Battle of Hannut: Wikis


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Battle of Hannut
Part of the Second World War
Bundesarchiv Bild 121-0412, Frankreich, Panzer Somua S35, Geschütz.jpg
Two destroyed SOMUA S35s being inspected by German soldiers.
Date 12—14 May 1940
Location Hannut, Belgium
Result Tactical French victory[1][2]

Strategic and operational German victory[3]

France France
United Kingdom United Kingdom
Netherlands The Netherlands[Notes 1]
Nazi Germany Germany
France General René Prioux (First Army Cavalry Corps)
  • France General Gabriel Bougrain
  • France General Langlois
General Erich Hoepner (Army Corps XVI)
2 Armoured Divisions
20,800 personnel
600 AFVs [5][Notes 2]
2 Panzer Divisions
25,927 personnel
618 tanks (some sources say 674)[6]
108 artillery pieces [5][Notes 3]
1,252 aircraft
Casualties and losses
121 tanks,[7]
personnel: unknown
60 killed
80 wounded
49 tanks destroyed
111 Tanks damaged [8]

The Battle of Hannut (not to be confused with the Battle of Gembloux Gap)[9] was a Second World War battle fought during the Battle of Belgium which took place between 12 and 14 May 1940 at Hannut, Belgium. At the time, it was the largest tank battle of the war,[10] only to be surpassed later by other engagements during the North African Campaign and on the German-Soviet front.

The primary purpose of the engagement at Hannut was to tie down strongest elements of the 1st French Army and remove it from Army Group A's main thrust through the Ardennes, as laid out in the German operational plan Fall Gelb, or "Case Yellow", by General Erich von Manstein. The German breakout of the Ardennes was scheduled for 15 May, five days after the German invasions of the Netherlands and Belgium. The delay was to entice the Allies into believing the main thrust would, like the Schlieffen Plan in World War I, come through Belgium and into France. When the Allied armies advanced into Belgium, they would be tied down by diversionary German offensive operations in eastern Belgium, at Hannut and Gembloux. With the Ardennes flank exposed, the German thrust to the English Channel would encircle and destroy the Allied forces.

The Germans reached the Hannut area just two days after the invasion of Belgium. The French and their Allies did win a series of delaying tactical engagements early in the battle, but failed to prevent the collapse of the Belgian front. The German battle plan succeeded in tying down substantial Allied forces that were removed from the path of the decisive blow through the Ardennes. However, the Germans failed to neutralise the French 1st Army completely, which once again scored tactical successes at the battle of Gembloux, during the 14—15 May. Although seriously damaged it was able retreat to Lille, where it delayed the Wehrmacht and assisted in the British Expeditionary Force' escape from Dunkirk.




Allied intentions

The Allied supreme commander General Maurice Gamelin committed his First Army Group, under General Gaston Billotte, and its strongest Army, the French 1st Army with the fully mechanised Corps de Cavalerie (Cavalry Corps), commanded by General René-Jacques-Adolphe Prioux, to advance into Belgium to support the large but more lightly equipped Belgian Army. Gamelin expected the German attack to break the Belgian defences at the Albert Canal line rapidly—the Belgians had in any case indicated they would after four days withdraw to the planned allied front in central Belgium, the "Dyle Line" between Antwerp and Namur—and sought to quickly establish an entrenched front line centred on Gembloux, just north of Namur, to check what Gamelin foresaw as the main enemy effort (Schwerpunkt) of the campaign: an attempt to break through the "Gembloux Gap" between the rivers Dyle and Meuse with a concentration of armoured forces. As Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg would remain neutral until the German invasion of those countries (Fall Gelb), it had proven impossible to adequately prepare positions for the French 1st Army. Therefore the Cavalry Corps was given the mission to execute a delaying battle, somewhere between Gembloux and Maastricht (the likely crossing-point, where the Albert Canal connected to it, over the eastern bend of the Meuse), to prevent the enemy from reaching the Gembloux area until the eighth day of an invasion and to allow the 1st Army sufficient time to dig in.[11]

