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1948 Palestinian exodus from Lydda and Ramla
A woman dressed in shorts, with a scarf over her head and a machine gun over her right shoulder, squats down and takes a cigarette from a packet being held in the right hand of an elderly man wearing a robe and a turban, who is sitting on the ground
A female soldier from Israel's Yiftah Brigade takes a cigarette from an Arab resident in Lydda, after the fall of the city.
Other names Lydda death march
Participants Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Arab Legion, Arab residents of Lydda and Ramla
Location Lydda, Ramla, and surrounding villages, then part of Palestine, now part of Israel
Date 12 July 1948
Result 50,000–70,000 residents fled from, or were expelled by, the IDF

The 1948 Palestinian exodus from Lydda and Ramla began around July 12, 1948, when 50,000–70,000 Palestinian residents fled or were expelled as Israeli troops moved into the towns. Israel's military action occurred within the context of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, triggered when five Arab states invaded the area following its declaration of independence on May 14. Both towns, which had been Arab areas in Palestine, became predominantly Jewish areas in the new state of Israel, with Lydda becoming known as Lod.[1]

Between 290–450 Palestinians and around 10 Israeli soldiers were killed during the conquest of Lydda. The death toll in Ramla is unknown, but presumed lower because it surrendered immediately.[2] Once the Israelis were in control, expulsion orders were issued by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Ramla's residents were bussed out. The people of Lydda walked 17 kilometers (10 miles) to Barfiliya in temperatures of 30–35 °C (86–95 °F), from where the Arab LegionJordan's British-led army—helped them reach a refugee camp in Ramallah.[3] The harsh conditions of the exodus, known as the Lydda death march, caused deaths among the refugees, with figures ranging from just a few to 355, mostly from exhaustion and dehydration. Eyewitnesses also said people were killed by Israeli soldiers for refusing to part with their valuables.[4]

According to the Israeli army, their actions averted an Arab threat to Tel Aviv, helped them gain control of the road to Jerusalem, and, by clogging the roads with refugees, thwarted an Arab Legion advance.[5] The exodus accounted for one-tenth of the overall Arab exodus from Palestine, known in the Arab world as al-Nakba ("the catastrophe").[6] One of the key issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is whether the refugees ought to have the right of return, which Israel views as a threat to its identity as a Jewish state.

Until the late 1970s, Israel's historians maintained that the Palestinians had been ordered to leave by their Arab leaders, or had simply fled. In the 1980s, newly released Israeli government documents showed that residents had, in fact, been expelled from Lydda and Ramla by the IDF. The documents triggered a reassessment of Israel's role in the events of 1948 by a group of Israeli scholars known as the "New Historians."[7]

Contents

Background

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UN partition plan, Israel's declaration of independence

Eleven men sitting behind a conference table. One man is standing and holding a text. There is a large photograph of a bearded man on the wall behind them with a Star of David on either side of him.
David Ben-Gurion declares Israel's independence, 14 May 1948.

Lydda and Ramla were Arab towns in Palestine, which was under British rule from 1917 to 1948. On 30 November 1947, after 30 years of conflict in the country between Jews and Arabs, the United Nations voted to divide it into two states, one Jewish and one Arab, with Lydda and Ramla to form part of the latter. The proposal was welcomed by the Jewish leadership in Palestine and rejected by the Arab leadership. Civil war broke out between the communities, marking the start of the period historians call the 1948 Palestine War. The British decided to pull out of the area, and on 14 May 1948, the day British rule ended, the State of Israel declared its independence. Several Arab states—Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Transjordan—launched an attack on the new state the next day, triggering the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.

Strategic importance of Lydda and Ramla

A map from 1947 showing in yellow the area that became Israel, and in orange the areas that were Jewish settlements. Syria, Egypt and Trans-Jordan are in the background in beige.
Palestine in 1947, showing the locations of Lydda and Ramla.

Lydda dates back to 6000 BCE, which made it one of the oldest cities in Palestine. It is the city in which Saint George, the patron saint of England, was martyred, according to Christian legend.[8] Ramla, three kilometers away, was founded in the 8th century CE and had been the provincial capital of Jund Filastin.[9] The two towns were strategically important because they sat at the intersection of Palestine's main north–south and east–west roads. In 1948, the area's largest British army camp lay a few kilometers south-west of Lydda at Sarafand, and one of the largest British depots was seven kilometers north-east of Lydda at Bayt Nabala. Palestine's main airport lay just to the north of Lydda, and its main railway junction was Lydda itself. The main source of Jerusalem's water supply was at Ras al-Ayn, 15 kilometers north of Lydda.[10]

Throughout 1947, Jewish and Arab militias had been attacking each other on roads and villages near the cities. Following Israel's declaration of independence on 14 May 1948, there were ground attacks on Ramla on 21–22 and 24–25 May, and on 30 May, the IDF bombed both towns, killing three and injuring 11.[11] Israel's prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, had developed what Israeli historian Benny Morris calls an obsession with the towns, seeing them as serious threats to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary several times that they had to be "destroyed," and on 16 June 1948, he told the Israeli cabinet that the "two thorns" had to be removed.[12]

Operation Danny

Israel subsequently launched a military operation, Operation Danny, to neutralize Arab forces in the Lydda–Ramla–Latrun–Ramallah area, and to bring relief to Jerusalem and the Tel Aviv–Jerusalem road.[13] On 7 July the IDF appointed Yigal Allon to head the operation, with Yitzhak Rabin, who became Israel's prime minister in 1974, as his deputy.[14] It was carried out between 9 July 1948, the end of the first truce in the Arab-Israeli war, and 18 July, the start of the second truce, a period known in Israeli historiography as the Ten Days.[15]

Israel mistakenly believed the Arab Legion, Jordan's army, had a substantial force in the area, but in fact there were only 120–150 Arab Legion soldiers in Lydda and Ramla, bolstered by 1,500–2,000 local residents who had been trained and armed.[6] Based on the faulty intelligence, the IDF assembled 8,000–9,000 men and third artillery pieces for its invasion of the towns—two Palmach brigades, Harel and Yiftah; the Eighth Armored Brigade's 82nd and 89th Battalions; and several battalions of Kiryati and Alexandroni infantry men.[16]

Lydda's defenses

Ancient buildings, several with domed roofs, with a church in the background and a palm tree at the very back and another at the forefront.
Lydda in 1920 with St. George's Church in the background

In July 1948, Lydda and Ramla had a joint population of 50,000–70,000 Arabs, 20,000 of whom were refugees from Jaffa and the surrounding area.[17] Several Palestinian towns had already fallen to Jewish, and then Israeli, advances since April—as well as Jaffa, there was Tiberias, Haifa, Safad, Acre, and Baysan—but Lydda and Ramla had held out. In January, John Bagot Glubb, the British soldier who led Jordan's Arab Legion, had toured Palestinian towns and villages, including Lydda and Ramla, urging them to prepare to defend themselves. The Legion had distributed barbed wire and as many weapons as could be spared.[18]

Israeli historians Alon Kadish and Avraham Sela write that Lydda's national committee had mobilized resources, acquired arms, conducted training, constructed trenches, requisitioned vehicles, and organized medical services. They write that, by the time of the Israeli invasion, the militia in Lydda numbered 1,000 men equipped with rifles, submachine guns, 15 machine guns, five heavy machine guns, 25 anti-tank launchers, six or seven light field-guns and two or three heavy ones, and armored cars with machine guns.[19] Palestinian historian Walid Khalidi writes that the only troops defending Lydda were 125 men from the Arab Legion, the rest of them volunteer civilian residents under the command of a retired British Arab-Legion sergeant.[10]

A distinguished looking man look to his right. He is wearing a white turban, and has a beard and mustache.
King Abdullah of Jordan (1882–1951) withdrew most of his troops just before the Israeli invasion.[20]

The local militia also stopped women and children from leaving, because their departure had acted elsewhere as a catalyst for the men to leave too.[19] Kadish and Sela write that it was common for Palestinians to leave their homes under threat of Israeli invasion, in part because they feared atrocities, particularly rape, and in part because of a reluctance to live under Jewish rule—what Kadish and Sela call "an unthinkable idea." In Lydda's case, the fears were more particular: a few days before the city fell, a Jew found in Lydda's train station had been publicly executed and his body mutilated by residents, who, according to Kadish and Sela, now feared Jewish reprisals.[21]

A number of Arab Legion soldiers, including 200–300 Bedouin volunteers, had arrived in Lydda and Ramla in April, and a company-sized force had set itself up in the old British police stations in Lydda and on the Lydda-Ramla road, with armored cars and other weapons. An Arab Legion officer was appointed military governor of both towns, signalling the desire of Abdullah I of Jordan to stake a claim in the parts of Palestine allotted by the UN to an Arab-Palestinian state, but Glubb advised the king and the Jordanian prime minister, Tawfik Abu al-Huda, that the Legion was overstretched and could not hold Lydda and Ramla. As a result, Abdullah ordered the Legion to assume a defensive position only, and the Legionnaires already in Lydda withdrew during the night of 11–12 July.[22]

Fall of the cities

Air attacks and Moshe Dayan raid

The Israelis captured Lydda airport on 10 July.

The Israeli air force began bombing the cities on the night of 9–10 July, intending to induce civilian flight, and it seemed to work in Ramla: at 11:30 hours on the morning of 10 July, Operation Danny headquarters (Danny HQ) told the IDF that there was a "general and serious flight from Ramla."[23] That afternoon, Danny HQ told one of its brigades to facilitate the flight of women, children, and the elderly, but to detain men of military age.[24] On the same day, the IDF took control of Lydda airport.[25]

During the afternoon of 11 July, Israel's 89th (armored) Battalion led by Lt. Col. Moshe Dayan, moved into Lydda. Israeli historian Anita Shapira writes that the raid was launched entirely on Dayan's own initiative, without even warning his brigade commander, and was illustrative of the lack of discipline that contributed to the legend that grew around him.[26] He had organized a column of jeeps headed by a "terrible tiger," an armored vehicle with a cannon. They launched the attack in daylight, fully exposed and using enormous firepower, before proceeding to Ramla.[27] Kadish and Sela write that his troops faced heavy fire from the Arab Legion troops in the police stations in Lydda and on the Lydda-Ramla road.[19] Kenneth Bilby, a correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune was in the city at the time. He wrote:

Moshe Dayan led a jeep commando column into the town ... with rifles, Stens, and sub-machine guns blazing. It coursed through the main streets, blasting at everything that moved ... the corpses of Arab men, women, and even children were strewn about the streets in the wake of this ruthlessly brilliant charge.[28]

Moshe Dayan (1915-1981) led a raid on Lydda "blasting at everything that moved."[28]

The raid lasted 47 minutes, leaving dozens of Arabs dead—up to 200, according to the Israeli and American press the next day; 100–150, according to Dayan's 89th Battalion and 40, according to the IDF's Third Battalion intelligence, though they may have meant 40 killed by them specifically. Six died and 21 were wounded on the Israeli side.[29] Kadish and Sela write that the high casualty rate among civilians was caused by confusion over who Dayan's troops were. The IDF were wearing keffiyehs, and were led by an armored car seized from the Arab Legion. Lydda's southern entrance was awash with Arab fighters, and grenades were being thrown from all directions. In the confusion, residents may have believed the Israeli attack was over, and that the Arab Legion had arrived, only to encounter Dayan's forces shooting at everything as they ran from their homes.[19]

On the same day, the Israeli air force dropped leaflets onto the towns telling residents to surrender or die.[6] That evening, 300–400 Israeli soldiers entered Lydda. Not long afterwards, the Arab Legion forces on the Lydda-Ramla road withdrew, though a small number of Arab soldiers remained in the Lydda police station.

Surrender

At dawn on 12 July, Israeli troops entered the old town in Lydda. Community leaders in both towns were told to surrender, which they did in Ramla, after which the Israelis mortared the city, entered it, and imposed a curfew.[30] Two very different images have emerged of the town under occupation. The family of Khalil Wazir, who later joined the PLO and became known as Abu Jihad, owned a grocer's store in Ramla. He was 12 years old at the time:

Prisoners in Ramla, 12-13 July 1948

I will never forget that day. The men had gathered together. And they were saying that the Jews were going to do to us what they had done in Deir Yassin. That they had surrounded the town and were about to enter it. ... And then my mother and my sisters and I went to the church. The whole village went to the church. ... I remember the archbishop standing in front of the church. He was holding a white flag. ... Afterwards we came out and the picture will never be erased from my mind. There were bodies scattered on the road and between the houses and the side streets. No one, not even women or children, had been spared if they were out in the street. ...[31]

Against this, the American writer Arthur Koestler, working at the time as a journalist, visited Ramla a few hours after the invasion:

The Arabs were hanging about in the street much as usual, except for a few hundred youths of military age who have been put into a barbed wire cage and were taken off in lorries to an internment camp. Their veiled mothers and wives were carrying food and water to the cage, arguing with the Jewish sentries and pulling their sleeves, obviously quite unafraid. ... Groups of Arabs came marching down the main street with their arms above their heads, grinning broadly, without any guards, to give themselves up. The one prevailing feeling among all seemed to be that as far as Ramleh was concerned the war was over, and thank God for it.[32]

No formal surrender was announced in Lydda, though people gathered in the streets waving white flags. According to a contemporaneous IDF account: "Groups of old and young, women and children streamed down the streets in a great display of submissiveness, bearing white flags, and entered of their own free will the detention compounds we arranged in the mosque and church—Muslims and Christians separately." The buildings soon filled up, and women and children were released, leaving several thousand men inside, including 4,000 in the town's Great Mosque.[33]

July 12: Alleged massacres

Unexpected shooting

On 12 July, at 11:30 hours, two or three Arab Legion armored cars entered the city, led by Lt. Hamadallah al-Abdullah from the Jordanian 1st Brigade. Israeli historian Yoav Gelber writes that the legionnaires in the police station were panicking, and had been sending frantic messages to their HQ: "Have you no God in your hearts? Don't you feel any compassion? Hasten aid!"[34]

The Arab Legion armored cars opened fire on the Israeli soldiers who were combing the old city. The exchange of gunfire led residents to believe the Legion had arrived in force, and those still armed started firing at the Israelis. Kadish and Sela write that the Israelis came under heavy fire from thousands of weapons from every house, roof and window, quoting the Third Battalion's commander, Moshe Kelman. Morris argues that this is nonsense, and that only a few dozen townspeople took part in what turned out to be a brief firefight. Brief or not, the Israeli soldiers were unnerved by it: there were only 300–400 of them to quell tens of thousands of residents, and they had been under the impression the locals had surrendered, albeit informally.[35]

Israeli response

Israeli troops in Lydda or Ramla, July 1948

Gelber describes what followed as the bloodiest massacre of the war. Shapira writes that the Israelis had no experience of governing civilians and panicked.[36] One of the Israeli battalion commanders, Moshe Kalman, ordered troops to shoot at any clear target, including at anyone seen on the streets.[37] Kelman said he had no choice; there was no chance of immediate reinforcements, and no indication of where the attacks were coming from.[38] Israeli soldiers threw grenades into houses they suspected snipers were hiding in. Residents ran out of their homes in panic and were shot. Hundreds died.[6]

The Israelis reported 250 Palestinians killed and an unknown number wounded. Palestinian historian Aref al-Aref places the death toll at 426, 179 of whom were killed in the mosque (see below).[39] Muhammad Nimr al-Khatib writes that 1,700 were killed,[40] which Morris regards as an exaggeration. An Arab intelligence report said, "the Jews massacred close to 3000."[41] Morris writes that both Israeli and Arab historians have described the events as an "uprising," though for different reasons: the Israelis to justify the death toll, and the Palestinians to show they stood tall in the face of aggression.[7]

The Dahmash mosque just after occupation.

At some point during the afternoon of 12 July, there was shooting in one of the mosques, during a confusing incident that has come to be known in the Arab world as a massacre separate from the shooting in the town. Around 4,000 male Muslim detainees had been taken to the Great Mosque the day before. There was also a smaller mosque called the Dahmash Mosque. Christian detainees had been taken either to the church or to the Greek Orthodox monastery nearby, leaving the Muslims inside the Great Mosque in fear of a massacre.[42]

Morris writes that some of the Great Mosque detainees tried to break out, hearing the shooting in the town and fearing they were about to be killed. The IDF threw grenades and fired bazooka rockets into a mosque compound. Kadish and Sela write that it was in the smaller mosque that a firefight broke out between armed militiamen inside and Israeli soldiers outside; they say the Israelis fired an anti-tank PIAT shell into it, then stormed it, killing 30 inside. Whichever mosque the shooting was in, there is confusion about the number killed. An eyewitness published a memoir in 1998 saying he had removed 95 bodies from the Dahmash Mosque, though others spoke of 600 dead. Aref al-Aref writes that 179 were killed.[43] Other residents were required to move and dispose of the corpses. Eyewitness Fayeq Abu Mana, who was 20 years old at the time, told a meeting arranged by the Israeli charity, Zochrot:

They said to go to the mosque and take the corpses out from there. How take them out? The hands of the dead were very swollen. We couldn't lift the corpses by hand, we brought bags and put the corpses on the bags and we lifted them onto a truck. We gathered everyone in the cemetery. Among them was one woman and two children. They said burn. We burned everyone.[44]

After the shooting

The ruins of Lydda after the assault

Bodies littered the streets in Lydda and the Lydda–Ramla road, posing a health risk and a political problem. The Red Cross was due to visit Ramla on or around 12 July, but the new Israeli governor of the town, from the Kiryati Brigade, issued an order to have the visit delayed. It was rescheduled for 15:00 hours on 14 July; Danny HQ ordered Israeli troops to "evacuate all the refugees [and] to get rid of the corpses" by that time. The order seems not to have been carried out. On 15 July, Dr. Klaus Dreyer of the IDF Medical Corps complained that there were still unburied corpses in and around Lydda, which constituted a health hazard and a "moral and aesthetic issue." He asked the IDF to commandeer trucks and Palestinian residents to fix the problem.[45]

Expulsion orders

Decision to expel

Benny Morris writes that David Ben-Gurion, Israel's prime minister, and the IDF were left to their own devices to decide how Arab residents were to be treated. As a result, their policy was haphazard and circumstantial, depending in part on the location, but also on the religion and ethnicity of the town. The Arabs of Western and Lower Galilee, mainly Christian and Druze, were allowed to stay in place, but Lydda and Ramla, mainly Muslim, were almost completely emptied.[46] There was no official policy to expel the Palestinian population, he writes, but the idea of transfer was "in the air," and the leadership understood this.[47]

The 12 July resistence in Lydda seems to have sealed the townpeople's fate. That day, as the shooting in the city continued, a meeting was held at Operation Danny headquarters between Ben-Gurion, Generals Yigael Yadin and Zvi Ayalon of the IDF, and Yisrael Galili, formerly of the Haganah (the pre-IDF army). Also present were Yigal Allon, commanding officer of Operation Danny, and his deputy Yitzhak Rabin.[48]

Rabin's account

Yitzhak Rabin (1922–1995) signed the expulsion order

According to Rabin's account in 1977, at one point he, Ben-Gurion, and Allon left the room. Allon asked what was to be done with the residents. Rabin said Ben-Gurion waved his hand and said, "garesh otam"—"expel them."[49] In the manuscript of his memoirs in 1979, Rabin wrote that Ben-Gurion "waved his hand in a gesture which said 'Drive them out!'".[48] "Driving out" is a term with a harsh ring," he wrote. "Psychologically, this was one of the most difficult actions we undertook. The population of Lod did not leave willingly. There was no way of avoiding the use of force and warning shots in order to make the inhabitants march the 10 to 15 miles to the point where they met up with the legion."[48] An Israeli censorship board composed of five Cabinet members removed this section from Rabin's manuscripts. Peretz Kidron, an Israeli journalist who translated the memoirs into English, passed the censored text to David Shipler of The New York Times, where it was published on 23 October 1979.[50]

Yigal Allon: "There was no expulsion order, but rather a provoked exodus."[51]

In an interview with The New York Times two days later, Yigal Allon took issue with Rabin's version of events. "With all my high esteem for Rabin during the war of independence, I was his commander and my knowledge of the facts is therefore more accurate," he told Shipler. "I did not ask the late Ben-Gurion for permission to expel the population of Lydda. I did not receive such permission and did not give such orders." He said the residents left in part because they were told to by the Arab Legion so the latter could recapture Lydda at a later date, and in part because they were panic-stricken.[52] Allon described it elsewhere as a "provoked exodus," rather than an expulsion.[53]

Yoav Gelber also takes issue with Rabin's account. He attributes the expulsions to Allon, who he says was known for his scorched earth policy. Wherever Allon was in charge of Israeli troops, Gelber writes, no Palestinians remained.[54] In 1950, Allon gave a lecture on the war to a KM Forum, during which Shapira writes that he was uncharacteristically frank. He said he blamed the Palestinian exodus on three factors. First, they fled because they were projecting: the Arabs imagined that the Jews would do to them what they would do to the Jews if positions were reversed. Second, Arab and British leaders encouraged people to leave their towns so as not to be taken hostage, so they could return to fight another day. Third, there were some cases of expulsion, though these were not the norm. In Lydda and Ramla, the Arab Legion continued to attack Israeli outposts in the hope of reconnecting with their troops in Lydda, he said. When the expulsions started, the attacks died down. To leave the towns' hostile populations in place would be to risk them being used by the Legion to coordinate further attacks. Allon said he had no regrets: "War is war. In war things must be measured according to the criteria of war, the criteria of revolution."[55]

Orders issued

Bechor-Shalom Sheetrit (1895–1967) tried to stop the expulsions.[56]

At 13:30 hours on 12 July, just as the shooting in Lydda had stopped, the IDF issued the expulsion orders for Lydda and Ramla.[57] The Israeli cabinet reportedly knew nothing about the expulsion plan until Bechor-Shalom Sheetrit, minister for minority affairs appeared unannounced in Ramla on 12 July. He was shocked when he saw troops organizing expulsions.[58]

Sheetrit returned to Tel Aviv for a meeting with Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, who later met with Ben Gurion to agree on guidelines for how the residents were to be treated, though Morris writes that Ben Gurion apparently failed to tell Sharett that he himself was the source of the expulsion orders. The men agreed that the townspeople should be told anyone who wanted to leave could do so, but that anyone who stayed was responsible for himself and would not be given food. Women and children were not to be forced to leave, and the monasteries and churches must not be damaged, though no mention was made of the mosques.[59] Sharett's order was passed to Operation Danny HQ at 23:30 hours on 12 July, ten hours after the expulsion orders were issued. Sharett believed he had managed to avert the expulsions, not realizing that, even as he was discussing them in Tel Aviv, they had already begun.[6]

Exodus

Agreement to leave

By 13 July, the wishes of the IDF and those of the residents had dovetailed. Over the past three days, the townspeople had undergone aerial bombardment, ground invasion, had seen grenades thrown into their homes and hundreds of residents killed, had been living under a curfew, had been abandoned by the Arab Legion, and the able-bodied men had been rounded up. Morris writes they had concluded that living under Israeli rule was not sustainable.[60] The important thing, wrote Spiro Munayyer, an eyewitness, was to get out of the city.[61] A deal was reached with IDF soldier Shmarya Guttman, normally an archeologist, that the residents would leave in exchange for the release of the prisoners; according to Guttman, he went to the mosque himself and told the men they were free to join their families.[62] Town criers and soldiers walked or drove around the town instructing residents where to gather for departure.[63]

Notwithstanding that an agreement may have been reached, Morris writes that the troops understood that what followed was an act of deportation, not a voluntary exodus. While the residents were still in the town, IDF radio traffic had already started calling them "refugees" (plitim).[64] Operation Danny HQ told the IDF General Staff/Operations at noon on July 13 that "[the troops in Lydda] are busy expelling the inhabitants [oskim begeirush hatoshavim]," and told the HQs of Kiryati, 8th and Yiftah brigades at the same time that, "enemy resistance in Ramle and Lydda has ended. The eviction [pinui]" of the inhabitants ... has begun."[65]

The march

Refugees leaving Ramla.

