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The Clarity Act (known as Bill C-20 before it became law) is legislation passed by the Parliament of Canada that established the conditions under which the Government of Canada would enter into negotiations that might lead to secession following such a vote by one of the provinces. It stipulated that in order to lead to separation negotiations, a referendum on independence in a given province would have to have "clearly" (according to the judgment of the House of Commons) framed its question to voters in terms of independence, and that the result would have to be a "clear majority" in favour, rather than merely, for instance, a 50%+1 majority. The Clarity Bill (C-20) was tabled for first reading in the House of Commons on December 13, 1999. It was passed by the House on March 15, 2000, and by the Senate, in its final version, on June 29, 2000.^[1]

The Clarity Act was created in response to the 1995 Quebec referendum and ongoing independence movement in that province. The content of the Clarity Act was based on the 1998 secession reference to the Supreme Court of Canada made by the federal government under Jean Chrétien.

The Quebec Contingency Act (Bill C-341) was a private member's bill tabled in Canada's federal Parliament in 1996 to establish the conditions which would apply to a referendum regarding the separation of Quebec from Canada. It was a precursor to the Clarity Act of 2000.

Background

Ambiguity of Referendum Question

The motivation behind the Clarity Act was largely based on the near separation vote of the 1995 Quebec referendum, in which the people of Quebec voted against the sovereignty option by a small margin (50.58% to 49.42%).

See the article on the 1995 Quebec referendum for the wording of the question and the external links at the bottom of this article for the Act Respecting the Future of Québec which contains the details on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI).

Stéphane Dion and the Three Letters

Prime Minister Jean Chrétien appointed political scientist Stéphane Dion as Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs. Dion would challenge Quebec sovereignist assertions about the legal validity of the 1995 Quebec referendum question in three open letters to Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard and Quebec Intergovernmental Affairs Minister Jacques Brassard.^[2][3][4]

In the first open letter, Dion challenged three assertions that Bouchard had made: that a unilateral declaration of independence is supported by international law, that a majority of "50% plus one" was a sufficient threshold for secession, and that international law would protect the territorial integrity of Quebec following a secession. Against the first assertion, Dion argued that the vast majority of international law experts "believe that the right to declare secession unilaterally does not belong to constituent entities of a democratic country such as Canada."^[2] In regard to the simple majority argument, Dion argues that due to the momentous changes to Quebecers' lives that would result from secession, a simple majority that could disappear in the face of difficulties would be insufficient to ensure the political legitimacy of the sovereignist project. In regard to the territorial integrity of Quebec, Dion retorts that "there is neither a paragraph nor a line in international law that protects Quebec's territory but not Canada's. International experience demonstrates that the borders of the entity seeking independence can be called into question, sometimes for reasons based on democracy."^[2]

In Dion's second open letter to Jacques Brassard, Quebec's intergovernmental affairs minister, Dion expands upon his earlier arguments against the territorial integrity of Quebec following secession by highlighting the inconsistency in the argument that Canada is divisible but Quebec is not. Secondly, Dion underscores that without recognition by the Government of Canada and when opposed by a strong minority of citizens, a unilateral declaration of independence faces much difficulty in gaining international recognition.^[3]

In Dion's third open letter to Lucien Bouchard, he criticizes the Quebec premier for accepting some aspects of the Supreme Court ruling on Secession (such as the political obligation for the Government of Canada to negotiate secession following a clear expression of will from the people of Quebec) and not other sections of the ruling (such as the need for a clear majority on a clear question and the unconstitutionality of a unilateral declaration of independence). In regard to the ruling, Dion makes three claims: that the federal government has a role in the selection of the question and the level of support required for it to pass, that secession can only be achieved through negotiation rather than a "unilateral declaration of independence", and that the terms of negotiation could not be decided solely by the Government of Quebec.^[4]

Supreme Court Reference re Secession of Quebec

On September 30, 1996, Dion would submit three questions to the Supreme Court of Canada constituting the Supreme Court Reference re Secession of Quebec:

1. Under the Constitution of Canada, can the National Assembly, legislature, or government of Quebec effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?
2. Does international law give the National Assembly, legislature, or government of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? In this regard, is there a right to self-determination under international law that would give the National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?
3. In the event of a conflict between domestic and international law on the right of the National Assembly, legislature, or government of Quebec to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally, which would take precedence in Canada?

