The Afghan National Army is a service branch of the Military of Afghanistan which is currently trained by the coalition forces to ultimately take the role in land-based military operations in Afghanistan. Afghanistan's national army was established in the 1880s with the help of British, when the nation was ruled by Emir Abdur Rahman Khan.^[4][5] Prior to that the army was mostly a combination of tribesmen and militia forces, as well as a special army force under the ruler of the country.^[6][7][8][9]

During World War I and World War II, the Afghan army was supported by Germany but the Afghan nation remained neutral. From the 1960s to the early 1990s, the army of Afghanistan was trained and equipped by the Soviet Union. By 1992, the national army fragmented into regional militias under local warlords. This was followed by the Taliban government in the mid 1990s, which had their own armed forces. After the removal of the Taliban in late 2001, the new Afghan National Army was created with support from the United States and other NATO nations.

The Afghan National Army is equipped today with modern weapons and provided with newly-built housing facilities. Since 2002, billions of dollars worth of military equipment, facilities, and other forms of aid has been provided to the ANA. Most of the weapons come from the United States, which includes 4,500 Humvees, at least 104,000 M-16 assault rifles, body armored jackets as well as other types of vehicles. It also includes the building of a national military command center, with training compounds in different parts of the country.^[10] As of September 2009, there are more than 4,000 military trainers from the United States and additional numbers from other NATO members, providing advanced warfare training to the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police and Afghan Provincial Reconstruction Teams.^[11]

To thwart and dissolve anti-government militant groups, the Karzai administration has offered cash and vocational training to encourage members to join the ANA. As of July 2010^[update], the Afghan National Army consists of 134,000 active troops and is expected to double within the next 2 years. The current goal of the Afghan Ministry of Defense is to expand the ANA to about 260,000 troops at a cost of $20 billion, which is supported by U.S. President Barack Obama. All costs of expansion of the military, including pay and new modern equipment, would be paid for by the American government.^[12]

History

An Afghan army has existed since at least 1880s when the country was ruled by Emir Abdur Rahman Khan.^[4][5] Prior to that, from 1709 to 1880, the army of Afghanistan was usually a mixture of tribesmen and militia forces, as well as a special army force under the ruler of the country.^[6][7][8][9] The Afghan army was modernized by King Amanullah Khan in the early 1900s just before the Third Anglo-Afghan War. King Amanullah and his Afghan army fought against the British in 1919, after which Afghanistan declared full independence from the UK over its foreign affairs. The Afghan army was further modernized or upgraded during King Zahir Shah's reign, starting in 1933.

From the 1960s to the early 1990s, the Afghan army was trained and equipped mostly by the former Soviet Union. Before the PDPA takeover in April 1978, according to military analyst George Jacobs, the armed forces included "some three armored divisions (570 medium tanks plus T 55s on order), eight infantry divisions (averaging 4,500 to 8,000 men each), two mountain infantry brigades, one artillery brigade, a guards regiment (for palace protection), three artillery regiments, two commando regiments, and a parachute battalion (largely grounded). All the formations were under the control of three corps level headquarters. All but three infantry divisions were facing Pakistan along a line from Bagram south to Khandahar."^[13] After the coup, desertions swept the force, affecting the loyalty and moral values of soldiers, there were purges on patriotic junior and senior officers, and upper class Afghan aristocrats in society.

Gradually the army's three armoured divisions (4th and 15th at Kabul/Bagram and 7th at Khandahar) and now sixteen infantry divisions dropped in size to between battalion and regiment sized, with no formation stronger than about 5,000 troops.^[14] During the Soviet war in Afghanistan, in the 1980s, the National Army of Afghanistan was involved in fighting against the mujahideen rebel groups. A big problem in the Afghan army became deserters. The Afghan army's casualties were as high as 50-60,000 and another 50,000 deserted the armed forces. The Afghan army's defection rate was about 10,000 per year between 1980–89, the average deserters left the Afghan army after the first five months.^[15]

By 1992, after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the fall of the communist regime in Kabul, the Soviet-trained army splintered between the government in Kabul and the various warring factions.^[16] By mid 1994 for example, there were two parallel 6th Corps operating in the north. Abdul Rashid Dostam's 6th Corps was based at Pul-i-Khumri and had three divisions. The Defence Ministry of the Kabul government's 6th Corps was based at Kunduz and also had three divisions, two sharing numbers with formations in Dostum's corps.^[17] During that time local militia forces were formed or the former Soviet era national army units 'regionalised;' both provided security for their own people living in the territories they controlled. The country was factionalized with different warlords controlling the territories they claimed, and there was no officially recognized national army in the country.

