|Mission name||Apollo 1|
mass 20,412 kg
|Booster||Saturn IB SA-204|
|Launch pad||LC 34
|Launch date||February 21, 1967|
|Landing||March 7, 1967
north of Puerto Rico a
|Mission duration||14 days|
|Number of orbits||~200|
|Orbital period||~89.7 m|
|Left to right: Grissom, White, Chaffee|
Italics indicate parameters for the planned mission canceled following the January 27 fire.
a The intended recovery carrier was the USS Essex.
Apollo 1 is the official name that was retroactively assigned to the never-flown, first manned Apollo program mission, officially designated as AS-204 (Apollo-Saturn), to be launched from Pad 34 (Launch Complex 34, Cape Canaveral, then known as Cape Kennedy) atop a Saturn 1B rocket, on February 21, 1967. The selected crew were: Command Pilot Virgil I. "Gus" Grissom, Senior Pilot Ed White and Pilot Roger B. Chaffee. However, during a preliminary test and launch rehearsal on January 27, 1967, a fire broke out in the cabin which killed all three and destroyed the Command Module (CM-012). This was the world's first crew fatality associated with a manned space flight.
An Apollo 204 Review Board was quickly launched to determine the cause of the accident. Although the ignition source of the fire was never conclusively identified, the astronauts' deaths were attributed to a wide range of lethal design hazards in the early Apollo Command Module. The manned phase of Apollo was delayed for twenty months while these problems were fixed. The Saturn 1B launch vehicle SA-204 (Saturn/Apollo) was re-used for the first unmanned Lunar Module test flight, Apollo 5.
|Command Pilot||Virgil I. "Gus" Grissom|
|Senior Pilot||Edward H. White II|
|Pilot||Roger B. Chaffee|
|Command Pilot||James McDivitt|
|Senior Pilot||David Scott|
|This crew flew on Apollo 9.|
|Command Pilot||Walter Schirra|
|Senior Pilot||Donn Eisele|
|This crew flew on Apollo 7.|
AS-204 was to be the first manned flight of a command and service module (CSM) to Earth orbit, launched on a Saturn 1B. CM-012, the Apollo 1 command module, was a Block I design built for spaceflight but never intended for a trip to the moon since it lacked the needed docking equipment.
The AS-204 mission was scheduled for February 21, 1967, having already missed a target date for the last quarter of 1966. The flight was to test "launch operations, ground tracking and control facilities and the performance of the Apollo-Saturn launch assembly" and would have lasted up to two weeks, depending on how the spacecraft performed. Grissom resolved to keep AS-204 in orbit for a full 14 days if there was any way to do so.
Apollo 1 was intended to be followed by two more Apollo flights in the summer and late autumn of 1967. The first of these would have launched a Block II Apollo CSM on a Saturn 1B along with an unmanned LM on a second Saturn 1B, both ascending to low earth orbit for a CSM-LM rendezvous and docking. The second flight would have launched the CSM and LM together on a Saturn V to high earth orbit. Both of these missions were canceled immediately following the fire.
As it turned out, those planned dates proved to be completely unrealistic, since the Saturn V was not ready for its first unmanned test flight until November 9, 1967, and the LM was not similarly ready until January 22, 1968. The low earth orbit docking was finally achieved using a Saturn V on Apollo 9, launched on March 3, 1969. The high earth orbit mission was deemed unnecessary and cancelled to keep the program on track to a 1969 first lunar landing.
The Apollo Command Module was much bigger and far more complex than any previously implemented spacecraft design. It was built by North American Aviation, which had originally suggested the hatch open outward and carry explosive bolts in case of emergency. NASA didn't agree, arguing the hatch could accidentally open, as it had on Liberty Bell 7. Before the fire, astronauts successfully lobbied for an outward-opening hatch on future command modules, but NASA subsequently claimed the astronauts were thinking about ease of exit and entry for spacewalks (along with getting out of the CM after splashdown) rather than safety.
