Convoy PQ 17: Wikis

Advertisements
  
  

Note: Many of our articles have direct quotes from sources you can cite, within the Wikipedia article! This article doesn't yet, but we're working on it! See more info or our list of citable articles.

Encyclopedia

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Convoy PQ 17
Part of World War II, Atlantic Campaign
Convoy PQ 17 sailing in Hvalfjord.jpg
Escorts and merchant ships at Hvalfjord before the sailing of Convoy PQ 17.
Date 27 June – 10 July 1942
Location Arctic Ocean
Result Axis victory
Belligerents
United Kingdom United Kingdom
United States United States of America
Soviet Union Soviet Union
Netherlands Netherlands
Panama Panama
 Nazi Germany
Commanders
United Kingdom Adm. J. C. Tovey
United Kingdom Rear-Adm. L.H.K. Hamilton
United Kingdom Cdr. J. E. Broome
United Kingdom Commodore John Dowding
Nazi Germany Großadmiral Erich Raeder
Nazi Germany Admiral Karl Dönitz
Nazi Germany Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen Stumpff
Strength
6 destroyers,
2 anti-aircraft ships,
2 submarines,
11 smaller craft,
34 merchant ships.
U-boats,
(boats with kills:)
U88, U251, U255,
U334, U355, U376,
U456, U457, U703
33 torpedo aircraft,
6 bombers.
(Flying over 200 sorties).
Casualties and losses
23 merchant ships sunk,
153 merchant mariners killed.
unknown

PQ17 was the code name for an Allied World War II convoy in the Arctic Ocean. In July 1942, the Arctic convoys suffered a significant defeat when Convoy PQ17 lost twenty-one of its thirty-four merchant ships during a series of heavy enemy daylight attacks which lasted a week.[1] On 27 June 1942 the ships sailed eastbound from Hvalfjord, Iceland for the port of Arkhangelsk in Russia. The convoy was located by German forces on 1 July, after which it was shadowed continuously and attacked. The convoy's progress was being observed by the British Admiralty, which ordered the ships to scatter because of information German navy surface units were being refuelled to intercept the convoy.[2] The convoy was the first joint Anglo-American naval operation under British command in the war.[3]

As the close escort and the covering cruiser forces withdrew westward to intercept the presumed German raiders, the individual merchant ships were left without their escorting destroyers.[4] In their ensuing attempts to reach the appointed Russian ports, the merchant ships were repeatedly attacked by German air units and submarines. Of the initial thirty-four ships, only eleven reached their destination, delivering 70,000 tons of cargo.[5] The disastrous outcome of the convoy demonstrated the difficulty of passing adequate supplies through the Arctic, especially during the summer period of perpetual daylight.[6]

Contents

Background

With the entry of the Soviet Union in the war, the British and American governments agreed to send unconditional aid to their Russian allies. The Beaverbrook-Harriman Anglo-American Mission visited Moscow in October 1941, agreeing to a series of munitions deliveries to Russia.[7] The most direct way to carry these supplies was by sea around the North Cape, through Arctic waters to the ports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk.[8] The agreement stated that the Soviet government was responsible for receiving the supplies in Russian ships at British or American ports. However since there were not enough ships for the quantities of aid being sent by the Western allies to the Soviet Union, British and American ships began to constitute an increasing proportion of the convoy traffic.[9]

Although the defence of the Arctic convoys was the responsibility of the Royal Navy, Fleet Admiral Ernest King assigned Task Force 39 built around the carrier USS Wasp and the battleship USS Washington to support the British.[10]