During the afternoon and evening of 12 July, thousands of Ramla's residents began moving out of town, on foot or in trucks and buses. The IDF used its own vehicles and confiscated Arab ones to move them.[66] Lydda residents were made to walk, possibly because of their earlier resistance, or because there were no vehicles left. Whatever the reason, they walked 6–7 kilometers to Beit Nabala, then 10–12 kilometers to Barfiliya, along dusty roads in temperatures of 30–35C, carrying their young children and their portable possessions, either in carts pulled by animals, or on their backs.[6] Possessions were slowly abandoned as people grew tired, or collapsed. "To begin with [jettisoned] utensils and furniture," one Israeli witness wrote, "and in the end, bodies of men, women, and children."[67] Witnesses also report that soldiers moved among residents telling them, "Go to King Abdullah, go to Ramallah."[68] After a three-day march, the refugees were picked up by the Arab Legion and driven to Ramallah.[69] Shmarya Guttman of the IDF wrote that the march made him think of the exile of Israel, or a pogrom:

A multitude of inhabitants walked one after another. Women walked burdened with packages and sacks on their heads. Mothers dragged children after them ... Occasionally, [IDF] warning shots were heard ... Occasionally, you encountered a piercing look from one of the youngsters ... and the look said, "We have not yet surrendered. We shall return to fight you.[70]

Six women and five children rest in shade on a sunny day. The women sit on the ground; the only unveiled one turns and looks at the camera. One tired young child sits; the others stand.
Women and children rest during the three-day exodus.

Reports vary regarding how many died. Many were elderly people and young children, who died from the heat and exhaustion.[48] Morris has written that it was a "handful and perhaps dozens," and "quite a few."[71] He attributes a figure of 335 to Nimr al Khatib, but regards it as an exaggeration. Khalidi gives a figure of 350, citing Aref al-Aref.[72]

The expulsions clogged the roads eastward with what Morris calls human flotsam. He writes that IDF thinking was simple and cogent. The IDF had just taken two major objectives and was out of steam. The Arab Legion was expected to counter-attack and now couldn't: the roads were cluttered, and they were suddenly responsible for the welfare of an additional tens of thousands of people.[73] There were objections from within Israel to the use of the refugees in this way. Meir Ya'ari, Mapam party co-leader, told the Kibbutz Artzi Council on 12 December 1948: "How easily they speak of how it is possible and permissible to take women, children and old men and to fill the roads with them because such is the imperative of strategy. And this we say, the members of Hashomer Hatza'ir [a socialist-Zionist youth movement] who remember who used this means against our people during the [Second World] war ... I am appalled."[74]

Looting of refugees and the cities

The Sharett-Ben Gurion guidelines to the IDF about the treatment of the residents had specified there was to be no robbery, but numerous sources spoke of widespread looting during the expulsions. The Economist wrote on 21 August that year: "The Arab refugees were systematically stripped of all their belongings before they were sent on their trek to the frontier. Household belongings, stores, clothing, all had to be left behind."[75] Father Oudeh Rantisi, who was 12 when he was expelled from Lydda, writes that he saw a man killed for refusing to hand over his money.

When we entered this gate, we saw Jewish soldiers spreading sheets on the ground and each who passed there had to place whatever they had on the ground or be killed. I remember that there was a man I knew from the Hanhan family from Lod who had just been married barely six weeks and there was with him a basket which contained money. When they asked him to place the basket on the sheet he refused—so they shot him dead before my eyes.[76]

George Habash (1926–2008), a medical student who later founded the PFLP, was one of those expelled from Lydda.

George Habash, who later founded the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, was born in Lydda to a Greek Orthodox family. He was in his second year at medical school in Beirut, but returned to Lydda to be with his family when he heard the Israelis had arrived in Jaffa, and was subsequently one of those expelled. He describes what may be the same killing as the one Rantisi witnessed:

The Israelis were rounding everyone up and searching us. People were driven from every quarter and subjected to complete and rough body searches. You can’t imagine the savagery with which people were treated. Everything was taken — watches, jewellery, wedding rings, wallets, gold. One young neighbor of ours, a man in his late twenties, not more, Amin Hanhan, had secreted some money in his shirt to care for his family on the journey. The soldier who searched him demanded that he surrender the money and he resisted. He was shot dead in front of us. One of his sisters, a young married woman, also a neighbor of our family, was present: she saw her brother shot dead before her eyes. She was so shocked that, as we made our way toward Birzeit, she died of shock, exposure, and lack of water on the way."[77]

Aharon Cohen, director of Mapam's Arab Department, complained to General Allon months after the deportations that troops had been ordered to remove jewellery and money from residents so that they would arrive at the Arab Legion without resources, thereby increasing the burden of looking after them. Allon replied that he knew of no such order, but conceded it as a possibility.[6]

As the residents left, the sacking of the cities began, and continued for weeks. One of the 3rd Battalion commanders, Lt. Col. Schmuel "Mula" Cohen, wrote of Lydda that, "the cruelty of the war here reached its zenith," and that the conquest of a city regarded as a key enemy base, "gave rise to vengeful urges" among Israeli troops.[6] Bechor Sheetrit, the minister for minority affairs, said the army removed 1,800 truckloads of property from Lydda alone. Dov Shafrir was appointed Israel's Custodian of Absentee Property, supposedly charged to protect and redistribute Palestinian property, but his staff were inexperienced and unable to control the situation.[78] The looting—described by the soldiers as "commandeering enemy property"[79]—was so extensive that the 3rd Battalion had to be withdrawn from Lydda during the night of July 13–14, and sent for a day to Ben Shemen for kinus heshbon nefesh, a conference to encourage soul-searching. Cohen forced them to hand over their loot, which was thrown onto a bonfire and destroyed, but the situation continued when they returned to town. Some were later prosecuted.[80]

Stuart Cohen writes that central control over the Jewish fighters was weak. Only Yigal Allon, commander of the IDF, made it standard practice to issue written orders to commanders, including that violations of the laws of war would be punished. Otherwise, trust was placed, and sometimes misplaced, in what Cohen calls intuitive troop decency. Allegations of indiscriminate killing, rape, expulsions, and looting were rife, which outraged sections of the Israeli government, but criminal convictions were rare. Cohen adds that, despite the alleged war crimes, the majority of IDF troops behaved with decency and civility.[81] Some refused to take part in the expulsions. Yitzhak Rabin wrote in his memoirs:

Soldiers of the Yiftach brigade included youth movement graduates, who had been inculcated with values such as international fraternity and humaneness. The eviction action went beyond the concepts they were used to. There were some fellows who refused to take part in the expulsion action. Prolonged propaganda activities were required after the action, to remove the bitterness of these youth movement groups, and explain why we were obliged to undertake such harsh and cruel action.[82]

Allegations of rape

Agriculture Minister Aharon Zisling (1901–1964) said he could forgive rape, but not robbery.[83]

There were also allegations that Israeli soldiers had raped Palestinian women. Ben-Gurion referred to them in his diary entry for 15 July 1948: "The bitter question has arisen regarding acts of robbery and rape [o'nes ("אונס")] in the conquered towns ..."[84] Lila Abu-Lughod and Diana Keown Allan write that fear of rape and the desire to protect sharaf al-bint—women's honor—was one of the key reasons for the flight of Palestinians.[85]

Israeli writer Amos Kenan, who served in 1948 in Lydda as a platoon commander in the 82nd Battalion, writes of his time there: "At night, those of us who couldn't restrain ourselves would go into the prison compounds to fuck Arab women. I want very much to assume, and perhaps even can, that those who couldn't restrain themselves did what they thought the Arabs would have done to them had they won the war." Kenan heard of only one woman who complained. A court-martial was arranged, he said, but in court, the accused ran the back of his hand across his throat, and the woman decided not to proceed.[86]

The allegations were given little consideration by the Israeli government. Agriculture Minister Aharon Zisling told the Cabinet on 21 July: "It has been said that there were cases of rape in Ramla. I could forgive rape, but I will not forgive other acts, which appear to me much graver. When a town is entered and rings are forcibly removed from the fingers and jewellery from necks—that is a very grave matter."[83]

Other villages

Walid Khalidi writes that the residents of 25 other villages conquered from 9–13 July were expelled at the same time.[10] On 10 July, Israel's Yiftah Brigade told Danny HQ they were clearing the Innaba-Jimzu-Daniyal area, and were "torching everything" that could be burned. They added a few hours later that Kharruba and Khirbet al Kumeisa had been captured, and the houses blown up.[87] Fifty "sappers" were sent to destroy the village of Innaba. On 11 July, Yiftah told Danny HQ they were blowing up houses in Jimzu and Daniyal. Other villages in the area captured at the time were Beit Safafa, al Maliha, Ein Karim, Suba, Sataf, Khirbet al Lawz, Deir Amr, Aqqur, Sara, Kasla, Ishwa, Islin, Deir Rafat, and Artuf. Most of the inhabitants had already fled, and those who hadn't did so when the troops approached. Anyone remaining was expelled.[88] The Harel, Yiftah, 8th, and Kiriyati brigades were told on July 19, in an order signed by Rabin, to prevent the return of the inhabitants, "with live fire" (emphasis in the original).[89]

Aftermath

In Ramallah, Amman, and elsewhere

John Bagot Glubb, the British commander of the Arab Legion, was spat at as he drove through the West Bank.[90]

Tens of thousands of Palestinians from Lydda and Ramla poured into Ramallah. For the most part, they had no money, property, food, or water, and represented a health risk, not only to themselves. The Ramallah city council asked King Abdullah to remove them.[91] Count Folke Bernadotte, the United Nations mediator in Palestine, visited the refugee camp they were eventually sent to, and said he had never seen a more ghastly sight.[92]

Some of the refugees reached Amman, the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, and the Upper Galilee, and all over the area there were angry demonstrations against Abdullah and the Arab Legion for their failure to defend the cities. People spat at John Bagot Glubb as he drove through the West Bank. Wives and parents of Arab Legion soldiers tried to break into King Abdullah's palace. Palestinians drove out the Jordanian governor of Nablus. The Iraqi army had to use force to quell protests.[90] Alec Kirkbride, the British ambassador in Amman, described one protest in the city on 18 July:

A couple of thousand Palestinian men swept up the hill toward the main [palace] entrance ... screaming abuse and demanding that the lost towns should be reconquered at once ... The king appeared at the top of the main steps of the building; he was a short, dignified figure wearing white robes and headdress. He paused for a moment, surveying the seething mob before, [then walked] down the steps to push his way through the line of guardsmen into the thick of the demonstrators. He went up to a prominent individual, who was shouting at the top of his voice, and dealt him a violent blow to the side of the head with the flat of his hand. The recipient of the blow stopped yelling ... the King could be heard roaring: so, you want to fight the Jews, do you? Very well, there is a recruiting office for the army at the back of my house ... go there and enlist. The rest of you, get the hell down the hillside!" Most of the crowd got the hell down the hillside.[93]

Morris writes that, during a meeting in Amman on 12-13 July of the Political Committee of the Arab League, delegates—particularly from Syria and Iraq—accused Glubb of serving British, or even Jewish, interests, with his excuses about troop and ammunition shortages. Egyptian journalists accused him of handing Lydda and Ramla to the Jews. King Abdullah eventually did the same, deciding it was safer to accuse Glubb, particularly after Iraqi officers alleged that the entire Hashemite house was in the pay of the British. Abdullah wanted Glubb's resignation, but London asked him to stay on to fight the war. As a result, Britain's popularity with the Arabs reached an all-time low.[94]

The UN Security Council called for the ceasefire to be reinstated no later than 18 July, with sanctions to be levelled against transgressors. The Arabs were outraged: "No justice, no logic, no equity, no understanding, but blind submission to everything that is Zionist," Al-Hayat responded, though Morris writes that cooler heads in the Arab world were privately pleased that they were being required not to fight, given Israel's obvious military superiority.[95]

Situation of the refugees

A Palestinian refugee camp in 1948, location unknown.

The situation of the refugees was dire. They camped in public buildings, in abandoned British barracks, and under trees, many with no aid and no obvious access to food. Most of the aid that did reach them came from the West though the Red Cross and the Quakers. Morris writes that the Arab governments did little for them. Poor management in the aid distribution centers in Beirut and Damascus meant that thousands of tents donated by Britain remained in warehouses. A new UN body was set up to get things moving, and a year later, in December 1949, it became the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, or UNRWA, which many of the refugees and their descendants, now standing at four million, still depend on.[96]

Count Bernadotte's mediation efforts, which resulted in a proposal to split Palestine between Israel and Jordan, and to hand Lydda and Ramla to King Abdullah, ended on 18 September 1948, when Bernadotte was assassinated by four Israeli gunmen from Lehi, an extremist Zionist faction.

Resettlement of the cities

Power is handed from the military governor of Lydda, now called Lod, to the first mayor, Pesach Lev, April 1949.
The first city council as the city of Lod.

On 14 July 1948, the IDF told Ben-Gurion that "not one Arab inhabitant" remained in Ramla or Lod, as Lydda was now called.[97] In fact, several hundred remained, including the elderly, the ill and some Christians, and others managed to sneak back in over the following months, though they were shot on sight if caught.[98] In October 1948, the Israeli military governor of Ramla-Lod reported that 960 Palestinians were living in Ramla, and 1,030 in Lod. Morris writes that Kadish, Sela, and Golan use these figures to argue that there was only a partial expulsion from the area.[99] Military rule in Lod and Ramla ended in April 1949.[100]

Nearly 700,000 Jews immigrated to Israel between May 1948 and December 1951, doubling its Jewish population. In 1950, Israel passed the Law of Return, giving people of Jewish ancestry and their spouses the right to settle there. Most of the immigrants, or olim, were from Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Romania; a minority were Mizrahi Jews from Morocco, Tunis, and Turkey.[101]

The immigrants were assigned Palestinian homes, and could buy refugees' furniture from the Custodian for Absentees' Property. The refugees' homes were used in part because of the inevitable housing shortage, but also as a matter of policy to make it harder for the Palestinians to return.[102] Jewish families were occasionally placed in houses that belonged to Palestinians still living in the cities, the so-called "present absentees," who were regarded as physically present but legally absent, with no legal standing to reclaim their property.[103] By March 1950, there were 8,600 Jewish and 1,300 Palestinian living in Ramla, and 8,400 Jews and 1,000 Palestinians in Lod.[104]

The Palestinian workers allowed to remain in the cities were confined to ghettos.[105] The military administrator split the region into three zones—Ramla, Lod, and Rakevet, a neighborhood in Lod established by the British for rail workers—and declared the Arab areas within them "closed," with each closed zone run by a committee of three to five members.[106] In Lod, the Palestinian area was near the main mosque and the St. George Church. Many of the town's essential workers were Palestinians, but they were not trusted. Palestinian train workers, for example, were required to live in the Rakevet area and were subject to a strict curfew from evening until morning, with periodic searches to make sure they had no guns.[107]

The military administrators did satisfy some of the Palestinian residents' needs, such as building a school, supplying medical aid, allocating them 50 dunams for growing vegetables, and renovating the interior of the Dahmash mosque,[108] but the refugees felt like prisoners. One wrote an open letter in March 1949 to the Al Youm newspaper on behalf of 460 Palestinian Muslim and Christian train workers: "We, the Arab inhabitants of Lod train station, did not participate in any defiant acts against the Israeli army ... Since the occupation, we continued to work and our salaries have still not been paid to this day. Then our work was taken from us and now we are unemployed. The curfew is still valid ... [W]e are not allowed to go to Lod or Ramla, as we are prisoners. No one is allowed to look for a job but with the mediation of the members of the Local Committee ... we are like slaves. I am asking you to cancel the restrictions and to let us live freely in the state of Israel.[109]

Key players

George Habash, the second-year medical student expelled from Lydda, went on to lead one of the best-known of the Palestinians' guerrilla groups, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). In September 1970, Habash masterminded the so-called Dawson's Field hijackings, the hijacking of four passenger jets bound for New York, an attack that put the Palestinian cause on the map. The PFLP was also behind the 1972 Lod Airport massacre, in which 27 people died, and the 1976 hijacking of an Air France flight to Entebbe, which famously led to the IDF's rescue of the hostages, Operation Entebbe. Habash told Robert Fisk in 1993: "The house is still there and a Jewish family lives in it now, it's my right to go directly to my house and live there."[110] He died of a heart attack in Amman in 2008.

Yigal Allon, who may have ordered the expulsions, was elected in 1965 to Israel's parliament, the Knesset, becoming a minister in 1961 and deputy prime minister in 1967. He was a member of the war cabinet during the 1967 Arab Israeli Six-Day War, and the architect of the post-war Allon Plan, a proposal to end Israel's occupation of the West Bank. He died in 1980.[111]

Yitzhak Rabin's historic handshake with Yasser Arafat at the White House, 1993.

Yitzhak Rabin, who signed the Lydda expulsion order, became Israel's prime minister in 1974, and again in 1992, making a name for himself as a man of peace. He was assassinated in 1995 by a right-wing Israeli radical opposed to Rabin's involvement in the Oslo Accords, a peace agreement with the PLO.

Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), the grocer's son expelled from Ramla, became one of the founders of Yasser Arafat's Fatah faction within the PLO, and specifically of its armed wing, Al-Assifa. He organized the PLO's guerrilla warfare, and the Fatah youth movements that helped spark the First Intifada. He was assassinated by Israeli commandos in his home in Tunis in 1988.

Artistic representations

Ismail Shammout's Where to ..?

