In response to the Croatian offensive the
United Nations command decided that intervention was necessary.
The 875 troops of the Second Battalion of the
Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry were ordered to move into the region accompanied by two
French mechanized units.
They were instructed to wedge themselves between the Serb and Croatian forces.
Canadian forces had been engaged for
peacekeeping in the
former Yugoslavia since 1992.
The Princess Pats in particular had engaged in several small operations in an attempt to reduce fighting.
For the most part in the Yugoslavian wars the appearance of United Nations forces had convinced local armies to cease operations in the area.
However, just recently there had been some dramatic failures by the UN to ensure the safety of those in the
United Nations Protected Areas.
Concerned that the UN advance could be resisted the Princess Pats were fully armed and travelling in
M-113 APCs.
They carried a mix of
C-6 medium machine guns,
C-7 automatic rifles, C-9 light machine guns, and
84 mm Carl Gustav anti-tank rockets.
The attached Heavy Weapons Support Company brought
81mm mortars and specially fitted APC armed with anti-tank guided missiles.
They were the best armed of the UN forces in Yugoslavia, and it was for that reason that the French commander of the region selected them.
About half of the Princess Pats were reservists.
The Croatian forces, largely on the initiative of the local commanders who were out of contact with their central command, decided to oppose the Canadians.
Quickly upon arrival the Canadian forces began constructing a fortified position.
This was met with an artillery barrage from the Croatian forces consisting of over five hundred shells.
The barrage was only sporadic, and the Canadians successfully used breaks in the shelling to repair and reinforce their positions.
In the end only four Canadians were wounded by the attack.
At about the same time as the Canadians arrived, Serb reinforcements from around the area moved into the region, halting the Croatian advance.
The Croatians were left in control of much of the Medak pocket, an area mostly populated by Serbs.
The UN forces, under the command of
Lieutenant-Colonel James Calvin were determined to see the Croatians move back to their cease-fire line.
The goal was to remove the Croatians, and block the return of the Serb forces so that the region could become a UN supervised safe haven.
On
September 15 the UN forces resumed their advance, taking control of vacated Serb positions.
When approaching the Croatian lines the forces took some small arms fire.
The UN forces retreated and advanced attaching large UN flags to their vehicles and ensuring the Croatians could see their white paint.
This brought no decrease in fire from the Croatians, as the Canadian and French forces advanced the Croatians opened up with
RPG and
anti-aircraft guns.
The UN forces then dug in their positions and returned fire.
As night fell the Croatians attempted several flanking operations as the Canadians used
sniper rifles with
night vision scopes to block these moves.
The French responded to Croatian heavy weapons by locating them and responding with 22mm cannon fire.
This destroyed few of them, but the swift and potent response convince the Croatians to only use their strongest weapons sporadically.
They did not use their most powerful weapons, however.
The T-72 tanks were far more potent than anything the peacekeepers had, and could have made short work of the UN APCs, but the Croatians were concerned about escalating the conflict.
They also had very few of the tanks and the anti-tank rockets and potential airstrikes of the peacekeepers could easily have destroyed some of them.
After the day and night of fighting the Croatian Army had suffered 27 fatalities compared to no injuries by the UN forces.
The Croatians, realizing they would not get the UN forces to retreat began negotiations and agreed to retreat at noon
September 16.
When dawn arrived the UN forces observed that the Croatians had used the delay to set fire to the predominantly Serb villages in the pocket and evict their inhabitants.
While the Canadian and French forces were angered by the scenes they observed at a distance, they were forced to wait for the Croatian retreat.
They had neither the orders nor the weaponry to launch a full blown offensive against the Croatian lines.
The Croatians deliberately slowed their withdrawal, delaying the UN advance at each checkpoint and roadblock.
After the Croatian withdrawal, the Canadians found that (in the words of an official Canadian study on the incident) "each and every building in the Medak Pocket had been leveled to the ground", in a total of eleven villages and hamlets.
The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) later established that an estimated 164 homes and 148 barns and outbuildings were pillaged and subsequently destroyed during the cease-fire before the withdrawal.
In addition to that, the
United Nations observers determined that 29 Serb civilians had been killed in addition to 59 other casualties.
The ICTY cites at least 38 civilian casualties: 21 executed and 17 injured, and two executed Serbian POWs.
It is suspected that there were more killed, but their bodies were eradicated by the Croatians.
The Medak Pocket affair was widely publicized, caused an international outcry and badly dented Croatia's international reputation.
However, the Canadian government, concerned about not harming Canada's reputation for neutrality in the Balkans suppressed all news of the Canadian participation in the fighting.
It did not come to general knowledge in Canada until 1996.
The Canadian Forces were also concerned that Canadians killing Croatians would be seen as similar to the
Somalia Affair, that was raging at the time.
External links and references
Professionalism Under Fire: Canadian Implementation of the Medak Pocket Agreement, Croatia 1993, by Lee A.
Windsor ICTY - Indictment of General Rahim Ademi ICTY - Indictment of General Janko Bobetko "Former General, Aides Convicted in Croatian War Crimes Trial", Southeast European Times, 24 March 2003 Case Study - The Medak Pocket.
From a Croatian perspective