The first convoy sailed from the United Kingdom in August 1941, two months after the German invasion of Russia. By the spring of 1942 twelve more convoys had made the passage with the loss of only one out of 103 ships.[1] From then on the threat of attacks on the convoys increased, with the Germans preparing to stop the flow of supplies to Russia with every means at their disposal, including the basing of heavy ships in Norway.[1] In 1941, the Kriegsmarine had already begun concentrating its strength in Norway in winter, both to prevent a repeated British attack, and to obstruct Allied supply lines to Russia. The battleship Tirpitz was moved to Trondheim in January, where she was joined by Admiral Scheer and in March by the cruiser Admiral Hipper.[11] Initial German dispositions had also directed battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the cruiser Prinz Eugen to concentrate in Arctic waters, but these all fell victim to Allied air attacks, and had to turn back for repairs.[12] Moreover, the Germans had bases along the length of Norway, which meant, until escort carriers became available, Allied convoys had to be sailed through these areas without adequete defense against aircraft and submarine attack.[13]

Admiralty instructions and diversionary operations

Track of PQ17, with approximate localisation of the convoy's losses.

British naval intelligence in June reported the Germans' intention to bring out major naval units to attack the next eastbound convoy, east of Bear Island.[11][14] Thus German forces would operate close to the Norwegian coast, with support of shore-based air reconnaissance and striking forces, with a screen of U-boats in the channels between Spitsbergen and Norway.[15] Allied covering forces, on the other hand, would be without air support, one thousand miles from their base, and with the destroyers too short on fuel to escort a damaged ship to harbour.[11]

To prevent such a situation, the Admiralty issued instructions on 27 June, which allowed the convoy to be turned back temporarily in order to shorten the distance to the nearest Allied base.[15] In the event, enemy surface movements took place later than expected, making these instructions unnecessary.[16] The Admiralty also instructed the safety of the convoy from surface attack to the westward of Bear Island depended on Allied surface forces, while to the eastward it was to be met by Allied submarines. Furthermore, the convoy's cruiser covering force was not to go east of Bear Island, unless the convoy was threatened by the presence of a surface force which the cruiser force could fight, nor to go beyond 25° East under any circumstance.[17][18]

A decoy convoy was also organised to divert enemy forces, consisting of the First Minelaying Squadron and four colliers, escorted by HMS Sirius and HMS Curacoa, five destroyers, and some trawlers. This diversionary force assembled at Scapa Flow for a week, sailing two days after the convoy.[19] German reconnaissance of Scapa during the period of assembly failed to notice the diversion, which was also not sighted on its passage. The operation was repeated on 1 July, again without success.[19] Additionally on 26 June the Admiralty took the opportunity to pass a westbound convoy QP 13, in conjunction with QP 17. The former was made up of returning merchant ships from Arkhangelsk, with some ships leaving Murmansk.[19] It consisted of thirty-five ships and was escorted by five destroyers, three corvettes, one anti-aircraft ship, three minesweepers, two trawlers and, as far as the Bear Island area, one submarine. It was sighted by German aircraft on 30 June and 2 July. However QP 13 was not attacked, since the German tactic was to concentrate on eastbound (laden) convoys,[19] rather than westbound convoys in ballast.

A fresh ice reconnaissance done on 3 July found the passage north of Bear Island had widened. The Admiralty suggested the convoy should pass at least 50 miles (80 km) north of it.[20] The senior officer of the escort preferred to stay in the low visibility on the original route, and to make ground to the eastward. Commander J. E. Broome, in command of the escort squadron, later decided that a more northerly route was necessary, ordered the senior office of the escort to alter the convoy's course to pass 70 miles (110 km) north of Bear Island and, later on to open to 400 miles (640 km) from Banak.[20]

Covering forces

USS Wichita and HMS London, part of PQ17's cruiser covering force.

The convoy's close escort was the First Escort Group (EG1), under Commander Broome, and included six destroyers, eleven corvettes, minesweepers or armed trawlers, and two anti-aircraft auxiliaries. The destroyers were HMS Fury, HMS Keppel, HMS Leamington, HMS Ledbury, HMS Offa and HMS Wilton. The anti-aircraft auxiliaries were the HMS Palomares and HMS Pozarica. The other escorting ships were the corvettes HMS Lotus, HMS Poppy, HMS La Malouine, the minesweepers HMS Halcyon, HMS Salamander, HMS Dianella, HMS Britomart and the anti-submarine trawlers HMT Lord Middleton, HMT Lord Austin, HMT Ayrshire and HMT Northern Gem.[21]