The Cavalry Corps had been created on 26 December 1939, containing both then existing armoured divisions of the Cavalry, the 1re Division Légère Mécanique ("1st Mechanised Light Division") and the 2e DLM. On 26 March 1940 however, 1st DLM was given the mission, in case of an invasion, to establish a connection with the Dutch Army near Breda; this experienced active division was therefore removed from the Cavalry Corps. It was replaced by the 3e DLM, recently constituted on 1 February, manned with reservists and still insufficiently trained. Nevertheless, Prioux still considered his forces sufficient to either contest a river-crossing at Maastricht, or wage a manoeuvre battle or, as a third alternative, defend an improvised line. He was at liberty to choose any option, provided the enemy was kept from Gembloux long enough. He decided to keep all possibilities open and act as the situation would demand.[12]

German intentions

General Hoepner commanded Army Corps XVI at the Battle of Hannut and the Gembloux gap offensive

The German plan for this sector called for an assault by airborne and shock troops, to take Fort Eben-Emael and the Meuse and Albert Canal bridges, open the way through the Dutch and Belgian defences for the 4. Panzerdivision (4th Panzer Division), and bring the Albert Canal line to a premature collapse. Once this breach was made, General Erich Hoepner's XVI Army Corps, and Army Group B would assume control of the 4th Panzer Division. Also commanding 3rd Panzer and 20th Motorised Infantry Divisions, Hoepner's mission was to quickly launch his Corps from the bridgehead, seize the area of the intended Allied front around Gembloux before the French infantry divisions could entrench themselves there, and by thus conforming to the worst fears of the French High Command draw all French reserves to the modern Allied forces, like the French 1st Army, away from the main thrust through the Ardennes. This would enable the Wehrmacht to cut them off by a swift advance to the English Channel leading to a giant encirclement. His action was thus basically a feint.[13]

Opposing forces

Allied forces

The Battle of Hannut became the largest tank battle of the campaign because both sides committed considerable armoured forces. The French DLMs had each two Brigades Légères Mécaniques, one of these, the "combat" brigade, contained two tank regiments, each regiment again having a medium tank squadron, equipped with the SOMUA S35, and a light tank squadron fielding the Hotchkiss H35.[14] Its organic strength was 44 S 35s and 43 H35s; also eight armoured command vehicles were present. The other brigade contained a reconnaissance regiment, equipped with 44 Panhard 178 armoured cars organised in two squadrons, and a mechanised infantry regiment equipped with 126 Laffly S20TL APCs but also having three organic AMR (Automitrailleuse de Reconnaissance) squadrons of 22 tanks each, and in total three armoured command vehicles. The 2e DLM used AMR 35 tanks for this rôle, but as the production of this light tank had been discontinued, 3e DLM employed H35s instead.[15]

SOMUA S35 at the Bovington Tank Museum. It outmatched the Panzer I to IIIs in terms of armour.

Each DLM thus had an organic strength of 240 tanks and 44 Panhards, for a total of 176 SOMUA S35s, 238 Hotchkiss H35s, 66 AMR 35s and 88 P 178s, including the organic matériel reserve. The 3e DLM used mainly improved H35s of the swifter modifié 39 version, that today is often referred to as the "H 39", but also had a single AMR squadron of 22 vehicles of the slower original batch of four hundred, that were also exclusively present in 2e DLM. Most Hotchkiss tanks of both versions were still fitted with the short, Long 21, 37 mm gun, with a poor antitank capability. Some platoon and squadron commander's vehicles had been fitted with the more powerful Long 35 SA 38 37 mm gun, about a fifth of the total number of Hotchkiss tanks.[16]

The more detailed organisation of 2e DLM was: 3e BLM as a combat brigade, with 13e Dragons and 29e Dragon tank regiments; the second brigade was 4e BLM with 8e Cuirassiers reconnaissance regiment and 1er Dragons mechanised infantry regiment. The 3e DLM had 5e BLM with 1er Cuirassiers and 2e Cuirassiers tank regiments and 6e BLM with 12e Cuirassiers reconnaissance regiment and 11e Dragons mechanised infantry regiment.[14]

German forces

Panzer I Ausf. A during the invasion of Belgium.

