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Cross-Strait relations
People's Republic of China   Republic of China
Map indicating location of China and Taiwan
     China      Taiwan


Cross-Strait relations (simplified Chinese: 海峡两岸关系traditional Chinese: 海峽兩岸關係pinyin: Hǎixiá Liǎng'àn guānxì) refers to the relations between mainland China, which sits to the west of the Taiwan Strait, and Taiwan, which sits to the east; especially the relations between their respective governments, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC).

In 1949, with the Chinese Civil War turning decisively in the Communists' (CPC) favour, the ROC government led by the Kuomintang (KMT) retreated to Taipei, in Taiwan, while the CPC proclaimed the PRC government in Beijing.

Since then, the relations between mainland China and Taiwan have been characterised by non-contact and animosity. In the early years, military conflicts continued, while diplomatically both governments competed to be the legitimate government of all China. More recently, the legal and political status of Taiwan have become more controversial, with the expression of Taiwan independence sentiments in Taiwan which were formerly outlawed. At the same time, there has been increasing non-governmental and semi-governmental exchanges between the two sides. From 2008, negotiations began to restore the "three links" (transportation, commerce, and communications) between the two sides, cut off since 1949. Party-to-party talks between the CPC and the KMT have resumed and semi-official negotiations through organizations representing the interests of their respective governments are being scheduled.

The English expression "cross-Strait relations" has been used by the two sides concerned and by many observers so that the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan would not be referred as "China–Taiwan relations" or "PRC–ROC relations". The former term implies the exclusion of Taiwan from China, and is considered non-neutral. The latter term implies the co-existence of the two governments as states, and does not reflect the official positions of either government. There is also no commonly used Chinese language term equivalent to the latter two terms.

Contents

History

Before 1949

A 1912 map of the Japanese Empire, showing Taiwan, which was under Japanese rule from 1895 to 1945.

The early history of cross-Strait relations involved the exchange of cultures, people, and technology.[1][2][3] However, no Chinese dynasty formally incorporated Taiwan in ancient times.[4] In the 16th and 17th centuries, Taiwan caught the attention of first Portuguese, then Dutch and Spanish explorers. In 1624, the Dutch established their first settlement in Taiwan. In 1662, Zheng Chenggong, a Ming-loyalist, defeated the Dutch rulers of Taiwan, and took the island, establishing the first formally Han Chinese regime in Taiwan. Zheng's heirs used Taiwan as a base for launching raids into mainland China against the Manchu Qing Dynasty. However, they were defeated in 1683 by Qing forces. The following year, Taiwan was incorporated into Fujian province. Over the next two centuries, the Imperial government paid little attention to Taiwan.[citation needed]

The situation changed in the 19th century, with other powers increasingly eying Taiwan for its strategic location and resources. In response, the administration began to implement a modernization drive. In 1885, the Imperial government raised Taiwan to a province. Within 10 years, Taiwan had become one of the most modern provinces in the Empire. However, the fall of the Qing outpaced the development of Taiwan, and in 1895, following its defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War, the Imperial government ceded Taiwan to Japan in perpetuity. Qing loyalists briefly resisted the Japanese rule under the banner of the "Republic of Taiwan", but order was quickly established by Japanese authorities.[citation needed]

Japan ruled Taiwan until 1945. During this time, Taiwan, as part of the Japanese Empire, was a foreign jurisdiction in relation to first the Qing Empire, and, after 1912, the ROC. In 1945, Japan was defeated in World War II and surrendered its forces in Taiwan to the ROC, then ruled by the Kuomintang (KMT). The period of post-war Kuomintang rule over China (1945–1949) was marked in Taiwan by conflicts between local residents and the new KMT authority, most violently in the 228 Incident, which occurred on February 28, 1947. The seeds for the Taiwan autonomy and independence movement were sown in this time. During this time and in subsequent periods, the Taiwan autonomy and independence movement was allied with the CPC in the struggle against Chiang Kai-shek's KMT-led government in the ROC. Indeed, one such organization, the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League, remains one of the eight official minor parties in mainland China.[citation needed]

China was soon engulfed in full scale civil war. In 1949, the war turned decisively against the KMT and in favor of the CPC. On October 1, 1949, the CPC proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China in Beijing. The ROC government retreated, eventually declaring Taipei its temporary capital in December 1949.[citation needed]