The Palestinian artist Ismail Shammout was 19 years old when he was expelled from Lydda. He created a series of oil paintings about the march, the best known of which is Where to ..? (1953), which enjoys iconic status among Palestinians. A life-size image of a man dressed in rags holds a walking stick in one hand, the wrist of a crying child in the other. A toddler sleeps on his shoulder. Behind them a third child is crying and walking alone. The skyline of an Arab town with a minaret can be seen in the distance.[112]

Israeli poet Nathan Alterman, described by Bernard Avishai as the laureate of the Zionist revolution, wrote about Lydda in his poem Al Zot ("On This"), published in Davar on 21 November 1948. He wrote specifically about the shooting of civilians. "Let us sing then also about 'delicate incidents'/For which the true name, incidentally, is murder/Let us sing about conversations of those in the know/who with collusive chuckles make concessions and grant forgiveness."[79] Avishai writes that when David Ben-Gurion first read the poem, he ordered that it be recited the next day during inspection in every army camp.[113]

Historiography

Israeli historian Anita Shapira writes that Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, not only led the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, he also wrote its history.[114]

Benny Morris writes that Israeli historians during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s—who wrote what he calls the "Old History"—were "less than honest" about what had happened in Lydda and Ramla, in part because they relied on censored IDF documents and interviews with primary sources, and in part because they felt Israel was fighting for its survival and should not be weakened by having its image blackened.[7]

The IDF's official history, Toldot Milhemet HaKomemiyut (History of the War of Independence), written by employees of its history branch, and published in 1959, said that residents of Lydda had violated the terms of their surrender, were afraid of Israeli retribution for that reason, and left voluntarily. The head of the history branch, Lt. Col Netanel Lorch, wrote in The Edge of the Sword (1961) that residents had even requested safe conduct from the IDF.[7] Ian Lustick writes that Lorch admitted in 1997 that he left his post because the censorship made it impossible to write good history.[115] Another employee of the history branch, Lt. Col. Elhannan Orren, wrote a detailed history of Operation Danny in 1976, Baderekh el Ha'ir (On the Road to the City) that made no mention of expulsions.[7] Other histories were written by intelligence officers such as David Kimche, or military commanders such as Yigal Allon. Israel's prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, famously told the Knesset in 1961 that the Palestinians had left on orders from Arab leaders or in response to radio broadcasts from other Arab states. Historian Anita Shapira writes that Ben-Gurion not only led the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, he also wrote its history, and his version of events was almost completely accepted in Israel until the 1980s; anyone who challenged it was treated as a pariah.[114]

Benny Morris, one of Israel's New Historians, argues that Israel's pre-1980s history of what happened in Lydda and Ramla was "less than honest."[7]

According to Morris, a series of myths lay at the heart of the pre-1980s history:

The essence of the Old History is that Zionism was a beneficent and well-meaning, progressive national movement; that Israel was born pure into an uncharitable, predatory world; that Zionist efforts to achieve compromise and conciliation were rejected by the Arabs; and that Palestine's Arabs, and in their wake the surrounding Arab states, for reasons of innate selfishness, xenophobia, and downright cussedness, refused to accede to the burgeoning Zionist presence and in 1947 launched a war to extirpate the foreign plant. ... Poorly armed and outnumbered, the Jewish community in Palestine, called the Yishuv, fought valiantly, suppressed the Palestinians gangs .. and repelled the "five" invading Arab armies. In the course of that war, says the Old History—which at this point becomes indistinguishable from Israeli propaganda—Arab states and leaders, in order to blacken Israel's image and facilitate the invasion of Palestine, called on or ordered Palestine's Arabs to quit their homes and the "Zionist areas"—to which they were expected to return once the Arab armies had proved victorious. Thus was triggered the Palestinian Arab exodus ...[7]

Morris writes that the first person to acknowledge publicly that the residents of Lydda and Ramla had not simply fled, but had been expelled, was Yitzhak Rabin in the manuscript of his 1979 memoirs, Pinkas Sherut (Service Notebook). The text was erased from the manuscript by an Israeli government censorship board, but it was published in October that year after Rabin's translator leaked it to The New York Times.[7]

A group calling itself the "New Historians" emerged in the 1980s. The 30-year rule of Israel's Archives Law, passed in 1955, meant that hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of government documents were released throughout the 1980s. Almost all the Foreign Ministry's papers from 1947 to 1956 became available, as did documents from other ministries, including the Prime Minister's Office. The opening of the archives triggered new research into the events of 1948, which was around the time the "New Historians" were born. Morris argues that their age meant they had weaker emotional ties to the stories that surrounded Israel's creation, and a degree of intellectual distance.[7]

Between 1987 and 1993, four Israeli historians, three of them Oxbridge-trained, published a series of books that changed the history of the exodus from Lydda and Ramla, and of the Palestinian exodus in general, making it clear that there had, indeed, been expulsions: Simha Flapan's The Birth of Israel (1987), Benny Morris's The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949 (1988), Israel's Border Wars, 1949–1956 (1993) and 1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians (1994); Ilan Pappe's Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 1948–1951 (1988) and The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947–1951 (1992), and Avi Shlaim's Collusion across the Jordan (1988) and The Politics of Partition (1990).[116] Their work is not without its critics, most notably Israeli historian Efraim Karsh, who writes that there was more voluntary Palestinian flight than Morris and the others concede, but regarding events in Lydda and Ramla, Karsh has acknowledged that there were expulsions, though he argues, as does Morris, that they were unplanned.[117]

Lydda and Ramla today

Lod town center, 2005

As of 2004, 63,462 people were living in Ramla, 20 percent of them Arab. The town became briefly known around the world in 1962, when Adolf Eichmann, a key figure in the Holocaust, was hanged in Ramla prison on 31 May that year.[118] The population in Lod as of 2001 was 66,100, 19.7 percent of them Arab.[119] The town's main industry is its airport, named Ben-Gurion International Airport in 1973, the largest in Israel, and the home base for the country's airline, El Al. Other local industries include oil refining, and the manufacture of electrical appliances, paper, and cigarettes. The Absorption Centre of the Jewish Agency for Israel, which handles Jewish immigrants arriving in Israel, is based there.

Racial tensions and economic deprivation make Lod "the most likely place to explode," according to Arnon Golan, Israel's leading expert on racially-mixed cities. Its Ramat Eshkol neighborhood is regarded as the crime capital of Israel. In addition to existing racial problems, Jewish immigrants from Ethiopia were housed there in the 1990s, which increased the tension. A fifth of the town's population are Bedouins who have set up illegal dwellings on agricultural land, as a result of which they receive no municipal services, such as trash collection or sewage disposal. The Arab community has complained that, when Arabs became a majority in Ramat Eshkol, the local school was closed rather than turned into an Arab-sector school, and in September 2008, it was re-opened as a yeshiva, a Jewish religious school. The local council admits that it wants Lod to become a more Jewish city.[120]

Zochrot places a sign on the former ghetto.

Zochrot, an Israeli educational group that researches the Palestinian towns that once stood where Israeli towns are now situated, visited Lod in 2003 and 2005, erecting signs depicting its history. They pointed out a spot near the main road where there is allegedly a mass grave, and posted a sign on the wall of the former Arab ghetto: "Here were concentrated and placed under military rule approx. 1000 men and women who remained in Al Lydd after the expulsion from the city and its environs of 45,000 Palestinians." The visits were met with a mixture of interest and hostility.[121] Father Oudeh Rantisi, who was expelled from Lydda in 1948, visited his family's former home for the first time 20 years later:

As the bus drew up in front of the house, I saw a young boy playing in the yard. I got off the bus and went over to him. "How long have you lived in this house?" I asked. "I was born here," he replied. "Me too," I said ...[122]

Notes

  1. ^
    • For population figures: Morris 2004, p. 425 writes that, in July 1948 before the invasion, Lydda and Ramla had a population of 50,000–70,000, 20,000 of whom were refugees from Jaffa and the surrounding area; all were expelled, except for a few who were retained to work, or who managed to sneak back in.
    • For Lydda becoming known as Lod: Yacobi 2009, p. 29: "The occupation of Lydda by Israel in the 1948 war did not allow the realization of Pocheck's garden city vision. Different geopolitics and ideologies began to shape Lydda's urban landscape ... [and] its name was changed from Lydda to Lod, which was the region's biblical name."; also see Pearlman and Yannai 1964, p. 160.
  2. ^ *Ramla is also written Ramle or Ramleh.
    • The Palestinian death toll in Lydda was, according to Morris 2004, p. 426:

      1. July 11: Six dead and 21 wounded on the Israeli side, and "dozens of Arabs (perhaps as many as 200)" during the raid led by Moshe Dayan. Third Battalion intelligence puts the figure at 40 Arabs dead.

      2. July 12: Israeli troops were ordered to shoot at anyone seen on the streets: during that incident, 3-4 Israelis were killed and around a dozen wounded. On the Arab side, 250 dead and many wounded.

  3. ^ Morris 2004, p. 432; Gilbert 2008, pp. 218–219, and Rantisi 1990, p. 25.
  4. ^
    • For the use of the term "Lydda death march," see, for example, Fraser 2001, p. 64.
    • For the number of refugees who died during the march:
    • Morris 1989, pp. 204–211: "Quite a few refugees died - from exhaustion, dehydration and disease." Morris 2003, p. 177: "a handful, and perhaps dozens, died of dehydration and exhaustion." Morris 2004, p. 433: "Quite a few refugees died on the road east", attributing a figure of 335 dead to Nimr al Khatib, which he describes as "hearsay."
    • Khalidi 1998, pp. 80-98: 350 dead citing an estimate from Aref al-Aref. According to Henry Laurens, Arif al-'Arif's figures break down as follows: "the number of Arab dead at Lydda at the time of the events of the 12th of July rises to 426, of who 176 (were killed) in the mosque. The total number of dead rises to 1,300: 800 during fighting in the city, the remainder in the exodus" (Laurens 2003, p. 47). Nur Masalha writes that 350 died.
    • For examples of eyewitness accounts of soldiers killing refugees who refused to hand over possessions, see Rantisi and Beebe 2000, and George Habash in Brandabur 1990.
  5. ^ Morris 2004, p. 433. Also see Yitzhak Rabin in Shipler 1979a.
  6. ^ a b c d e f g h Morris 1986.
  7. ^ a b c d e f g h i Morris 1987.
  8. ^ Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2009.
  9. ^ Golan 2003.
  10. ^ a b c Khalidi 1998.
  11. ^ Death toll from HIS-AD, May 31, 1948, intercepted messages from the mayors of Ramla and Lydda to the "heads of the Egyptian army etc," HA 105/92 aleph, cited in Morris 2004, p. 424, also see pp. 424–425.
  12. ^ Ben-Gurion 1982, June 16, 1948, p. 525; see Morris 2004, pp. 424-425, and Segev 2000.
  13. ^ Morris 2008, p. 286
  14. ^ Shipler 1979a. Also see Morris 2004, p. 424, and Morris 2009.
  15. ^ Morris 2004, p. 414.
  16. ^ Khalidi 1998; Morris 2008, p. 286.
  17. ^ Morris 2004, p. 425.
  18. ^ Morris 2003, p. 118.
  19. ^ a b c d Kadish and Sela 2005.
  20. ^ Glubb 1957, pp. 142–143.
  21. ^ See Tel Aviv District Court in March 1953, 'Al ha-Mishmar, March 15, 17, 18, 24, 25 and 30, 1953 and April 16, 1953, cited in Kadish and Sela 2005.
  22. ^ Glubb 1957, pp. 142–143, cited in Morris 2008, p. 286, also see p. 289; and Khalidi 1998.
  23. ^ Danny HQ to IDF/General Staff, July 10, 1948, IDFA 922/75//1235, cited in Morris 2004, p. 425.
  24. ^ "Malka" to "Tziporen," July 10, 1948, 16:00 hours, IDFA 922/75//1237, cited in Morris 2004, p. 425.
  25. ^ Gelber 2001, p. 159.
  26. ^ Shapira 2007, p. 225.
  27. ^ Shapira 2007, p. 225; Morris 2004, p. 424.
  28. ^ a b Bilby 1950, p. 43.
  29. ^ Up to 200 Palestinians dead according to Morris 2004, p. 426; 40 according to the IDF, cited in Morris 2004, p. 426; and 100-150 according to Dayan, cited in Kadish and Sela 2005. Morris writes that it is not clear whether the Third Battalion meant 40 Arab dead in all, or 40 killed by them specifically. Morris cites the original report: 3rd Battalion Intelligence, "Comprehensive Report of Third Battalion Activities from Friday 9.7 until Sunday 18.7, July 19. 1848, IDFA 922/75//1237.

    Six died and 21 were wounded on the Israeli side, according to Kadish, Sela, and Golan 2000, p. 36, cited in Morris 2004, p. 426.

    For examples of the newspapers giving the 200 casualty figure, see Yedi'ot Aharonot, July 12, 1948; Yedi'ot Ma'ariv, July 12, 1948; and Currivan, Gene. The New York Times, July 13, 1948.

  30. ^ Formal surrender discussed in a telephone message from Danny HQ, July 12, 1948, 10:30 a.m., IDFA 922/75//1237, cited in Morris 2004, p. 427.
  31. ^ Dimbley and McCullin 1980, pp. 88–89.
  32. ^ Koestler 1949, pp. 270–271.
  33. ^ Unsigned printed page describing events in Lydda, July 11-12, 1948, IDFA 922/75/1237, cited in Morris 2004, p. 427; for the 4,000 in the Great Mosque, see Kadish and Sela 2005.
  34. ^ Gelber 2006, p. 159. Also see Munayyer 1998, p. 95, and Morris 2004, p. 427, 1st Battalion HQ to chief of staff, Arab Legion, "Following are the memoirs of 1st Battalion Officer Arshid Marshud on the Battles of the 1st Battalion in Palestine," December 9, 1948, IDFA 922/75//693.
  35. ^ Kadish and Sela 2005; Morris 2004, footnote 78, p. 453; Tal 2004, p. 311.
  36. ^ Gelber 2006, p. 162; Shapira 2007, p. 227. Walid Khalidi calls it "an orgy of indiscriminate killing" (Khalidi, Walid, Introduction to Spiro Munayyer's "The Fall of Lydda", Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 80-98, 1998),and Alon Kadish and Avraham Sela call it, "an intense battle where the demarcation between civilians, irregular combatants and regular army units hardly existed" (Kadish and Sela 2005).
  37. ^ Morris 2004, p. 427.
  38. ^ Cohen, Mula. "The Conquest of Lod," Sefer ha-Palmach, Vol. II, p. 571; Ramallah Radio, July 11–12, 1948, HA, 105/310. Haviv, In the Suburbs and Streets of Lydda, p. 166, cited in Kadish and Sela 2005.
  39. ^ Al-Aref, Aref. Al-Nakba, Vol III, p. 605; also see Orren, p. 110 cited in Morris 1986, p. 89; and Kadish and Sela 2005.
  40. ^ Nimr al-Khatib 1951, cited in Kadish and Sela 2005, footnote 40.
  41. ^ July 18, 1948, HA, 105/31, cited in Kadish and Sela 2005, footnote 40.
  42. ^ Munayyer 1998, pp. 93–94.
  43. ^
    • See "Mahraqat Shuhada' Madinat al-Lud," ["The Burning of the Martyrs of the City of Lydda"], al-Quds (Jerusalem), November 5, 1998.
    • Shara', Mudhakkirat Jundi, p. 59, spoke of 600 dead people in the Great Mosque.
    • The story about the massacre was also adopted by A. Yitzhaki, Yedi'ot Aharonot, June 14, 1972. Cited in Kadish and Sela 2005, footnote 40.
    • Morris 2004, p. 428, and footnote 81, p. 453. Morris cites Orren, On the Road, p. 100.
    • "Avi-Yiftah" (Shmarya Guttman), "Lydda," 456; and an interview with Eldad Avidar in "Al-Nakba" (1998), a documentary produced and directed by Benny Brunner.
    • Mannin, Ethel. The road to Beersheba. H. Regnery Co., 1964, original from the University of Michigan.
    • Al-Aref, Aref. Al-Nakba, Vol III, p. 605.
    • Kadish and Sela 2005.
  44. ^ Zochrot 2003.
  45. ^ Morris 2004, p. 434.
  46. ^ Morris 2004, p. 415.
  47. ^ Shavit 2004.
  48. ^ a b c d Shipler 1979a.
  49. ^ Bar-Zohar 1977, p. 775, cited in Morris 1986.
  50. ^ Shipler 1979a; Kidron 1998.
  51. ^ Ha'aretz, October 25, 1979; telegram to Danny HQ (at 23:30), IDFA, 922/1975, file 1182, cited in Kadish and Sela 2005.
  52. ^ Shipler 1979b
  53. ^ Ha'aretz, October 25, 1979; telegram to Danny HQ (at 23:30), IDFA, 922/1975, file 1182, cited in Kadish and Sela 2005. Also see interview with Yigal Allon on Kol Yisrael radio, October 24, 1979, some of it reproduced in Al Hamishmar, October 25, 1979, cited in Morris 2004, footnote 89, p. 454.
  54. ^ Gelber 2006, pp. 162–163.
  55. ^ Shapira 2007, p. 232.
  56. ^ Sheetrit 1948, cited in Morris 1986, p. 92.
  57. ^ The orders for Lydda were from Danny HQ to Yiftah Brigade HQ and 8th Brigade HQ, and to Kiryati Brigade at around the same time.

    "1. The inhabitants of Lydda must be expelled quickly without attention to age. They should be directed towards Beit Nabala. Yiftah [Brigade HQ] must determined the method and inform Dani HQ and 8th Brigade HQ.

    "2. Implement immediately (Prior, 1999, p. 205. The IDF Archives holds two nearly identical copies of the expulsion order. According to Morris, 2004, p. 429, 454, Yigal Allon later denied that there had been such an order, saying that the order to evacuate the civilian population of Lydda and Ramle came from the Arab Legion; see also Al Hamishmar, 25 Oct. 1979). A telegram from Kiryati Brigade HQ to Zvi Aurback, its officer in charge of Ramla, read:

    "1. In light of the deployment of 42nd Battalion out of Ramle - you must take [over responsibility] for the defence of the town, the transfer of prisoners [to PoW camps] and the emptying of the town of its inhabitants.

    "2. You must continue the sorting out of the inhabitants, and send the army-age males to a prisoner of war camp. The old, women and children will be transported by vehicle to al Qubab and will be moved across the lines - [and] from there continue on foot.." (Kiryati HQ to Aurbach, Tel Aviv District HQ (Mishmar) etc., 14:50 hours, 13 July 1948, HA (=Haganah Archive, Tel Aviv) 80\774\\12 (Zvi Aurbach Papers). See also Kiryati HQ to Hail Mishmar HQ Ramle -Shiloni, 19:15 hours, 13 July 1948, HA 80\774\\12. Cited in Morris (2004), pp. 429, 454.

  58. ^ Sheetrit 1948, cited in Morris 1986, p. 92.
  59. ^ Neither the original guidelines from Sharett and Ben Gurion, nor the summary from Operation Danny HQ, said that mosques should be left untouched along with monasteries and churches; Morris writes that this may have been a simple oversight (Morris 1986, footnote 36, p. 93).
  60. ^ Morris 2004, p. 431.
  61. ^ Munayyer 1998, p. 94
  62. ^ Shmarya Guttmann cited in Morris 1986, pp. 95–96. Morris finds Guttman's account subjective and impressionistic, but valuable in terms of understanding what went on in Lydda and Ramla during the crucial period.
  63. ^ Morris 2004, p. 432.
  64. ^ Morris 2004, footnote 96, p. 455.
  65. ^ Morris 2004, p. 432: At 18:15 hours that day, Danny HQ asked Yiftah Brigade: "Has the removal of the population [hotza'at ha'ochlosiah] of Lydda been completed?"
  66. ^ Morris (2004), p. 429
  67. ^ Morris 1987.
  68. ^ Several eyewitnesses report this e.g. Munayyer 1998.
  69. ^ Abu Nowar. Jordanian-Israeli War, pp. 206–207, cited in Morris 2008, p. 291.
  70. ^ Guttman, pp. 460–461, cited in Morris 2004, p. 433.
  71. ^ Morris 2003, p. 177; Morris 2004, p. 433.
  72. ^ Khalidi 1998, pp. 80–98.
  73. ^ Morris 2004, p. 433.
  74. ^ Kibbutz Artzi Council protocols, December 10-12, 1948, HHA 5.20.5(4), cited in Morris 2004, p. 435.
  75. ^ Pappé 2006, p. 168.
  76. ^ Benvenisti et al., 2007, pp. 101–102; Rantisi 1990, pp. 24–25.
  77. ^ Brandabur 1990.
  78. ^ Segev 1986, pp. 69–71
  79. ^ a b Cohen 2008, p. 140.
  80. ^ Morris 2004, footnote 86, p. 454.
  81. ^ Cohen 2008, p. 139.
  82. ^ Kidron, cited in Said and Hitchens, 1998, pp. 90–93.
  83. ^ a b KMA-AZP, 9.9.3 protocol text of Zisling's statements in Cabinet, July 21, 1948, cited in Morris 1986, p. 105. See also Segev 1986, pp. 71–72.
  84. ^ Ben-Gurion, Volume 2, p. 589: "The bitter question has arisen regarding acts of robbery and rape in the conquered towns. Zvi Ayalon spoke yesterday with Yitzhak Rabin. He issued an order to a Palmach battalion (Mula's? ['Yiftah']) - of [Moshe] Kelman [The 3rd battalion]) to get out of the town already the day before yesterday. It is unclear if they got out, but soldiers from all the battalions robbed and stole. An instructor from battalion 5 (from the Palmach) demanded of them (Hachsharot people!) to go to Ramla and to rob."
  85. ^ Abu Lughod and Allan 2007, p. 35.
  86. ^ Kenan 1989.
  87. ^ Yiftah HQ to Danny HQ, undated, and Yiftah to Danny, 21:15 hours, July 10, 1948, both in IDFA 922/75//1237, cited in Morris (2004), p. 435.
  88. ^ Morris 2004, pp. 435-436.
  89. ^ Yitzhak R[abin], Danny HQ to Harel, Yiftah, etc, July 19, 1948, IDFA 922/75/1235, cited in Morris 2004, p. 436.
  90. ^ a b Morris 2008, pp. 290–291.
  91. ^ IDF Intelligence Service/Arab Department, July 21, 1948, cited in Morris 2008, p. 291.
  92. ^ Thomas 1999, p. 288.
  93. ^ Kirkbride 1976, p. 48, cited in Morris 2008, p. 291.
  94. ^ Morris 2008, pp. 291–2.
  95. ^ Al-Hayat, quoted in Houston Boswell to FO, July 21, 1948, PRO FO 371-68494, cited in Morris 2008, p. 295.
  96. ^ Morris 2008, p. 310.
  97. ^ Cabinet meeting, July 14, 1948, ISA, cited in Morris 2004, p. 434.
  98. ^ Morris, 2004, pp. 301–302.
  99. ^ Morris 2004, footnote 110, p. 455.
  100. ^ "The cancellation of the Military rule in Jaffa and Ramla-Lod," June 23, 1949, IDF archive 31/50/1860, cited in Yacobi 2009, p. 39.
  101. ^ "Ramla and Lod, population, undated," IDF archive 24/50/1860, cited in Yacobi 2009, p. 42.
  102. ^ Morris 2008, p. 308; also see Yacobi 2009, p. 45.
  103. ^ "The evacuation of nine Arab families from their houses in Lod," November 23, 1952, IS archive Gimel/15/2219/779; "The Anglican Church property in Lod," November 11, 1953, IS archive Gimel/15/2291/779, cited in Yacobi 2009, p. 42.
  104. ^ Golan 2003. Also see Lev, Pesach in City of Lod 1952, in Yacobi 2009, p. 39: "In the words of its first mayor, Pesach Lev, speaking in 1952, Lod was transformed from "a neglected Arab town that was Judenrein to a "Hebraic city."
  105. ^ One of the workers, Alnakib Abd Al Hamid, told Zochrot: "Lots of Jews demonstrated against the use of the word ghetto ... They demonstrated against us being put in the ghetto ... The demonstrations were against the name ghetto but also against the act" (Remembering Lydda," pamphlet produced by Zochrot, Tel Aviv: The Jaffa Press, 2005).
  106. ^ Yacobi 2009, p. 33.
  107. ^ Yacobi 2009, p. 34.
  108. ^ Yacobi 2009, p. 36.
  109. ^ "An open letter," Al Youm, March 2, 1949, IDF archive 31/50/1860, cited in Yacobi 2009, p. 35.
  110. ^ Fisk 1993.
  111. ^ Jewish Agency for Israel.Allon, Yigal (1918-1980), accessed September 25, 2009.
  112. ^ Ankori 2006, pp. 48–50.
  113. ^ Avishai 2003.
  114. ^ a b Lustick 1997.
  115. ^ Lorch 1997, cited in Lustick 1997.
  116. ^ Morris 1987, and Lustick 1997.
  117. ^ Karsh 2003, pp. 160–161.
  118. ^ Weitz 2007.
  119. ^ Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.
  120. ^ Jeffay 2008.
  121. ^ Remembering Al-Lydd 2005, Lydda 2005; Tour and signposting in Al-Lydd (Lod), 2003, and Testimonies on the Nakba of Lod.
  122. ^ Rantisi and Amash 2000.

