From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
|
Chadian-Libyan conflict |

Chadian soldiers in a Toyota
pickup modified into a technical |
| Date |
1978–1987 |
| Location |
Chad |
| Result |
Chadian victory |
Territorial
changes |
Chad gains control of the Aouzou Strip |
|
|
Belligerents |
Libya |
Chad
France |
|
Commanders |
Muammar
al-Gaddafi |
Hissène
Habré
Hassan
Djamous |
|
Casualties and losses |
7,500+
killed
1,000+ captured
800+ Armored vehicles
28+ Aircraft |
1,000+ killed
112+ wounded |
|
Chad received aid from France and Zaire, while Libya was backed by
the GUNT |
The Chadian-Libyan conflict was a state of
sporadic warfare events in Chad
between 1978 and 1987 between Libyan and Chadian forces. Libya had been
involved in Chad's internal affairs prior to 1978 and before Muammar
al-Gaddafi's rise to power in Libya in 1969, beginning with the
extension of the Chadian
Civil War to northern Chad in 1968.[1]
The conflict was marked by a series of four separate Libyan
interventions in Chad, taking place in 1978, 1979, 1980–1981 and
1983–1987. In all of these occasions Gaddafi had the support of a
number of factions participating in the civil war, while Libya's
opponents found the support of the French
government, which intervened militarily to save the Chadian
government in 1978, 1983 and 1986.
The military pattern of the war delineated itself in 1978, with
the Libyans providing armour, artillery and air support and their
Chadian allies the infantry, that assumed the bulk of the scouting
and fighting.[2]
This pattern was radically to change in 1986, towards the end of
the war, when all Chadian forces united in opposing the Libyan
occupation of northern Chad with a degree of unity that had never
been seen before in Chad.[3] This
deprived the Libyan forces of their habitual infantry, exactly when
they found themselves confronting a mobile army, well provided now
with anti-tank and anti-air missiles, thus cancelling the Libyan
superiority in fire-power. What followed was the Toyota War, in which the
Libyan forces were routed and expelled from Chad, putting an end to
the conflict.
Regarding the reasons behind Gaddafi's involvement with Chad,
the initial reason stood in his ambition to annex the Aouzou Strip, the
northernmost part of Chad that he claimed as part of Libya on the
grounds of an unratified treaty of the colonial period.[1]
In 1972 his goals became, in the evaluation of the historian Mario
Azevedo: The creation of a client state in Libya's "underbelly", an
Islamic republic modelled after his jamahiriya, that would maintain close ties
with Libya, and secure his control over the Aouzou Strip; expulsion of the French from
the region, and use of Chad as a base to expand his influence in Central
Africa.[4]
Events
Libyan involvement with Chad can be said to have started in
1968, during the Chadian Civil War, when the insurgent
Muslim National Liberation Front
of Chad (FROLINAT)
extended its guerilla war against the Christian President François Tombalbaye to the
northerly Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti
Prefecture (BET).[5] Libya's
king Idris
I felt compelled to support the FROLINAT because of
long-standing strong links between the two sides of the
Chadian-Libyan border. To preserve relations with Chad's former
colonial master and current protector, France, Idris limited himself to granting the
rebels sanctuary in Libyan territory and to providing only
non-lethal supplies.[1]
All this changed with the Libyan coup d'état of September 1, 1969 that
deposed Idris and brought Muammar al-Gaddafi to power. Gaddafi
claimed the Aouzou
Strip in northern Chad, referring to an unratified treaty
signed in 1935 by Italy and France, (then the colonial powers
of Libya and Chad, respectively).[1]
Such claims had been previously made when in 1954 Idris had tried
to occupy Aouzou, but his troops were repelled by the French Colonial Forces.[6]
Though initially wary of the FROLINAT, Gaddafi had come to see
by 1970 the organization as useful to his needs and with the
support of Soviet bloc nations, particularly East
Germany, trained and armed the insurgents, and provided them
with weapons and funding.[7][1]
On August 27, 1971 Gaddafi was bold enough to engineer a coup
attempt against Tombalbaye, that only narrowly failed; this may
have been triggered by Libya's anxiety following an attempt made on
July 24 to further Christian-Muslim reconciliation with the grant
of half the Chadian cabinet's posts to Muslim politicians. Such an
opening, though turned down by the FROLINAT, was seen by Gaddafi as
a menace to his influence in Chad.[8]
On the same day of the failed coup, Tombalbaye cut all diplomatic relations with Libya, and
invited all Libyan opposition groups to base themselves in Chad,
and started laying claims to Fezzan on the grounds of "historical rights".
Gaddafi's answer was to officially recognize on September 17 the
FROLINAT as the sole legitimate government of Chad, while in
October the Chadian Foreign Minister Baba Hassan denounced at the
United Nations
Libya's "expansionist ideas".[9]
Through French pressure on Libya, and with Hamani Diori the President of Niger playing the role of mediator, the two
countries resumed diplomatic relations on April 17, 1972. Shortly
after, Tombalbaye broke diplomatic relations with Israel and is said to have secretly accepted on
November 28 to cede the Aouzou Strip to Libya; in exchange Gaddafi
pledged 40 million pounds to the Chadian President[10] and
the two countries signed in December a Treaty of Friendship.