In a more distant covering role was the First Cruiser Squadron (CS1), under the command of Rear Admiral Louis H. K. Hamilton), consisting of HMS London, HMS Norfolk, USS Wichita, USS Tuscaloosa, and four destroyers, of which two were American. As further protection, the convoy was to be tracked at about 200 miles (320 km) by Home Fleet battleships.[22]

As the convoy began its preliminary movements, the covering forces planned by the Admiralty were moving to positions. Hamilton's First Cruiser Squadron left Seidisfjord in the night between 30 June and 1 July.[19] It arrived in a covering position north of the convoy on 2 July. The cruisers were not sighted by the Germans until late on 3 July.[19]

The second, heavy covering force, under the command of Admiral John Tovey, was made up of HMS Victorious, HMS Duke of York, USS Washington, HMS Cumberland, HMS Nigeria, and nine destroyers.[23] The force was shadowed for a short period while north-east of Iceland on 1 July, while the cruiser screen was refuelling at Seidisfiord. It was shadowed for a short period early on 3 July, while in a covering position south of the convoy.[19] Later that day, course was altered to the northward, to cross the convoy's track and to reach a position north-west of Bear Island. This would place Victorious within air striking range of the convoy on the morning of 4 July. This was calculated to occur at the same time at which a surface attack was expected to materialise. While on route to the new covering area, the task force was joined by HMS Manchester and HMS Eclipse from Spitsbergen.[20]

Air reconnaissance of the Norwegian harbours had been hindered by weather, but information available showed German heavy units were probably moving northwards, and an air photograph of Trondheim late on 3 July confirmed Tirpitz and Hipper had sortied.[20] The flying boat patrol and the two lines of submarines between North Cape and Bear Island were being adjusted to cover the line of approach to the convoy as it moved eastwards. In view of the uncertainty of the two ships' position, Rear Admiral Hamilton decided to continue to provide close cover with the cruiser squadron and to pass east of Bear Island.[20]

Convoy movement, covering forces and escort

USS Wainwright broke up an air attack on the convoy on 4 July.

The convoy sailed from Hvalfjord on 27 June, under the command of Commodore John Dowding. In addition to the thirty-four merchant ships, an oiler (RFA Grey Ranger) for the escort, and three rescue ships (Rathlin, Zamalek and Zaafaran)[24] sailed with the convoy. The escort was made up of six destroyers, four corvettes, three minesweepers, four trawlers, two anti-aircraft ships, and two submarines. The route was longer than earlier convoys, since the ice allowed for a passage north of Bear Island with an evasive detour in the Barents Sea. Moreover, all the convoy was bound for Arkhangelsk, because recent heavy air raids had destroyed most of Murmansk.[25] One ship suffered mechanical failure just out of port and was forced to turn back. Another, SS Exford, turned back after sustaining ice damage.[26]

Part of the convoy ran into drifting ice in thick weather of the Denmark Strait. Two merchant ships were damaged and had to turn back. Grey Ranger was also damaged,[27] her speed reduced to eight knots, and since it was doubtful if she could face heavy weather, it was decided to transfer her to the fuelling position north-east of Jan Mayen in exchange for the RFA Aldersdale.[28]

Shortly after it entered the open sea, PQ17 was sighted and tracked by U-456, and shadowed continuously except for a few short intervals in fog. This was augmented by Luftwaffe BV 138s on 1 July. On 2 July, the convoy sighted the returning convoy QP 13. It suffered its first air attack, by nine torpedo aircraft, later the same day. The planes were unsuccessful, one being shot down.[29] At 13:00 on 3 July, PQ 17's destroyer screen was steering east to pass between Bear Island and Spitsbergen.[30]

A solitary aircraft scored a torpedo hit on the morning of 4 July (the stricken merchantman, SS Christopher Newport, had to be scuttled by the escort) and there was an unsuccessful attack by six bombers in the evening.[31][32] USS Wainwright successfully broke up an air attack on the convoy the same day.[33] Later the same evening another attack, by twenty-five torpedo bombers, took place, sinking SS William Hooper.[34] Two ships were now sunk, and at least four aircraft were shot down.[35]

