Direct Action Day: Wikis


Note: Many of our articles have direct quotes from sources you can cite, within the Wikipedia article! This article doesn't yet, but we're working on it! See more info or our list of citable articles.


From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Dead and wounded after the 'Direct Action Day' which developed into pitched battles as Muslim mob attacked and killed Hindus across Calcutta, Calcutta in 1946, the year before independence

Direct Action Day, also known as The Great Calcutta Killing,[1] was on 16 August 1946—a day of widespread riot and manslaughter in the city of Calcutta (now known as Kolkata) in the Bengal province of British India. The day also marked the start of what is known as "The Week of the Long Knives".[2][3]

The Muslim League and the Indian National Congress were the two largest political parties in the Constituent Assembly of India in the 1940s. The 1946 Cabinet Mission to India for planning of the transfer of power from the British Raj to the Indian leadership proposed an initial plan of composition of the new Dominion of India and its government. However, soon an alternative plan to divide the British Raj into a Hindu-majority India and a Muslim-majority Pakistan was proposed. The Congress rejected the alternative proposal outright. Muslim League planned general strike (hartal)[4] on 16 August to protest this rejection, and to assert its demand for a separate Muslim homeland.[5][6]

The protest triggered massive riots in Calcutta.[7][8] In Calcutta, within 72 hours, more than 4,000 people lost their lives and 100,000 residents in the city of Calcutta were left homeless.[1][8] Violence in Calcutta sparked off further religious riots in the surrounding regions of Noakhali, Bihar, United Province (modern Uttar Pradesh), Punjab, and the North Western Frontier Province. These events sowed the seeds for the eventual Partition of India. But the most dangerous riots in India took place in Calcutta and Noakhali (now in Bangladesh). After the riots were stopped in Noakhali, the Muslim league claimed that only 500 Hindus were killed in Noakhali, but the survivors said that more than 50000 Hindus were butchered. The Hindu population in Noakhali was nearly annihilated. [9]



The Muslim League, under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, declared August 16, 1946 as Direct Action day.

In 1946, the Indian independence movement against the British Raj had reached a pivotal stage when the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee sent a three member Cabinet Mission to India aimed at discussing and finalising plans for the transfer of power from the British Raj to the Indian leadership, providing India with independence under Dominion status in the Commonwealth of Nations.[10] After holding talks with the representatives of the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League—the two largest political parties in the Constituent Assembly of India—on May 16, 1946, the Mission proposed initial plans of composition of the new Dominion of India and its government.[8][11] On June 16, under pressure from the Muslim League headed by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Mission proposed an alternative plan to arrange for India to be divided into Hindu-majority India and a Muslim-majority Pakistan.[12] The princely states of India would be permitted to accede to either dominion or attain independence.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the one time Congressman and Indian Nationalist, and now the leader of the Muslim League, had accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan of 16 June whereas the Congress rejected it outright.[8][13] On July 10, Jawaharlal Nehru held a press conference in Bombay declaring that the Congress had agreed only to participate in the Constituent Assembly and regarded itself free to change or modify the Cabinet Mission Plan as it thought best.[13] Fearing Hindu Domination[14] in the Constituent Assembly, Jinnah denounced the British Cabinet Mission and decided to boycott the Constituent Assembly to try and put pressure on Congress and the British, by resorting to "Direct Action".[5]

Suhrawardy(on telephone) and Nazimuddin are often criticized for their inability of restoring order soon and delivering fiery speeches at the onset of troubles.
Photo: Margaret Bourke-White.

In July 1946, Jinnah held a press conference at his home in Bombay where he declared his intent to create Pakistan. Jinnah proclaimed that the Muslim league was "preparing to launch a struggle" and that they "have chalked a plan".[5] He had decided to boycott the Constituent Assembly. He rejected the British plan for transfer of power to an interim government which would combine both the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress. He said that if the Muslims were not granted Pakistan then he would launch "Direct Action".[5] When asked to specify Jinnah retorted: "Go to the Congress and ask them their plans. When they take you into their confidence I will take you into mine. Why do you expect me alone to sit with folded hands? I also am going to make trouble."[5]

On the next day, Jinnah announced August 16, 1946 would be "Direct Action Day" for the purpose of winning the separate Muslim state and warned congress, "We do not want war, if you want war we accept your offer unhesitatingly. We shall have India divided or we shall have India destroyed."[5] Muslim League Council Meeting held during the period 27 July–29 July 1946 passed a resolution declaring, the Direct Action Day was intended to unfold “direct action for the achievement of Pakistan.”

