In law, a contract is a binding legal agreement that is enforceable in a court of law or by binding arbitration. That is to say, a contract is an exchange of promises with a specific remedy for breach.
Agreement is said to be reached when an offer capable of immediate acceptance is met with a "mirror image" acceptance (i.e., an unqualified acceptance). The parties must have the necessary capacity to contract and the contract must not be either trifling, indeterminate, impossible, or illegal. Contract law is based on the principle expressed in the Latin phrase pacta sunt servanda (usually translated "pact s must be kept", but more literally "agreements are to be kept"). Breach of contract is recognized by the law and remedies can be provided.
As long as the good or service provided is legal, any oral agreement between two parties can constitute a binding legal contract. The practical limitation to this, however, is that only parties to a written agreement have material evidence (the written contract itself) to prove the actual terms uttered at the time the agreement was struck. In daily life, most contracts can be and are made orally, such as purchasing a book or a sandwich. Sometimes written contracts are required by either the parties, or by statutory law within various jurisdiction for certain types of agreement, for example when buying a house or land.
As a means of economic ordering, contract relies on the notion of consensual exchange and has been extensively discussed in broader economic, sociological and anthropological terms (see "Contractual theory", below). In American English, the term extends beyond the legal meaning to encompass a broader category of agreements.
This article mainly concerns contract law in common law jurisdictions (approximately coincident with the English-speaking world and anywhere the British Empire once held sway). However, contract is a form of economic ordering common throughout the world, and different rules apply in jurisdictions applying civil law (derived from Roman law principles), Islamic law, socialist legal systems, and customary or local law.
Common-law jurisdictions usually offer proceedings in the English language, which has become to an extent the lingua franca of international business. The common law retains a high degree of freedom of contract, with parties largely free to set their own terms, whereas civil-law systems typically apply certain over-arching principles to disputes arising out of contract (see, for example the French Civil Code). It is very common for businesses not located in common-law jurisdictions to opt in to the common law through "choice of law" clauses.
|Part of the common law series|
|Offer and acceptance · Mailbox rule
Mirror image rule · Invitation to treat
Firm offer · Consideration
|Defenses against formation|
|Lack of capacity
Duress · Undue influence
Illusory promise · Statute of frauds
Non est factum
|Parol evidence rule
Contract of adhesion
|Excuses for non-performance|
|Mistake · Misrepresentation
Frustration of purpose · Impossibility
Impracticability · Illegality
Unclean hands · Unconscionability
Accord and satisfaction
|Rights of third parties|
|Privity of contract
Assignment · Delegation
Novation · Third party beneficiary
|Breach of contract|
|Anticipatory repudiation · Cover
Exclusion clause · Efficient breach
Penal damages · Rescission
|Related areas of law|
|Conflict of laws · Commercial law|
|Other common law areas|
|Tort law · Property law
Wills, trusts and estates
Criminal law · Evidence
In common-law systems, the five key requirements for the creation of a contract are:
One of the most famous cases on forming a contract is Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Company, decided in nineteenth-century England. A medical firm advertised that its new wonder drug, a smoke ball, would prevent those who used it according to the instructions from catching the flu, and if it did not, buyers would receive £100 and said that they had deposited £1,000 in the bank to show their good faith. When sued, Carbolic argued the ad was not to be taken as a serious, legally binding offer. It was merely an invitation to treat, and a gimmick (a 'mere puff'). But the court of appeal held that it would appear to a reasonable man that Carbolic had made a serious offer, primarily because of the reference to the £1000 deposited into the bank. People had given good "consideration" for it by going to the "distinct inconvenience" of using a faulty product. "Read the advertisement how you will, and twist it about as you will," said Lindley LJ, "here is a distinct promise expressed in language which is perfectly unmistakable".