As soon as these questions were made public, both parties of the National Assembly, the Bloc Québécois and numerous federalists denounced Ottawa's gesture. An Act respecting the exercise of the fundamental rights and prerogatives of the Québec people and the Québec State was passed in the National Assembly of Quebec by the Parti Québécois government two days after the Clarity Act had been introduced in the Canadian House of Commons.

On August 20, 1998, the Supreme Court answered, concluding that Quebec does not have the right to secede unilaterally under Canadian or international law. However, the Government of Canada would have to enter into negotiations with the Quebec government if Quebeckers expressed a clear will to secede. It confirmed that the Parliament of Canada had the power to determine whether or not a referendum question was clear enough to trigger such negotiations. The Constitution of Canada would remain in effect until terms of secession were agreed to by all parties involved, and these terms would have to respect principles of democracy, minority and individual rights as outlined in the Canadian constitution.^[5]

Both the Government of Quebec and the Government of Canada publicly stated that they were very pleased with the opinion of the Supreme Court, which stated both that Quebec could not legally separate unilaterally from Canada and that the Government of Canada would have a 'political obligation' to enter into separation negotiations with Quebec in the event that a clear majority of its populace were to vote in favor of independence.

Bill Clinton and the First International Conference on Federalism

Stéphane Dion would go on to organize and host the First International Conference on Federalism in Mont Tremblant in October 1999 to foster international support for the cause of federalism in Canada. Quebec sovereignist leaders were granted a prominent role in the conference and would use their floor time to denounce Canadian federalism to an international audience to the great annoyance of their federalist host. But the Clarity Act would get a big boost during the closing speech by United States President Bill Clinton. While looking directly at Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard, who was present in the audience, Clinton appeared to echo the Supreme Court Reference, warning that "when a people thinks it should be independent in order to have a meaningful political existence, serious questions should be asked ... Are minority rights as well as majority rights respected? How are we going to co-operate with our neighbours?". Clinton argued that federalism allows peoples seeking recognition of their identity a way to do so without isolating themselves in a nation-state. The speech would lay to rest any doubts about the U.S. position on the legality and desirability of unilateral secession in Quebec.^[6]

Passage and Reactions to Clarity Act

The Clarity Act (Bill C-20) was later drafted and presented to the House of Commons on December 13, 1999. This was more bitterly denounced by all provincial parties in the Quebec National Assembly, the Bloc Québécois, and many federalists.^{[citation needed]} The Progressive Conservative Party, led by Joe Clark, also opposed the Act. Following its adoption by the Parliament of Canada, an open letter supporting Quebec's right to self-determination was published and signed by numerous intellectuals from Quebec and other parts of Canada.

William Johnson, leader of Quebec's largest anglophone rights group, Alliance Quebec said the Act would prevent the typical misinformation of separatists.^[7]

Former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien has often stated that the Clarity Act was among his proudest achievements in federal politics.

In an interview with CTV News aired on May 15, 2005, separatist former Premier of Quebec Jacques Parizeau said that the Clarity Act "meant nothing" and would be ignored.

On December 7, 2005, in the midst of a federal election, NDP leader Jack Layton too announced that he backed the Clarity Act. This was in contrast to comments made in the 2004 election where he said that the Act accentuates divisions in Canada. He attributed his new found support to understanding the constitutionality of the act.

Key points

The key points of the legislation included the following:

• Giving the House of Commons the power to decide whether a proposed referendum question was considered clear before the public vote;
• Specifically stating that any question not solely referring to secession was to be considered unclear;
• Giving the House of Commons the power to determine whether or not a clear majority has expressed itself in any referendum, implying that some sort of supermajority is required for success;
• Stating that all provinces and the First Nations were to be part of the negotiations;
• Allowing the House of Commons to override a referendum decision if it felt the referendum violated any of the tenets of the Clarity Act;
• The secession of a province of Canada would require an amendment to the Constitution of Canada.

Quebec mirror law

Following the adoption of the Clarity Act by the federal government, the Quebec provincial government adopted its own law : An Act respecting the exercise of the fundamental rights and prerogatives of the Québec people and the Québec State, R.S.Q., chapter E-20.2. This provincial act was inspired by the same decision of the Supreme Court of Canada that the federal one was.

