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This photograph was taken after reaching an agreement for the
armistice that ended World War I. This is Ferdinand Foch's own
railway carriage and the location is in the forest of Compiègne.
Foch is second from the right.
The armistice between the Allies and Germany was signed in a railway carriage
in Compiègne Forest on 11 November 1918,
and marked the end of the First World War on the Western Front. Principal
signatories were Marshal Ferdinand Foch, the Allied
Commander-in-chief, and Matthias Erzberger, Germany's
representative. It was a military agreement that marked a complete
defeat for Germany, but was neither an unconditional surrender nor
a treaty.
October
1918 telegrams
On 29 September 1918 the German Supreme Command informed
Kaiser Wilhelm II and the
Imperial Chancellor Count Georg von
Hertling at army headquarters in Spa, Belgium
that the military situation was hopeless. Generalquartiermeister Erich
Ludendorff, probably fearing a breakthrough, claimed that he
could not guarantee that the front would hold for another 24 hours
and demanded a request be given to the Entente for an immediate ceasefire. In addition, he
recommended the acceptance of the main demand of US President Woodrow Wilson
(Fourteen
Points) and put the Imperial Government on a democratic
footing, hoping for more favourable peace terms. This enabled him
to save the face of the Imperial Army and put the responsibility
for the capitulation and its consequences squarely
into the hands of the democratic parties and the parliament. As he
said to officers of his staff on 1 October: They now must lie
on the bed that they've made us."[1]
On 3 October liberal Prince Maximilian of Baden
was appointed Chancellor of Germany instead of Georg von Hertling
in order to negotiate an armistice.
The telegrams that were exchanged between the General
Headquarters of the Imperial High Command, Berlin, and Wilson are
discussed in Ferdinand Czernin's Versailles, 1919 (New
York: G. P. Putnam's
& Sons, 1964).
The following telegram was sent through the Swiss government and
arrived in Washington, D.C., on 5 October 1918 [p. 6]:
The German Government requests the President of the United
States of America to take steps for the restoration of peace, to
notify all belligerents of this request, and to invite them to
delegate positions for the purpose of taking up negotiations. The
German Government accepts, as a basis of peace negotiations, the
Program laid down by the President of the United States in his
message to Congress of 8 January 1918, and his subsequent
pronouncements, particularly in his address of 27 September 1918.
In order to avoid further bloodshed the German Government
requests to bring about the immediate conclusion of an armistice on
land, on water, and in the air.
—Max, Prince of Baden,
Imperial Chancellor
In the subsequent two exchanges, Wilson's allusions "failed to
convey the idea that the Kaiser's abdication was an essential
condition for peace. The leading statesmen of the Reich were not
yet ready to contemplate such a monstrous possibility."
[p. 7]
The third German telegram was sent on 20 October.
Woodrow
Wilson responded to the request for a truce with three
diplomatic notes. As a precondition for negotiations he demanded
the retreat of Germany from all occupied territories, the cessation
of submarine activities and – in between lines – the Kaiser's
abdication.
Wilson's reply on 23 October contained the following:
If the Government of the United States must deal with the
military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany now, or
if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the
international obligations of the German Empire, it must demand not
peace negotiations but surrender. Nothing can be gained by leaving
this essential thing unsaid.
—[Emil Ludwig, Wilhelm
Hohenzollern (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1927), p.
489]
According to Czernin [p. 9]:
... Prince Hohenlohe, serving as councilor in the German
Legation in Berne, Switzerland, cabled the German Foreign Office
that "a confidential informant has informed me that the conclusion
of the Wilson note of 23 October refers to nothing less than the
abdication of the Kaiser as the only way to a peace which is more
or less tolerable".
Wilhelm's abdication was necessitated by the popular perceptions
that had been created by the Entente propaganda against him, which
had been picked and further refined when the U.S. declared war in
April 1917.
After the third Wilson Note of 24 October, Ludendorff, in a
sudden change of mind, declared the conditions of the Allies
unacceptable. He now demanded to resume the war which he himself
had declared lost only one month earlier. It had been only in the
course of the request for a truce, submitted on his demand, that
the total military weakness of the Empire was revealed to the
Allies. The German troops had adapted themselves to the ending of
the war and were pressing to get home. It was scarcely possible to
newly arouse their readiness for battle and desertions were on the increase.