Military stalemate to diplomatic war (1949–1979)

The two governments continued in a state of war until 1979. In October 1949 a PRC attempt to take the ROC controlled island of Kinmen was thwarted in the Battle of Kuningtou halting the PLA advance towards Taiwan.[5] The Communists' other amphibious operations of 1950 were more successful: they led to the Communist conquest of Hainan Island in April 1950, capture of Wanshan Islands off the Guangdong coast (May-August 1950) and of Zhoushan Island off Zhejiang (May 1950).[6]

In June 1949, the ROC declared a "closure" of all mainland China ports and its navy attempted to intercept all foreign ships. The closure covered from a point north of the mouth of Min river in Fujian province to the mouth of the Liao river in Manchuria.[7] Since mainland China's railroad network was underdeveloped, north-south trade depended heavily on sea lanes. ROC naval activity also caused severe hardship for mainland China fishermen.

After losing mainland China, a group of approximately 12,000 KMT soldiers escaped to Burma and continued launching guerrilla attacks into south China. Their leader, General Li Mi, was paid a salary by the ROC government and given the nominal title of Governor of Yunnan. Initially, the United States supported these remnants and the Central Intelligence Agency provided them with aid. After the Burmese government appealed to the United Nations in 1953, the U.S. began pressuring the ROC to withdraw its loyalists. By the end of 1954, nearly 6,000 soldiers had left Burma and Li Mi declared his army disbanded. However, thousands remained, and the ROC continued to supply and command them, even secretly supplying reinforcements at times.

During the Korean War, some captured Communist Chinese soldiers, many of whom were originally KMT soldiers, were repatriated to Taiwan rather than mainland China. A KMT guerrilla force continued to operate cross-border raids into south-western China in the early 1950s. The ROC government launched a number of air bombing raids into key coastal cities of mainland China such as Shanghai.

Though viewed as a military liability by the United States, the ROC viewed its remaining islands in Fujian as vital for any future campaign to defeat the PRC and retake mainland China. On September 3, 1954, the First Taiwan Strait crisis began when the PLA started shelling Quemoy and threatened to take the Dachen Islands.[7] On January 20, 1955, the PLA took nearby Yijiangshan Island, with the entire ROC garrison of 720 troops killed or wounded defending the island. On January 24 of the same year, the United States Congress passed the Formosa Resolution authorizing the President to defend the ROC's offshore islands.[7] The First Taiwan Straits crisis ended in March 1955 when the PLA ceased its bombardment. The crisis was brought to a close during the Bandung conference.[7]

The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis began on August 23, 1958 with air and naval engagements between the PRC and the ROC military forces, leading to intense artillery bombardment of Quemoy (by the PRC) and Amoy (by the ROC), and ended on November of the same year.[7] PLA patrol boats blockaded the islands from ROC supply ships. Though the United States rejected Chiang Kai-shek's proposal to bomb mainland China artillery batteries, it quickly moved to supply fighter jets and anti-aircraft missiles to the ROC. It also provided amphibious assault ships to land supply, as a sunken ROC naval vessel was blocking the harbor. On September 7, the United States escorted a convoy of ROC supply ships and the PRC refrained from firing. On October 25, the PRC announced an "even-day ceasefire" — the PLA would only shell Quemoy on odd-numbered days.

Despite the end of the hostilities, the two sides have never signed any agreement or treaty to officially end the war.

After the 1950s, the "war" became more symbolic than real, represented by on again, off again artillery bombardment towards and from Kinmen. In later years, live shells were replaced with propaganda sheets. The bombardment finally ceased in 1979 after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States.

During this period, movement of people and goods virtually ceased between PRC- and ROC-controlled territories. There were occasional defectors. One high profile defector was Justin Yifu Lin, who swam across the Kinmen strait to mainland China and is now Chief Economist and Senior Vice President of the World Bank.

Most observers expected Chiang's government to eventually fall in response to a Communist invasion of Taiwan, and the United States initially showed no interest in supporting Chiang's government in its final stand. Things changed radically with the onset of the Korean War in June 1950. At this point, allowing a total Communist victory over Chiang became politically impossible in the United States, and President Harry S. Truman ordered the United States Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan straits to prevent the ROC and PRC from attacking each other.[8]

After the ROC complained to the United Nations against the Soviet Union supporting the PRC, the UN General Assembly Resolution 505 was adopted on February 1, 1952 to condemn the Soviet Union.

