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Battle of Manzikert
Part of the Byzantine-Seljuk wars
131 Bataille de Malazgirt.jpg

In this 15th-century French miniature depicting the Battle of Manzikert, the combatants are clad in contemporary Western European armour.

Date August 26, 1071
Location near Manzikert, (modern Malazgirt, Turkey)
Result Decisive Seljuk victory
Byzantine Empire Great Seljuk Sultanate
Romanos IV #,
Nikephoros Bryennios,
Theodore Alyates,
Andronikos Doukas
Alp Arslan
Afşın Bey
Artuk Bey
Suleyman Shah
(originally 40,000[2])
(possibly 30,000?)[2]
Casualties and losses
~2,000 dead[4]
~4,000 captured[4]
(more than half deserted)

The Battle of Manzikert, or Malazgirt, was fought between the Byzantine Empire and Seljuq forces led by Alp Arslan on August 26, 1071 near Manzikert (modern Malazgirt in Muş Province, Turkey). The decisive defeat of the Byzantine army and the capture of the Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes[5] played an important role in undermining Byzantine authority in Anatolia and Armenia.[6]

The brunt of the battle was borne by the professional soldiers from the eastern and western tagmata, as large numbers of the mercenaries and Anatolian levies fled early and survived the battle.[7] The fallout from Manzikert was near disastrous for the empire, with subsequent numerous civil conflicts and an economic crisis severely weakening the empire's ability to adequately defend its borders.[8]This led to the mass movement of Turks into central Anatolia and by 1080, an area of 30,000 square miles (78,000 km2) had been lost to the empire. It took a decade of internal strife before Alexios I Komnenos (1081 to 1118) brought stability back to the empire.



Although the Byzantine Empire had remained a strong and powerful entity in the Middle Ages,[9] the Empire began to decline under the reign of the militarily incompetent Constantine IX and again under Constantine X—a brief two year rule of reform under Isaac I Komnenos only delaying the decay of the Byzantine military.[10] It was under Constantine IX's reign that the Byzantines first came into contact with the Seljuk Turks, the latter attempting to annex Ani in Armenia. Rather than deal with the problem by force of arms, Constantine IX signed a truce. The truce did not last; in 1063 the Great Seljuk Sultan Alp Arslan came to power and thus the invasion of Armenia, halted in 1045, began again.

During the 1060s, the Seljuk Sultan Alp Arslan allowed his Turkish allies, as well as the Kurds, to migrate towards Armenia and Asia Minor. In 1064, they conquered the Armenian capital at Ani.[9] Constantine X (successor to Isaac Komnenos) did much discredit to his predecessor—in 1067 Armenia was taken by the Turks, followed by Caesarea.[11] In 1068, Romanos IV took power and after a few speedy military reforms led an expedition against the Seljuks, allowing him to capture the city of Hierapolis Bambyce in Syria. A Turkish attack against Iconium was thwarted when a Byzantine counter from Syria ended in victory.[5] In 1070, Romanos led a second expedition towards Malazgirt (then known as Manzikert) in the eastern end of Anatolia (in today's Muş Province), where a Byzantine fortress had been captured by the Seljuks, and offered a treaty with Alp Arslan; Romanos would give back Hierapolis if Arslan gave up the siege of Edessa (Urfa). Romanos threatened war if Alp Arslan did not comply, and prepared his troops anyway, expecting the sultan to decline his offer, which he did.


Accompanying Romanos was Andronikos Doukas, the co-regent and a direct rival. The army consisted of about 5,000 professional Byzantine troops from the western provinces and probably about the same number from the eastern provinces; 500 Frankish and Norman mercenaries under Roussel de Bailleul; some Turkish (Uz and Pecheneg) and Bulgarian mercenaries; infantry under the duke of Antioch; a contingent of Armenian troops; and some (but not all) of the Varangian Guard, to total around 40,000 men (possibly 70,000 men?).[4][12] The quantity of the Byzantine Thematic (provincial) troops had declined in the years prior to the succession of Romanos as the central government diverted resources to the recruitment of mercenaries who were considered less likely to become involved in coups or factional fighting within the Empire. Even when mercenaries were used, they were disbanded after to save money.