References

  • Abu Lughod, Lila and Allan, Diana Keown (2007). "Places of Memory" in Sa'di, Ahmad H. and Abu-Lughod, Lila (eds). Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the claims of memory. Columbia University Press.
  • Allon, Yigal (1979). Ha'aretz, October 25, 1979.
  • Ankori, Gannit (2006.) Palestinian art. Reaktion Books. ISBN 1861892594, 9781861892591
  • Al-Khatib, Muhammad Nimr (1967). The Events of the Disaster or the Palestinian Disaster. Beirut: Al Khayat Publishers.
  • Aref al-'Aref (1959). Al-Nakba: Nakbat Filsatin wal-Firdaws al-Mafqud 1947-1952 [The Catastrophe: The Catastrophe of Palestine and the Lost Paradise 1947-1952]. Sidon and Beirut, A1-Maktab al-'Sariyya lil-Tiba'a wal-Nashr.
  • Avishai, Bernard (2003). Flight School, Slate, October 17, 2003, accessed September 26, 2009.
  • Bar-Zohar, Michael (1977). Benn Gurion, Tel Aviv: Am Oved, Vol II.
  • Baylis, Thomas (1999). How Israel was won: a concise history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Lexington Books. ISBN 0739100645, 9780739100646
  • Ben-Gurion, David (1982). The War Diary: The War of Independence, 5708-5709, Volumes 1 and 2, Israel Defense Ministry Publications.
  • Benvenisti, Eyal; Gans, Chaim; Hanafi, Sārī (2007). Israel and the Palestinian refugees. Springer. ISBN 3540681604, 9783540681601
  • Bilby, Kenneth (1951). New Star in the Near East. Doubleday.
  • Brandabur, A. Clare (1990). Reply To Amos Kenan's "The Legacy of Lydda" and An Interview With PFLP Leader Dr. George Habash, Peuples & Monde; first published in The Nation, January 1, 1990.
  • Cohen, Stuart (2008). Israel and Its Army: From Cohesion to Confusion. Taylor & Francis.
  • Dimbleby, Jonathan, and McCullin, Donald (1980). The Palestinians. Quartet Books.
  • Encyclopaedia Britannica (2009). "Lod", accessed September 27, 2009.
  • Fisk, Robert (1993). "Still dreaming of his homeland," The Independent, October 9, 1993.
  • Fraser, Tom (2001). "Arab–Israeli wars," in Holmes, Richard (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Military History. Oxford University Press.
  • Gelber, Yoav (2006). Palestine, 1948: war, escape and the emergence of the Palestinian refugee problem. Sussex University Press. ISBN 1902210670, 9781902210674
  • Gilbert, Martin (2008.) Israel: A History. Key Porter Books. ISBN 1554700663, 9781554700660
  • Glubb, John Bagot (1957). A Soldier with the Arabs, Harper and Brothers.
  • Golan, Arnon (2003). "Lydda and Ramle: From Palestinian Arab to Israeli Towns, 1948-1967," Middle Eastern Studies, 39 (4), October 1, 2003, pp. 121–139.
  • Guttman, Shmarya ("Avi-Yiftah") (1948). "Lydda," Mibifnim, November 1948, pp. 458-460.
  • Holmes, Richard; Strachan, Hew; Bellamy, Chris; and Bicheno, Hugh (2001.) The Oxford companion to military history. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0198662092, 9780198662099
  • Jeffay, Nathan (2008). Israel’s Mixed Cities on Edge After Riots, The Jewish Daily Forward, October 31, 2008.
  • Kadish, Alon; Sela, Avraham; Golan, Arnon (2000). The Occupation of Lydda, July 1948, Tel Aviv: Israel Ministry of Defense and Hagana Historical Archive. (Hebrew)
  • Kadish, Alon, and Sela, Avraham (2005). "Myths and historiography of the 1948 Palestine War revisited: the case of Lydda," The Middle East Journal, September 22, 2005.
  • Karsh, Efraim (2003). Rethinking the Middle East. Routledge. ISBN 0714654183, 9780714654188
  • Kelman, Moshe (1972). "Ha-Hevdel bein Deir Yasin le-Lod" ["The Difference between Deir Yasin and Lydda"], Yedi'ot Aharonot, May 2, 1972.
  • Kenan, Amos (1989). The Legacy of Lydda: Four Decades of Blood Vengeance, The Nation, February 8, 1989.
  • Khalidi, Walid (1998). Introduction to Munayyer, Spiro. The fall of Lydda. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 80–98.
  • Kirkbride, Alec (1976). From the wings: Amman memoirs, 1947-1951, Routledge. ISBN 0714630616
  • Koestler, Arthur (1949). Promise and Fulfilment - Palestine 1917-1949. This edition Read Books 2007. ISBN 1406747238
  • Laurens, Henry (2002). La Question de Palestine. Fayard. ISBN 221361251X
  • Lev, Pesach (1952). City of Lod.
  • Lorch, Netanel (1997). "A Word from an Old Historian," Haaretz, June 23, 1997.
  • Lustick, Ian S. (1997). "Israeli history: Who is fabricating what?", Survival, Volume 39, Issue 3 Autumn 1997, pp. 156–166.
  • Masalha, Nur (2003). The Politics of Denial: Israel and the Palestinian Refugee Problem. Pluto Press. ISBN 0745321216 9780745321219
  • Monterescu, Daniel and Rabinowitz, Dan (2007). Mixed Towns, Trapped Communities. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. ISBN 0754647323, 9780754647324
  • Morris, Benny (1986). "Operation Dani and the Palestinian Exodus from Lydda and Ramle in 1948", Middle East Journal, Vol 40, issue 1, pp. 82–109.
  • Morris, Benny (1987). The New Historiography: Israel confronts its Past, in Morris, Benny (ed). Making Israel, 2007, p. 11–28.
  • Morris, Benny (1988). The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949, Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0679744754
  • Morris, Benny (1995). "Falsifying the Record: A Fresh Look at Zionist Documentation of 1948", Journal of Palestine Studies, Spring 1995, pp. 44-62.
  • Morris, Benny (2001). Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001. Vintage Books. ISBN 0521330289, 9780521330282
  • Morris, Benny (2003). The Road to Jerusalem: Glubb Pasha, Palestine and the Jews. Tauris. ISBN 1860649890, 9781860649899
  • Morris, Benny (2004). The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521009677
  • Morris, Benny (2008). 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War. Yale University Press.
  • Morris, Benny (2009). He tried harder , Haaretz, May 17, 2009.
  • Munayyer, Spiro (1998). "The Fall of Lydda", Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol 27, issue 4, pp. 80-98, Institute for Palestine Studies.
  • Pappé, Ilan (2006). The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Oneworld. ISBN 1851684670
  • Pearlman, Moshe and Yannai, Yacov (1964). Historical sites in Israel. Vanguard Press.
  • Prior, Michael, P. (1999). Zionism and the state of Israel: a moral inquiry. Routledge. ISBN 0415204623, 9780415204620
  • Rantisi, Audeh G. (1990). Blessed are the peacemakers: the story of a Palestinian Christian. ISBN 0863470599
  • Rantisi, Audeh G. and Amash, Charles (2000). Death March, The Link, July-August 2000, Vol 33, Issue 3, Americans for Middle East Understanding. PDF version here.
  • Ron, James (2003). Frontiers and ghettos: state violence in Serbia and Israel. University of California Press. ISBN 0520236572, 9780520236578
  • Sa'di, Ahmad H. and Abu-Lughod, Lila (2007). Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the claims of memory. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0231135793, 9780231135795
  • Said, Edward W. and Hitchens, Christopher (1988). Blaming the Victims. Verso. ISBN 0860911756
  • Segev, Tom (1986). 1949, The First Israelis, Owl Books by Henry Holt and Company. ISBN 0805058966 978-0805058963
  • Segev, Tom (2000). What really happened in the conquest of Lod? Haaretz, May 12, 2000.
  • Shavit, Avi (2004). Survival of the fittest, Part 1, Part 2, Haaretz, January 8, 2004.
  • Shapira, Anita (2007). Ygal Allon, native son: A biography. University of Pennsylvania Press, ISBN 0812240286, 9780812240283
  • Shipler, David K. (1979a). Israel Bars Rabin from Relating '48 Eviction of Arabs, The New York Times, October 23, 1979.
  • Shipler, David (1979b). "Allon Denies '48 Ouster of Arabs", The New York Times, October 25, 1979, page A8.
  • Tal, David (2004). War in Palestine, 1948: strategy and diplomacy. Routledge. ISBN 071465275X, 9780714652757
  • Weitz, Yechiam (2007). 'We have to carry out the sentence', Haaretz, August 2, 2007.
  • Yacobi, Haim (2009). The Jewish-Arab City: Spatio-politics in a mixed community. Routledge.
  • Zochrot (2003). Testimonies on the Nakba of Lod, January 11, 2003. Also see [1] [2] [3]

Further reading

  • Alterman, Nathan (1948). Al Zot, in Hebrew.
  • Karsh, Efraim (1997). Fabricating Israeli History: The 'New Historians'. Ilford, Essex: Frank Cass.
  • Karsh, Efraim (2002). The Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Palestine War 1948, Osprey Publishing, 2002. ISBN 1841763721, 9781841763729
  • Khalidi, Walid (1961). "Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine," Middle East Forum, Vol. 37, p. 11.
  • Khalidi, Walid (1988). "Plan Dalet Revisited", Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 18: Nos. 1, 5.
  • Munayyer, Spiro (1997). Lydda During the Mandate and Occupation Periods. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies.
  • Rantisi, Audeh G. Would I ever see my home again?, Al-Ahram.
  • Zochrot. Remembering al-Lydd, 2005.

Coordinates: 31°56′30.01″N 34°52′41.83″E / 31.9416694°N 34.8782861°E / 31.9416694; 34.8782861


[[File:|right|thumb|250px|A woman soldier from Israel's Yiftah Brigade takes a cigarette from an Arab resident in Lydda, after the fall of the city.]]

File:Ramla prisoners of war, July 12-13,
Prisoners of war in Ramla, July 12–13, 1948

The exodus from Lydda and Ramla took place in July 1948 during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, when 50,000–70,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled from the cities as Israeli troops moved in.[1]

According to the Israeli army, the military action averted a long-term Arab threat to Tel Aviv, helped secure the road to Jerusalem, and thwarted an advance by the Arab Legion, Jordan's British-led and -trained army, by clogging the roads with refugees.[2] Between 290–450 Palestinians and 9–10 Israeli soldiers were killed during the conquest of Lydda; the death toll in Ramla is unknown but presumed much lower because it surrendered immediately.[3]

Ramla's residents were mostly bussed to al-Qubab, from where they walked to Arab Legion lines in Latrun and Salbit. The people of Lydda had no transport: they walked 17 kilometers (10 miles) to Barfiliya in temperatures of 30–35 °C (86–95 °F), carrying whatever possessions they could. From there, the Arab Legion helped them reach a refugee camp in Ramallah some 50 kilometers (30 miles) away.[4][5] The harsh conditions of the exodus caused deaths among the refugees, with figures ranging from just a few to 355, mostly from exhaustion and dehydration, though eyewitnesses also say people were killed by Israeli soldiers for refusing to part with their valuables. Their journey has come to be known as the Lydda death march.[6][7]

The expulsions accounted for one-tenth of the overall Arab exodus from Palestine, an event commemorated in the Arab world as al-Nakba (lit. "the catastrophe").[8] The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has continued ever since, with the fate of the refugees at its core.[9]

Contents

Background to the conflict

After World War I and until the outbreak of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Lydda and Al-Ramla were exclusively Palestinian towns located in the District of Ramla in British Mandate Palestine.[10][11] On November 30, 1947, after 30 years of conflict between Jews and Arabs in British-ruled Palestine, the United Nations voted to support a partition plan, dividing Palestine into two states (one Jewish and one Arab). Lydda and Ramla were among the cities that were to form part of the proposed Arab state.[10] Formally welcomed by the Zionist leadership in Palestine, the plan was rejected by the Arabs. That marked the beginning of the 1948 War between Arabs and Jews, known in the Arab world as the "First Palestine War," and by Israelis as the "War of Independence."[12]

In a first phase in early 1948, while the country remained under British rule, civil war broke out between Palestine's Jewish and Arab communities.[12] It resulted in the collapse of Palestinian society and a massive exodus of its population. On the other side, the 100,000 Jewish inhabitants of Jerusalem were isolated from the remainder of the Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine.

On May 14, 1948, the last day of the British Mandate of Palestine, the State of Israel declared its independence. Several Arab states opposed to the partition plan—Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Transjordan—launched an attack. After a month of fighting, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) remained undefeated. Exhausted and depleted by heavy casualties, forces on both sides agreed to a four-week truce.[13] The day before the end of the first truce, the Egyptians launched an offensive, hoping to catch the IDF off guard, and on July 9, Israel launched three offensives, one of which was Operation Danny in the area of Lydda and Ramla.[14]

Situation of Lydda and Ramla

Strategic importance

[[File:|left|160px|thumb|Lydda's old city]] Lydda dates back to the 6000 BCE, making it one of the oldest cities in Palestine. Ramla, three kilometers away, was founded in the 8th century CE and become the provincial capital of Jund Filastin.[15]

The cities were strategically important, then and in the 20th century, because they sat at the intersection of Palestine's main north–south and east–west roads. In 1948, the area's largest British army camp lay a few kilometers south-west of Lydda at Sarafand, and one of the largest British depots was seven kilometers north-east of Lydda at Bayt Nabala. Palestine's main airport lay just to the north of Lydda, and its main railway junction was Lydda itself. The main source of Jerusalem's water supply was at Ras al-Ayn, 15 kilometers north of Lydda.[16]

Throughout 1947, Arab militia attacked Jewish traffic on roads near the cities. The Haganah launched a retaliatory strike on December 10, 1947, killing two guards in a parking lot in Ramla, and destroying 15 empty Arab vehicles.[17] On February 18, 1948, the Irgun detonated a bomb in Ramla's market, killing seven and injuring 24.[18] Also in February, the Irgun killed nine Arab men and one woman in Abu al-Fadl, near Ramla.[19] There were further Israeli ground attacks on Ramla on the nights of May 21–22 and 24–25, and on May 30, the IDF bombed both towns, killing three and injuring 11.[20][21]

Residents and refugees

As a result of the attacks, and because the electricity and water supplies kept failing and there was a shortage of fuel, Arab morale fell, leading to a mass flight of women, children, and the elderly from Ramla. Arab militiamen on the city's outskirts tried to prevent young men from leaving.[21] The presence of so many refugees in the towns did not help morale. In July 1948, there were altogether 50,000-70,000 inhabitants in both towns, around 20,000 of whom had recently arrived from Jaffa and elsewhere, thinking the towns safe because they lay outside the Jewish state proposed by the UN, and because King Abdullah's troops were there, implying that the area was under his protection.[21]

The presence of the refugees caused chaos: most had neither money nor food, and would make foraging raids outside the towns to gather wheat and vegetables, risking IDF attacks.[21] Spiro Munayyer, who worked in Lydda at the telephone exchange, and who became a paramedic, wrote that, "Life in the city became untenable. The alleys and streets were teeming with people and strewn with rubbish; although the city employed additional sanitation crews, the streets were so clogged with people that the workers were unable to perform their jobs.[22]

The family affiliations of the notables of Lydda were divided between long-term rivals for political influence in Palestine: the Husseinis and the Nashashibis.[23] On 13 April Alec Kirkbride, the British ambassador in Amman, wrote to foreign secretary Ernest Bevin, that the notables of Lydda and Ramla were 'terrorised by the [Husseini] Mufti's followers who have threatened to murder anyone who has dealings with the Arab Legion'.[24]

Israel's attitude toward the cities

File:Lydda and Ramla area - 9 July
Lydda and Ramla area on July 9, 1948 before the Israeli invasion

Israel's Kiryati Brigade, responsible for protecting Tel Aviv, reported to the IDF in May that the Arab Legion had a substantial force in the Lydda–Ramla area; Anita Shapira writes that the faulty intelligence suggested the Arabs had 2,000 soldiers based there, supported by 20 armored cars and 1,500 irregulars.[25] Morris writes that there were only around 120–150 Arab Legion soldiers in Lydda and Ramla together, bolstered by 1,500-2,000 local residents who had been trained and armed.[8]

Israel's prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, had developed what Morris calls an obsession with the fate of Lydda and Ramla, seeing them as threats not only to Tel Aviv, but also to Jerusalem. He repeatedly wrote in his diary that they had to be "destroyed"; on June 16, he told the Cabinet of the need to remove these "two thorns":

We haven't succeeded in Latrun, and there remain the two thorns: Lod [Lydda] and Ramla. This is a serious flaw in our current status. If the war resumes, we won't destroy the Egyptian or Syrian nations, but if we fail and fall, they'll destroy us; and this is why we can't let them return to the places they desert."[26]

Six lines are deleted from the minutes of the Cabinet meeting at this point.[27]

Israel subsequently launched Operation Danny, the aim of which was to destroy and capture Arab forces in the Lydda–Ramla–Latrun–Ramallah area, and to bring relief to Jerusalem and the Tel Aviv – Jerusalem road.[28][29] On July 7, the IDF appointed Yigal Allon as the operation's commanding officer, with Yitzhak Rabin, then commander of the Harel Brigade, as his operations officer.[30] The operation was carried out over a ten-day period between July 9, 1948, the end of the first truce in the Arab-Israeli war, and July 18, the start of the second truce.[31] The period is known in Israeli historiography as the Ten Days.[32]

Based on the faulty intelligence reports, the IDF assembled an enormous force for its attacks on the towns, its largest until that point, consisting of 8,000-9,000 men.[16][25] There were two Palmach brigades—Harel and Yiftah—which meant five battalions in all; the Eighth Armored Brigade's 82nd and 89th Battalions; and several battalions of Kiryati and Alexandroni infantrymen, including the Kiryati's 44th Battalion. They also had thirty artillery pieces.[33] The Eighth Armored Brigade had a high proportion of World War II veterans from the U.S., Britain, France, and South Africa, volunteering under the Mahal program and acting under the order of Yitzhak Sadeh, founder of the Palmach.[16][34]

Lydda's defenses

(left) and Lydda around 1925]]

Although several Palestinian towns had fallen since April—Tiberias, Haifa, Jaffa, Safad, Acre, and Baysan—Lydda and Ramla had managed to hold out. Alon Kadish and Avraham Sela write that Lydda's military preparations were unique among Palestinian towns and villages. Because of the fear of Israeli invasion, its National Committee, an emergency body, assumed civic and military powers. It mobilized resources, acquired arms, conducted training, constructed trenches and other obstacles, requisitioned vehicles, and assembled armoured cars complete with machine guns. It organized local medical services, trained paramedics, and procured ambulances. By March-April 1948 the city had become a center for arms supply and military coordination for surrounding towns and villages. Although the influx of refugees had placed an additional burden on the town, the National Committee incorporated the arrivals into their training program, and made them part of its militia.[29]

By the time of the Israeli invasion, according to Kadish and Sela, the local militia in Lydda numbered 1,000 men, who were equipped with rifles, submachine guns, 15 machine guns, five heavy machine guns, 25 anti-tank launchers, 6–7 light field-guns and 2–3 heavy ones, and armored cars armed with machine guns. In addition, the IDF estimated the Arab Legion force to be 200–300 men, 50 of them stationed in the two police stations.[29] Against Kadish and Sela's account, Walid Khalidi writes that the only troops defending Lydda were 125 men from the Fifth Infantry Company of the Arab Legion, the rest of them volunteer civilian residents under the command of a retired Arab-Legion sergeant.[16]