North American Aviation had suggested the cabin atmosphere be an oxygen/nitrogen mixture as on the Earth's surface. NASA objected, citing heightened risks such as catastrophic decompression sickness and mismanagement of nitrogen levels, which could cause the astronauts to pass out and die. NASA officials asserted a pure oxygen atmosphere had been used without incident in the Mercury and Gemini programs, demonstrating that pure oxygen could be safely employed on Apollo. Also, a pure oxygen design saved weight.
CM-012 was delivered to NASA with 113 significant incomplete planned engineering changes. An additional 623 Engineering Orders were generated subsequent to delivery. The crew expressed serious concerns about fire hazards and other problems (Grissom even famously took a lemon from a tree by his house, telling his wife Betty, "I'm going to hang it on that spacecraft").
The January 27, 1967 launch simulation, officially considered not hazardous because the Saturn 1B was not loaded with fuel, was a "plugs-out" test to determine whether the spacecraft would operate nominally on internal power while detached from all cables and umbilicals. There was hope that if the spacecraft passed this and subsequent tests, it would be ready to fly on February 21, 1967. In a BBC documentary "NASA: Triumph and Tragedy", Jim McDivitt said that NASA had no idea how 100% oxygen atmosphere would influence burning. Similar remarks by other astronauts were expressed in a documentary "In the Shadow of the Moon."
At 1:00 PM (1800 GMT) on January 27 Grissom, White and Chaffee entered the command module fully suited, were strapped into their seats and hooked up to the spacecraft's systems in preparation for the plugs-out test. There were immediate problems. A sour "buttermilk" smell in the air circulating through Grissom's suit delayed the launch simulation until 2:42 PM. Three minutes later the hatch was sealed and high-pressure pure oxygen began replacing the air in the cabin.
Further problems included episodes of high oxygen flow apparently linked to movements by the astronauts in their flightsuits. There were also faulty communications between the crew, the control room, the operations and checkout building and the complex 34 blockhouse. "How are we going to get to the moon if we can't talk between three buildings?" Grissom complained in frustration over the communication loop. This put the launch simulation on hold again at 5:40. Most countdown functions had been successfully completed by 6:20 but the countdown was still holding at T minus 10 minutes at 6:30 with all cables and umbilicals still attached to the command module while attempts were made to fix the communication problem.
The crew members were reclining in their horizontal couches, running through a checklist when a voltage transient was recorded at 6:30:54 (23:30:54 GMT). Ten seconds later (at 6:31:04) Chaffee said, "Hey..." Scuffling sounds followed for three seconds before Grissom shouted "Fire!" Chaffee then reported, "We've got a fire in the cockpit," and White said "Fire in the cockpit!"
After nearly ten seconds of frenetic movement noises Chaffee yelled, "We've got a bad fire! Let's get out! We're burning up! We're on fire! Get us out of here!" Some witnesses said they saw Ed White on the television monitors, reaching for the hatch release handle as flames in the cabin spread from left to right and licked the window. Only 17 seconds after the first indication by crew of any fire, the transmission ended abruptly at 6:31:21 with a scream of pain as the cabin ruptured after rapidly expanding gases from the fire overpressurized the CM to 29 psi (200 kPa).
Intense heat, dense toxic smoke, malfunctioning gas masks and shock waves and explosions from the cabin hampered the ground crew's rescue efforts. There were fears the fire might ignite the solid fuel rockets in the launch escape tower above the command module, likely killing nearby ground personnel. It took five minutes to open the inner and outer hatches, a set of three with many ratchets. By this time the fire in the command module had gone out. Although the cabin lights remained lit the ground crew was at first unable to find the astronauts. As the smoke cleared they found the bodies but were not able to remove them. The fire had partly melted the astronauts' nylon space suits and the hoses connecting them to the life support system. Grissom's body was found lying mostly on the deck. His and White's suits were fused together. The body of Ed White (whom mission protocol had tasked with opening the hatch) was lying back in his center couch. White would not have been able to open the inward-opening hatch against the internal pressure. Chaffee's job was to shut down the spacecraft systems and maintain communications with ground control. His body was still strapped into the right-hand seat.