The march across Asia Minor was long and difficult, and Romanos did not endear himself to his troops by bringing a luxurious baggage train along with him; the Byzantine population also suffered some plundering by Romanos' Frankish mercenaries, whom he was forced to dismiss. The expedition first rested at Sebasteia on the Halys. The Emperor destructed Armeninan district of the city after complaints and killed some of Armenians and exiled their leaders. Then the expedition reached Theodosiopolis in June 1071. There, some of his generals suggested continuing the march into Seljuk territory and catching Arslan before he was ready. Some of the other generals, including Nikephoros Bryennios, suggested they wait there and fortify their position. Eventually it was decided to continue the march.

Thinking that Alp Arslan was either further away or not coming at all, Romanos marched towards Lake Van expecting to retake Manzikert rather quickly, as well as the nearby fortress of Khliat if possible. However, Arslan was actually in Armenia, with 30,000 cavalry from Aleppo, Mosul, and his other allies. Alp Arslan's spies knew exactly where Romanos was, while Romanos was completely unaware of his opponent's movements.

Romanos ordered his general Joseph Tarchaneiotes to take some of the Byzantine troops and Varangians and accompany the Pechenegs and Franks to Khliat, while Romanos and the rest of the army marched to Manzikert. This split the forces in half, each taking about 20,000 men. It is unknown what happened to the army sent off with Joseph Tarchaneiotes—according to Islamic sources, Alp Arslan smashed this army; however Byzantine sources remain quiet of any such encounter, whilst Attaleiates suggests that Tarchaneiotes fled at the sight of the Seljuk Sultan—an unlikely event considering the reputation of the Byzantine general. Either way, Romanos' army was reduced to less than half his planned 40,000 men (possibly 70,000 men?).[4][12]

The battle

Byzantine territory (purple), Byzantine attacks (red) and Seljuk attacks (green).

Romanos was unaware of the loss of Tarchaneiotes and continued to Manzikert, which he easily captured on August 23; the Seljuks responded with heavy incursions by bowmen.[12] The next day some foraging parties under Bryennios discovered the Seljuk army and were forced to retreat back to Manzikert. The Armenian general Basilakes was sent out with some cavalry, as Romanos did not believe this was Arslan's full army; the cavalry was destroyed and Basilakes taken prisoner. Romanos drew up his troops into formation and sent the left wing out under Bryennios, who was almost surrounded by the quickly approaching Turks and was forced to retreat once more. The Turks hid among the nearby hills for the night, making it nearly impossible for Romanos to send a counterattack.[5][13]

On August 25, some of Romanos' Turkish mercenaries came into contact with their Seljuk relatives and deserted. Romanos then rejected a Seljuk peace embassy as he wanted to settle the Turkish problem with a decisive military victory and understood that raising another army would be both difficult and expensive. The Emperor attempted to recall Tarchaneiotes, who was no longer in the area. There were no engagements that day, but on August 26 the Byzantine army gathered itself into a proper battle formation and began to march on the Turkish positions, with the left wing under Bryennios, the right wing under Theodore Alyates, and the centre under the emperor. At that moment, when a Turkish soldier said to Alp Arslan "My Sultan, the enemy army is approaching", Alp Arslan is told to have said "Then we are also approaching them". Andronikos Doukas led the reserve forces in the rear—a foolish mistake, considering the loyalties of the Doukids. The Seljuks were organized into a crescent formation about four kilometres away.[14] Seljuk archers attacked the Byzantines as they drew closer; the centre of their crescent continually moved backwards while the wings moved to surround the Byzantine troops.

The Byzantines held off the arrow attacks and captured Arslan's camp by the end of the afternoon. However, the right and left wings, where the arrows did most of their damage, almost broke up when individual units tried to force the Seljuks into a pitched battle; the Seljuk cavalry simply fled when challenged, the classic hit and run tactics of steppe warriors. With the Seljuks avoiding battle, Romanos was forced to order a withdrawal by the time night fell. However, the right wing misunderstood the order, and Doukas, as an enemy of Romanos, deliberately ignored the emperor and marched back to the camp outside Manzikert, rather than covering the emperor's retreat. Now that the Byzantines were thoroughly confused, the Seljuks seized the opportunity and attacked.[5] The Byzantine right wing was routed; the left under Bryennios held out a little longer but was soon routed as well.[7] The remnants of the Byzantine centre, including the Emperor and the Varangian Guard, were encircled by the Seljuks. Romanos was injured, and taken prisoner by the Seljuks. The survivors were the many who fled the field and were pursued throughout the night, but not beyond that; by dawn, the professional core of the Byzantine army had been destroyed whilst many of the Peasant troops and levies who had been under the command of Andronikus fled.[7]

Captivity of Romanos Diogenes

Alp Arslan humiliating Emperor Romanos IV. From a 15th-century illustrated French translation of Boccaccio's De Casibus Virorum Illustrium.

