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Celebrating the signing of the Camp David Accords: Menachem Begin, Jimmy Carter, Anwar El Sadat.

The Camp David Accords were signed by Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin on September 17, 1978, following twelve days of secret negotiations at Camp David.[1] The two agreements were signed at the White House, and were witnessed by United States President Jimmy Carter. The Accords led directly to the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty. They also resulted in Sadat and Begin sharing the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize.

Contents

Background

Upon assuming office on January 20, 1977, President Carter moved to rejuvenate the Middle Eastern peace process that had stalled throughout the 1976 presidential campaign in the United States. Following the advice of a Brookings Institution report, Carter opted to replace the incremental, bilateral peace talks which had characterized Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy following the 1973 Yom Kippur War with a comprehensive, multilateral approach. This new approach called for the reconvening of the 1973 Geneva Conference, this time with a Palestinian delegation, in hopes of negotiating a final settlement; however, this never materialized.

Carter also wasted no time in visiting the heads-of-state on whom he would have to rely to make any peace agreement feasible. By the end of his first year in office, he had already met with Anwar El Sadat of Egypt, King Hussein of Jordan, Hafez al-Assad of Syria, and Yitzhak Rabin of Israel. However, the United States still feared some action by Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Albania who had fought on the Egyptian and Syrian side. They were also members of the Warsaw Pact. Other Arab nations like Libya, Syria, and Lebanon as well as others also weren't too glad to see the United States trying to get Egypt to make peace with Israel. Many Arab terrorist groups also threatened to launch attacks against Egypt if they signed a peace treaty with Israel. As a precaution, the NATO armies were mobilized for war. Carter's and Vance's exploratory meetings gave him a basic plan for reinvigorating the peace process based on the Geneva Conference and Israeli withdrawal on all fronts, including the West Bank. The political situation in Israel underwent a dramatic upheaval with a devastating electoral loss of the long-ruling Alignment (the forerunner of the Israeli Labour Party) to Menachem Begin's Likud in May 1977. While Begin officially favored the reconvention of the conference, perhaps even more vocally than Rabin, and even accepted the Palestinian presence, in actuality the Israelis and the Egyptians were secretly formulating a framework for bilateral talks. Even earlier, Begin had not been opposed to returning the Sinai, but a major future obstacle was his firm refusal to consider relinquishing control over the West Bank.[2]

The key to the arrangement between Begin and Sadat took place on Sunday, August 6, 1978, as a result of a telephone call made that morning to the Israeli prime minister's office by a United States citizen who had an "Idea for Peace." The prime minister had not yet arrived at his office and the caller spoke to Mr. Yechiel Kadishai, a Begin staff member. Kadishai said that "no one was speaking to anyone and we expect a war in October." He also told the caller that if any high level talks were to occur the caller could be assured that they would be using his approach. Begin arrived, was informed of the plan, and contacted Sadat who agreed to the plan on that day. On the next day, U.S. Secretary of State Vance traveled to the Middle East and obtained first-hand confirmation of the agreement between Israel and Egypt. The following day, Tuesday, August 8th, the Camp David meeting was scheduled to take place in exactly four weeks time; on September 5, 1978. The plan was that Israel agreed on August 6th to return the land to Egypt. There was nothing to negotiate. Israel's security was insured by the specific activities to take place during the five-year transition period. Those activities were included in the "Idea for Peace" communicated to Begin's office on August 6th. In lieu of recognizing the contribution of the caller, President Carter instead took credit as if he initiated the peace accord. carter and Begin received the Nobel Peace Prize and the caller with the "Idea for Peace" virtually lost his civil rights.

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The Sadat peace initiative

President Anwar El Sadat came to feel that the Geneva track peace process was more show than substance, and was not progressing, partly due to disagreements with his Arab (mainly Syria, Libya, and Iraq) and his communist allies. He also lacked confidence in the Western powers to pressure Israel after a meeting with the Western leaders. His frustration boiled over, and after clandestine preparatory meetings between Egyptian and Israeli officials, unknown even to the NATO countries, in November 1977 Anwar El Sadat became the first Arab leader to visit Israel, thereby implicitly recognizing Israel.

On November 9, 1977, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat startled the world by announcing his intention to go to Jerusalem. Ten days later he arrived for the groundbreaking three-day visit, which launched the first peace process between Israel and an Arab state. As would be the case with later Israeli-Arab peace initiatives, Washington was taken by surprise.

The Sadat visit came about after he delivered a speech in Egypt stating that he would travel anywhere, "even Jerusalem," to discuss peace.[3] That speech led the Begin government to declare that, if Israel thought that Sadat would accept an invitation, Israel would invite him.

In Sadat's Knesset speech he talked about his views on peace, the status of Israel's occupied territories, and the Palestinian refugee problem. This tactic went against the intentions of both the West and the East, which were to revive the Geneva Conference. Hungarian leader Janos Kadar threatened war with Egypt if they signed a peace agreement with Israel. Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Albania followed. Yugoslavia and East Germany also threatened to attack Egypt if they did not revoke their recognition of Israel. The Soviet Union, Poland, and Romania didn't threaten war, but they would enter Egypt should NATO armies intervene. Libya, Iraq, Syria, and other Arab nations called Egypt a traitor, and said they would support an Eastern invasion by any means possible, even by military action.