Diplomatically during this period, until around 1971, the ROC government continued to be recognized as the legitimate government of all China by most NATO governments. The PRC government was recognized by Soviet Bloc countries, members of the non-aligned movement, and some Western nations such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Both governments claimed to be the legitimate government of China, and labeled the other as illegitimate. Civil war propaganda permeated the education curriculum. Each side portrayed the people of the other as living in hell-like misery. In official media, each side called the other "bandits". The ROC also suppressed expressions of support for Taiwanese identity or Taiwan Independence.

Thawing of relations (1979–1998)

The Taiwan Strait.

In 1978, the ROC government began to allow visits to mainland China. This benefited many, especially old KMT soldiers, who had been separated from their family in mainland China for decades. This also proved a catalyst for the thawing of relations between the two sides. Problems engendered by increased contact necessitated a mechanism for regular negotiations.

In order to effect negotiations with mainland China on operational issues without compromising the government's position on denying the other side's legitimacy, the ROC government under Chiang Ching-kuo created the "Straits Exchange Foundation" (SEF), a nominally non-governmental institution directly led by the Mainland Affairs Council, an instrument of the Executive Yuan. The PRC responded to this initiative by setting up the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), directly led by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. This system, described as "white gloves", allowed the two governments to engage with each other on a semi-official basis without compromising their respective sovereignty policies.

Led by highly respected elder statesmen Koo Chen-fu and Wang Daohan, the two organizations began a series of talks that culminated in the 1992 meetings, which, together with subsequent correspondence, established the 1992 Consensus, under which both sides agreed to deliberate ambiguity on questions of sovereignty, in order to engage on operational questions affecting both sides.

Also during this time, however, the rhetoric of ROC President Lee Tung-hui began to turn further towards Taiwan independence. Prior to the 1990s, the ROC had been a one-party authoritarian state committed to eventual reunification with mainland China. However with democratic reforms the attitudes of the general public began to influence policy in Taiwan. As a result, the ROC government shifted away from its commitment to the one China policy and towards a separate political identity for Taiwan. Lee's mainland China counterpart, Jiang Zemin, was also unwilling to compromise. Jiang notoriously attempted to influence the 1996 ROC election in Taiwan by conducting a missile exercise designed to intimidate Taiwanese voters and interfere with international shipping, leading to the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. By 1998, semi-official talks had broken down.

Hostile non-contact (1998–2008)

Lien Chan (first row, fourth from left in background) and Chiang Pin-kung (first row, second from left in background) touring the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing, China with the Kuomintang delegation to mainland China in 2005.

Chen Shui-bian was elected President of the ROC in 2000. Politically, Chen is pro-Taiwan independence. Chen's repudiation of the 1992 Consensus combined with the PRC's insistence that the ROC agree to a "one China" principle for negotiations to occur prevented improvement in cross-strait relations.

Hu Jintao became President of the PRC in 2003, though he was ruling de facto as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China since late 2002.

Chen called for talks without any preconditions, repudiating the 1992 consensus while Hu continued to insist that talks can only proceed under an agreement of the "one China" principle. Chen Shui-bian and his party continued to express an ultimate goal of Taiwanese independence, and make statements on the political status of Taiwan that the PRC considers provocative. At the same time, Hu and the PRC continued a military missile buildup across the strait from Taiwan while making threats of military action against Taiwan should it declare independence or if the PRC considers that all possibilities for a peaceful reunification are completely exhausted. The PRC also continued applying diplomatic pressure to other nations to isolate the ROC diplomatically.[citation needed] One noted instance of co-operation in this period was during the 2003 Iraq war, when the PRC allowed Taiwanese airlines use of mainland airspace.[9]

After the re-election of Chen Shui-bian in 2004, Hu's government changed the previous blanket no-contact policy, a holdover from the Jiang Zemin administration. Under the new policy, on the one hand, the PRC government continued a no-contact policy towards Chen Shui-bian. It maintained its military build-up against Taiwan, and pursued a vigorous policy of isolating Taiwan diplomatically. In March 2005, the Anti-Secession Law was passed by the National People's Congress, formalising "non-peaceful means" as an option of response to a declaration of independence in Taiwan.[citation needed]

