Battle of Triangle Hill: Wikis


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Battle of Triangle Hill
Part of the Korean War
A colored photograph showing a howitzer recoils with fumes covering the front of the howitzer. A pair of GIs are standing besides the howitzer breech while another pair are crouching besides the howitzer trails. The heads of a third pair of GIs are at the bottom of the photograph near the howitzer shells.
US Army 155mm howitzer firing on Triangle Hill
Date October 14 – November 25, 1952
Location north of Kimhwa (Also spelled as Gimhwa or Kumhwa), Korea
Result Chinese victory on Triangle Hill;

Both China and South Korea claim victory on Sniper Ridge[1][nb 1]

 United Nations
United States Mark Wayne Clark
United States James Van Fleet
United States Ruben E. Jenkins
United States Wayne C. Smith
South Korea Chung Il-kwon
People's Republic of China Deng Hua
People's Republic of China Wang Jinshan
People's Republic of China Qin Jiwei
People's Republic of China Ceng Shaoshan
People's Republic of China Cui Jiangong
United States 7th Infantry Division
South Korea 2nd Infantry Division
South Korea 30th Infantry Regiment
Ethiopia 2nd Kagnew Battalion[2]
Colombia one infantry battalion[3]
Artillery: 288 guns[4]
Aircraft: 2,200+ sorties[5]
People's Republic of China 15th Corps[nb 2]
People's Republic of China 12th Corps
Infantry: 43,000
Artillery: 110 guns, 24 rocket launchers
AA Artillery: 47 guns[6]
Casualties and losses
365 killed
1,174 wounded
1 captured[7]
South Korea:
1,096 killed
3,496 wounded
97 missing[8]
Chinese estimation:
Chinese source:
7,100 killed
8,500 wounded[9]
UN estimation:

The Battle of Triangle Hill, also known as Operation Showdown or the Shangganling Campaign (simplified Chinese: 上甘岭战役pinyin: Shàng Gān Lǐng Zhàn Yì),[nb 3] was a protracted military engagement during the Korean War. The main combatants were two United Nations infantry divisions, with additional support from the United States Air Force, against elements of the 15th and 12th Corps[nb 2] of the People's Republic of China. The battle was part of American attempts to gain control of "The Iron Triangle", and took place from October 14 – November 25, 1952.

The immediate American objective was Triangle Hill (38°19′17″N 127°27′52″E / 38.32139°N 127.46444°E / 38.32139; 127.46444Coordinates: 38°19′17″N 127°27′52″E / 38.32139°N 127.46444°E / 38.32139; 127.46444), a forested ridge of high ground 4 kilometers (2.5 mi) north of Kimhwa near the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The hill was invested by the veterans of the People's Volunteer Army's 15th Corps, who had gradually withdrawn to elevated positions over the previous months. Over the course of nearly a month, substantial American and South Korean forces made repeated attempts to capture Triangle Hill and the adjacent Sniper Ridge. Despite clear superiority in artillery and aircraft, escalating American and South Korean casualties resulted in the attack being halted after three weeks of fighting, with Chinese forces regaining their original positions.



By mid-1951 the Korean War had entered a period of relative stalemate.[11] With the resignation of Dwight D. Eisenhower as the Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in June 1952, General Matthew Ridgway of the United Nations Command was transferred from Korea to Europe as Eisenhower's replacement.[12] The United States Army appointed General Mark Wayne Clark, commander of the US Fifth Army during World War II, to overall command on the Korean Peninsula as a replacement for Ridgway.

A map of Korea with a line drawn across to illustrate the battle line of Korean War. The Chinese 15th Corps and the US 7th Division face each other at the middle of the battle line and right besides Kimhwa and the Iron Triangle.
Front line of Korean War, mid-1952.