Like their French counterparts the German armoured divisions each had an armoured brigade (Panzer-Brigade) with two tank regiments (Panzer-Regimente). The latter were divided into two tank battalions (Panzer-Abteilungen); each tank battalion had, apart from a staff company, two light companies of nineteen battle tanks, in theory mainly equipped with the Panzerkampfwagen III, and a medium company of fifteen battle tanks using the Panzerkampfwagen IV. Due to a shortage of these types, the positions were actually in majority filled with the light Panzerkampfwagen II and even Panzerkampfwagen I. The exact numbers of each type on 10 May available to the German armoured divisions are known: 3 Pz. Div. had 314 battle tanks in its 3. Panzer-Brigade consisting of 5. and 6. Panzer-Regiment: 117 PzKpfw Is, 129 PzKpfw IIs, 42 PzKpfw IIIs and 26 PzKpfw IVs; 4 Pz. Div. had 304 battle tanks in its 5. Panzer-Brigade consisting of 35. and 36. Panzerregiment: 135 PzKpfw Is, 105 PzKpfw IIs, 40 PzKpfw IIIs and 24 PzKpfw IVs. XVI. Armeekorps thus had a total of 618 tanks: 252 PzKpfw Is, 234 PzKpfw IIs, 82 PzKpfw IIIs and 50 PzKpfw IVs. Besides these battle tanks, 3 Pz. Div. had 27 Befehlspanzer tracked command vehicles with only a machine-gun armament and 4 Pz. Div. ten.[17] Each division also had about 56 armoured cars. Most PzKpfw IIs of XVI Armeekorps had not yet been uparmoured to the new 30 mm standard and were thus vulnerable to even the French 37 mm L/21 gun.[18]

As the French mechanised infantry regiments had three mechanised infantry battalions, total infantry strength of the Corps de Cavalerie was six battalions. XVI. Armeekorps had seven motorised infantry battalions. The French units were only lightly equipped with antitank-guns: twelve 25 mm and eight 47 mm SA 37 guns per division; and AA-guns: six 25 mm guns per division.[19] Also, there was an imbalance in artillery: the DLMs had each 36 pieces against 68 (including 24 7.5 cm leichtes Infanteriegeschütz 18) per Panzerdivision.[20] This was not set off by Corps artillery; the Germans had four attached artillery regiments and a heavy battery; the French CC only two 75 mm field gun regiments (and a group of twelve 25 mm antitank-guns) as corps troops.[14]

The specialized VIII. Fliegerkorps of the Luftwaffe, with some 300 Junkers 87 Dive bomber and 42 Henschel Hs 123 biplanes, plus some 130 Messerschmitt 109 fighter aircraft, stood ready to support the Panzers. The IV. Fliegerkorps and IX. Fliegerkorps added some 280 medium bombers and over 500 Messerschmitt 109 and Messerschmitt Bf 110 heavy fighters, some of which would also be at Hoepner's disposal.[21]

The battle

12 May

Morning actions

On 12 May 4. Panzerdivision raced to seize their first objective, Hannut, reaching the area that morning. General Hoepner, commander of the German 6th Army ordered the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions (3 Pz. Div. and 4 Pz. Div.) to concentrate on and secure Hannut to secure the 6th Army's flank. Noting his lack of fuel and his divisions artillery and infantry support that had not yet caught up with the Panzer, which made an immediate assault on Hannut risky, General Stever request an air-drop of fuel. That morning the 4 Pz. Div. made contact with a French Armoured force of some 25 tanks.[22] The 4 Pz. Div. knocked out seven of the French tanks for no losses while the division's 35 Panzer Regiment advancing toward Hannut ran into fierce resistance. The French armour was deployed under cover and during the battle counter-attacked several times. The engagement ended with the French retreating. The 4 Pz. Div. destroyed nine enemy tanks for the loss of five. The 4 Pz. Div. continued toward Crehen and encircled the French 2nd Cuirassiers. However 2nd DLMs SOMUA S35s breached the German line and the French units broke out, suffering heavy losses in the process. The right flank of the 4 Pz. Div. was now dangerously exposed.[23]

Evening action

The 3 Pz. Div. moved up to cover this threat. At 16:30 pm German 6th Army requested air reconnaissance. The Luftwaffe reported French armour at Orp and motorised units at Gembloux. Hoepner ordered the 3 Pz. Div. to attack to prevent the Allies organising an effective defence. Coming under intense artillery fire from French strong points at Wansin and Thisnes the German force fell back. The French again counter-attacked and both forces armour engaged in a fire-fight. The result was a stalemate, and both retreated to their starting points.[24]

At 20:00 Stever spoke to Hoepner, telling him he was certain two French mechanised divisions were before him, one to his front and one behind the Mehaigne river. Both agreed to mount a major offensive the next day. According to the plan the 4 Pz. Div. would concentrate to Gembloux's right and operate jointly with the 3rd Panzer.