When the Emperor Romanos IV was conducted into the presence of Alp Arslan, he refused to believe that the bloodied and tattered man covered in dirt was the mighty Emperor of the Romans. After discovering the identity of the Emperor, he placed his boot on the Emperor's neck and forced him to kiss the ground.[7] A famous conversation is also reported to have taken place:

Alp Arslan: "What would you do if I were brought before you as a prisoner?"
Romanos: "Perhaps I'd kill you, or exhibit you in the streets of Constantinople."
Alp Arslan: "My punishment is far heavier. I forgive you, and set you free."

He treated him with considerable kindness and again offered the terms of peace which he had offered previous to the battle.

Romanos remained a captive of the Sultan for a week. During this time, the Sultan allowed Romanos to eat at his table whilst concessions were agreed upon; Antioch, Edessa, Hierapolis and Manzikert were to be surrendered.[8] This would have left the vital core of Anatolia untouched. A payment of 10 million gold pieces demanded by the Sultan as a ransom for Romanos was deemed as too high by the latter so the Sultan reduced its short-term expense by instead asking for 1.5 million gold pieces as an initial payment followed by an annual sum of 360,000 gold pieces.[8] Finally, Romanos would marry one of his daughters to the Sultan. The Sultan then gave Romanos many presents and an escort of two emirs and one hundred Mamelukes to Constantinople. Shortly after his return to his subjects, Romanos found his rule in serious trouble. Despite attempts to raise loyal troops, he was defeated three times in battle against the Doukas family and was deposed, blinded and exiled to the island of Proti; soon after, he died as a result of an infection caused by an injury during his brutal blinding. Romanos' last time in the Anatolian heartland, that he worked so hard to defend, was a public humiliation on a donkey with a rotten face.[8]


The Turks did not move into Anatolia until after Alp Arslan’s death in 1072. However, the Byzantine Empire was still in a chaotic civil war and offered no effective resistance

Despite being a long-term strategic catastrophe for Byzantium, Manzikert was by no means the massacre that earlier historians presumed. Modern scholars estimate that Byzantine losses were relatively low,[15] considering that many units survived the battle intact and were fighting elsewhere within a few months. Certainly, all the commanders in the Byzantine side (Doukas, Tarchaneiotes, Bryennios, de Bailleul, and, above all, the Emperor) survived and took part in later events.[16]

Doukas had escaped with no casualties, and quickly marched back to Constantinople where he led the coup against Romanos and proclaimed Michael VII as basileus.[8] Bryennios also lost few men in the rout of his wing. The Seljuks did not pursue the fleeing Byzantines, nor did they recapture Manzikert itself at this point. The Byzantine army regrouped and marched to Dokeia, where they were joined by Romanos when he was released a week later. The most serious loss materially seems to have been the emperor's extravagant baggage train.

The result of this disastrous defeat was, in simplest terms, the loss of Byzantine's Anatolian heartland. John Julius Norwich says in his trilogy on the Byzantine Empire that the defeat was "its death blow, though centuries remained before the remnant fell. The themes in Anatolia were literally the heart of the empire, and within decades after Manzikert, they were gone." In his smaller book, "A Short History of Byzantium", Norwich describes the battle as "the greatest disaster suffered by the Empire in its seven and a half centuries of existence".[17] Anna Komnene, writing a few decades after the actual battle, wrote:

...the fortunes of the Roman Empire had sunk to their lowest ebb. For the armies of the East were dispersed in all directions, because the Turks had over-spread, and gained command of, countries between the Euxine Sea [Black Sea] and the Hellespont, and the Aegean Sea and Syrian Seas [Mediterranean Sea], and the various bays, especially those which wash Pamphylia, Cilicia, and empty themselves into the Egyptian Sea [Mediterranean Sea].[18]

