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The Venezuelan coup attempt of 2002 was a failed coup d'état on 11 April 2002 that lasted 47 hours, whereby the head of state President Hugo Chávez was illegally detained,[1][2] the National Assembly and the Supreme Court dissolved, and the country's 1999 Constitution declared void.[3]

Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce (Fedecámaras) president Pedro Carmona was installed as interim president. In Caracas, the coup led to a pro-Chávez uprising that the Metropolitan Police attempted to suppress.[4] Key sectors of the military[5] and parts of the anti-Chávez movement refused to back Carmona.[6][7] The pro-Chávez Presidential Guard eventually retook the Miraflores presidential palace without firing a shot, leading to the collapse of the Carmona government and the re-installation of Chávez as president.

The coup was publicly condemned by Latin American nations (the Rio Group presidents were gathered together in San José, Costa Rica, at the time, and were able to issue a joint communiqué) and international organizations. The United States and Spain quickly acknowledged the de facto pro-US Carmona government, but ended up condemning the coup after it had been defeated.[8]

Contents

Background

Chávez was first elected president in 1998. One of his campaign promises was to convene a new constitutional convention,[9] and on 15 December 1999 he put the new Constitution of Venezuela to the voters in a referendum, which passed with 71.78% of the popular vote. Opposition to the Chávez government was particularly strong in the private media,[10] the business community and among the upper and middle classes who feared losing economic and political power as a result of Chávez's reforms.[11] The new policies of subsidizing basic foodstuffs, redistributing oil revenue and breaking-up large land estates were particularly contentious. Following the 1999 constitutional referendum, Chávez was reelected in 2000 under the terms of the new constitution.

Geopolitically, Venezuela under Chávez has shifted its alignment away from the United States in favor of more sovereignty and cooperation with other Latin American countries through, amongst other organisations, Mercosur. It forged links with Cuba, providing the island with 160,000 barrels (25,000 m3) of oil a day and assisting the nation's fledgling oil industry. In return, Venezuela received 10,000 doctors and other health care workers, to jump-start Chávez's effort (Barrio Adentro) to reduce infant mortality and the occurrence of treatable diseases. Private media companies and newspapers continued without censorship or state interference, despite their often virulent hostility to the government.

In early 2002, Chávez's attempts to end the functional independence of the state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), to bring its oil revenues under state control were met with strong resistance from PDVSA officials and managers. The case of the PDVSA management received a great deal of attention from the private media. In February 2002, Chávez replaced several of PDVSA's top officials with people more in sympathy with his economic program.[12] Tensions between the Chávez government and PDVSA management continued to escalate through March and early April, culminating on 8 April 2002, when Chávez fired seven top PDVSA executives (and several other managers of lesser status) during a televised address.[13] The fired PDVSA managers received immediate support from the private media and the upper and middle classes.

Events leading up to the coup

A still from footage showing pro-Chávez shooters on Puente Llaguno. Both sides still contest at whom shots were fired.

The first hints of disturbance emerged when Venezuela Air Force Colonel Pedro Vicente Soto and National Reserve Captain Pedro Flores Rivero led a small rally protesting the Chávez government's allegedly undemocratic and authoritarian practices. They were sent home in uniform and placed under investigation by a joint civilian and military board.

On 9 April 2002, the Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV)—the country's largest trade-union federation, traditionally affiliated with the opposition Democratic Action (Acción Democrática) party, led by Carlos Ortega—called for a two-day strike. Fedecámaras joined the strike/lockout and called on all of its affiliated member businesses to shut down for 48 hours. Two days later, amid rapidly escalating tensions, an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 people marched to the PDVSA headquarters in defense of its recently dismissed management board. Unexpectedly, the organizers decided to re-route the march to Miraflores, the presidential palace, where a pro-Chávez demonstration was taking place. The march was re-routed without consultation with the Police, who legally had to approve the changed route,[14] and in spite of protests from organisers from the pro-Chávez march who feared a confrontation. Twenty people were killed and more than 100 wounded, with victims on both sides.

There is no consensus as to who was responsible for the deaths on 11 April 2002, and this remains one of the most controversial issues in Venezuelan politics today. The opposition version of events puts the blame on Chávez, or at least on his supporters. Several private television channels in Venezuela showed footage of people using handguns to shoot from the pro-Chávez counter-march being held on Puente Llaguno, an overpass that crosses one of central Caracas's busiest avenues; it is unclear who they are shooting at but the commentary and juxtaposition with separate video of the dead made for a clear story. These shooters were four pro-Chávez political activists identified as Rafael Cabrices, Richard Peñalver, Henry Atencio, and Nicolás Rivera. They were captured by the police and jailed for one year as they awaited trial, but charges were dropped before the trial began. Rafael Cabrices died from a heart attack three years later, 30 August 2005[15].