Where a product in large quantities is advertised in a newspaper or on a poster, it may be an offer , but generally speaking it will be regarded as an invitation to treat, since even when large stock is held it is still limited, whilst the response to an advertisement may be unlimited. This was the basis of the decision in Partridge v. Crittenden a criminal case in which the defendant was charged with "offering for sale" bramblefinch cocks and hens. The court held that the newspaper advertisement could only be an invitation to treat, since it could not have been intended as an offer to the world, so the defendant was not guilty of "offering" them for sale. Similarly, a display of goods in a shop window is an invitation to treat, as was held in Fisher v. Bell another criminal case which turned on the correct analysis of offers as against invitations to treat. In this instance the defendant was charged with "offering for sale" prohibited kinds of knife, which he had displayed in his shop window with prices attached. The court held that this was an invitation to treat, the offer would be made by a purchaser going into the shop and asking to buy a knife, with acceptance being by the shopkeeper, which he could withhold. (The law was later amended to "exposing for sale".) A display of goods on the shelves of a self-service shop is also an invitation to treat, with the offer being made by the purchaser at the checkout and being accepted by the shop assistant operating the checkout: Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v. Boots Cash Chemists (Southern) Ltd. If the person who is to buy the advertised product is of importance, for instance because of his personality, etc., when buying land, it is regarded merely as an invitation to treat. In Carbolic Smoke Ball, the major difference was that a reward was included in the advertisement, which is a general exception to the rule and is then treated as an offer.
The most important feature of a contract is that one party makes an offer for an arrangement that another accepts. This can be called a 'concurrence of wills' or 'ad idem' (meeting of the minds) of two or more parties. The concept is somewhat contested. The obvious objection is that a court cannot read minds and the existence or otherwise of agreement is judged objectively, with only limited room for questioning subjective intention: see Smith v. Hughes. Richard Austen-Baker has suggested that the perpetuation of the idea of 'meeting of minds' may come from a misunderstanding of the Latin term 'consensus ad idem', which actually means 'agreement to the [same] thing'. There must be evidence that the parties had each from an objective perspective engaged in conduct manifesting their assent , and a contract will be formed when the parties have met such a requirement. An objective perspective means that it is only necessary that somebody gives the impression of offering or accepting contractual terms in the eyes of a reasonable person, not that they actually did want to form a contract.
The case of Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. (above) is an example of a 'unilateral contract', obligations are only imposed upon one party upon acceptance by performance of a condition . In the U.S., the general rule is that in "case of doubt, an offer is interpreted as inviting the offeree to accept either by promising to perform what the offer requests or by rendering the performance, as the offeree chooses."
Offer and acceptance does not always need to be expressed orally or in writing. An implied contract is one in which some of the terms are not expressed in words. This can take two forms. A contract which is implied in fact is one in which the circumstances imply that parties have reached an agreement even though they have not done so expressly. For example, by going to a doctor for a checkup, a patient agrees that he will pay a fair price for the service. If one refuses to pay after being examined, the patient has breached a contract implied in fact. A contract which is implied in law is also called a quasi-contract, because it is not in fact a contract; rather, it is a means for the courts to remedy situations in which one party would be unjustly enriched were he or she not required to compensate the other. For example, a plumber accidentally installs a sprinkler system in the lawn of the wrong house. The owner of the house had learned the previous day that his neighbor was getting new sprinklers. That morning, he sees the plumber installing them in his lawn. Pleased at the mistake, he says nothing, and then refuses to pay when the plumber delivers the bill. Will the man be held liable for payment? Yes, if it could be proven that the man knew that the sprinklers were being installed mistakenly, the court would make him pay because of a quasi-contract. If that knowledge could not be proven, he would not be liable. Such a claim is also referred to as "quantum meruit".
