The Republic of China (ROC), commonly known as Taiwan, is currently recognized by 23 states. The course of the foreign relations of the ROC is dominated by maintaining diplomatic relations with these countries, as well as unofficial relations with other countries via its de facto embassies and consulates.
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Established in 1912, the early years of the Republic of China were characterised by the domination of warlords and foreign incursions. When World War I broke out in 1914, Japan fought on the Allied side and seized the German possessions in Shandong. The Japanese set before the Beiyang government in Beijing (then romanised as 'Peking') the Twenty-One Demands. The Beijing government rejected some of these demands but yielded to the Japanese insistence on keeping the Shandong territory already in its possession. Beijing also recognised Tokyo's authority over southern Manchuria and eastern part of modern-day Inner Mongolia. In 1917, in secret communiques, Britain, France, and Italy assented to the Japanese claim in exchange for Japanese naval action against Germany.
In 1917, the Chinese Acting President Feng Kuo-Chang declared war on Germany[1] in the hope of recovering its lost province Shandong,[citation needed] then under Japanese control. But in 1918 the Beijing Beiyang government signed a secret deal with Japan accepting the latter's claim to Shandong. When the Treaty of Versailles confirmed the Japanese claim to Shandong and Beijing's sellout became public, internal reaction was shattering. Thousands of students gathered in the streets of Beijing in a protest known as the May Fourth Movement. In Paris, the Chinese prevented their delegates from participating to the debates.
Between 1901 and 1937, the United States military maintained a strong presence in China to maintain Far East trade interests and to pursue a permanent alliance with the Republic of China, after long diplomatic difficulties with the Chinese Empire. The relationship between the U.S. and China was mostly on-again off-again, with periods of both cordial diplomatic relations accompanied by times of severed relations and violent anti-U.S. protests. The United States military in China was slowly withdrawn to protect other U.S. interests in the Pacific with the approach of World War II.
After years of Japanese control of Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia, war broke out between Japan and China in 1937 in the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.
The 1970s saw a switch in diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the People's Republic of China (PRC) with countries like the United States, Japan, and Canada making the switch during that decade. In October 1971, Resolution 2758 was passed by the UN General Assembly, expelling "the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek" and replacing the China seat on the Security Council (and all other UN organs) with delegates from the PRC. It declared "that the representatives of the Government of the PRC are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations" and thus do not regard the ROC as legitimately representing the whole of China.
Many attempts by the ROC to rejoin the UN, in recent years, have not made it past committee, under fierce opposition and threatened vetoes from the PRC. The recent resolutions have all emphasized that Resolution 2758, replacing the ROC with the PRC in 1971, only addressed the question of who should have China's seat in the UN rather than whether an additional seat for the Taiwan Area can be created to represent the 23 million people on Taiwan and ROC's other islands. Today, only 23 states officially recognize the ROC, as the PRC makes breaking ties with the ROC and recognizing the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China (including Taiwan) the prerequisite to establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC.
On less official terms, the ROC is involved in a complex dispute for control over the Spratly Islands with the PRC, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and possibly Brunei; and over the Paracel Islands, occupied by the PRC, but claimed by Vietnam and ROC. ROC claims the Japanese-administered Diaoyu Islands (which the Japanese call "Senakaku-shoto"), as does the PRC.
On November 7, 2003, ties were established with Kiribati. However, Taipei did not demand that ties be broken with Beijing and ROC Foreign Minister Eugene Chien said that he would not reject having both sides of the Taiwan Strait recognized simultaneously.[2] The PRC also broke precedent by not cutting ties until November 29 and spent the interim lobbying for Kiribati President Anote Tong to reverse his decision. The decision to hold off for weeks was possibly due to the strategic importance of the PRC's satellite tracking base on Kiribati, which had been used for Shenzhou V and thought to have been used to spy on a U.S. missile range in the Marshall Islands.