On the other hand, the PRC administration loosened its rhetoric in relation to Taiwan, and pursued contact with apolitical, or politically non-independence leaning, groups in Taiwan. In his May 17 Statement in 2004, Hu Jintao made friendly overtures to Taiwan on resuming negotiations for the "three links", reducing misunderstandings, and increasing consultation. In the Anti-Secession Law passed in 2005, the PRC government for the first time authoritatively committed to negotiations on the basis of equal status between the two sides, and further refrained from imposing the "one China" policy as a precondition for talks. The CPC increased contacts on a party-to-party basis with the KMT, then the opposition party in Taiwan. Despite having been the warring parties in the Chinese Civil War, the CPC and the KMT also had a history of co-operation, when the two parties twice co-operated in the Northern Expedition and the war against Japan. The increased contacts culminated in the 2005 Pan-Blue visits to mainland China, including a meeting between Hu and then-KMT chairman Lien Chan in April 2005.[10][11]

Resumption of high level contact (2008–present)

On March 20, 2008, the KMT party won the presidency in the Republic of China. It also has a majority in the Legislature.[citation needed]

A series of meetings between the two sides have followed. On April 12, 2008, Hu Jintao held a meeting with ROC's then vice-president elect Vincent Siew as chairman of the Cross-strait Common Market Foundation during the Boao Forum for Asia. On May 28, 2008, Hu met with KMT chairman Wu Po-hsiung, the first meeting between the heads of the CPC and the KMT as ruling parties. During this meeting, Hu and Wu agreed that both sides should recommence semi-official dialogue under the 1992 consensus. Wu committed the KMT against Taiwanese independence, but also stressed that a "Taiwan identity" did not equate to "Taiwanese independence". Hu committed his government to addressing the concerns of the Taiwanese people in regard to security, dignity, and "international living space", with a priority given to discussing Taiwan's wish to participate in the World Health Organization.

Both Hu and his new counterpart Ma Ying-jeou agree that the 1992 Consensus is the basis for negotiations between the two sides of the Taiwan strait. On March 26, 2008, Hu Jintao held a telephone talk with the US President George W. Bush, in which he explained that the "1992 Consensus" sees "both sides recognize there is only one China, but agree to differ on its definition".[12] The first priority for the SEF–ARATS meeting will be opening of the three links, especially direct flights between mainland China and Taiwan.

These events suggest a policy by the two sides to rely on the deliberate ambiguity of the 1992 Consensus to avoid difficulties arising from asserting sovereignty. As Wu Po-hsiung put it during a press conference in his 2008 mainland China visit, "we do not refer to the 'Republic of China' so long as the other side does not refer to the 'People's Republic of China'". Since the March elections in Taiwan, the PRC government has not mentioned the "one China policy" in any official announcements. The only exception has been one brief aberration in a press release by the Ministry of Commerce, which described Vincent Siew as agreeing to the "1992 consensus and the "one China policy". Upon an immediate protest from Siew, the PRC side retracted the press release and issued apologetic statements emphasising that only press releases published by the Xinhua News Agency represented the official PRC position. The official press release on this event did not mention the One China Policy.[13]

Ma Ying-jeou, the current ROC President, has advocated that cross-strait relations should shift from "mutual non-recognition" to "mutual non-denial".[14]

Dialogue through semi-official organisations (the SEF and the ARATS) reopened on June 12, 2008 on the basis of the 1992 Consensus, with the first meeting held in Beijing. Neither the PRC nor the ROC recognizes the other side as a legitimate entity, so the dialogue was in the name of contacts between the SEF and the ARATS instead of the two governments, though most participants were actually officials in PRC or ROC governments. Chen Yunlin, President of the ARATS, and Chiang Pin-kung, President of the SEF, signed files on June 13, agreeing that direct flights between the two sides would begin on July 4[15] and that Taiwan would allow entrance of up to 3000 visitors from mainland China every day.[16]