In addition to defending the city, the local militia stopped women and children from leaving, because their departure had acted elsewhere as a catalyst for the men to leave too. Kadish and Sela write that Arab residents leaving their cities under threat of Israeli invasion was common at the time, in part because of a deep fear of atrocities, particularly rape of the women, and in part because of what they call the "unthinkable idea" of living under Jewish rule. In Lydda's case, the fears were more particular: a few days before the city fell, a Jew found in Lydda's train station had been publicly executed and his body mutilated by residents, who, according to Kadish and Sela, now feared Jewish reprisals.[35]

Arab Legion involvement

[[File:|right|thumb|120px|King Abdullah of Jordan (1882–1951) sent his troops into Lydda to help defend it. He later became the target of Palestinian anger over the loss of the city.[36]]] In addition to the local militia, 200–300 Bedouin volunteers from Transjordan arrived in Lydda and Ramla in April, after being recruited by the Arab Legion (al-Jaysh al-Arabī), Transjordan's army. At the beginning of June, a company-sized force of the Arab Legion set itself up in the old British police stations in Lydda and on the Lydda-Ramla road, with armoured cars and other weapons. The Arab Legion forces took their orders from the Jordanian 4th Battalion's headquarters in Latrun's sector. Kadish and Sela write that the local forces also reportedly received arms and ammunition from the Egyptian Army at the beginning of June.[29]

In addition to the external military input, an Arab Legion officer was appointed military governor of Lydda and Ramla, responsible for civil, as well as military, affairs, signalling the desire of King Abdullah of Transjordan to stake a claim in those parts of Palestine allotted by the UN to an Arab-Palestinian state. Abdullah was also concerned about an Arab shortage of ammunition and money, which motivated him to ensure that the first truce in the Arab-Israeli war was observed, making control of the militia in Lydda an imperative.[29]

According to Kadish and Sela, the varying levels of authority in Lydda, with the Arab Legion reporting not to the Arab Legion governor, but to its 4th Battalion headquarters, and the lack of effective cooperation between the Legion's forces and the local militia, contributed to the military confusion in the town when Israel invaded it on July 11.[29]

John Bagot Glubb, the British soldier who led the Arab Legion, wrote in his memoirs in 1957 that he made it clear to King Abdullah and the Jordanian prime minister, Tawfik Abu al-Huda, before the end of the British Mandate on May 15, that the Legion could not hold Lydda and Ramla, because its troops were already overstretched. As a result, he wrote, Abdullah ordered the Legion to assume a defensive position only, and the Legionnaires already in Lydda withdrew during the night of July 11–12.[36] In January, Glubb and his officers had toured Arab towns and villages, including Lydda and Ramla, begging them to prepare to defend themselves. The Legion also distributed barbed wire and as many weapons as could be spared.[37]

Fall of the cities

July 9–10: Air attacks

[[File:|thumb|left|200px|Lydda airport following its capture.]] The bombing and shelling of the cities began on the night of July 9-10, and continued the next night, intended to induce panic and flight, and it seemed to work in Ramla: at 11:30 hours on the morning of July 10, Operation Danny headquarters (Danny HQ) told the IDF that there was a "general and serious flight from Ramla," advising that, "[t]here is great value in continuing the bombing."[38] That afternoon, Danny HQ told one of its brigades to facilitate the flight of women, children, and the elderly, but to detain men of military age.[39] On the same day, the IDF took control of Lydda airport.[40] Spiro Munayyer writes that a British Army sergeant who was helping to defend Lydda predicted the city would fall at noon the next day.[41]

July 11: Moshe Dayan raid on Lydda

File:Moshe Dayan
Moshe Dayan (1915-1981) led a raid on Lydda "blasting at everything that moved."[42]

During the late afternoon of July 11, the 89th (armored) Battalion,[43] led by Lt. Col. Moshe Dayan, moved into Lydda, driving from east to west, because Dayan believed the locals were not expecting an attack from the east.[29] He had gathered some former Lehi veterans, and had organized a column of jeeps headed by a "terrible tiger", an armored vehicle with a cannon. They launched the attack in daylight, fully exposed and using enormous firepower,[44] reportedly spraying machine-gun fire at anything that moved, before proceeding to Ramla.[45] Kadish and Sela write that Dayan's troops faced heavy fire from the Arab Legion troops in the police stations in Lydda and on the Lydda-Ramla road.[29]

Kenneth Bilby, a correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune who was in the city at the time, wrote, "Moshe Dayan led a jeep commando column into the town ... with rifles, Stens, and sub-machine guns blazing. It coursed through the main streets, blasting at everything that moved ... the corpses of Arab men, women, and even children were strewn about the streets in the wake of this ruthlessly brilliant charge."[42]

One of Dayan's soldiers, "Gideon", spoke of his ambivalence about the raid:

[My] jeep made the turn and here at the ... entrance to the house opposite stands an Arab girl, stands and screams with eyes filled with fear and dread. She is all torn and dripping blood — she is certainly wounded. Around her on the ground lie the corpses of her family. Still quivering, death has not yet redeemed them from their pain. Next to her is a bundle of rags — her mother, hand outstretched trying to draw her into the house. And the girl understands nothing ... Did I fire at her? ... But why these thoughts, for we are in the midst of a battle, in the midst of conquest of the town. The enemy is at every corner. Everyone is an enemy. Kill! Destroy! Murder! Otherwise you will be murdered and will not conquer the town. What [feeling] did this lone girl stir within you? Continue to shoot! Move forward! ... Where does this desire to murder come from? What, because your friend ... was killed or wounded, you have lost your humanity and you kill and destroy? Yes! ... I kill every one who belongs to the enemy camp: man, woman, old person, child. And I am not deterred.[46]
File:Haaretz and Davar headlines saying Lod has been
Haaretz (top) and Davar, July 12: "Lod Conquered By IDF Forces," and "Lod Surrendered Last Night To IDF."

The raid lasted 47 minutes, leaving dozens of Arabs dead: up to 200, according to Morris;[47] 40, according to the IDF's Third Battalion intelligence, though they may have meant 40 killed by them specifically;[47] 100-150, according to Dayan's 89th Battalion.[29] Six died and 21 were wounded on the Israeli side.[48] The newspapers the next day said 200 had died.[49]

Kadish and Sela write that the high casualty rate among civilians can be explained by confusion over who Dayan's troops were. They write that the IDF were wearing keffiyehs, a common practice, and were led by an armored car just seized from the Arab Legion. In addition, Lydda's southern entrance was "awash," as Dayan reported, with Arab fighters, and grenades were being thrown from all directions. In the confusion, residents may have believed the Israeli attack was over and the Arab Legion had arrived, only to encounter Dayan's forces shooting at everything as they ran from their homes.[29]

On the same day, the Israeli air force dropped leaflets onto the towns telling residents to surrender or die.[8] That evening, 300-400 soldiers from the Yiftah Brigade's Third Battalion entered Lydda. Not long afterwards, the Arab Legion forces on the Lydda-Ramla road withdrew, though the Arab soldiers in the police station remained.

Shapira writes that the initial raid on the city was launched entirely on Dayan's initiative, without even warning Sadeh, the brigade commander. It was illustrative of Dayan's lack of discipline, and contributed significantly to the legend that grew around him, though Shapira argues that it was actually the Yiftah Brigade who took the city, "advancing cautiously, step by step, without any of the glory of Dayan's trail-blazing action".[44]

July 12: Formal and informal surrender

At dawn on July 12, Palmach troops combed the old town in Lydda and occupied a school that the local militia had been using.[29] Community leaders in Lydda and Ramla were advised to surrender and instruct residents to hand over their weapons. Ramla residents were told to go to Barriya, and people in Lydda to Jimzo, and to hold a white flag aloft. Khalil Wazir, who later joined Yasser Arafat's Fatah organization, and became known as Abu Jihad, was 12 years old when Israeli troops moved into Ramla on July 12:

File:Abu Jihad
Abu Jihad (1935-1988) of the PLO was 12 years old when he was expelled from Ramla.
I will never forget that day. The men had gathered together. And they were saying that the Jews were going to do to us what they had done in Deir Yassin. That they had surrounded the town and were about to enter it. ... And then my mother and my sisters and I went to the church. The whole village went to the church. ... I remember the archbishop standing in front of the church. He was holding a white flag. ... Afterwards we came out and the picture will never be erased from my mind. There were bodies scattered on the road and between the houses and the side streets. No one, not even women or children, had been spared if they were out in the street. ... Then they put us in the bus ... [After the bus], we spent four days walking."[50]

Isma'in Nakhas, Haret Haji, Hussam al Khairi, and Imada Khouri signed the surrender documents on behalf of Ramla on the morning on July 12.[51] The Kiryati Brigade's 42nd Battalion mortared the city, then entered it, imposing a curfew.[52]

No formal surrender was announced in Lydda, though people gathered in the streets waving white flags after the 8 am curfew had ended. According to a contemporaneous, unsigned IDF account: "Groups of old and young, women and children streamed down the streets in a great display of submissiveness, bearing white flags, and entered of their own free will the detention compounds we arranged in the mosque and church — Muslims and Christians separately." The buildings soon filled up, and women and children were released, leaving several thousand men inside.[53] Kadish and Sela write that around 4,000 men were detained in the Great Mosque.[29]

Unexpected shooting

On July 12, at 11:30 hours, two or three Arab Legion armoured cars entered the city, led by Lt. Hamadallah al-Abdullah from the Jordanian 1st Brigade in Bet Naballah. Spiro Munayyer writes that the Jordanians were trying to rescue the Arab Legion troops besieged in the police station, and that they withdrew soon after.[54] Gelber writes that the legionnaires in the police station were panicking, and that their frantic messages to Ramallah had been filling the air: "Have you no God in your hearts? Don't you feel any compassion? Hasten aid!"[55]

The Arab Legion armored cars opened fire on the Palmach soldiers who were combing the old city. The exchange of gunfire led residents to believe the Legion had arrived in force, and those still armed started firing at the Israelis. Kadish and Sela write that the Palmach came under heavy fire from "thousands of weapons from every house, roof and window," quoting the Third Battalion's commander, Moshe Kelman. Morris argues that this is "nonsense," and that only a few dozen townspeople took part in what turned out to be a brief firefight.[56] Brief or not, the Israeli soldiers were unnerved by it: there were only 300-400 of them to quell tens of thousands, and they had been under the impression the locals had surrendered, albeit informally.[57]

Israeli response

[[File:|left|thumb|180px|Israeli troops in Lydda or Ramla, July 1948]] In response, Moshe Kalman ordered troops to shoot at "any clear target," and at anyone "seen on the streets."[58] There was no chance of immediate reinforcements, and no clear indication of where the attacks were coming from. Kelman said he had no choice: "it is a question of either them or us."[59]

Munayyer writes that, at noon, there was suddenly a "crescendo of bullets and explosions in all parts of the city"; people started "running helter-skelter, screaming with fear."[60] Residents ran out of their homes in panic and were shot. Israeli soldiers threw grenades into houses they suspected snipers were hiding in.[8] At 13:15 hours, Yiftah HQ told Danny HQ: "Battles have erupted in Lydda. We have hit an armoured car with a two-pounder [gun] and killed many Arabs. There are still exchanges of fire in the town. We have taken many wounded.[61]

George Habash (1926–2008), a medical student who later founded the PFLP, dug his sister's grave with his hands.[62]

The shooting lasted until 13:30 hours. Morris writes that both Israeli and Arab historians describe the events as an "uprising," though for different reasons: the Israelis to justify the death toll, and the Arabs to show they had stood tall in the face of aggression.[63] He argues that the ratio of Arab to Israeli casualties, 250–426 Arab dead against 3–4 Israelis, is not consistent with it being either a "battle" or an "uprising".[64] The Palmach reported 250 Arabs killed and an unknown number wounded. Palestinian historian Aref al-Aref places the Palestinian death toll at 426, 179 of whom were killed in the mosque (see below).[65] Muhammad Nimr al-Khatib writes that 1,700 were killed,[66] which Morris regards as an exaggeration. Kadish and Sela report Arab estimates, produced by unidentified sources after the events, ranging from 176 to 3,000 combatants and civilians. An Arab intelligence report said, "the Jews massacred close to 3000."[67]

There is no disagreement among historians and eyewitnesses that the killing appeared indiscriminate.[68] Yoav Gelber describes it as the bloodiest massacre of the war;[69] Walid Khalidi, "an orgy of indiscriminate killing,"[70] and Alon Kadish and Avraham Sela, "an intense battle where the demarcation between civilians, irregular combatants and regular army units hardly existed."[29] Anita Shapira argues that Yiftah simply panicked, and that the fatalities sprang from their lack of experience in governing civilians.[71]

George Habash, who later founded the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, was born in Lydda to a Greek Orthodox family. He was a second-year medical student at the time of the invasion, and helped out in Lydda's clinic treating the injured. On his way through the town, he saw: "terrible sights: Dozens of bodies lay in pools of blood, old and young had been shot. Among the dead, I recognized one elderly man, a neighbor who had a small falafel shop and who had never carried a gun."[72] Amos Kenan, who served with the IDF in Lydda, writes that Habash buried his own sister in the backyard of her home. She had fallen ill and there were no medical supplies, and the curfew made burial in the cemetery impossible, so Habash dug her grave with his hands.[62]

Mosque deaths

[[File:|thumb|left|180px|The Dahmash mosque just after occupation.]] Another of Lydda's great controversies concerns the deaths in the mosque on July 12, which have also come to be known as a massacre throughout the Arab world, though what happened remains unclear.[29]

At some point during the afternoon of July 12, there was shooting in one of the mosques. Around 4,000 male Muslim detainees were being held in the Great Mosque. There was also a smaller mosque called the Dahmash Mosque. Christian detainees had been taken either to the church or to the Greek Orthodox monastery nearby, leaving the Muslims inside the Great Mosque in fear of a massacre.[73]

Spiro Munayyer writes that people sought refuge in one of the mosques when they heard the shooting in the town.[73] Morris writes that some of the detainees tried to break out, hearing the shooting and fearing they were about to be killed. It is agreed that the IDF threw grenades and fired bazooka rockets into a mosque compound. Munayyer said his fellow paramedics told him they had carried out 93 bodies.[73]

Kadish and Sela write that there was no military action taken against the Great Mosque, where the 4,000 detainees were being held; they write that Morris does not distinguish between the Great Mosque and the smaller mosque, the Dahmash Mosque. It was in the smaller mosque that a fire fight erupted, they say, between armed militiamen who had taken refuge there and Israeli soldiers outside. In response, the Israelis fired an anti-tank PIAT shell at a group of 50-60 armed men who were barricaded inside, then stormed the building, killing 30 of them. Israeli soldiers recalled that some women, children, and elderly men were also killed.[74]

Nimr al-Khatib writes that all those within the small mosque were killed.[75] An eyewitness published a memoir in 1998 saying he had removed 95 bodies from the Dahmash Mosque.[76] Palestinian historian Aref al-Aref writes that 176 were killed in the mosque.[77]

Fayeq Abu Mana, who was 20 years old at the time, said: "They said to go to the mosque and take the corpses out from there. How take them out? The hands of the dead were very swollen. We couldn't lift the corpses by hand, we brought bags and put the corpses on the bags and we lifted them onto a truck. We gathered everyone in the cemetery. Among them was one woman and two children. They said burn. We burned everyone."[78]

After the shooting

[[File:|left|thumb|180px|The ruins of the city after the assault]] Corpses littered the streets in Lydda and the Lydda–Ramla road, posing a health risk and a political problem. The Red Cross was due to visit Ramla on or around July 12, but the new governor of the town, from the Israeli's Kiryati Brigade, issued an order to have the visit delayed. It was rescheduled for 15:00 hours on July 14; Danny HQ ordered the Kiryati to "evacuate all the refugees [and] to get rid of the corpses" by that time.[79]

The order seems not to have been carried out. On July 15, Dr. Klaus Dreyer (Ya'akov Dror) of the IDF Medical Corps complained that there were still unburied corpses in Lydda and in the fields around it, which constituted a health hazard and a "moral and aesthetic issue." He asked IDF General Staff/Operations to commandeer trucks, and "some tens of [Arab] civilians from the towns themselves," to fix the problem.[79] Fayeq Abu Mana, who took part in the removal of bodies, told Zochrot: "They were buried not far from here, near the main road. They buried them in a pit, I mean a jama'a [mass grave], everyone."[78]

Expulsions

File:BG
David Ben-Gurion (1886–1973) warned there should be no expulsions without an explicit order. Yitzhak Rabin said it was Ben-Gurion himself who gave that order.[80]

Cabinet guidelines

The Israeli government had established the Committee for Abandoned Property on June 14 to oversee the treatment of Arabs and their property, and decide on the transfer of Arabs from one place to another.[29] Before the start of Operation Danny, on July 4, the Committee had issued a warning to the IDF, a warning Morris attributes to Ben-Gurion himself:

Outside the time of the actual fighting, it is forbidden to destroy, burn or demolish Arab cities and villages, to expel Arab inhabitants from villages, neighbourhoods and cities, and to uproot inhabitants from their places without special permission or explicit order from the Defence Minister in each specific case. Anyone violating this order will be put on trial.[81]

July 12 meeting: Decision to expel

File:Ygal Yadin - Lt Gel
Yigael Yadin (1917–1984), chief of staff of the IDF, attended the July 12 meeting

Ben-Gurion's role in the Lydda expulsions remains unclear. Morris argues that Ben-Gurion and the IDF generals acted behind the Cabinet's back and without its authorization, and in Ben-Gurion's case subsequently deceived it.[8] Despite the establishment of the Committee for Abandoned Property, Morris writes that Ben-Gurion and the IDF were left largely to their own devices to decide how Arab residents were to be treated. As a result, he argues, their policy was haphazard and circumstantial, depending in part on the location, but also on the religion and ethnicity of the town. The Arabs of Western and Lower Galilee, mainly Christian and Druze, were allowed to stay in place, but Lydda and Ramla, mainly Muslim, were almost completely emptied.[80] There was no official policy to expel the Palestinian population, Morris writes, but the idea of transfer was "in the air," and the entire leadership understood this. Morris argues that the idea emanated from Ben-Gurion himself: "The officer corps understands what is required of them. Under Ben-Gurion, a consensus of transfer is created." [82]

The resistance in Lydda appears to have sealed the townpeople's fate. On July 12, as the shooting in the city continued, a meeting was held at Operation Danny headquarters between Ben-Gurion; Generals Yigael Yadin and Zvi Ayalon of the IDF; and Yisrael Galili, formerly of the Haganah (the pre-IDF army) National Staff. Also present were Yigal Allon, commanding officer of Operation Danny, and his deputy Yitzhak Rabin.[83]

Rabin's account

[[File:|thumb|right|120px|Yitzhak Rabin (1922–1995) signed the expulsion order]] At one point during the July 12 meeting, Ben-Gurion, Allon, and Rabin left the room. Allon asked what was to be done with the Arab population. Ben-Gurion is reported by Yitzhak Rabin to have waved his hand and said, "garesh otam" — "expel them."[84]

An Israeli censorship board composed of five Cabinet members, headed by Justice Minister Shmuel Tamir, removed Rabin's claim about Ben-Gurion from Rabin's memoirs, published in 1979. Peretz Kidron, an Israeli journalist who translated the memoirs into English, passed the censored text to The New York Times, which published it on October 23, 1979:[85]

Not even Ben-Gurion could offer any solution, and during the discussions at operational headquarters, he remained silent, as was his habit in such situations. Clearly, we could not leave Lod's hostile and armed populace in our rear, where it could endanger the supply route to Yiftah [another brigade], which was advancing eastward.

We walked outside, Ben-Gurion accompanying us. Allon repeated his question: What is to be done with the population? B.G. waved his hand in a gesture which said, "Drive them out!"

Allon and I held a consultation. I agreed that it was essential to drive the inhabitants out. We took them on foot toward the Bet Horon Road, assuming that the legion would be obliged to look after them, thereby shouldering logistic difficulties which would burden its fighting capacity, making things easier for us.

"Driving out" is a term with a harsh ring. Psychologically, this was one of the most difficult actions we undertook. The population of Lod did not leave willingly. There was no way of avoiding the use of force and warning shots in order to make the inhabitants march the 10 to 15 miles to the point where they met up with the legion.[83]

Arguments against Rabin's account

Yigal Allon denied Rabin's version of events in the same October 23, 1979 New York Times article; he said that he (Allon) gave no order to expel, and neither requested nor received permission from Ben-Gurion to do so.[83] "There was no expulsion order," he said, "but rather a provoked exodus."[86] He told Kol Yisrael radio, also in October 1979, that the Arab Legion had given an order to evacuate the towns.[87] Allon reportedly told Schmuel "Mula" Cohen, one of the Third Brigade commanders, that, "Ben-Gurion, as head of state, could not give the order. I do what a commander has to do in the heat of battle."[88]

Ben-Gurion, as head of state, could not give the order. I do what a commander has to do in the heat of battleYigal Allon[88]

[[File:|thumb|left|Yigal Allon: "There was no expulsion order, but rather a provoked exodus."[86]]] Historian Yoav Gelber also takes issue with Rabin's account. Ben-Gurion was known, he writes, for clearly formulating his policies, not for announcing them with a wave of his hand. Gelber cites Ben-Gurion's apparent agreement with Bechor-Shalom Sheetrit and Moshe Sharett (see below) not to force the expulsion of residents, as evidence that expulsion was not Ben-Gurion's intention, rather than as evidence of his duplicity, as Morris implies.[89] Gelber attributes the expulsions to Allon, known for his "scorched earth policy": wherever Allon was in charge of Israeli troops, Gelber writes, no Palestinians remained. He argues that Allon had ignored Ben-Gurion on several occasions, and did not require his permission to take advantage of the situation in Lydda. By the end of the Ten Days campaign, the IDF had become harsh and unforgiving, according to Gelber. They blamed the Palestinians for everything that had happened to the Jews since the Arab states had attacked Israel on May 15, and felt the Palestinians deserved their fate.[90]

Israeli finance minister, Eliezer Kaplan, said that Ben-Gurion told him, on July 12 or 13, that "the young male inhabitants [of Ramla and Lydda] were to be taken prisoners. The rest of the inhabitants were to be encouraged to leave the place [yesh le'oded la'azov et hamakom], but whoever stayed—Israel would have to take care of his maintenance."[91]

In 1950, Allon gave a lecture on the war to a KM Forum, during which Shapira writes that he was uncharacteristically frank. He said he blamed the Palestinian exodus in general on three factors. First, he said, they fled because they were projecting: the Arabs imagined that the Jews would do to them what they would do to the Jews, if positions were reversed. Second, Arab and British leaders encouraged people to leave their towns so as not to be taken hostage, and so they could return to fight another day. Third, there were some cases of expulsion, though these were not the norm. In Lydda and Ramla, the Arab Legion continued to attack Israeli outposts in the hope of reconnecting with their troops in Lydda. When the expulsions started, the attacks died down. To leave the towns' hostile populations in place would be to risk them being used by the Legion to coordinate further attacks. Allon said he had no regrets: "War is war. In war things must be measured according to the criteria of war, the criteria of revolution."[92]

Expulsion orders

At 13:30 hours on July 12, just as the shooting had stopped, Danny HQ issued the expulsion order for Lydda to Yiftah Brigade HQ and 8th Brigade HQ, and to Kiryati Brigade at around the same time:

1. The inhabitants of Lydda must be expelled quickly without attention to age. They should be directed towards Beit Nabala. Yiftah [Brigade HQ] must determined the method and inform Dani HQ and 8th Brigade HQ.