Dates indicate establishment or duration of relations; * indicates an embassy in Taipei
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Africa (4 states)
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Central & South America (12 states)
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Panama established diplomatic relations with the Qing Empire in 1909, and has continued to maintain relations with the ROC from 1911 up until the present.[3] All of the 23 states which have official diplomatic ties with the ROC recognize it as the sole legitimate government of the whole of China, instead of just its current jurisdiction of the island groups of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu and some other islands.
Kiribati established diplomatic relations with the ROC on 7 November 2003 switching recognition from the PRC.[4] Saudi Arabia and South Korea ended their diplomatic relations with the ROC in 1990 and 1992 respectively, and South Africa switched recognition to the PRC in 1998. Liberia switched from the PRC to the ROC in 1989, and back again in October 2003. In March 31, 2004, Dominica ended its recognition, which began in 1983, because of offers from the PRC to provide $117 million over 6 years. The Republic of Macedonia recognized the ROC in the 1999 but switched diplomatic recognition in 2001 after the PRC imposed economic sanctions and used a rare veto on the UN Security Council to block peacekeeping efforts.[5]
The ROC has publicly feared that if any one state should switch its recognition to the PRC, it would create a domino effect, encouraging other states to do so as well.[12] The Holy See (Vatican) – the only European state to recognize the ROC – made efforts in 2007 to create formal ties with the PRC.[13] High-ranking bishops in the Roman Catholic Church have implied that such a diplomatic move was possible,[14] predicated on the PRC granting more freedom of religion[15] and interfering less in the hierarchy of the Chinese church.[16] (Note: The Catholic Church, the Holy See, and the Vatican City state are interconnected and share a leader.)
| Country | Period of recognition of ROC or year recognition ceased |
|---|---|
| 1949 | |
| 1955 | |
| 1972 | |
| 1972 | |
| 1971 | |
| 1989–97 | |
| 1971 | |
| 1985 | |
| 1975 | |
| 1974 | |
| 1949 | |
| 1950 | |
| 1971 | |
| 1970 | |
| 1962–64, 1968–76, 1991–98 | |
| 1950 | |
| 1962–72, 1997–2006[17] | |
| 1970 | |
| 1979 | |
| 1972 | |
| 1961 | |
| 1944-2007[18] | |
| 1960 | |
| 1949 | |
| 1964 | |
| 1950 | |
| 1983–2004 | |
| 1956 | |
| 1980 | |
| 1970 | |
| 1950 | |
| 1964[19] | |
| 1974 | |
| 1972 | |
| 1989–2005 | |
| 1959 | |
| 1990–98 | |
| 1949 | |
| 1971 | |
| 1950 | |
| 1950 | |
| 1971 | |
| 1958 | |
| 1979[20] | |
| 1970 | |
| 1972 | |
| 1952–72 | |
| 1977 | |
| 1971 | |
| 1971 | |
| 1966–83, 1990–94 | |
| 1957–77, 1989–93, 1997–2003 | |
| 1978 | |
| 1950 | |
| 1972 | |
| 1999–2001 | |
| 1972 | |
| 1966–2008[21] | |
| 1957-74 | |
| 1972 | |
| 1995 | |
| 1958 | |
| 1972 | |
| 1955 | |
| 1972 | |
| 1963–74, 1992–96 | |
| 1960–71 | |
| 1950 | |
| 1947-51 | |
| 1971 | |
| 1948–75 | |
| 1949 | |
| 1979 | |
| 1949 | |
| 1946–90 | |
| 1969–72, 1996–2005 | |
| 1971 | |
| 1965-92 | |
| 1976–98[22] | |
| 1973 | |
| 1949 | |
| 1949–92 | |
| 1975[23] | |
| 1959 | |
| 1950 | |
| 1950 | |
| 1956 | |
| 1975 | |
| 1972 | |
| 1972–98 | |
| 1971 [24] | |
| 1962 | |
| 1984 | |
| 1912–1950 | |
| 1912–1979 | |
| 1966–88 | |
| 2004-2004[25] | |
| 1944-74 | |
| 1972 | |
| 1956 |
The bilateral relations between India and the ROC have improved since the 1990s despite both nations not maintaining official diplomatic relations,[26].[27] India recognizes only the PRC (in mainland China) and not the ROC's contention of being the legitimate government of territorial China - a conflict that emerged after the Chinese Civil War (1945–49). However, India's economic & commercial links as well as people-to-people contacts with Taiwan have expanded in recent years.[26]
Japan-Republic of China relations are guided by the 1972 Japan-PRC Joint Communique. Japan has maintained non-governmental, working-level relations with the Republic of China ever since.