Consideration is known as 'the price of a promise' and is a controversial requirement for contracts under common law. Some common-law and civil-law systems do not require consideration, and some commentators consider it unnecessary—the requirement of intent by both parties to create legal relations by both parties performs the same function under contract. The reason that both exist in common law jurisdictions is thought by leading scholars to be the result of the combining by 19th century judges of two distinct threads: first the consideration requirement was at the heart of the action of assumpsit, which had grown up in the Middle Ages and remained the normal action for breach of a simple contract in England & Wales until 1884, when the old forms of action were abolished; secondly, the notion of agreement between two or more parties as being the essential legal and moral foundation of contract in all legal systems, promoted by the 18th century French writer Pothier in his Traite des Obligations, much read (especially after translation into English in 1805) by English judges and jurists. The latter chimed well with the fashionable will theories of the time, especially John Stuart Mill's influential ideas on free will, and got grafted on to the traditional common law requirement for consideration to ground an action in assumpsit.
The idea behind consideration is that both parties to a contract must bring something to the bargain. A party seeking to enforce a contract must show that it conferred some benefit or suffered some detriment (though it might be trivial, see below) that is recognized by law. For example, money is often recognized as consideration, but in some cases money will not suffice as consideration (for example, when one party agrees to make partial payment of a debt in exchange for being released from the full amount). Although several rules govern consideration, the following are the principal rules.
Civil law systems take the approach that an exchange of promises, or a concurrence of wills alone, rather than an exchange in valuable rights is the correct basis. So if you promised to give me a book, and I accepted your offer without giving anything in return, I would have a legal right to the book and you could not change your mind about giving me it as a gift. However, in common law systems the concept of culpa in contrahendo, a form of 'estoppel', is increasingly used to create obligations during pre-contractual negotiations. Estoppel is an equitable doctrine that provides for the creation of legal obligations if a party has given another an assurance and the other has relied on the assurance to his detriment. A number of commentators have suggested that consideration be abandoned, and estoppel be used to replace it as a basis for contracts. However, legislation, rather than judicial development, has been touted as the only way to remove this entrenched common law doctrine. Lord Justice Denning famously stated that "The doctrine of consideration is too firmly fixed to be overthrown by a side-wind."
There is a presumption for commercial agreements that parties intend to be legally bound (unless the parties expressly state that they do not want to be bound, like in heads of agreement). On the other hand, many kinds of domestic and social agreements are unenforceable on the basis of public policy, for instance between children and parents. One early example is found in Balfour v. Balfour. Using contract-like terms, Mr. Balfour had agreed to give his wife £30 a month as maintenance while he was living in Ceylon (Sri Lanka). Once he left, they separated and Mr. Balfour stopped payments. Mrs. Balfour brought an action to enforce the payments. At the Court of Appeal, the Court held that there was no enforceable agreement as there was not enough evidence to suggest that they were intending to be legally bound by the promise.
The case is often cited in conjunction with Merritt v. Merritt. Here the court distinguished the case from Balfour v. Balfour because Mr. and Mrs. Merritt, although married again, were estranged at the time the agreement was made. Therefore any agreement between them was made with the intention to create legal relations.
The doctrine of privity of contract means that only those involved in striking a bargain would have standing to enforce it. In general this is still the case, only parties to a contract may sue for the breach of a contract, although in recent years the rule of privity has eroded somewhat and third party beneficiaries have been allowed to recover damages for breaches of contracts they were not party to. In cases where facts involve third party beneficiaries or debtors to the original contracting party have been allowed to be considered parties for purposes of enforcement of the contract .A recent advance has been seen in the case law as well as statutory recognition to the dilution of the doctrine of privity of contract .The recent tests applied by courts have beenthe test of benefit and the duty owed test .The duty owed test looks to see if the third party was agreeing to pay a debt for the original party[needs elaboration] and whereas the benefit test looks to see if circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance. Any defense allowed to parties of the original contract extend to third party beneficiaries. A recent example is in England, where the Contract (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 was introduced.
Contrary to common wisdom, an exchange of promises can still be binding and legally as valid as a written contract. A spoken contract should be called an oral contract, which might be considered a subset of verbal contracts. Any contract that uses words, spoken or written, is a verbal contract. Thus, all oral contracts and written contracts are verbal contracts. This is in contrast to a "non-verbal, non-oral contract," also known as "a contract implied by the acts of the parties", which can be either implied in fact or implied in law.
