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The Bangladesh famine of 1974 refers to a period of mass starvation beginning in March 1974 and ending in about December of the same year. The famine is considered the worst in recent years; it was characterised by massive flooding along the Brahmaputra river as well as high mortality.
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Warnings of famine began in March, 1974 when the price of rice rose sharply. In this month “widespread starvation started in Rangpur district ”[1], the region which would become one of three most afflicted [2]. It had only been two years and three months since the end of the Bangladesh Liberation War for their independence (December 1971) and Bangladesh's formal creation. In many ways, Bangladesh's new state and devastated infrastructure and markets were wholly unprepared to deal with the situation [3][4]. Corruption among the newly appointed officials was rampant and widespread. In April, though government officials reiterated that the crisis would be temporary, rice prices continued to rise sharply and reports of starvation became more widespread. From April to July, Bangladesh was hit by heavy rainfall and a series of devastating floods along the Brahmaputra river, with notably destructive incidents in May, July and September [5]. In addition, neighboring India declined to cooperate with the government of Bangladesh. Rice crops were devastated and prices rocketed. In October rice prices peaked and conditions eased by November 1974 as foreign aid and the winter crop arrived [6]. The famine was officially over by December, though 'excess' mortality (e.g. by disease) continued well into the following year, as is the case with most famines. More people suffered in the rural areas due to starvation. Generally, regional famine intensity was correlated to flood exposure and no doubt the floods exacerbated the famine [7]. However, though warnings of famine began long before the flood (as demonstrated above), it is to the floods which the famine is popularly blamed [8].
In terms of total mortality, though figures vary, one scholar estimates 1.5 million deaths as a reasonable estimate[9]. This number includes the post-famine mortality. Starvation was not the only factor; a significant number of deaths are attributable to diseases, cholera, malaria and diaherric diseases. As with most famines, weakened, disease-susceptible conditions resulted in high post-famine mortalities of over 450,000.[10] The poor, labourers and non-landowners were especially susceptible.
Multiple authors agree that “wage labourers suffered the highest
mortality for all groups” [11][12]. Crude
death rate "among landless families was three times higher than
that for families with three or more acres” p. 18. Amartya Sen's micro-level entitlement
analysis explains this trend. Sen's theory, looks at individual
"entitlements", or direct access, to food resources. Individuals
who have a direct claim to food (e.g. landowning farmers), will
fare better than those who rely on markets to purchase food(e.g.
artisans, or those in service sectors). For example, while a
landowning farmer claims her product, her labourer is paid awage
and must buy food from the market. Thus, non-crop-owners are
exposed to fluctuations in foodprices, employment opportunities,
wage and demand for products and services. In a time of food
insecurity, these conditions deteriorate, leaving non-crop-owners
susceptible to famine.[13]
As with most famines, the causes of the Bangladesh famine were multiple. These included flooding, government mismanagement of foodgrain stocks, legislation restricting movement of foodgrains between districts, foodgrain smuggling to neighbouring countries and so called distributional failures. The famine did not occur among all areas and populations but was concentrated in specific areas; particularly those hit by flooding.[14]
In their studies of the 1974 famine, various scholars find that 1974 average foodgrain production was a 'local' peak [15] [16]. For this reason, scholars argue that, “food availability approach offers very little in the way of explanation of the Bangladesh famine of 1974” p. 141. Rather, they argues that the Bangladesh famine was not caused by a failure in availability of food but in distribution (or entitlement), where one group gained “market command over food” p. 162.
Two distributional failures stand out. The first failure was internal: the specific configuration of the state rationing system and the market resulted in speculative hoarding by farmers and traders and a consequent rise in prices.[17] The second failure was external: the US had withheld 2.2 million tonnes of food aid to 'ensure that it abandoned plans to try Pakistani war criminals'. And a year later, when Bangladesh was faced with severe monsoons and imminent floods, the then US Ambassador to Bangladesh made it abundantly clear that the US probably could not commit food aid because of Bangladesh's policy of exporting jute to Cuba. And by the time Bangladesh succumbed to the American pressure, and stopped jute exports to Cuba, the food aid in transit was 'too late for famine victims'. [18]
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