The gesture stemmed from an eagerness to enlist the help of the NATO countries in improving the ailing Egyptian economy, a belief that Egypt should begin to focus more on its own interests than on the interests of the Arab world, and a hope that an agreement with Israel would catalyze similar agreements between Israel and her other Arab neighbors and help solve the Palestinian problem. Prime Minister Begin's response to Sadat's initiative, though not what Sadat or Carter had hoped, demonstrated a willingness to engage the Egyptian leader. Like Sadat, Begin also saw many reasons why bilateral talks would be in his country's best interests. It would afford Israel the opportunity to negotiate only with Egypt instead of with a larger Arab delegation that might try to use its size to make unwelcome or unacceptable demands. Israel felt Egypt could help protect Israel from other Arabs and Eastern communists. In addition, the commencement of direct negotiations between leaders – summit diplomacy – would distinguish Egypt from her Arab neighbors. Carter’s people apparently had no inkling of the secret talks in Morocco between Dayan and Sadat’s representative, Hassan Tuhami, that paved the way for Sadat’s initiative. Indeed, in a sense Egypt and Israel were ganging up to push Carter off his Geneva track. The basic message of Sadat's speech at the Knesset were the request for the implementation of Resolutions 242 and 338. Sadat’s visit was the first step to negotiations such as the preliminary Cairo Conference in December 1977.

Washington Reluctance to Bi-lateral Talks

A mechanism had yet to be created for Israel and Egypt to pursue the talks begun by Sadat and Begin in Jerusalem.[4] The Egyptian president suggested to Begin that Israel place a secret representative in the American embassy in Cairo. With American “cover,” the true identity of the Israeli, who would liaise between the Egyptian and Israeli leaders, would be known only to the American ambassador in Cairo.[5]

Sadat’s liaison initiative spoke volumes about his reasons for wanting to make peace with Israel. He wanted an alliance with the American superpower and he wanted to kill Carter’s Geneva initiative.[6] His trip to Jerusalem signaled a major reorientation of Cairo’s place in the global scheme of things, from the Soviet to the American camp.[7]

Carter’s acceptance of the proposed liaison scheme would have signaled American backing for Sadat’s unprecedented peace initiative. But Carter said no. However, Carter couldn’t thwart the Israeli-Egyptian peace push. Within days Israeli journalists were allowed into Cairo, breaking a symbolic barrier, and from there the peace process quickly gained momentum. An Israeli-Egyptian working summit was scheduled for December 25 in Ismailiya, near the Suez Canal.[8]

By then, Carter and his team had finally bowed to realities and agreed to be the exclusive sponsors of the bilateral Israeli-Egyptian process. The Geneva Conference was never mentioned again.

The talks

Begin and Brzezinski playing chess at Camp David.

Accompanied by their capable negotiating teams and with their respective interests in mind, both leaders converged on Camp David for thirteen days of tense and dramatic negotiations from September 5-17, 1978. By all accounts, Carter's relentless drive to achieve peace and his reluctance to allow the two men to leave without reaching an agreement are what played the decisive role in the success of the talks. Numerous times both the Egyptian and Israeli leaders wanted to scrap negotiations, only to be lured back into the process by personal appeals from Carter. Begin and Sadat had such mutual antipathy toward one another that they only seldom had direct contact; thus Carter had to conduct his own microcosmic form of shuttle diplomacy by holding one-on-one meetings with either Sadat or Begin in one cabin, then returning to the cabin of the third party to relay the substance of his discussions. Begin and Sadat were “literally not on speaking terms,” and “claustrophobia was setting in."

President Carter, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance at Camp David.

A particularly difficult situation arose on the tenth stalemated day of the talks. The issues of Israeli settlement withdrawal from the Sinai and the status of the West Bank created what seemed to be an impasse. In response, Carter had the choice of trying to salvage the agreement by conceding the issue of the West Bank to Begin, while advocating Sadat’s less controversial position on the removal of all settlements from the Sinai Peninsula. Or he could have refused to continue the talks, reported the reasons for their failure, and allowed Begin to bear the brunt of the blame. Carter chose to continue and for three more days negotiated. During this course, Carter even took the two leaders to the nearby Gettysburg National Military Park in the hopes of using the American Civil War as a simile to their own struggle.[citation needed]

Terms of the agreements

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin acknowledge applause during a joint session of Congress in Washington, D.C., during which President Jimmy Carter announced the results of the Camp David Accords, 18 September 1978.

There were two 1978 Camp David agreements: A Framework for Peace in the Middle East and A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, the second leading towards the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty signed in March 1979. The agreements and the peace treaty were both accompanied by "side-letters" of understanding between Egypt and the U.S. and Israel and the U.S.[9]

The first agreement had three parts. The first part was a framework for negotiations to establish an autonomous self-governing authority in the West Bank and the Gaza strip and to fully implement SC 242. It was less clear than the agreements concerning the Sinai, and was later interpreted differently by Israel, Egypt, and the United States. The fate of Jerusalem was deliberately excluded from this agreement[10].

The second part dealt with Egyptian-Israeli relations, the real content being in the second agreement. The third part "Associated Principles" declared principles that should apply to relations between Israel and all of its Arab neighbors.

The second agreement outlined a basis for the peace treaty six months later, in particular deciding the future of the Sinai peninsula. Israel agreed to withdraw its armed forces from the Sinai, evacuate its 4,500 civilian inhabitants, and restore it to Egypt in return for normal diplomatic relations with Egypt, guarantees of freedom of passage through the Suez Canal and other nearby waterways (such as the Straits of Tiran), and a restriction on the forces Egypt could place on the Sinai peninsula, especially within 20-40 km from Israel. Israel also agreed to limit its forces a smaller distance (3 km) from the Egyptian border, and to guarantee free passage between Egypt and Jordan. With the withdrawal, Israel also returned Egypt's Abu-Rudeis oil fields in western Sinai, which contained long term, commercially productive wells.