This era was followed by the Taliban regime in 1996, which removed the militia forces and decided to control the country by Islamic Sharia law. The Taliban also had their own army troops and commanders, some of whom were secretly trained by the intelligence agency (ISI) or Pakistani Armed Forces in the border region on the Durand Line.^[19] After the removal of the Taliban in late 2001, a number of new army formations were created by the Ministry of Defence, especially in the north, northeast, and Kabul area as patronage opportunities. Formations in existence by the end of 2002 included the 1st Army Corps (Nangrahar), 2nd Army Corps (Kandahar, dominated by Gul Agha Shirzai and his allies), 3rd Army Corps (Paktia, where the US allegedly attempted to impose Atiquallah Ludin as commander), 4th Army Corps (Herat, dominated by Ismail Khan), 6th Army Corps at Kunduz, 7th Army Corps (under Ustad Atta Mohammad Noor at Mazar-i-Sharif in Balkh Province^[20]), 8th Army Corps (at Shiberghan, dominated by Dostum's National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) and the Central Army Corps around Kabul.^[21]

The new Afghan National Army was founded with the issue of a decree by new President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai on December 1, 2002.^[22] Upon his election Karzai set a goal of an army of at least 70,000 men by 2009.^[23] However, many western military experts as well as the Defense Minister of Afghanistan, Abdul Rahim Wardak, believe that 70,000 is insufficient and that the nation needs at least 200,000 active troops in order to defend the country from the Taliban, al-Qaida, and other threats.^[24]

The first new Afghan battalion was trained by British Army personnel of the International Security Assistance Force, becoming 1st Battalion, Afghan National Guard.^[25] Yet while the British troops provided very high quality training, they were few in number. After some consideration, it was decided that U.S. Army Special Forces troops might be able to provide the training. Thus follow-on battalions were recruited and trained by 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group of Ft. Bragg, NC, under the command of LTC McDonnell. 3rd SFG built the training facilities and ranges for early use, using a Soviet built facility on the eastern side of Kabul, near the then ISAF headquarters. The first training commenced in approximately late May 2002, with a difficult but successful recruitment process of bringing hundreds of new recruits in from all parts of Afghanistan. Early training was done in Pashto, Persian, Dari and some Arabic due to the very diverse ethnicities.^[26]

By January 2003, just over 1,700 soldiers in five Kandaks (Pashto for battalions) had completed the 10-week training course, and by June 2003 a total of 4,000 troops had been trained. Initial recruiting problems lay in the lack of cooperation from regional warlords and inconsistent international support. The problem of desertion dogged the force in its early days: in the summer of 2003, the desertion rate was estimated to be ten percent and in mid-March 2004, estimate suggested that 3,000 soldiers had deserted.

On March 21, 2004, fighting erupted in Herat between governor Ismail Khan's private army and the Defense Ministry's 4th Corps militia.^[27] Afghan Civil Aviation Minister Mirwais Sadeq [the son of Ismail Khan] was killed by a rocket-propelled grenade during the military standoff between his father and the Defense Ministry's Herat Division commander, General Abdul Zaher Nayebzadah. The death toll from the fighting was estimated at 50 to 100 people. The deployment of about 1,500 National Army troops to Herat in response to the fighting marked the beginning of a permanent presence in the city by central government ANA forces. The ANA were sent to the garrison of the 17th Herat Division of the Defense Ministry's 4th Corps - General Abdul Zaher Nayebzadah's headquarters. The 17th Division headquarters had been overrun by Ismail Khan's militia on 21 March.

