform average night
maneuvers.[36]
That day, Gabonese chief of staff Albert Bernard (later Omar) Bongo informed
President M'ba that the number of troops outside Libreville was unusually
high. M'ba, however, did not think much of this anomaly.[37]
Coup
During the night of 17 February and the early morning of 18
February 1964, 150 members of the Gabonese military, gendarmerie, and
police, headed by Lieutenant Jacques Mombo and Valére Essone,
seized the presidential palace.[38]
The gendarmes on duty claimed that this was but a military
exercise.[36]
However, during the "exercise" the lieutenants dragged President
M'ba from his bed at gunpoint.[5]
Bongo heard this noise and telephoned President of the National
Assembly Louis
Bigmann to find out what had happened. Bigmann arrived at the
presidential palace and asked the rebels what Bongo had asked him.
At this point they opened the gates and arrested him too.[31]
The plotters subsequently arrested every member of the Gabonese
cabinet except the respected technician André Gustave Anguilé.[39]
Apparently, the plotters let him roam free in the hopes of him
joining them, although before noon he asked to be arrested. Joseph N'Goua, the Gabonese minister of
foreign affairs, was able to tell the French Embassy of this before
he was arrested.[31]
The insurgents, calling themselves a "revolutionary
committee",[31]
spread themselves strategically across the Gabonese capital during
the night. They shut down the airport and seized the post office
and radio station. On Radio Libreville, the military announced that
a coup had taken place and that they required "technical
assistance".[40]
They issued radio statements every half hour promising that "public
liberties will be restored and all political prisoners will be
freed"[41][34]
and ordered the French not to interfere in the matter, claiming
that it would be a violation of their sovereignty.[20]
In addition, they decreed the closing of schools and
businesses.[42]
M'ba acknowledged his defeat in a radio broadcast, in accordance
with orders from his captors.[34]
"D-Day is here, the injustices are beyond measure, these people are
patient, but their patience has limits", he said. "It came to a
boil."[c][40]
During these events, no gunshots were fired. The public did not
react strongly, which, according to the military, was a sign of
approval.[43] A
provisional government was formed, composed of civilian politicians
from the UDSG and BDG such as Philippe N'dong, editor of Gabon's
literary review Realites Gabonaises; Dr. Eloi Chambrier,
Gabon's only physician; Philippe Maury, a famous Gabonese actor;
and civil servant Paul Gondjout.[44] Mbene
stated that the provisional government would not include any
members of the M'ba government. He declared that Gabon's pro-French
foreign policy would remain unchanged and that Mombo would
supervise the government until the presidency was given to
Aubame.[41][45]
The plotters were content to ensure security for civilians, urging
them to remain calm and not hurt anyone.[34]
Most of them were junior officers, living in the army barracks. The
senior officers did not intervene; instead, they stayed in their
"pleasant" houses.[36]
Aubame was unaware of the coup until the French ambassador to
Gabon, Paul Cousseran, called him on the telephone roughly a half
hour after sunrise. Cousseran, meanwhile, was awoken by the noisy
streets and checked to see what was happening. Aubame replied that
he was to find out why there was "no government", as Cousseran
never directly mentioned a coup. However, about midway through the
morning an automobile carrying the revolutionary committee arrived
at Aubame's residence and drove him to the governmental offices,
where he had been named president.[34]
Second Lieutenant Ndo Edou gave instructions to transfer M'ba to
Ndjolé, Aubame's
electoral stronghold. However, due to heavy rain, the deposed
president and his captors took shelter in an unknown village. The
next morning they decided to take him over the easier road to Lambaréné.