The agreement also resulted in the United States committing to several billion dollars worth of annual subsidies to the governments of both Israel and Egypt, subsidies which continue to this day, and are given as a mixture of grants and aid packages committed to purchasing U.S. materiel. From 1979 (the year of the peace agreement) to 1997, Egypt received military aid of US$1.3 billion annually, which also helped modernize the Egyptian military.[11] (This is beyond economic, humanitarian, and other aid, which has totaled more than US$25 billion.) Eastern-supplied until 1979, Egypt now received American weaponry such as the M1A1 Abrams Tank, AH-64 Apache gunship and the F-16 fighter jet. In comparison, Israel has received $3 billion annually since 1985 in grants and military aid packages.[12]

Consequences

According to The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East:

"The normalization of relations [between Israel and Egypt] went into effect in January 1980. Ambassadors were exchanged in February. The boycott laws were repealed by Egypt's National Assembly the same month, and some trade began to develop, albeit less than Israel had hoped for. In March 1980 regular airline flights were inaugurated. Egypt also began supplying Israel with crude oil"[13].

The time that has elapsed since the Camp David Accords has left no doubt as to their enormous ramifications on Middle Eastern politics. Most notably, the perception of Egypt within the Arab world changed. With the most powerful of the Arab militaries and a history of leadership in the Arab world under Nasser, Egypt had more leverage than any of the other Arab states to advance Arab interests. One key point of criticism was at concluding a peace treaty without demanding greater concessions for Israeli recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination. Egypt was also suspended from the Arab League from 1979 until 1989.

United States President Jimmy Carter greeting Egyptian President Anwar Sadat at the White House shortly after the Camp David Accords went into effect, 8 April 1980.

The Camp David Accords also prompted the disintegration of a united Arab front in opposition to Israel. Egypt's realignment created a power vacuum that Saddam Hussein of Iraq, at one time only a secondary power, hoped to fill. Because of the vague language concerning the implementation of Resolution 242, the Palestinian problem became the primary issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict immediately following the Camp David Accords (and arguably, until today). Many of the Arab nations blamed Egypt for not putting enough pressure on Israel to deal with the Palestinian problem in a way that would be satisfactory to them.

Although most Israelis supported the Accords, the Israeli settler movement opposed them. Because Sadat would not agree to a treaty in which Israel had any presence in the Sinai Peninsula at all, Israel had to withdraw from the entire Sinai Peninsula.[14]. Israeli settlers living in there tried to prevent the government from dismantling their settlements.[15]

Lastly, the biggest consequence of all may be in the psychology of the participants of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The success of Begin, Sadat, and Carter at Camp David demonstrated to other Arab states and entities that negotiations with Israel were possible — that progress results only from sustained efforts at communication and cooperation. Despite the disappointing conclusion of the 1993 Oslo Accords between the PLO and Israel, and even though the 1994 Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace has not fully normalized relations with Israel, both of these significant developments had little chance of occurring without the precedent set by Camp David.

Criticism of the Accords

For Israel, perhaps the most evident tangible benefit of the agreement with Egypt (other than the subsequent U.S. aid, which Egypt also received) was a peaceful mutual border, enabling the Israel Defense Forces to reduce their levels of alert on Israel's southwestern frontier. Although both sides generally abided by the agreements since 1978, in the following years a common belief emerged in Israel that the peace with Egypt is a "cold peace." There are Israelis who feel that Egypt is adhering only to letter and not the spirit of the agreement, particularly with the clauses concerning normalization of relations between the two countries. Others feel that the Peace agreement was between the Israeli people and Egypt's charismatic President Anwar El Sadat, rather than with the Egyptian people, who were not given the opportunity to accept or reject the agreement with a free vote or a representative majority. However, it was initially supported by the vast majority.[16] While the treaty was approved by a parliament majority in Israel, which has a multi-candidate, Multi-party electoral system, Egypt has had a semi-presidential system with a single candidate government since 1953.

Further supporting this claim is the fact that although Israeli tourists flocked to Egypt, few Egyptians returned the gesture: in the peak year, 1999, 415,000 Israelis visited Egypt. The highest number of Egyptians visiting Israel was 28,000, in 1995.[citation needed] (While the disparity is undoubtedly attributable in part to Egyptian average income being lower, it is also worth noting that Israel's population is 6 million while Egypt's is 71 million). Approximately 1.8 million Egyptians travel abroad every year,[17] while in 2006 2 million Israelis traveled abroad,[18] indicating that a significantly higher percentage of Israeli travelers visit Egypt than the percentage of Egyptian travelers who visit Israel.

According to the BBC,[19][20] New York Times,[21] the Middle East Media Research Institute,[22] Anti-Defamation League,[23][24][25][26] and former Israeli diplomat to Egypt Ephraim Dowek,[27] anti-Semitic themes and cartoons still appear in the Egyptian media. These themes include Holocaust denial, accusations that Jews committed the 9/11 terrorist attacks, imagery of Jews as Satanic figures, equating Jews with Nazis, imagery of Jews with hooked noses, and resurfacing the blood libel against Jews. Abdullah Schliefer, director of Television Studies at American University of Cairo, explains that "it's not real racial anti-Semitism," but rather "just a stupid knee-jerk reaction to the Arab-Israeli conflict."[19]

Egypt has mediated several unofficial cease fire understandings between Israel and the Palestinians. There have been many popular protests in Egypt against peace with Israel (from all levels of society, up to and including intellectuals, students and democratization movements such as Kifaya). These typically intensify following Israeli actions in its conflicts with the Palestinians and Lebanon, which Israel views as self defence, but are seen in Egypt as harsh repression of Arabs.

