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Al Hajj Abdu Ali Sharqawi is a citizen of Yemen held in extrajudicial detention in the United States's Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba.^[1] His Guantanamo Internment Serial Number is 1457.^[1] The Department of Defense reports that he was born on 26 May 1974, in Taiz, [sic] Saudi Arabia.^[1]

As of December 11, 2009, Abdu Ali al Haji Sharqawi has been held at Guantanamo for five years three months.^[2] Prior of that he spent two and a half years in extrajudicial detention in the CIA's black sites.

Identity

Abdu Ali al Haji Sharqawi's name was spelled inconsistently on various official Department of Defense documents:

Al Hajj Abdu Ali Sharqawi on the official list released on 20 April 2006, and three official lists released in September 2007.^{[3][4 ][5][6]} Abdu Ali Al Haji Sharqawi on the official list released on 15 May 2006. on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 9 November 2004.^{[1] [7]} Abdu Ali Sharqawi on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his second annual Administrative Review Board, on 14 September 2006.^{[8 ]}

Transportation to Guantanamo Bay

Human Rights group Reprieve reports that flight records show two captives named Al-Sharqawi and Hassan bin Attash were flown from Kabul in September 2002. The two men were flown aboard N379P, a plane suspected to be part of the CIA's ghost fleet. Flight records showed that the plane originally departed from Diego Garcia, stopped in Morocco, Portugal, then Kabul before landing in Guantanamo Bay.^[9]

The Guardian reports that one of the two men has been released from US custody.^[9]

A differing report shows Sharqawi was arrested by the CIA in Karachi, Pakistan, in February 2002, and rendered to Jordan. He was transferred to Afghanistan in January 2004, where he was held at the CIA-run Dark Prison, then at Bagram Air Base, and then finally transferred to Guantanamo in September 2004.^[10]

According to MSNBC al-Sharqawi was one of 25 top al Qaeda leaders, and was known as "Riyadh the Facilitator."^{[11 ]}

Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abdu Ali Al Hajj Sharqawi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 9 November 2004. The memo listed the following allegations against him:^[2]

a. The detainee is a member of al Qaida:

1. The detainee traveled extensively throughout Europe, the Middle East, and Eastern Africa, during the period 1995 through 2001, for the purpose of participating in Jihad.
2. The detainee traveled with Usama Bin Laden for a period of two months after the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000.
3. The detainee operated an al Qaida safe house in Karachi, Pakistan in 2001.
4. The detainee served as an intermediary in obtaining false travel documents for Jihad leaders in the Philippines.

b. The detainee participated in military operations against the coalition.

1. The detainee was present with top al Qaida leadership in Tora Bora.
2. During the Spring and Summer of 2001, the detainee assisted on average 5 to 15 mujahid per week to gain entry in Afghanistan from his location in Karachi Pakistan.

Transcript

There is no record that captive 1457 chose to participate in his Tribunal.

Administrative Review Board

Captives whose CSRT labelled them "enemy combatants" were scheduled for annual Administrative Review Board hearings. These hearings were designed to judge whether the captive still posed a threat if repatriated to their home country.^[12]

First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Al Hajj Abdu Ali Sharqawi's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 20 October 2005. The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.^{[13 ]}

The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Commitment

1. The detainne joined the jihad in Bosnai. He traveled there using money from donations that people made to mosques. This money was donated for people traveling to join any jihad.
2. The detainee sustaine a chest wound and spent two months in the hospital recovering. He then returned to the fight in Bosnia at the front line for another four months before a ceasefire was declared. He waited another two months before returning to Yemen. After returning to Yemen, the detainee wanted to join the jihad in Chechnya but knew it was difficult to go there.
3. In 1996, the detainee traveled from Yemen to Kenya seeking to join the jihad in Somalia. The detainee returned to Yemen without joining the fight.
4. In 1997 the detainee traveled to Khartoum, Sudan in an attempt to support anti-government Islamic rebels in Eritrea. The detainee left Sudan after about a week because he was denied the opportunity to join the fight.
5. In 1997 the detainee went to Arakan, Bangladesh because he heard Buddhists were killing Muslims there. He was unable to enter Arakan so he then returned to Yemen. He also traveled to Burma and Bangladesh for Jihad but was denied the opportunity to join the fight.
6. The detainee assisted other Yemeni Mujahedin in traveling to Afghanistan.
7. The detainee decided to travel to Afghanistan to receive military training prior to traveling onward to Chechnya for jihad.
8. The detainee collected money to support the Chechnya jihad and he also traveled to Syria in an attempt to get to Chechnya to join the jihad.
9. The detainee flew to Pakistan en route to Afghanistan for training for the Chechnya jihad.
10. The detainee facilitated the travel of many Yemeni Mujahedin to Afghanistan in 2001.
11. The detainee solicited money to support Mujahedin fleeing Afghanistan in the wake of the United States campaign against the Taliban.
12. While in Pakistan, the detainee received funds from Saudi Arabia using the Hawala system.