The financial relationship between the two areas improved on 1 May 2009 in a move described as "a major milestone" by The Times.[17] The ROC's financial regulator, the Financial Supervisory Commission, announced that mainland Chinese investors would be permitted to invest in Taiwan's money markets for the first time since 1949.[17] Investors can now apply to purchase Taiwan shares that do not exceed one tenth of the value of the firm’s total shares.[17] The move came as part of a “step by step” movement which is supposed to relax restrictions on mainland Chinese investment. Taipei economist Liang Chi-yuan, commented: “Taiwan's risk factor as a flash point has dropped significantly with its improved ties with the mainland. The mainlanders would be hesitant about launching a war as their investment increases here.”[17] Mainland China's biggest telecoms carrier, China Mobile, was the first company to avail of the new movement by spending $529 million (£359 million) on buying 12% of Far EasTone, the third largest telecoms operator in Taiwan.[17]

President Ma has called repeatedly for the PRC to dismantle the missile batteries targeted on Taiwan's cities, without result.[18]

On Jan 30 2010, the Obama administration announced it intended to sell $6.4 billion worth of antimissile systems, helicopters and other military hardware to Taiwan, an unexpected move which drew a forceful reaction from Beijing: in retaliation, China warned the US and Taiwan that their cooperation could suffer over Washington's decision to sell arms to Taipei.[19] Some have even argued that the current situation might trigger a new arms race in Asia fueled essentially by ideological motives, which could hinder Cross-Strait relations. [20]

Current formal relations

Interpretation of the relations

On 2 September 2008 the ROC President Ma Ying-jeou was interviewed by the Mexico based newspaper Sol de Mexico and he was asked about his views on the subject of 'two Chinas' and if there is a solution for the sovereignty issues between the two. The ROC President replied that the relations are neither between two Chinas nor two states. It is a special relationship. Further, he stated that the sovereignty issues between the two cannot be resolved at present, but he quoted the '1992 Consensus', currently accepted by both sides, as a temporary measure until a solution becomes available.[21] The spokesman for the ROC Presidential Office Wang Yu-chi (Chinese: 王郁琦) later elaborated the President's statement and said that the relations are between two regions of one country, based on the ROC Constitutional position, the Statute Governing the Relations Between the Peoples of the Taiwan Area and Mainland Area and the '1992 Consensus'.[22] On 7 October 2008 Ma Ying-jeou was interviewed by a Japan based magazine "World". He said that laws relating to international relations cannot be applied regarding the relations between Taiwan and mainland China, as they are parts of a state.[23][24][25]

Inter-government

Semi-governmental contact is maintained through the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). Negotiations between the SEF and the ARATS resumed on 11 June 2008.[26]

Although formally privately constituted bodies, the SEF and the ARATS are both directly led by the Executive Government of each side: the SEF by the Mainland Affairs Council of the Executive Yuan of the ROC, and the ARATS by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of the PRC. The heads of the two bodies, Chiang Pin-kung and Chen Yunlin, are both full time appointees and do not hold other government positions. However, both are senior members of their respective political parties (Kuomintang and Communist Party of China respectively), and both have previously served as senior members of their respective governments. Their deputies, who in practice are responsible for the substantive negotiations, are concurrently senior members of their respective governments. For the June 2008 negotiations, the main negotiators, who are deputy heads of the SEF and the ARATS respectively, are concurrently deputy heads of the Mainland Affairs Council and the Taiwan Affairs Office respectively.[citation needed]

2008 meetings

First 2008 meeting

A series of meetings were held between the SEF and the ARATS at Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing from 11 June 2008 to 14 June 2008. By convention, SEF–ARATS negotiations proceed in three rounds: a technical round led by negotiators seconded from the relevant government departments, a draft round led by deputy heads of the two organisations, and a formal round led by the heads of the two organisations. In this case, however, both sides have already reached broad consensus on these issues on both the technical and political levels through previous negotiations via the non-governmental and inter-party channels. As a result, the initial technical round was dispensed with, and the negotiations began with the second, draft round.[26]

The two sides agreed to the following:

Route Map of the weekend Cross-strait charter, for flights as of August, 2008. (Notice that although most lines do not cross over Hong Kong, in effect, planes by then did have to fly through Hong Kong airspace)
  • Initiate direct passenger airline services every weekend from 4 July 2008. Both parties agreed to negotiate on the routes of cross-strait direct flights and establish direct communication procedures concerning air traffic management systems as soon as possible. But before the routes of direct flights are finalized, charter flights may temporarily fly across Hong Kong Flight Information Region. There is no need to stop in Hong Kong, but planes still have to fly through its airspace. Weekend charter flights shall fly from each Friday to the following Monday for a total of four full days.
Mainland China agreed to open the following five cities as destinations: Beijing, Shanghai (Pudong), Guangzhou, Xiamen and Nanjing. Mainland China shall open Chengdu, Chongqing, Hangzhou, Dalian, Guilin, Shenzhen and other destinations later on and other cities if so demanded by the market.
Taiwan agreed to open the following eight cities as destinations: Taoyuan, Kaohsiung (Siaogang), Taichung (Chingchunkang), Taipei (Sungshan), Penghu (Makung), Hualien, Kinmen and Taitung[27].
  • Opening Taiwan to mainland Chinese tourists. Both parties agreed that mainland Chinese tourists must travel to the Taiwan in groups. Tourists must enter into, visit, and exit from Taiwan in groups. The maximum quota of tourists received by the party responsible for tourist reception shall not exceed the average of 3,000 persons per day, and each group shall consist of a minimum of ten persons and forty persons at the maximum, being in Taiwan for a maximum of ten days[28].

To facilitate the above, both sides also agreed to further discuss on the possibilities of exchanging representative offices, with an SEF office to be opened in Beijing and an ARATS office in Taipei to issue travel permits to cross-Strait visitors, among other duties.

See also: Cross-strait charter

Second 2008 meeting

Following an invitation issued by the SEF at the first meeting, the head of ARATS, Chen Yunlin, began a visit to Taiwan on 3 November 2008.[29] Items on the agenda raised by SEF Chairman Chiang Pin-kung included direct maritime shipping, chartered cargo flights, direct postal service, and co-operation in ensuring food safety, in response to the 2008 Chinese milk scandal[29], while ARATS chairman Chen Yunlin raised the matters of direct freight service, and opening up air routes that directly cross the Taiwan Strait. Previous routes avoided crossing the Strait for security reasons, with planes detouring through Hong Kong or Japan air control areas.[30]

On 4 November 2008, ARATS and SEF signed a number of agreements in Taipei. The agreement relating to direct passenger flights increased the number of charter flights from 36 to 108 per week, operating daily instead of the four days a week previously. Flights would now operate to and from 21 mainland Chinese cities. Flights would also take a more direct route. Private business jet flights would also be allowed. The agreement relating to cargo shipping allowed direct shipping between 11 sea ports in Taiwan and 63 in mainland China. The shipping would be tax free. The agreement relating to cargo flights provided for up to 60 direct cargo flights per month. Finally, an agreement was made to set up food safety alerts between the two sides. [31]

During Chen's visit in Taipei, he was met with a series of strong protests directed at himself and Ma Ying-jeou, some of which were violent with Molotov cocktails being thrown by the protesters at riot police. A series of arrests were made after the protests.[32][33] Local police reported that 149 of its officers were injured during the opposition protests.[34] Consistent with the 1992 Consensus, Chen did not call Ma as "President".[35][36] Similarly, the representatives from Taiwan did not call the PRC President Hu Jin-tao as "President" in the previous meeting in Beijing.

The polls in two of Taiwan's biggest newspapers after the visit reported that the public was pleased with Chen's visit, with about 50% of the Taiwanese public considered Chen's visit having a positive effect on Taiwan's development, while 18 to 26% of the respondents thought the effect would be negative.[37] In another poll, it suggested that 26% of the respondents were satisfied with the DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen's handling of the crowds in the series of protests, while 53% of the respondents were unsatisfied. The same poll also showed that 33% of the respondents were satisfied with President Ma's performance at his meeting with Chen Yunlin, while 32% of the respondents were not satisfied.[38] According to a telephone poll conducted by Taiwan's top-selling Apple Daily newspaper on 7 November 2008 on the subject of a series of anti-Chen protests organised by the DPP, 62.12% of the respondents considered it bad for DPP's image, describing it as a "violent party", 31.13% of the respondents considered it good for the DPP's image, as it demonstrated Taiwan's democracy, while 6.75% of the respondents did not express an opinion.[39]

Inter-party

The (current) ruling parties of the two sides, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China, maintain regular dialogue via the "KMT–CPC Forum". This has been called a "second rail" in Taiwan, and helps to maintain political understanding and aims for political consensus between the two sides.