Years and decades later, Manzikert came to be seen as a disaster for the Empire; later sources therefore greatly exaggerate the numbers of troops and the number of casualties. Byzantine historians would often look back and lament the "disaster" of that day, pinpointing it as the moment the decline of the Empire began. It was not an immediate disaster, but the defeat showed the Seljuks that the Byzantines were not invincible—they were not the unconquerable, millennium-old Roman Empire (as both the Byzantines and Seljuks still called it). The usurpation of Andronikos Doukas also politically destabilized the empire and it was difficult to organize resistance to the Turkish migrations that followed the battle. Within a decade almost all of Asia Minor was overrun.[17] Finally, while intrigue and deposing of Emperors had taken place before, the fate of Romanos was particularly horrific, and the destabilization caused by it also rippled through the centuries.

What followed the battle was a chain of events—of which the battle was the first link—that undermined the Empire in the years to come. They included intrigues for the throne, the horrific fate of Romanos and Roussel de Bailleul attempting to carve himself an independent kingdom in Galatia with his 3,000 Frankish, Norman and German mercenaries.[19] He defeated the Emperor's uncle John Doukas who had come to suppress him, advancing toward the capital to destroy Chrysopolis (Üsküdar) on the Asian coast of the Bosphorus. The Empire finally turned to the spreading Seljuks to crush de Bailleul (which they did). However the Turks ransomed him back to his wife, and it was not before the young general Alexios Komnenos pursued him that he was captured. These events all interacted to create a vacuum that the Turks filled. Their choice in establishing their capital in Nikaea (Iznik) in 1077 could possibly be explained by a desire to see if the Empire's struggles could present new opportunities.

In hindsight, both Byzantine and contemporary historians are unanimous in dating the decline of Byzantine fortunes to this battle. As Paul K. Davis writes, "Byzantine defeat severely limited the power of the Byzantines by denying them control over Anatolia, the major recruiting ground for soldiers. Henceforth, the Moslems controlled the region. The Byzantine Empire was limited to the area immediately around Constantinople, and the Byzantines were never again a serious military force."[20] It is also interpreted as one of the root causes for the later Crusades, in that the First Crusade of 1095 was originally a western response to the Byzantine emperor's call for military assistance after the loss of Anatolia.[21] From another perspective, the West saw Manzikert as a signal that Byzantium was no longer capable of being the protector of Eastern Christianity or Christian pilgrims to the Holy Places in the Middle East.

Delbruck considers that the importance of the battle has been exaggerated; but it is clear from the evidence that as a result of it, the Empire was unable to put an effective army into the field for many years to come.

The Battle of Myriokephalon, also known as the Myriocephalum, has been compared to the Battle of Manzikert as a pivotal point in the decline of the Byzantine Empire.[citation needed] In both battles, separated by over a hundred years, an expensive Byzantine army finds itself ambushed by a more elusive Seljuk opponent. However, Myriocephalum's implications were initially limited, thanks to Manuel I Komnenos' holding on to power. The same could not be said of Romanos, whose enemies, "martyred a courageous and upright man..." and as a result "the Empire... would never recover".[19]