Gaddafi withdrew official support to the FROLINAT and forced its
leader Abba
Siddick to move his headquarters from Tripoli to Algiers.[11][8]
Good relations were confirmed in the following years, with Gaddafi
visiting the Chadian capital N'Djamena in March 1974,[12] and
in the same month a joint bank was created to provide Chad with
investment funds.[9]
Six months after the signature of the 1972 treaty, Libyan troops
moved into the Strip and established just north of Aouzou an
airbase protected by surface-to-air missiles. A civil
administration was set up, attached to Kufra, and Libyan citizenship was extended to the
few thousand inhabitants of the area. From that moment, Libyan maps
represented the area as part of Libya.[11]
The exact terms by which Libya gained Aouzou remain partly
obscure, and are debated. The existence of a secret agreement
between Tombalbaye and Gaddafi was revealed only in 1988, when the
Libyan President exhibited an alleged copy of a letter in which
Tombalbaye recognizes Libyan claims. Against this, scholars like
Bernard Lanne have argued that there never was any sort of formal
agreement, and that simply Tombalbaye had found expedient for
himself not to make mention of the occupation of a part of his
country. Also, Libya was unable to exhibit the original copy of the
agreement when the case of the Aouzou Strip was brought in 1993 before
the International Court of
Justice.[13][11]
Expansion of the
insurgency
The rapproachment was not to last long, as on April 13, 1975 a
coup d'état
removed Tombalbaye and replaced
him with General Felix Malloum. As opposition to
Tombalbaye's policy of appeasement towards Libya was among the
reasons behind the coup, Gaddafi felt the coup as a menace to his
influence in Chad and resumed supplying the FROLINAT.[1]
In April 1976, there was a Gaddafi-backed attempted
assassination of Malloum,[8]
and in the same year Libyan troops started making forays into
central Chad in company of FROLINAT forces.[2]
Libyan activism began generating concerns in the strongest
faction into which the FROLINAT had split, the Command
Council of the Armed Forces of the North (CCFAN). On the issue
of the interested nature of Libyan support the insurgents split in
October 1976, with a minority leaving the militia and forming the
Armed Forces of the North
(FAN), lead by the anti-Libyan Hissène Habré, while the majority,
willing to accept an alliance with Gaddafi, was commanded by Goukouni
Oueddei. The latter group was to shortly after rename itself People's Armed Forces (FAP).[14]
In those years, Gaddafi's support had been mostly moral, with
only a limited supply of weapons. All this started changing in
February 1977, when the Libyans provided Goukouni's men with
hundreds of AK-47 assault rifles,
dozens of bazookas, 81 and
82mm mortars
and recoilless cannons. Armed with these
weapons, the FAP attacked in June the Chadian
Armed Forces' (FAT) strongholds of Bardaï and Zouar in Tibesti and of Ounianga Kebir in Borkou. Goukouni assumed with this attack full
control of the Tibesti, because Bardaï, besieged since June 22,
surrendered on July 4, while Zouar was evacuated. The FAT lost 300
men, and piles of military supplies fell into the hands of the
rebels.[15][16]
Ounianga was attacked on June 20, but was saved for the time being
by the French military advisors present there.[17]
This year, as it had become evident that the Aouzou Strip was
being used by Libya as a base for deeper involvement in Chad,
Malloum decided to bring the issue of the Strip's occupation before
the United
Nations and the Organisation of African
Unity.[18]
Malloum also decided he needed new allies; because of this, he
negotiated a formal alliance with Habré, the Khartoum Accord, in
September. This accord was kept secret until January 22, when a
Fundamental Charter was signed, following which a National Union
Government was formed on August 29, 1978 with Habré as Prime
Minister.[19][20]
The Malloum-Habré accord was actively promoted by Sudan and Saudi Arabia, both of which feared a
radical Chad controlled by Gaddafi and saw in Habré, with his good
Muslim and anti-colonialialist credentials, the only chance to
thwart Gaddafi's plans.[21]
Libyan
escalation
The Malloum-Habré accord was perceived by Gaddafi as a serious
threat to his influence in Chad, and he promptly answered by
bringing Libyan involvement to levels never reached before. For the
first time with the active participation of Libyan ground
units,[2]
Goukouni's FAP unleashed on January 29, 1978 the so-called Ibrahim
Abatcha offensive against the last outposts held by the government
in northern Chad, namely Faya-Largeau, Fada and Ounianga Kebir. The attacks were
completely successful, and Goukouni and the Libyans assumed
complete control of the BET Prefecture.[22][23]
The decisive confrontation between the Libyan-FAP forces and the
Chadian regular forces took place at Faya-Largeau, the capital of
the BET. The city, defended by 5,000 Chadian soldiers, fell on
February 18 after sharp fighting to 2,500 rebels, supported by
possibly as many as 4,000 Libyan troops. The Libyans do not seem to
have directly participated in the fighting; in a pattern that was
to repeat itself in the future, the Libyans provided armor,
artillery and air support.[2]
The rebels also were much better armed than before, displaying Strela 2 surface-to-air missiles.[24]
Goukouni had made about 2,500 prisoners with these successes and
those in 1977; as a result, the Chadian Armed Forces had lost at
least 20% of its manpower,[23]
and in particular the Nomad and
National Guard (GNN) was decimated by the fall of Fada and
Faya.[25]
Goukouni used these victories to strengthen his position in the
FROLINAT: during a Libyan-sponsored congress held in March in Faya,
the insurgency's main factions reunited themselves and nominated
Goukouni new secretary-general of the FROLINAT.[26]
Malloum's reaction to the Goukouni–Gaddafi offensive was to
sever diplomatic relations with Libya on February 6 and bring
before the United Nations Security
Council the issue of Libyan involvement in the fighting, as
well as raising again the question of Libya's occupation of the
Aouzou Strip; but on February 19, after the fall of Faya, Malloum
was forced to accept a ceasefire and withdraw the protest. The
ceasefire was reached also because Libya had halted the advance of
Goukouni, because of pressure from France, then an important weapon
supplier of the Arab country.[22]
Malloum and Gaddafi restored diplomatic relations on February 24
at Sebha in
Libya, where an international peace conference was held which
included as mediators Niger's President Seyni
Kountché and Sudan's Vice-President. Under severe pressure from
France, Sudan and Zaire,[27]
Malloum was forced to sign on March 27 the Benghazi Accord, which
recognized the FROLINAT and agreed on a new ceasefire. Among the
chief conditions of the agreement was creation of a joint
Libya–Niger military committee, that was tasked with implementing
the agreement; through this committee, Chad legitimized Libyan
intervention in its territory. The accord also contained another
condition dear to Libya, as it asked for the termination of all
French military presence in Chad.[22]
The stillborn accord was for Gaddafi nothing more than a strategy
to strengthen his protégé Goukouni; it also weakened
considerably Malloum's prestige among southern Chadians, who saw
his concessions as a proof of his weak leadership.[27]
On April 15, only a few days after signing the ceasefire,
Goukouni left Faya, leaving there a Libyan garrison of 800 men.