In his book The Great Divide, H V Hodson recounted, "The working committee followed up by calling on Muslims throughout India to observe 16th August as direct action day. On that Day meeting would be held all over the country to explain League's resolution. These meetings and processions passed off — as was manifestly the Central league leaders' intention — without more than commonplace and limited disturbance with one vast and tragic exception... what happened was more than anyone could have foreseen."[15]

In Muslim Societies: Historical and Comparative Aspects, edited by Sato Tsugitaka, Nakazato Nariaki writes:

"From the viewpoint of institutional politics, the Calcutta disturbances possessed a distinguishing feature in that they broke out in a transitional period which was marked by the power vacuum and systemic breakdown. It is also important to note that they constituted part of a political struggle in which the Congress and the Muslim League competed with each other for the initiative in establishing the new nation-state(s), while the British made an all-out attempt to carry out decolonization at the lowest possible political cost for them. The political rivalry among the major nationalist parties in Bengal took a form different from that in New Delhi, mainly because of the broad mass base those organizations enjoyed and the tradition of flexible political dealing in which they excelled. At the initial stage of the riots, the Congress and the Muslim League appeared to be confident that they could draw on this tradition even if a difficult situation arose out of political showdown. Most probably, Direct Action Day in Calcutta was planned to be a large-scale hartal and mass rally which they knew very well how to control. However, the response from the masses far exceeded any expectations. The political leaders seriously miscalculated the strong emotional response that the word 'nation', as interpreted under the new situation, had evoked. In August 1946 the 'nation' was no longer a mere political slogan. It was rapidly turning into 'reality' both in realpolitik and in people's imaginations. The system to which Bengal political leaders had grown accustomed for decades could not cope with this dynamic change. As we have seen, it quickly and easily broke down on the first day of the disturbances."[4]


Following Jinnah's declaration of 16 August as the Direct Action Day, acting on the advice of R.L. Walker, the then chief secretary of Bengal, the Muslim League Chief Minister of Bengal, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, requested Governor Burrows to declare a public holiday on that day. Governor Burrows agreed. Walker made this proposal with the hope that the risk of conflicts, especially those related to picketing, would be minimized if government offices, commercial houses and shops remained closed throughout Calcutta on the 16th[4][1][16] Bengal Congress protested against the declaration of public holiday, arguing that a holiday would enable 'the idle folks' to successfully enforce hartals in areas where the Muslim League leadership was uncertain. Congress accused the League government for "indulging in communal policies' for narrow goal".[17] Congress leaders thought that if a public holiday was observed, its own supporters would have no choice but to close down their offices and shops, and thus be compelled against their will to lend a hand in the Muslim League's hartal.[4] In addition, there was an element of pride involved in that the monopolistic position that the Congress had hitherto enjoyed in imposing and enforcing hartals, strikes, etc. was being challenged.[4] However, the League went ahead with the declaration, and Muslim newspapers published the program for the day.

The Star of India, an influential local Muslim newspaper, published detailed programme for the day. The programme called for complete hartal and general strike in all spheres of civic, commercial and industrial life except essential services. The notice proclaimed that processions would start from multiple parts of Calcutta, Howrah, Hooghly, Metiabruz and 24 Parganas, and would converge at the foot of the Ochterlony Monument (now known as Shaheed Minar) where a joint mass rally presided over by Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy would be held. The Muslim League branches were advised to depute three workers in every mosque in every ward to explain the League's action plan before Juma prayers and to report to the district headquarters about arrangements. Moreover, special prayers were arranged in every mosque on Friday after Juma prayers for the freedom of Muslim India.[18]

An armed mob on the prowl
A corpse is surrounded by rioters armed with Lathis, a lethal weapon in trained hands.[19]

The notice drew divine inspiration from the Quran, emphasizing on the coincidence of Direct Action Day with the holy month of Ramzaan, claiming that the upcoming protests were an allegory of Prophet Muhammad's conflict with heathenism and subsequent conquest of Mecca and establishment of the kingdom of Heaven in Arabia.[18]