There are a number of problems with this version of events. The anti-Chávez commercial stations repeatedly showed only a small part of the scene (see still shot), of pro-Chávez supporters firing, claiming they were firing at unarmed demonstrators. The documentary The Revolution Will Not Be Televised included footage captured by an amateur cameraman that showed the gunmen firing while the street below was empty (except for an armoured police which had previously been firing at the bridgevehicle) and not filled with demonstrators.

The gunmen - Cabrices, Peñalver, Atencio and Rivera - argue that they were, in fact, returning fire at unknown snipers firing towards them. An eyewitness with military experience, who was shot himself, reported most victims being killed with precise head shots, and alerted the crowds to the danger of snipers.[16] Some of the victims (which included both opposition and Chavistas) were shot in locations not reachable from the bridge, being around corners from the main street.[17] El Nacional reported that the presidential honour guard arrested 3 snipers,[18] while other reports claim 7 arrests at the Hotel Ausonia of men later freed in the chaos of the coup, and empty shells found at the Hotel Edén.[19] A reconstruction of the events is the basis for the film Llaguno Bridge: Keys to a Massacre[20] which provides video and photographic evidence that most victims were shot between 3.20pm and 3.55pm, while the Chavistas on the Bridge did not begin firing until 4.38pm. Finally, CNN correspondent Otto Neustald has said that on the morning of 11 April he recorded a video message from a number of high-ranking military officers which was broadcast later in the day. The message, recorded at least two hours before the killings started, accused Chávez of massacring innocent people using snipers, referring to at least 6 dead and dozens wounded.[21]

Several times in the early afternoon, Chávez took to the airwaves in several cadenas (government announcements or addresses broadcast over all public and private airwaves), some of which asked protesters to return to their homes while others featured lengthy pre-recorded discourses led by the president. The last of these cadenas began just minutes after shots were fired at the crowds of protesters and continued throughout the massacre. The private television reacted by splitting the screen between the president's address and scenes of the massacre. Chávez then ordered private outlets to be taken off the air in a forced blackout. The measure managed to block coverage of the crisis in Caracas only, as the private television stations continued to broadcast in the rest of the country and via satellite.[22]

Coup

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Chávez's detention

President Chávez and several ministers were in the presidential palace, which was surrounded by tanks. The evening of 11 April, members of the military high command entered the palace, demanding Chávez' resignation. General Manuel Rosendo, chief of the National Unified Army Command (CUFAN) at the time, reported that he and others chose to disobey the president when he ordered them to apply Plan Ávila, a contingency plan designed to deal with major disturbances.[23]

Chávez, under arrest in Turiamo.

In the early hours of 12 April, the coup plotters demanded Chávez' resignation. With the loss of "almost all ... military force on hand in order to resist or move to another place",[24] Chávez said that he would consider it, in order to avoid a potential bloodbath if there were disturbances involving the crowds outside Miraflores.[25] However he declared that four conditions would have to be met, including that he be allowed to resign before the National Assembly, with power passing constitutionally to the Vice President prior to new elections; and that he would be able to address the nation live on television.[26][24] At 3 am, with the coup plotters threatening to bomb the Miraflores palace if Chávez did not resign, Chávez told General-in-Chief Lucas Rincón that he would do so. Within twenty minutes Rincon had announced on television that Chávez had been asked for his resignation, and had accepted.[27] A few minutes later, Chávez was told that the four conditions he had declared would no longer be accepted, and Chávez declared that he would surrender himself to the coup plotters as "president prisoner".[28]