Relying on Libyan armor and airpower, Goukouni's forces conquered a
small FAT garrison and pointed towards the capital N'Djamena.[27][2]
Against these stood freshly arrived French forces. Already in
1977, after Goukouni's first offensives, Malloum had asked for a
French military return in Chad, but President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was
at first reluctant to commit himself before the carrying out of the
legislative
elections, held in March 1978; also, France was afraid of
damaging its profitable commercial and diplomatic relations with
Libya. At the end, the rapid deterioration of the situation in Chad
resolved the President on February 20, 1978 to start Opération
Tacaud, that by April brought in Chad 2,500 troops to secure
the capital from the rebels.[28]
The decisive battle took place at Ati, a town 270 miles northeast of N'Djamena.
The town's garrison of 1,500 soldiers was attacked on May 19 by the
FROLINAT insurgents, equipped with artillery and modern weapons.
The garrison was relieved by the arrival supported by armor of a
Chadian task force and, more importantly, of the Foreign
Legion and the 3rd Regiment of Marine Infantry; in a two-day
battle, the FROLINAT was repelled with heavy losses, a victory that
was confirmed in June by another engagement at Djedaa, after which
the FROLINAT admitted defeat and fled north, after having lost
2,000 men and left the "ultramodern equipment" they carried on the
ground. Of key importance in these battles was the complete air
superiority the French could count on, as the Libyan Air Force
pilots refused to fight the French.[27][29][30]
Libyan
difficulties
Only a few months after the failed offensive against the
capital, major dissensions in the FROLINAT shattered all vestiges
of unity and badly weakened Libyan power in Chad. On the night of
August 27 Ahmat Acyl,
leader of the Volcan
Army, attacked Faya-Largeau with the support of Libyan troops
in what was apparently an attempt by Gaddafi to remove Goukouni
from the leadership of the FROLINAT, replacing him with Acyl. The
attempt backfired, as Goukouni reacted by expelling all Libyan
military advisors present in Chad, and started searching for a
compromise with France.[31][32]
The reasons for the clash between Gaddafi and Goukouni were both
ethnic and political. The FROLINAT was divided between Arabs, like
Acyl, and Toubous, like
Goukouni and Habré. These ethnic divisions also reflected a
different attitude towards Gaddafi and his Green Book.
In particular, Goukouni and his men had shown themselves reluctant
to follow Gaddafi's solicitations to make The Green Book
the official policy of the FROLINAT, and had first tried to take
time, leaving the question to the complete reunification of the
movement. When the unification was accomplished, and Gaddafi
pressed again for the adoption of The Green Book, the
dissensions in the Revolution's Council became manifest, with many
proclaiming their loyalty to the movement's original platform
approved in 1966 when Ibrahim Abatcha was made first
secretary-general, while others, among whom Acyl, fully embraced
the Colonel's ideas.[33]
In N'Djamena, the contemporary presence of two armies, the FAN
of the Prime Minister Habré and the FAT of the President Malloum,
prepared the stage for the battle of N'Djamena, which was to bring
about the collapse of the State and the ascent to power of the
Northern elite. A minor incident escalated on February 12, 1979
into heavy fighting between Habré and Malloum's forces, and the
battle intensified on February 19 when Goukouni's men entered in
the capital to fight alongside Habré against the FAT. It is
estimated that by March 16, when the first international peace
conference took place, 2,000–5,000 people were killed and
60,000–70,000 forced to flee the capital, and the greatly
diminished Chadian army left the capital in the rebels' hand and
reorganized itself in the south under the leadership of Wadel Abdelkader Kamougué.
During the battle, the French garrison stood passively by, even
helping Habré in certain circumstances, as when they demanded the
Chad Air Force to stop its bombings.[34]
An international peace conference was held in Kano in Nigeria, to which Chad's bordering states
participated with Malloum for the Chadian army, Habré for the FAN
and Goukouni for the FAP. The Kano Accord was signed on March 16 by all
those present, and Malloum resigned, replaced by a Council of State
under the chairmanship of Goukouni.[35] This
was a result of Nigerian and French pressures on Goukouni and Habré
to share power;[36]
the French in particular saw this as part of their strategy to cut
all ties between Goukouni and Gaddafi.[37] A few
weeks later, the same factions formed the Transitional
Government of National Unity (GUNT), kept together to a
considerable extent by the common desire to see Libya out of
Chad.[38]
Despite signing the Kano Accord,[39] Libya
was incensed that the GUNT did not include any of the leaders of
the Volcan Army and had not recognized Libyan claims on the Aouzou
Strip. Already since 13 April there had been some minor Libyan
military activity in northern Chad, and support was provided to the
secessionist movement in the south, but a major response came only
after June 25, when the ultimatum for the formation of a new, more
inclusive, coalition government posed by Chad's bordering states to
the GUNT expired. On June 26, 2,500 Libyan troops invaded Chad
directed to Faya-Largeau. The Chadian government appealed for
French help. The Libyan forces were first stymied by Goukouni's
militiamen, and then forced to retreat by French reconnaissance
planes and bombers. In the same month, the factions excluded by the
GUNT founded a counter-government, the Front for Joint Provisional
Action (FACP), in northern Chad with Libyan military support.[40][38][36]
The fighting with Libya, the imposition by Nigeria of an
economic boycott and international pressure brought to a new
international peace conference in Lagos in August, to which all eleven factions
present in Chad participated. A new accord was signed on August 21, under
which a new GUNT was to be formed, open to all factions. The French
troops were to leave Chad, and be replaced by a multinational
African peace force.[41] The
new GUNT took office in November, with Goukouni President, Kamougué
Vice-President, Habré Defence Minister[42]
and Acyl Foreign Minister.[43]
Despite the presence of Habré, the new composition of the GUNT had
enough pro-Libyans to satisfy Gaddafi.[44]
Libyan
intervention
It became clear from the start that Habré isolated himself from
the other members of the GUNT, which he treated with disdain.
Habré's hostility for Libya's influence in Chad united itself with
his ambition and ruthlessness: observers concluded that the warlord
would never be content with anything short of the highest office.