Several hours later, they returned to Libreville.[46]
French
intervention
French authorities first received information on the coup not
from Cousseran but rather from Bongo, giving him some standing
among them.[47]
President de Gaulle, upon advice from his chief adviser on African
policy, Jacques
Foccart, decided that he would restore the legitimate
government. This was in accordance with a 1960 treaty between Gabon
and the French,[48] which
was ironically signed by Aubame in his stint as Foreign
Minister.[49]
Foccart, on the other hand, had only decided to launch the
countercoup to protect the interests of the French petroleum group
Elf, which
operated in Gabon and was led by a close friend of his.[45]
M'ba was also a close friend of his; David Yates reports that M'ba
could call Foccart personally, and Foccart would meet with him "at
a moment's notice".[50]
French commentators, however, claimed that if they did not
intervene, they would be tempting other dissidents. France had
refrained from intervening in recent coups in the French Congo, Dahomey, and Togo, despite being opposed to all of them.
However, the Gabon coup differed in that, they claimed, it lacked
notable public support.[51]
Following the restoration of M'ba's government in Gabon, the French
intervened in African coups roughly every other year.[52]
In 1995, the French Minister for Foreign Assistance Jacques
Godfrain explained that Paris "will intervene each time an elected
democratic power is overthrown by a coup d'état if a military
cooperation agreement exists".[52]
Shortly after de Gaulle and Foccart's meeting, French commanders
Haulin and Royer were released at the request of the French
Embassy.[53]
Intervention could not commence without a formal petition to the
Head of State of Gabon. Since M'ba was held hostage, the French
contacted the Vice President of Gabon, Paul-Marie Yembit, who had not been
arrested.[54]
At the time, Yembit was in a car with U.S. ambassador Charles
Darlington[55]
travelling to N'Dende.[56] This
was to officially open a school built by the Peace Corps nearby, in Yembit's birthplace
of Moussambou, and completing his electoral campaign.[47][57]
Therefore, they decided to compose a predated letter that Yembit
would later sign, confirming their intervention. They sent this to
him via a small airplane, since there were no road bridges in Gabon
at the time and the only way to cross a river was on a ferry.
Yembit did not come back to Libreville on the plane as would be
expected, but rather at 8:00 WAT on 18 February to read a statement
over Radio Libreville that was likely prepared by French
officials.[57]
Yembit, however, claimed that he called for French intervention
while the insurgent troops held M'ba hostage; this version of the
story was quickly disputed by several diplomats on the scene, as
several French troops had arrived before this alleged incident.[53]
Less than 24 hours after de Gaulle had been notified,
French paratroopers stationed in Dakar and Brazzaville under General René Cogny[5][58] and a
General Kergaravat were notified that they were going to end the
coup.[6]
This had come even before the provincial government was formed.[59]
Maurice Robert and Guy Ponsaille, who were among a group Foccart
convened to discuss the French intervention, were part of the
paratrooper unit. Receiving Foccart's orders to "normalize" the
situation by 19 February or the next day at the latest,[55]
at 10:50 WAT on 18 February, the first
50 troops landed at the Libreville International
Airport.[5][47]
The rebels closed the airport but failed to establish obstacles,
allowing the French troops to land unharmed,[51]
albeit during a large storm.[60]
Throughout that day, more than 600 paratroopers arrived at the
airport.[47]
Sweeping through Libreville unopposed, the troops easily
captured the provincial council, though they met resistance at the
Baraka military base in Lambaréné when they attacked at
daylight.[5][47][60]
Upon learning of the impending attack, Aubame called Cousseran and
asked him what had been going on. Cousseran dodged answering the
question and requested that Aubame release M'ba uninjured. After
receiving the false assurance from the ambassador that the French
government had no intention of restoring M'ba to power, Aubame sent
out a military officer to the countryside to find the deposed
president.[61]
M'ba was moved to a small village near the Albert Schweitzer
Hospital.[5] At
dawn on 19 February, French Air Force planes strafed the rebels at Baraka,
while the French
Army attacked the insurgents with machine gun fire and mortars.[53]
The rebels at the military base promptly surrendered once their
ammunition supply ran out, and their commander, Lieutenant Ndo
Edou, was executed.[61]
Later, the French army managed to break through the gate to the
village where M'ba was held and rescued the deposed president.[5]
Before the end of the day, the French troops surrounded all of