Soldiers in the new army initially received $30 a month during training and $50 a month upon graduation, though pay for trained soldiers has since risen to $120. Some recruits were under 18 years of age and many could not read or write. Recruits who only spoke the Pashto language experienced difficulty because instruction was usually given through interpreters who spoke Dari.

Growth continued, however, and the Afghan National Army had expanded to 5,000 trained soldiers by July 2003. That month, approximately 1,000 ANA soldiers were deployed in the US-led Operation Warrior Sweep, marking the first major combat operation for Afghan troops.

Current status

Ongoing issues

The Afghan National Army is plagued by inefficiency and endemic corruption.^[37] U.S. training efforts have been drastically slowed by the corruption, widespread illiteracy, vanishing supplies, and lack of discipline.^[38]

U.S. trainers report missing vehicles, weapons and other military equipment, and outright theft of fuel provided by the U.S.^[39] Death threats have been leveled against U.S. officers who try to stop Afghan soldiers from stealing. Afghan soldiers often find improvised explosive devices and snip the command wires instead of marking them and waiting for U.S. forces to come to detonate them. The Americans say this just allows the insurgents to return and reconnect them.^[39] U.S. trainers frequently must remove the cell phones of Afghan soldiers hours before a mission for fear that the operation will be compromised by bragging, gossip and reciprocal warnings.^[40]

American trainers often spend large amounts of time verifying that Afghan rosters are accurate — that they are not padded with “ghosts” being “paid” by Afghan commanders who quietly collect the bogus wages.^[41]

The Afghan Army has severely limited fighting capacity.^[39] Even some of the best Afghan units lack fully comprehensive training, strict discipline and adequate reinforcements. In one green unit in Baghlan Province, soldiers have been found cowering in ditches rather than fighting.^[42] Some are suspected of collaborating with the Taliban against the Americans or engaging in reciprocal exchanges on offensives or unsanctioned psychological warfare through boasts or using their knowledge to communicate with friends or family in the battlezone.^[39] “They don’t have the basics, so they lay down,” said Capt. Michael Bell, who is one of a team of U.S. and Hungarian mentors tasked with training Afghan soldiers. “I ran around for an hour trying to get them to shoot, getting fired on. I couldn’t get them to shoot their weapons.”^[39] For example, in multiple firefights during the February, 2010 NATO offensive in Helmand Province, many Afghan soldiers did not aim — they pointed their American-issued M-16 rifles in the rough direction of the incoming small-arms fire and pulled their triggers without putting rifle sights to their eyes. Their rifle muzzles were often elevated several degrees high.^[43]

Desertion is a significant problem in the Afghan Army. One in every four combat soldiers quit the Afghan Army during the 12-month period ending in September 2009, according to data from the U.S. Defense Department and the Inspector General for Reconstruction in Afghanistan.^[44]

Personnel strength

As of July 2010^[update], manpower of the ANA is 134,000 personnel which is expected to reach 240,000 by a year or so.^[2] Facilities and capacity planning efforts are rapidly adjusting to the significant increases in national recruiting efforts to meet manpower needs. The goal is a 260,000 Afghan troops by U.S. President Obama and is supported by the Afghan Defense Ministry.

The Battalion

The basic unit in the Afghan National Army is the kandak (battalion), consisting of 600 troops. Kandaks may be further broken down into four toli (company-sized units).^[45] Although the vast majority of kandaks are infantry, at least one mechanized and one tank battalion have been formed; more may be planned. Every ANA Corps will be assigned an ANA Commando Battalion with the sixth designated as a special national unit under the Afghan Defense Ministry's purview.

As of September 2005^[update], 28 of the 31 Afghan National Army battalions were ready for combat operations and many had already participated in them. At least nine brigades are planned at this time, each consisting of six battalions. By March 1, 2007, half of the planned army of 70,000 ANA soldiers had been achieved with 46 of the planned 76 Afghan battalions operating in the fore or in concert with NATO forces. The size and limits of the ANA were specified in the Bonn II Agreement, signed in 2002. This agreement called for the establishment of the ANA and formal development of Afghan forces under NATO doctrine.^{[citation needed]}

Brigades

A total of 14 brigades that will primarily be regionally oriented are planned for 2008. According to Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) thirteen of these brigades are to be light infantry, one will be mechanized and one will be commando.