Hindu public opinion was mobilised around the Akhand Hindusthan (United India) slogan.[20] Certain Congress leaders in Bengal imbibed a strong sense of Hindu identity, especially in view of the perceived threat from the Pakistan movement.[8] Such mobilisation along communal lines was partly successful due to a concerted propaganda campaign which resulted in a 'legitimization of communal solidarities'.[8]

On the other hand, following the protests against the British after INA trials, the British administration decided to give more importance to protests against the government, rather than management of communal violence within the Indian populace, according to their "Emergency Action Scheme".[4] Frederick Burrows, the Governor of Bengal, rationalized the declaration of "public holiday" in his report to Lord Wavell —

...many of the mischief-makers were people who would have had idle hands anyhow. If shops and markets had been generally open, I believe that there would have been even more looting and murder than there was; the holiday gave the peaceable citizens the chance of staying at home...

—Frederick Burrows, Burrows' Report to Lord Wavell.[1]

Riots and Massacre

Victims pile up
Photo:Margaret Bourke-White.
Clean up of the bodies begin with lorries(trucks).
Photo: Margaret Bourke-White.

Troubles started on the morning of the August 16. Even before 10 o'clock Police Headquarters had reported that there was excitement throughout the city, that shops were being forced to close, and that there were many reports of stabbing and throwing of stones and brickbats. The trouble had assumed the communal character which it was to retain throughout.[1] The League's rally began at Ochterloney Monument. The gathering was considered as the 'largest ever Muslim assembly' at that time.[21][22]

The meeting began around 4 pm though processions of Muslims from all parts of Calcutta had started assembling since the midday prayers. A large number of the participants were reported to have been armed with iron bars and lathis (bamboo sticks). The numbers attending were estimated by a Central Intelligence Officer's reporter (a Hindu) at 30,000 and by a Special Branch Inspector (a Muslim) at 500,000. The latter figure is impossibly high and the (Muslim) Star of India reporter put it at about 100,000. The main speakers were Khawaja Nazimuddin and Chief Minister Suhrawardy. Nazimuddin in his speech preached peacefulness and restraint but rather spoilt the effect by asserting that till 11 o'clock that morning all the injured persons were Muslims, and the Muslim community had only retaliated in self-defence.[1] The Chief Minister's speech consisted of both calming and excitatory passages, of which the audience remembered the hot passages more clearly than the cold.[citation needed]

The Special Branch had sent only one Urdu shorthand reporter to the meeting, with the result that no transcript of the Chief Minister's speech is available. But the Central Intelligence Officer and a reporter, who Frederick Burrows believed was reliable, deputed by the military authorities agree on one mischievous statement (not reported at all by the Calcutta Police). The version in the former's report was—"He [the Chief Minister] had seen to police and military arrangements who would not interfere".[1] The version of the latter's was—"He had been able to restrain the military and the police".[1] However, the police did not receive any specific order to "hold back". So, whatever Suhrawardy may have meant to convey by this, the impression of such a statement on a largely uneducated audience must have been that it was an open invitation to disorder[1] indeed, many of the listeners started attacking Hindus and looting Hindu shops as soon as they left the meeting.[1][9] Subsequently, there were reports of lorries (trucks) that came down Harrison Road in Calcutta, carrying Muslim men armed with brickbats and bottles as weapons and attacking Hindu-owned shops.[5]

Hindus and Sikhs were every bit as fierce as the Muslims in the beginning.[5][20] Field Marshal Viscount Wavell estimated that appreciably more Muslims than Hindus were killed. Parties of one community would lie in wait, and as soon as they caught one of the other community, they would cut him to pieces.[23] Near military installations, static guards, forces specially trained to protect such installation, took over from police guards and a party of troops under Major Littleboy, the Assistant Provost-Marshal, did valuable work in the rescue operation for displaced and needy persons. Outside the military areas, the situation worsened hourly. Buses and taxis were charging about loaded with Sikhs and Hindus armed with swords, iron bars and firearms.[24] In later interviews some of the Hindu participants recounted —

... I heard that two goalas (milkmen) had been killed in Beliaghata and riots have started in Boubazar ...;it was a very critical time for the country; the country had to be saved. If we become a part of Pakistan, we will be oppressed… so I called all my boys and said, this is the time we have to retaliate, and you have to answer brutality with brutality ... We were fighting those who attacked us ... We fought and killed them. So if we heard one murder has taken place, we committed ten more ... the ratio should be one to ten, that was the order to my boys.