Public support

According to an Egyptian Government 2006, poll of 1000 Egyptians (taken at the time of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict) 92% of Egyptians view Israel as an enemy nation.[28][29] However, the treaty was supported by the vast majority of Egyptians on the day it was signed.[16] In Israel, there is lasting support of the Camp David Peace Accords, which have become a national consensus, supported by 85% of Israelis according to a 2001 poll taken by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (Israel based).[30] Nevertheless, a minority of Israelis believe the price Israel paid for the peace agreement was too high for its present gains, i.e. having relinquished the entire Sinai Peninsula, with its oil, tourism and land resources (Israel has no other oil wells), and the trauma of evacuating thousands of its Israeli inhabitants (many resisted, as in the town of Yamit and had to be forcefully evacuated, a phenomenon encountered also in the subsequent Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, known as the disengagement).

Arab-Israeli peace diplomacy and treaties

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Camp David Accords - Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  2. ^ George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, Duke University Press, 1990 p.164. ISBN 0822309726. From Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981, (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1983), p.88.

    [Carter] outlined to Begin his program, which consisted of five points: (1) achieve a comprehensive peace affecting all of Israel’s neighbors: (2) peace to be based on UN Resolution 242: (3) peace would involve open borders and free trade; (4) peace would call for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories to secure borders; (5) a Palestinian entity (but not an independent nation) should be created. Begin responded that he could accept all of these points accept the Palestinian entity.

  3. ^ Feron, James. "Menachem Begin, Guerrilla Leader Who Became Peacemaker." The New York Times. 9 March 1992. 15 February 2009.
  4. ^ Forward.com
  5. ^ Forward.com
  6. ^ Bitterlemons.org
  7. ^ Foreignpolicyblogs.com
  8. ^ Peacenow.org
  9. ^ "The Camp David Accords." Jimmy Carter Library and Museum. 21 July 2001. 28 April 2008.
  10. ^ Gold, 175
  11. ^ "Egypt" U.S. Department of State. March 2008. 28 April 2008.
  12. ^ Benhorin, Yitzhak. "Israel still top recipient of US foreign aid." Ynetnews. 2 August 2007. 28 April 2008.
  13. ^ Sela, "Arab-Israel Conflict," 100
  14. ^ Sela, "Sinai Peninsula," 774
  15. ^ Armstrong, 414
  16. ^ a b Vatikiotis, P.J. (1992). The History of Modern Egypt (4th edition ed.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University. pp. 443. 
  17. ^ Saad, Rehab. "Think about Oman." Al-Ahram Weekly. 10-16 May 2007. 28 April 2008.
  18. ^ 2006 - Israeli Tourism Statistics
  19. ^ a b Clark, Kate. "Interpreting Egypt's anti-semitic cartoons." BBC News. 10 August 2003. 28 April 2008.
  20. ^ "Egypt criticised for 'anti-Semitic' film." BBC News. 1 November 2002. 28 April 2008.
  21. ^ Wakin, Daniel J. "Anti-Semitic 'Elders of Zion' Gets New Life on Egypt TV." The New York Times. 26 October 2002. 28 April 2008.
  22. ^ Stalinksy, Steven. "MEMRI: Special Report - No. 28." MEMRI: The Middle East Media Research Institute. 2 April 2004. 28 April 2008.
  23. ^ "Anti-Semitic Images in the Egyptian Media: Jews as Nazis." ADL. January 2000 - February 2001. 28 April 2008.
  24. ^ Anti-Semitism in the Egyptian Media - Images and Accusations: Jews as Abnormal; Israelis as Nazis." ADL. 1997. 28 April 2008.
  25. ^ Anti-Semitism in the Egyptian Media - Images and Accusations: Jews as Abnormal; Israelis as Nazis
  26. ^ "Anti-Semitism in the Egyptian Media - Conspiracy Theories." ADL. 1997. 28 April 2008.
  27. ^ Dowek, Ephraim. "Israeli-Egyptian Relations, 1980-2000." Google Book Search. 28 April 2008.
  28. ^ "Denmark 'Egypt's foe', says poll" BBC News. 1 November 2006. 28 April 2008.
  29. ^ Pipes, Daniel. "Time to Recognize the Failure OF Israel-Egypt Treaty." The New York Sun. 21 November 2006. 28 April 2008.
  30. ^ Ronen, Joshua. "Poll: 58% of Israelis back Oslo process." Tel Aviv University. 7 June 2001. 28 April 2008.

References

  • Armstrong, Karen. Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths. New York: Ballantine Books, 1996.
  • Bregman, Ahron Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America.
  • Eran, Oded. "Arab-Israel Peacemaking." Sela.
  • Gold, Dore. The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West, and the Future of the Holy City. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2007.
  • Meital, Yoram. Egypt’s Struggle for Peace: Continuity and Change, 1967-1977.
  • "Arab-Israel Conflict." Sela.
  • Sela, Avraham, ed. The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. New York: Continuum, 2002.
  • Adam Curtis' 2004 documentary The Power of Nightmares, in its 2nd and 3rd part, studies the Camp David Accords from the point of view of fundamentalist Muslims.

External links


, Jimmy Carter, Anwar El Sadat]] The Camp David Accords were signed by Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin on September 17, 1978, following twelve days of secret negotiations at Camp David.[1] The two framework agreements were signed at the White House, and were witnessed by United States President Jimmy Carter. The second of these frameworks, A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, led directly to the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty, and resulted in Sadat and Begin sharing the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize. Little progress was achieved on the first framework however, A Framework for Peace in the Middle East, which dealt with the Palestinian territories.