This Quebec act emphasizes the right to self-determination according to the public international law. Under this law, a 50% of the valid votes cast plus one represents a clear expression of Quebecers to their right to determine their own future. It also claims the right to territorial integrity of the province of Quebec. The Act also recognizes the rights of Quebec's English-speaking minority and of the First nations of Quebec. Finally, Article 13 clearly responds to the Canadian federal Clarity Act by stating: "No other parliament or government may reduce the powers, authority, sovereignty or legitimacy of the National Assembly, or impose constraint on the democratic will of the Québec people to determine its own future."

Impact of both laws

The constitutional validity of both laws and the compliance of their provisions remain uncertain - most likely - until the eve of a new referendum. However, in Reference re Secession of Quebec, (1998) 2 S.C.R. 217, the Supreme Court of Canada has essentially said that a democratic vote in itself would have no legal effect, since the secession of a province in Canada would only be constitutionally valid after a negotiation between the federal government and the provincial government; whose people would have clearly expressed, by a clear majority, that it no longer wished to be part of Canada. Only then could a constitutional amendment could be considered.

On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that a de facto unilateral secession of a province would violate the Canadian Constitution, but it could still be recognized by the international community and that such recognition may result from the conduct of the provincial and the federal government. Thus, these two laws are subjugated by the good or bad faith shown during negotiations. Indeed, it could affect the international recognition of a secession's validity. Under the unwritten constitutional principles of Canada, both parties have an obligation to negotiate.

References and Notes

See also

• 1995 Quebec referendum
• Quebec sovereignty movement
• Politics of Quebec
• Politics of Canada

External links

• Text of the Clarity Act
• Full text of the Reference re Secession of Quebec
• 1995 Act Respecting the Future of Quebec
• Open letter in support of the democratic right to self-determination for Quebec
• Debates - Issue 44 - April 6, 2000 (Senate's Second Reading debate about the passage of specific powers to the House of Commons; notable because the Senate is a co-equal body)
• CBC report on introduction of Clarity Bill

From Wikisource

Wikipedia has more on: Clarity Act. C-31.8

2000, c. 26 (Canada)

An Act to give effect to the requirement for clarity as set out in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference

[Assented to 29th June, 2000.]

Preamble.

WHEREAS the Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that there is no right, under international law or under the Constitution of Canada, for the National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally;

WHEREAS any proposal relating to the break-up of a democratic state is a matter of the utmost gravity and is of fundamental importance to all of its citizens;

WHEREAS the government of any province of Canada is entitled to consult its population by referendum on any issue and is entitled to formulate the wording of its referendum question;

WHEREAS the Supreme Court of Canada has determined that the result of a referendum on the secession of a province from Canada must be free of ambiguity both in terms of the question asked and in terms of the support it achieves if that result is to be taken as an expression of the democratic will that would give rise to an obligation to enter into negotiations that might lead to secession;

WHEREAS the Supreme Court of Canada has stated that democracy means more than simple majority rule, that a clear majority in favour of secession would be required to create an obligation to negotiate secession, and that a qualitative evaluation is required to determine whether a clear majority in favour of secession exists in the circumstances;

WHEREAS the Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that, in Canada, the secession of a province, to be lawful, would require an amendment to the Constitution of Canada, that such an amendment would perforce require negotiations in relation to secession involving at least the governments of all of the provinces and the Government of Canada, and that those negotiations would be governed by the principles of federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and the protection of minorities;

WHEREAS, in light of the finding by the Supreme Court of Canada that it would be for elected representatives to determine what constitutes a clear question and what constitutes a clear majority in a referendum held in a province on secession, the House of Commons, as the only political institution elected to represent all Canadians, has an important role in identifying what constitutes a clear question and a clear majority sufficient for the Government of Canada to enter into negotiations in relation to the secession of a province from Canada;

AND WHEREAS it is incumbent on the Government of Canada not to enter into negotiations that might lead to the secession of a province from Canada, and that could consequently entail the termination of citizenship and other rights that Canadian citizens resident in the province enjoy as full participants in Canada, unless the population of that province has clearly expressed its democratic will that the province secede from Canada;

NOW, THEREFORE, Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows:

House of Commons to consider question

1. (1) The House of Commons shall, within thirty days after the government of a province tables in its legislative assembly or otherwise officially releases the question that it intends to submit to its voters in a referendum relating to the proposed secession of the province from Canada, consider the question and, by resolution, set out its determination on whether the question is clear.