Libreville's public buildings. Shortly thereafter, Radio Libreville
announced the surrender of the rebel forces.[61]
Kergaravat concluded his military operation on 20 February,
saluting Cousseran and saying "Mission accomplie".[62]
Over its course, one French soldier were killed and 18 died on the
Gabonese side.[53]
Unofficial sources said two French soldiers and 25 insurgents were
killed, with more than 40 Gabonese and four French troops were
wounded.[53]
The number of civilian casualties was unknown but numerous, as the
straw roofs on their homes were not a good protector against aerial
bullets.[60]
Aftermath
Immediate aftermath and
riots
The United States Embassy in Libreville
France's intervention in the coup was openly applauded by the Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, the Malagasy Republic, Niger, and Upper Volta. In fact, France
was barely criticised at all in Africa, other than a mild response
by Dahomey[29]
and one by the Democratic
Republic of Congo.[57]
The matter was not discussed at the next meeting of the Council of
Ministers of the OAU, held on 24 February–29 February in Lagos. The revolutionary movement
in French Africa immediately retrogressed following the coup.[29]
M'ba was returned to Libreville on 21 February.[63]
Shortly after his arrival, the 10:00 pm curfew[64]
that had been imposed by the French was lifted, and some stores
were reopened.[53]
Squads of officials, known as "les gorilles", travelled through
Libreville and arrested any suspected M'ba opposers.[65] After
his reinstatement, M'ba refused to believe that the coup was
directed against his regime,[66]
instead considering it to be a conspiracy against the state.[67]
Nonetheless, following the coup M'ba dismissed every soldier in the
army and started recruiting new men.[68]
On 1 March,[69]
however, anti-government demonstrations began, with protesters
shouting "Léon M'ba, président des Français!" ("Léon M'ba,
President of the French!") and calling for the end of the
"dictatorship".[67]
Originating in Libreville, these demonstrations spread to Port-Gentil and N'Dende
and lasted into the summer.[69]
When 1,000 pro-government demonstrators responded by shouting "Long
Live Léon M'ba" outside the presidential palace, they were attacked
by dissidents.[70]
Among the pro-government demonstrators were an opposition member,
Martine Oyane, who had been forcefully undressed following her
arrest, beaten by the police, paraded naked throughout Libreville,
and forced to shout "Long Live Léon M'ba".[71] At
the height of these demonstrations, 3,000 to 4,000 Gabonese
protested throughout central Libreville.[72]
Protesters also took their anger out against the French in Gabon,
stoning more than 30 cars belonging to Frenchmen and chanting "Go
home, go home!"[73][74]
This rioting was so intense that M'ba announced that whoever went
to work would not be paid. The French reacted to these incidents by
swinging rifle butts and throwing grenades. The crowds responded by
throwing bottles and stones, though they were put down soon
after.[72]
There were no reports of injured protesters, despite orders to the
Gabonese police that they fire at protesters on sight.[70]
Allegations of U.S.
involvement
Some Gabonese mistakenly identified the United States as a
co-conspirator in the coup.[75]
Time asserted that French
officials helped spread the rumor of American involvement.[76]
This reached a point which some automobile stations refused to help
Darlington and other Americans.[77]
After William F. Courtney, deputy chief of the United States
Embassy, received a call from a man identifying himself as DuPont
and threatening an imminent attack, a hand grenade[77]
exploded outside the embassy. The explosion, which occurred at a
time when the building was closed and locked on 3 March, resulted
in damage to the embassy sign and the cracking of two windows.[74]
Following the bombing, French Gabonese made more threatening
phone calls to the embassy.[73]
A second bomb exploded at the embassy two nights later, causing no
damage. A drive-by shooting, during which at least five rounds of
buckshot were fired from a 12-gauge
automatic shotgun, riddled the second story windows with over 30
holes.[64]
It is likely that its perpetrators were French, as Gabonese have no
access to grenades. Following the second bombing a car containing
white men was noticed, driving through otherwise empty Shore
Boulevard. At the time, practically the only white men in Gabon
were French.[77]
Two Gabonese policemen were assigned to protect the building,
and M'ba ordered an investigation into the bombings.[64]
He denounced the allegations against Americans, saying:
Nothing permits to determine that the United States played a
role in the recent events. However, relations of friendship
existing between members of the United States Embassy and some
politicians who participated in the rebellion could have given this
impression to some, an impression which I do not share.