According to the Apollo 204 Review Board, Grissom suffered severe third degree burns on over a third of his body and his spacesuit was mostly destroyed. White suffered third degree burns on almost half of his body and a quarter of his spacesuit had melted away. Chaffee suffered third degree burns over almost a quarter of his body and a small portion of his spacesuit was damaged. It was later confirmed the crew had died of smoke inhalation with burns contributing. In later lawsuits brought by Gus Grissom's widow Betty Grissom there were claims the astronauts had lived longer than NASA claimed publicly.
The review board found the documentation for CM-012 so lacking that they were at times unable to determine what had been installed in the spacecraft or what was in it at the time of the accident.
Since the CM was designed to endure outward pressure in the vacuum of space, the plugs-out test had been run with the cabin pressure at over 16 psi, almost 2 psi above the ambient sea level pressure at Launch Complex 34 and near the upper limits of measuring devices in the spacecraft. This represented over 5 times the oxygen density carried within the Mercury and Gemini spacecraft while in spaceflight (which was only 3 psi but equal to the partial pressure of oxygen at sea level and thus very breathable). Following a worldwide survey of artificial oxygen-rich environments, it was found that rarely if ever had a 100% oxygen environment been created and maintained at such a high pressure, in which a bar of aluminum can burn like wood. The investigation also found much substandard wiring and plumbing in the craft along with a misplaced socket wrench. (which was ruled out as a cause). Hence, the fire was at first believed to have been caused by a spark somewhere in the over 25 km (16 mi) of wiring threaded throughout the command module.
The review board noted a silver-plated copper wire running through an environmental control unit near the command module pilot's couch had become stripped of its Teflon insulation and abraded by repeated opening and closing of a small access door. This weak point in the wiring also ran near a junction in an ethylene glycol/water cooling line which was known to be prone to leaks. The electrolysis of ethylene glycol solution with the silver anode was a notable hazard which could cause a violent exothermic reaction, igniting the ethylene glycol mixture in the CM's corrosive test atmosphere of pure, high-pressure oxygen.
The panel cited how the NASA crew systems department had installed 34 square feet (3.2 m2) of fuzzy Velcro throughout the spacecraft, almost like carpeting. This velcro was found to be explosive in a high-pressure 100% oxygen environment. Up to 70 pounds of other non-metallic flammable materials had crept into the design. Buzz Aldrin in Men From Earth states that the three astronauts complained that they wanted the flammable material removed, and that there was to be no flammable material in the spacecraft; the flammable material was removed, but was replaced prior to delivery to Cape Kennedy.
In 1968 a team of MIT physicists went to Cape Kennedy and performed a static discharge test in the CM-103 command module while it was being prepared for the launch of Apollo 8. With an electroscope, they measured the approximate energy of static discharges caused by a test crew dressed in nylon flight pressure suits and reclining on the nylon flight seats. The MIT investigators found sufficient energy for ignition discharged repeatedly when crew-members shifted in their seats and then touched the spacecraft's aluminum panels.
However, the ignition source for the Apollo 1 fire was never officially determined.
After the fire the Apollo project was grounded for review and redesign. In hindsight the command module was understood to be extremely hazardous and in some instances, carelessly assembled. Many design changes were made:
Thorough protocols were implemented for documenting spacecraft construction and maintenance. By all accounts the design changes were successful and justified the 21-month delay of the first manned mission, Apollo 7.
In March 1961 Soviet cosmonaut Valentin Bondarenko had died after a fire that started in a high-oxygen isolation chamber. The USSR concealed the tragedy for over 20 years, which subsequently caused some speculation as to whether or not the Apollo 1 disaster might have been averted had NASA been aware of the incident. However, the fire hazards of a 100%-oxygen sea-level pressure environment had been well described by 1967 and many deaths from flash fires had been publicly reported during the 1950s and 1960s. A 1966 editorial in the journal Space/Aeronautics asserted "The odds are that the first spaceflight casualty due to environmental exposure will occur not in space, but on the ground", and further noted that safety protocols for the Apollo project were thoroughly lacking.