After the resignation had been announced, Chávez was escorted under military guard to Fort Tiuna, where he met with representatives of the Roman Catholic Church. Chávez was also met by army officers, who by then had determined that he was not to be sent to Cuba. Instead, Chávez would be taken to La Orchila, a military base off the coast of Venezuela, until rebel leaders could decide Chávez's fate. Whilst being held at Fort Tiuna, Chávez was able to get word out that he had not in fact resigned, via a telephone call to his daughter, who, via switchboard operators at Miraflores still loyal to Chávez, was able to speak first to Fidel Castro and then to Cuban television.[29] In an interview with two women from the military's legal department, Chávez reiterated that he had not resigned, and they faxed a copy of his statement to the Attorney General, Isaias Rodriguez. In order to make public the news on Venezuelan media, Rodriguez called a press conference supposedly to announce his own resignation. Instead, on 12 April at 2pm, he announced live on television that Chávez had never quit, and was being held illegally. Most of his statement was cut off, with Venezuelan networks returning to the studios.[30] In the evening, Chávez was flown to the remote naval base of Turiamo, near Puerto Cabello, and he considered the risk of assassination. According to Chávez, at one point an officer declared to another, "If you kill the president here we'll all kill none another."[31] On 13 April, with Chavez supporters having retaken Miraflores and the soldiers holding him now calling him "President", Chávez wrote a note from his captivity in Turiamo stating specifically that he had not resigned.[32]

Carmona's interim presidency

Businessman Pedro Carmona, president of Fedecámaras, was installed as interim President after Chavez' detention. Carmona isssued a decree, which came to be known as the Carmona Decree, dissolving the National Assembly and Supreme Court, and voiding the 1999 Constitution.[33] The decree declared that new elections for a "National Legislative Power" would take place no later than December 2002, and that this would draft a general reform of the 1999 constitution; new "general national elections" would take place within a year of the decree's declaration.[34] The decree also suspended the Attorney General, Comptroller General, state governors and mayors elected during Chávez's administration.[35][36] As one academic later put it, "all institutions were abolished leaving the country effectively without the rule of law."[37] A Rio Group meeting of Latin American governments taking place that day in Costa Rica adopted a resolution condemning the "interruption of constitutional order in Venezuela"; only Francisco Flores of El Salvador said that he would recognise the Carmona government.[38]

Although Carmona promised new elections within a year, with a return to the pre-1999 bicameral parliamentary system, and also repealed a controversial set of 48 laws on the economy which had been passed six months earlier, the dissolution of the institutional framework fragmented the broad anti-Chavez coalition which had supported the coup, with many anti-Chavez groups viewing it as "the triumph of a small oligarchic elite."[33] Additional strategic errors (the failure to include labour leaders such as Carlos Ortega in the government, and the appointment of Admiral Hector Ramirez Perez as minister of defence, ahead of army General Efran Vazquez) contributed to the inability of the interim government to withstand the backlash against it.[33]

Despite police efforts to shut down community radio and television stations, the news that Chavez had not in fact resigned continued to spread.[39] Carmona's installation as President generated a widespread uprising in support of Chávez that was suppressed by the Metropolitan Police.[4] It also led to a demonstration outside the Presidential Palace by hundreds of thousands of people. In contrast to the opposition marches, "it was the poor from the peripheral barrios who returned Chavez to power."[40] The Presidential Guard, loyal to Chávez and cheered on by the demonstrators, retook the palace and the rebellion collapsed. Since Chávez was being held in a secret location, the presidency was assumed for several hours by Vice President Diosdado Cabello until Chávez was reinstated. After the retaking of Miraflores, the military coup plotters held a meeting in Fort Tiuna, and drafted a statement recognising Carmona as President, but demanding the restoration of the country's democratic institutions. In the confusion of the meeting, a Chavez ally crossed out the section recognising Carmona; and it was in this form that the statement was read to CNN studios (since no Venezuelan media would broadcast it)[41]

However, it took some time to make this known. At the beginning of the coup, the dissident military had occupied Venezolana de Televisión, the state television channel, and the private media also refused to broadcast the news instead maintaining the fiction that the coup-plotters had succeeded. Despite the fact that tens of thousands of people had taken to the streets around the palace, Carmona declared that there had been some disturbances, but things were now under control. Chavez loyalists however were able to contact international news organisations who re-broadcast the actual situation back to Venezuela via satellite. Only by 8 o'clock that evening the reinstalled government managed to inform the people through domestic (state) television channels. Because there were difficulties getting Chávez back, to restore order, two hours later the vice-president was sworn in as interim president on television. Chávez returned the next day.

