From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The daily
Hürriyet ran an extra edition, whose
headline read "The army has seized control".
The 12 September 1980 Turkish coup d'état,
headed by Chief of the General Staff General Kenan Evren,
was the third coup d'état in the history of the Republic after the 1960 coup and the 1971 "Coup by Memorandum".
The 1970s were marked by right-wing and left-wing armed
conflicts—proxy wars
between the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively.[1] In
order to create a pretext for a decisive intervention, the Turkish
military allowed the conflicts to escalate;[2][3]
some say they actively adopted a strategy of tension.[4][5] The
violence abruptly stopped afterwards,[6] and the
coup was welcomed by some for restoring order.[2]
For the next three years the Turkish Armed Forces ruled the
country through the National Security
Council, before democracy was restored.[7]
Prelude
In 1975 Süleyman Demirel, president of the
conservative Justice Party (Turkish:
Adalet Partisi, AP)
succeeded Bülent Ecevit, president of the
social-democratic Republican People's
Party (Turkish: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) as
Prime Minister. He formed a coalition with the Nationalist Front
(Turkish:
Milliyetçi Cephe), Necmettin
Erbakan's fundamentalist National Salvation Party (Turkish:
Millî Selamet
Partisi, MSP) and Alparslan Türkeş' far right Nationalist Movement Party
(Turkish:
Milliyetçi Hareket
Partisi, MHP). The MHP used the opportunity to
infiltrate state security services, seriously aggravating the
low-intensity war that was waging between rival factions.[8]
The elections of 1977 had no
winner. First, Demirel continued the coalition with the Nationalist
Front. But in 1978 Ecevit was able to get to power again with the
help of some deputies who had shifted from one party to another. In
1979, Demirel once again became Prime Minister. At the end of the
1970s Turkey was in an unstable situation with unsolved economic
and social problems facing strike actions and partial paralysis of
politics (the Grand National Assembly
of Turkey was unable to elect a President during the six months
preceding the coup). Since 1968-69, a proportional representation
system made it difficult to find any parliamentary majority. The
interests of the industrial bourgeoisie, which held the largest holdings
of the country, were opposed by other social classes such as smaller
industrialists, traders, rural notables, landlords, whose interests
did not always coincide among themselves. Numerous agricultural and
industrial reforms requested by parts of the middle upper classes
were blocked by others.[8]
Henceforth, the politicians seemed unable to combat the growing
violence in the country.
Unprecedented political violence had erupted in Turkey in the
late 1970s. The overall death toll of the 1970s is estimated at
5,000, with nearly ten assassinations per day.[8]
Most were members of left-wing and right-wing political
organizations, then engaged in bitter fighting. The
ultra-nationalist Grey
Wolves, youth organisation of the MHP party, claimed they were supporting the
security forces.[7]
According to the British Searchlight
magazine, in 1978 there were 3,319 fascist attacks, in which
831 were killed and 3,121 wounded.[9]
In the central trial against the left-wing organization Devrimci Yol
(Revolutionary Path) at Ankara Military Court the defendants listed
5,388 political killings before the military coup. Among the
victims were 1,296 right-wingers and 2,109 left-wingers. The others
could not clearly be related.[10] The
1978 Bahçelievler
Massacre, the 1977 Taksim Square massacre with 35
victims and the 1978 Kahramanmaraş
Massacre with over 100 victims are some notable incidents.
Martial law was announced the Kahramanmaraş Massacre in 14 of
(then) 67 provinces in December 1978. At the time of the coup
martial law had been extended to 20 provinces.
Ecevit was warned about the coming coup in June 1979 by Nuri
Gündeş of the National Intelligence
Organization (MİT). Ecevit then told his interior minister,
İrfan Özaydınlı, who then told Sedat Celasun—one of the five
generals who would lead the coup. The deputy undersecretary of the
MİT, Nihat Yıldız, was demoted to the London consulate and replaced
by a lieutenant general as a result.[11]
Coup
Evren's letter to Demirel, dated September 12.