General James Van Fleet of the US Eighth Army had hoped that the change of commanders would allow him to reengage the Chinese in a major campaign,[13] but in an effort to sustain the ongoing peace talks in Panmunjom, Clark repeatedly overruled Van Fleet's requests for an authorized offensive into North Korean territory.[13] In September 1952, Van Fleet submitted tentative offensive plans for Operation Showdown, a small-scale offensive drafted by the US IX Corps as a ridge-capturing operation. The goal of the submitted plans was to improve the defensive line of the United States 7th Division north of Kimhwa near Triangle Hill, pushing the Chinese defensive line back 1,250 yd (1,140 m).[14]

In September 1952, the negotiations at Panmunjom began to fall apart, primarily due to Sino-Korean insistence that all prisoners of war be repatriated to their respective original countries, regardless of their personal preferences.[15] As a significant number of Chinese and North Korean POWs had expressed their desire to defect permanently to South Korea or Taiwan, the demand was met with strong opposition from the United States and South Korea.[11] Feeling that the negotiations would soon fail, military commanders on both sides authorized numerous tactical plans as a means of applying pressure on their opponents. In late September, the High Command of the People's Volunteer Army (PVA) authorized the tactical plans which led to the Battle of White Horse. On October 8, 1952, truce negotiations officially ceased. Clark gave his consent to Operation Showdown the same day.[16]


Locations and terrain

Triangle Hill, as it was named by the American command, is a forested hill that appears as a V shape when seen from the air or on a map. Located at 38°19′17″N 127°27′52″E / 38.32139°N 127.46444°E / 38.32139; 127.46444Coordinates: 38°19′17″N 127°27′52″E / 38.32139°N 127.46444°E / 38.32139; 127.46444, Hill 598 sits at the tip of the V and overlooks the Kimhua valley less than 2 km (1.2 mi) to the South. From this apex, two ridges extend to the northeast and northwest. The ridge to the northwest is dominated by a hill nicknamed Pike's Peak. The other connect to a pair of hills that had been dubbed Jane Russell. A less prominent ridge, named Sandy, slopes down to the east. Across the valley from Sandy stands Sniper Ridge, located at 38°19′44″N 127°29′07″E / 38.328965°N 127.485309°E / 38.328965; 127.485309.[17]

Forces and strategies

A topographic map that illustrates the content in the locations and terrain section.
Map of Triangle Hill area.

The original plan for Operation Showdown called for simultaneous attacks on both Triangle Hill and Sniper Ridge. One battalion from the 31st Regiment of the US 7th Division would take Triangle Hill from Kimhwa, while one battalion from the 32nd Regiment of the Republic of Korea (ROK) 2nd Division would attack Sniper Ridge along a parallel northbound route. UN planners expected the operation to last no more than five days with two hundred casualties on the UN side, based on the assumption that maximum artillery and air support would be available.[16][18] Before the plan could be carried out, however, the artillery and air assets for this operation were diverted to the fighting at White Horse.[17] Upon reviewing the situation, Colonel Lloyd R. Moses, commander of the 31st Regiment, doubled the US strength just before the offensive.[18]

On the Chinese side, Triangle Hill was defended by the 8th and 9th Companies, and Sniper Ridge by the 1st Company of the 15th Corps' 135th Regiment, 45th Division.[19] The 15th Corps had arrived on the Korean Peninsula in March 1951 as part of the second wave of Chinese reinforcements to North Korean forces. Although well equipped, the 15th Corps was not considered to be an elite formation, with the 45th division considered a Second Line Unit.[nb 4] Qin Jiwei, commander of the 15th Corps, predicted that any major American attack would be one of mechanized infantry and armor directed at the Pyonggang Valley 20 km (12 mi) to the west.[20] As a result, the primary formations of the 15th Corps, including the 44th Division, the 29th Division, one armored regiment and most of the corps artillery, were positioned near Pyonggang.[21] In an effort to bolster the comparatively marginal defenses of Triangle Hill, Qin ordered the 45th Division to construct an intricate series of tunnels and trenches along the ridge.[22] On October 5, 1952, a staff officer of the ROK 2nd Division defected to Chinese forces, bringing with him a complete battle plan of Operation Showdown.[20]


Opening moves

A line of soldiers are standing in front of a trench and holding rocks over their shoulders. Rocks are flying to the right while smokes are filling the background.
Chinese infantrymen throwing rocks at attackers.