—Gopal Patha, BBC "50 years of India’s independence".[2]

... I saw four trucks standing, all with dead bodies piled at least three feet high; like molasses in a sack, they were stacked on the trucks, blood and brain oozing out… that sight had a tremendous effect on me ... One murder would fetch ten rupees, and a wounding would bring five ...

—Jugal Chandra Ghosh, BBC "50 years of India’s independence".[2]

Troops finally arrive

The region most affected by the violence was the densely populated sector of the city bounded by Park Circus on the south, CIT Road on the east, Vivekananda Road on the north and Strand Road on the west. Official estimate put the casualties at 4,000 dead and 100,000 injured. Other sources put the death toll at 7,000–10,000.[2] Some authors have claimed that most of the victims were Hindus.[21] However, others indicate appreciably more Muslims were killed than Hindus.[23][25]

Skirmishes between the communities continued for almost a week. Finally, on 21 August, 5 battalions British troops, supported by 4 battalions Indians and Gurkhas, were deployed in the city. Lord Wavell alleged that more British troops ought to have been called in earlier, and there is no indication that more British troops were not available.[23] The rioting reduced on 22 August.[22]

Characteristics of the riot

Victims wait in line to get food.

In earlier riots in Calcutta, shops dealing with immediate consumer goods or items whose price had just risen were mostly looted. However, in the riot of 1946 any shop was an object of attack, the only discriminatory feature being Muslims exclusively pillaging Hindu shops and vice versa.[4][7] Collective violence on either side also displayed features of organisation. The looted booty was carried to waiting lorries for transportation to a central place, shops were marked carefully with signs so that the crowd left untouched the establishments of their co-religionists.[20] Houses of a particular community were attacked simultaneously. Both League and Congress volunteers used Red Cross badges to evade police detection.[20] Perhaps at the height of antagonism the Hindu and Muslim crowd were impregnated with cross-fertilisation of ideas on collective conduct wherein one was copying the acts of others.[8]

The Muslim League mobilised all its frontal organisations to make the Direct Action Day a success. Special coupons for gallons of petrol (gasoline) were issued in the names of League ministers to be used by their party functionaries, the petrol was used to incinerate Hindu businesses. One month's food ration for 10,000 people was drawn in advance to feed the League activists. Once the riots began the Chief Minister, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, accompanied by his political aids, spent considerable time in the Police Control Room while Muslims executed the riots.[22] This made it extremely difficult for the Commissioner of Police, who was primarily responsible for handling the situation, to give clear and balanced decisions on all the numerous calls for help that were pouring in.[citation needed] It is not of course the function of a Minister to direct detailed operations, but the position was one of considerable delicacy as the Commissioner of Police could not insist on the extrusion from the Control Room of the Minister responsible for law and order.

At the same time, however, Suhrawardy put forth a great deal of effort to bring reluctant British officials around to calling the army in from Sealdah Rest Camp. Unfortunately, British officials did not send the army out until 1.45am on the 17th.[4]

On the other hand, Marwari merchants purchased arms and ammunitions from American soldiers, which were later used during the riot.[22] Acid bombs were manufactured and stored in Hindu-owned factories before the outbreak. Calcutta's Hindu blacksmiths were mobilised to prepare spearheads and other weapons.[22] Violence in Calcutta, between 1945 and 1946, passed by stages from Indian versus European to Hindu versus Muslim. Indian Christians and Europeans were generally free from molestation[26] as the tempo of Hindu-Muslim violence quickened. The decline of anti-European feelings as communal Hindu-Muslim tensions increased during this period is evident from the casualty numbers. During the riots of November 1945, casualty of Europeans and Christians were 46; in the riots of the 10 February–14 February 1946, 35; from February 15 to the August 15, only 3; during the Calcutta riots from August 15, 1946 to September 17, 1946, none.[27]


People crossing the Howrah Bridge to escape the violence in Calcutta.
Photo: Margaret Bourke-White.