'Convoy is to scatter'

Excerpts of signals between the Admiralty (ADMY) and
the First Cruiser Squadron (CS1)[36]
TIME FROM TO MESSAGE
21:11 ADMY CS1 Cruiser Force withdraw to the westward at high speed.
21:23 ADMY CS1 Owing to threat from surface ships, convoy is to disperse and proceed to Russian ports.
21:36 ADMY CS1 Convoy is to scatter.

At 12:30, 4 July, the Admiralty gave Admiral Hamilton permission to proceed east of 25° East, should the situation demand, unless contrary orders were received from Admiral Tovey. This was a reversal of previous orders. As no information in Tovey's possession justified this change, Hamilton was ordered to withdraw when the convoy was east of 25° East, or earlier at his discretion, unless the Admiralty assured him Tirpitz would not be met. However, at 18:58 the Admiralty informed Hamilton further information was expected shortly[37] and instructed him to remain with the convoy pending further instructions. At 21:11, 4 July, the Admiralty sent a message, prefixed "Most Immediate" ordering Hamilton to withdraw to the westward at high speed.[38]

This was due to U-boat information, a fact not shared with Hamilton. At 21:23 the Admiralty, in a message prefixed "Immediate", ordered the convoy to disperse and proceed to Russian ports owing to threat from surface ships.[39] Again, at 21:36 the Admiralty sent another "Most Immediate" message, ordering the convoy to scatter.[40][a]

Admiral Hamilton, Commander Broome, and Commodore Dowding took these signals to indicate an attack by Tirpitz was imminent.[41] The convoy was immediately ordered to scatter, with the escorting destroyers ordered to join the cruiser force and the merchantmen to proceed independently.[42] The Admiralty's decision and orders would not have been so vehement had only British warships been concerned, but the idea the first joint Anglo-American operation under British command might involve the destruction of American as well as British units may well have influenced the decisions of First Sea Lord Pound.[43] The Allied cruiser squadron was already beyond the standing orders set by the Admiralty; hence, if no new orders had gone out, the cruisers would have had to withdraw some time afterwards in any case. The earlier cruiser movement did not influence the tactical situation. However, in light of later knowledge, the decision was deemed precipitious.[44]

Convoy losses

U-255 after the attacks on PQ17, flying four victory pennants and the captured flag of the merchant ship SS Paulus Potter.

When the order to scatter the convoy was received, it had covered more than half of its route with the loss of only three ships. The consequences for the merchantmen were dire. Now the ships were spread over a wide area, stripped of mutual protection as well as trained escort. The Germans took advantage of this situation. As the escort moved off to hunt for the suspected German surface force, messages on Merchant Navy wavelengths began to be received by the destroyers: "Am being bombed by a large number of planes", "On fire in the ice", "Abandoning ship", "Six U-boats approaching on the surface."[45] With the majority of the escorts ordered to return to Scapa Flow, only the close escort of anti-aircraft auxiliaries, corvettes, minesweepers, and armed trawlers was left to attempt to protect the scattered convoy. On 5 July, six merchantmen, including SS Fairfield City and SS Daniel Morgan, were sunk by Luftwaffe and six more by four U-boats. Among the losses that day were SS Pan Kraft, SS Washington, SS Carlton, SS Honomu, the Commodore's flagship SS River Afton, SS Empire Byron and SS Peter Kerr. Kerr was abandoned after a fire got out of control.[46] Commodore Dowding's refusal to accept defeat contributed to the rescue of most of the ships that eventually survived the convoy.[47] SS Paulus Potter had been abandoned by her crew after an aerial attack on 5 July. The ship was then boarded by sailors from U-255 on 13 July; after taking the ship's documents and flag, Kptlt. Reche then sank the Potter with one torpedo.[48]

