Anti-Russian sentiment: Wikis


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The German inscription reads: "The Russian must die so that we may live" (1941)

Anti-Russian sentiment refers to a diverse spectrum of prejudices, dislikes or fears of Russia, Russians, or Russian culture, including Russophobia. In modern international politics the term "Russophobia" is also used more specifically to describe clichés preserved from the times of the Cold War.[1][2] Many prejudices, often introduced as elements of political war against the Soviet Union, are still observed in the discussions of the relations with Russia—whose leadership are seen as manipulating by omitting from of its Soviet past.[3] The extent of Russophobia varies country by country and depends not only on the geography but also the fraction of the society. The intensity of Russophobia in various countries evolved throughout history, and relies on old stereotypes linking Russians to organized crime/mafia and other activities of this genre.



Dislike of Russians is sometimes seen as a backlash of Russification pursued by Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, and backlash against modern policies of Russian government.[4] However, Russophobia has a long history and already existed for many centuries before Russia became one of the major powers in Europe.[5]

During the 19th century, the competition between Russia and the Great Britain for the spheres of influence and colonies (see e.g. The Great Game and Berlin Congress) possibly was a reason for the Russophobia in Great Britain where British propaganda of the time portrayed Russians as uncultured Asiatic barbarians.[6] These views spread to other parts of the world and were reflected in the literature of late 19th and early 20th centuries.[5]

The Prometheism political strategy conceived by Polish chief of state Józef Piłsudski intended to weaken Tsarist Russia and later the Soviet Union. The Pan-Slavism movement included anti-Russian sentiment as a reaction to Russia's involvement on Austrian side during the Hungarian Revolution of 1848. Russia's involvement also resulted in the enmity of Austria-Hungary to Eastern orientation of many of its Slavic constituents in the second half of the 19th century. The elites saw Russia as a threat to Austro-Hungarian multi-ethnic empire. The public opinion became even more radicalized and Russophobic, as the common anti-Russian stereotypes fell onto a fertile ground.

In the 1930s, Adolf Hitler enhanced the Russophobe stereotypes with his racial theory of subhumans, in part to rationalize and justify the German invasion of the Soviet Union and the atrocities committed against its populace.

""Need, hunger, lack of comfort have been the Russians' lot for centuries. No false compassion, as their stomachs are perfectly extendible. Don't try to impose the German standards and to change their style of life. Their only wish is to be ruled by the Germans. <...> Help yourselves, and may God help you!" ("12 precepts for the German officer in the East", 1941) [7]

It is difficult to draw a distinction from a casual xenophobia, observable for any two peoples living side by side or even intermixed and historically involved in armed conflicts. Also it might not be always easy to separate actions unpopular in Russia caused by rational political concerns of its neighbors from the actions caused by an irrational Russophobia. The opinions on these matters are highly subjective and may vary a great deal between different historians.

Dr. Vlad Sobell of Daiwa Research Institute (a member company of Daiwa Securities Group) claims that what he sees as "Russophobic sentiment" in the West is a result of the West failing to adapt and change its historical attitude towards Russia, even as Russia has in his opinion ditched its ideology and opted for pure pragmatism, successfully driving its economic revival. He further claims that the west remained stuck with its unchanged and unchanging beliefs. He continues, that if anything, the orthodoxy was further entrenched by the West's perception, that, having won the epic fight against totalitarianism, it must forever remain the only game in town.[8]

Attitudes and claims of attitudes towards Russia and Russians by country

In the October of 2004, the International Gallup Organization announced that according to its poll,[9] anti-Russian sentiment remained fairly strong throughout Europe and the West in general. It found that Russia was the least popular G-8 country globally. The percentage of population with a negative perception of Russia was 62% in Finland, 57% in Norway, 42% in the Czech Republic and Switzerland, 37% in Germany, 32% in Denmark and Poland, and 23% in Estonia. However, according to the poll, the people of Kosovo had the lowest opinion of Russia: 73% of Kosovar respondents said their opinion was "very negative" or "fairly negative". Overall, the percentage of respondents with a positive view of Russia was only 31%.