Contents

Background

Upon assuming office on January 20, 1977, President Carter moved to rejuvenate the Middle East peace process that had stalled throughout the 1976 presidential campaign in the United States. Following the advice of a Brookings Institution report, Carter opted to replace the incremental, bilateral peace talks which had characterized Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy following the 1973 Yom Kippur War with a comprehensive, multilateral approach.

Carter visited the heads-of-state on whom he would have to rely to make any peace agreement feasible. By the end of his first year in office, he had already met with Anwar El Sadat of Egypt, King Hussein of Jordan, Hafez al-Assad of Syria, and Yitzhak Rabin of Israel. Carter's and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's exploratory meetings gave him a basic plan for reinvigorating the peace process based on the Geneva Conference and Israeli withdrawal on all fronts, including the West Bank. The political situation in Israel underwent a dramatic upheaval with a devastating electoral loss of the long-ruling Alignment (the forerunner of the Israeli Labour Party) to Menachem Begin's Likud in May 1977. While Begin officially favored the reconvention of the conference, perhaps even more vocally than Rabin, and even accepted the Palestinian presence, in actuality the Israelis and the Egyptians were secretly formulating a framework for bilateral talks. Even earlier, Begin had not been opposed to returning the Sinai, but a major future obstacle was his firm refusal to consider relinquishing control over the West Bank.[2]

The key to the arrangement between Begin and Sadat took place on Sunday, August 6, 1978, as a result of a telephone call made that morning to the Israeli prime minister's office by a United States citizen who had an "Idea for Peace." The prime minister had not yet arrived at his office and the caller spoke to Mr. Yechiel Kadishai, a Begin staff head. Kadishai said that "no one was speaking to anyone and we expect a war in October." He also told the caller that if any high level talks were to occur the caller could be assured that they would be using his approach. Begin arrived, was informed of the plan, and contacted Sadat who agreed to the plan on that day. On the next day, U.S. Secretary of State Vance traveled to the Middle East and obtained first-hand confirmation of the agreement between Israel and Egypt. The following day, Tuesday, August 8th, the Camp David meeting was scheduled to take place in exactly four weeks time; on September 5, 1978. The plan was that Israel agreed on August 6th to return the land to Egypt. Sadat’s then waning popularity would be greatly enhanced as a result such an achievement. Israel's security was insured by the specific activities to take place during the “transition period.” Those activities were included in the "Idea for Peace" communicated to Begin's office on August 6th. In lieu of recognizing the contribution of the caller, President Carter instead took credit as if he initiated the peace accord.

The Sadat peace initiative

, Jimmy Carter and Anwar Sadat at Camp David, 1978]] President Anwar El Sadat came to feel that the Geneva track peace process was more show than substance, and was not progressing, partly due to disagreements with his Arab (mainly Syria, Libya, and Iraq) and his communist allies. He also lacked confidence in the Western powers to pressure Israel after a meeting with the Western leaders. His frustration boiled over, and after clandestine preparatory meetings between Egyptian and Israeli officials, unknown even to the NATO countries, in November 1977 Anwar El Sadat became the first Arab leader to visit Israel, thereby implicitly recognizing Israel.

On November 9, 1977, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat startled the world by announcing his intention to go to Jerusalem. Ten days later he arrived for the groundbreaking three-day visit, which launched the first peace process between Israel and an Arab state. As would be the case with later Israeli-Arab peace initiatives, Washington was taken by surprise. The Sadat visit came about after he delivered a speech in Egypt stating that he would travel anywhere, "even Jerusalem," to discuss peace.[3] That speech led the Begin government to declare that, if Israel thought that Sadat would accept an invitation, Israel would invite him. In Sadat's Knesset speech he talked about his views on peace, the status of Israel's occupied territories, and the Palestinian refugee problem. This tactic went against the intentions of both the West and the East, which were to revive the Geneva Conference.

The gesture stemmed from an eagerness to enlist the help of the NATO countries in improving the ailing Egyptian economy, a belief that Egypt should begin to focus more on its own interests than on the interests of the Arab world, and a hope that an agreement with Israel would catalyze similar agreements between Israel and her other Arab neighbors and help solve the Palestinian problem. Prime Minister Begin's response to Sadat's initiative, though not what Sadat or Carter had hoped, demonstrated a willingness to engage the Egyptian leader. Like Sadat, Begin also saw many reasons why bilateral talks would be in his country's best interests. It would afford Israel the opportunity to negotiate only with Egypt instead of with a larger Arab delegation that might try to use its size to make unwelcome or unacceptable demands. Israel felt Egypt could help protect Israel from other Arabs and Eastern communists. In addition, the commencement of direct negotiations between leaders – summit diplomacy – would distinguish Egypt from her Arab neighbors. Carter's people apparently had no inkling of the secret talks in Morocco between Dayan and Sadat's representative, Hassan Tuhami, that paved the way for Sadat's initiative. Indeed, in a sense Egypt and Israel were ganging up to push Carter off his Geneva track. The basic message of Sadat's speech at the Knesset were the request for the implementation of Resolutions 242 and 338. Sadat's visit was the first step to negotiations such as the preliminary Cairo Conference in December 1977.