The ROC has long considered Mongolia part of its territory. As such, and because Mongolia has recognized the PRC since 1949, there have never been formal diplomatic relations between the two states. The ROC recognized Mongolia's independence in early 1946, in accordance with an agreement made in connection with the Sino-Soviet Friendship treaty of August 1945, and the Mongolian referendum in October 1945. However, the ROC abrogated the 1945 Sino Soviet Friendship treaty in 1953, and began to claim Mongolia again.[28]
The ROC used its United Nations veto once — in 1955, the ROC representative cast the only Security Council veto blocking the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations on the grounds that all of Mongolia was part of China. This postponed the admission of Mongolia until 1960, when the Soviet Union announced that unless Mongolia was admitted, it would block the admission of all of the newly independent African states. Faced with this pressure, the ROC relented under protest.
In 2002, a Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office was opened in Ulaanbaatar, and on 3 October 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Taiwan recognizes Mongolia as an independent country.[29] In 2002, the ROC government excluded Mongolia from the definition of the "mainland area" for administrative purposes. In 2006, old laws regulating the formation of banners and monasteries in Outer Mongolia were repealed. However, the official borders of the ROC have not been changed via a vote of the National Assembly (as required by the Constitution prior to 2005) or via a referendum (as required by the Constitution after amendments made in 2005). The formal claim of the ROC to the territory of Mongolia is reflected in various provisions of the Constitution of the ROC. For example, Article 26(2) provides that "[d]elegates to represent Mongolia shall be elected on the basis of four for each league and one for each special banner".[30] Nevertheless, in practice Mongolia is treated as an ordinary foreign power.
While Paraguay is not a particularly large country in absolute terms, it presently (2009) is the largest country maintaining official diplomatic relations with ROC. The partnership between the anti-communist governments of General Alfredo Stroessner and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was quite natural. Many Paraguayan officers went for training in Fu Hsing Kang College in Taiwan.[31]
The ouster of Stroessner in 1989, and his successor Andrés Rodríguez's reinventing himself as a democratically elected president, were immediately followed by invitations from the PRC to switch diplomatic recognition.[32] However, the Taiwanese ambassador, Wang Sheng, and his diplomats were able to convince the Paraguayans that continuing the relationship with ROC, and thus keeping Taiwan's development assistance and access to Taiwan's markets, would be more advantageous for Paraguay. As the ROC Commercial Attaché at Asunción, Tseng Cheng-te, explained later, "I tried constantly to figure out what we could buy from them. It was very difficult, because they have nothing to offer".[32]
The relations between the ROC with the PRC, which controls mainland China, has been complicated by history and politics.
Neither the government of the ROC nor the government of the PRC sees their relations as foreign relations. The government position that both Taiwan and mainland China are parts of the same state is not universally accepted in Taiwan. In particular, the pro-independence Pan-Green Coalition considers the ROC as "Taiwan", and considers the PRC as "China" and a different country. By contrast, the pro-reunification Pan-Blue Coalition supports the official position that both Taiwan and mainland China are parts of the same state, the ROC. Former president Lee Tung-hui, described these relations as "Special State-to-State Relations".[33] The subsequent administrations of President Chen Shui-bian described the ROC and the PRC by saying "...with Taiwan and China on each side of the Taiwan Strait, each side is a country.". Current President Ma Ying-jeou has returned to the earlier government position of the early 1990s, calling relations with the PRC special relations between two areas within one state. That state according to the ROC is the ROC, and due to constitutional reasons, neither the ROC nor the PRC recognises each other as a legitimate government.[34][35][36]
The term preferred by the ROC and PRC governments is "cross-strait relations", referring to the geographical separator, the Taiwan Strait. The constitutional position of the ROC is that the territory of the ROC is divided into the "Mainland Area" and the "Free Area" (also known as "Taiwan Area"). Administratively, cross-strait relations are not conducted by the Foreign Ministry of the ROC, but by the Mainland Affairs Council, an instrumental of the Executive Yuan. The relations with Hong Kong and Macau are also conducted by the Mainland Affairs Council, although not all regulations applicable to mainland China are automatically applied to those territories.