Aftermath

Allegations of U.S. involvement

Chavez has asserted numerous times that U.S government officials knew about plans for a coup, approved of them and assumed they would be successful.[42] Chávez also further alleged that "two military officers from the United States" were present in the headquarters of coup plotters.[43] Rear Admiral Carlos Molina, a central leader of the coup, later said that "We felt we were acting with US support . . . we agree that we can’t permit a communist government here. The US has not let us down yet."[44]

According to a report in The New York Times, US Assistant Secretary of State Otto Reich warned Congressional aides that there was more at stake in Venezuela than the success or failure of Chávez. He accused Chávez of meddling with the historically government-owned state oil company, providing a haven for Colombian guerrillas, and bailing out the Cuban dictatorship with preferential rates on oil. Reich, a Cuban American and anti-Fidel Castro activist with a background in covert political and propaganda operations against left-wing groups in Latin America,[45] also announced that the administration had received reports that "foreign paramilitary forces", who they claimed were Cuban, were involved in the bloody suppression of anti-Chávez demonstrators.[46] No proof was offered. Eva Golinger published an article and several official documents claiming that a number of US agencies, including the CIA, had previous knowledge of the coup. She maintains that the USAID was being used by the CIA in the coup.[47]

Upon news of Chávez's return, Condoleezza Rice, then National Security Advisor to U.S. President George W. Bush, said: "We do hope that Chávez recognizes that the whole world is watching and that he takes advantage of this opportunity to right his own ship, which has been moving, frankly, in the wrong direction for quite a long time."[48] Bush denied any involvement of the U.S. government in the coup attempt and asked Chávez to "learn a lesson" from it.[49]

Bush Administration officials acknowledged meeting with some of the planners of the coup in the several weeks prior to 11 April, but have strongly denied encouraging the coup itself, saying that they insisted on constitutional means. [2] Because of allegations, an investigation conducted by the U.S. Inspector General, at the request of U.S. Senator Christopher Dodd, requested a review of U.S. activities leading up to and during the coup attempt. The OIG report found no "wrongdoing" by U.S. officials either in the State Department or in the U.S. Embassy.[50][51]

In 2009 former U.S. President Jimmy Carter told Colombian newspaper El Tiempo that he believed that Washington knew about the abortive coup, and may have been involved.[49]

Criminal penalties for coup participants

Under the 1999 Constitution, military officers are entitled to a pre-trial hearing before the Plenary of the Supreme Court of Justice to rule on whether they should be charged with a crime. In such a hearing on 14 August 2002, the Tribunal ruled by an 11–9 margin (with two justices recused) that four high-ranking military officers charged with rebellion should not stand trial, arguing that what took place was not a "coup" but a "vacuum of power" that had been generated by the announcement of Chávez's resignation made by Gen. Lucas Rincón Romero.[52] On 12 March 2004, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court ruled that the recusals were unconstitutional, the hearing was invalid, and the military officers (by then retired) may stand trial.[53]

On 18 November 2004, leading state prosecutor Danilo Anderson was assassinated, shortly before he was scheduled to bring charges against 400 people who allegedly participated in the coup. Meanwhile Carmona and several other participants in the events of 11 April went into exile.

In December 2007 Chavez issued a pardon covering more than 60 people who had drafted or signed the Carmona Decree.[54]

In April 2009, after a trial that had begun in March 2006 and which saw "265 expert testimonies, 5,700 photos, 20 videos and 198 witnesses", ten police officers were convicted for their involvement in the deaths of 3 demonstrators on 11 April 2002. Six, charged with homicide, were sentenced to 30 years in prison. One other officer was found not guilty. A lawyer for the victims of the violence described the Caracas Metropolitan Police on 11 April 2002 as "the armed wing of the opposition".[55]

Irish documentary

A television crew from Ireland's RTE, which happened to be recording an unrelated documentary about Chávez at the time, was caught at the heart of the coup as it unfolded in the presidential palace. Their subsequent documentary film The Revolution Will Not Be Televised features footage shot after the short coup that was based largely in the presidential palace with members of both rival governments and their supporters. The film contradicts explanations by opponents of Chávez, the Venezuelan private media and the United States.

The film has won awards at many film festival screenings where it was shown.[56] While some organizations argued for the accuracy of the documentary[57] Others consider that the film omits and misrepresents important events.[58], others, including the Venezuelan opposition, have disputed the film's narrative, decrying that it is used by the Venezuelan government for propaganda purposes.