In such a context it was thought that sooner or later an armed
confrontation between Habré and the pro-Libyan factions would take
place, and more importantly, between Habré and Goukouni.[42]
As expected, clashes in the capital between Habré's FAN and
pro-Libyan groups became progressively more serious; in the end, on
March 22, 1980 a minor incident, like in 1979 with the first,
triggered the second battle of N'Djamena. In ten days, the clashes
between the FAN and Goukouni's FAP, who both had 1,000–1,500 troops
in the city, had caused thousands of casualties and the flight of
about half the capital's population. The few remaining French
troops, who left on May 4, proclaimed themselves neutral, as did
the Zairian peace force.[45][46]
While the FAN was supplied economically and militarily by Sudan
and Egypt, Goukouni received
shortly after the beginning of the battle the armed support of
Kamougué's FAT and Acyl's CDR, and was provided with Libyan
artillery. On June 6, the FAN assumed control of the city of Faya;
this alarmed Goukouni, and he signed, on June 15, a Treaty of
Friendship with Libya. The treaty gave Libya a free hand in Chad,
legitimising its presence in that country: this was especially
evident in the first article of the treaty, where it was written
that the two countries were committed to mutual defence, and a
threat against one constituted a threat against the other.[46][47]
Beginning in October, Libyan troops airlifted to the Aouzou
Strip operated in conjunction with Goukouni's forces to reoccupy
Faya. The city was then used as an assembly point for tanks,
artillery and armored vehicles that moved south against the capital
of N'Djamena.[48]
An attack started on December 6, spearheaded by Soviet T-54 and
T-55 tanks and reportedly coordinated by
advisors from the Soviet Union and the German
Democratic Republic, brought the fall of the capital on
December 16. The Libyan force, numbering between 7,000 and 9,000
men of regular units and the paramilitary Pan-African Islamic Legion,
60 tanks, and other armored vehicles, had been ferried across 1,100
kilometers of desert from Libya's southern border, partly by
airlift and tank transporters and partly under their own power. The
border itself was 1,000 to 1,100 kilometers from Libya's main bases
on the Mediterranean coast.[48]
The Libyan intervention demonstrated an impressive logistical
ability, and provided Gaddafi with his first military victory and a
substantial political achievement.[49]
While forced into exile and with his forces confined to the
frontier zones of Darfur,
Habré remained defiant: on December 31 he announced in Dakar he would resume fighting as a
guerilla against the GUNT.[49][46]
Libyan
withdrawal
On January 6, 1981, a joint comuniqué was issued in Tripoli by
Gaddafi and Goukouni that Libya and Chad had decided "to work to
achieve full unity between the two countries". The merger plan
caused strong adverse reaction in Africa, and was immediately
condemned by France, that on
January 11 offered to strengthen French garrisons in friendly
African states and on January 15 placed the French Mediterranean
fleet on alert. Libya answered by threatening to impose an oil
embargo, while France threatened to react if Libya attacked another
bordering country. The accord was also opposed by all GUNT
ministers present with Goukouni at Tripoli, with the exception of
Acyl.[43][50]
Most observers believe that the reasons behind Goukouni's
accepting the accord may be found in a mix of threats, intense
pressure and the financial help promised by Gaddafi. Also, just
before his visit to the Libyan capital, Goukouni had sent two of
his commanders to Libya for consultations; at Tripoli, Goukouni
learned from Gaddafi that they had been assassinated by "Libyan
dissidents", and that if he didn't want to risk losing Libyan
favour and lose power, he should accept the merger plan.[51]
The importance of the opposition they met caused Gaddafi and
Goukouni to downplay the importance of the communiqué, speaking of
a "union" of peoples, and not of states, and as a "first step"
towards closer collaboration. But the damage had been done, and the
joint communiqué badly weakened Goukouni's prestige as a
nationalist and a statesman.[43]
Increasing international pressure against Libyan presence in
Chad were at first met by Goukouni's statement that the Libyans
were present in Chad because requested by the government, and that
international mediators should simply accept the decision of Chad's
legitimate government. In a meeting held in May Goukouni had become
more accommodating, declaring that while the Libyan forces
withdrawal was not a priority, he would accept the decisions of the
OAU. Goukouni could hardly at the time renounce Libyan military
support, necessary for dealing with Habré's FAN, which was
supported by Egypt and Sudan and funded through Egypt by the United
States Central Intelligence
Agency.[52]
In the meantime, relations between Goukouni and Gaddafi started
deteriorating. Libyan troops were stationed in various points of
northern and central Chad, in numbers that had reached by
January–February about 14,000 troops. The Libyan forces in the
country created considerable annoyance in the GUNT, by supporting
Acyl's faction in its disputes with the other militias, including
the clashes held in late April with Goukouni's FAP. There were also
attempts to Libyanize the local population, that made many conclude
that "unification" for Libya meant Arabization and the imposition
of Libyan political culture, in particular of The Green
Book.[53][54][55]
Amid fighting in October between Gaddafi's Islamic Legionnaires
and Goukouni's troops, and rumors that Acyl was planning a coup
d'état to assume the leadership of the GUNT, Goukouni demanded on
October 29 the complete and unequivocal withdrawal of Libyan forces
from Chadian territory, which, beginning with the capital, was to
be completed by December 31. The Libyans were to be replaced by an
Organization for African Unity (OAU)
Inter-African Force (IAF). Gaddafi complied, and by November 16 all
Libyan forces had left Chad, redeploying in the Aouzou Strip.[55][54]
Libya's prompt retreat took many observers by surprise. Reasons
were to be found in Gaddafi's desire to host the OAU's annual
conference in 1982 and assume the presidency of the OAU for that
year. Another point could be found in Libya's difficult situation
in Chad where, without some popular and international acceptance
for Libyan presence, it would have been difficult to take the
concrete risk of causing a war with Egypt and Sudan, with US
support. This does not mean that Gaddafi had renounced the goals he
had set for Chad, but that he now had to search for somebody else
as Chad's leader, as Goukouni had proved himself unreliable.[55][56]
Habré takes N'Djamena
The first IAF component to arrive in Chad were the Zairian