Most jurisdictions have rules of law or statutes which may render otherwise valid oral contracts unenforceable. This is especially true regarding oral contracts involving large amounts of money or real estate. For example, in the U.S., generally speaking, a contract is unenforceable if it violates the common law statute of frauds or equivalent state statutes which require certain contracts to be in writing. An example of the above is an oral contract for the sale of a motorcycle for US$5,000 in a jurisdiction which requires a contract for the sale of goods over US $500 to be in writing to be enforceable. The point of the Statute of frauds is to prevent false allegations of the existence of contracts that were never made, by requiring formal (i.e. written) evidence of the contract. However, a common remark is that more frauds have been committed through the application of the Statute of frauds than have ever been prevented. Contracts that do not meet the requirements of common law or statutory Statutes of frauds are unenforceable, but are not necessarily thereby void. However, a party unjustly enriched by an unenforceable contract may be required to provide restitution for unjust enrichment. Statutes of frauds are typically codified in state statutes covering specific types of contracts, such as contracts for the sale of real estate.
In Australia and many, if not all, jurisdictions which have adopted the common law of England, for contracts subject to legislation equivalent to the Statute of frauds, there is no requirement for the entire contract to be in writing. Although for property transactions there must be a note or memorandum evidencing the contract, which may come into existence after the contract has been formed. The note or memorandum must be signed in some way, and a series of documents may be used in place of a single note or memorandum. It must contain all material terms of the contract, the subject matter and the parties to the contract. In England and Wales, the common law Statute of frauds is only now in force for guarantees, which must be evidenced in writing, although the agreement may be made orally. Certain other kinds of contract must be in writing or they are void, for instance, for sale of land under s. 52, Law of Property Act 1925.
If a contract is in a written form, and somebody signs the contract, then the person is bound by its terms regardless of whether they have read it or not, provided the document is contractual in nature. Furthermore, if a party wishes to use a document as the basis of a contract, reasonable notice of its terms must be given to the other party prior to their entry into the contract. This includes such things as tickets issued at parking stations.
Contracts may be bilateral or unilateral. A bilateral contract is the kind of contract that most people think of when they think "contract." It is an agreement in which each of the parties to the contract makes a promise or promises to the other party. For example, in a contract for the sale of a home, the buyer promises to pay the seller $200,000 in exchange for the seller's promise to deliver title to the property.
In a unilateral contract, only one party to the contract makes a promise. A typical example is the reward contract: A promise to pay a reward to B if B finds A's dog. B is not obliged to find A's dog, but A is obliged to pay the reward to B if B finds the dog. The consideration for the contract here is B's reliance on A's promise, or B giving up his legal right to do whatever he wanted at the time he was engaged in the finding of the dog.
In this example, the finding of the dog is a condition precedent to A's obligation to pay, although it is not a legal condition precedent, because technically no contract here has arisen until the dog is found (because B has not accepted A's offer until he finds the dog, and a contract requires offer, acceptance, and consideration), and the term "condition precedent" is used in contract law to designate a condition of a promise in a contract. For example, if B promised to find A's dog, and A promised to pay B when the dog was found, A's promise would have a condition attached to it, and offer and acceptance would already have occurred. This is a situation in which a condition precedent is attached to a bilateral contract.
Condition precedents can also be attached to unilateral contracts, however. This would require A to require a further condition to be met before he pays B for finding his dog. So, for example, A could say "If anyone finds my dog, and the sky falls down, I will give that person $100." In this situation, even if the dog is found by B, he would not be entitled to the $100 until the sky falls down. Therefore the sky falling down is a condition precedent to A's duty being actualized, even though they are already in a contract, since A has made an offer and B has accepted.
An offer of a unilateral contract may often be made to many people (or 'to the world') by means of an advertisement. In that situation, acceptance will only occur on satisfaction of the condition (such as the finding of the offeror's dog). If the condition is something that only one party can perform, both the offeror and offeree are protected – the offeror is protected because he will only ever be contractually obliged to one of the many offerees; and the offeree is protected, because if she does perform the condition, the offeror will be contractually obliged to pay her.