So the Imperial Government stayed on course and replaced
Ludendorff as First General Quartermaster with General Wilhelm
Groener. On 5 November the Allies agreed to take up
negotiations for a truce. But the third Wilson Note had created the
impression among many soldiers and the general population that the
Kaiser must abdicate in order to achieve peace.
A much bigger obstacle, which contributed to the five-week delay
in the signing of the armistice and to the resulting social
deterioration in Europe, was the fact that the Entente Powers had
no desire to accept the Fourteen Points and Wilson's subsequent
promises. As Czernin points out [p. 23]:
The Allied statesmen were faced with a problem: so far they
had considered the 'fourteen commandments' as a piece of clever and
effective American propaganda, designed primarily to undermine the
fighting spirit of the Central Powers, and to bolster the morale of
the lesser Allies. Now, suddenly, the whole peace structure was
supposed to be built up on that set of 'vague principles,' most of
which seemed to them thoroughly unrealistic, and some of which, if
they were to be seriously applied, were simply unacceptable.
The Kaiser himself wrote:
Nevertheless, it must be noted that John Kenneth Turner, in
his […] book,
Shall it Be Again? gives extensive proof
that all Wilson’s reasons for America's entry into the war were
fictitious; that it was far more a cause of acting solely in the
interest of Wall Street high finance.
[2]
Subsequently, this was substantiated by the findings of the Nye Committee,
which studied the causes of the United States' involvement in World
War I.
German
Revolution
The sailor’s revolt which took place
during the night of 29 to 30 October 1918 in the naval port of Wilhelmshaven
spread across the whole country within days and led to the
proclamation of a republic on 9 November 1918 and shortly
thereafter to the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm
II. The new German government headed by Friedrich Ebert
after a renewed demand by the Supreme Command, had accepted the
harsh terms of the Entente for a truce.
Negotiation
process
The Armistice was
agreed at 5 AM on 11 November, to come into effect at 11 AM Paris
time, for which reason the occasion is sometimes referred to as
"the eleventh (hour) of the eleventh (day) of the eleventh
(month)". It was the result of a hurried and desperate process.
Acting German commander Paul von Hindenburg had requested
arrangements for a meeting from Ferdinand Foch by telegram on 7
November. He was under pressure of imminent revolution in Berlin,
Munich, and elsewhere across
Germany.
The German delegation headed by Matthias Erzberger crossed the front
line in five cars and was escorted for ten hours across the
devastated war zone of Northern France. They were then entrained
and taken to the secret destination, aboard Foch's private train
parked in a railway siding in the forest of Compiègne.
Foch appeared only twice in the three days of negotiations: on
the first day, to ask the German delegation what they wanted, and
on the last day, to see to the signatures. In between, the German
delegation discussed the detail of Allied terms with French and
Allied officers. The Armistice amounted to complete German demilitarization, with few promises made by
the Allies in return. The naval blockade of Germany would continue
until complete peace terms could be agreed upon.
There was no question of negotiation. The Germans were able to
correct a few impossible demands (for example, the decommissioning
of more submarines than their fleet possessed), and registered
their formal protest at the harshness of Allied terms. But they
were in no position to refuse to sign. On Sunday 10 November, they
were shown newspapers from Paris, to inform them that Kaiser Wilhelm II had abdicated.
Erzberger was not able to get instructions from Berlin because
of the fall of the government. However, he was able to communicate
with the German Army Chief of
Staff Paul von Hindenburg in Spa who instructed
him to sign at any price as an armistice was absolutely
necessary.[3]
Signatures were made between 5:12 AM and 5:20 AM, Paris time.
The
Armistice Carriage
The armistice was signed in a carriage of Foch's private train,
CIWL #2419
("Le Wagon de l'Armistice"). It was later put back into regular
service with the Compagnie des Wagons-Lits, but after a short
period it was withdrawn to be attached to the French presidential
train.