On 6 July, SS Pan Atlantic was sunk by the Luftwaffe, and SS John Witherspoon by U-255. On 7 and 8 July, five more ships were sunk (two by U-255), including SS Olapana and SS Alcoa Ranger. The remaining escort withdrew into the Arctic Ocean on 9 July, but the merchant ships suffered no more that day. The last losses were SS Hoosier and SS El Capitan on 10 July. The Luftwaffe flew over two hundred sorties, and lost only five planes in exchange for the eight merchantmen they destroyed.[49]

In the ensuing voyage to the Russian ports, some ships took refuge along the frozen coast of Novaya Zemlya, landing at Matochkin.[50] Additionally, the Soviet tanker Azerbaijan had lost her cargo of linseed oil, and much of SS Winston-Salem's cargo had been jettisoned in Novaya Zemlya.[51] Many of the ships' locations were unknown, in spite of widespread searches by Coastal Command aircraft which had proceeded to North Russia after their patrols, and by minesweepers and corvettes in these waters. A fortnight elapsed before the results of these attacks and the fate of the various ships of the convoy were fully known.[44] Of the thirty-four ships which left Iceland, twenty-three were sunk. Two British, four American, one Panamanian, and two Russian merchant ships reached Arkhangelsk. Two American ships, the SS Samuel Chase and SS Benjamin Harrison landed at Murmansk.[52] The total deliveries amounted to 70,000 tonnes out of the 200,000 which had started from Iceland.[53]

Aftermath

Prime Minister Winston Churchill called the event, "one of the most melancholy naval episodes in the whole of the war."[53] An inquiry assigned no blame to anyone, since orders were issued by the First Sea Lord.[54] The Soviet Union did not believe so many ships could be lost in one convoy and openly accused the Western Allies of lying. Despite the help provided by the material delivered, PQ17 actually worsened Soviet-Allied relations over the short term, with the Soviets never acknowledging the efforts of Allied merchant seaman or sailors in either navy.[55] Joseph Stalin, and Soviet naval experts, found it difficult to understand the order to scatter given by the Admiralty, given "that the escorting vessels of the PQ 17 should return, wheareas the cargo boats should disperse and try to reach the Soviet ports one by one without any protection at all." [56] Admiral King, already known to distrust the British, was furious with what he perceived as Admiral Pound's bungling and promptly withdrew Task Force 39, sending it to the Pacific. He hesitated to conduct further joint operations under British command.[10]

In view of PQ17, the Admiralty proposed to suspend the Arctic convoys at least until the ice receded and perpetual daylight passed.[54] At a conference with Hitler, Kriegsmarine Commander-in-Chief Admiral Raeder stated, "...our submarines and aircraft, which totally destroyed the last convoy, have forced the enemy to give up this route temporarily..."[57] At a meeting with the head of the Soviet Military Mission, Admiral Harlamov and the Soviet ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky, the Soviets requested to know the scheduled departure of PQ 18. Pound said nothing could be done until better Russian air cover was arranged, after which Harlamov criticised the order to withdraw the cruisers from PQ 17. Pound was furious, and deeply resented the Russian attitude. Pound angrily admitted that PQ 17 was scattered by his personal order while Maisky stated that "even British admirals make mistakes".[58]

It was not until September that another convoy set out for North Russia. The convoy's defence scheme was revised, with a very strong constant close escort of sixteen destroyers and the first of the new escort carriers, HMS Avenger, herself equipped with twelve fighter aircraft.[59] After the war there was criticism of this incident, both from American and Soviet sources.[59] Soviet historians give varying reasons for the suspension and reduction in supply caused by the halt in the Arctic convoys. Some considered it the result of "the fact that in 1942, Anglo-American (ocean) communications were destroyed."[60]

Notes

a. ^  This latter signal was intended merely as a correction of technical wording from "disperse" to "scatter", but this was not known at the time. The order to scatter was only used under immediate threat of surface attack. Detailed instructions in each ship's signal book laid down the actions that were to be taken by each ship on receipt of this order.[2]