Consistently with the policies of both governments, the ROC and the PRC governments do not directly interact. Talks are conducted by the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) of the PRC and the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) of the ROC, formally privately constituted bodies that are controlled and directly answerable to the executive branch of their respective governments.
Until the late 1990s Hong Kong and Macau were British and Portuguese colonies respectively. They provided neutral detour points for people and goods moving from one side of the strait to the other. They, as well as Singapore, also served as venues for talks between the two sides. Among the fruits of these negotiations were the 1992 Consensus, reached in Hong Kong in 1992.
The Soviet Union had diplomatic relations with the ROC until 1949, when it switched to the recognition of the PRC (and in the same year the ROC established diplomatic relations with South Korea). Taiwan has exported many ferric materials to Russia in 2004-2005. In 2005, the total amount of the trade between the two countries (in US dollars) was 2,188,944,473. Russia also has a representative office in Taipei, and Taiwan has a representative office in Moscow. As can be seen from the data, Russia keeps a positive balance in its trade relations with Taiwan thanks to crude oil, cast iron and steel, nonferrous metals, petrochemical products, ferroalloys, coking coal, timber, and chemical fertilizers. Russia imports mostly electronics and electronic parts, computers and computer parts, and home appliances. The two nations currently have a dispute over Tannu Uriankhai.
Singapore had maintained unofficial relations with both the ROC and the PRC until 1992. After the establishment of diplomatic ties between Singapore and the PRC on October 3, 1992, it continues to maintain close economic and military ties with the ROC as part of its attempt to position itself as a neutral party to both sides. This is, however, a diplomatically delicate situation which has flared up occasionally. A severe diplomatic row broke out between the PRC and Singapore when Lee Hsien Loong visited Taiwan a month before being sworn-in as the Prime Minister of Singapore on 12 August 2004.[37] The Singaporean defence ministry took great pains to correct an erroneous report in the Liberty Times on a joint military exercise between the Singapore and the ROC in March 2005.[38] Still, Singapore is the only foreign country to maintain military training camps in Taiwan, and continues to regularly send infantry, artillery, and armoured personnel there for training annually. There has been talk in recent years, however, of the possibility of moving some or all of these facilities to Hainan following an offer by the PRC, although this may not be taken up due to sensitivities in diplomatic relations between Singapore and its largely Muslim neighbours.[39][40]
Relations between the ROC and South Korea date back to 4 January 1949, four months after the formal establishment of the South Korean government, when the Republic of China set up an embassy in Seoul's Myeongdong district. However, on 23 August 1992 the ROC severed diplomatic relations with South Korea in advance of the latter's announcement of formal recognition of the PRC.
Current relations between the United States and the Republic of China are governed by the Taiwan Relations Act. In addition Taiwan has been mentioned in the Three Communiques between the United States and the PRC.
According to the US Department of State's Background Notes,[41]
This statement is an example of the careful wording that the United States has to undergo to avoid possibly disastrous diplomatic gaffes. A clear statement that the United States does not recognize the PRC claim to Taiwan would bring instant diplomatic retaliation from the PRC. A clear statement that the United States does recognize the PRC claim over Taiwan would risk encouraging the PRC to take military action against Taiwan, and would also be politically almost impossible, in view of the sympathy that Taiwan has in the United States. So the United States responds by making a clear statement that it prefers dialogue over tension and peace over war; about the PRC's claim to Taiwan, it makes no statement at all.