A Russian commentator Vyacheslav Nikonov claimed Russia’s image is so negative in the West by quoting his Canadian friend: "The main problem is that these Russians have white skin. If they had been green, or pink, or came from Mars…or had flowers sticking out of their ears, then everybody would have said – well, these people are different, like Turks, or Chinese, or Japanese. We have no questions about the Japanese. They are different, their civilisation is different. But these Russians … they are white but they have totally different brains … which is thoroughly suspicious."[2]


According to veteran German author, journalist and Russia-correspondent Gabriele Krone-Schmalz, there is deep disapproval of everything Russian in Estonia.[10]

According to the distinguished Estonian philosopher Jaan Kaplinski, the birth of anti-Russian sentiment in Estonia only dates back to 1940, as there was little or none during the czarist and first independence period, when anti-German sentiment predominated. Kaplinski states the imposition of Soviet rule in 1940 and subsequent actions by Soviet authorities led to the replacement of anti-German sentiment with anti-Russian sentiment within just one year, and characterized it as "one of the greatest achievements of the Soviet authorities".[11] Kaplinski supposes that anti-Russian sentiment could disappear as quickly as anti-German sentiment did in 1940, however he believes the prevailing sentiment in Estonia is sustained by Estonia's politicians who employ "the use of anti-Russian sentiments in political combat," together with the "tendentious attitude of the [Estonian] media."[12] Kaplinski says that a "rigid East-West attitude is to be found to some degree in Estonia when it comes to Russia, in the form that everything good comes from the West and everything bad from the East"[12]; this attitude, in Kaplinski's view, "probably does not date back further than 1940 and presumably originates from Nazi propaganda."[12]

In a 2005 case brought against American attorney general Alberto Gonzalez, a Russo-Estonian family appealed for asylum in the United States on the grounds of anti-Russian discrimination tied to anti-Russian sentiment in Estonia.[13 ] The family's request for a review of the case was denied on the grounds that the discrimination documented by the petitioners was not held as equivalent to persecution.[13 ]

The Estonian businessman and politician Tiit Vähi, who briefly served as Estonia's prime minister in 1992 and once more in 1995-1997, described "overall anti-Russian sentiment" as a feature of the populist current in the country's politics, raising it as one among a number of issues with the ruling coalition of Prime Minister Andrus Ansip.[14]

European discrimination watchgroups express worries about the usage of a highly derogatory Estonian term for Russians, tibla, in mainstream media.[15][16]

The Caucasus

Although the Caucasus has never been the subject of any formal studies or polls, it is widely thought that the Caucasus may be highly Russophobic. It especially suffered from the brutality of both the Russian Empire, and its successor, the Soviet Union. In the 1800s, after the bloody Caucasian Wars, millions of Caucasians were deported to the Ottoman Empire and many were massacred. Under the Soviet Union, Ingush, Chechen, Karachay, Balkar, and Noghai peoples were almost indiscriminately accused (all Caucasians were suspected except the Ossetians, historical allies of the Russians) of collaborating with the Nazis, despite their own contributions to the Russian side during the war. They were rounded up and deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan, where they were forced to labor with little food and shelter, causing massive amounts of death. Especially victimized were the Chechens, who lost a very high portion of their population as a result of deportation (often cited as one of the reasons for the Chechen wars)[17]. Now, in the modern day, Russia has fought two wars against Chechens, where many other Caucasian peoples, especially Abkhaz, Circassians, Ingush, Georgians and Dagestanis, have to come to the aid of the Chechens unofficially.

There have often been reports of anti-Russian activity even in Republics far removed from the Chechen Wars. For example, journalist Fatima Tlisova released an article in 2009 discussing the frequent occurrences of crosses being sawed off buildings and thrown off mountains in Circassia, due to the cross being associated with the people who initiated the Muhajir.[18]

In Chechnya, anti-Russian sentiment is frequently evoked when discussing politics. In a report by the Jamestown Federation, dealing with the topic of the (extremely positive) reception of John McCain's statements about Russia's "double standards in the Caucasus", one Chechen was quoted to have gone so far as to tell the website that Chechnya "cannot exist within the borders of Russia because every 50 years... Russia kills us Chechens".[19]