During the riots, thousands began fleeing Calcutta. For several days the Howrah Bridge over the Hooghly River was crowded with evacuees headed for the Howrah station to escape the mayhem in Calcutta. Many of them would not escape the violence that spread out into the region outside Calcutta.[5] Lord Wavell claimed during his meeting on August 27, 1946 that Gandhi had told him, "If India wants bloodbath she shall have it ... if a bloodbath was necessary, it would come about in spite of non-violence".[28]

There was criticism of Suhrawardy, Chief Minister in charge of the Home Portfolio in Calcutta, for being partisan and of Sir Frederick John Burrows, the British Governor of Bengal, for not having taken control of the situation. The Chief Minister spent a great deal of time in the Control Room in the Police Headquarters at Lalbazar, often attended by some of his supporters. Short of a direct order from the Governor, there was no way of preventing the Chief Minister from visiting the Control Room whenever he liked; and Governor Burrows was not prepared to give such an order, as it would clearly have indicated complete lack of faith in him.[1]

There are several views on the exact cause of the direct action day riots. According to intelligentsia, riots were instigated by members of the Muslim League and its affiliate Volunteer Corps'[1][4][7][8][17][29] in the city in order to enforce the declaration by the Muslim League that Muslims throughout the subcontinent were to 'suspend all business' to support their demand for an independent Pakistan.[1][4][7][30] However, supporters of the Muslim League believed that the Congress Party was behind the violence in an effort to weaken the fragile Muslim League government in Bengal.[1][10][17] Members of the Indian National Congress, including Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru responded negatively to the riots and expressed shock. The riots would lead to further rioting and pogroms between Hindus and Sikhs and Muslims. These events sowed the seeds for the eventual Partition of India.[9]

Further Rioting in India

The Direct Action Day riots sparked off several riots between Muslims and Hindus/Sikhs in Noakhali, Bihar, Punjab, and the North Western Frontier Province in that year.

Noakhali–Tippera Riot

An important incident following Direct Action Day was the Noakhali and Tippera district massacres in October 1946. The Noakhali–Tippera riot was a direct sequel to the Great Calcutta Riot and therefore, believed to be a repercussion of the latter. However, studies have indicated that violence was different in nature from Calcutta.[8][21]

Rioting in the districts began in the Ramganj police station area in the northern Noakhali District on October 10, 1946.[21] The violence unleashed was described as "the organized fury of the Muslim mob".[31] It soon engulfed the neighbouring police stations of Raipur, Lakshmipur, Begumganj and Sandip in Noakhali, and Faridganj, Hajiganj, Chandpur, Lakshman and Chudagram in Tippera.[21][32] The devastation caused by widespread violence was quite extensive. Initial statistics regarding casualties remained doubtful. While the "Hindu" press placed the figures in thousands, the "League" press went on to the other extreme and even denied incidents of death.[24] However, the official estimate was a conservative 200.[21][32]

The immediate occasion for the outbreak of the disturbances was the looting of a Bazaar (market) in Ramganj police station following the holding of a mass meeting and provocative speech by Gholam Sarwar Hussein. This included attacks on the house of Surendra Nath Bose and Rajendra Lal Roy Choudhury, the erstwhile president of the Nokhali Bar and a prominent Hindu Mahasabha leader.[21][32]

Rest of India

Some of the worst riots happened in Bihar and Garhmukteshwar in United Provinces. The Bihar riot began on 25 October 1946, which was being observed as Noakhali day. Severe violence broke out in Chapra and Saran district, between 25 and 28 of October. Very soon Patna, Munger and Bhagalpur became the sites of serious violence. By November 3, the official estimate put the figure of death at 445.[8][32]