On 11 September 1979, Evren ordered a hand-written report from
full general Haydar Saltık on whether or not a coup was in order,
or if the government merely needed a stern warning. The report,
which recommended preparing for a coup, was delivered in six
months. Evren kept the report in his office safe.[12]
Evren says the only other person beside Saltık who was aware of the
details was Nurettin Ersin. It has been argued that this was a ploy
on Evren's part to encompass the political spectrum as Saltık was
close the left, while Ersin took care of the right. Backlash from
political organizations after the coup would thereby be
prevented.[3]
Kenan Evren declaring coup d'état on the national channel
TRT.
On 21 December, the War Academy generals convened to decide the
course of action. The pretext for the coup was to put an end to the
social conflicts of the 1970s, as well as the parliamentary
instability. They resolved to issue the party leaders (Süleyman
Demirel and Bülent Ecevit) a memorandum by way of the
president, Fahri Korutürk, which was done on 27
December. The leaders received the letter a week later.[12]
A second report, submitted in March 1980, recommended
undertaking the coup without further delay, otherwise apprehensive
lower-ranked officers might be tempted to "take the matter into
their own hands".[12]
Evren made only minor amendments to Saltık's plan, titled
"Operation Flag" (Turkish: Bayrak Harekâtı).[3]
The coup was planned to take place on 11 July 1980, but was
postponed after a motion to put Demirel's government to a vote of confidence was rejected on 2 July.
At the Supreme Military Council meeting (Turkish:
Yüksek Askeri Şura)
on August 26, a second date was proposed: September 12.[12]
On 7 September 1980, Evren and the four service commanders
decided that they would overthrow the civilian government. On
September 12, the National Security
Council (Turkish: Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK), headed
by Evren declared coup d'état on the national channel. The MGK then
extended martial law
throughout the country, abolished the Parliament and the government, suspended
the Constitution and
banned all political parties and trade unions. They invoked the Kemalist
tradition of state secularism and of the unity of the nation, which
had already justified the precedent coups, and presented themselves
as opposed to communism, fascism, separatism and religious
sectarianism.[8]
Economy
One of coup's most visible effects was on the economy. On the
day of the coup, it was on the verge of collapse, with three digit
inflation. There was large-scale unemployment, and a chronic
foreign trade deficit. The economic changes of the 1980-1983 period
were credited to Turgut Özal, who was the main person
responsible for the economic policy by the Demirel administration
since January 24, 1980. Özal supported the IMF, and to this end he
forced the resignation of the director of the Central Bank, İsmail Aydınoğlu, who opposed
it.
The strategic aim was to unite Turkey with the "global economy," which big
business supported,[13] and
gave Turkish companies the ability to market products and services
globally. One month after the coup, London's International
Banking Review wrote "A feeling of hope is evident among
international bankers that Turkey's military coup may have opened
the way to greater political stability as an essential prerequisite
for the revitalization of the Turkish economy".[14]
During 1980-1983, the foreign exchange left free. The foreign
investment encouraged. The national establishments, initiated by Ataturk reforms, were promoted to involve
with of joint enterprises with foreign establishments. The 85%
pre-coup level government involvement in economy forced for a
reduction in the relative importance of the state sector. Just
after the coup, Turkey revitalized the Atatürk Dam and the Southeastern Anatolia
Project, which was a land reform project promoted as a solution
to the underdeveloped Southeastern Anatolia was
transformed into a multi-sector social and economic development
program, a sustainable development
program, for the 9 million people of the region. The closed
economy, produced for only Turkey's need, subsidized for a vigorous
export drive.
The drastic increase in the economy during this period was
relative to the previous level. The domestic product remained well
below those of most Middle Eastern and European countries. Some
undesirable results were the freezing of wages,
a significant decrease of the public sector, a deflationist policy,
and several successive mini-devaluations.[8]
Tribunals
The coup moved the members of the sides into court system.
Within a very short time, there were 250,000[7]-650,000
people detained. Among the detainess, 230,000 were tried, 14,000
were stripped of citizenship, and 50 were executed.[15] In
addition, hundreds of thousands of people were tortured, and
thousands are still missing. A total of 1,683,000 people were
blacklisted.[16] Apart
from the militants killed during shootings, at least four prisoners
were legally executed immediately after the coup; the first ones
since 1972, while in February 1982 there were 108 prisoners
condemned to capital punishment.[8]
Among the prosecuted were Ecevit, Demirel, Türkeş, and Erbakan, who
were incarcerated and temporarily suspended from politics.