Corps

Currently the Afghan National Army maintains seven corps. Originally, the four outlying corps were assigned one or two brigades, with the majority of the manpower of the army based in Kabul's 201st Corps. This was superseded by a buildup in which each corps added extra brigades. Establishment of the corps started when four regional corps commanders and some of their staff were appointed on 1 September 2004.^[46]

• ANA Air Force - ANA Air Corps until June 2010; formed from the old Afghan Air Force. Plans exist to separate this corps again and reclaim the old Afghan Air Force role as a separate branch of the Afghan military.^{[citation needed]}

Five, plus a newly forming corps, serve as regional commands for the ANA:

• 201st Corps (Kabul) - 1st Brigade is at the Presidential Palace. 3rd Brigade, at Pol-e-Chakri, is to be a mechanised formation including M-113s^[47] and Soviet-built main battle tanks.^[48] Later information from LongWarJournal.org places most of the 3rd Brigade at Jalalabad, 2nd Brigade at Pol-e-Charkhi, and only a single battalion of 1st Brigade at the Presidential Palace.^[49] The Corps is charged with operation in eastern Afghanistan, including Kabul, Logar, Kapisa, Konar, and Laghman. It’s battlespace includes the Afghan capital of Kabul as well as vital routes running north and south, and valleys leading from the Pakistani border into Afghanistan. Currently the 3rd Brigade of the 201st Corps is the only unit that has control of an area of responsibility in Afghanistan without the aid or assistance of U.S. or coalition forces for its command system.^[50][51] in 2005.]]
• 203rd Corps (Gardez) The original Gardez Regional Command was established on 23 September 2004.^[52] As of 2009, 1st Brigade, Khost, 2nd Brigade, FOB Rushmore, Sharana, Paktika Province, 3rd Brigade, Ghazni.^[53] On 19 Oct 2006, as part of Operation Mountain Fury, two Embedded Training Team members mentored and advised a D30 artillery section from 4th Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 203rd Corps, to conduct the first indirect artillery fire missions during combat operations with harassment and indirect fires.^[54] Three days later, they successfully conducted counterfire (with assistance from a US Q-36 radar) that resulted with ten enemy casualties, the highest casualties inflicted from indirect artillery fire in ANA history.^{[citation needed]} The corps is supported by the Gardez Regional Support Squadron of the ANAAC, equipped with 8 helicopters: 4 transport to support the Corps' commando battalion, 2 attack, and two medical transport.^[55]
• 205th Corps (Kandahar) - has the responsibility for the provinces of Kandahar, Zabul, and Oruzgan.^[56] It consists of four brigades, a commando battalion and three garrisons. The corps has integrated artillery and airlift capacity, supplied by a growing Kandahar Wing of the ANAAC.^[57]
• 207th Corps (Herat) - 1st Brigade at Herat, 2nd Brigade at Farah, and elements at Shindand (including commandos).^[58] The corps is supported by the Herat Regional Support Squadron of the ANAAC, equipped with 8 helicopters: 4 transport to support the corps' commando battalion, 2 attack, and two medical transport.^[55]
• 209th Corps (Mazari Sharif) - Works closely with the German-led Regional Command North, and has 1st Brigade at Mazar-i-Sharif and, it appears, a 2nd Brigade forming at Kunduz. An Army Corps of Engineers solicitation for Kunduz headquarters facilities for the 2nd Brigade was issued in March 2008.^[59] The corps is supported by the Mazar-i-Sharif Regional Support Squadron of the ANAAC, equipped with 8 helicopters: 4 transport to support the Corps' commando battalion, 2 attack, and two medical transport.^[55]
• 215th Corps (Lashkar Gah) - The Afghan government has approved a new seventh corps of the Afghan National Army — Corps 215 Maiwand — to be based in the Helmand capital of Lashkar Gah where the first fresh U.S. troops are expected to arrive.([4]) The 215th is a new unit, developed specifically to partner with the Marine Expeditionary Brigade in Helmand.^[60] On 28 January 2010, Xinhua reported that General Sayed Mallok would command the new corps. ([5]) The corps will cover all parts of Helmand, half of Farah and most parts of southwestern Nimroz province. Elements of 2nd Brigade, 215th Corps, have been reported at FOB Delaram, Farah Province.