Due to opposition pressure, The Revolution Will Not Be Televised was withdrawn from an Amnesty International film festival in Vancouver in November 2003. The decision to withdraw the film was taken because of threats to the physical safety of Amnesty staff in Caracas if the film was shown in the festival.[59]

See also

External links

References

  1. ^ Rey, J. C. (2002), "Consideraciones políticas sobre un insólito golpe de Estado", pp. 1–16; cited in Cannon (2004:296); "In 2002, Venezuela's military and some of its business leaders ousted President Chavez from power and held him hostage." (N. Scott Cole (2007), "Hugo Chavez and President Bush's credibility gap: The struggle against US democracy promotion", International Political Science Review, 28(4), p498)
  2. ^ "Venezuela - Country Reports on Human Rights Practices". U.S. Department of State. 31 March 2003. Archived from the original on 11 August 2009. http://www.webcitation.org/5ix1JTajY. Retrieved 8 August 2009.  
  3. ^ Interim Venezuelan president sworn in. BBC News. (13 April 2002). URL last accessed on 30 May 2007
  4. ^ a b "Círculos bolivarianos protestaron". Últimas Noticias. 13 April 2002. http://www.ultimasnoticias.com.ve/ediciones/2002/04/13/p16n2.htm. Retrieved 11 April 2008.  (Spanish)
  5. ^ "Insurrección civil y militar termina con el golpe; Chávez, en Miraflores". La Jornada. 14 April 2002. http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2002/04/14/019n1mun.php?origen=index.html. Retrieved 4 March 2007.  (Spanish)
  6. ^ Hernández, Enrique (7 May 2002). "Capriles: "Nunca apoyé el gobierno de Carmona"". Asamblea Nacional de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela. http://www.asambleanacional.gov.ve/ns2/noticia.asp?numn=1837. Retrieved 4 March 2007.  (Spanish)
  7. ^ "Cecilia Sosa no ha sido notificada formalmente medida privativa de libertad". Unión Radio. 21 October 2005. http://www.unionradio.com.ve/Noticias/Noticia.aspx?noticiaid=149501. Retrieved 4 March 2007.  (Spanish)
  8. ^ Official U.S. Government Statements — Venezuela. Retrieved 10 April 2006.
  9. ^ "Venezuela is promised 'political revolution'". BBC. 2 February 1999. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/270790.stm. Retrieved 4 March 2007.  
  10. ^ Read, Oliver (28 December 2006). "Venezuela's Media Wrestles with Stigmas, New Rules". PBS. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/latin_america/venezuela/media.html. Retrieved 4 March 2007.  
  11. ^ Branford, Becky (13 August 2004). "Analysis: Chavez at eye of storm". BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3559668.stm. Retrieved 4 March 2007.  
  12. ^ Margarita López Maya, "Venezuela 2002-2003: Polarization, Confrontation, and Violence," in Olivia Burlingame Goumbri, The Venezuela Reader, Washington D.C., U.S.A., 2005, p 14.
  13. ^ "OPEP: crisis petrolera a la vista". BBC News. 8 April 2002. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/business/newsid_1917000/1917606.stm. Retrieved 1 September 2009.  
  14. ^ Espinoza, Ocarina (2005). "Sucesos de Abril de 2002: Tres días que marcaron la historia del país". Unión Radio. http://www.unionradio.net/Especiales/especial.aspx?especialid=162. Retrieved 12 July 2007.  (Spanish)
  15. ^ "Falleció de un infarto Rafael Cabrices". Radio Nacional de Venezuela. 30 August 2005. http://www.rnv.gov.ve/noticias/index.php?act=ST&f=28&t=22680. Retrieved 4 March 2007.  (Spanish)
  16. ^ Bart Jones (2008), Hugo!, p. 323–324.
  17. ^ Bart Jones (2008), Hugo!, p. 328.
  18. ^ Cited in [1], footnote 11
  19. ^ Bart Jones (2008), Hugo!, p329
  20. ^ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u9wU0OIIEmY
  21. ^ Special Broadcasting Service, 11 November 2002, Venezuela - Anatomy of a Coup, Journeyman Pictures
  22. ^ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 31 March 2003 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2002 Accessed 4 August 2006. Archived 11 August 2009.
  23. ^ "Many in the armed forces supported the coup because they did not want to be ordered by the Venezuelan government to repress protesters as the army had been ordered to do in the 1989 Caracazo. The emergence of an autocratic transitional government that might ask them to repress a different set of civilian protesters led many to also withdraw their support from Carmona." - Parish, Randall, Peceny, Mark and Delacour, Justin(2007), "Venezuela and the Collective Defence of Democracy Regime in the Americas", Democratization, 14: 2, 207 — 231, p220