On October 14, 1952 at 4 am, following two days of preliminary air strikes,[23] the Korean-American bombardment intensified across the 30 km (19 mi) front held by the Chinese 15th Corps. At 5 am, the two hundred and eighty guns and howitzers of the IX Corps extended their firing range to allow for the Korean-American infantry to advance behind a rolling barrage.[24] The concentrated bombardment succeeded in clearing the foliage on Triangle Hill and Sniper Ridge, destroying most of the above-ground fortifications on the two positions.[24] The intense shelling also disrupted Chinese communication lines, eliminating all wired and wireless communications in the area.[25]

As the American and South-Korean forces approaching the Chinese defenses, they were met with grenades, Bangalore torpedoes, rocks, and shaped charges.[23][26][nb 5] Unable to safely advance, American and South-Korean troops were forced to rely on close-support artillery to subdue Chinese resistance, but a complex network of bunkers and tunnels allowed the Chinese to bring up reinforcements as the above-ground troops were killed. The 31st Regiment was equipped with ballistic vests in the first mass military deployment of modern personal armor,[7] its 1st and 3rd battalions nevertheless suffered ninety six fatalities, with an additional three hundred and thirty seven men wounded in the first attack — the heaviest casualties the 31st Infantry Regiment had suffered in a single day during the war.[7][27]

The Chinese managed to inflict heavy casualties on the attackers, but their defenses were starting to give away under devastating UN firepower. The defending company of Sniper Ridge was forced to withdraw into the tunnels after it was reduced to twenty survivors,[28] and the ROK 2nd Battalion captured the ridge by 3:20 pm.[24] Despite the acquisition of Sniper Ridge, the attack on Triangle Hill stalled in front of the dominant Hill 598 as both American battalions suffered heavy casualties to Chinese grenades. When only partial progress could be claimed by the late afternoon, US and ROK attacks subsided and preparation of defensive positions to face a Chinese counterattack began.[29]

A group of soldiers are surrounding a tracked vehicle that carries two injured soldiers. One of the injured is getting off with the help of two soldiers while another is laying on top of the vehicle.
Medical corpsmen assist wounded infantrymen of the 31st Regiment, following the fight for Hill 598.

To recover lost ground, the PVA 135th Regiment attempted a sneak attack with four infantry companies by 7 pm. When flares broke the night cover, the attackers launched bayonet charges and hand-to-hand fighting ensued.[26][30] The UN forces responded with heavy artillery fire, but the determined Chinese assault troops marched through both Chinese and UN artillery screens to reach the UN positions — a strange sight that made some American observers believe that the attackers were under the influence of drugs.[29][31] The intense fighting prevented UN forces from receiving any resupply,[29] and the defenders were forced to give up all captured ground after running out of ammunition.[26][29]

Taking the surface

Both Major General Wayne C. Smith and Lieutenant General Chung Il-kwon, commanders of the US 7th Division and the ROK 2nd Division respectively, relieved exhausted battalions daily to maintain troops' morale. On October 15, General Smith ordered the 1st Battalion of the US 32nd Regiment and the 2nd Battalion of the US 31st Regiment to be placed under the command of Colonel Moses to resume the attack on Triangle Hill.[29] Similarly, General Chung replaced the 2nd Battalion of the ROK 32nd Regiment with the 2nd Battalion of the ROK 17th Regiment.[26] Later that day both US battalions captured Hill 598 and Sandy Ridge after meeting only light resistance, but the Chinese tunnels and a counterattack by the PVA 135th Regiment prevented the Americans from advancing towards Pike's Peak and Jane Russell Hill.[32] The South Koreans, on the other hand, were thrown back by a Chinese counterattack after recapturing Sniper Ridge.[26]

Two soldiers armed with flame thrower are walking to the right with two soldiers armed with rifles. In the background a group of soldiers are resting over a desolate landscape.
American flame thrower units advancing toward a tunnel entrance.