[78]
Much of these attacks against Americans were against Darlington
personally. His son Christopher was hit by a grenade in July,
though it did not detonate. The ambassador resigned his post on 26
July.[79] It
was not until 14 August 1965 that David M. Bane replaced him.[80]
1964
elections
Despite these incidents, legislative elections planned before
the coup were held in April 1964.[81] They
were originally to be held on 23 February,[16]
though he dissolved the National Assembly and rescheduled them for
12 April. Upon insistence of the French, M'ba allowed opposition
candidates to run, which it claimed was the main reason for
starting the coup in the first place.[53]
However, their leaders were barred from participating because of
their involvement in the coup,[82] and
known anti-Mba organizers were deported to remote parts of the
country.[75]
In addition, M'ba was known to have bribed voters with
banknotes.[83]
France closely followed the election, deporting a Peace Corps
teacher.[75]
The UDSG disappeared from the political scene, and M'ba's
opposition was composed of parties that lacked national focus and
maintained only regional or pro-democracy platforms.[84]
Nevertheless, the opposition garnered 46% of the vote and 16 of 47
seats in the assembly, while the BDG received 54% of the vote and
31 seats.[84]
The opposition disputed this, and held strikes across the country,
though these did not have a sizable impact on business.[85]
Lambarene trial
and rest of M'ba's term
Aubame and Gondjout fled Libreville, but were captured sometime
before 20 February.[63]
Most of the other rebels took refuge at the U.S. Embassy, though
they were soon discovered and brought to jail.[62]
That August, a trial of the military rebels and provisional
government was opened in Lambaréné.[69]
A "state of precations" was imposed, which decreed that local
government kept surveillance on suspected troublemakers and, if
necessary, order curfew, while special permits were required to
travel through the town. The trial was held in a school building
overlooking the Ogooue River,[86]
which was near Albert Schweitzer's hospital. Space at the
hearing was limited, so members of the public were disallowed from
attending. Permits were required to attend the trial, and family
members were restricted to one permit each. Press coverage was
limited, and journalists were allowed only if they represented a
high-profile news agency. In addition, there were restrictions on
the defence of the accused.[87]
The prosecution called 64 separate witnesses.[87]
Essone, Mbene, and Aubame claimed that their involvement in the
coup was due to a lack of development in the Gabonese army. Judge
Leon Auge, the judge in the case, said that if "that is the only
reason for your coup d'état, you deserve a severe penalty."[88]
Essone said that almost all Gabonese military officers knew of an
imminent coup beforehand, while Aubame affirmed his position that
he did not participate in its planning. According to him, he formed
the provisional government in a constitutional manner, and at the
request of some "putschists". He reasoned that the French
intervention was effectively an illegal act of interference, an
assertion which Gondjout and the former education minister, Jean
Mare Ekoh, shared.[87]
Ekoh had served as Foreign Minister during the coup.[35]
The Gabonese actor said that it should be the French troops being
tried, not he and his comrades[87]:
"If we'd been able to put up a few more Gabonese soldiers against
the French, we'd have won — and we shouldn't be here
today."[89]
On 9 September, without consulting M'ba, Leon Auge handed down a
verdict which acquitted both Ekoh and Gondjout; although the
charges carried the death sentence as a maximum. Aubame was
sentenced to 10 years of hard labor and 10 years of exile on a
remote island off Settecama, 100 miles (161 km) down the