In unilateral contracts, the requirement that acceptance be communicated to the offeror is waived. The offeree accepts by performing the condition, and the offeree's performance is also treated as the price, or consideration, for the offeror's promise.
The offeror is master of the offer; it is he who decides whether the contract will be unilateral or bilateral. A bilateral contract is one in which there are duties on both sides, rights on both sides, and consideration on both sides. If an offeror makes an offer such as "If you promise to paint my house, I will give you $100," this is a bilateral contract once the offeree accepts. Each side has promised to do something, and each side will get something in return for what they have done.
If the terms of the contract are uncertain or incomplete, the parties cannot have reached an agreement in the eyes of the law. An agreement to agree does not constitute a contract, and an inability to agree on key issues, which may include such things as price or safety, may cause the entire contract to fail. However, a court will attempt to give effect to commercial contracts where possible, by construing a reasonable construction of the contract.
Courts may also look to external standards, which are either mentioned explicitly in the contract or implied by common practice in a certain field. In addition, the court may also imply a term; if price is excluded, the court may imply a reasonable price, with the exception of land, and second-hand goods, which are unique.
If there are uncertain or incomplete clauses in the contract, and all options in resolving its true meaning have failed, it may be possible to sever and void just those affected clauses if the contract includes a severability clause. The test of whether a clause is severable is an objective test—whether a reasonable person would see the contract standing even without the clauses.
A contractual term is "[a]ny provision forming part of a contract". Each term gives rise to a contractual obligation, breach of which can give rise to litigation. Not all terms are stated expressly and some terms carry less legal weight as they are peripheral to the objectives of the contract.
As discussed in Tina L. Stark's Negotiating and Drafting Contract Boilerplate, when lawyers refer to a “boilerplate” provision, they are referring to any standardized, “one size fits all” contract provision. But lawyers also use the term in a more narrow context to refer to certain provisions that appear at the end of the contract. Typically, these provisions tell the parties how to govern their relationship and administer the contract. Although often thought to be of secondary importance, these provisions have significant business and legal consequences. Common provisions include the governing law provision, venue, assignment and delegation provisions, waiver of jury trial provisions, notice provisions, and force majeure provisions.
It is an objective matter of fact whether a term goes to the root of a contract. By way of illustration, an actress' obligation to perform the opening night of a theatrical production is a condition, whereas a singers obligation to perform during the first three days of rehearsal is a warranty.
Statute may also declare a term or nature of term to be a condition or warranty; for example the Sale of Goods Act 1979 s15A provides that terms as to title, description, quality and sample (as described in the Act) are conditions save in certain defined circumstances.
Status as a term is important as a party can only take legal action for the non fulfillment of a term as opposed to representations or mere puffery. Legally speaking, only statements that amount to a term create contractual obligations. There are various factor that a court may take into account in determining the nature of a statement. In particular, the importance apparently placed on the statement by the parties at the time the contract is made is likely to be significant. In Bannerman v. White it was held a term of a contract for sale and purchase of hops that they had not been treated with sulphur, since the buyer made very explicit his unwillingness to accept hops so treated, saying that he had no use for them. The relative knowledge of the parties may also be a factor, as in Bissett v. Wilkinson in which a statement that farmland being sold would carry 2000 sheep if worked by one team was held merely a representation (it was also only an opinion and therefore not actionable as misrepresentation). The reason this was not a term was that the seller had no basis for making the statement, as the buyer knew, and the buyer was prepared to rely on his own and his son's knowledge of farming.
A term may either be express or implied. An express term is stated by the parties during negotiation or written in a contractual document. Implied terms are not stated but nevertheless form a provision of the contract.