paratroopers; they were followed by Nigerian and Senegalese forces, bringing the IAF to 3,275
men. Before the peace-keeping force was fully deployed, Habré had
already taken advantage of Libya's withdrawal, and made massive
inroads in eastern Chad, including the important city of Abéché, that fell on
November 19.[57] Next
to fall was in early January Oum Hadjer, at only 100 miles from Ati, the
last relevant town before the capital. The GUNT was saved for the
moment by the IAF, the only credible military force confronting
Habré, that prevented the FAN from taking Ati.[58]
In the light of Habré's offensive, the OAU requested the GUNT to
open reconciliation talks with Habré, a demand that was angrily
refused by Goukouni;[59] later
he was to say:
"The OAU has deceived us. Our security was fully ensured by
Libyan troops. The OAU put pressure on us to expel the Libyans. Now
that they have gone, the organization has abandoned us while
imposing on us a negotiated settlement with Hissein Habre"[60]
In May, the FAN started a final offensive, passing unhindered by
the peacekeepers in
Ati and Mongo.[60]
Goukouni, increasingly angered with the IAF's refusal to fight
Habré, made an attempt to restore his relations with Libya, and
reached Tripoli on May 23, but Gaddafi, burned by his experience
the previous year, proclaimed his state neutrality in the civil
war.[61]
The GUNT forces attempted to make a last stand at Massaguet, 50 miles north
of capital on the Abéché-N'Djamena road, but were defeated by the
FAN on June 5 after a hard battle. Two days later Habré entered
unopposed in N'Djamena, making him the de facto source of national government in
Chad, while Goukouni fled the country seeking sanctuary in Cameroon.[62][63]
Immediately after occupying the capital, Habré proceeded to
consolidate his power by occupying the rest of the country. In
barely six weeks, he conquered southern Chad, destroying the FAT,
Kamougué's militia, whose hopes for Libyan help failed to
materialize. Also the rest of the country was submitted, with the
exception of the Tibesti.[64]
GUNT
offensive
Since Gaddafi had kept himself mostly aloof in the months prior
to the fall of N'Djamena, Habré hoped at first to reach an
understanding with Libya, possibly through an accord with its proxy
in Chad, the leader of the Revolutionary Democratic Council (CDR)
Ahmat Acyl, who
appeared receptive to dialogue. But Acyl died on July 19, replaced
by Acheikh ibn Oumar, and the CDR was antagonized by Habré's
eagerness to unify the country, making him overrun the CDR's
domains.[65]
Therefore, it was with Libyan support that Goukouni reassembled
the GUNT, creating in October a National Peace Government with its
seat in the Tibesti town of Bardaï and claiming itself the
legitimate government by the terms of the Lagos Accord. For the impending fight
Goukouni could count on 3,000–4,000 men taken from several
militias, later merged in an Armée Nationale de Libération
(ANL) under the command of a Southerner, Negue Djogo.[66][67]
Before Gaddafi could throw his full weight behind Goukouni,
Habré attacked the GUNT in the Tibesti, but was repelled both in
December 1982 and in January 1983. The following months saw the
clashes intensify in the North, while talks, with even an exchange
in March of visits between Tripoli and N'Djamena, broke down.
Therefore, on March 17 Habré brought the Chad-Libya
quarrel before the United Nations, asking for an urgent
meeting of the UN Security
Council to consider Libya's "aggression and occupation" of
Chadian territory.[66][68]
Gaddafi was ready now for an offensive. The decisive offensive
began in June, when a 3,000 strong GUNT force invested
Faya-Largeau, the main government stronghold in the North, that
fell on June 25, and then rapidly proceeded towards Koro Toro, Oum Chalouba and
Abéché, assuming control of the main routes towards N'Djamena.
Libya, while helping with recruiting and training and providing the
GUNT with heavy artillery, only committed a few thousand regular
troops to the offensive, and most of these were artillery and
logistic units. This may have been due to Gaddafi's desire that the
conflict should be read as a Chadian internal affair.[48][66][62]
The international community reacted
adversely to the Libyan-backed offensive, in particular France and
the United States. On the same day as the fall of Faya, the French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson
warned Libya that France would "not remain indifferent" to a new
Libyan involvement in Chad, and on July 11 the French government
accused again Libya of direct military support to the rebels.
French arms shipments were resumed on June 27, and on July 3 a
first contingent of 250 Zairians arrived to strengthen Habré; the
United States announced in July military and food aid for 10
million dollars. Gaddafi suffered also a diplomatic setback from
the OAU, that at the meeting held in June officially recognized
Habré's government and asked for all foreign troops to leave
Chad.[69][66][68]
Supplied by Americans, Zairians and the French, Habré rapidly
reorganized his forces (now called Chadian National Armed
Forces or FANT) and marched north to confront the GUNT and the
Libyans, that he met south of Abéché. Habré proved again his
ability, crushing Goukouni's forces, and started a vast
counteroffensive that enabled him to retake in rapid succession
Abéché, Biltine,
Fada and, on July 30,
Faya-Largeau, threatening to attack the Tibesti and the Aouzou
Strip.[66]
French
intervention
A map of Chad including the 15th parallel (the Red Line) where the
French separated government and rebel forces
Feeling that a complete destruction of the GUNT would be an
intolerable blow for his prestige, and fearing that Habré would
provide support for all opposition to Gaddafi, the Colonel called
for a Libyan intervention in force, as his Chadian allies could not
secure a definitive victory without Libyan armor and airpower.[70]
Since the day after the fall of the town, Faya-Largeau was
subjected to a sustained air bombardment, using Su-22 and Mirage
F-1s from the Aouzou air base, along with Tu-22 bombers from Sebha. Within
ten days, a large ground force had been assembled east and west of
Faya-Largeau by first ferrying men, armor, and artillery by air to
Sabha, Al Kufrah, and the Aouzou airfield, and
then by shorter range transport planes to the area of conflict. The
fresh Libyan forces amounted to 11,000 mostly regular troops, and
eighty combat aircraft participated to the offensive;
nowithstanding this, the Libyans maintained their traditional role
of providing fire support, and occasional tank charges, for the
assaults of the GUNT, that could count on 3,000–4,000 men on this
occasion.[48][71]
The GUNT-Libyan alliance invested on August 10 the Faya-Largeau
oasis, where Habré had entrenched himself with about 5,000 troops.