Washington reluctance to bilateral talks

A mechanism had yet to be created for Israel and Egypt to pursue the talks begun by Sadat and Begin in Jerusalem.[4] The Egyptian president suggested to Begin that Israel place a secret representative in the American embassy in Cairo. With American "cover," the true identity of the Israeli, who would liaise between the Egyptian and Israeli leaders, would be known only to the American ambassador in Cairo.[5]

Sadat's liaison initiative spoke volumes about his reasons for wanting to make peace with Israel. He wanted an alliance with the American superpower and he wanted to kill Carter's Geneva initiative.[6] His trip to Jerusalem signaled a major reorientation of Cairo's place in the global scheme of things, from the Soviet to the American camp.[7] Carter's acceptance of the proposed liaison scheme would have signaled American backing for Sadat's unprecedented peace initiative. But Carter said no. However, Carter couldn't thwart the Israeli-Egyptian peace push. Within days Israeli journalists were allowed into Cairo, breaking a symbolic barrier, and from there the peace process quickly gained momentum. An Israeli-Egyptian working summit was scheduled for December 25 in Ismailiya, near the Suez Canal.[8]

The talks

at Camp David]]

Accompanied by their capable negotiating teams and with their respective interests in mind, both leaders converged on Camp David for thirteen days of tense and dramatic negotiations from September 5 to 17, 1978. By all accounts, Carter's relentless drive to achieve peace and his reluctance to allow the two men to leave without reaching an agreement are what played the decisive role in the success of the talks. Numerous times both the Egyptian and Israeli leaders wanted to scrap negotiations, only to be lured back into the process by personal appeals from Carter. Begin and Sadat had such mutual antipathy toward one another that they only seldom had direct contact; thus Carter had to conduct his own microcosmic form of shuttle diplomacy by holding one-on-one meetings with either Sadat or Begin in one cabin, then returning to the cabin of the third party to relay the substance of his discussions. Begin and Sadat were "literally not on speaking terms," and "claustrophobia was setting in." , and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance at Camp David]] A particularly difficult situation arose on the tenth stalemated day of the talks. The issues of Israeli settlement withdrawal from the Sinai and the status of the West Bank created what seemed to be an impasse. In response, Carter had the choice of trying to salvage the agreement by conceding the issue of the West Bank to Begin, while advocating Sadat's less controversial position on the removal of all settlements from the Sinai Peninsula. Or he could have refused to continue the talks, reported the reasons for their failure, and allowed Begin to bear the brunt of the blame. Carter chose to continue and for three more days negotiated. During this course, Carter even took the two leaders to the nearby Gettysburg National Military Park in the hopes of using the American Civil War as a simile to their own struggle.[citation needed]

Terms of the agreements

File:Sadat and Begin
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin acknowledge applause during a joint session of Congress in Washington, D.C., during which President Jimmy Carter announced the results of the Camp David Accords, 18 September 1978.

There were two 1978 Camp David agreements: A Framework for Peace in the Middle East and A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, the second leading towards the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty signed in March 1979. The agreements and the peace treaty were both accompanied by "side-letters" of understanding between Egypt and the U.S. and Israel and the U.S.[9]

The first agreement had three parts. The first part was a framework for negotiations to establish an autonomous self-governing authority in the West Bank and the Gaza strip and to fully implement SC 242. It was less clear than the agreements concerning the Sinai, and was later interpreted differently by Israel, Egypt, and the United States. The fate of Jerusalem was deliberately excluded from this agreement.[10]

The second part dealt with Egyptian-Israeli relations, the real content being in the second agreement. The third part "Associated Principles" declared principles that should apply to relations between Israel and all of its Arab neighbors.

The second agreement outlined a basis for the peace treaty six months later, in particular deciding the future of the Sinai peninsula. Israel agreed to withdraw its armed forces from the Sinai, evacuate its 4,500 civilian inhabitants, and restore it to Egypt in return for normal diplomatic relations with Egypt, guarantees of freedom of passage through the Suez Canal and other nearby waterways (such as the Straits of Tiran), and a restriction on the forces Egypt could place on the Sinai peninsula, especially within 20–40 km from Israel. Israel also agreed to limit its forces a smaller distance (3 km) from the Egyptian border, and to guarantee free passage between Egypt and Jordan. With the withdrawal, Israel also returned Egypt's Abu-Rudeis oil fields in western Sinai, which contained long term, commercially productive wells.

The agreement also resulted in the United States committing to several billion dollars worth of annual subsidies to the governments of both Israel and Egypt, subsidies which continue to this day, and are given as a mixture of grants and aid packages committed to purchasing U.S. materiel. From 1979 (the year of the peace agreement) to 1997, Egypt received military aid of US$1.3 billion annually, which also helped modernize the Egyptian military.[11] (This is beyond economic, humanitarian, and other aid, which has totaled more than US$25 billion.) Eastern-supplied until 1979, Egypt now received American weaponry such as the M1A1 Abrams Tank, AH-64 Apache gunship and the F-16 fighter jet. In comparison, Israel has received $3 billion annually since 1985 in grants and military aid packages.[12]

Consequences

According to The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East:
"The normalization of relations [between Israel and Egypt] went into effect in January 1980. Ambassadors were exchanged in February. The boycott laws were repealed by Egypt's National Assembly the same month, and some trade began to develop, albeit less than Israel had hoped for. In March 1980 regular airline flights were inaugurated. Egypt also began supplying Israel with crude oil".[13]

The time that has elapsed since the Camp David Accords has left no doubt as to their enormous ramifications on Middle Eastern politics. Most notably, the perception of Egypt within the Arab world changed. With the most powerful of the Arab militaries and a history of leadership in the Arab world under Nasser, Egypt had more leverage than any of the other Arab states to advance Arab interests. One key point of criticism was at concluding a peace treaty without demanding greater concessions for Israeli recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination. Egypt was also suspended from the Arab League from 1979 until 1989.

File:Carter and Sadat White
United States President Jimmy Carter greeting Egyptian President Anwar Sadat at the White House shortly after the Camp David Accords went into effect, 8 April 1980.