The treatment of the Russian minority in Chechnya as well as elsewhere in the Caucasus is a frequently discussed topic, especially regarding the Chechen wars. In most Caucasian republics in the late 1980s and 1990s, the Russian population left the Republics in large numbers as they seized more and more autonomy. Especially in Chechnya, but elsewhere as well, this was due to job-related issues: the native Caucasians were officially discriminated against and systematically kept out of any government jobs, as well as unofficially discriminated in most other jobs, giving rise to the notorious Caucasian mafias. However, during perestroika, as the native Caucasian peoples seized more autonomy and attained situations of control, the situation reversed: in most cases, the Russians were vastly outnumbered, and were rapidly replaced with native Caucasians in both the workforce and government.[20] There is still a debate over whether this was distinct discrimination by the now-Caucasian authorities or whether it was simply, as the Caucasians claim, choosing without discrimination, meaning that naturally the natives would outnumber the Russians according to the population makeup (which the Russians claim ignores their claims that the Russians were far more skilled than the natives, which the natives in turn refute). Whatever the nature of the mass replacement of Russians in the workforce, it caused a mass exodus of Russians, as high as a ratio of 26 Russians leaving per one entrance in Checheno-Ingushetia at the time.

Once Chechnya had independence (as Ichkeria) the presence and level of discrimination against Russians is highly debated. Some, such as Tony Wood, claim that the Chechens mainly kept their dislike of the Russia to political Russia until the war (when the Russian diaspora vastly helped their kindred in Russia proper) and notes that even the highly nationalistic president of Chechnya at the time, Dzhokhar Dudayev, in fact, had a Russian wife, as well as the fact that what was left of Russia's diaspora in Chechnya (i.e., the ones who still had jobs) "did not hasten to leave it" after independence was achieved . On the other hand, people who support the Russian side of the war often cite the lack of language rights for the Russians as well as the lack of political representation of Ichkerian Russians.

In the "Circassian republics", Russian nationalists claim that Russians are discriminated against and for that reason, the three (Adygeya, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia) should be swallowed into Krasnodar or Stavropol' and have their autonomy revoked.[21]


According to recent polls 62% of Finnish citizens had a negative view of Russia.[9] The main reasons are general distrust of major powers in world politics (in the same poll conducted during the Iraq War, 56% of Finns had a negative view of United States)[9] and historically rooted antipathy. Deportation of Ingrian Finns, autochthones of St. Petersburg,Ingria and other Soviet repressions against its Finnish minorities have contributed negative view of Russia and Russians.


Most Japanese interaction with Russian individuals -besides in major cities such as Tokyo- happens with seamen and fishermen of the Russian fishing fleet, therefore Japanese people tend to carry the stereotypes associated with sailors over to Russians.[22][23] According to a report by the Cabinet in Japan, the percentage of Japanese who dislike Russia is 15%. (Japanese dislike towards China is 35%, South Korea 20%, and North Korea 80%.) In the report it is forecast that Japanese Anti-Russian sentiment is decreasing.[24]


Following the breakup of the Soviet Union ethnic clashes have been infrequent but, sometimes serious.[25] The Kyrgyzstan's 2005 Tulip Revolution turned into an anti-Russian pogrom in Bishkek.[26][27]


Russian officials claim that negative feelings towards Russia are widespread in Poland. The New York Times reported after the Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza that Gleb Pavlovsky, an advisor to President of Russia Vladimir Putin, complained during his 2005 visit to Warsaw that "Poles talk about Russians the way anti-Semites talk about Jews." [28] On the other hand, Poland's foreign minister Adam Rotfeld thinks that Russian politicians are "looking for an enemy and…find it in Poland.".

According to Boris Makarenko, deputy director of a Moscow-based think tank Center for Political Technologies, anti-Russian sentiments have existed in Poland for more than 200 years. He said that much of the anti-Russian feelings in Poland is caused by grievances of the past. [29] The most contentious issue is the massacre of 22,000 Polish officers, priests and intellectuals in Katyn Forest in 1940. [30] "It is easy to understand why, and I am not going to defend Russia either for three divisions of Poland [at the end of the 18 century] or many other [unjust things done to Poland]. These anti-Russian sentiments resurfaced in the recent decade and there are many examples of that." Makarenko said. He also noted that Poland had criticized Russia’s stance on human rights or press freedom, and had clashed with Russia over the Orange Revolution events in Ukraine.

Jakub Boratyński, the director of international programs at the independent Polish think tank Stefan Batory Foundation, said that anti-Russian feelings have substantially decreased since Poland joined the EU and NATO, and that Poles feel more secure than before, but he also admitted that many people in Poland still look suspiciously at Russian foreign-policy moves and are afraid Russia is seeking to "recreate an empire in a different form." [29]


There is a wide anti-Russian sentiment in Romania. It dates back to the conflict between Russian and the Ottoman empires in the early 19th century and the ceding of part of the Moldavian principality to Russia in 1812 after its de facto annexation, and to the annexations during World War II and after by the Soviet Union of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia. Following WWII, Romania was occupied by Soviet forces. Soviet dominance over the Romanian economy was manifested through the so-called Sovroms, exacting a tremendous economic toll ostensibly as war-time reparations. Overall, there is a negative perception of everything Russian, including language, culture and people, and of those who take interest in Russia, such individuals seen as pro-Communists or Russophiles.