Battered by multiple rocket launcher
(MRL), artillery and tank fire and continuous airstrikes, the
FANT's defensive line disintegrated when the GUNT launched the
final assault, leaving 700 FANT troops on the ground. Habré escaped
with the remnants of his army to the capital, without being pursued
by the Libyans.[71]
This was to prove a tactical blunder, as the new Libyan
intervention had alarmed France. Habré issued a fresh plea for
French military assistance on August 6.[72]
France, also due to American and African pressures, announced on
August 6 the return of French troops in Chad as part of Opération Manta, meant to stop the
GUNT-Libyan advance and more generally weaken Gaddafi's influence
in the internal affairs of Chad. Three days later several hundred
French troops were dispatched to N'Djamena from the Central African Republic, that
were later brought to 2,700, with several squadron of Jaguar
fighter-bombers. This made it the largest expeditionary force ever
assembled by the French in Africa, except for the Algerian
War of Independence.[71][73][74][75]
The French government then defined a limit (the so-called Red
Line), along the 15th parallel, extending from Mao to Abéché, and warned
that they would not tolerate any incursion south of this line by
Libyan or GUNT forces. Both the Libyans and the French remained on
their side of the line, with France showing itself unwilling to
help Habré retake the north, while the Libyans avoided starting a
conflict with France by attacking the line. This led to a de facto
division of the country, with Libya maintaining control of all the
territory north of the Red Line.[73][48]
A lull ensued, during which in November talks sponsored by the
OAU failed to conciliate the opposing Chadian factions; no more
successful was Ethiopia's
leader Mengistu's attempt at the
beginning of 1984. Mengistu's failure was followed on January 24 by
a GUNT attack, supported by heavy Libyan armor, on the FANT outpost
of Ziguey, a move mainly meant to persuade France and the African
states to reopen negotiations. France reacted to this breach of the
Red Line by launching the first significant air counter-attack,
bringing into Chad new troops and unilaterally rising the defensive
line to the 16th parallel.[76][77][78]
French
withdrawal
To put an end to the deadlock, Gaddafi proposed on April 30 a
mutual withdrawal of both the French and Libyan forces in Chad. The
French President François Mitterrand showed himself
receptive to the offer, and on September 17 the two leaders
publicly announced that the mutual withdrawal would start on
September 25, and be completed by November 10.[76]
The accord was at first hailed by the media as a proof attesting
Mitterrand's diplomatic skills and a decisive progress towards the
solution of the Chadian crisis;[79] it
also answered Mitterrand's intent of following regards Libya and
Chad a foreign policy independent from both the United States and
the Chadian government.[73]
While France respected the deadline, the Libyans limited
themselves to retiring some forces, while maintaining at least
3,000 men stationed in Northern Chad. When this became evident, it
resulted in a source of considerable embarrassment for the French
and the occasion of recriminations between the French and Chadian
governments.[80] On
November 16 Mitterrand met with Gaddafi on Crete, under the auspices of the Greek prime
minister Papandreou. Despite Gaddafi's
declaration that all Libyan forces had been withdrawn, the next day
Mitterrand admitted that this was not true but did not order French
troops back to Chad.[81]
According to Nolutshungu, the 1984 bilateral
Franco-Libyan agreement may have provided Gaddafi with an excellent
opportunity to find an exit from the Chadian quagmire, while
bolstering his international prestige and posing him in a condition
to force Habré into accepting a peace accord which would have
included Libya's proxies. Instead, Gaddafi misread France's
withdrawal as a willingness to accept Libya's military presence in
Chad and the de facto annexation of the whole BET
Prefecture by Libya, an action that was certain to meet the
opposition of all Chadian factions and of the OAU and the UN.
Gaddafi's blunder would eventually bring about his defeat, with the
rebellion against him of the GUNT and a new French expedition in
1986.[82]
New
French intervention
During the period between 1984 and 1986, in which no major clash
took place, Habré greatly strengthened his position thanks to
staunch US support and Libya's failure to respect the Franco-Libyan
1984 agreement. Decisive was also the increasing factional
bickering that started plaguing the GUNT since 1984, centered
around the fight between Goukouni and Acheikh ibn Oumar over the
leadership of the organization.[83]
In this period, Gaddafi expanded his control over northern Chad,
building new roads and erecting a major new airbase, Ouadi Doum,
meant to better support air and ground operations beyond the Aouzou Strip, and
brought in considerable reinforcements in 1985, rising their forces
in the country to 7,000 troops, 300 tanks and 60 combat
aircraft.[84] While
this build-up took place, significant elements of the GUNT passed
over to the Habré government, as part of the latter's policy of
accommodation.[85]
These desertions alarmed Gaddafi, as the GUNT provided a cover
of legitimacy to Libya's presence in Chad. To put a halt to these
and reunite the GUNT, a major offensive was launched on the Red
Line, whose ultimate goal was N'Djamena itsef. The attack, started
on February 10, involved 5,000 Libyan and 5,000 GUNT troops, and
concentrated on the FANT outposts of Kouba Olanga, Kalait and Oum
Chalouba. The campaign ended in disaster for Gaddafi, when a FANT
counteroffensive on February 13 using the new equipment obtained
from the French forced the attackers to withdraw and
reorganize.[78][85][86]
Most important was French reaction to the attack. Gaddafi had
possibly believed that, due to the upcoming French
legislative elections, Mitterrand would have been reluctant to
start a new risky and costly expedition to save Habré; this
evaluation proved wrong, as what the French President could not
politically risk was to show weakness towards Libyan aggression. As
a result, on February 14 Opération Epervier was started, bringing
1,200 French troops and several squadrons of Jaguars in Chad. Two
days later, to send a clear message to Gaddafi, the French Air
Force bombed Libya's Ouadi Doum airbase,
which caused in retaliation the following day the Libyan bombing of
the N'Djamena Airport.[87][88][86]
Tibesti
War
The defeats suffered in February and March accelerated the
disintegration of the GUNT. When in March at a new round of
OAU-sponsored talks held in the People's
Republic of Congo Goukouni failed to appear, many suspected the
hand of Libya, causing the defection from the GUNT of its