There is a general agreement to maintain the "status quo," which includes not being very clear about what the "status quo" really is. There was some worry that the policy of strategic ambiguity would cause mistaken impressions of people's intentions. Partly to deal with this situation, the policy of the Four Noes and One Without has been developed in which the ROC has pledged not to take certain actions that would be provocative toward Beijing. In a number of cases, when the ROC appeared to be moving away from this policy, Washington has asked for and received assurances that this was not the case.
Similar positions on Taiwan are taken by a majority of countries. Twenty-three states recognize the ROC as the legitimate ruler of China and reject the PRC claims to legitimacy. During the 1990s, the ROC actively encouraged such recognition through generous grants of foreign aid. In the 2000s, this strategy was abandoned because the PRC could outbid the ROC with foreign aid, and the spending of large sums of money to buy recognition became quite unpopular in Taiwan.
In the 2000s, the diplomatic strategy of the ROC appears to have shifted to encourage "democratic solidarity" with major powers such as the United States, Europe, and Japan.
In 2007, a measure was introduced into the United States Congress that would dramatically strengthen U.S. ties with the ROC.[42] The United States House of Representatives passed a resolution calling for the lift of United States Government curbs on visits by high ranking or top ROC officials. The Resolution noted that "High-Level visitors from Taiwan, including the President, seek to come to the United States, their requests results in a period of complex, lengthy and humiliating negotiations." In an additional note on the resolution it said: "Lifting these restricitions will help bring a United States friend and ally out of its isolation, which will be beneficial to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific Region."
A bill was also introduced by US lawmakers to back the UN bid by Taiwan. The bill stated that Taiwan and its 23 million people "deserve membership in the United Nations" and that the United States should fulfill a commitment "to more actively support Taiwan's membership in appropriate international organizations." The bill was introduced on the 8th of November 2007, at the House Foreign Affairs Committee by 18 Republican legislators and one Democrat. Congressional records show that the move was led by New Jersey Republican Representative Scott Garrett. [4]
Official diplomatic relations are currently nonexistent, as the United States ended them in 1979 as a prerequisite for establishing ties with the PRC. Unofficial diplomatic relations are nevertheless maintained on both sides by means of de facto embassies, which are technically "private organizations" staffed by career diplomats who are formally "on leave". Taiwan's de facto embassy network is the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) with offices in Washington and 12 other US cities (as well as many other countries without official ties to Taiwan). The Americans' analogous organization is the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT).
In 2007 Venezuela decided not to renew visas for five members of Taiwanese commercial representation in Caracas.[43] Relations with Venezuela have worsened because of the increasing partnership between the government of Hugo Chávez and the PRC.
The ROC maintains diplomatic relations with six countries in Oceania: Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu. The PRC has relations with the other eight (including Australia, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand and Fiji). The Pacific is an area of intense and continuous diplomatic competition between the PRC and the ROC, with several countries (Nauru, Kiribati, Vanuatu) having switched diplomatic support from one to the other at least once. Both the PRC and the ROC provide development aid to their respective allies. In exchange, the ROC's allies support Taiwan's membership bid in the United Nations. The ROC is one of tiny Tuvalu and Nauru's most important economic partners.
In May 2008, Republic of China's Foreign Minister James Huang resigned, along with two other top officials of the out-going Chen Shui-bian Administration, after wasting over €19 million in a failed attempt to win diplomatic recognition for the ROC from Papua New Guinea. The misuse of the money caused public outrage, forcing Huang's resignation.[44] Papua New Guinea's foreign minister Sam Abal subsequently confirmed that his country had no intention of recognising the ROC.[45]
The incident led the ROC's then-incoming president Ma Ying-jeou to call for what he referred to as a "cease-fire" in the competition between the ROC and the PRC for diplomatic allies.[46]
While maintaining diplomatic relations with the PRC, many countries still maintain unofficial 'trade missions' or 'representative offices' in Taipei, to deal with commercial and consular issues. For example, France maintains a "French Institute" in Taipei, whose first apparent purpose is "cultural," but which also has consular and economic sections,[47] as does the United Kingdom's British Trade and Cultural Office.,[48] However, owing to political sensitivities, these countries may often forward visa applications to their nearest embassy or consulate, rather than processing them locally. Similarly, the ROC maintains Taipei Economic and Cultural Offices or Taipei Representative Offices in other countries, which handle visa applications as well as relations with local authorities.
