Forward air control: Wikis


Note: Many of our articles have direct quotes from sources you can cite, within the Wikipedia article! This article doesn't yet, but we're working on it! See more info or our list of citable articles.


From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Forward air control is the provision of guidance to Close Air Support (CAS)[1] aircraft intended to ensure that their attack hits the intended target and does not injure friendly troops. This task is carried out by a forward air controller (FAC)[2]. For NATO forces the qualifications and experience required to be a FAC are set out in a NATO Standard (STANAG). FACs may form part of a Fire Support Team or Tactical Air Control Party, they may be ground based, airborne FACs in fixed wing aircraft (FAC-A) or in helicopters (ABFAC)[3]. Since 2003 the United States Armed Forces have used the term joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) for some of their ground based FACs[4], prior to this they used the term Forward Air Guide(FAG)[5].

A primary function of a Forward Air Controller is ensuring the safety of friendly troops. Enemy targets in the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) are often close to friendly forces and therefore friendly forces are at risk of friendly fire through proximity during air attack. The danger is twofold: the bombing pilot cannot identify the target clearly, and is not aware of the locations of friendly forces. Camouflage, constantly changing situation and the fog of war all increase the risk. Air interdiction the term used for air attacks conducted at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required, thus it by definition does not involve the participation of a FAC.[6]


Early air ground support[7]

Even as close air support began during World War I, there were pioneer attempts to direct the trench strafing by the ground troops laying out signal panels on the ground, firing flares, or lighting smoke signals. Aircrews had difficulty communicating with the ground troops; they would drop messages or use messenger pigeons.[8] Benno Fiala von Fernbrugg, an Austro-Hungarian pilot, pioneered the use of radio for fire control; at the Battle of Gorlice he used a radio transmitter in his airplane to send changes via morse code to an artillery battery on the ground.[9] Colonel Billy Mitchell also equipped his Spad XVI command airplane with a radio, and the Germans experimented with radios in their Junkers J 1.[10]

The Marines in the so-called Banana Republic wars of the 1920s and 1930s used Curtiss Falcons and Vought Corsairs that were equipped with radios powered by airstream-driven generators, with a range of up to 50 miles. Another method of communication was for the pilot to drop messages in a weighted container, and to swoop in and pick up messages hung out by ground troops on a “clothesline” between poles. The objective was aerial reconnaissance and air attack. Using these various methods, the Marine pilots combined the functions of both FAC and strike aircraft, as they carried out their own air attacks on the Sandinistas in Nicragua in 1927. The commonality of pilots and ground troops belonging to the same service led to a close air support role similar to that sought by use of FACs, without the actual use of a FAC.[11] This distinctive doctrine would persist, recurring in the Korean War and the Vietnam War.[12]

French colonial operations in the Rif War (1920) of 1920 - 1926 used air power similarly to the Marines in Nicaragua against the Sandinistas but in a different environment, the desert. The French Mobile Groups of combined arms not only used aircraft for scouting and air attack; the airplanes carried trained artillery officers as observers. These aerial observers called in artillery fire via radio.[13]

When the United States Army Air Force was founded on 20 June 1941, it included provisions for Air Ground Control Parties to serve with the United States Army at the division, corps, and Army headquarters. The Air Ground Control Parties functions were to regulate bombing and artillery in close conjunction with the ground troops, as well as assess bomb damage. They were thus the first of similar units to try to fulfill the functions of the FAC without being airborne.[14] However, these units were often plagued by "turf wars" and cumbersome communications between the respective armies and air forces involved. As a result, it could take hours for an air strike requested by ground troops to actually show up.[15]

World War II

Forward Air Control came into existence as a result of exigency, and was used in several theaters of World War II. It was a result of field expedience rather than planned operations.[16]


Europe and Africa

North Africa

British Mobile Fighter Controllers (now known as FACs) operating during World War II

FACs were first used by the British Desert Air Force in North Africa, but not by the USAAF until operations in Salerno[17]. During the North African Campaign in 1941 the British Army and the Royal Air Force established Forward Air Support Links (FASL, a mobile air support system using ground vehicles. Light reconnaissance aircraft would observe enemy activity and report it by radio to the FASL; the FASL would then call in air strikes.[18]. They also introduced the system of ground direction of air strikes by a FAC (originally termed a mobile fighter controller) traveling with the forward troops[19].