One notable victim of the hangings was a 17-year-old Erdal Eren,
who said he looked forward to it in order to avoid thinking of the
torture he had witnessed.[17]
After having taken advantage of the Grey Wolves' activism,
General Kenan Evren imprisoned hundreds of them. At the time they
were some 1700 Grey Wolves organizations in Turkey, with about
200,000 registered members and a million sympathizers.[18]
In its indictment of the MHP in May 1981, the Turkish military
government charged 220 members of the MHP and its affiliates for
694 murders.[9]
Evren and his cohorts realized that Türkeş was a charismatic leader
who could challenge their authority using the paramilitary Grey
Wolves.[19]
Following the coup in Colonel Türkeş's indictment, the Turkish
press revealed the close links maintained by the MHP with security
forces as well as organized crime involved in drug
trade, which financed in returns weapons and the
activities of hired fascist commandos all over the country.[8]
Constitution
Within three years the generals passed some 800 laws in order to
form a militarily disciplined society.[20] The
coup members were convinced of the unworkability of the existing
Constitution. They decided to adopt a new constitution that
included mechanisms to prevent what they saw as impeding the
functioning of democracy. On 29 June 1981 the military junta
appointed 160 people as members of an Advisory Assembly to draft a
new Constitution. The new
constitution brought clear limits and definitions, such as on the
rules of election of the President, which was stated as a factor
for the coup d'état.
On 7 November 1982 the new Constitution was put to a referendum,
which was accepted with 92%. On 9 November 1982 Kenan Evren was
appointed President for the next
seven years.
Aftermath
After the approval by referendum of the new Constitution in June
1982, Kenan Evren organized general elections, held on 6 November
1983. This transition to
democracy has been criticized by the Turkish scholar Ergun
Özbudun as a "textbook case" of a junta's dictating the terms of
its departure.[21]
The referendum and the elections did not take place in a free
and competitive setting. Many political leaders of pre-coup era
(including Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, Alparslan Türkeş and
Necmettin Erbakan) had been banned from politics, and all new
parties needed to get the approval of the National Security Council
in order to participate in the elections. Only 3 parties, two of
which were actually created by the junta were permitted to
contest.
The secretary general of the National Security Council was
general Haydar Saltık. Both him and Evren were the strong men of
the regime, while the government was headed by a retired admiral,
Bülent Ulusu, and included several retired military officers and a
few civil servants. Some alleged in Turkey, after the coup, that
general Saltuk had been preparing a more radical, rightist coup,
which had been one of the reason prompting the other generals to
act, respecting the hierarchy, and then to include him in the MGK
in order to neutralize him.[8]
Out of the 1983 elections came one-party governance under Turgut Özal's Motherland Party, which
combined a neoliberal economic program with conservative social
values.
Yildirim Akbulut became the head of the
Parliament. He was succeeded in 1991 by Mesut Yılmaz.
Meanwhile, Süleyman Demirel founded the center-right True Path Party in 1983, and returned to
active politics after the 1987 Turkish referendum.
Yılmaz redoubled Turkey's economic profile, converting towns
like Gaziantep from
small provincial capitals into mid-sized economic boomtowns, and
renewed its orientation toward Europe. But
political instability followed as the host of banned politicians
reentered politics, fracturing the vote, and the Motherland Party
became increasingly corrupt. Ozal, who succeeded Evren as President
of Turkey, died of a heart attack in 1993 and Süleyman Demirel was
elected president.
The Özal government empowered the police force with
intelligence capabilities to counter the National Intelligence
Organization, which at the time was run by the military. The
police force even engaged in external intelligence collection.[22]
American
involvement
Recognizing the power vacuum in Europe after World War II,
President Harry
S. Truman formulated the Truman Doctrine to prevent European
countries from being pulled into the Soviet sphere of
influence.[23]
As "the West's easternmost bulwark against communism",[24]
Turkey was an especially "strategic ally in the containment of
Soviet communism".[25] To
this end, the United States set up a secret paramilitary network
under Operation Gladio whose members were
trained to subvert a possible Soviet invasion, and stage false flag attacks that
would be pinned on communists. Anti-communist groups were also
funded to debilitate communism's support from within[23]
. The name of the Turkish branch of the operation was revealed by
prime minister Ecevit in 1974 to be the "Counter-Guerrilla"[26].
Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Washington had
lost its main ally in the region, while the Carter doctrine, formulated on 23 January
1980 stated that the United States would use military force if
necessary to defend its national interests in the Persian Gulf region.
Turkey received large sums of economic aid mainly organized by the
OECD and
military aid from the NATO but the USA in particular.[27]
Between 1979 and 1982 the OECD countries raised $4 billion in
economic aid to Turkey.[28]
Washington started developing the Rapid Deployment
Forces (RDF) in implementation of the Carter doctrine, for a
quick intervention in areas outside NATO, particularly in the
Persian Gulf, and without having to rely on NATO troops. On 1
October 1979 President Jimmy Carter announced the foundation of the
RDF. One day before the military coup of 12 September 1980 some
3,000 American troops of the RDF started a maneuver Anvil
Express on Turkish soil.[29] Just
before the coup, the general in charge of the Turkish Air Forces
had travelled to the United States.[8] At
the end of 1981 a Turkish-American Defense Council (Turkish:
Türk-Amerikan Savunma
Konseyi) was founded. Defense Minister Ümit Haluk and
Richard Perle,
then US Assistant
Secretary of Defense of the new Reagan administration, and the deputy Chief
of Staff Necdet Öztorun participated in its first meeting on 27
April 1982. On 9 October 1982 a "Memorandum of Understanding" (Turkish:
Mutabakat Belgesi)
was signed with a focus of extending airports mainly in the
Southeast for military purposed. Such airports were built in the
provinces of Batman, Muş, Bitlis, Van and Kars in the south-east.
The U.S. support of this coup was acknowledged by the CIA Ankara
station chief Paul Henze. After the
government was overthrown, Henze cabled Washington, saying, "our
boys [in Ankara] did it."[30][31] This
has created the impression that the USA stood behind the coup.
Henze denied this during a June 2003 interview on CNN Türk's
Manşet, but two days later Birand presented an interview
with Henze recorded in 1997 in which he basically confirmed Mehmet
Ali Birand's story.[32][33] The
US State Department itself announced the
coup during the night between 11 and 12 September: the military had
phoned the US embassy in Ankara to alert them of the coup an hour in
advance.[8]
After the coup, State
Security Courts were set up, as prescribed in U.S. Army Field Manual 31-15: Operations Against
Irregular Forces (translated into Turkish in 1965 as ST
31-15: Ayaklanmaları Bastırma Harekâtı);[23]
the Counter-Guerrilla's bible.[34][35]
According to senior PKK member Selahattin Çelik,[36] the
coup was "the State Security Courts are a product of the Special
Warfare Department and they are assigned the task of restructuring
the judicial process to fit the demands of the
contra-guerrillas."[23]
The manual instructs the courts "not to condemn the defendants
according to the punishments set out for the political crimes, but
to administer punishments as severe as those set out for murder and
other crimes against the person".[37]
Severe punishments were indeed legion in the wake of the coup.
Imprisoned Grey Wolves members were offered amnesty if they
agreed to fight the Kurdish
minority and the outlawed Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK) in the south-east of the country[38] as
well as the Armenian
Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). They then
went on to fight separatist Kurds, under the guidance of the "Counter-Guerrilla", killing and
torturing thousands in the 1980s, and also carrying "false flag attacks in
which the Counter-Guerrilla attacked villages, dressed up as PKK
fighters, and raped and executed people randomly".[39] The
dirty
war had a toll of 37,000 victims.[40]
Retired staff lieutenant colonel Talat Turhan, who has devoted
three decades to exposing the Counter-Guerrilla, confirmed that
they had engaged in torture, having been a victim in July 1972.[41] In
his book Zordur Zorda Gülmek, journalist Oğuz Güven
enumerated the methods employed, including but not limited to bastinado, urination, and submersion in sewage.[42]
Based on incidents such as the aforementioned, a growing number
of people are reaching the conclusion that the United States,
acting through the Counter-Guerrilla, directed the coup.[23][35][43]
In
Culture
The coup had been criticised on many Turkish movies, TV series
and songs after 1980
Movies
TV Series
Music
- Cem Karaca (1992),
maNga (2006), Ayben (2008),
'Raptiye Rap Rap' (1992)
- Fikret Kızılok 'Demirbaş' (1995)
- Grup Yorum: Büyü -
(Composed in memory of Erdal Eren)
- Hasan Mutlucan, 'Yine de Şahlanıyor'
- Mor ve
Ötesi, 'Darbe' (2006)
- Ozan Arif, Yaşıyor Kenan Paşa
- Ozan Arif, 'Seksenciler'
- Ozan Arif, 'Muhasebe'(12 Eylül)
- Ozan Arif, Bir İt Vardı
- Sezen Aksu, 'Son
Bakış' (1989)
- Suavi
'Eylül' (1996)
- Teoman ve Yavuz Bingöl,
'İki Çocuk' (2006)
- Özdemir Erdoğan, 'Gurbet Türküsü'
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August 1983, pg.11.