In late 2008 it was announced that the 201st Corps' former area of responsibility would be divided, with a Capital Division being formed in Kabul and the corps concentrating its effort further forward along the border.^[61] The new division, designated the 111th Capital Division, became operational on April 21, 2009.^[62] It has a 1st Brigade, 2nd Brigade (both forming) and a Headquarters Special Security Brigade. ^[63]

Commandos

In July 2007 the Afghan army graduated its first commandos. The commandos underwent a grueling three month course being trained by American special forces. They received training in advanced infantry skills as well as training in first aid and tactical driving. They are fully equipped with US equipment and have received US style training.^[64] The new Afghan commandos are the most elite branch of the rising Afghan Army. By the end of 2008 the six ANA commando battalions will be stationed in the southern region of Afghanistan assisting the Canadian forces. There are also female soldiers being trained. The first female Afghan parachutist Khatol Mohammadzai, trained under the Soviets, became the first female general in the Afghan National Army on 19 August 2002.^[65] Afghan commandos are expected to increase significantly in number by 2011, when the army will double in size. They will also receive more advanced equipment from NATO.^[12] NATO hopes that elite Afghan commando units can help in the fight against the Taliban, especially around the mountainous Durand Line border region.

Special Forces

The First ANA Special Forces team finished training on May 12, 2010, the soldiers were selected from the ANA Commando Battalion. The team is based on the US Army Special Forces teams.^{[66][67][68][69]} Graduates of the special forces course with retain their 'commando' tab and will also have a' special forces' tab on top of the commando tab. They have been attached to US Army Special Forces teams operating in Kandahar province in the 2010 operation.^[70]

Training

Members of the coalition forces in Afghanistan have undertaken different responsibilities in the creation of the ANA. All these various efforts are managed on the Coalition side by Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A), a three-star level multi-national command headquartered in downtown Kabul. On the ANA side, as of July 2006^[update] all training and education in the Army is managed and implemented by the newly-formed Afghan National Army Training Command (ANATC), a two-star command which reports directly to the Chief of the General Staff. All training centers and military schools are under ANATC HQ. The coalition forces are partnered with the ANA to mentor and support formal training through Task Force Phoenix. This program was formalized in April 2003, based near the Kabul Military Training Center coordinating collective and individual training, mentoring, and Coalition Force support.

Each ANA HQ above battalion level has an embedded Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) of NATO trainers and mentors acting as liaisons between ANA and ISAF. The OMLTs co-ordinate operational planning and ensure that the ANA units receive enabling support.^[71]

Individual basic training is conducted primarily by Afghan National Army instructors and staff at ANATC's Kabul Military Training Center, situated on the eastern edge of the capital. The ANA are still supported, however, with various levels of CSTC-A oversight, mentorship, and assistance. The US military assists in the basic and advanced training of enlisted recruits, and also runs the Drill Instructor School which produces new training NCOs for the basic training courses.

A French Army advisory team oversees the training of officers for staff and platoon or company command in a combined commissioning/infantry officer training unit called the Officer Training Brigade, also located at Kabul Military Training Center. OTB candidates in the platoon- and company- command courses are usually older former militia and mujaheddin leaders with various levels of military experience.

The United Kingdom also conducts initial infantry officer training and commissioning at the Officer Candidate School. While OCS is administratively under OTB's control, it is kept functionally separate. OCS candidates are young men with little or no military experience. The British Army also conduct initial and advanced Non-Commissioned Officer training as well in a separate NCO Training Brigade.

The Canadian Forces supervises the Combined Training Exercise portion of initial military training, where trainee soldiers, NCOs, and officers are brought together in field training exercises at the platoon, company and (theoretically) battalion levels to certify them ready for field operations. In the Regional Corps, line ANA battalions have attached Coalition Embedded Training Teams that continue to mentor the battalion's leadership, and advise in the areas of intelligence, communications, fire support, logistics and infantry tactics.