coast of Gabon, as were most criminals of the case.[74][89]
He was not particularly popular during his political career, though
according to Time, his arrest "ballooned him to
heroic proportions in the eyes of the aroused public".[76]
While serving his 10 years of labor, he was beaten regularly
by prison guards. Besides Aubame, M'ba imprisoned more than 150 of
his opponents,[90]
most of whom were sentenced to 20 years of hard labor. These
included the two officers and Aubame's nephew, Pierre Eyeguet, a
former ambassador to the United Kingdom.[91] The
actor and the doctor were given 10 years of imprisonment each.[47]
While appealing for peace on 18 February,[70]
he pledged "no pardon or pity" to his enemies, but rather "total
punishment".[5]
Two years after the coup there was still open repression of
dissent in Gabon.[69]
Following these events M'ba became increasingly reclusive, staying
in his presidential palace protected by French troops known as the
"Clan des Gabonais".[92]
Not even Yembit was close to him, but Foccart's friends Ponsaille
and Robert "were never far" from M'ba, according to Pean, and
provided the aging president with counseling and advice.[90]
M'ba was, however, still convinced of his popularity.[73]
Three years later, M'ba was diagnosed with cancer, and he died on
28 November 1967.[12][93] After
M'ba's death, French-supported Bongo[94]
succeeded him as president, and released Aubame in 1972.[95]
Notes
- [a] ^ "Tout Gabonais
a deux patries : la France et le Gabon."
- [b] ^ "Se voulant et
se croyant sincèrement démocrate, au point qu’aucune accusation ne
l’irrite davantage que celle d’être un dictateur, il n’en a pas
moins eu de cesse qu’il n’ait fait voter une constitution lui
accordant pratiquement tous les pouvoirs et réduisant le parlement
au rôle d’un décor coûteux que l’on escamote même en cas de
besoin."
- [c] ^ "Le jour J est
arrivé, les injustices ont dépassé la mesure, ce peuple est
patient, mais sa patience a des limites... il est arrivé à
bout."
References
- ^ a
b
c
"Gabon's President Ousted by
Bloodless Army Coup: Officer Group Seizes Mba -- Old Rival Reported
Chosen as Successor", The New York Times (Reuters): p. 1, 19 February
1964, http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F60B11FE3A5C147A93CBA81789D85F408685F9, retrieved
2008-09-07
- ^
Murison 2003, p. 434
- ^
Matthews, Ronald
(10 April 1966), "Forecast for Africa: More
Plots, More Coups", The New York Times: p. 182, http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F10F11F9395C15768FDDA90994DC405B868AF1D3, retrieved
2008-09-18
- ^
Matthews 1966, p. 118
- ^ a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
"De Gaulle to the
Rescue", Time, 28 February 1964, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,873821,00.html, retrieved
2008-09-07
- ^ a
b
c
Reed 1987, p. 297
- ^
Reed 1987, p. 284
- ^ Biteghe 1990, pp. 23–24
- ^
Péan 1983, pp. 40-42
- ^
Péan 1983, p. 20
- ^ Biteghe 1990, p. 35
- ^ a
b
c
"Leon Mba, President of Gabon
Since Independence, Dies at 65", The New York
Times: p. 47, 19 November 1967, http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F10C13F63C5813778DDDA00A94D9415B878AF1D3, retrieved
2008-09-07
- ^ Biteghe 1990, p. 29
- ^ Biteghe 1990, p. 44.
- ^ Biteghe 1990, p. 46
- ^ a
b
Matthews 1966, p. 123
- ^ Keese 2004, p. 162
- ^ Bernault 1996, p. 222
- ^
Reed 1987, p. 293
- ^ a
b
Garrison, Lloyd (23
February 1964), "Many Gabonese Angered By
Paris; Intervention to Crush Coup Sets Off Controversy", The New York
Times: p. 7, http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F10716F7395F137A8EDDAA0A94DA405B848AF1D3, retrieved
2008-09-08
- ^
Biteghe 1990, p. 52
- ^
Biteghe 1990, p. 49
- ^ (French)
Pesnot, Patrick (producer) & Billoud, Michel (director) (10
March 2007), 1964, le putsch raté contre
Léon M'Ba président du Gabon [radio], France Inter.
