From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Feyzin disaster occurred in a refinery near to the small town of Feyzin (about 10 kilometers south of Lyons, France) on January 4 1966. The disaster was the result of a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE), which occurred due to a massive propane gas leak (which consequently exploded). This and other resulting explosions resulted in the deaths of 18 people, the injury of 81 and extensive damage to the site.

Prior to the incident

The Feyzin refinery (run by Elf, now acquired by Total), employed around 250 personnel at the time of the incident and had a production of about 2 million tons of crude oil annually.The main refinery units were located to the north of a local road.

The main storage areas were situated to the south of this road in a 145m wide strip adjacent to a boundary fence with a motorway. This was the area in which the disaster occurred.

The equipment in this area consisted of:

• Four 1200m3 spherical vessels used for propane storage
• Four 2000m³ pressure vessels used for propane storage
• Two 150m3 horizontal bullet pressure vessels used for propane and butane
• Ten 2500m³ and 6500m³ floating roof tanks used for the storage of finished grade petrol and kerosene

The LPG (liquefied petroleum gas) storage spheres were about 450m away from the nearest refinery unit and about 300 m from the nearest houses in the village. The shortest distance between an LPG sphere and the motorway was 42.4m, and the spacings between individual spheres varied from 11.3m to 17.2m. Each of the spheres were provided with fixed watersprays both at the top and at the mid-height, plus an additional single spray directed towards the bottom connections.

The Explosion

Events

During the 6AM to 2PM shift at the factory, workers were required to take a routine sample from each of the LPG storage tanks. A team comprising of a plant operator, the shift fireman and a laboratory technician were taking a sample from sphere no.443. The operator, due to the fact that he had only a single valve spanner, opened the valves in the incorrect order. This caused the release of a small amount of caustic soda and a small amount of gas when he opened the lower valve. This prompted the operator to close the valve and then reopen it, leading to only a few drops emerging. The upper valve was then opened fully. This led to a very powerful jet of propane to rush out. This release splashed up the from the drain and gave frost burns to the operator on the face and forearm. As he recoiled from the flow, the operator partly pulled off the valve handle. The fireman, losing sight of the operator, turned on the water supply to the sprays fitted to the sphere and, with the operator, attempted to reposition the valve handle and shut the valve. They failed to do so.

The time was now approximately 06.40. The three workers then set off on foot to sound the alarm and seek help (they were afraid of using the telephone or starting up the truck that transported them there in case they set fire to the escaping gas). They were successful in raising the alarm, and traffic was stopped on the nearby motorway. However, the escaping gas ignited.

The fire services attended the blaze, but they were not trained in controlling the type of BLEVE fire. While they attempted to cool the surrounding gas spheres, the leaking sphere exploded, killing several firemen. The explosion also caused another sphere to topple and leak gas.

References

• [1] HSE
• [2] Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE) loss prevention bulletin, 'The Feyzin Disaster' (LPB077, 1987)