Terms may be implied due to the facts of the proceedings by which the contract was formed. In the Australian case of BP Refinery Westernport v. Shire of Hastings the UK Privy Council proposed a five stage test to determine situations where the facts of a case may imply terms (this only applies to formal contracts in Australia). However, the English Court of Appeal sounded a note of caution with regard to the BP case in Philips Electronique Grand Public SA v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd in which the Master of the Rolls described the test as "almost misleading" in its simplicity. The classic tests have been the "business efficacy test" and the "officious bystander test". The first of these was proposed by Lord Justice Bowen in The Moorcock. This test requires that a term can only be implied if it is necessary to give business efficacy to the contract to avoid such a failure of consideration that the parties cannot as reasonable businessmen have intended. But only the most limited term should then be implied - the bare minimum to achieve this goal. The officious bystander test derives its name from the judgment of Lord Justice Mackinnon in Shirlaw v. Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd but the test actually originates in the judgment of Lord Justice Scrutton in Reigate v. Union Manufacturing Co (Ramsbottom) Ltd This test is that a term can only be implied in fact if it is such a term that had an "officious bystander" listening to the contract negotiations suggested that they should include this term the parties would "dismiss him with a common 'Oh of course!'". It is at least questionable whether this is truly a separate test or just a description of how one might go about arriving at a decision on the basis of the business efficacy test.
Some jurisdictions, notably Australia, Israel and India, imply a term of good faith into contracts. A final way in which terms may be implied due to fact is through a previous course of dealing or common trade practice. The Uniform Commercial Code of the United States also imposes a duty of good faith in performance and enforcement of contracts covered by the Code, which cannot be derogated from.
These are terms that have been implied into standardized relationships. Instances of this are quite numerous, especially in employment contracts and shipping contracts.
These terms will be implied into all contracts of the same nature as a matter of law.
The rules by which many contracts are governed are provided in specialized statutes that deal with particular subjects. Most countries, for example, have statutes which deal directly with sale of goods, lease transactions, and trade practices. For example, most American states have adopted Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which regulates contracts for the sale of goods. The most important legislation implying terms under United Kingdom law are the Sale of Goods Act 1979, the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000 and the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 which imply terms into all contracts whereby goods are sold or services provided.
There are a few ways of determining whether a contract has been coerced or is voluntary:
There can be four different ways in which contracts can be set aside. A contract may be deemed 'void', 'voidable', 'unenforceable'or 'ineffective'. Voidness implies that a contract never came into existence. Voidability implies that one or both parties may declare a contract ineffective at their wish. Unenforceability implies that neither party may have recourse to a court for a remedy. Ineffectiveness implies that the contract terminates by order of a court where a public body has failed to satisfy public procurement law. To rescind is to set aside or unmake a contract.
Misrepresentation means a false statement of fact made by one party to another party and has the effect of inducing that party into the contract. For example, under certain circumstances, false statements or promises made by a seller of goods regarding the quality or nature of the product that the seller has may constitute misrepresentation. A finding of misrepresentation allows for a remedy of rescission and sometimes damages depending on the type of misrepresentation.
There are two types of misrepresentation in contract law, fraud in the factum and fraud in inducement. Fraud in the factum focuses on whether the party in question knew they were creating a contract. If the party did not know that they were entering into a contract, there is no meeting of the minds, and the contract is void. Fraud in inducement focuses on misrepresentation attempting to get the party to enter into the contract. Misrepresentation of a material fact (if the party knew the truth, that party would not have entered into the contract) makes a contract voidable.
According to Gordon v. Selico it is possible to make a misrepresentation either by words or by conduct, although not everything said or done is capable of constituting a misrepresentation. Generally, statements of opinion or intention are not statements of fact in the context of misrepresentation.
Both an order for specific performance and an injunction are discretionary remedies, originating for the most part in equity. Neither is available as of right and in most jurisdictions and most circumstances a court will not normally order specific performance. A contract for the sale of real property is a notable exception. In most jurisdictions, the sale of real property is enforceable by specific performance. Even in this case the defenses to an action in equity (such as laches, the bona fide purchaser rule, or unclean hands) may act as a bar to specific performance.
Related to orders for specific performance, an injunction may be requested when the contract prohibits a certain action. Action for injunction would prohibit the person from performing the act specified in the contract.