Retrieved on 22 August 2008.
- ^ a
b
c
Reed 1987, p. 296
- ^ Biteghe 1990, p. 54
- ^ Biteghe 1990, p. 55
- ^ a
b
Biteghe 1990, p. 59
- ^
Darlington &
Darlington 1968, pp. 123-124.
- ^ a
b
c
Wallerstein 2005,
p. 78
- ^
International
Institute for Strategic Studies 1964, p. 8
- ^ a
b
c
d
e
Darlington &
Darlington 1968, p. 131
- ^
"Sounds in the Night",
Time, 8 November 1963, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,897004,00.html, retrieved
2008-10-11
- ^ Darlington & Darlington
1968, p. 132
- ^ a
b
c
d
e
Matthews 1966, p. 115
- ^ a
b
Darlington &
Darlington 1968, p. 140
- ^ a
b
c
Darlington &
Darlington 1968, p. 130
- ^ Pederson, Nicholas (May
2000) ( – Scholar search), French Involvement in
Gabon, University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/research/OPs/Pederson/html/contents/sect5.html, retrieved
2008-08-09
- ^ Giniger, Henry (20
February 1964), "Gabon Insurgents Yield as
France Rushes in Troops", The New York Times, http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F40815F73E5415738DDDA90A94DA405B848AF1D3, retrieved
2008-09-17
- ^
Gardinier 1994, p. 58
- ^ a
b
Biteghe 1990, p. 62
- ^ a
b
"Gabon Regime Ousted;
Military Seizes Power", The Washington Post: p. C20,
19 February 1964, http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost_historical/access/164576492.html?dids=164576492:164576492&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=FEB+19%2C+1964&author=&pub=The+Washington+Post&desc=Gabon+Regime+Ousted%3B+Military+Seizes+Power&pqatl=google, retrieved
2008-09-08
- ^ Darlington & Darlington
1968, p. 335
- ^
Biteghe 1990, p. 63
- ^
Gardinier 1994,
p. 59.
- ^ a
b
Whitney, Craig R.
(20 March 1997), "Jacques Foccart Dies at 83;
Secret Mastermind in Africa", The New York Times, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E02E4D81E38F933A15750C0A961958260, retrieved
2008-08-06
- ^ Darlington & Darlington
1968, p. 134
- ^ a
b
c
d
e
f
Pederson, Nicholas
(May 2000) ( – Scholar search), French Intervention in
the 1964 Coup In Gabon, University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/Research/OPs/Pederson/html/contents/sect6.html, retrieved
2008-08-06
- ^
"Gabon History",
Encyclopedia of the Nations, Thomson Gale,
2007, http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Gabon-HISTORY.html, retrieved
2008-08-06
- ^ Matthews 1966, p. 124
- ^
Yates 1996, p. 110
- ^ a
b
Root, Waverley (20
February 1964), "French Action Taken to Halt More Coups", The
Washington Post: p. A34
- ^ a
b
French, Howard W.
(22 May 1996), "France's Army Keeps Grip in
African Ex-Colonies", The New York Times, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C00E0DB1039F931A15756C0A960958260, retrieved
2008-08-06
- ^ a
b
c
d
e
f
g
Garrison, Lloyd (21
February 1964), "Gabon President Resumes
Office: Mba, Restored by French, Vows 'Total Punishment' for All
Who Aided Coup", The New York Times: p. 1, http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F40A1EF73E5415738DDDA80A94DA405B848AF1D3, retrieved
2008-09-08
- ^ Biteghe 1990, p. 19
- ^ a
b
Yates 1996, p. 112
- ^
Darlington Darlington,
p. 126
- ^ a
b
c
Matthews 1966, p. 125
- ^
Grundy, Kenneth W.