The Camp David Accords also prompted the disintegration of a united Arab front in opposition to Israel. Egypt's realignment created a power vacuum that Saddam Hussein of Iraq, at one time only a secondary power, hoped to fill. Because of the vague language concerning the implementation of Resolution 242, the Palestinian problem became the primary issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict immediately following the Camp David Accords (and arguably, until today). Many of the Arab nations blamed Egypt for not putting enough pressure on Israel to deal with the Palestinian problem in a way that would be satisfactory to them.

Although most Israelis supported the Accords, the Israeli settler movement opposed them. Because Sadat would not agree to a treaty in which Israel had any presence in the Sinai Peninsula at all, Israel had to withdraw from the entire Sinai Peninsula.[14] Israeli settlers living in there tried to prevent the government from dismantling their settlements.[15]

Lastly, the biggest consequence of all may be in the psychology of the participants of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The success of Begin, Sadat, and Carter at Camp David demonstrated to other Arab states and entities that negotiations with Israel were possible—that progress results only from sustained efforts at communication and cooperation. Despite the disappointing conclusion of the 1993 Oslo Accords between the PLO and Israel, and even though the 1994 Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace has not fully normalized relations with Israel, both of these significant developments had little chance of occurring without the precedent set by Camp David.

Criticism of the Accords

For Israel, perhaps the most evident tangible benefit of the agreement with Egypt (other than the subsequent U.S. aid, which Egypt also received) was a peaceful mutual border, enabling the Israel Defense Forces to reduce their levels of alert on Israel's southwestern frontier. Although both sides generally abided by the agreements since 1978, in the following years a common belief emerged in Israel that the peace with Egypt is a "cold peace." There are Israelis who feel that Egypt is adhering only to letter and not the spirit of the agreement, particularly with the clauses concerning normalization of relations between the two countries.[citation needed] Others feel that the Peace agreement was between the Israeli people and Egypt's charismatic President Anwar El Sadat, rather than with the Egyptian people, who were not given the opportunity to accept or reject the agreement with a free vote or a representative majority. However, it was initially supported by the vast majority.[16] While the treaty was approved by a parliament majority in Israel, which has a multi-candidate, Multi-party electoral system, Egypt has had a semi-presidential system with a single candidate government since 1953.

Further supporting this claim is the fact that although Israeli tourists flocked to Egypt, few Egyptians returned the gesture: in the peak year, 1999, 415,000 Israelis visited Egypt. The highest number of Egyptians visiting Israel was 28,000, in 1995.[citation needed] (While the disparity is undoubtedly attributable in part to Egyptian average income being lower, it is also worth noting that Israel's population is 6 million while Egypt's is 71 million). Approximately 1.8 million Egyptians travel abroad every year,[17] while in 2006 2 million Israelis traveled abroad,[18] indicating that a significantly higher percentage of Israeli travelers visit Egypt than the percentage of Egyptian travelers who visit Israel.

According to the BBC,[19][20] New York Times,[21] the Middle East Media Research Institute,[22] Anti-Defamation League,[23][24][25][26] and former Israeli diplomat to Egypt Ephraim Dowek,[27] anti-Semitic themes and cartoons still appear in the Egyptian media. These themes include Holocaust denial, accusations that Jews committed the 9/11 terrorist attacks, imagery of Jews as Satanic figures, equating Jews with Nazis, imagery of Jews with hooked noses, and resurfacing the blood libel against Jews. Abdullah Schliefer, director of Television Studies at American University of Cairo, explains that "it's not real racial anti-Semitism," but rather "just a stupid knee-jerk reaction to the Arab-Israeli conflict."[19]

Egypt has mediated several unofficial cease fire understandings between Israel and the Palestinians. There have been many popular protests in Egypt against peace with Israel (from all levels of society, up to and including intellectuals, students and democratization movements such as Kifaya). These typically intensify following Israeli actions in its conflicts with the Palestinians and Lebanon, which Israel views as self defence, but are seen in Egypt as harsh repression of Arabs.

Public support

According to an Egyptian Government 2006, poll of 1000 Egyptians (taken at the time of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict) 92% of Egyptians view Israel as an enemy nation.[28][29] However, the treaty was supported by the vast majority of Egyptians on the day it was signed.[16] In Israel, there is lasting support of the Camp David Peace Accords, which have become a national consensus, supported by 85% of Israelis according to a 2001 poll taken by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (Israel based).[30] Nevertheless, a minority of Israelis believe the price Israel paid for the peace agreement was too high for its present gains, i.e. having relinquished the entire Sinai Peninsula, with its oil, tourism and land resources (Israel has no other oil wells), and the trauma of evacuating thousands of its Israeli inhabitants (many resisted, as in the town of Yamit and had to be forcefully evacuated, a phenomenon encountered also in the subsequent Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, known as the disengagement).[citation needed]