See also

Citations

  1. ^ a b c London Gazette, Friday, 13 October 1950, p. 5139 
  2. ^ a b Churchill, The Second World War, Volume IV, p. 235 
  3. ^ Churchill, The Second World War, Volume IV, p. 236 
  4. ^ Hill, Destroyer Captain, pp. 45–46 
  5. ^ Churchill, The Second World War, Volume IV, p. 237 
  6. ^ Churchill, The Second World War, Volume IV, p. 240 
  7. ^ Langer, The Harriman-Beaverbrook Mission and the Debate over Unconditional Aid for the Soviet Union, 1941, pp. 463–482 
  8. ^ Churchill, The Second World War, Volume IV, p. 228 
  9. ^ Churchill, The Second World War, Volume IV, p. 229 
  10. ^ a b Miller, War at Sea: A Naval History of World War II, p. 309 
  11. ^ a b c London Gazette, Friday, 13 October 1950, p. 5140 
  12. ^ Churchill, The Second World War, Volume IV, p. 229 
  13. ^ Hill, Destroyer Captain, p. 26 
  14. ^ Winton, Ultra at sea, pp. 61 
  15. ^ a b London Gazette, Friday, 13 October 1950, p. 5143 
  16. ^ Churchill, The Second World War, Volume IV, p. 235 
  17. ^ London Gazette, Friday, 13 October 1950, pp. 5144–5145 
  18. ^ Churchill, The Second World War, Volume IV, p. 236 
  19. ^ a b c d e f g London Gazette, Friday, 13 October 1950, p. 5145 
  20. ^ a b c d e London Gazette, Friday, 13 October 1950, p. 5146 
  21. ^ Admiralty, ADM 199/427: HOME FLEET DESTROYER COMMAND - April to December 1942, HMSO 
  22. ^ Churchill, The Second World War, Volume IV, p. 234 
  23. ^ Wilton, Ultra at sea, pp. 62 
  24. ^ Turner, Fight for the sea: naval adventures from World War II, p. 103 
  25. ^ Connell, Arctic destroyers: the 17th Flotilla, p. 80 
  26. ^ NMHS, Sea history, Issues 61-68, p. 58 
  27. ^ Hill, Destroyer Captain, p. 29 
  28. ^ Hill, Destroyer Captain, p. 37 
  29. ^ Hill, Destroyer Captain, p. 39 
  30. ^ Hill, Destroyer Captain, p. 41 
  31. ^ Turner, Fight for the sea: naval adventures from World War II, p. 105 
  32. ^ Hill, Destroyer Captain, p. 42 
  33. ^ Turner, Fight for the sea: naval adventures from World War II, p. 110 
  34. ^ Turner, Fight for the sea: naval adventures from World War II, p. 106 
  35. ^ Hill, Destroyer Captain, p. 43 
  36. ^ Churchill, The Second World War, Volume IV, p. 235 
  37. ^ Hinsley, Eastaway Thomas, British intelligence in the Second World War, pp. 213–214 
  38. ^ Hill, Destroyer Captain, p. 43 
  39. ^ Hill, Destroyer Captain, p. 44 
  40. ^ Hinsley, Eastaway Thomas, British intelligence in the Second World War, pp. 216–219 
  41. ^ Hill, Destroyer Captain, p. 45 
  42. ^ Hill, Destroyer Captain, p. 50 
  43. ^ Churchill, The Second World War, Volume IV, pp. 235–236 
  44. ^ a b Churchill, The Second World War, Volume IV, p. 236 
  45. ^ Hill, Destroyer Captain, p. 48 
  46. ^ Moore, A careless word-- a needless sinking, p. 220 
  47. ^ Connell, Arctic destroyers: the 17th Flotilla, p. 101 
  48. ^ Wynn, U-boat Operations of the Second World War, p. 178 
  49. ^ Helgason, Gudmundur. "PQ-17 The Greatest Convoy Disaster" (in English). http://www.uboat.net/ops/convoys/pq-17.htm. Retrieved 2009-04-16. 
  50. ^ Riesenberg, Sea War, Part 773., p. 320 
  51. ^ Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, p. 187 
  52. ^ Bunker, Liberty ships: the ugly ducklings of World War II, p. 67 
  53. ^ a b Churchill, The Second World War, Volume IV, p. 237 
  54. ^ a b Churchill, The Second World War, Volume IV, p. 238 
  55. ^ Denkhaus, Richard A. (February 1997). "World War II: Convoy PQ-17" (in English). http://www.historynet.com/world-war-ii-convoy-pq-17.htm/6. Retrieved 2009-04-16. 
  56. ^ Wykes, 1942, The Turning Point, p. 107 
  57. ^ Churchill, The Second World War, Volume IV, p. 243 
  58. ^ Hawkins; Deighton, Destroyer, p. 176 
  59. ^ a b Churchill, The Second World War, Volume IV, p. 244 
  60. ^ Howarth, The Battle of the Atlantic 1939-1945, p. 554 