  1. ^ Haldon 2001, p. 173.
  2. ^ a b Haldon 2001, p. 172.
  3. ^ Markham, Paul, Battle of Manzikert: Military Disaster or Political Failure?, .
  4. ^ a b c d Haldon 2001, p. 180.
  5. ^ a b c d Grant, R.G. (2005). Battle a Visual Journey Through 5000 Years of Combat. London: Dorling Kindersley. pp. 77. 
  6. ^ Holt, Peter Malcolm; Lambton, Ann Katharine Swynford & Lewis, Bernard (1977), The Cambridge History of Islam, pp. 231–232 
  7. ^ a b c d Norwich, John Julius (1997). A Short History of Byzantium. New York: Vintage Books. pp. 240. 
  8. ^ a b c d e Norwich, John Julius (1997). A Short History of Byzantium. New York: Vintage Books. pp. 241. 
  9. ^ a b Konstam, Angus (2004). The Crusades. London: Mercury Books. pp. 40. 
  10. ^ Norwich, John Julius (1997). A Short History of Byzantium. New York: Vintage Books. pp. 236. 
  11. ^ Norwich, John Julius (1997). A Short History of Byzantium. New York: Vintage Books. pp. 237.  — "The fate of Caesarea was well known."
  12. ^ a b c Norwich 1991, p. 238.
  13. ^ Konstam, Angus (2004). The Crusades. London: Mercury Books. pp. 41. 
  14. ^ Norwich, John Julius (1997). A Short History of Byzantium. New York: Vintage Books. pp. 239. 
  15. ^ Haldon, John (2000). Byzantium at War 600–1453. New York: Osprey. pp. 46. 
  16. ^ Norwich, John Julius (1997). A Short History of Byzantium. New York: Vintage Books. pp. 240–3.  — Andronikus returned to the capital, Tarchaneiotes did not take part, Bryennios and all others, including Romanos, took part in the ensuing civil war.
  17. ^ a b Norwich, John Julius (1997). A Short History of Byzantium. New York: Vintage Books. pp. 242. 
  18. ^ "Medieval Sourcebook: Anna Comnena: The Alexiad: Book I". Retrieved 2008-08-26. 
  19. ^ a b Norwich, John Julius (1997). A Short History of Byzantium. New York: Vintage Books. pp. 243. 
  20. ^ Paul K. Davis, 100 Decisive Battles from Ancient Times to the Present: The World’s Major Battles and How They Shaped History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 118.
  21. ^ Madden, Thomas (2005). Crusades The Illustrated History. Ann Arbor: University of Michiga P. pp. 35. 

Further reading

  • Haldon, John (2001), The Byzantine Wars: Battles and Campaigns of the Byzantine Era, Stroud: Tempus, ISBN 0752417959 
  • Treadgold, Warren (1997), A History of the Byzantine State and Society, Stanford: Stanford University Press, ISBN 0804724210 
  • Runciman, Steven (1951), A History of the Crusades, Vol. One, New York: Harper & Row 
  • Norwich, John Julius (1991), Byzantium: The Apogee, London: Viking, ISBN 0670802522 
  • Carey, Brian Todd; Allfree, Joshua B. & Cairns, John (2006), Warfare in the Medieval World, Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books, ISBN 1844153398 
  • Konstam, Angus (2004), Historical Atlas of The Crusades, London: Mercury, ISBN 1904668003 
  • Madden, Thomas (2005), Crusades The Illustrated History, Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, ISBN 0472031279 
  • Konus, Fazli (2006), Selçuklular Bibliyografyası, Konya: Çizgi Kitabevi, ISBN 9758867881 

External links

Coordinates: 39°08′41″N 42°32′21″E / 39.14472°N 42.53917°E / 39.14472; 42.53917

Simple English

Battle of Manzikert
Part of the Byzantine-Seljuk wars
In this 15th-century French miniature showing the Battle of Manzikert, the combatants are clad in Western European armour of the time.
Date August 26, 1071
Location Manzikert, (modern Malazgirt)
Result Decisive Seljuk victory
Byzantine Empire Great Seljuk Sultanate
Romanus IV,
Nikephoros Bryennios,
Theodore Alyates,
Andronikos Doukas
Alp Arslan
Up to 70,000[1](More than half deserted)
~ 20,000 [2]- 30,000 took part.
~ 20,000 [3]-30,000
~ 8,000 [4] Unknown

The Battle of Manzikert, or Malazgirt (Turkish: Malazgirt Savaşı) was fought between the Byzantine Empire and Seljuq Empire. The Seljuq forces attacked on August 26, 1071 near Manzikert, (modern Malazgirt, Turkey).[2] Its result was one of the most decisive defeats of the Byzantine Empire and the capture of the Byzantine Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes. The Battle of Manzikert played an important role in breaking the Byzantine resistance and preparing the way for the Turkish settlement in Anatolia.[3]


  1. Konstam, Angus (2004). The Crusades. London: Mercury Books. pp. p. 40. 
  2. Hewsen, Robert H. (2001). Armenia: a historical atlas. The University of Chicago Press. pp. p. 126. ISBN 0-226-33228-4. 
  3. Peter Malcolm Holt, Ann Katharine Swynford Lambton, Bernard Lewis The Cambridge History of Islam, 1977, p.231,232 [1]


  • Haldon, John. The Byzantine Wars: Battles and Campaigns of the Byzantine Era, 2001. ISBN 0-7524-1795-9.

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