The ROC has been excluded from or downgraded in many international organizations. In some cases the ROC still participates but does not use its official name. Below is a list of such international organization and the names as which the ROC is known:
The ROC claims to be the sole legitimate government of China.[citation needed] Accordingly, the ROC claims all territories currently administered by the People's Republic of China and Mongolia. This includes Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Outer Mongolia. As part of the same claim, the ROC also claims some surrounding areas which it says were historically part of Chinese territory, including Arunachal Pradesh, an eastern part of Bhutan, the Russian-administered part of Heixiazi Island, a northern part of Burma, part of the Pamir Mountains, Sixty-Four Villages East of the Heilongjiang River and Tannu Uriankhai. However, the ROC government does not currently actively pursue these claims.[citation needed]
The ROC also claims islands in the South China Sea on the same basis as its claim to historical Chinese territory. Unlike its claims on the Asian mainland, however, the ROC government actively pursues and defends some of its claims to these islands. These include all of the Spratly Islands, the Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal. These islands are administered by a number of governments around the South China Sea. The ROC also claims the Diaoyutai Islands, currently administered by Japan.
The PRC, in turn, asserts itself as the sole legitimate government of pre-civil war China, and claims all territories administered by the ROC as part of that territory.
The dispute over the ROC's status has also affected the island's air links with the outside world, particularly Europe, North America and Australia. For many years, Mandarin Airlines, a subsidiary of the ROC's national airline, China Airlines (CAL) served many international destinations that CAL did not, owing to political sensitivities. However, in 1995 CAL dropped the ROC national colours from its livery, and now flies to international destinations under its own name.
Many countries' national airlines similarly set up special subsidiaries to operate services to Taipei, with a different name, and livery omitting national symbols. For example, British Airways' now defunct subsidiary, British Asia Airways operated flights to London, KLM's subsidiary KLM Asia operated flights to Amsterdam, and Swissair's subsidiary Swissair Asia operated flights to Zurich, while other countries' flag carriers, such as Germany's Lufthansa, operated flights to Taipei using an existing subsidiary (in Lufthansa's case, Condor). Qantas had a subsidiary called Australia Asia Airlines, which flew between Sydney and Taipei, but now operates flights to the island as a code share with EVA Air.
Japan Air Lines established a subsidiary called Japan Asia Airways to operate flights to Tokyo. Before the completion of the second runway at New Tokyo International Airport (now Narita International Airport) near Tokyo, Japan, airlines from Taiwan were required to fly to Tokyo International Airport (commonly known as Haneda Airport) in Ota, Tokyo in order not to offend the airlines from the PRC that flew to Narita.
As of July 2008, charter flights between mainland China and Taiwan which were traditionally only allowed on special holidays such as the Chinese New Year, were expanded greatly. Under current plans, the opening of these flights may eventually reach a capacity of 3,000 mainland Chinese tourists per day entering Taiwan.
International dialling codes are assigned by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to its member states and their dependencies. However, as the ROC was not an ITU member state, it had to be allocated the code 886 unofficially, with the ITU listing the code as 'reserved'. Originally, until the late 1970s, the ROC used the code 86, but the code was re-assigned to the PRC in conformity with ITU's official membership, forcing the ROC to utilize another code for countries that wished to maintain direct dial connections.
The PRC has reserved part of its numbering plan for calls to Taiwan, using the prefix 06, but despite this, calls from the PRC to Taiwan are still currently made by using the international dialling code +886.
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