Universities in Turkmenistan have been encouraged to reject applicants with non-Turkmen surnames, especially ethnic Russians.[31]


Modern Anti-swearing poster in Lviv, Ukraine, issued by the political party Svoboda.[32][33] Ukrainian text reads: "Remember! Swearing turns you into a Moskal. In Russia, they do not use profanity for cursing, they use profanity for speaking." The term Moskal was originally an ethnonym used by Ukrainians to describe Russians. Today its usage is considered to be an ethnic slur.

An overwhelming majority of Ukrainians have a positive opinion of Russia and its inhabitants, in a poll held October 2008 42.8% of the respondents said they regard Russia as “very good” while 44.9% said their attitude was “good"[34], in a poll held June 2009 93% of the pollees respected Russia and 96% respected Russians[35] (in a poll held June 2009 in Russia a total of 56% of Russians questioned said they disrespect Ukraine and 34% of the respondents were positive about Ukraine[36]). Sentiment towards Russia in Ukraine does vary throughout the country.

According to a long-term survey by Institute of Sociology of National Academy of Science of Ukraine, the overall population of the country, has a on average a similar attitude towards ethnic Russians as towards ethnic Ukrainians.[37] (cf. 23% of negative attitude towards Ukraine in Russia [38]). Another survey showed that in 2005, compared to the rest of the population, the population of Western Ukraine, Kiev and Kiev Oblast had a less positive attitude towards Russia. [39] The right-wing political party "Svoboda",[32][33][40] marginal on the national scale,[41] often invokes the radical Russophobic rhetoric (see poster) and has sufficient electoral support to form factions in several municipal and provincial local councils in Western Ukraine.


In May and June 2006, Russian media cited discrimination against Russian companies as one possible reason why the contemplated merger between the Luxembourg-based steelmaker Arcelor and Russia's Severstal did not finalize. According to the Russian daily Izvestiya, those opposing the merger "exploited the 'Russian threat' myth during negotiations with shareholders and, apparently, found common ground with the Europeans",[42] while Boris Gryzlov, speaker of the State Duma observed that "recent events show that someone does not want to allow us to enter their markets."[43] On 27 July 2006, the New York Times quoted the analysts as saying that many Western investors still think that anything to do with Russia is "a little bit doubtful and dubious" while others look at Russia in "comic book terms, as mysterious and mafya-run."[44]

However, the same article also quoted Aleksandr Temerko, a former vice president of YUKOS, the company which was broken up and sold off by the Russian government, saying that Western investors should treat take-overs by Russian companies with suspicion: "What if tomorrow they decide to grab Mordashov [the oligarch in charge of Severstal] and force him to sell his stock to a state company?... Then some K.G.B. agent will show up at Arcelor and say, 'I'm your new partner'.... Political motives are real; they exist.... Investors are right to fear them." Some Russian activists who are against the greater political control associated with the rule of Putin and the United Russia Party are still disappointed by such Western repulsion, however, as a lack of foreign economic presence and investment is, in their view, one of the reasons why the new government and the KGB can so easily interfere in business and economics. Arcelor shareholders themselves portrayed their doubts about Severstal's bid very differently, and completely unrelated to stereotypes of Russian business practice: they were worried about the manner in which the bid was being presented to them by the Arcelor management, who were in favour of the take-over, and the degree of personal control Mr. Mordashov would have over the new company.[45]

View of Russia in Western media

Some Russian and Western commentators express concern about a far too negative coverage of Russia in Western media (some Russians even describe this as a"war of information") [46][47][48]. In April 2007 David Johnson, founder of the Johnson's Russia List, said in interview to the Moscow News: "I am sympathetic to the view that these days Putin and Russia are perhaps getting too dark a portrayal in most Western media. Or at least that critical views need to be supplemented with other kinds of information and analysis. An openness to different views is still warranted." [49]

In 1995, years before Putin was elected to his first term, the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press reported: "coverage of Russia and its president, Boris Yeltsin, was decidedly negative, even though national polls continue to find the public feeling positive toward Russia and largely uncritical of Yeltsin." [50]