Formal education and professional development is currently conducted at two main ANATC schools, both in Kabul. The National Military Academy of Afghanistan, located near Kabul International Airport, is a four-year military university, which will produce degreed second lieutenants in a variety of military professions. NMAA's first cadet class entered its second academic year in spring 2006. A contingent of US and Turkish military instructors jointly mentor the NMAA faculty and staff. The Command and General Staff College, located in southern Kabul, prepares mid-level ANA officers to serve on brigade and corps staffs. France established the CGSC in early 2004, and a cadre of French Army instructors continues to oversee operations at the school. A National Defense University will also be established at a potential site in northwestern Kabul. Eventually all initial officer training (to include the NMAA) as well as the CGSC will be re-located to the new NDU facility.

Operations

of ANA soldiers at a rescue operation in February 2005.]]

Following the crash of Kam Air Flight 904 on February 4, 2005, The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) made numerous unsuccessful helicopter rescue operation attempts. But when technology failed, Afghan National Army soldiers searched for the plane. The Ministry of Defense ordered the ANA's Central Corps to assemble a team to attempt a rescue of victims presumed to be alive. The crash site was at an altitude of 11,000 feet (3,400 m) on the peak of the Chaperi Mountain, 20 miles (32 km) east of the Afghan capital of Kabul.^[72]

The Afghan army caught the senior Taliban leader Mullah Mahmood near Khandahar, who was wearing a Burkha. Mahmood was suspected of organizing suicide attacks in Kandahar province.^[73] More than forty-nine Taliban fighters were killed by the Afghan forces in one of the independent operations carried out by the Afghan forces.^[74]

In a rescue operation, the Afghan National Army deployed their Mi-8 helicopters and evacuated flood victims in the Ghorban district of Parwan province. Afghan soldiers safely evacuated 383 families to safer places.^[75]

The Afghan Army has already begun small independent operations^[76] which were expanded to large-scale operations in spring 2009.^[76] One operation included a small retaliation and invasion^[77] and firing at Pakistan in ^[78] This incident was fueled by anti-Pakistani tensions in Afghanistan^[77] and the rising animosity between the two nations.^[77] The Afghan army fired rockets on a Pakistani army border post in the Kudakhel area, after the Pakistani army attempted to build a post in Paktika province, Afghanistan.^[77]

Operation Achilles

The Afghan National Army along with the ISAF successfully engaged Taliban extremist strongholds. This operation was launched on March 6, 2007, to stabilize northern Helmand province for the government to start the reconstruction work.^[79]

Battle of Musa Qala

After 10 months in Taliban hands, the town of Musa Qala was retaken by Afghan National Army backed by ISAF and coalition support. Taliban insurgents had scattered mostly to the north.^[80]

Operation Panther's Claw

Operation Panchai Palang, or Panther's Claw, was a United Kingdom-led military operation of the War in Afghanistan in Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan. United Kingdom, Afghanistan, Denmark and Estonia contributed a total of 3,000 soldiers for the operation. The alliance targeted Afghan and Pakistani-based Taliban involved in the drug trade. The battle ran, for a period of time, simultaneously with the US-Afghan Operation Strike of the Sword.

Operation Khanjar (Strike of the Sword)

Operation Strike of the Sword or Operation Khanjar is an ongoing US-led offensive in Helmand province in southern Afghanistan. About 4,000 Marines from the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade as well as 650 Afghan soldiers are involved, supported by NATO planes. The operation began when units moved into the Helmand river valley in the early hours of July 2, 2009. This operation is the largest Marine offensive since the battle of Fallujah, Operation Phantom Fury, in 2004. The operation is also the largest airlift offensive since the Vietnam War.

Equipment

Since the early 1970s, the Afghan army has been equipped with the Russian AK-47 assault rifle as their main service rifle. In 2008, the ANA replaced its AK47s in favor of the US M16 rifles, and Canadian Colt Canada C7 rifles, as part of a force modernization effort that will change not only how the soldiers handle their weapons but possibly how they fight. They are also swapping their pick-up trucks for US Humvees as well as adopting other NATO weapons into their arsenal.^[81][82] Some ANA special forces are already equipped with M16s. There is the possibility that the ANA makes use of Soviet weapons left over from the Soviet war in Afghanistan. This equipment may also be used by the Afghan National Police.