b. Training

1. The detainee trained with the Bosnian Army for forty days. Training consisted of physical training and weapons, such as the Kalashnikov and hand grenades.
2. The detainee attended a training camp where he was taught electronics.

c. Connections/Associations

1. On the day of the USS Cole bombing, the detainee evacuated Kandaahr and fled to Kabul with Usama Bin Laden and his guards.
2. The detainee traveled with Usama Bin Laden's entourage for a few months in early 2001.
3. Thdetainee was responsible for the physical storage and distribution of al Qaida cash in Karachi.
4. The detainee served as a conduit for funds suspected to have been used to finance al Qaida attacks against Israeli interests in Kenya.
5. The detainee met the chief medical advisor for al Wafa at a guesthouse and invited him to visit him in Karachi.
6. The detainee provided details on Usama Bin Laden's security staff and his personal bodyguards and he described the selection process for security staff members.
7. The detainee was an acquaintance of Ibrahim al-Thawr, one of the suicide bombers who attacked the USS Cole on 12 October 2000.
8. The detainee was a friend of Jamal Mohammad Ahmad (Al Badawi), who was convicted in the USS Cole bombing.
9. When the detainee was shown photographs of the known 11 September 2001 hijackers he recognized and identified each one of them.
10. Usama Bin Laden designated the detainee as a falcon. Usama Bin Laden was the only one with the authority to designate falcons and this falcon designation was based on how important someone was to bin Laden's organization.

d. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee provided money, visas, passports and airline tickets to Yemenis wanting to travel to Afghanistan to receive training for jihad.
2. The detainee stated that he feels that joining jihad and dying in the process of helping Muslims is a better way to die.
3. By his own estimate, the detainee assisted approximately 100 members of the Mujahadeen depart Pakistan before his capture.
4. The detainee bribed officials and forged documents to obtain visas and passports for people.
5. The detainee coordinated the distribution of video cameras to combat zones in Afghanistan. The video footage was intended for jihad recruitment in Saudi Arabia.
6. The detainee fought in Bosnia as a guard on the front line.
7. The detainee operated a guesthouse in Karachi, Pakistan to house Muslims going from Yemen to Afghanistan for military training.
8. The detainee placed travelers in local hotels, assisted in acquiring airline tickets for subsequent travel in Pakistan and instructing travelers on transit into Afghanistan.
9. The detainee house escaping jihadists in his Karachi guesthouse after the U.S. bombing campaign in Afghanistan began in September 2001. The detainee also secured Pakistani passport stamps for jihadists to allow them to return to their home countries.
10. The detainee stated he was brought up to believe that America is an imperial power only interested in protecting its own interests.
11. The detainee believes that the U.S. is an enemy of Islam.
12. The detainee stated he wants to personally kill every American upon his release from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

The following primary factors favor release or transfer

The detainee stated he is confused as to what he will do upon leaving Guantanamo Bay. He does not know if he will rejoin the fight against America with Usama Bin Laden and Zarqawi, or if he will resign and just go away into retirement.

Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abdu Ali Sharqawi's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 14 September 2006. The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.^{[14 ]}

Third annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abdu Ali Sharqawi's third annual Administrative Review Board.^{[15 ]} The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

Extraordinary rendition

Al Haji Abdu Ali Sharqawi has written that after his capture, in February 2002, in Pakistan he spent two years in CIA custody in foreign interrogation centres, prior to his transfer to Guantanamo, in February 2004: ^[16][17] He writes that he spent 19 months in Amman, Jordan, and then five months in a secret interrogation centre. While in Jordan he had been handed over to the custody of Jordan's General Intelligence Department. He wrote:

• "I was kidnapped, not knowing anything of my fate, with continuous torture and interrogation for the whole of two years. When I told them the truth, I was tortured and beaten.
• "I was told that if I wanted to leave with permanent disability both mental and physical, that that could be arranged. They said they had all the facilities of Jordan to achieve that. I was told that I had to talk, I had to tell them everything."

References

External links

• Human Rights Watch, Double Jeopardy: CIA Renditions to Jordan (2008)