Russian Front

During Operation Barbarossa, in the latter part of 1941, Generaloberst Wolfram von Richthofen circled over fleeing Russian troops in a Fieseler Storch and called in Stukas and other German ground attack aircraft on the enemy.[20]

Italian campaign

By the time the Italian Campaign had reached Rome, the Allies had established air superiority. They were then able to pre-schedule strikes by fighter-bomber squadrons; however, by the time the aircraft arrived in the strike area, oftimes the targets, which were usually trucks, had fled.[21] The initial solution to fleeting targets was the British Rover system. These were pairings of air controllers and army liaison officers in light aircraft roving over the battlefield. Incoming strike aircraft arrived with pre-briefed targets, which they would strike 20 minutes after arriving on station only if the Rovers had not directed them to another more pressing target. Rovers might call on artillery to mark targets with smoke shells, or they might direct the fighters to map grid coordinates, or they might resort to a description of prominent terrain features as guidance. However, one drawback for the Rovers was the constant rotation of pilots, who were there for fortnightly stints leading to a lack of institutional memory. US commanders, impressed by British at the Salerno landings, adapted their own doctrine to include many features of the British system[22]

Call signs for the Rovers were Rover Paddy and Rover David for the RAF; the names were those of the fighter pilots who originated the idea. The American version was Rover Joe.[23] Rover Joe was not an individual, but an ad hoc unit of a pilot forward air controller, a ground forward air controller, and fifteen enlisted men, including communications specialists and other ranks. The unit could move right along with the ground forces it supported.[24]

It soon became apparent that air strikes could be used even beyond the range of marking artillery, and that better target marking methods were needed. This led to the Horsefly FACs.[25] There are two accounts of the origin of the Horsefly FACs in this case; both may be true, as they are not contradictory.

  • One version tells of an anonymous L-5 Sentinel pilot who mentioned the FAC concept to Tactical Air Controller Captain William Davidson. Davidson then bucked it up the line to his seniors in Tactical Air Command.[26]
  • The other version says Colonel Earl Reichert asked his commander to borrow a couple of liaison aircraft from General Mark Clark.[27]

Regardless of inspiration, the first Horsefly FACs were launched on 28 June 1944. The scrounged L-5s had been equipped with SCR-522 VHF radios, and were flown by volunteer fighter-bomber pilots. Fighter-bomber squadrons were instructed that FAC missions had priority in targeting. The Horseflies operated at an altitude of 3,000 to 4,000 feet, ranging above small arms fire, roving up to 20 miles inside German lines, and marking targets with smoke bombs. To aid the strike pilots in seeing the tiny liaison craft, the upper wing surfaces were painted with one of four bright colors. Call signs were keyed to these colors: Horsefly Red, Green, Yellow, or Blue. When the German ground troops realized that the silvery-bottomed Horseflies were deadly, they concentrated fire on them. The counter to that was to paint the Horseflies the same khaki as ordinary artillery spotters. The Germans then became leery of firing on any of the khaki observation aircraft.