(October 1968), "On Machiavelli and the
Mercenaries", The Journal of Modern African Studies
6 (3): 295–310, doi:10.1017/S0022278X00017420, http://www.jstor.org/pss/159300
(subscription
required)
- ^ Matthews 1966, p. 116
- ^ a
b
c
Darlington &
Darlington 1968, p. 133
- ^ a
b
c
Matthews 1966, p. 117
- ^ a
b
Darlington &
Darlington 1968, p. 135
- ^ a
b
Root, Waverley (21
February 1964), ""No Pity, No Pardon", Gabon
Rebels Warned", The Washington Post: p.
A34, http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost_historical/access/164580052.html?dids=164580052:164580052&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=FEB+21%2C+1964&author=By+Waverley+Root+The+Washington+Post+Foreign+Service&pub=The+Washington+Post&desc='No+Pity%2C+No+Pardon%2C'+Gabon+Rebels+Warned&pqatl=google, retrieved
2008-09-08
- ^ a
b
c
Garrison, Lloyd (10
March 1964), "Gunmen in Gabon Rake U.S.
Mission: Whites Again Bomb Building in Former French State --
Nobody Is Injured", The New York Times: 1–5, http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FB0916FD355E147A93C2A81788D85F408685F9, retrieved
2008-09-08
- ^
Yates 1996, pp. 112-113
- ^ Biteghe 1990, p. 100
- ^ a
b
Biteghe 1990, p. 92
- ^
Darlington &
Darlington 1968, p. 139
- ^ a
b
c
d
Reed 1987, p. 298
- ^ a
b
c
"Street Rioting in Gabon is
Reported Put Down", The New York Times (Associated
Press): p. 6, 3 March 1964, http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FA0912FC395415738DDDAA0894DB405B848AF1D3, retrieved
2008-09-08
- ^
Matthews 1966, p. 130.
- ^ a
b
Garrison, Lloyd (6
March 1964), "Gabonese Capital Tense After
Riots", The New York Times: 9, http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F40813FC355E147A93C4A91788D85F408685F9, retrieved
2008-09-08
- ^ a
b
c
Garrison, Lloyd (11
March 1964), "French-African Bitterness Is
Increasing in Gabon", The New York Times: p. 15, http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F70711FF3A5C147A93C3A81788D85F408685F9, retrieved
2008-09-07
- ^ a
b
c
"Americans Score French in
Gabon", The New York Times: 3, 7 March
1964, http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F50A12FD395415738DDDAE0894DB405B848AF1D3, retrieved
2008-09-07
- ^ a
b
c
Howe, Russell Warren (7
April 1964), "Election Sunday to Test
French "Counter-Coup" in Gabon", The
Washington Post: p. D7, http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost_historical/access/197659472.html?dids=197659472:197659472&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=APR+08%2C+1964&author=By+Russell+Warren+Howe+The+Washington+Post+Foreign+Service&pub=The+Washington+Post&desc=Election+Sunday+to+Test+French+'Counter-Coup'+in+Gabon&pqatl=google, retrieved
2008-09-08
- ^ a
b
"Sure Cure for
Sterility", Time, 28 March 1964, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,940365,00.html, retrieved
2008-08-10
- ^ a
b
c
Darlington &
Darlington 1968, p. 158
- ^
"Gabon Chief Clears U.S. of
Role in Plot", The New York Times (Associated
Press): 16, 16 March 1964, http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F30915F9395415738DDDAE0994DB405B848AF1D3, retrieved
2008-09-08
- ^
Darlington &
Darlington 1968, pp. 170-171.
- ^
"US Ambassador to Gabon", Notable Names Database (Soylent Communications), 2008, http://www.nndb.com/gov/554/000120194/, retrieved
2008-10-19
- ^
"Mba Dissolves His Cabinet
And Again Delays Election", The New York Times (Associated
Press): 3, 25 February 1964, http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F30914FF3A5C147A93C7AB1789D85F408685F9, retrieved
2008-09-18
- ^
Biteghe 1990, p. 94
- ^
"French Stand Guard While
Gabon Votes", The New York Times (Associated
Press): p. 7, 12 April 1964, http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F40D16F8385B1B728DDDAA0994DC405B848AF1D3, retrieved
2008-09-23
- ^ a
b
Biteghe 1990, p. 96
- ^
"Troops Patrolling Capital of
Gabon to Keep Order", The New York Times (Associated
Press): p. 45, 16 April 1964, http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F00D1EF83A5C147A93C4A8178FD85F408685F9, retrieved
2008-09-08
- ^ Matthews 1966, p. 127
- ^ a
b
c
d
Matthews 1966, p. 128.