From April 1921 to April 1927, it was on exhibition in the Cour
des Invalides in Paris.
In November 1927, it was ceremonially returned to the forest in
the exact spot where the Armistice was signed. Marshall Foch,
General Weyland and many others watched it being placed in a
specially constructed building: the Clairiere de l’Armistice.
There it remained, a monument to the defeat of the Kaiser’s
Germany, until 22nd June 1940, when swastika-bedecked German staff
cars bearing Hitler, Goering, Keitel, von Ribbentrop and others
swept into the Clairiere and, in that same carriage, demanded and
received the surrender armistice from France.
During the Occupation, the Clairiere de l’Armistice was
destroyed and the carriage taken to Berlin, where it was exhibited
in the Lustgarten.
After the American advance into Germany in early 1945, the
carriage was removed by the Germans for safe keeping to the town of
Ohrdruf, but as an American armoured column entered the town the
detachment of the SS guarding it set it ablaze and it was
totally destroyed.
After the war, the Compiègne site was restored, but not until
Armistice Day 1950 was a replacement carriage, correct in every
detail, rededicated – an identical Compagnie des Wagon-Lits
carriage, no. 2439, built 1913 in the same batch as the original,
was renumbered no. 2419D.
Key
personnel
For the Allies, the personnel involved were entirely
military:
For Germany:
- Matthias Erzberger, a civilian
politician;
- Count Alfred von Oberndorff, from the Foreign Ministry;
- Major General Detlof von Winterfeldt, the army;
- Captain Ernst Vanselow, the navy.
General Weygand and General von Gruennel are not mentioned in
the (French) document.
Terms
The terms contained the following major points:.[3]
- Termination of military hostilities within six hours after
signature.
- Immediate removal of all German troops from France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Alsace-Lorraine.
- Subsequent removal of all German troops from territory on the
west side of the Rhine plus
30 km radius bridgeheads of the right side of the Rhine at the
cities of Mainz, Koblenz, and Cologne with ensuing occupation by Allied and
US troops.
- Removal of all German troops at the eastern front to German
territory as it was on August 1, 1914.
- Renouncement of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Russia and of the Treaty of Bucharest with Romania.
- Internment of the German fleet.
- Surrender of materiel: 5,000 cannons, 25,000 machine guns,
3,000 minenwerfers,
1,700 airplanes, 5,000 locomotive engines, and 150,000
railcars.
Aftermath
The peace between the Allies and Germany would subsequently be
settled in 1919, by the Paris Peace Conference,
and the Treaty of Versailles that same
year.
Last
casualties
The news was quickly given to the armies during the morning of
11 November, but even after hearing that the armistice was due to
start at 11:00, intense warfare continued right until the last
minute. Many artillery units continued to fire on German targets to
avoid having to haul away their spare ammunition. The Allies also
wished to ensure that should fighting restart, they would be in the
most favourable position. Consequently there were 10,944 casualties
of which 2,738 men died on the last day of the war.[4]
Augustin Trébuchon was the last
Frenchman to die when he was shot on his way to tell fellow
soldiers that hot soup would be served after the ceasefire. He was
killed at 10:45 am. The last British soldier to die, George Edwin
Ellison of the 5th Royal Irish Lancers, was killed earlier that
morning at around 9:30 am while scouting on the outskirts of Mons,
Belgium. The final Canadian, and Commonwealth, soldier to die,
Private George Lawrence Price, was killed
just two minutes before the armistice to the north of Mons, in an
Allied trench at 10:58 am to be recognized as one of the last
killed with a monument to his name. And finally, American Henry
Gunther is generally recognized as the last soldier killed in
action in World War I. He was killed 60 seconds before the
armistice came into force while charging astonished German troops
who were aware the Armistice was nearly upon them.[5][6]
The last reported German casualty occurred after the 11 a.m.
armistice. A Leutnant Tomas, in the Meuse-Argonne
sector, went to inform approaching American soldiers that he and
his men would be vacating houses that they had been using as
billets. However, he was shot by soldiers who had not been told
about the ceasefire.
External
links
References