2. Implement immediately.[93]

A telegram from Kiryati Brigade HQ to Zvi Aurback, its officer in charge of Ramla, read:

1. In light of the deployment of 42nd Battalion out of Ramle - you must take [over responsibility] for the defence of the town, the transfer of prisoners [to PoW camps] and the emptying of the town of its inhabitants.

2. You must continue the sorting out of the inhabitants, and send the army-age males to a prisoner of war camp. The old, women and children will be transported by vehicle to al Qubab and will be moved across the lines - [and] from there continue on foot.."[94]

Sheetrit's intervention

File:Bechor-Shalom
Bechor-Shalom Sheetrit (1895–1967) tried to stop the expulsions.[95]

The Israeli cabinet reportedly knew nothing about the expulsion plan until Bechor-Shalom Sheetrit, minister for minority affairs appeared unannounced in Lydda on July 12. He was shocked when he saw troops organizing expulsions. Kiryati Brigade commander Michael Ben-Gal told him that the IDF was about to take men of military age in Ramla prisoner, and that the rest of them, and the women and children, were to be "taken beyond the border and left to their fate." The same was to happen in Lydda, Sheetrit said he was told.[95]

Sheetrit returned to Tel Aviv for a meeting with Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, who later met with Ben Gurion to agree on guidelines for how the residents were to be treated, though Morris writes that Ben Gurion apparently failed to tell Sharett that he himself was the source of the expulsion orders. The men agreed that the townspeople should be told anyone who wanted to leave could do so, but that anyone who stayed was responsible for himself and would not be given food. Women and children were not to be forced to leave, and the monasteries and churches must not be damaged.[8] Neither the original guidelines from Sharett and Ben Gurion, nor the summary from Operation Danny HQ, said that mosques should be left untouched along with monasteries and churches; Morris writes that this may have been a simple oversight.[96]

The Sharett order was passed to Operation Danny HQ at 23:30 hours on July 12, ten hours after the expulsion orders were issued: "1. All are free to leave, apart from those who will be detained. 2. To warn that we are not responsible for feeding those who remain. 3. Not to force women, the sick, children and the old to go/walk.[97] 4. Not to touch monasteries and churches. 5. Searches without vandalism. 6. No robbery.[8] The order convinced Sharett that he had managed to avert the expulsions, not realizing that, even as he was discussing them in Tel Aviv, they had already begun.[8]

July 12–15: Exodus

Lydda residents ask to leave

By July 13, the wishes of the IDF and those of the residents of Ramla and Lydda had dovetailed. Over the previous three days, the townspeople had undergone aerial bombardment, raids from troops on the ground, had been told to surrender or die, had seen grenades thrown into their homes and hundreds of residents killed, had been living under a curfew, had been abandoned by the Arab Legion, and the able-bodied men had been rounded up, and killed or detained. The residents almost certainly concluded that living under Israeli rule was not sustainable.[91] The important thing, wrote Spiro Munayyer, was to get out of the city.[98]

On July 13, representatives of the Lydda residents asked the IDF for permission for the townspeople to leave, though a minority insisted they wanted to stay. Most refused to leave while their menfolk were being detained in the grand mosque and church. A deal was reached with Shmarya Guttman, normally an archeologist, now a soldier with the IDF, that the residents would leave in exchange for the release of the prisoners; according to Guttman, he went to the mosque himself and told the detainees they were free to join their families.[99] Town criers and soldiers walked or drove around the town instructing residents where to gather for departure.[4]

Notwithstanding that an agreement may have been reached, Morris writes that the troops understood that what followed was an act of deportation, not a voluntary exodus. Before the residents had left, IDF radio traffic had already started calling them "refugees" (plitim).[100] Operation Danny HQ told the IDF General Staff/Operations at noon on July 13 that "[the troops in Lydda] are busy expelling the inhabitants [oskim begeirush hatoshavim]," and told the HQs of Kiryati, 8th and Yiftah brigades at the same time that, "enemy resistance in Ramle and Lydda has ended. The eviction [pinui]" of the inhabitants ... has begun."[101] At 18:15 hours that day, Danny HQ asked Yiftah Brigade: "Has the removal of the population [hotza'at ha'ochlosiah] of Lydda been completed?"[4]

The march

[[File:|thumb|right|220px|The march out of Ramla.]]

File:Exodus from Lydda and
The march out of Lydda
File:Women and children on the march out of Lydda, July
Women and children rest during the three-day exodus.

During the afternoon and evening of July 12, thousands of Ramla's residents began moving out of town, on foot or in trucks and buses. Arab vehicles were confiscated and the brigade's own vehicles were used to move them. Kiryati OC Ben-Gal radioed the IDF's General Staff for more vehicles on the night of July 12–13.[102]

Lydda residents were made to walk further, possibly because of the earlier sniper fire, or because there were no vehicles left. Whatever the reason, they had to walk 6–7 kilometers to Beit Nabala, then 10–12 kilometers to Barfiliya, along dusty roads in temperatures of 30-35C, carrying their young children and whatever possessions they were able to leave with, either in carts pulled by animals, or on their backs.[8] Along the way, possessions were abandoned as people grew tired, or collapsed. "To begin with [jettisoned] utensils and furniture," one Israeli witness wrote, "and in the end, bodies of men, women, and children."[103]

Soldiers moved among residents telling them, "Go to King Abdullah, go to Ramallah."[104] Shmarya Guttman wrote that it made him think of the exile of Israel, or a pogrom: "A multitude of inhabitants walked one after another. Women walked burdened with packages and sacks on their heads. Mothers dragged children after them ... Occasionally, [IDF] warning shots were heard ... Occasionally, you encountered a piercing look from one of the youngsters ... and the look said, "We have not yet surrendered. We shall return to fight you."[105]

Reports of how many died vary. Many of them were elderly people and young children who died from the heat and exhaustion.[83] Morris has written that it was a "handful and perhaps dozens," and "quite a few."[106] He attributes a figure of 335 to Nimr al Khatib, but regards it as an exaggeration. Martin Gilbert writes that it was 355.[107] Walid Khalidi gives a figure of 350, citing Palestinian historian Aref al-Aref.[70]

John Bagot Glubb, the British leader of the Arab Legion wrote: "Perhaps 30,000 people or more, almost entirely women and children, snatched up what they could and fled from their homes across the open fields .... It was a blazing day in July in the coastal plains — the temperature about 100 degrees in the shade. It was 10 miles across open hilly country, much of it ploughed, part of it stony fallow covered with thorn bushes, to the nearest Arab village of Beit Sira. Nobody will ever know how many children died."[108][109]

Raja e-Basailah describes how, after making it to the Arab village of Ni'ilin, he pushed himself through the crowds for water to take back to his mother and a close friend, hiding it from others who were begging for it, leaving him haunted by guilt for years afterwards. Because he was blind, Basailah could only hear others describe the scenes: they told him that people were lying dead with their tongues sticking out and covered in dust, and that a baby lay alive on the breast of a dead woman.[10]

Father Oudeh Rantisi watched people die in the crush to get through the gates of a farm where there was food and water. He saw a baby fall from his mother's arms only to be run over by a cart. He saw a man killed for refusing to hand over his money.

When we entered this gate, we saw Jewish soldiers spreading sheets on the ground and each who passed there had to place whatever they had on the ground or be killed. I remember that there was a man I knew from the Hanhan family from Lod who had just been married barely six weeks and there was with him a basket which contained money. When they asked him to place the basket on the sheet he refused—so they shot him dead before my eyes. Others were killed in front of me too, but I remember this person well because I used to know him ...

Hundreds lost their lives due to fatigue and thirst. It was very hot during the day and there was no water. I remember that when we reached an abandoned house, they tied a rope around my cousin's child and sent him down into the water. They were so thirsty they started to suck the water from his clothes ... The road to Ramallah had become an open cemetery.[110][111]

After a three-day march, the refugees were picked up by the Legion and driven to Ramallah.[112]

The expulsions clogged the roads eastward with what Morris calls "human flotsam." He writes that IDF thinking was "simple and cogent." The IDF had just taken two major objectives and was out of steam. The Arab Legion was expected to counter-attack and now couldn't: the roads were cluttered, and they were suddenly responsible for the welfare of an additional tens of thousands of people.[113] An IDF logbook of July 15 notes: "The refugees from Lydda and Ramla are causing the Arab Legion great problems. There are acute problems of housing and supplies ... In this case, the Legion is interested in giving all possible help to the refugees as the Arab public is complaining that the Legion was unforthcoming in assistance Ramle and Lydda.[114]

There were objections from within Israel to the use of the refugees in this way. Meir Ya'ari, Mapam party co-leader, told the Kibbutz Artzi Council on December 12, 1948: "Many of us are losing their [human] image ... How easily they speak of how it is possible and permissible to take women, children and old men and to fill the roads with them because such is the imperative of strategy. And this we say, the members of Hashomer Hatza'ir, who remember who used this means against our people during the [Second World] war ... I am appalled."[115]

Looting of refugees

Although the Sharett-Ben Gurion guidelines specified that there was to be no robbery, numerous sources spoke of widespread looting of the refugees during the expulsions.

The Economist published a report on August 21 that year, saying that residents were not allowed to take much with them: "The Arab refugees were systematically stripped of all their belongings before they were sent on their trek to the frontier. Household belongings, stores, clothing, all had to be left behind."[116]

Spiro Munayyer writes that: "The occupying soldiers had set up roadblocks on all the road leading east and were searching the refugees, particularly the women, stealing their gold jewelry from their necks, wrist and fingers and whatever was hidden in their clothes, as well as money and everything else that was precious and light enough to carry."[117] A British teacher in Amman who investigated the condition of the refugees in late July said she had heard the same story of refugees being allowed to leave with some valuables, only to have them removed on the outskirts of the town.[8]

Aharon Cohen, director of Mapam's Arab Department, complained to General Allon months after the deportations that troops had been ordered to remove from residents every watch and piece of jewellery, and all their money, so that they would arrive at the Arab Legion without resources, thereby increasing the burden of looking after them. Allon replied that he knew of no such order, but conceded it as a possibility.[8]

George Habash, founder of the PFLP, had been studying medicine in Beirut, but when he heard that Jaffa had fallen to the Israelis, he returned to Lydda, his hometown, to be with his family, only to find himself expelled with them. He told A. Clare Brandabur:

The Israelis were rounding everyone up and searching us. People were driven from every quarter and subjected to complete and rough body searches. You can’t imagine the savagery with which people were treated. Everything was taken — watches, jewelry, wedding rings, wallets, gold. One young neighbor of ours, a man in his late twenties, not more, Amin Hanhan, had secreted some money in his shirt to care for his family on the journey. The soldier who searched him demanded that he surrender the money and he resisted. He was shot dead in front of us. One of his sisters, a young married woman, also a neighbor of our family, was present: she saw her brother shot dead before her eyes. She was so shocked that, as we made our way toward Birzeit, she died of shock, exposure, and lack of water on the way."[72]

Sacking of the cities

[[File:|right|thumb|280px|Ramla in the early 20th century]] The fall of the cities was followed by their looting by groups of soldiers, which continued for weeks. Bechor Sheetrit, the minister for minority affairs, said that the army removed 1,800 truckloads of property from Lydda alone.[118] Dov Shafrir was appointed Custodian of Absentee Property, but his staff were unexperienced and unable to control the situation.[118]

Fouzi El-Asmar, a child at the time, was able to sneak back into Lydda after being expelled:

I was shocked on this visit by the sight of this large city completely deserted, the houses open, the shops broken into and the remaining merchandise rotting. We were afraid of the trucks which were working every day without a break. The men who had come with the trucks would go into house after house and take out any article of value such as beds, mattresses, cupboards, kitchenware, glassware, couches, draperies and other such effects.[119]

One of the 3rd Battalion commanders, Lt. Col. Schmuel "Mula" Cohen, wrote of Lydda that, "the cruelty of the war here reached its zenith," and that the conquest of a city regarded as a key enemy base, "gave rise to vengeful urges" among Israeli troops.[8] The looting of the town—described by the soldiers as "commandeering enemy property"[120]—was so extensive that the 3rd Battalion had to be withdrawn from Lydda during the night of July 13–14, and sent for a day to the Ben Shemen wood for kinus heshbon nefesh, a conference to encourage soul-searching. Mula Cohen forced them to hand over the loot, which was thrown onto a bonfire and destroyed, but the looting continued when they returned to town. Some were later prosecuted.[121]

Stuart Cohen writes that central control over the Jewish fighters was still weak. Only Yigal Allon, commander of the IDF, made it standard practice to issue written orders to commanders, including that violations of the laws of war would be punished. Otherwise, trust was placed, and sometimes misplaced, in what Cohen calls intuitive troop decency. Allegations of indiscriminate killing, rape, expulsions, and looting were rife, which outraged sections of the Israeli government, but criminal convictions were rare. Cohen adds that, despite the alleged war crimes, the majority of IDF troops behaved with decency and civility.[122] Some refused to take part in the expulsions. Yitzhak Rabin wrote in his memoirs:

Soldiers of the Yiftach brigade included youth movement graduates, who had been inculcated with values such as international fraternity and humaneness. The eviction action went beyond the concepts they were used to. There were some fellows who refused to take part in the expulsion action. Prolonged propaganda activities were required after the action, to remove the bitterness of these youth movement groups, and explain why we were obliged to undertake such harsh and cruel action.[123]

Allegations of rape

File:Aharon
Agriculture Minister Aharon Zisling (1901-1964) said he could forgive rape, but not robbery.[124]

There were allegations that Israeli soldiers had raped Palestinian women. Ben-Gurion referred to the allegations in his diary entry for July 15, 1948: "The bitter question has arisen regarding acts of robbery and rape [o'nes ("אונס")] in the conquered towns ... Soldiers from all the battalions robbed and stole."[125] Lila Abu-Lughod and Diana Keown Allan write that fear of rape and the desire to protect sharaf al-bint—women's honour— was one of the key reasons for the flight of Palestinians.[126]

Israeli writer Amos Kenan, who served in 1948 in Lydda as a platoon commander in the 82nd Battalion, alludes to rape in an article about his time there: "At night, those of us who couldn't restrain ourselves would go into the prison compounds to fuck Arab women. I want very much to assume, and perhaps even can, that those who couldn't restrain themselves did what they thought the Arabs would have done to them had they won the war."[62] Kenan knows of only one woman who complained. A court-martial was arranged, but in court, the accused ran the back of his hand across his throat, and the woman decided not to proceed.[62]

Fayeq Abu Mana lived in Lydda during the invasion. He told a group of people at a Zochrot lecture: "[W]e saw six soldiers with a baby. They gave her to us. A month and a half old. Her mother fled. The six had raped her. She's a very young woman so she ran away. She didn't want to see, not her daughter and not anything. At the headquarters they told us to take care of the baby and maybe we would find the mother or father. We took her in a carriage and we found the mother downstairs. She said, 'They raped me and I can't do anything.' She took the girl."[78]

The rape allegations were given little consideration by the Israeli government. Agriculture Minister Aharon Zisling told the Cabinet on July 21: "It has been said that there were cases of rape in Ramla. I could forgive rape, but I will not forgive other acts, which appear to me much graver. When a town is entered and rings are forcibly removed from the fingers and jewellery from necks—that is a very grave matter."[124]

Other villages

Walid Khalidi writes that the residents of 25 other villages conquered from July 9–13 during Operation Danny were expelled at the same time, making 80,000 people in all, the largest instance of deliberate expulsion during the 1948 war.[16]

On July 10, Yiftah Brigade told Danny HQ: "Our forces are clearing the Innaba-Jimzu-Daniyal area, "and are torching everything that can be burned." Yiftah added a few hours later that Kharruba, Khirbet al Kumeisa had been captured, and the houses blown up.[127] Fifty "sappers" to were to sent to "destroy" the village of Innaba. On July 11, Yiftah told Danny HQ that they were blowing up the houses in Jimzu and Daniyal ('oskot betihur hakfarim u'fitzutz habatim). Yiftah Brigade was instructed: "In all the places you have conquered you should ... destroy every house that you do not intend to garrison." Morris writes that "demolition ... presupposed depopulation." Other villages captured in the area as part of Operation Danny were Beit Safafa, al Maliha, Ein Karim, Suba, Sataf, Khirbet al Lawz, Deir Amr, Aqqur, Sara, Kasla, Ishwa, Islin, Deir Rafat, and Artuf. Most of the inhabitants had already fled; those who hadn't did so when the troops approached. Anyone remaining was expelled.[128]

The Harel, Yiftah, 8th, and Kiriyati brigades were told on July 19, in an order signed by Yitzhak Rabin, to prevent the return of the inhabitants, "with live fire" (emphasis in the original).[129]

Aftermath

In Ramallah, Amman, and elsewhere

[[File:|right|thumb|120px|The UN's Count Folke Bernadotte (1895-1948) said he had never seen a more ghastly sight than the refugee camp in Ramallah.[130]]] Tens of thousands of Palestinians from Lydda and Ramla poured into Ramallah. For the most part, they had no money, property, food, or water, and represented a health risk, not only to themselves. The Ramallah city council asked King Abdullah to remove them.[131] Count Folke Bernadotte, the United Nations mediator in Palestine, visited the refugee camp they were eventually sent to, and said he had never seen a more ghastly sight.[130] Some of those expelled from Lydda still live in the Am'ari camp, two kilometers south of Ramallah, along with their descendants.

Some of the refugees reached Amman, the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, and the Upper Galilee, and all over the area there were angry demonstrations against Abdullah and the Arab Legion for their failure to defend the cities. People spat at John Bagot Glubb as he drove through the West Bank. Wives and parents of Arab Legion soldiers tried to break into King Abdullah's palace. Palestinians drove out the Jordanian governor of Nablus. The Iraqi army had to use force to quell protests.[132]

Alec Kirkbride, the British ambassador in Amman, described one protest in the city on July 18:

A couple of thousand Palestinian men swept up the hill toward the main [palace] entrance ... screaming abuse and demanding that the lost towns should be reconquered at once ... The king appeared at the top of the main steps of the building; he was a short, dignified figure wearing white robes and headdress. He paused for a moment, surveying the seething mob before, [then walked] down the steps to push his way through the line of guardsmen into the thick of the demonstrators. He went up to a prominent individual, who was shouting at the top of his voice, and dealt him a violent blow to the side of the head with the flat of his hand. The recipient of the blow stopped yelling ... the King could be heard roaring: so, you want to fight the Jews, do you? Very well, there is a recruiting office for the army at the back of my house ... go there and enlist. The rest of you, get the hell down the hillside!" Most of the crowd got the hell down the hillside.[133]

Morris writes that, during a meeting in Amman on July 12-13 of the Political Committee of the Arab League, delegates—particularly from Syria and Iraq—accused Glubb of serving British, or even Jewish, interests, with his excuses about troop and ammunition shortages. Egyptian journalists accused him of handing Lydda and Ramla to the Jews. King Abdullah eventually did the same, deciding it was safer to accuse Glubb, particularly after Iraqi officers alleged that the entire Hashemite house was in the pay of the British. Abdullah wanted Glubb's resignation, but London asked him to stay on to fight the war. As a result, Britain's popularity with the Arabs reached an all-time low.[134]

The UN Security Council called for the ceasefire to be reinstated no later than July 18, with sanctions to be levelled against transgressors. The Arabs were outraged: "No justice, no logic, no equity, no understanding, but blind submission to everything that is Zionist," Al-Hayat responded, though Morris writes that cooler heads in the Arab world were privately pleased that they were being required not to fight, given Israel's obvious military superiority.[135]


The situation of the refugees was dire. They camped in public buildings, in abandoned British barracks, and under trees, many with no aid and no obvious access to food. Most of the aid that did reach them came from the West though the Red Cross and the Quakers. Morris writes that the Arab governments did little for them. Poor management in the aid distribution centers in Beirut and Damascus meant that thousands of tents donated by Britain remained in warehouses. A new UN body was set up to get things moving, and a year later, in December 1949, it morphed into the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, or UNRWA, which the refugees and their descendants, now standing at four million overall, still depend on.[136]

Count Bernadotte's mediation efforts, which resulted in a proposal to split Palestine between Israel and Jordan, and to hand Lydda and Ramla to King Abdullah, ended on September 18, 1948, when Bernadotte was assassinated by four Israeli gunmen from Lehi, an extremist Zionist faction. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has continued ever since, with the fate of the refugees at its core.