On October 16, Colonel Joseph R. Russ of the 32nd Regiment took over the operational command from Moses. He was also given the 2nd Battalion of the US 17th Regiment to reinforce his right wing.[33] After arriving on the battlefield, the US 2nd Battalion managed to wrestle Jane Russell Hill away from the Chinese on October 16,[31] but the Americans soon came under heavy fire from Chinese machine guns in the valley below, and were forced to withdraw to the slope behind the hill on October 18.[34] The Chinese continued to harass the American positions with small raiding parties and grenade barrages throughout that night.[34] The Koreans fared somewhat better. A joint attack by 2nd Battalion of the ROK 17th Regiment and the 2nd Battalion of the ROK 32nd Regiment captured Sniper Ridge and held it against subsequent Chinese counterattacks.[26] For the first time since the combat began, UN forces had gained firm control of the surface, with the exception of Pike's Peak.[35] On the afternoon of October 17, the 3rd Battalion of the US 17th Regiment relieved the 2nd Battalion of the US 31st Regiment on the left wing, while the 1st Battalion of the US 32nd Regiment was withdrawn from the pacified center.[33]

For Cui Jiangong, commander of the PVA 45th Division, the lack of heavy artillery and functioning communication networks prevented him from responding to the UN assaults.[36] He also received no reinforcement or resupply, due to PVA High Command's confusion about the UN's amphibious feint at Kojo.[37][38] Meanwhile, the superior fire power of the UN forces had isolated the 45th Division.[36] On October 17, after learning that about twenty Chinese infantry companies were rendered combat ineffective, Cui committed the remaining seven infantry companies to a last ditch counterattack.[39] Aided by a regiment of recently arrived BM-13 rocket launchers, the elite 8th Company of the 134th Regiment attacked from the tunnels under Hill 598 while the other six infantry companies attacked across open ground at dusk on October 19.[40] Their left wing drove the Koreans off Sniper Ridge,[26] but the US defenders on Triangle Hill held firm.[41] At daybreak on October 20, UN firepower regained the upper hand[35] and the Chinese were forced back into the tunnels after suffering heavy casualties.[42] By the time Smith replaced the US 17th Regiment with the US 32nd Regiment on the afternoon of October 20,[35] Cui reported to his superiors that the 45th Division was a shamble.[43] The Chinese attacked Hill 598 again on the night of October 23 with two infantry companies, but the well entrenched US troops beat back the attack with little difficulty.[35]

An old propaganda poster depicting a Chinese soldier in combat.
According to the Chinese government, the famous Chinese martyr Huang Jiguang (黄继光烈士) used his own body to block machine gun fire during the battle.[44]

After suffering over 4,000 casualties in ten days, the failure of the last attack ended the 45th Division's role as the only combatant on the Chinese side.[45] The UN forces had gained strong control over most of the area, with the remaining Chinese defenders trapped in tunnels under the UN positions. Despite the initial setbacks, Deng Hua, acting commander of the PVA, considered the situation a golden opportunity to bleed the US military white.[46] In the strategy meeting held on the evening of October 23, the 15th Corps was ordered to retake the two hills regardless of the cost.[47]


Van Fleet decided to rest the US 7th Division on October 25, thus sidestepping the Chinese intention of inflicting additional casualties on the Americans. The 31st Regiment of the ROK 2nd Division would take over the Triangle Hill area while the 17th Regiment of the ROK 2nd Division maintained control over Sniper Ridge.[2][35] On the same day, fresh Chinese reinforcements were converging on the Kimhwa front. The PVA High Command ordered the 12th Corps to be placed under the command of the 15th Corps and Qin ordered the 86th and 87th Regiments of the 29th Division, 12th Corps, to link up with the 45th Division for a new counterattack. The 45th Division also received 1,200 new recruits to reconstitute its fourteen infantry companies. About sixty seven heavy guns and one regiment of anti-aircraft artillery were made available to support the upcoming counterattack. All Chinese reinforcements were focused on Triangle Hill, with Sniper Ridge considered secondary.[48]

Over the next five days, the ROK 31st Regiment was involved in a bitter struggle with the Chinese defenders underground.[2] The PVA 45th Division had also infiltrated small units into UN positions every night to resupply the trapped units and to evacuate the wounded, causing heavy casualties among the Chinese logistics and medical units.[49] As there was no battalion level combat between October 20 and October 29,[50] the Chinese were able to gather their strength for a decisive blow.