- ^
Alternative Türkeihilfe, Militärs an der Macht (An
alternative aid for Turkey, Military in Power) Herford (Germany),
August 1983, pg.6.
- ^ Birand, Mehmet Ali.
12 Eylül, Saat: 04.00, 1984, pg. 1
- ^
Hear Paul Henze say it: Fethullahçı Gladyo at YouTube (requires Adobe Flash)
8m20s in.
- ^ Balta, Ibrahim.
"Birand’dan Paul Henze’ye
‘sesli–görüntülü’ yalanlama," Zaman, 14 June 2003.(Turkish)
- ^
"Paul Henze ‘Bizim çocuklar
yaptı’ demiş" (in Turkish). Hürriyet. 2003-06-14. http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?viewid=279384. Retrieved
2008-10-09.
- ^
"Gladyo-Ergenekon yol
kardeşliği" (in Turkish). Radikal. 2008-08-13. http://www.radikal.com.tr/Default.aspx?aType=Detay&ArticleID=893195&Date=13.08.2008&CategoryID=77. Retrieved
2008-10-15.
- ^ a
b
Turhan, Talat (1976-10-11). "12 Mart Hukuku'nun Ardındaki
ABD mi?" (in Turkish). Politika Gazetesi. http://www.talatturhan.com/gazete-17.htm. Retrieved
2008-11-04.
- ^
Kutschera, Chris. "Revelations on the
PKK". http://www.chris-kutschera.com/A/Revelations%20PKK.htm. Retrieved 2008-11-05.
"Selahattin Celik participated in the secret meetings which
preceded the foundation of the PKK and was one of the small number
of PKK leaders who organised the armed struggle and the first
military operations against Turkish army bases on 15 August 1984, a
historic date in the history of the PKK."
Originally
published in The Middle East magazine, May 2000; Al
Wasat, 24 January 2000; L'Express, 10 Février 2000; Le Temps, 22 Février
2000.
- ^
FM 31-15, quoted in Celik.
- ^
Former Grey Wolves member İbrahim Çiftçi speaking to Milliyet on 13 November
1996. "They have used and discarded
us". Turkish Daily
News. Milliyet.
1996-11-14. http://turkishdailynews.com.tr/archives.php?id=1457. Retrieved
2008-10-22.
Çiftçi was
assassinated by the Ergenekon network
ten years later.
- ^
(Ganser 2005, p. 241)
- ^ Oberlé, Thierry (2006-05-02). "Les Kurdes de Turquie
redoutent un retour aux années de plomb" (in French). Le Figaro. http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/20060502.FIG000000233_les_kurdes_de_turquie_redoutent_un_retour_aux_annees_de_plomb.html. Retrieved 2 May
2006.
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Ketenci, Şükran (1975-11-11). "Kontrgerilla Köşküne
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"12 Eylül'ün inanılmaz işkence
yöntemleri" (in Turkish). Hürriyet. 2008-09-12. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/9882487.asp. Retrieved
2008-09-12.
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Dündar, Can (2008-01-23). "Güncele Dair: Ergenekon"
(in Turkish). http://www.candundar.com.tr/index.php?Did=5983. Retrieved
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Bibliography
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Secret Armies. Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western
Europe. London: Frank Cass.
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