Non-governmental

A third mode of contact is through private bodies accredited by the respective governments to negotiate on technical and operational aspects of issues between the two sides. Called the "Macau mode", this avenue of contact was maintained even through the years of the Chen Shui-bian administration. For example, on the issues of opening Taiwan to mainland Chinese tourists, the accredited bodies were tourism industry representative bodies from both sides.

Public support

According to an opinion poll released by the Mainland Affairs Council taken after the second 2008 meeting, 71.79% of the Taiwanese public supports continuing negotiations and solving issues between the two sides through the semi-official organisations, SEF and ARATS, 18.74% of the Taiwanese public does not support this, while 9.47% of the Taiwanese public does not have an opinion.[40]

Informal relations

The Three Links

Flight CAL581, the first direct flight between Taipei and Beijing, and also the first direct flight between mainland China and Taiwan: January 29, 2005.

Regular weekend direct, cross-strait charter flights between mainland China and Taiwan resumed on July 4, 2008 for the first time since 1950. Liu Shaoyong, China Southern Airlines chair, piloted the first flight from Guangzhou to Taipei airport. Simultaneously, a Taiwan-based China Airlines flight flew to Shanghai. Five mainland Chinese cities will be connected with eight Taiwan airports. The flights will operate four days a week (Friday to Monday), totalling 36 round-trip flights across the Taiwan Strait. Previously, regular passengers (other than festive or emergency charters) had to make a time-consuming stopover at a third destination, usually Hong Kong.[41][42] Under the current procedure, the flights do not directly cross the Taiwan Strait for security reasons, but instead must enter the Hong Kong air control area before moving into or out of mainland China or Taiwan airspace.

Taiwan residents cannot use the Republic of China passport to travel to mainland China, as neither the ROC nor the PRC considers this international travel. The PRC government requires Taiwan residents to hold a Taiwan Compatriot Pass when entering the Chinese Mainland, whereas the ROC government requires mainland residents to hold a Mainland Compatriot Pass to enter the Taiwan Area.

Cross-strait investments

Cross-strait investments have greatly increased in recent years. Predominantly, this involves Taiwan-based firms moving to, or collaborating in joint ventures, in mainland China. The collective body of Taiwanese investors in mainland China is now a significant economic force for both the mainland China and Taiwan.

Cultural, educational, religious and sporting exchanges

Cultural exchanges have increased in frequency. The National Palace Museum in Taipei and the Palace Museum in Beijing have collaborated on exhibitions. Scholars and academics frequently visit institutions on the other side. Books published on each side are regularly re-published in the other side, though restrictions on direct imports and the different orthography between the two sides somewhat impede the exchange of books and ideas.

Students of Taiwan origin receive special concessions in the National Higher Education Entrance Examination in mainland China. There are regular programs for school students from each side to visit the other.

Religious exchange has become frequent. Frequent interactions occur between worshippers of Matsu, and also between Buddhists.

Humanitarian actions

The PRC and the ROC have provided humanitarian aid to each other on several occasions. Most recently, following the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, an expert search and rescue team was sent from Taiwan to help rescue survivors in Sichuan. Shipments of aid material was also provided under the co-ordination of the Red Cross Society of The Republic of China and charities such as Tzu Chi.