Before the start of the battle, Qin had worried that Van Fleet was trying to lure the Chinese forces around Triangle Hill, with the real blow directed towards the Pyongyang Valley.[51] To counter this possibility, the 44th Division and the 85th Regiment of the 29th Division had been conducting preemptive attacks on Jackson Heights since early October.[52] From mid October, the 44th Division increased the strength of its attacks in an effort to relieve pressure from Triangle Hill,[53] the battle of attrition that was witnessed over Triangle Hill had also developed at Jackson Heights.[54]

A submachine-gunner and a machine-gunner laying in a trench with their weapons ready and pointing toward the left. In the background, several more soldiers are also laying in the trench and facing left.
A squad of Chinese infantrymen in defensive position on Triangle Hill. The machine-gunner is armed with a Degtyaryov.

At noon on October 30, in the largest artillery operation the PLA had ever conducted up to that point, the 15th Corps bombarded the Koreans with one hundred and thirty three large-caliber guns, twenty four rocket launchers and thirty 120mm heavy mortars.[55] When the bombardment ended at midnight, eleven companies from the 45th and the 29th Divisions[56] swarmed over the ROK 31st Regiment's positions and pushed the Koreans off the summit.[2] In the aftermath of the fighting, only one hundred and seventy five Koreans survived the onslaught out of the three defending companies.[57] With the PVA 91st Regiment of the 31st Division, 12th Corps, arriving as reinforcement on the night of October 31,[58] the Chinese forces chased the remaining Korean defenders off Jane Russell Hill on November 1 and beat off the subsequent counterattack.[59][nb 6] Responding to the losses, the US IX Corps ordered the ROK 30th Regiment of the 9th Division to take back Triangle Hill on October 31.[2] The South Koreans continuously launched battalion size attacks for the next five days to no avail.[2][nb 6] Although the Koreans failed to recapture the hill, the resulting heavy casualties forced the Chinese to call in the 93rd Regiment of the 31st Division as reinforcement on November 5.[60] On the same day, Lieutenant General Ruben E. Jenkins, commander of the US IX Corps, suspended further attacks on Triangle Hill to prevent more casualties and to protect Sniper Ridge.[2][59]

As the IX Corps gave up on Triangle Hill, the PVA 31st Division was in position to take back Sniper Ridge.[61] Under the cover of inclement weather, an assault was launched by the 92nd Regiment at 4 pm on November 11.[62] The Chinese soon drove off the defending 1st Battalion of the ROK 32nd Regiment, but General Chung immediately replied with a counterattack by the ROK 17th Regiment of the 2nd Division on the dawn of November 12. After two hours of fighting, the 1st Battalion of the ROK 17th Regiment recaptured two-thirds of Sniper Ridge and inflicted heavy casualties on the PVA 92nd Regiment.[62] Qin moved the 93rd Regiment of the 31st Division on November 13 to launch another assault,[63] but the ROK 17th Regiment responded by committing all units to blunt the attack. By November 17, with the help of the ROK 1st Field Artillery Group, the ROK 2nd Battalion returned to the 1st Battalion's original position after a two-hour battle.[59][64] Undeterred by heavy casualties, the PVA 106th Regiment of the 34th Division, 12th Corps relieved the weakened 93rd Regiment during the night of November 18.[65] For the next six days, 'seesaw' fighting continued on Sniper Ridge. By November 25, the ROK 2nd Division was relieved by the ROK 9th Division on Sniper Ridge and the fighting finally died down.[8]


Given the high numbers of UN casualties and under pressure from Clark, Van Fleet broke off Operation Showdown on November 28, thus ending the Battle of Triangle Hill.[66] A few days later, the PVA 34th Division and the ROK 9th Division were engaged in a seesaw battle on Sniper Ridge on December 2 and 3.[67] It failed to produce any territorial gains for either side. On December 15, with the PVA 29th Division taking over the control of the battlefield from the 34th Division, the 12th Corps withdrew from the area and the 15th Corps settled back to the status quo prior to October 14.[68][nb 1]


A smiling older officer is shaking hands with an expressionless young soldier. The young soldier is wearing three medals.
General Wayne C. Smith awarding the Silver Star to Lieutenant Tom Fernandez after the Battle of Triangle Hill in November 1952.