The Horseflies were obviously susceptible to enemy air attack and ground fire; they also added radio traffic to an already overburdened network. However, their effectiveness outweighed their disadvantages.[28] The Horseflies became an integral part of XII Tactical Air Command, and moved with them from Italy to southern France to southern Germany. The Horseflies saw action until the end of the European war.[29][30] Horsefly losses amounted to one L-5 wiping out its landing gear in a landing accident.[31][32]

North West Europe

With the invasion of Europe (D Day), Fighter bombers began a new direct support role, operating with the assistance of radio-equipped FACs on the ground with the supported formations. The fighter bombers were on call from "Cab Ranks", orbiting points close to the forward edge of the battle area. From these Cab Ranks, the FACs could very quickly call on air support for any targets of opportunity or threats to the troops in their area[33]. These FACs operated from White Scout Cars or Half Tracks (and later tanks) equipped with a wide range of radio sets for both ground to air and ground to ground communications[34]. Airborne FACs were supplied from the Air Observation Post Squadrons of the RAF[35].

Pacific and South Asia

South Pacific

In November, 1942, the Australian military, along with some Americans, were fighting the Japanese in the Battle of Buna-Gona, New Guinea. 4 Squadron of the Royal Australian Air Force was an army cooperation squadron flying support for the ground effort, in outdated two-seater CAC Wirraway trainers. They sometimes used the second seat to carry an observer. The local terrain was jungled; ground troops had difficulty in observing the enemy or in staying linked with one another. Therefore, the Wirraway pilots, with their superior observation, began directing artillery fire onto the Japanese from the air via radio, as well as carrying out their own strafing and bombing. One pilot, Pilot Officer J. Archer, even shot down a Japanese Zero, for the only known aerial victory by a FAC.

After the Japanese lost Buna-Goa in January, 1943, they fell back on Wau. On 3 February 1943, a 4 Squadron Wirraway reconnaissance Japanese dispositions at 1:20 PM. It left, to return at 2:39 leading the Bristol Beaufighters of 30 Squadron RAAF into the target area. The Wirraway marked the target with tracer fire, and the Beaufighters struck. A Japanese prisoner captured shortly thereafter reported that out of the 60 troops in his vicinity, 40 had been killed by the air strike. Later, in December, 1944, 4 Squadron directed the US 7th Fighter Squadron as they supported an Australian army attack in the Battle of Shaggy Ridge.

The other cooperation squadron in the theater, 5 Squadron, also took up the forward air control role. Both squadrons were re-equipped with the CAC Boomerang, which was an Australian fighter-bomber containing many Wirraway components. The Boomerangs had performance comparable to enemy fighters, and became the original fast FACs.[36] Dissatisfaction with the poor target marking possible with tracer bullets led to 5 Squadron's use of 30 pound phosphorus bombs on Bougainville in 1944. During the Bougainville campaign, FACs from 5 Squadron directed as many as 20 Corsairs at a time in air strikes. With practice, ordnance came to be delivered as close as 150 yards from friendly troops.[36]

Aleutian Islands Campaign

American aerial attackers had to contend with fog and low-lying cloud cover, as well as heavy Japanese defensive ground fire. The situation led to the use of forward air control. On 16 May 1943, General Eugene M. Landrum ordered his air chief of staff, Colonel William O. Eareckson to coordinate air strikes with ground operations for the invasion of Attu. Eareckson borrowed an OS2U Kingfisher from the USS Casco (AVP-12). Using the seaplane's low speed and maneuverability to his advantage, Eareckson flew reconnaissance missions to spot Japanese positions. He would then spiral up through the clouds to rendezvous with strike aircraft and either lead the strike into the targets or describe the target location to the fighter-bombers. Ground fire not only hit the Kingfisher; it sometimes punctured the plane's single float. Eareckson would land in shallow water, beach the plane, and plug the bullet holes with rubber plugs before resuming his mission.[37]


By May 1944 the Air Forces in Burma had worked out the technique of forward air control. This was exercised by a party of one or two officers plus six to eight enlisted men. They approved targets selected by the Army, called up air strikes by radio, and if necessary guided the aircraft to the target. On occasion, liaison aircraft would observe the strike.[38]. For the Chindit's Operation Thursday each column had a forward air controller to direct support from Mitchell and Mustang aircraft[39][40].