- ^
"Coup Planners Blame Army
Lag", The Washington Post (Reuters): A1, 31 August
1964, http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost_historical/access/181183942.html?dids=181183942:181183942&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=SEP+01%2C+1964&author=&pub=The+Washington+Post&desc=Coup+Planners+Blame+Army+Lag&pqatl=google, retrieved
2008-09-18
- ^ a
b
Matthews 1966, p. 129.
- ^ a
b
Yates 1996, p. 113
- ^
"Gabon Convicts 17 in
February's Coup", The New York Times (Reuters), 10 September
1964, http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F3071FFD355415738DDDA90994D1405B848AF1D3, retrieved
2008-09-28
- ^ Yates 1996, p. 114
- ^
Reed 1987, p. 283
- ^
Reed 1987, p. 288
- ^ Yates 1996, p. 117
Bibliography
- (French)
Bernault, Florence
(1996), Démocraties ambiguës en Afrique centrale:
Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, 1940-1965, Paris: Karthala, ISBN 2865376362, OCLC 36142247
.
- (French)
Biteghe, Moïse
N’Solé (1990), Echec aux militaires au Gabon en 1964,
Paris: Chaka, ISBN 2907768069, OCLC 29518659
.
- Darlington, Charles Francis;
Darlington, Alice B. (1968), African Betrayal, New York, New York: D. McKay Co., OCLC 172139
.
- Gardinier,
David E. (1994), Historical Dictionary of Gabon (2nd ed.),
Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow
Press, ISBN 0810814358, OCLC 7462387
.
-
International
Institute for Strategic Studies (1964), Adelphi Papers:
NATO and the Cyprus Crisis, Adelphi Papers (9,14,17,21-23 ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, OCLC 173447370
.
- (French)
Keese, Alexander
(2004), "L'évolution du leader
indigène aux yeux des administrateurs français: Léon M'Ba et le
changement des modalités de participation au pouvoir local au
Gabon, 1922-1967", Afrique & Histoire
2 (1): 141–170, ISSN 1764-1977, http://www.cairn.info/article.php?ID_REVUE=AFHI&ID_NUMPUBLIE=AFHI_002&ID_ARTICLE=AFHI_002_0141
.
- Matthews,
Ronald (1966), African Powder Keg: Revolt and Dissent in Six
Emergent Nations, London: The Bodley Head, OCLC 246401461
.
- Murison,
Katharine, ed. (2003), Africa South of the Sahara 2004
(33rd ed.), London: Europa
Publications, ISBN 1-85743-183-9,
OCLC 52621809
.
- (French)
Péan, Pierre
(1983), Affaires africaines, Paris: Fayard, ISBN 2213013241, OCLC 10363948
.
- Reed, Michael C.
(June 1987), "Gabon: A Neo-Colonial Enclave
of Enduring French Interest", The Journal of Modern African Studies
(Cambridge University Press)
25 (2): 283–320, doi:10.1017/S0022278X00000392, OCLC 77874468, http://www.jstor.org/pss/161015
.
- Wallerstein,
Immanuel Maurice (2005), Africa: The Politics of Independence
and Unity, Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska
Press, ISBN 0803298560, OCLC 60590049
.
- Yates, Douglas A.
(1996), The rentier state in Africa: oil rent dependency and
neocolonialism in the Republic of Gabon, Trenton,
New Jersey: Africa World Press, ISBN 0-86543-521-9,
OCLC 34543635
.
1964 Gabon coup
d'état |
|
| Key figures |
|
|
| Key places |
|
|
| Key events |
|
|