In February 2007 the Russian creativity agency E-generator put together a "rating of Russophobia" of Western media, using for the research articles concerning a single theme — Russia's chairmanship of G8, translated into Russian by InoSmi.Ru. The score was composed for each edition, negative values granted for negative assessments of Russia, and positive values representing positive ones. The top in the rating were Newsday (-43, U.S.), The Financial Times (-34, Great Britain), The Wall Street Journal (-34, U.S.), Le Monde (-30, France), while editions on the opposite side of the rating were Toronto Star (+27, Canada) and The Conservative Voice (+26, U.S.) [51] [3]

Dr. Vlad Sobell claimed that an example of the anti-Russian bias in the West was that in his opinion President Putin was widely assumed to be guilty of the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, without any evidence being considered as necessary. The only proof the Western press needed for Putin's guilt was, that the victim said so himself on his deathbed.[8]

California-based international relations scholar Andrei Tsygankov has remarked that anti-Russian political rhetoric coming from Washington circles has received wide echo in American mainstream media, asserting that "Russophobia's revival is indicative of the fear shared by some U.S. and European politicians that their grand plans to control the world's most precious resources and geostrategic sites may not succeed if Russia's economic and political recovery continues."[52]

See also


  1. ^ Aside from prevalent use in the media, the term "russophobia" was used specifically by Russian ambassador Yuri Fedotov to describe British-Russian relations in 2007. "Envoy complains Britons mistreat Russians". Reuters. 2007-07-08. Retrieved 2007-07-30.  
  2. ^ "The west's new Russophobia is hypocritical - and wrong", The Guardian, June 30, 2006
  3. ^ Forest, Johnson, Till. Post-totalitarian national identity: public memory in Germany and Russia. Social & Cultural Geography, Volume 5, Number 3, September 2004. Routledge.
  4. ^ Peter Lavelle goes back as far as the Csarist era to illustrate Western distrust and disdain for Russia. Lavelle hosts a weekly pro-Russia commentary show on state sponsored RIA Novosti's English language cable news channel.Peter Lavelle et al. (2005-07-08). "RP’s Weekly Experts’ Panel: Deconstructing "Russophobia" and "Russocentric"". Russia Profile. Retrieved 2007-07-30.  
  5. ^ a b Jimmie E. Cain Jr. (15 May 2006), Bram Stoker and Russophobia: Evidence of the British Fear of Russia in Dracula and The Lady of the Shroud, McFarland & Co Inc.,U.S., ISBN 0786424079  
  6. ^ Peter Hopkirk. The Great Game, Kodansha International, 1992, ISBN 4-7700-1703-0
  7. ^ Russian: Политика геноцида, Государственный мемориальный комплекс «Хатынь»
  8. ^ a b Western treatment of Russia signifies erosion of reason Dr. Vlad Sobell, 2007
  9. ^ a b c Helsingin Sanomat, October 11, 2004, International poll: Anti-Russian sentiment runs very strong in Finland. Only Kosovo has more negative attitude
  10. ^ Krone-Schmalz, Gabriele (2008). "Zweierlei Maß" (in German). Was passiert in Russland? (4 ed.). München: F.A. Herbig. pp. 45–48. ISBN 9783776625257.  
  11. ^ Subrenat, Jean-Jacques (2004). Estonia: identity and independence. Rodopi. p. 273. ISBN 9042008903.  
  12. ^ a b c Subrenat, Jean-Jacques, A. Bertriko, David Cousins, Alexander Harding, and Richard C. Waterhouse. Estonia: Identity and Independence. Translated by David Cousins, Alexander Harding, Richard C. Waterhouse. Rodopi, 2004. ISBN 9042008903, ISBN 9789042008908. P. 273.
  13. ^ a b "Jelena Vladimir OREHHOVA; Valdek Orehhov; Anne Orehhova; and Aleksandr Serdjuk, Petitioners, v. Alberto GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent." United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. July 21, 2005–417 F.3d 48. AltLaw. Retrieved 17 August 2009.