The Battle of Triangle Hill was the biggest and bloodiest contest of 1952.[8] After six weeks of heavy fighting, the Eighth Army had failed to gain the two hill masses that were its original goal.[8] For the Chinese, on the other hand, not only did the 15th Corps stop the UN attacks at Triangle Hill, the assaults conducted by the 44th Division on the Pyongyang front also resulted in Jackson Heights' capture on November 30.[69] The high UN casualties forced Clark to suspend any upcoming offensive operations involving more than one battalion, effectively preventing any major UN offensives for the rest of the war.[70]

Largely due to the unfavorable outcome despite the valiant efforts of the American and South Korean fighting men, this bloody battle was ignored and forgotten by Western media and gradually faded into history. But for the Chinese, this costly victory presented an opportunity to trumpet the values of obedience and sacrifice. The valor demonstrated by the Chinese soldiers at Triangle Hill was repeatedly glorified in various forms of media, including several major motion pictures. Qin was also celebrated as the hero of Shangganling and eventually rose to become the Minister of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the National People's Congress.[71] The 15th Corps became one of the most prestigious units within the PLA, and the PLAAF selected the 15th Corps to become China's first airborne corps in 1961.[72] It remains the most elite corps-size unit in China today.[73]


  1. ^ a b There is a discrepancy between South Korean and Chinese records on their starting locations with regards to Sniper Ridge. Sniper Ridge is composed of two peaks on both the north and the south ends of the ridge. According to Chinese records, the PVA occupied the northern peak only, with UN units already controlling the southern peak at the start of the battle. South Korean records list the southern peak as its main battle objective, with the PVA controlling the entire ridge.
  2. ^ a b In Chinese military nomenclature, the term "Army" (军) means Corps, while the term "Army Group" (集团军) means Army.
  3. ^ Chinese sources often mistranslate Shangganling Campaign as the Battle of Heartbreak Ridge.
  4. ^ People's Liberation Army usually assigns a "Primary" (主) or "Secondary" (偏) designation for its units to grade their combat readiness. In PVA 15th Corps, 44th Division was named 44th "Primary" Division (主师), while 45th Division was named 45th "Secondary" Division (偏师). Zhou 2000.
  5. ^ According to Chinese reports, due to the limitations of Chinese/Soviet firearms and the dense concentrations of UN formations, Chinese troops generally preferred to fight with explosives and heavy projectiles like rocks during the course of the battle. Zhou 2000.
  6. ^ a b Chinese records diverge greatly from October 30 to November 5, claiming that in addition to the ROK 30th Regiment, 2nd Kagnew Battalion and US 187th Regimental Combat Team was also present during this phase of the battle.
  1. ^ Chae, Chung & Yang 2001, p. 473.
  2. ^ a b c d e f g Chae, Chung & Yang 2001, p. 470.
  3. ^ Martinez, Guadalupe A. (2009-01). "The Colombians’ role in the battle for Triangle Hill (Hill 598)" (PDF). The Graybeards (Charleston, IL: Korean War Veterans Association) 23 (1): 30–31, 63. Retrieved 2009-06-04.  
  4. ^ Edwards 2006, p. 170.
  5. ^ Hermes 1992, p. 329.
  6. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 3, section 1, paragraph 2.
  7. ^ a b c Ecker, Richard (2002-09). "Showdown on Triangle Hill: twelve days of intense combat in October 1952 cost the U.S. 7th Infantry Division 365 KIA for a piece of turf that ultimately remained in enemy hands". Washington, D.C.: VFW Magazine.;col1. Retrieved 2009-02-05.  
  8. ^ a b c d Chae, Chung & Yang 2001, p. 472.
  9. ^ a b Zhou 2000, chapter 3, section 1, paragraph 4.
  10. ^ Hermes 1992, p. 318.
  11. ^ a b Millett, Allan R. (2009). "Korean War". Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved 2009-02-04.  
  12. ^ "People: Matthew B. Ridgway". Washington, D.C.: The Cold War Files. Retrieved 2009-02-22.  