In the United States, in order to obtain damages for breach of contract or to obtain specific performance or other equitable relief, the aggrieved injured party may file a civil (non-criminal) lawsuit in state court (unless there is diversity of citizenship giving rise to federal jurisdiction). If the contract contains an arbitration clause, the aggrieved party must submit an arbitration claim in accordance with the procedures set forth in the agreement.
Many contracts provide that all disputes arising thereunder will be resolved by arbitration, rather than litigated in courts. Customer claims against securities brokers and dealers are almost always resolved by arbitration because securities dealers are required, under the terms of their membership in self-regulatory organizations such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (formerly the NASD) or NYSE to arbitrate disputes with their customers. The firms then began including arbitration agreements in their customer agreements, requiring their customers to arbitrate disputes. On the other hand, certain claims have been held to be non-arbitrable if they implicate a public interest that goes beyond the narrow interests of the parties to the agreement (i.e., claims that a party violated a contract by engaging in illegal anti-competitive conduct or civil rights violations). Arbitration judgments may generally be enforced in the same manner as ordinary court judgments. However, arbitral decisions are generally immune from appeal in the United States unless there is a showing that the arbitrator's decision was irrational or tainted by fraud. Virtually all states have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act to facilitate the enforcement of arbitrated judgments. Notably, New York State, where a sizable portion of major commercial agreements are executed and performed, has not adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act.
In England and Wales, a contract may be enforced by use of a claim , or in urgent cases by applying for an interim injunction to prevent a breach. Likewise, in the United States, an aggrieved party may apply for injunctive relief to prevent a threatened breach of contract, where such breach would result in irreparable harm that could not be adequately remedied by money damages.
Online contracts, which are easily made, are usually valid on a smaller scale for a period of one to three months, while on a larger scale can last about five years. As with all things legal, especially in regards to the ever-evolving internet, general rules like length of validity have many exceptions. All cases are evaluated on their own merits, and those merits are defined by the facts presented in each instance. It is up to the owner of the site to do what it can to guarantee enforceability of its contracts. Though 90% of people sign online contracts before reading the content, E-signature laws have made the electronic contract and signature as legally valid as a paper contract. It has been estimated that roughly one hundred and ten electronic contracts are signed every second.
Contract theory is the body of legal theory that addresses normative and conceptual questions in contract law. One of the most important questions asked in contract theory is why contracts are enforced. One prominent answer to this question focuses on the economic benefits of enforcing bargains. Another approach, associated with Charles Fried, maintains that the purpose of contract law is to enforce promises. This theory is developed in Fried's book, Contract as Promise. Other approaches to contract theory are found in the writings of legal realists and critical legal studies theorists.
More generally, writers have propounded Marxist and feminist interpretations of contract. Attempts at overarching understandings of the purpose and nature of contract as a phenomenon have been made, notably 'relational contract theory' originally developed by U.S. contracts scholars Ian Roderick Macneil and Stewart Macaulay, building at least in part on the contract theory work of U.S. scholar Lon L. Fuller, while U.S. scholars have been at the forefront of developing economic theories of contract focussing on questions of transaction cost and so-called 'efficient breach' theory.
Another dimension of the theoretical debate in contract is its place within, and relationship to a wider law of obligations. Obligations have traditionally been divided into contracts, which are voluntarily undertaken and owed to a specific person or persons, and obligations in tort which are based on the wrongful infliction of harm to certain protected interests, primarily imposed by the law, and typically owed to a wider class of persons.
Recently it has been accepted that there is a third category, restitutionary obligations, based on the unjust enrichment of the defendant at the plaintiff’s expense. Contractual liability, reflecting the constitutive function of contract, is generally for failing to make things better (by not rendering the expected performance), liability in tort is generally for action (as opposed to omission) making things worse, and liability in restitution is for unjustly taking or retaining the benefit of the plaintiff’s money or work.
The common law describes the circumstances under which the law will recognise the existence of rights, privilege or power arising out of a promise.