References

  • Admiralty, ADM 199/427: HOME FLEET DESTROYER COMMAND - April to December 1942, HM Stationery Office 
  • Bunker, John (1972), Liberty ships: The ugly ducklings of World War II, Naval Institute Press, ISBN 9780870213403 
  • Churchill, Winston S. (1951), The Second World War: Volume IV, The Hinge of Fate, Cassell & Co. Ltd., OCLC 153203701 
  • Connell, G. G. (1982), Arctic destroyers: the 17th Flotilla, W. Kimber, ISBN 9780718304287 
  • Hawkins, Ian; Deighton, Len (2003), Destroyer: An anthology of first-hand accounts of the war at sea, 1939-1945, Conway Maritime Press, ISBN 9780851779478 
  • Hill, Roger P. (1986), Destroyer Captain, Periscope Publishing Ltd., ISBN 1904381251 
  • Hinsley F.H., Edward; Eastaway Thomas (1990), British intelligence in the Second World War: its influence on strategy and operations, Volume II, HM Stationery Office, ISBN 9780116309341 
  • Howarth, Stephen (1994), The Battle of the Atlantic 1939-1945: the 50th anniversary International Naval Conference Part 770 of The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939-1945: The 50th Anniversary International Naval Conference, Greenhill, ISBN 9781557500588 
  • Langer, John D. (1979), The Harriman-Beaverbrook Mission and the Debate over Unconditional Aid for the Soviet Union, 1941, Journal of Contemporary History, ISSN 0022-0094 
  • Miller, Nathan (1997), War at Sea: A Naval History of World War II, Oxford University Press US, ISBN 9780195110388 
  • Moore, Arthur R. (1984), "A careless word-- a needless sinking": a history of the staggering losses suffered by the U.S. Merchant Marine, both in ships and personnel during World War II, American Merchant Marine Museum 
  • Morison, Samuel E. (2001), History of United States Naval Operations in World War II: The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939-May 1943, Volume 1 of History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, University of Illinois Press, ISBN 9780252069635 
  • NMHS (1992), Sea history, Issues 61-68, National Maritime Historical Society 
  • Riesenberg, Felix (1956), Sea War, Part 773., Rinehart 
  • The Bookseller (1971), Issues 3394-3405, Authors Publishers' Association, Booksellers Association of Great Britain and Ireland, ISBN 9780340125120 
  • London Gazette: (Supplement) no. 39041, pp. 5139–5145, 17 October 1950.
  • Frayn Turner, John (2002), Fight for the sea: naval adventures from World War II, Naval Institute Press, ISBN 9781557508843 
  • Winton, John (1988), Ultra at sea, Leo Cooper, ISBN 0850528836 
  • Wykes, Alan (1972), 1942, The Turning Point, Macdonald & Co., ISBN 9780356039695 
  • Wynn, Kenneth G. (1997), U-boat Operations of the Second World War: Career histories, U1-U510, Chatham, ISBN 9781557508607 

External links

Advertisements

Advertisements






Got something to say? Make a comment.
Your name
Your email address
Message