In May 1967, Congress questioned NASA's selection of North American Aviation as the prime contractor for Apollo. On May 11, NASA Administrator James E. Webb issued a statement defending the selection. On June 9, Deputy Director Robert C. Seamans, Jr. filed a seven-page memorandum documenting the process that led to North American's selection in November 1961.
Internally, some acrimony developed between NASA and North American over assignment of blame. North American argued unsuccessfully that it was not responsible for the fatal error in spacecraft atmosphere design. Finally, Webb contacted North American president Lee Atwood, and demanded that either he or Chief Engineer Harrison "Stormy" Storms resign. Atwood elected to fire Storms.
The Apollo 1 insignia has a center showing a command service module flying over the southeastern United States with Florida (the launch point) prominent. The moon is seen in the distance, symbolic of the eventual program goal. A yellow border carries the mission and astronaut names with another border set with stars and stripes, trimmed in gold. The insignia was designed by the crew, with the artwork done by Allen Stevens of Rockwell International.
Gus Grissom and Roger Chaffee were buried at Arlington National Cemetery. Ed White was buried at the cemetery of the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York. Their names are also enshrined on the Space Mirror Memorial at the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex in Merritt Island, Florida.
An Apollo 1 mission patch was left on the moon's surface during the first manned lunar landing by Apollo 11.
Launch Complex 34 was subsequently used only for the launch of Apollo 7 and later dismantled but the launch platform remains at the site ( ) along with a few other concrete and steel-reinforced structures. The launch platform bears two plaques noting the tragedy.
One reads: LAUNCH COMPLEX 34, Friday, 27 January 1967, 1831 Hours. Dedicated to the living memory of the crew of the Apollo 1: USAF. Lt. Colonel Virgil I. Grissom, USAF. Lt. Colonel Edward H. White, II, U.S.N. Lt. Commander Roger B. Chaffee. They gave their lives in service to their country in the ongoing exploration of humankind's final frontier. Remember them not for how they died but for those ideals for which they lived.
The other reads: In memory of those who made the ultimate sacrifice so others could reach for the stars; Ad astra per aspera (a rough road leads to the stars); God speed to the crew of Apollo 1
In January 2005 three granite benches built by a college classmate of one of the astronauts, one for each member of the crew, were installed at the site.
Each year the families of the Apollo 1 crew are invited to the site for a memorial, and the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Center offers a visit to the site for those who choose to take a special tour to the older launch sites on Cape Canaveral.
When North American Aviation shipped spacecraft CM-012 to Kennedy Space Center it bore a banner proclaiming it as Apollo One. Grissom's crew had received approval for an Apollo 1 patch in June 1966 but NASA was planning to call the mission "AS-204." After the fire, the astronauts' widows asked that Apollo 1 be reserved for the flight their husbands never made.
Apollo 1's (AS-204) Saturn IB rocket was taken down from Launch Complex 34, later reassembled at Launch Complex 37B and used to launch the Apollo 5 LM-1 into earth orbit for the first Lunar Module test mission.
For a time mission planners called the next scheduled launch Apollo 2. There were also suggestions the first Apollo CSM flights be named wholly out of chronological sequence as Apollo 1 (AS-204), Apollo 1A (AS-201), Apollo 2 (AS-202) and Apollo 3 (AS-203) but the NASA project designation committee decided on Apollo 4 for the first (unmanned) Apollo-Saturn V mission (AS-501), with no retroactive renaming of earlier missions. Hence, AS-203 is now sometimes informally (and chronologically) referred to as Apollo 2 and likewise, AS-202 as Apollo 3.
The Apollo 1 command module has never been on public display. After the accident the burned-out spacecraft was removed and taken to Kennedy Space Center to be studied for any information that might prevent a recurrence of the tragedy. It was then moved to the NASA Langley Research Center in Hampton, Virginia and placed in a secured storage warehouse. On February 17, 2007 the wreckage of CM-012 was moved approximately 100 feet (30 m) to a newer, environmentally-controlled warehouse. Only a few weeks earlier Gus Grissom's brother Lowell publicly suggested CM-012 be permanently entombed in the concrete remains of Launch Complex 34.