  14. ^ Hõbemägi, Toomas. "Tiit Vähi: Estonian PM Lies and Doesn’t Even Blink". Baltic Business News. 9 October 2008. Retrieved 20 August 2009.
  15. ^ "Sixth Periodic Report" on the Implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination Submitted by the Republic of Estonia under Article 9 of the Convention", 2004
  16. ^ Shmelev, M. Strange accent of the local transaltion." Daily Vesti, 16.09.2008; the reference taken from "Racism in Estonia", ENAR Shadow Report 2008
  17. ^ Wood, Tony. Chechnya: the Case for Independence
  18. ^
  19. ^
  20. ^ Sakwa, Edward. Chechnya: From Past to Future
  21. ^
  22. ^ Otaru onsen lawsuit, hearing 7: oral testimonies by the plaintiffs, March 11, 2002, Sapporo district court
  23. ^ Jon Letman March 31, 2000: Russian visitors boiling over Japanese bathhouses
  24. ^ [:ja:中央調査社] 中央調査報(No.575)より(世論調査分析)日本人の「好きな国・嫌いな国」 [1]
  25. ^ KYRGYZSTAN: Economic disparities driving inter-ethnic conflict
  26. ^ Russia ready to evacuate its citizens from Kyrgyzstan
  27. ^ KYRGYZSTAN: Focus on post-Akayev Russian exodus, IRIN Asia
  28. ^ "After Centuries of Enmity, Relations Between Poland and Russia Are as Bad as Ever" (free text)
  29. ^ a b Radio Free Europe. Eastern Europe: Russian-Polish Tensions Rise Over Attack On Russian Children In Warsaw, by Valentinas Mite. 3 August 2005; last accessed on 14 July 2007
  30. ^ The Saint Petersburg Times. Lingering Bitterness Over May 9. 26 April 2005. retrieved on 14 July 2007
  31. ^ Turkmenistan: Russian Students Targetedby the Institute for War and Peace Reporting16 July 2003
  32. ^ a b Ukraine's orange-blue divide |
  33. ^ a b David Duke makes repeat visit to controversial Kyiv universityKyiv Post
  34. ^ Russia, Ukraine relationship going sour, say polls, Kyiv Post (October 2, 2008)
  35. ^ 93% Of Pollees Respect Russia, 96% Respect Russians, Ukrainian News Agency (June 17, 2009)
  36. ^ 56% Of Russians Disrespect Ukraine, Ukrainian News Agency (June 17, 2009)
  37. ^ Паніна Н. В. Українське суспільство 1994—2005: соціологічний моніторинг — Київ: ТОВ «Видавництво Софія», 2005. — с. 67.
  38. ^ (Russian)
  39. ^ (Russian)
  40. ^ "Tiahnybok considers 'Svoboda' as the only right-wing party in Ukraine", Hazeta po-ukrainsky, 06.08.2007. Russian edition, Ukrainian edition
  41. ^ 0.36% of electoral support in the 2005 elections to Verkhovna Rada. Source
  42. ^ Как закалялась "Северсталь", by Izvestija 26 June 2006
  43. ^ Russian: Председатель Госдумы Борис Грызлов, комментируя пропагандистскую кампанию против слияния российской "Северстали" и европейской "Arcelor", заявил, что Россию не хотят пускать на мировые рынки, by Rossijskaya Gazeta 27 June 2006
  44. ^ Russian Politicians See Russophobia in Arcelor's Decision to Go With Mittal Steel, by the New York Times 27 July 2006
  45. ^ Rebel investors gear up to sink Russian takeover of Arcelor, by The Observer 18 June 2006
  46. ^ "Pravda" on Potomac, by Edward Lozansky, Johnson's Russia List, December 2005
  47. ^ Why are the American media, both liberal and conservative, so unanimously anti-Russian?, by Ira Straus, Johnson's Russia List, January 2005
  48. ^ (Russian) Western Media "put" Russia "to the place", by km.Ru, June 2007
  49. ^ Interview with David Johnson by the Moscow News, April 2007
  50. ^ 1995 report of the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press
  51. ^ (Russian) Rating of Russophoby, by E-generator, February 2007
  52. ^ Tsygankov, Andrei. "The Russophobia Card". Atlantic Community. 19 May 2008. Retrieved 17 August 2009.


  • (Polish)/(Russian) ed. Jerzy Faryno, Roman Bobryk, "Polacy w oczach Rosjan - Rosjanie w oczach Polaków. Поляки глазами русских - русские глазами поляков. Zbiór studiów" - conference proceedings; in Studia Litteraria Polono-Slavica; Slawistyczny Ośrodek Wydawniczy Instytutu Slawistyki Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Warszawa 2000, ISBN 83-86619-93-7.

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