  24. ^ a b Harnecker, Marta. (Z Communications, 9 January 2003)."Lessons of the April Coup: Harnecker interviews Chávez". Retrieved 18 October 2005.
  25. ^ Bart Jones (2008:337)
  26. ^ Bart Jones (2008:337)
  27. ^ Bart Jones (2008:338)
  28. ^ Bart Jones (2008:338-9)
  29. ^ Bart Jones (2008):345)
  30. ^ Bart Jones (2008):346-7)
  31. ^ Bart Jones (2008:354)
  32. ^ Bart Jones (2008:359-60)
  33. ^ a b c Strategic Comments, "Venezuela's Political Tempests: Can Chávez Weather the Storm?", 8 no. 4, May 2002
  34. ^ (Spanish) Acta de constitución del Gobierno de Transición Democrática y Unidad Nacional
  35. ^ BBC news. (BBC Venezuela investiga el "Carmonazo". Retrieved 13 June 2006. (Spanish)
  36. ^ BBC news. (BBC 13 April 2002) Interim Venezuelan president sworn in Retrieved 31 Aug 2006
  37. ^ Cannon, Barry (2004), "Venezuela, April 2002: Coup or Popular Rebellion? The Myth of a United Venezuela", Bulletin of Latin American Research, 23(3), p297
  38. ^ Parish, Randall, Peceny, Mark and Delacour, Justin(2007), "Venezuela and the Collective Defence of Democracy Regime in the Americas", Democratization, 14: 2, 207 — 231, pp218-219
  39. ^ Bart Jones (2008:356)
  40. ^ Cannon (2004:295)
  41. ^ Bart Jones (2008:358)
  42. ^ Observer International, 2002, http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,688071,00.html 'Venezuela coup linked to Bush team' Accessed 22 September, 2007
  43. ^ BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/1985670.stm 'Warning to Venezuelan leader', Accessed 22 September, 2007
  44. ^ Wilson, Scott, "Clash of visions pushed Venezuela toward coup", Washington Post, 21 April 2002, cited in Avilés, William (2009), "Policy Coalitions, Economic Reform and Military Power in Ecuador and Venezuela", Third World Quarterly, 30: 8, 1549 — 1564
  45. ^ Public Diplomacy and covert propaganda National Security Archive. The declassified record of Otto Reich. Retrieved 5 March 2007.
  46. ^ Marquis, Christopher. (17 April 2002). "U.S. Cautioned Leader of Plot Against Chávez". The New York Times. Retrieved 5 March 2007.
  47. ^ THE PROOF IS IN THE DOCUMENTS: THE CIA WAS INVOLVED IN THE COUP AGAINST VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT CHAVEZ, Eva Golinger, Venezuelafoia.info
  48. ^ Bellos, Alex (15 April 2002). "Chávez rises from very peculiar coup". The Guardian. Retrieved 20 July 2006.
  49. ^ a b "US 'likely behind' Chavez coup". Al Jazeera. 21 September 2009. Archived from the original on 25 September 2009. http://www.webcitation.org/5k4GdHQBZ. Retrieved 23 September 2009.  
  50. ^ U.S. Embassy, Caracas, Venezuela. State Dept. Issues Report on U.S. Actions During Venezuelan Coup: (Inspector General finds U.S. officials acted properly during coup). Accessed 26 May 2006.
  51. ^ U.S. Department of State and Office of Inspector General. A Review of U.S. Policy toward Venezuela, November 2001 - April 2002. Accessed 26 May 2006.
  52. ^ Sentencia de los Militares. (Spanish) Retrieved 17 November 2005.
  53. ^ TSJ (2005), "T1 ST04 N5", Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, http://infovenezuela.org/attachments-spanish/T1%20ST04%20N5%20Decisi%F3n%20del%20TSJ%20que%20anula%20la%20sentencia%20de%20agosto%202002.pdf  .
  54. ^ USA Today, 31 December 2007, Chavez pardons accused coup backers
  55. ^ Venezuelanalysis, 6 April 2009, Nine Police Found Guilty of April 2002 Venezuelan Coup Deaths
  56. ^ "The Revolution Will Not Be Televised (2002)". New York Times. http://movies.nytimes.com/movie/288243/The-Revolution-Will-Not-Be-Televised/details. Retrieved 6 January 2010.  
  57. ^ "Statement in Support of the Documentary Film “The Revolution Will Not Be Televised”". www.venezuelanalysis.com. http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/docs.php?dno=1008. Retrieved 30 June 2006.  
  58. ^ "Venezuela's curious coup: Riddle wrapped in a mystery". www.economist.com. http://www.economist.com/books/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13813460. Retrieved 20 September 2009.  
  59. ^ Campbell, Duncan (2003-11-22). "Chavez film puts staff at risk, says Amnesty". The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/nov/22/film.venezuela. Retrieved 2008-06-15.  

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