Armoured Fighting Vehicles

Main Battle tanks

Air Defence/Artillery

Weapons

• Other vehicles
  • International 7000-MV^[86] (2,781)
  • Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) trucks
  • Tata Motors SK1613/SE1615/SE1615TC 4½ ton trucks (50+)^[87] Template:Country data India
  • 2½ ton trucks (100+) Template:Country data India
  • Jeeps (120+) Template:Country data India - likely Tata Motors Sumo Jeep or Mahindra Jeeps
  • Ambulances (15+) Template:Country data India
  • Other Technicals of various origins:
    • Ford Ranger LTV pickups (5000)
    • Toyota pickup trucks /Template:Country data Japan

Future

According to statements made by Colonel Thomas McGrath on October 19, 2007 the coalition supporting the build-up of the ANA has seen progress and is pleased with the Afghan performance in recent exercises. McGrath estimated that the ANA should be capable of carrying out independent brigade-size operations by the spring of 2008.^[88]

On December 23, 2007, the CTV and CBC television network reported that Canada's military will supply the Afghan National Army with surplus Colt Canada C7 rifles in order to bring the ANA up to NATO equipment standards.^[89]

The Afghan National Army has a contract with International Trucks. It will provide a fleet of 2,781 trucks which can be used for transporting personnel, water, petroleum and a recovery truck. The Afghan National Army has already received 374 out of the 2,781 trucks.

The Czech Republic and Hungary have announced they will donate advanced air medic choppers to the Army and National Police, as well as more new trucks for border security in the Afghan-Pakistan frontier to defend it from Pakistani Taliban incursions.

Greece is donating at least 13 M60A3 main battle tanks to help bolster Afghan tank platoons. Greece may increase this number to almost 50 tanks, within the alliance’s efforts for equipping and training Afghan military forces.^[90] On November 12, 2009, the Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff Walter Natynczyk declared the Afghan National Army will not receive the Canadian Leopard 1 like anticipated previously by Abdul Rahim Wardak in 2007. General Walter Natynczyk declared the Afghan National Army maybe have access to surplus supplies and also M-113 recently modernized.^[91] The reason for the reversal of delivery of tanks is probably connected to Long War Journal reports that the single Afghan tank and mechanised battalions are operating as infantry due to inadequate heavy equipment maintenance.^[92]

According to Marin Strmecki, a member of the Defense Policy Board and a former top Pentagon adviser on Afghanistan in a speech to the United States Senate, "the Afghan Army should increase to 250,000 soldiers and the National Police Force should add more than 100,000 officers. Only when Afghan security forces reaches those numbers would they achieve the level necessary for success in counterinsurgency."^[93] On March 19, 2009, American President Barack Obama called for an expansion of the Afghan National Army to 260,000 soldiers. The cost would reach $20 billion dollars and would beef up Afghan manpower as well as inject the army with more modern equipment.^[93]

See also

• Provincial Reconstruction Team

References

Further reading

• Antonio Giustozzi, ‘Shadow Ownership and SSR in Afghanistan,’ Chap. 11 in Tim Donnais (ed.) 'Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform,' DCAF/Lit Verlag, Zurich/Berlin, 2008 ‘Local Ownership.’ Portrays a varying level of vested interest/warlord subversion of reform among the various security agencies; little local ownership at the MOD/ANA despite several attempts to seize more local control and subvert the foreign process by not proving enough personnel, imposing different officers, and wanting a conscript force. The army is financially unsustainable even at 70,000 strong and not being trained for combat in small units.
• War, politics and society in Afghanistan, 1978–1992, By Antonio Giustozzi

External links

• Hierarchy of Command Structure
• Government Accountability Office, AFGHANISTAN SECURITY: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined GAO-05-575, June 2005
• United States Army Corps of Engineers, Afghanistan Engineer District, Photo Gallery (Construction of ANA military bases)
• Article by Afghan policy analyst
• Tank maneuvers showcase new Afghan Army's capabilities