See also

References

  1. ^ Zhang, Qiyun. (1959) An outline history of Taiwan. Taipei: China Culture Publishing Foundation
  2. ^ Sanchze-Mazas (ed.) (2008) Past human migrations in East Asia : matching archaeology, linguistics and genetics. New York: Routledge.
  3. ^ Brown, Melissa J. (2004) Is Taiwan Chinese? : the impact of culture, power, and migration on changing identities. Berkeley: University of California Press
  4. ^ Lien, Heng. (1979 reprint) Taiwan Tongshi (General History of Taiwan). Taipei:Zhongwen Book Company.
  5. ^ Qi, Bangyuan. Wang, Dewei. Wang, David Der-wei. [2003] (2003). The Last of the Whampoa Breed: Stories of the Chinese Diaspora. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0231130023. pg 2
  6. ^ MacFarquhar, Roderick. Fairbank, John K. Twitchett, Denis C. [1991] (1991). The Cambridge History of China. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521243378. pg 820.
  7. ^ a b c d e Tsang, Steve Yui-Sang Tsang. The Cold War's Odd Couple: The Unintended Partnership Between the Republic of China and the UK, 1950–1958. [2006] (2006). I.B. Tauris. ISBN 1850438420. p 155, p 115-120, p 139-145
  8. ^ Bush, Richard C. [2005] (2005). Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 081571288X.
  9. ^ [1]
  10. ^ Sisci, Francesco (April 5, 2005). "Strange cross-Taiwan Strait bedfellows". Asia Times Online. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GD05Ad08.html. Retrieved 2008-05-15. 
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  12. ^ "Chinese, U.S. presidents hold telephone talks on Taiwan, Tibet". Xinhuanet. March 27, 2008. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/27/content_7865209.htm. Retrieved 2008-05-15. 
  13. ^ "胡锦涛会见萧万长 就两岸经济交流合作交换意见 (Hu Jintao meets Vincent Siew; Exchange opinions on cross-Strait economic exchange and co-operation)" (in Simplified Chinese). Xinhua News Agency. April 12, 2008. http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2008-04/12/content_943267.htm. Retrieved 2008-06-02. 
  14. ^ "晤諾貝爾得主 馬再拋兩岸互不否認 (Meeting Nobel laureates, Ma again speaks of mutual non-denial)" (in Chinese). Liberty Times. April 19, 2008. http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2008/new/apr/19/today-p3.htm. Retrieved 2008-06-02. 
  15. ^ "海峡两岸包机会谈纪要(全文)(Cross-Strait charter flights neogitation memorandum (full text))" (in Simplified Chinese). Xinhua News Agency. June 13, 2008. http://news.xinhuanet.com/tw/2008-06/13/content_8360544.htm. Retrieved 2008-06-15. 
  16. ^ "海峡两岸关于大陆居民赴台湾旅游协议(全文)(Cross-Strait agreement on mainland residents visiting Taiwan for tourism (full text))" (in Simplified Chinese). Xinhua News Agency. June 13, 2008. http://news.xinhuanet.com/tw/2008-06/13/content_8360914.htm. Retrieved 2008-06-15. 
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  18. ^ President Ma urges China to dismantle missiles targeting Taiwan
  19. ^ AFP (February 2, 2010). "China: US spat over Taiwan could hit co-operation". Agence France Presse. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jDzKLVZ7X2dz8yrsshklcJZh38Cg. 
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  39. ^ "民調 陳雲林這次台灣行,民進黨發動圍城行動,請問你對民進黨的印象是? (An Opinion poll on Chen Yunlin's visit to Taiwan. Regarding the protests organised by the DPP, what is your opinion on the DPP?)" (in Traditional Chinese). Apple Daily. http://1-apple.com.tw/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Article&Sec_ID=1&IssueID=20081108&art_id=31123343&NewsType=1&SubSec=169&ShowDate=20081108. 
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  41. ^ Afp.google.com, China, Taiwan resume direct flights
  42. ^ bbc.co.uk, Direct China-Taiwan flights begin

Further reading

  • Bush, R. & O'Hanlon, M. (2007). A War Like No Other: The Truth About China's Challenge to America. Wiley. ISBN 0471986771
  • Bush, R. (2006). Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0815712901
  • Carpenter, T. (2006). America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 1403968411
  • Cole, B. (2006). Taiwan's Security: History and Prospects. Routledge. ISBN 0415365813
  • Copper, J. (2006). Playing with Fire: The Looming War with China over Taiwan. Praeger Security International General Interest. ISBN 0275988880
  • Federation of American Scientists et al. (2006). Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning
  • Gill, B. (2007). Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0815731469
  • Shirk, S. (2007). China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0195306090
  • Tsang, S. (2006). If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics. Routledge. ISBN 0415407850
  • Tucker, N.B. (2005). Dangerous Strait: the U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0231135645
  • China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America, 21p.

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