Vice-president Kamougué, followed by the First Army and the
FROLINAT Originel. In August, it was the CDR's turn to leave the
coalition, seizing the town of Fada. When in October Goukouni's FAP
attempted to retake Fada, the Libyan garrison attacked Goukouni's
troops, giving way to a pitched battle that effectively ended the
GUNT. In the same month, Goukouni was arrested by the Libyans,
while his troops rebelled against Gaddafi, dislodging the Libyans
from all their positions in the Tibesti, and on October 24 went
over to Habré.[89]
To reestablish their supply lines and retake the towns of
Bardaï, Zouar and Wour, the Libyans sent in Tibesti a task-force of
2,000 troops with T-62 tanks and
heavy support by the Libyan Air Force. The offensive
started successfully, expelling the GUNT from its key strongholds,
also through the use of napalm
and, allegedly, poison gas. This attack ultimately
backfired, causing the prompt reaction of Habré, who sent 2,000
FANT soldiers to link with the GUNT forces. Also Mitterrand reacted
forcefully, ordering a mission which parachuted fuel, food,
ammunition and anti-tank missiles to the rebels, and also
infiltrated military personnel. Through this action, the French
made clear that they did not felt any more committed to keep south
of the Red Line, and were ready to act whenever they found it
necessary.[90][91]
While militarily Habré was only partly successful in his attempt
to evict the Libyans from the Tibesti (the Libyans would fully
leave the region in March, when a series of defeats in the
north-east had made the area untenable), the campaign was a great
strategic breakthrough for the FANT, as it transformed a civil war
into a national war against a foreign invader, stimulating a sense
of national unity that had never been seen before in Chad.[92]
Toyota
War
At the opening of 1987, the last year of the war, the Libyan
expeditionary force was still impressive, counting on 8,000 troops
and 300 tanks; but it had lost the key support of its Chadian
allies, who had generally provided reconnaissance and acted as
assault infantry. Without them the Libyan garrisons resembled
isolated and vulnerable islands in the Chadian desert. On the other
side, the FANT was greatly strengthened, now having 10,000 highly
motivated troops, provided with fast-moving and sand-adapted Toyota trucks equipped with MILAN anti-tank guided missiles,
that gave the name of "Toyota War" to the last phase of the
Chadian-Libyan conflict.[93][94][95]
Habré started, on January 2, 1987, his reconquest of northern
Chad with a successful attack of the well-defended
Libyan communications base of Fada. Against the Libyan army the
Chadian commander Hassan Djamous conducted a series of
swift pincer movements, enveloping the Libyan positions and
crushing them with sudden attacks from all sides. This strategy was
repeated by Djamous in March in the battles of B'ir Kora and Ouadi
Doum, inflicting crushing losses and forcing Gaddafi to evacuate
northern Chad.[96]
This in turn endangered Libyan control over the Aouzou Strip, and
Aouzou fell in August to the FANT, only to be repelled by an
overwhelming Libyan counter-offensive and the French refusal to
provide air cover to the Chadians. Habré readily replied to this
setback with the first Chadian incursion in Libyan territory of the
Chadian-Libyan conflict, mounting on September 5 a surprise and fully successful
raid against the key Libyan air base at Maaten al-Sarra. This
attack was part of a plan to remove the threat of Libyan airpower
before a renewed offensive on Aouzou.[97]
The projected attack on Aouzou never took place, as the
dimensions of the victory obtained at Maaten made France fear that
the attack on the Libyan Base was only the
first stage of a general offensive into Libya proper, a possibility
that France was not willing to tolerate. As for Gaddafi, being
subjected to internal and international pressures, he showed
himself more conciliatory, which brought as a result to an OAU-brokered ceasefire on September 11.[98][99]
Aftermath
While there were many violations of the ceasefire, the incidents
were relatively minor. The two governments immediately started
complex diplomatic manoeuvres to bring on their side world opinion
in the case, widely expected, that the conflict was resumed; but
the two parts were also careful to leave the door open for a
peaceful solution. The latter course was promoted by France and
most African states, while the Reagan Administration saw in a
resumption of the conflict the best chance to unseat Gaddafi.[100]
Steadily, relations among the two countries improved, with
Gaddafi giving signs that he wanted to normalize relations with the
Chadian government, to the point of recognizing that the war had
been an error. In May 1988 the Libyan leader declared he would
recognize Habré as the legitimate president of Chad "as a gift to
Africa"; this led on October 3 to the resumption of full diplomatic
relations between the two countries. The following year, on August
31, 1989, Chadian and Libyan representatives met in Algiers to negotiate the
Framework Agreement on the Peaceful Settlement of the Territorial
Dispute, by which Gaddafi agreed to discuss with Habré the Aouzou Strip and to
bring the issue to the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) for a binding ruling if bilateral talks failed.
Therefore, after a year of inconclusive talks, the sides submitted
in September 1990 the dispute to the ICJ.[101][102][103]
Chadian-Libyan relations were further ameliorated when
Libyan-supported Idriss Déby unseated Habré on December 2.
Gaddafi was the first head of state to recognize the new regime,
and he also signed treaties of friendship and cooperation on
various levels; but regarding the Aouzou Strip Déby followed his
predecessor, declaring that if necessary he would fight to keep the
strip out of Libya's hands.[104][105]
The Aouzou dispute was concluded for good on February 3, 1994,
when the judges of the ICJ by a majority of 16 to 1 decided that the Aouzou Strip belonged to Chad. The court's
judgement was implemented without delay, the two parties signing as
early as April 4 an agreement concerning the practical modalities
for the implementation of the judgement. Monitored by international
observers, the withdrawal of Libyan troops from the Strip began on
April 15 and was completed by May 10. The formal and final transfer
of the Strip from Libya to Chad took place on May 30, when the
sides signed a joint declaration stating that the Libyan withdrawal
had been effected.[103][106]
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Notes
- ^ a
b
c
d
e
f
K. Pollack, Arabs at War, p. 375
- ^ a
b
c
d
e
K. Pollack, p. 376
- ^
S. Nolutshungu, Limits of Anarchy, p. 230
- ^
M. Azevedo, Roots of Violence, p. 151
- ^
A. Clayton, Frontiersmen, p. 98
- ^
M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis, p.