Arab-Israeli peace diplomacy and treaties

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Camp David Accords – Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  2. ^ George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, Duke University Press, 1990 p.164. ISBN 0822309726. From Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977–1981, (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1983), p.88.
    [Carter] outlined to Begin his program, which consisted of five points: (1) achieve a comprehensive peace affecting all of Israel's neighbors: (2) peace to be based on UN Resolution 242: (3) peace would involve open borders and free trade; (4) peace would call for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories to secure borders; (5) a Palestinian entity (but not an independent nation) should be created. Begin responded that he could accept all of these points accept the Palestinian entity.
  3. ^ Feron, James. "Menachem Begin, Guerrilla Leader Who Became Peacemaker." The New York Times. 9 March 1992. 15 February 2009.
  4. ^ Forward.com
  5. ^ Forward.com
  6. ^ Bitterlemons.org
  7. ^ Foreignpolicyblogs.com
  8. ^ Peacenow.org
  9. ^ "The Camp David Accords." Jimmy Carter Library and Museum. 21 July 2001. 28 April 2008.
  10. ^ Gold, 175
  11. ^ "Egypt" U.S. Department of State. March 2008. 28 April 2008.
  12. ^ Benhorin, Yitzhak. "Israel still top recipient of US foreign aid." Ynetnews. 2 August 2007. 28 April 2008.
  13. ^ Sela, "Arab-Israel Conflict," 100
  14. ^ Sela, "Sinai Peninsula," 774
  15. ^ Armstrong, 414
  16. ^ a b Vatikiotis, P.J. (1992). The History of Modern Egypt (4th edition ed.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University. p. 443. 
  17. ^ Saad, Rehab. "Think about Oman." Al-Ahram Weekly. 10–16 May 2007. 28 April 2008.
  18. ^ 2006 – Israeli Tourism Statistics
  19. ^ a b Clark, Kate. "Interpreting Egypt's anti-semitic cartoons." BBC News. 10 August 2003. 28 April 2008.
  20. ^ "Egypt criticised for 'anti-Semitic' film." BBC News. 1 November 2002. 28 April 2008.
  21. ^ Wakin, Daniel J. "Anti-Semitic 'Elders of Zion' Gets New Life on Egypt TV." The New York Times. 26 October 2002. 28 April 2008.
  22. ^ Stalinksy, Steven. "MEMRI: Special Report – No. 28." MEMRI: The Middle East Media Research Institute. 2 April 2004. 28 April 2008.
  23. ^ "Anti-Semitic Images in the Egyptian Media: Jews as Nazis." ADL. January 2000 – February 2001. 28 April 2008.
  24. ^ "Anti-Semitism in the Egyptian Media – Images and Accusations: Jews as Abnormal; Israelis as Nazis." ADL. 1997. 28 April 2008.
  25. ^ Anti-Semitism in the Egyptian Media – Images and Accusations: Jews as Abnormal; Israelis as Nazis
  26. ^ "Anti-Semitism in the Egyptian Media – Conspiracy Theories." ADL. 1997. 28 April 2008.
  27. ^ Dowek, Ephraim. "Israeli-Egyptian Relations, 1980–2000." Google Book Search. 28 April 2008.
  28. ^ "Denmark 'Egypt's foe', says poll" BBC News. 1 November 2006. 28 April 2008.
  29. ^ Pipes, Daniel. "Time to Recognize the Failure OF Israel-Egypt Treaty." The New York Sun. 21 November 2006. 28 April 2008.
  30. ^ Ronen, Joshua. "Poll: 58% of Israelis back Oslo process." Tel Aviv University. 7 June 2001. 28 April 2008.

References and further reading

  • Armstrong, Karen. Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths. New York: Ballantine Books, 1996.
  • Bregman, Ahron Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America.
  • Eran, Oded. "Arab-Israel Peacemaking." Sela.
  • Gold, Dore. The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West, and the Future of the Holy City. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2007.
  • Hinton, Clete A. Camp David Accords (2004)
  • Meital, Yoram. Egypt's Struggle for Peace: Continuity and Change, 1967–1977.
  • Quandt, William B. Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (1986), by leading political scientist
  • "Arab-Israel Conflict." Sela.
  • Sela, Avraham, ed. The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. New York: Continuum, 2002.
  • Adam Curtis' 2004 documentary The Power of Nightmares, in its second and third part, studies the Camp David Accords from the point of view of fundamentalist Muslims.

External links


Source material

Up to date as of January 22, 2010

From Wikisource

<Wikisource:Historical documents

Contents

The Framework for Peace in the Middle East

Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israel conflict to adhere to it.

Preamble

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

  • The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.
  • After four wars during 30 years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.
  • The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the parliament, government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.
  • The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.
  • To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and security with it are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.
  • Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability and in assuring security.
  • Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

Framework

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations. They recognize that for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework, as appropriate, is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

West Bank and Gaza

Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:

1. Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.
2. Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.
3. When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached in the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate right of the Palestinian peoples and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:
i. The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.
ii. Submitting their agreements to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.
iii.Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.
iv. Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.
v. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.
vi. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.
vii. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

Egypt-Israel

1. Egypt-Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the U.N. Charter.
2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of the Framework a peace treaty between them while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view the achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

Associated Principles

1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors - Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.
2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the U.N. Charter. Steps to be taken in this respect include:
a. full recognition;
b. abolishing economic boycotts;
c. guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.
3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.
4. Claims commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.
5. The United States shall be invited to participated in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.
6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect or the provisions. They shall be requested to conform their policies an actions with the undertaking contained in this Framework.
For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt: Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat
For the Government of Israel: Menachem Begin

Witnessed by Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America

Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel

In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them:

It is agreed that:

  • The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.
  • All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.
  • Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.
  • The following matters are agreed between the parties:
1. the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine;
2. the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai;
3. the use of airfields left by the Israelis near al-Arish, Rafah, Ras en-Naqb, and Sharm el-Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use only by all nations;
4. the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight;
5. the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and
6. the stationing of military forces listed below.

Stationing of Forces

  • No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 km. (30 miles) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.
  • Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km. (12 miles) to 40 km. (24 miles).
  • In the area within 3 km. (1.8 miles) east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers.
  • Border patrol units not to exceed three battalions will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above.
  • The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations.
  • Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement.
  • United Nations forces will be stationed:
1. in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km. of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and
2. in the Sharm el-Sheikh area to insure freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.
  • After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.

Interim Withdrawal

Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El-Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement.

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt: Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat
For the Government of Israel: Menachem Begin

Witnessed by: Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America


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