Resettlement of the cities: Lydda to Lod

[[File:|right|thumb|230px|Power is handed from the military governor of Lydda, now called Lod, to the first mayor, Pesach Lev, April 1949.]] On July 14, the IDF told Ben-Gurion that "not one Arab inhabitant" remained in Ramla or Lod, as Lydda was now called.[137] In fact, several hundred remained, including the elderly, the ill and some Christians, and others managed to sneak back in over the following months, though they were shot on sight if caught.[138] In October 1948, the Israeli military governor of Ramla-Lod reported that 960 Palestinians were living in Ramla, 580 in Lod, and 450 in the Lod train station. Morris writes that Kadish, Sela, and Golan use these figures to argue that there was only a partial expulsion from the area.[139]

Military rule in Lod and Ramla ended in April 1949.[140] Over the following three years, Lod was transformed, in the words of its first mayor, Pesach Lev, speaking in 1952, from "a neglected Arab town that was Judenrein to a "Hebraic city."[141] By March 1950, there were 8,600 Jewish and 1,300 Palestinian residents in Ramla, and 8,400 Jews and 1,000 Palestinians in Lod.[15]

Jews

[[File:|left|thumb|230px|The first city council as the city of Lod.]] Nearly 700,000 Jews immigrated to Israel between May 1948 and December 1951 from European and Arab countries, doubling its Jewish population since it declared its independence. The immigrants, or olim, were placed in Arab towns and villages, then later in transit camps called ma'abarot. This was done in part because of the inevitable housing shortage, but also as a matter of policy to make it harder for the Arabs to return.[142]

The Jewish Agency, the organization in charge of receiving Jewish immigrants, asked the Ministry of Defence in August 1948 for permission to place immigrants in Ramla. Lod was at first excluded from the request: King Abdullah had asked for the return of both cities to the Arabs, but had a stronger case with Lod, according to Kadish and Sela, because of the expulsions and the brutality of the fighting. The negotiations went nowhere and Lod was added to the repopulation request.[15]

From around August, the Israeli government allowed Jewish-Israeli farmers to begin cultivating the cities' agricultural land, roughly 59,000 dunams. In November, a survey of properties in Lod showed there were 4,912 rooms that could house the 10,000 Jewish immigrants the government had decided to settle in the city.[143] Approval to allow Jewish families to move into Ramla was given on November 5, the Jewish Agency deciding that 2,400 olim would be housed in Ramla over the following four months. By February 1949, 1,700 Jewish families were living there, around 6,000 people altogether. By March 1950, the two towns had a joint population of 20,000 inhabitants, about 2,300 of them Arabs.[15] Most of the immigrants were from Europe (Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Romania); a minority were Mitzrahi Jews from Morocco, Tunis, and Turkey.[144]

New arrivals were assigned houses or apartments, and they could buy furniture, which had been taken from the Arabs, from the Custodian for Absentees' Property. Apart from the housing shortage, one of the reasons immigrants were placed in Arab homes was to help prevent the former residents from trying to reclaim them.[145]

Some factories were also turned over to immigrants, and 600 shops in Ramla had been re-distributed by the end of 1949.[146] The Custodian reported in March 1950 that there were 478 stores and 4,912 apartment rooms in Lod, 3,600 of which were occupied; and 507 stores and 4,349 apartment rooms in Ramla, 2,980 of which were occupied.[15] Jewish families were also occasionally placed in houses that belonged to Arabs still living in the city, but who were not allowed to live in their homes.[147]

By 1951, the housing shortage was such that the government created transit camps for Jewish immigrants; three were constructed near Ramla and Lod, housing 2,000 families.[15] By 1969, 50 percent of the Jewish immigrants there were from North Africa; 18 percent from other Middle Eastern countries, and 24 percent from Europe.[148] The addition of so many immigrants, and the high housing density, brought problems of unemployment, poverty, and racism to the towns, and there were complaints about ethnic groups practicing their own rituals and culture, rather than assimilating.[149]

Arabs

1948 Palestinian exodus
File:Man see school nakba.jpg

Main articles
1948 Palestinian exodus


1947-48 civil war
1948 Arab-Israeli War
1948 Palestine War
Causes of the exodus
Depopulated areas
Nakba Day
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Palestinian refugee
Palestinian right of return
Present absentee
Resolution 194

Background
British Mandate of Palestine
Israel's declaration
of independence

Israeli-Palestinian conflict history
New Historians
PalestineTemplate:· Plan Dalet
1947 partition planTemplate:· UNRWA

Key incidents
Deir Yassin massacre
Exodus from Lydda

Notable writers
Aref al-ArefTemplate:· Yoav Gelber
Efraim KarshTemplate:· Walid Khalidi
Nur MasalhaTemplate:· Benny Morris
Ilan PappeTemplate:· Tom Segev
Avraham SelaTemplate:· Avi Shlaim

Related categories
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before 1948 Arab-Israeli War

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The Arab workers allowed to remain in the cities were kept in a special fenced area, which they saw as a ghetto. One of the workers, Alnakib Abd Al Hamid, told Zochrot: "Lots of Jews demonstrated against the use of the word ghetto... They demonstrated against us being put in the ghetto ... The demonstrations were against the name ghetto but also against the act."[150]

The military administrator of the Ramla–Lod area split the region into three zones where Palestinians lived—Ramla, Lod, and Rakevet (a neighborhood in Lod established by the British for rail workers)—and declared the Arab areas within them "closed." In Lod, the Palestinian area was near the main mosque and the St. George Church. A curfew was declared, which lasted from the evening until the next morning. Each closed zone was run by a committee of three to five members.[151]

According to the IDF, a small number of Palestinians lived in their own homes, but most lived in houses that had belonged to other expelled people, giving rise to the phenomenon of "present absentees", people who lived in Lod, but who were regarded as legally absent, or without standing, regarding their right to reclaim their property.[152] Aaraf Muharaba, a member of Lod's municipal council in 2003, told a Zochrot meeting that this policy was enforced in an "obsessive" way: "And thus the absurd situation was created of present absentees, because the people were residents of the city but they didn't live in their own houses. Ownership of the house was transferred according to the absentee property law to the custodian of absentee property. The person was present but was absent in his city."[78]

Many of the town's essential workers were Palestinians, but were not trusted. Arab train workers, for example, were required to live in the Rakevet area and were subjected to a strict curfew and periodic searches to make sure they had no guns.[153] One resident wrote an open letter in March 1949 to the Al Youm newspaper complaining about the unfairness of the situation on behalf of 460 train workers, 360 Muslims and 100 Christians:

We, the Arab inhabitants of Lod train station, did not participate in any defiant acts against the Israeli army ... Neverthless, we were treated in a hard manner ...

Since the occupation, we continued to work and our salaries have still not been paid to this day. Then our work was taken from us and now we are unemployed.

The curfew is still valid ... [W]e are not allowed to go to Lod or Ramla, as we are prisoners.

No one is allowed to look for a job but with the mediation of the members of the Local Committee ... we are like slaves.

I am asking you to cancel the restrictions and to let us live freely in the state of Israel.[154]

The military administrators did supply some of the Arab residents' needs, such as building a school, supplying medical aid, and allocating them 50 dunams for growing vegetables. They also renovated the interior of the Dahmash mosque. The main mosque had refugees living in it, and the Dahmash mosque had been used as an Arab military hospital during the war, so neither were fit for prayer. The authority's willingness to renovate it was part of their policy of protecting the holy places of both the Christian and Muslim Arab residents.[155]

George Habash and Abu Jihad

[[File:|left|thumb|210px|The hijacked airliners in Jordan, as the PFLP holds a press conference.]] George Habash, the second-year medical student from Lydda who had to bury his sister in her back yard, went on to lead one of the best-known of the Palestinians' guerrilla groups, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). In September 1970, Habash masterminded their most spectacular attack: the almost simultaneous hijacking of four passenger jets bound for New York, and their forced flight to Jordan. The so-called Dawson's Field hijackings put the Palestinian cause on the map. The PFLP was also behind the 1972 Lod Airport massacre, in which 27 people died, and the 1976 hijacking of an Air France flight to Entebbe, which famously led to the IDF's Operation Entebbe, and the rescue of all but four of the hostages.

He remained unapologetic about the hijackings, and told Robert Fisk in 1993 that he would never rest until he could return to Lydda. "The house is still there and a Jewish family lives in it now... it's my right to go directly to my house and live there."[156] He died of a heart attack in Amman in 2008.

Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), the grocer's son who was expelled from Ramla, became one of the founders of Yasser Arafat's Fatah faction within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and specifically of its armed wing, Al-Assifa. Throughout Arafat's career, Abu Jihad was his right-hand man. He organized the PLO's guerrilla warfare, and the Fatah youth movements that helped to spark the First Intifada. He was assassinated by Israeli commandos in his home in Tunis in 1988.

Artistic representations

Ismail Shammout's Where to ..?

There have been literary and artistic responses from both Palestinians and Israelis to the expulsions. The Palestinian artist Ismail Shammout was 19 years old when he was expelled from Lydda. He created a series of oil paintings about the march, the best known of which is Where to ..? (1953), which enjoys iconic status among Palestinians.[157] A life-size image of a man dressed in rags carries a walking stick in one hand, and grasps the wrist of a crying child with the other. A toddler sleeps on his shoulder. Behind them a third child is crying and walking alone. The skyline of an Arab town with a minaret can be seen in the distance.[157]

Israeli poet Nathan Alterman described Lydda in his poem Al Zot ("On This"), published in Davar on November 21, 1948. David Ben Gurion said it should be read out to all IDF troops:"Let us sing then also about 'delicate incidents'/For which the true name, incidentally, is murder/Let us sing about conversations of those in the know/about nods of forgiveness and clemency."[120]

The cities today

As of 2004, 63,462 people were living in Ramla, 20 percent of them Arab. The town became briefly known around the world in 1962, when Adolf Eichmann was hanged in Ramla prison on May 31 that year.[158] [[File:|right|thumb|140px|Ramla town center in 2006]]

Lod's main industry is its airport, named Ben-Gurion International Airport in 1973, the largest in Israel, and the home base for the country's airline, El Al. Other local industries include oil refining, and the manufacture of electrical appliances, paper, and cigarettes. As of 2001, the population of the city was 66,100, of which 19.7 percent are Arab.[159] The Jewish Agency's Absorption Centre, the main facility for handling Jewish immigrants arriving in Israel, is based there.

Racial tensions and economic deprivation make Lod "the most likely place to explode," according to Arnon Golan, Israel's leading expert on racially-mixed cities. A fifth of the town's population are Bedouins who have set up illegal dwellings on agricultural land, as a result of which they receive no municipal services, such as trash collection or sewage disposal. Its Ramat Eshkol neighborhood is regarded as the crime capital of Israel; in addition to existing racial problems, Jewish immigrants from Ethiopia were housed there in the 1990s, which led to minor clashes. The Arab community has complained that, when Arabs became a majority in Ramat Eshkol, the local school was closed rather than turned into an Arab-sector school, and in September 2008, it was re-opened as a yeshiva, a Jewish religious school. The local council admits that it wants Lod to become a more Jewish city.[160]

File:Zochrot at the former Lydda
Zochrot places a sign on the area Lod's Arabs called a ghetto.

Zochrot, an Israeli-Jewish educational group that draws attention to the Arab towns and villages that stood where Israeli towns are now situated, visited Lod in 2003 and 2005, erecting signs depicting the town's history. They pointed out a spot near the main road where there is allegedly a mass grave, and posted a sign on a wall in the area the Arabs called a ghetto: "Here were concentrated and placed under military rule approx. 1000 men and women who remained in Al Lydd after the expulsion from the city and its environs of 45,000 Palestinians." The visits were met with a mixture of interest and hostility.[161]

Father Oudeh Rantisi, who was expelled from Lydda in 1948, visited his family's former home for the first time 20 years later:

As the bus drew up in front of the house, I saw a young boy playing in the yard. I got off the bus and went over to him. "How long have you lived in this house?" I asked. "I was born here," he replied. "Me too," I said ...[162]