84
- ^
R. Brian Ferguson, The State, Identity and Violence, p.
267
- ^ a
b
c
M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 85
- ^ a
b
G. Simons, Libya and the West, p. 56
- ^
S. Nolutshungu, p. 327
- ^ a
b
c
J. Wright, Libya, Chad and the Central Sahara, p. 130
- ^
M. Azevedo, p. 145
- ^
(PDF) Public sitting held on
Monday 14 June 1993 in the case concerning Territorial Dispute
(Libyan Arab Jamayiriya/Chad). International Court of
Justice. http://www.icj-cij.org/cijwww/ccases/cdt/cDT_cr/cDT_cCR9314_19930614.PDF.
- ^ R.
Buijtenhuijs, "Le FROLINAT à l'épreuve du pouvoir", p. 19
- ^
R. Buijtenhuijs, pp. 16–17
- ^
(PDF) Public sitting held on
Friday 2 July 1993 in the case concerning Territorial Dispute
(Libyan Arab Jamayiriya/Chad). International Court of
Justice. http://www.icj-cij.org/cijwww/ccases/cdt/cDT_cr/cDT_cCR9326_19930702.PDF.
- ^
A. Clayton, p. 99
- ^
J. Wright, pp. 130–131
- ^
S. Macedo, Universal Jurisdiction, pp. 132–133
- ^ R.
Buijtenhuijs, Guerre de guérilla et révolution en Afrique
noire, p. 27
- ^
A. Gérard, Nimeiry face aux crises tchadiennes, p.
119
- ^ a
b
c
M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 86
- ^ a
b
R. Buijtenhuijs, Guerre de guérilla et révolution en Afrique
noire, p. 26
- ^ R.
Buijtenhuijs, "Le FROLINAT à l'épreuve du pouvoir", p. 18
- ^
Libya-Sudan-Chad Triangle, p. 32
- ^ R.
Buijtenhuijs, "Le FROLINAT à l'épreuve du pouvoir", p. 21
- ^ a
b
c
d
M. Azevedo, p. 146
- ^
J. de Léspinôis, "L'emploi de la force aeriénne au Tchad", pp.
70–71
- ^
M. Pollack, pp. 376–377
- ^
H. Simpson, The Paratroopers of the French Foreign Legion,
p. 55
- ^
M. Brandily, "Le Tchad face nord", p. 59
- ^
N. Mouric, "La politique tchadienne de la France", p. 99
- ^
M. Brandily, pp. 58–61
- ^
M. Azevedo, pp. 104–105, 119, 135
- ^
Ibid., p. 106
- ^ a
b
M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 88
- ^
N. Mouric, p. 100
- ^ a
b
K. Pollack, p. 377
- ^
T. Mays, Africa's First Peacekeeping operation, p. 43
- ^
T. Mays, p. 39
- ^
T. Mays, pp. 45–46
- ^ a
b
S. Nolutshungu, p. 133
- ^ a
b
c
M. Azevedo, p. 147
- ^
J. Wright, p. 131
- ^
S. Nolutshungu, p. 135
- ^ a
b
c
M. Azevedo, p. 108
- ^ M. Brecher & J.
Wilkenfeld, p. 89
- ^ a
b
c
d
e
H. Metz, Libya, p. 261
- ^ a
b
J. Wright, p. 132
- ^
M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, pp. 89–90
- ^
M. Azevedo, pp. 147–148
- ^
S. Nolutshungu, p. 156
- ^
S. Nolutshungu, p. 153
- ^ a
b
M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 90
- ^ a
b
c
M. Azevedo, p. 148
- ^
S. Nolutshungu, pp. 154–155
- ^
S. Nolutshungu, p. 164
- ^
T. Mays, pp. 134–135
- ^
S. Nolutshungu, p. 165
- ^ a
b
T. Mays, p. 139
- ^
S. Nolutshungu, p. 168
- ^ a
b
K. Pollack, p. 382
- ^
T. Mays, p. 99
- ^ S.Nolutshungu,
p. 186
- ^
Ibid. p. 185
- ^ a
b
c
d
e
S. Nolutshungu, p. 188
- ^
M. Azevedo, p. 110, 139
- ^ a
b
M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 91
- ^
M. Azevedo, p. 159
- ^
K. Pollack, pp. 382–383
- ^ a
b
c
K. Pollack, p. 383
- ^
J. Jessup, An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Conflict, p.
116
- ^ a
b
c
S. Nolutshungu, p. 189
- ^
M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, pp. 91–92
- ^ M. Azevedo, p.
139
- ^ a
b
M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 92
- ^
S. Nolutshungu, p. 191
- ^ a
b
M. Azevedo, p. 110
- ^
M. Azevedo, pp. 139–140
- ^
M. Azevedo, p. 140
- ^
G.L. Simons, p. 293
- ^
S. Nolutshungu, pp. 202–203
- ^
Ibid., pp. 191–192, 210
- ^
K. Pollack, pp. 384–385
- ^ a
b
S. Nolutshungu, p. 212
- ^ a
b
K. Pollack, p. 389
- ^
M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 93
- ^
S. Nolutshungu, pp. 212–213
- ^
S. Nolutshungu, pp. 213–214
- ^
S. Nolutshungu, pp. 214–216
- ^
K. Pollack, p. 390
- ^
S. Nolutshungu, pp. 215–216, 245
- ^
M. Azevedo, pp. 149–150
- ^
K. Pollack, p. 391, 398
- ^
S. Nolutshungu, pp. 218–219
- ^
K. Pollack, pp. 391–394
- ^
K. Pollack, pp. 395–396
- ^
S. Nolutshungu, pp. 222–223
- ^
K. Pollack, p. 397
- ^
S. Nolutshungu, pp. 223–224
- ^ G. Simons, p. 58, 60
- ^ S. Nolutshungu, p. 227
- ^ a
b
M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 95
- ^ "Chad The Devil Behind the
Scenes". Time. 1990-12-17. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,971950,00.html?iid=chix-sphere.
- ^ M. Azevedo, p. 150
- ^ G. Simons, p. 78
External
links