  13. ^ a b Hermes 1992, p. 293.
  14. ^ Tucker 2000, p. 650.
  15. ^ Hermes 1992, p. 280.
  16. ^ a b Chae, Chung & Yang 2001, p. 466.
  17. ^ a b Hermes 1992, p. 311.
  18. ^ a b Hermes 1992, p. 312.
  19. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 2, paragraph 2-3.
  20. ^ a b Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 1, paragraph 2.
  21. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 1, paragraph 1.
  22. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 1, section 2, paragraph 7.
  23. ^ a b Hermes 1992, p. 313.
  24. ^ a b c Chae, Chung & Yang 2001, p. 467.
  25. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 2, paragraph 5.
  26. ^ a b c d e f g Chae, Chung & Yang 2001, p. 469.
  27. ^ Borkowski, Walt (2001-09-13). "Oral History Interview - Thomas Martin". Trenton, NJ: Department of Military & Veterans Affairs, State of New Jersey. Retrieved 2009-02-05.  
  28. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 2, paragraph 9.
  29. ^ a b c d e Hermes 1992, p. 314.
  30. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 2, paragraph 12.
  31. ^ a b Mahoney 2001, p. 100.
  32. ^ Hermes 1992, pp. 314–315.
  33. ^ a b Hermes 1992, p. 315.
  34. ^ a b Mahoney 2001, p. 101.
  35. ^ a b c d e Hermes 1992, p. 316.
  36. ^ a b Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 2, paragraph 14.
  37. ^ "Korean War: Chronology of U.S. Pacific Fleet Operations, September–December 1952". Washington, D.C.: Naval History and Heritage Command. 2000-06-21. Retrieved 2009-02-09.  
  38. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 2, paragraph 20.
  39. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 2, paragraph 23.
  40. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 2, paragraph 26.
  41. ^ Chae, Chung & Yang 2001, pp. 469–470.
  42. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 2, paragraph 35.
  43. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 2, paragraph 36.
  44. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 2, paragraph 29.
  45. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 3, paragraph 12.
  46. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 2, paragraph 33.
  47. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 3, paragraph 14.
  48. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 3, paragraph 23-24.
  49. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 3, paragraph 19.
  50. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 3, paragraph 16.
  51. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 2, paragraph 17.
  52. ^ Hermes 1992, p. 307.
  53. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 3, paragraph 28.
  54. ^ Hermes 1992, pp. 307–310.
  55. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 4, paragraph 3.
  56. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 4, paragraph 4.
  57. ^ "Profit & Loss". TIME magazine (New York, NY: Time Inc.) LX (20). 1952-11-10.,9171,817183-1,00.html. Retrieved 2009-06-04.  
  58. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 4, paragraph 9.
  59. ^ a b c Hermes 1992, p. 317.
  60. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 4, paragraph 17.
  61. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 4, paragraph 27.
  62. ^ a b Chae, Chung & Yang 2001, p. 471.
  63. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 4, paragraph 30.
  64. ^ Chae, Chung & Yang 2001, pp. 471–472.
  65. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 4, paragraph 33.
  66. ^ Malkasian 2001, p. 82.
  67. ^ Hermes 1992, p. 369.
  68. ^ Zhou 2000, chapter 2, section 4, paragraph 41.
  69. ^ Hermes 1992, p. 310.
  70. ^ Clark 1954, p. 80.
  71. ^ "Qin Jiwei, Ex-Defense Minister of China, 82". New York, NY: The New York Times. 1997-02-10. Retrieved 2009-02-05.  
  72. ^ Xinhui (2005). "The 15th Airborne Corp". Retrieved 2009-02-05.  
  73. ^ Xinhui (2002). "People's Liberation Army - Order of Battle". Retrieved 2009-02-11.  



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