  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Burrows, Frederick (1946). Report to Viceroy Lord Wavell. The British Library IOR: L/P&J/8/655 f.f. 95, 96-107. 
  2. ^ a b c d Sengupta, Debjani (2006). A City Feeding on Itself: Testimonies and Histories of ‘Direct Action’ Day. Sarai Reader. 
  3. ^ L/I/1/425. The British Library Archives, London.
  4. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Tsugitaka, Sato (2000). Muslim Societies: Historical and Comparative Aspects. Routledge. p. 112. ISBN 0415332540. 
  5. ^ a b c d e f g h i Bourke-White, Margaret (1949). Halfway to Freedom: A Report on the New India. Simon and Schuster, New York. 
  6. ^ Panigrahi, D.N. (2004). India's Partition: The Story of Imperialism in Retreat. Routledge, pp.294. 
  7. ^ a b c d Islam, Prof. Sirajul (Chief Editor) (2000). Calcutta Riot (1946). "Banglapedia". Asiatic Society of Bangladesh. 
  8. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Das, Suranjan (May 2000). "The 1992 Calcutta Riot in Historical Continuum: A Relapse into 'Communal Fury'?". Modern Asian Studies (Cambridge University Press) 34 (2): 281–306. doi:10.1017/S0026749X0000336X. 
  9. ^ a b c Keay, John (2000). India: A history. Grove Press. p. 505. 
  10. ^ a b Jalal, Ayesha (1994). The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521458501. 
  11. ^ Mansergh, Nicholas; Moon, Penderel (1977). The Transfer of Power 1942-7 .. Vol VII. Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London. ISBN 9780115800825. 
  12. ^ Yusufi, Khurshid (1996). Statements and Messages of the Quaid-e-Azam .. Vol IV. Bazm-i-Iqbal. ISBN 9698042008. 
  13. ^ a b Azad, Abul Kalām (1988). India Wins Freedom. Orient Longman. ISBN 81-250-0514-5. 
  14. ^ Kaufmann, Chaim D. (Autumn 1998). "When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century". International Security (The MIT Press) 23 (2): 120–156. doi:10.2307/2539381. 
  15. ^ Hodson, H V (1997). Great Divide; Britain, India, Pakistan. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0195778212. 
  16. ^ Tyson, John D.. IOR: Tyson Papers, Eur E341/41, Tyson's note on Calcutta disturbances, 29 September 1946.. 
  17. ^ a b c Chakrabarty, Bidyut (2004). The Partition of Bengal and Assam, 1932-1947: Contour of Freedom. RoutledgeCurzon. ISBN 0415328896. 
  18. ^ a b Programme for Direct Action Day, Star of India, Published: 13 August, 1946.
  19. ^ "Dead Kafir". Hulton Archive. Getty Image. August 1946. Retrieved 2009-09-23. 
  20. ^ a b c d Das, Suranjan (1991). Communal Riots in Bengal, 1905-1947. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0195628403. 
  21. ^ a b c d e f g Batabyal, Rakesh (2005). Communalism in Bengal : From Famine to Noakhali, 1943-47. Sage Publishers. ISBN 0761933352. 
  22. ^ a b c d e Rashid, Harun-or (1987). The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh: Bengal Muslim League and Muslim Politics, 1936-1947,. Asiatic Society of Bangladesh. 
  23. ^ a b c Wavell, Archibald P. (1946). Report to Lord Pethick-Lawrence. British Library Archives: IOR. 
  24. ^ a b Tuker, Francis (1950). While Memory Serves. Cassell. 
  25. ^ Wolpert, Stanley (1984). Jinnah of Pakistan. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0195034120. 
  26. ^ Lambert, Richard (1951). Hindu-Muslim Riots. Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, pp.179. 
  27. ^ Horowitz, Donald L. (October 1973). "Direct, Displaced, and Cumulative Ethnic Aggression". Comparative Politics (Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York) 6 (1): 1–16. doi:10.2307/421343. 
  28. ^ Seervai, H. M. (1990). Partition of India: Legend and Reality. Oxford University Press. p. 78. ISBN 9780195977196. 
  29. ^ Chatterji, Joya (1994). Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932-1947. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521523281. 
  30. ^ "Direct Action". Time. Time Inc. 26 August 1946.,9171,933559,00.html. Retrieved 2008-04-10. 
  31. ^ Ghosh Choudhuri, Haran C. (6 February 1947). Proceedings of the Bengal Legislative Assembly (PBLA). Vol LXXVII. Bengal Legislative Assembly. 
  32. ^ a b c d Mansergh, Nicholas; Moon, Penderel (1980). The Transfer of Power 1942-7.. Vol IX. Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London. ISBN 9780115800849. 

See also

Got something to say? Make a comment.
Your name
Your email address