See also

Notes

  1. Morris 2004, p. 425 writes that, in July 1948 before the Israeli invasion, Lydda and Ramla had a population of 50,000–70,000, 20,000 of whom were refugees from Jaffa and the surrounding area; all were expelled, except for a few who were retained to work, or who managed to sneak back in. Also see Morris, 2003, pp. 176–177; Prior, 1999, p. 205; Peretz Kidron: Truth Whereby Nations Live. In Said and Hitchens, 1998, pp. 90-93.
    • Morris 2004, p. 433: "A Palmach report, probably written by Allon soon after [the expulsions], stated that the exodus, beside relieving Tel Aviv of a potential, long-term threat, had 'clogged the Legion's routes of advance,' and had foisted upon the Jordanians the problem of 'maintaining another 45,000 souls ... Moreover, the phenomenon of the flight of tens of thousands will no doubt cause demoralisation in every Arab area [the refugees] reach ... This victory will yet have great effect on other sectors'."
    Yitzhak Rabin: "Clearly, we could not leave Lod's hostile and armed populace in our rear, where it could endanger the supply route to Yiftah [another brigade], which was advancing eastward. (Shipler, David K. "Israel Bars Rabin from Relating '48 Eviction of Arabs," The New York Times, October 23, 1979.)"
  2. The Palestinian death toll in Lydda is, according to Morris 2004, p. 426: 1. July 11: Six dead and 21 wounded on the Israeli side, and "dozens of Arabs (perhaps as many as 200)" during the raid led by Moshe Dayan. Third Battalion intelligence puts the figure at 40 Arabs dead. 2. On July 12, Israeli troops were ordered to shoot at anyone seen on the streets: during that incident, 3-4 Israelis were killed and around a dozen wounded. On the Arab side, 250 dead and many wounded.
  3. 4.0 4.1 4.2 Morris 2004, p. 432
  4. Gilbert 2008, pp. 218–219, and Rantisi (1990), p. 25
  5. Fraser. Tom. "Arab–Israeli wars," The Oxford Companion to Military History, Ed. Richard Holmes. Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 64.
    • In The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949 (1989), Benny Morris writes: "Quite a few refugees died - from exhaustion, dehydration and disease" (p. 204-211). In The Road to Jerusalem: Glubb Pasha, Palestine and the Jews (2003), he writes that "a handful, and perhaps dozens, died of dehydration and exhaustion" (p. 177). In his 2004 revised edition of The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949, he writes that "Quite a few refugees died on the road east", attributing a figure of 335 dead to Nimr al Khatib, which he describes as "hearsay" (p. 433).
    • Martin Gilbert (2008, pp. 218-219) writes: "On the eastward march into the hills, and as far as Ramallah, in the intense heat of July, an estimated 355 refugees died from exhaustion and dehydration. 'Nobody will ever know how many children died,' Glubb Pasha commented."
    • In the introduction to Spiro Munayyer's "The Fall of Lydda", Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 80-98, 1998, Walid Khalidi gives a figure of 350 dead citing an estimate from Aref al-Aref. According to Henry Laurens, Arif al-'Arif's figures break down as follows: 'the number of Arab dead at Lydda at the time of the events of the 12th of July rises to 426, of who 176 (were killed) in the mosque. The total number of dead rises to 1,300: 800 during fighting in the city, the remainder in the exodus'. Henry Laurens, La Question de Palestine, Fayard, Paris, 2007 p.145.
    • In The Politics of Denial: Israel and the Palestinian Refugee Problem (Pluto Press 2003, p. 47) Nur Masalha writes that 350 died.
    • A number of eyewitnesses spoke of seeing refugees killed for refusing to hand over their belongings e.g.
  6. 8.00 8.01 8.02 8.03 8.04 8.05 8.06 8.07 8.08 8.09 8.10 8.11 Morris, Benny. Operation Dani and the Palestinian Exodus from Lydda and Ramle in 1948", Middle East Journal, Vol.40, No.1 (Winter, 1986), pp. 82-109.
  7. Morris 2008, find page number)
  8. 10.0 10.1 10.2 Sa'di and Abu-Lughod, 2007, pp. 91-92.
  9. Monterescu and Rabinowitz, 2007, pp. 16-17.
  10. 12.0 12.1 Morris 2008, p. 77
  11. Morris 2008, p. 263
  12. Morris 2008, p. 273
  13. 15.0 15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 15.5 Golan, Arnon. "Lydda and Ramle: from Palestinian-Arab to Israeli towns, 1948-67," Middle Eastern Studies, October 1, 2003.
  14. 16.0 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4 Khalidi, Walid. (1998) Introduction to Munayyer, Spiro. The fall of Lydda. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 80–98.
  15. "Report on Ramle Operation," undated, probably December 11, 1944, IDFA 922/75/1213, cited in Morris 2004, p. 424.
  16. "Nai'aim (Na'aman)" to his HIS-AD, "The Bomb in Ramle," February 24, 1948; two reports with the same heading, both in HA 105/358; and Haaretz, February 19, 1948, cited in Morris 2004, p. 424.
  17. "Nai'im" to HIS-AD, "Murder of Arabs in Rhovot," February 24, 1948, HA 105/358, cited in Morris 2004, p. 424.
  18. Death toll from HIS-AD, May 31, 1948, intercepted messages from the mayors of Ramla and Lydda to the "heads of the Egyptian army etc," HA 105/92 aleph, cited in Morris 2004, p. 424.
  19. 21.0 21.1 21.2 21.3 Morris 2004, pp. 424–425
  20. Munayyer, Spiro. (1998) The fall of Lydda. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 80–98:87.
  21. Morris, 2004, p. 37.
  22. Kirkbride to Bevin (No. 225), 13 April 1948, PRO FO 816\117 quoted in Morris, 2003, p. 128.
  23. 25.0 25.1 Shapira 2007, p. 223
  24. Ben-Gurion, David. "War Diary", Volume 2, Israel Defense Ministry Publications, 1982, Cabinet meeting, June 16, 1948, p. 525; see Morris 2004, pp. 424-425.
  25. Segev, Tom. What really happened in the conquest of Lod? Haaretz, May 12, 2000.
  26. Morris 2008, p. 286
  27. 29.00 29.01 29.02 29.03 29.04 29.05 29.06 29.07 29.08 29.09 29.10 29.11 29.12 29.13 29.14 Kadish, Alon, and Sela, Avraham. (2005) "Myths and historiography of the 1948 Palestine War revisited: the case of Lydda," The Middle East Journal, September 22, 2005.
  28. Shipler, David K. "Israel Bars Rabin from Relating '48 Eviction of Arabs," The New York Times, October 23, 1979. Also see Morris 2004, p. 424, and Morris, Benny. He tried harder , Haaretz, May 17, 2009.
  29. Pappé 2006, p. 156
  30. Morris 2004, p. 414
  31. Morris, Benny. 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War. Yale University Press, 2008, p. 286.
  32. Shapira 2007, p. 224
  33. See Tel Aviv District Court in March 1953, 'Al ha-Mishmar, March 15, 17, 18, 24, 25 and 30, 1953 and April 16, 1953, cited in Kadish and Sela 2005.
  34. 36.0 36.1 Glubb, John Bagot. A Soldier with the Arabs, Harper and Brothers, 1957, pp. 142–143, cited in Morris, Benny. 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War. Yale University Press, 2008, p. 286; also see Morris 2008, p. 289; and Khalidi 1998.
  35. Morris 2003, p. 118.
  36. Danny HQ to IDF/General Staff, July 10, 1948, IDFA 922/75//1235, cited in Morris 2004, p. 425.
  37. "Malka" to "Tziporen," July 10, 1948, 16:00 hours, IDFA 922/75//1237, cited in Morris 2004, p. 425.
  38. Gelber 2001, p. 159.
  39. Munayyer 1998, p. 92.
  40. 42.0 42.1 Bilby, Kenneth. New Star in the East, New York, 1950, p. 43, cited in Other death march reports, The Link, July-August 2000, Volume 33, Issue 3.
  41. Shabtai Teveth, "Moshe Dayan The soldier, the man, the legend." ISBN 0 704 31080 5. page 187. States that the strenght of the Battalion prior to Operation Danny was 367 men.
  42. 44.0 44.1 Shapira 2007, p. 225.
  43. Morris 2004, p. 424
  44. A. Kadish, A. Sela, A. Golan (2000), The Occupation of Lydda, July 1948, Tel Aviv: Israel Ministry of Defense and Hagana Historical Archive (Hebrew), cited in Morris 2004, p. 426, and Morris 2008, p. 289.
  45. 47.0 47.1 Morris 2004, p. 426
  46. A. Kadish, A. Sela, A. Golan (2000), p. 36, cited in Morris 2004, p. 426. Morris writes that it is not clear whether the Third Battalion meant 40 Arab dead in all, or 40 killed by them specifically. Morris cites the original report: 3rd Battalion Intelligence, "Comprehensive Report of Third Battalion Activities from Friday 9.7 until Sunday 18.7, July 19. 1848, IDFA 922/75//1237.
  47. Yedi'ot Aharonot, July 12, 1948; Yedi'ot Ma'ariv, July 12, 1948; Gene Currivan, The New York Times, July 13, 1948. Munayyir, Al-Lud, p. 92, explains why so many civilians came under fire but gives no figures of casualties. Cited in Kadish and Sela, 2005.
  48. Dimbley, Jonathan, and McCullin, Donald. The Palestinians. Quartet Books 1980, pp. 88-89.
  49. Telephone message from Danny HQ, July 12, 1948, 10:30 a.m., IDFA 922/75//1237, cited in Morris 2004, p.427.
  50. Morris 2004, p. 427.
  51. Unsigned printed page describing events in Lydda, July 11-12, 1948, IDFA 922/75/1237, cited in Morris 2004, p. 427.
  52. Munayyer 1998, p. 95. Also see 1st Battalion HQ to chief of staff, Arab Legion, "Following are the memoirs of 1st Battalion Officer Arshid Marshud on the Battles of the 1st Battalion in Palestine, December 9, 1948, IDFA 922/75//693, cited in Morris 2004, p. 427.
  53. Gelber 2006, p. 159.
  54. Kadish and Sela 2005, and Morris 2004, footnote 78, p. 453.
  55. Tal, David. War in Palestine, 1948: Strategy and Diplomacy. Routledge, 2004, p. 311.
  56. Morris 2004, p. 427.
  57. Cohen, Mula. "The Conquest of Lod," Sefer ha-Palmach, Vol. II, 571; Ramallah Radio, July 11–12, 1948, HA, 105/310. Haviv, In the Suburbs and Streets of Lydda, p. 166, cited in Kadish and Sela 2005.
  58. Munayyer 1998, p. 94.
  59. Yiftah HQ to Danny HQ, 13:15 hours, July 12, 1948, IDFA 922/75/1237, cited in Morris 2004, pp. 427–428.
  60. 62.0 62.1 62.2 62.3 Kenan, Amos. The Legacy of Lydda: Four Decades of Blood Vengeance, The Nation, February 8, 1989.
  61. Benny, Morris. (1987)The New Historiography: Israel confronts its Past, in Morris, Benny. (ed) Making Israel, 2007, p. 11-28.
  62. Morris 2004, p. 428; also see Sefer Hapalmach II, p. 565 and PA, pp. 142–163, "Comprehensive Report of the Activities of the Third Battalion from 9 July until 18 July," Third Battalion/Intelligence, July 19, 1948, cited in Morris 1986, p. 88. Morris 1986 reports that Operation Mickey HQ reported four Israelis dead and 14 wounded; other sources reported two or three dead. See footnote 24, p. 89. Tal (2004) writes that two Israelis died. Note that Morris 1986 cites the Palmach as saying the action lasted from 11:30 until 14:00 hours. In Morris 2004, p. 428, it is described as having ended by 13:30 hours.
  63. Al-Aref, Aref. Al-Nakba, Vol III, p. 605; also see Orren, p. 110 cited in Morris 1986, p. 89; and Kadish and Sela 2005.
  64. Muhammad Nimr al-Khatib, Min Athar al-Nakba [On the Impact of the Catastrophe]. Damascus: Al-Matba'a al-'Umumiyya, 1951, cited in Kadish and Sela 2005, footnote 40.
  65. July 18, 1948, HA, 105/31, cited in Kadish and Sela 2005, footnote 40.
  66. Morris 2004, p. 427 reports the order to shoot "any clear target" or anyone "seen on the streets," citing Book of the Palmach II, 571 and 717; and Third Battalion/Intelligence, "Comprehensive Report of the Activities of the Third Battalion from Friday 9.7 until Sunday 18.7," IDFA 922/75//1237. See also Tal, David. War in Palestine, 1948, p. 311.
  67. Gelber 2006, p. 162.
  68. 70.0 70.1 Khalidi, Walid, Introduction to Spiro Munayyer's "The Fall of Lydda", Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 80-98, 1998.
  69. Shapira 2007, p. 227.
  70. 72.0 72.1 Brandabur, A. Clare Reply To Amos Kenan's "The Legacy of Lydda" and An Interview With PFLP Leader Dr. George Habash, Peuples & Monde; first published in The Nation, January 1, 1990.
  71. 73.0 73.1 73.2 Munayyer 1998, pp. 93-94.
  72. Guttman, "Lydda Exiled," p. 100. M. Kelman, Yedi'ot Aharonot, May 2, 1972; Conversation between Ezra Greenboim and Uri Gefen, YAHA.
  73. Al-Khatib, Muhammad Nimr. (1967) The Events of the Disaster or the Palestinian Disaster. Beirut: Al Khay at Publishers, p. 350, cited in Kadish and Sela 2005, footnote 44.
  74. "Mahraqat Shuhada' Madinat al-Lud," ["The Burning of te Martyrs of the City of Lydda"], al-Quds (Jerusalem), November 5, 1998. Shara', Mudhakkirat Jundi, p. 59, spoke of 600 dead people in the Great Mosque. The story about the massacre was also adopted by A. Yitzhaki, Yedi'ot Aharonot, June 14, 1972. Cited in Kadish and Sela 2005, footnote 40. Also see Morris 2004, p. 428, and footnote 81, p. 453. Morris cites Orren, On the Road, 110; "Avi-Yiftah" (Shmarya Guttman), "Lydda," 456; and an interview with Eldad Avidar in "Al-Nakba" (1998), a documentary produced and directed by Benny Brunner. For more information, see Mannin, Ethel. The road to Beersheba. H. Regnery Co., 1964, original from the University of Michigan.
  75. Al-Aref, Aref. Al-Nakba, Vol III, p. 605; also see Kadish and Sela 2005.
  76. 78.0 78.1 78.2 78.3 Testimonies on the Nakba of Lod, Zochrot, January 11, 2003, accessed May 19, 2009.
  77. 79.0 79.1 Morris 2004, p. 434.
  78. 80.0 80.1 Morris 2004, p. 415
  79. Morris 2004, p. 415; also see General Staff Authorization, 30/8/4/a, IDFA, 2135/1950, file 42, signed by Deputy CoS Ayalon; Segev, Tom. 1949, The First Israelis, Jerusalem: Domino, 1984, p. 42 (Hebrew edition); and Transcripts of the Interim Government's Meetings, July 4, 1948, cited in Kadish, Alon, and Sela, Avraham. (2005) "Myths and historiography of the 1948 Palestine War revisited: the case of Lydda," The Middle East Journal, September 22, 2005.
  80. Shavit, Avi. Survival of the fittest, Part 1, Part 2, Haaretz, January 8, 2004.
  81. 83.0 83.1 83.2 83.3 Shipler, David K. "Israel Bars Rabin from Relating '48 Eviction of Arabs," The New York Times, October 23, 1979.
  82. Bar-Zohar, Michael. Benn Gurion, Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1977, Vol II, p. 775, cited in Morris, Benny. "Operation Dani and the Palestinian Exodus from Lydda and Ramle in 1948," Middle East Journal, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter, 1986), p. 91.
  83. Shipler, David K. "Israel Bars Rabin from Relating '48 Eviction of Arabs," The New York Times, October 23, 1979; also see Kidron, Peretz: Truth Whereby Nations Live. In Said and Hitchens, 1998, pp. 90-93.
  84. 86.0 86.1 Ha'aretz, October 25, 1979; telegram to Danny HQ (at 23:30), IDFA, 922/1975, file 1182, cited in Kadish and Sela 2005.
  85. Interview with Yigal Allon on Kol Yisrael radio, October 24, 1979, some of it reproduced in Al Hamishmar, October 25, 1979, cited in Morris 2004, footnote 89, p. 454.
  86. 88.0 88.1 Shapira 2007, p. 229.
  87. Gelber 2006, p. 162.
  88. Gelber 2006, pp. 162-3.
  89. 91.0 91.1 Morris 2004, p. 431.
  90. Shapira 2007, p. 232.
  91. Prior, 1999, p. 205. The IDF Archives holds two nearly identical copies of the expulsion order. According to Morris, 2004, p. 429, 454, Allon later denied that there had been such an order, saying that the order to evacuate the civilian population of Lydda and Ramle came from the Arab Legion; see also Al Hamishmar, 25 Oct. 1979.
  92. Kiryati HQ to Aurbach, Tel Aviv District HQ (Mishmar) etc., 14:50 hours, 13 July 1948, HA (=Haganah Archive, Tel Aviv) 80\774\\12 (Zvi Aurbach Papers). See also Kiryati HQ to Hail Mishmar HQ Ramle -Shiloni, 19:15 hours, 13 July 1948, HA 80\774\\12. Cited in Morris (2004), pp. 429, 454.
  93. 95.0 95.1 Sheetrit, Bechor. "A report of the minister's visit to Ramle on 12 July 1948," written on July 12 1948, and sent to the Prime Minister and other senior ministers on July 14, Israel State Archives (ISA), FM2564/10, cited in Morris, Benny. "Operation Dani and the Palestinian Exodus from Lydda and Ramle in 1948," Middle East Journal, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter, 1986), p. 92.
  94. Morris 1986, footnote 36, p. 93
  95. The word used for "go/walk" was lalechet: Morris adds that this word was ambiguous, and may have left troops thinking it was all right to expel these people so long as they were not made to walk: see Morris 1986.
  96. Munayyer (1998), p. 94
  97. Shmarya Guttmann cited in Morris, Benny. "Operation Dani and the Palestinian Exodus from Lydda and Ramle in 1948," Middle East Journal, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter, 1986), pp. 95-96. Morris finds Guttman's account subjective and impressionistic, but valuable in terms of understanding what went on in Lydda and Ramla during the crucial period.
  98. Morris 2004, footnote 96, p. 455.
  99. A more literal translation of the word "pinui" would be "evacuation," not "eviction." Efraim Karsh has written about what he sees as Morris's mistranslation of this word in another context. In a critique of Morris, Karsh quotes from Morris's "Falsifying the Record: A Fresh Look at Zionist Documentation of 1948", Journal of Palestine Studies, Spring 1995, p. 47, which cites Yosef Weitz's diary.

    According to Karsh, the pertinent section of Weitz's diary reads: "A delegation from the Jezreel Valley and Bet She'an informs that the Arab Legion entered the [Arab] town of Bet She'an; ordered the women and children to leave the town and barricaded itself inside it. The question arose: should we attack the town or lay siege to it? ... "The Bet She'an Valley is the gate to our state in the Galilee, and nobody should stand on its threshold to disturb us,"—I said—"the evacuation of the valley [pinuyo shel ha-`emek] is the order of the day."

    Morris reported this as: "On 4 May, he [Weitz] complained to the local Jewish leaders that 'the valley was still seething with enemies ... I said—the eviction [of the Arabs] from the valley is the order of the day'." Karsh writes of this passage: "Note that Morris mistranslates 'evacuation' of the valley as "eviction [of the Arabs]," though Weitz clearly refers to the valley, not the Arabs. Even if Weitz implies their eviction, Morris undoubtedly has taken liberties with the translation." See Karsh, Efraim. Benny Morris and the Resign of Error, The Middle East Quarterly, March 1999.

  100. Morris (2004), p. 429
  101. Morris 1987
  102. Several eyewitnesses report this e.g. Munayyer 1998.
  103. Guttman, Shmarya. (Avi-Yiftah). Lydda, pp. 460–461, cited in Morris 2004, p. 433
  104. Morris 2003, p. 177; 2004, p. 433.
  105. Gilbert 2008, pp. 218-219.
  106. Glubb, John Bagot -- get cite-->
  107. Steiger, Arab Legion, p. 206, cited in Morris 2008, pp. 290–291
  108. Benvenisti et al., 2007, pp. 101–102
  109. Rantisi (1990), pp. 24–25
  110. Abu Nowar. Jordanian-Israeli War, pp. 206–207, cited in Morris 2008, p. 291
  111. Morris 2004, p. 433.
  112. Logbook entry, possibly Giv'ati Brigade, for July 15, 1948, IDFA 922/75//1226, cited in Morris 2004, p. 433.
  113. Kibbutz Artzi Council protocols, December 10-12, 1948, HHA 5.20.5(4), cited in Morris 2004, p. 435.
  114. Pappé (2006), p. 168.
  115. Pappé (2006), p. 168
  116. 118.0 118.1 Segev 1986, pp. 69–71
  117. El-Asmar, Fouzi. "To Be An Arab in Israel", Institute for Palestine Studies, 1978, p. 13.
  118. 120.0 120.1 Cohen, Stuart. Israel and Its Army: From Cohesion to Confusion. Taylor & Francis, 2008, p. 140
  119. Morris 2004, footnote 86, p. 454.
  120. Cohen, Stuart. Israel and Its Army: From Cohesion to Confusion. Taylor & Francis, 2008, p. 139.
  121. Kidron, Peretz: Truth Whereby Nations Live. In Said and Hitchens, 1998, pp. 90–93.
  122. 124.0 124.1 KMA-AZP, 9.9.3 protocol text of Zisling's statements in Cabinet, July 21, 1948, cited in Morris 1986, p. 105. Also see Segev, Tom. 1949, The First Israelis, pp. 71-72.
  123. Ben-Gurion, David. The War Diary: The War of Independence, 5708-5709. Volume 2, p. 589: "The bitter question has arisen regarding acts of robbery and rape in the conquered towns. Zvi Ayalon spoke yesterday with Yitzhak Rabin. He issued an order to a Palmach battalion (Mula's? ['Yiftah']) - of [Moshe] Kelman [The 3rd battalion]) to get out of the town already the day before yesterday. It is unclear if they got out, but soldiers from all the battalions robbed and stole. An instructor from battalion 5 (from the Palmach) demanded of them (Hachsharot people!) to go to Ramla and to rob."
  124. Abu Lughod and Allan 2007, p. 35.
  125. Yiftah HQ to Danny HQ, undated, and Yiftah to Danny, 21:15 hours, July 10, 1948, both in IDFA 922/75//1237, cited in Morris (2004), p. 435.
  126. Morris 2004, pp. 435-436.
  127. Yitzhak R[abin], Danny HQ to Harel, Yiftah, etc, July 19, 1948, IDFA 922/75/1235, cited in Morris 2004, p. 436.
  128. 130.0 130.1 Thomas, 1999, p. 288.
  129. IDF Intelligence Service/Arab Department, July 21, 1948, cited in Morris 2008, p. 291.
  130. Morris 2008, pp. 290-291.
  131. Kirkbride, From the Wings, p. 48, cited in Morris 2008, p. 291.
  132. Morris 2008, pp. 291-2.
  133. Al-Hayat, quoted in Houston Boswell to FO, July 21, 1948, PRO FO 371-68494, cited in Morris 2008, p. 295.
  134. Morris 2008, p. 310.
  135. Cabinet meeting, July 14, 1948, ISA, cited in Morris 2004, p. 434.
  136. Morris, 2004, pp. 301-302.
  137. Morris 2004, footnote 110, p. 455.
  138. "The cancellation of the Military rule in Jaffa and Ramla-Lod," June 23, 1949, IDF archive 31/50/1860, cited in Yacobi 2009, p. 39.
  139. Lev, Pesach in City of Lod 1952, in Yacobi 2009, p. 39.
  140. Morris 2008, p. 308.
  141. Yacobi 2009, p. 40
  142. "Ramla and Lod, population, undated," IDF archive 24/50/1860, cited in Yacobi 2009, p. 42.
  143. Yacobi 2009, p. 45
  144. Segev 1986, pp. 77–78
  145. "The evacuation of nine Arab families from their houses in Lod," November 23, 1952, IS archive Gimel/15/2219/779; "The Anglican Church property in Lod," November 11, 1953, IS archive Gimel/15/2291/779, cited in Yacobi 2009, p. 42.
  146. Hashimshoni 1969, cited in Yacobi 2009, p. 42.
  147. Yacobi 2009, p. 45.
  148. "Remembering Lydda," pamphlet produced by Zochrot, Tel Aviv: The Jaffa Press, 2005.
  149. Yacobi 2009, p. 33.
  150. "Investigation of the problems in supplying municipal services in the cities Ramla-Lod and Acco, November 19, 1948, IDF archive 31/50/1860, cited in Yacobi, Haim. (2009) The Jewish-Arab City: Spatio-politics in a mixed community. Routledge, p. 33.
  151. Yacobi 2009, p. 34.
  152. "An open letter," Al Youm, March 2, 1949, IDF archive 31/50/1860, cited in Yacobi 2009, p. 35.
  153. Yacobi 2009, p. 36.
  154. Fisk, Robert (1993). "Still dreaming of his homeland," The Independent, October 9.
  155. 157.0 157.1 Ankori 2006, pp. 48-50.
  156. Weitz, Yechiam. 'We have to carry out the sentence', Haaretz, August 2, 2007.
  157. Israel Central Bureau of Statistics; will add citation.
  158. Jeffay, Nathan. Israel’s Mixed Cities on Edge After Riots, The Jewish Daily Forward, October 31, 2008.
  159. Remembering Al-Lydd 2005, Lydda 2005; Tour and signposting in Al-Lydd (Lod), 2003, and Testimonies on the Nakba of Lod.
  160. Rantisi, Audeh G. and Amash, Charles. (2000) Death March, The Link, July-August 2000, Vol 33, Issue 3.

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  • Kelman, Moshe (1972). "Ha-Hevdel bein Deir Yasin le-Lod" ["The Difference between Deir Yasin and Lydda"], Yedi'ot Aharonot, May 2, 1972.
  • Kenan, Amos (1989), The Legacy of Lydda: Four Decades of Blood Vengeance, The Nation, February 8, 1989.
  • Khalidi, Walid (1998). Introduction to Munayyer, Spiro. The fall of Lydda. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 80–98.
  • Monterescu, Daniel and Rabinowitz, Dan (2007). Mixed towns, trapped communities: historical narratives, spatial dynamics, gender relations and cultural encounters in Palestinian-Israeli towns. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. ISBN 0754647323, 9780754647324
  • Morris, Benny (1986). "Operation Dani and the Palestinian Exodus from Lydda and Ramle in 1948", Middle East Journal, Vol 40, issue 1, pp. 82-109.
  • Morris, Benny (1987. The New Historiography: Israel confronts its Past, in Morris, Benny (ed). Making Israel, 2007, p. 11-28.
  • Morris, Benny (1988). The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949, Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0679744754
  • Morris, Benny (1995). "Falsifying the Record: A Fresh Look at Zionist Documentation of 1948", Journal of Palestine Studies, Spring 1995, pp. 44-62.
  • Morris, Benny (2001). Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001. Vintage Books. ISBN 0521330289, 9780521330282
  • Morris, Benny (2003). The Road to Jerusalem: Glubb Pasha, Palestine and the Jews. Tauris. ISBN 1860649890, 9781860649899
  • Morris, Benny (2004). The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521009677
  • Morris, Benny (2008). 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War. Yale University Press.
  • Morris, Benny (2009). He tried harder , Haaretz, May 17, 2009.
  • Munayyer, Spiro (1998). "The Fall of Lydda", Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol 27, issue 4, pp. 80-98, Institute for Palestine Studies.
  • Pappé, Ilan (2006). The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Oneworld. ISBN 1851684670
  • Rantisi, Audeh G. (1990). Blessed are the peacemakers: the story of a Palestinian Christian. ISBN 0863470599
  • Rantisi, Audeh G. and Amash, Charles (2000). Death March, The Link, July-August 2000, Vol 33, Issue 3, Americans for Middle East Understanding.
  • Prior, Michael, P. (1999). Zionism and the state of Israel: a moral inquiry. Routledge. ISBN 0415204623, 9780415204620
  • Ron, James (2003). Frontiers and ghettos: state violence in Serbia and Israel. University of California Press. ISBN 0520236572, 9780520236578
  • Sa'di, Ahmad H. and Abu-Lughod, Lila (2007). Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the claims of memory. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0231135793, 9780231135795
  • Said, Edward W. and Hitchens, Christopher (1988). Blaming the Victims. Verso. ISBN 0860911756
  • Shapira, Anita (2007). Ygal Allon, native son: A biography. University of Pennsylvania Press, ISBN 0812240286, 9780812240283
  • Segev, Tom (1986). 1949, The First Israelis, Owl Books by Henry Holt and Company. ISBN 0805058966 978-0805058963
  • Segev, Tom (2000). What really happened in the conquest of Lod? Haaretz, May 12, 2000.
  • Shipler, David K. (1979). Israel Bars Rabin from Relating '48 Eviction of Arabs, The New York Times, October 23, 1979.
  • Tal, David (2004). War in Palestine, 1948: strategy and diplomacy. Routledge. ISBN 071465275X, 9780714652757
  • Yacobi, Haim (2009). The Jewish-Arab City: Spatio-politics in a mixed community. Routledge.
  • Zochrot (2003). Testimonies on the Nakba of Lod, January 11, 2003. Also see [1] [2] [3]

Further reading

  • Alterman, Nathan (1948). Al Zot, in Hebrew.
  • Asmar, Fouzi (1975). To be an Arab in Israel. Frances Pinter (Publishers) Limited.
  • Hasso, Frances S. (2000). "Modernity and Gender in Arab Accounts of the 1948 and 1967 Defeats," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 32:491–510.
  • Karsh, Efraim (1997). Fabricating Israeli History: The 'New Historians'. Ilford, Essex: Frank Cass.
  • Khalidi, Walid (1961). "Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine," Middle East Forum, Vol. 37, p. 11.
  • Khalidi, Walid (1988). "Plan Dalet Revisited", Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 18: Nos. 1, 5.
  • Lustick, Ian S. (1997). "Israeli history: Who is fabricating what?" Survival, Volume 39, Issue 3 Autumn 1997 , pp. 156-166.
  • Masalha, Nur. Towards the Palestinian Refugees
  • Munayyer, Spiro (1997). Lydda During the Mandate and Occupation Periods. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies.
  • Rantisi, Audeh G. Would I ever see my home again?, Al-Ahram.
  • Zochrot. Remembering al-Lydd], 2005.

Coordinates: 31°56′30.01″N 34°52′41.83″E / 31.9416694°N 34.8782861°E / 31.9416694; 34.8782861


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