The Germans again attacked during the night, testing the French defences. The French strongpoint at Wansin fought all night against German riflemen, finally withdrawing in the early hours of 13 May. The 3rd DLMs front remained, with positions near Tienen, Jandrenouille and Merdorp. The 2nd DLM held its original front. The only breach occurred at Winson, the 2nd DLMs junction with 3rd DLM. Hoepner had failed to take his objective.[25] "On the very first day, French armor — contrary to German reports — definitely emerged victorious".[26]

13 May

Morning actions

To the south-east of the plain, German forces began their assault over the Meuse River: the Wehrmacht's principal effort. To the north, General Hoepner launched spoiling attacks and tied down the powerful French First Army, so that it could not intervene. Hoepner believed the newly arrived 3 Pz. Div. had only weak enemy forces before it; the 4 Pz. Div. on the other hand, he believed, faced strong French mechanised forces at Hannut and Thisnes—which the French had in fact already abandoned—and possibly a second French mechanised division south of the Mehaigne. The Luftwaffe struck in the late morning to soften the enemy defences. The 3 Pz. Div. advanced on Thorembais. The 4th Panzer was to move in parallel on Perwez, against an expected strong Belgian anti-tank line. XVI Army Corps thus fell back on the 6th Army's instruction to push immediately on Gembloux.[27]

The French 12th Cuirassiers and to the south the 3rd Battalion of the 11th Dragoons, fought off waves of German infantry supported by armoured vehicles. The German 18th Infantry Division penetrated their positions. French command planned to counter-attack with tanks from the 1st Cuirassiers unit to restore their lines, but dropped those plans due to developments on the rest of the 3d DLM's front. In the afternoon the French command ordered a retreat, and the Allied force escaped as the German infantry was being slow in following up their success. The 2d DLM was positioned just south of the planned axis of Hoepner's attack. In the early morning the 2d DLM sent some 30 SOMUA S-35s from the Mehaigne to the line Merdorp-Crehen to relieve the pressure on the 3d DLM. The attack was repulsed by heavy enemy tank and antitank fire near Crehen with crippling losses. General Bougrain, commanding the 2d DLM, signalled enemy infiltrations and attacks by armoured cars over the Mehaigne river at Moha and Wanze, just north of Huy, attacks which threatened to cut off the large Belgian garrison in Huy. Bougrain diverted his tank reserves to try and retrieve the situation. At 3pm a French reconnaissance aircraft reported large concentrations of German armour south-east of Crehen. The 2d DLM no longer had reserves available to intervene.[28]

Bougrain's Dragoons and motorized infantry were strung out in a series of isolated strongpoints and thus were vulnerable to infiltration. Bougrain refused the offer of the Belgian III Corps, retreating through his front from the Liege area, to reinforce his troops on the Mehaigne river.[29]

The German command remained concerned with the apparent potential of the 2d DLM to interfere with its main attack. It gathered elements of the 35th, 61st, and 269th Infantry Divisions and four other units equipped with armoured vehicles. These forces penetrated French strong points north of Huy and drew the attention of Bougrain's armour allowing Hoepner to concentrate against Prioux's front west of Hannut.[30]

Fighting at Orp

The German forces attacked; the 3 Pz. Div. on the north facing Marilles and Orp, the 4 Pz. Div. facing Thisnes and Merdorp. After heavy fighting the German Divisions forced elements across the Mehaigne. Near Orp, large concentrations of Allied and German armour clashed. The Panzers were concentrated and numerically superior while the French operated in small groups. The 3 Pz. Div. was flanked and attacked in the rear but this was repulsed by elements of its 3rd Panzer Brigade. At 4pm German infantry had secured Orp. As French morale started to waver, the 3d DLM noted about one hundred Panzers before Orp and Marille. Colonel Dodart des Loges, commanding the northern sector of the 3d DLM front, ordered a retreat, As the remaining dragoons withdrew, their Hotchkiss H35 tanks together with two Hotchkiss squadrons from the 1st Cuirassiers counter-attacked. The French pushed the German armour back to the stream. Losses were about even, the French claiming six Panzers for the loss of four.[31] Colonel de Vernejoul commanding the 1st Cuirassiers dispatched 36 SOMUA S-35s to halt German armour advancing from Orp to Jandrain. German armoured forces then surprised the French as they attacked. An equal number of Panzers attacked from cover defeating the French attack.