Extension of time

(2) Where the thirty days referred to in subsection (1) occur, in whole or in part, during a general election of members to serve in the House of Commons, the thirty days shall be extended by an additional forty days.

Considerations

(3) In considering the clarity of a referendum question, the House of Commons shall consider whether the question would result in a clear expression of the will of the population of a province on whether the province should cease to be part of Canada and become an independent state.

Where no clear expression of will

(4) For the purpose of subsection (3), a clear expression of the will of the population of a province that the province cease to be part of Canada could not result from

(a) a referendum question that merely focuses on a mandate to negotiate without soliciting a direct expression of the will of the population of that province on whether the province should cease to be part of Canada; or

(b) a referendum question that envisages other possibilities in addition to the secession of the province from Canada, such as economic or political arrangements with Canada, that obscure a direct expression of the will of the population of that province on whether the province should cease to be part of Canada.

Other views to be considered

(5) In considering the clarity of a referendum question, the House of Commons shall take into account the views of all political parties represented in the legislative assembly of the province whose government is proposing the referendum on secession, any formal statements or resolutions by the government or legislative assembly of any province or territory of Canada, any formal statements or resolutions by the Senate, any formal statements or resolutions by the representatives of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, especially those in the province whose government is proposing the referendum on secession, and any other views it considers to be relevant.

No negotiations if question not clear

(6) The Government of Canada shall not enter into negotiations on the terms on which a province might cease to be part of Canada if the House of Commons determines, pursuant to this section, that a referendum question is not clear and, for that reason, would not result in a clear expression of the will of the population of that province on whether the province should cease to be part of Canada.

House of Commons to consider whether there is a clear will to secede

2. (1) Where the government of a province, following a referendum relating to the secession of the province from Canada, seeks to enter into negotiations on the terms on which that province might cease to be part of Canada, the House of Commons shall, except where it has determined pursuant to section 1 that a referendum question is not clear, consider and, by resolution, set out its determination on whether, in the circumstances, there has been a clear expression of a will by a clear majority of the population of that province that the province cease to be part of Canada.

Factors for House of Commons to take into account

(2) In considering whether there has been a clear expression of a will by a clear majority of the population of a province that the province cease to be part of Canada, the House of Commons shall take into account

(a) the size of the majority of valid votes cast in favour of the secessionist option;

(b) the percentage of eligible voters voting in the referendum; and

(c) any other matters or circumstances it considers to be relevant.

Other views to be considered

(3) In considering whether there has been a clear expression of a will by a clear majority of the population of a province that the province cease to be part of Canada, the House of Commons shall take into account the views of all political parties represented in the legislative assembly of the province whose government proposed the referendum on secession, any formal statements or resolutions by the government or legislative assembly of any province or territory of Canada, any formal statements or resolutions by the Senate, any formal statements or resolutions by the representatives of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, especially those in the province whose government proposed the referendum on secession, and any other views it considers to be relevant.

No negotiations unless will clear

(4) The Government of Canada shall not enter into negotiations on the terms on which a province might cease to be part of Canada unless the House of Commons determines, pursuant to this section, that there has been a clear expression of a will by a clear majority of the population of that province that the province cease to be part of Canada.

Constitutional amendments

3. (1) It is recognized that there is no right under the Constitution of Canada to effect the secession of a province from Canada unilaterally and that, therefore, an amendment to the Constitution of Canada would be required for any province to secede from Canada, which in turn would require negotiations involving at least the governments of all of the provinces and the Government of Canada.

Limitation

(2) No Minister of the Crown shall propose a constitutional amendment to effect the secession of a province from Canada unless the Government of Canada has addressed, in its negotiations, the terms of secession that are relevant in the circumstances, including the division of assets and liabilities, any changes to the borders of the province, the rights, interests and territorial claims of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, and the protection of minority rights.

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