This offensive was the principal effort of the 3d DLM to check the 3 Pz. Div. The 2d DLM launched raids against the still vulnerable flanks of the 4 Pz. Div., and some small groups of French tanks broke through but were quickly dealt with by the 654th Anti-tank battalion. Apart from these isolated and sporadic raids the 2d DLM did not make any further attempts to attack the 4 Pz. Div.'s flank.[32]

Afternoon actions

In the afternoon the 4 Pz. Div. began an assault on Medorp. As the French artillery opened fire and German artillery responded, the French pushed armour into the abandoned town and skillfully changed position making the Panzers struggle to strike their targets. The German tanks decided to bypass the town around its left flank, but this exposed the German infantry who were forced to give ground against encroaching French armour. The Panzers quickly did a u-turn and engaged the French in the open. Initially the French held the advantage due to their superior armour and firepower, but German tactics of schwerpunkt, concentrating their armour on the vital point, began to tell. Small groups of French infantry infiltrated and attacked from the rear but German infantry crushed any resistance.

At this point the 3 Pz. Div. and 4 Pz. Div. were advancing to Jandrain. Outside the town a bitter tank battle took place. The Panzers prevailed through numbers and reported 22 French SOMUA S-35s totally destroyed. The German forces secured the area and town. German forces reported taking 400 prisoners, and capturing four and five tanks.[33] The French forces, the 2d and 3d DLM began a general retreat westward. The Panzer Divisions, no longer fearing an attack to their flanks, advanced and engaged the remnants of the enemy in the evening. The 3d Panzer Brigade claimed a tally for the day of 54 French tanks knocked out, 36 by the 5th Panzer Regiment, 18 by its sister unit; 3rd Panzer Regiment. Its own losses were listed as "slight". The 6th Panzer regiment reported a provisional loss total of only two tanks.[7] The Germans suffered many more tanks disabled, but as the battlefield was secured a great many were repaired. The remainder of the 3d DLM was in line behind the Belgian antitank obstacle on the front Beauvechain-La Bruyere-Pietrebais-Incourt-Perwez. The next morning the 2d DLM fell back into line south of Perwez.[34]

14 May

Attack on the Perwez position

The German attack on Perwez came in the morning of 14 May. General Stumpff's 3 Pz. Div. was to engage the new Allied line near Gembloux, whilst General Stever and the 4 Pz. Div. were to break through its centre at Perwez. Hoepner ordered the attack to commence without infantry support, but could not break through the French positions.[35] The 4 Pz. Div. engaged French armour, which resisted heavily in wooded areas around Perwez. After hard fighting the French defences were destroyed with the help of German infantry. The French First Army had redistributed and spread its tank battalions behind the infantry. Spread out and unsupported, they were defeated by the concentration of numerically superior German combined arms teams.[36] The 3 Pz. Div. was halted due to fierce resistance from 2 DLM. Bitter fighting resulted and the appearance of large numbers of French tanks panicked the German Command into thinking a major counter-attack was developing, when in fact they were just rearguard actions. Both sides suffered significant losses in armour, but as night fell the 2d DLM halted rearguard actions. The German Command regained its composure. The Allied forces had gained themselves time to reorganise their forces in response to another major German assault on 15 May.[37]


The German PzKpfw III and IV were the only German tanks capable of matching the SOMUA S35 in battle. The SOMUA S35 was generally considered to be the most formidable tank during the campaign in the west. Despite being outnumbered by odds of two to one, the German forces still managed to defeat the qualitative and numerical superiority of the French.[26] The Germans saving grace was their superior tactical deployment. Using radio and mobility they constantly outmanoeuvred the French, who used rigid, static positioning as in the First World War. The French tanks could not communicate with such fluidity or rapidity. Thus tactical and operational expedience was lost, and prevented effective coordination.[26] The German tanks also had more crew members. The Commander could concentrate on command tasks, while the French commanders had to act as gunner and assistant gunner as well.[34]

The German plan failed to forestall the French 1st Army at Gembloux, despite their victory over the 3e DLM. Still, Hoepner's advance to the Belgian plain tied down the Cavalry Corps and part of the French First Army while the decisive German assault succeeded across the Meuse to the south-east. The Germans had hoped that Hoepner's panzers and their neighbouring corps would tie down and neutralise the threat of the First Army. However on 15 May, forces of the First Army, properly settled into position, checked the Panzerwaffe which gained them time and space to manoeuvre. In the end it was the First Army which, sacrificing itself, held up the bulk of the Panzers which had broken through to the Southeast, enabling the British Expeditionary Force and other French units to escape from Dunkirk.[38]

See also


  1. ^ contributed lightly armed infantry units retreating from Dutch territory. Also committed the Dutch Air Force on few, ineffective and costly missions.[4]
  2. ^ Gunsburg gives these numbers: 2nd DLM: 400 officers, 10,000 men, 300 AFVs
    3rd DLM: some 400 officers,10,000 men, 300 AFVs
  3. ^ Gunsburg gives these numbers, including Befehlspanzer: 3rd Panzer Division: 400 officers, 13,187 men, 343 tanks, 48 artillery pieces,
    4th Panzer Division: 335 officers, 12,005 men, 331 tanks, 60 artillery pieces



  1. ^ Frieser 2005, p. 246-48
  2. ^ Healy 2008, p. 38.
  3. ^ Gunsburg 1992, p. 240
  4. ^ Gunsburg 1992, p. 216
  5. ^ a b Gunsburg 1992, p. 210
  6. ^ Battistelli & Anderson 2007, p. 75
  7. ^ a b Gunsburg 1992, p. 236
  8. ^ Gunsburg 1992, p. 237
  9. ^ Frieser 2005, p. 243-46
  10. ^ Frieser 2005, p. 239
  11. ^ Frieser 2005, p. 245-246
  12. ^ Saint-Martin 1998, p. 260
  13. ^ Frieser 2005, p. 246-247
  14. ^ a b c Ramspacher 1979, p. 269
  15. ^ Danjou 2007, p. 17
  16. ^ Danjou 2007, p. 18
  17. ^ Jentz 1998, p. 125
  18. ^ Jentz 1998, p. 123
  19. ^ Saint-Martin 1998, p. 326
  20. ^ Saint-Martin 1998, p. 327
  21. ^ Gunsburg 1992, p. 211
  22. ^ Gunsburg 1992, p. 221
  23. ^ Gunsburg 1992, p. 223-224
  24. ^ Gunsburg 1992, p. 224-225
  25. ^ Gunsburg 1992, p. 226
  26. ^ a b c Frieser 2005, p. 242
  27. ^ Gunsburg 1992, p. 223-235
  28. ^ Gunsburg 1992, p. 228
  29. ^ Gunsburg 1992, p. 229
  30. ^ Gunsburg 1992, p. 229-31
  31. ^ Gunsburg 1992, p. 230
  32. ^ Gunsburg 1992, p. 231
  33. ^ Gunsburg 1992, p. 233
  34. ^ a b Frieser 2005, p. 242-243
  35. ^ Frieser 2005, p. 243-244
  36. ^ Frieser 2005, p. 245
  37. ^ Gunsburg 1992, p. 240-44
  38. ^ Gunsburg 1992, p. 242-244


  • Battistelli, Pier Paolo; Anderson, Duncan (2007), Panzer Divisions: The Blitzkrieg Years 1939–40, London: Osprey Publishing, ISBN 978-1846031465 
  • Danjou, Pascal (2007), HOTCHKISS H35 / H39, Ballainvilliers: Editions du Barbotin 
  • Danjou, Pascal (2006), SOMUA S 35, Ballainvilliers: Editions du Barbotin 
  • Frieser, Karl-Heinz (2005), The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, ISBN 978-1-591142942 
  • Gunsburg, Jeffrey A. (April 1992), "The Battle of the Belgian Plain, 12–14 May 1940: The First Great Tank Battle", The Journal of Military History 56 (2): 207–244 
  • Healy, Mark, Ed. Prigent, John &. Panzerwaffe: The Campaigns in the West 1940. Vol. 1. London. Ian Allan Publishing. 2008 ISBN 978-071103-240-8
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  • Prigent, John (2008), Panzerwaffe: The Campaigns in the West 1940, Vol. 1, London: Ian Allan Publishing, ISBN 978-071103-240-8 
  • Ramspacher, E. (1979), Chars et Blindés Français, Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle 
  • Saint-Martin, Gérard (1998), L'Arme Blindée Française, Tome 1, Mai-juin 1940! Les blindés français dans la tourmente, Paris: Ed Economica, ISBN 2-7178-3617-9 
  • Taylor, A. J. P.; Mayer, S. L. (1974), A History Of World War Two, London: Octopus Books, ISBN 0-70640-399-1 


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