Post World War II

U. S. Air Force versus U. S. Marine Corps

In the United States, despite its success in battle, the role of the FAC was not codified into doctrine until after the war's end, by which time no FACs remained in service in the US. In 1946, Army Field Manual 31-35 became the repository of the lessons learned by experience in battle. However, in 1947, the United States Air Force became a separate service, intent on strategic bombing. U. S. Air Force Forward Air Control expertise existed only on paper.[16] Their doctrine ranked air operations importance as being primarily concentrated on strategic bombing, with interdiction operations secondary, and close air support last. The Air Force believed in central control of close air support originated by FACs within Tactical Air Control Parties assigned to the Army at regimental and divisional level. By contrast, the U. S. Marine Corps placed its TACPs down to battalion level; air strike requests for naval air originated with the commanding officer. However, the greatest practical difference between the two systems lay in their very definition of close air support. The Air Force considered air strikes anywhere within artillery range of friendly units to be close air support. The Marines defined it as air strikes within 50 to 200 yards of friendly troops, delivered within fifteen minutes of request.[41]

British Commonwealth operations

The United Kingdom and Commonwealth continued to build on its experience in the Second World War in various campaigns around the would in the second half of the twentieth century, including the Malayan Emergency[42], the Suez Crisis[43], the Indonesian Confrontation[44] and operations in Aden and Oman[45][46]. With the re-formation of the Army Air Corps in 1957 this new corps's functions included airborne forward air control[47][48]

Korean War

War of movement

The first comprehensive airborne forward air controller program was developed in Korea.[49] Two weeks into the Korean War, the need for forward air control was starkly apparent, a powerful North Korean offensive was advancing so rapidly that the locations of the invaders could literally change hourly. US F-80 Shooting Stars flying from Japan had barely enough range to dump their bombs and turn back to base. Tactical Air Control Parties struggled to direct the air effort, but found their powers of observation limited by rugged terrain, near horizons, and an ever shifting tactical situation.

Once again, there are dual and non-contradictory tales of the FAC startup effort. Lieutenant Colonel Stanley P. Latiolas, operations officer of the Fifth Air Force that was operating in Korea, suggested having a slower airplane spot targets for the fuel-hog jets. Colonel John R. Murphy, who knew of the success of the Horseflies, asked the Commanding General of the Fifth Air Force, Earle E. Partridge for five pilots to fly reconnaissance.

On 9 July 1950, two lieutenants flew the first FAC missions of the Korean War from K-5 in Taejon. They flew into K-5 with two L-5 Sentinels. The L-5s' VHF radios didn't work, so the lieutenants borrowed Cessna U-17s and went airborne. Working under the call signs Angelo Fox and Angelo George, during the next three hours, the FACs managed to direct ten flights of F-80s in wreaking severe damage to North Korean tanks and vehicles. The following day saw the first use of a T-6 Texan for a FAC plane. During the direction of RAAF P-51 Mustangs, the T-6 radio became unserviceable. The FAC continued indicating targets by flying over them and rocking his wings. The resulting strikes were the first of many successful attacks made without radio contact, as United Nations bombers operated on many non-compatible radio frequencies.

T-6 Texan, an aircraft often used by Forward Air Controllers, especially in Korean War.

The T-6 became the standard FAC aircraft for Korean use; several of the smaller slower liaison planes were shot down by North Korean Yaks, and they were retired.[50] Fifth Air Force also turned to higher performance aircraft for the FAC mission. P-51 Mustangs and F4U Corsairs were used to penetrate enemy air space after it had become too hazardous for T-6s.[51]

The two original FACs had switched to a T-6 and promptly flew a sortie directing air strikes by P-80s that knocked out 17 North Korean tanks near Chonui. The T-6 Texan was such an obvious success for directing air strikes that an ad hoc forward air control unit began to coalesce; it would become the 6147th Tactical Control Group nicknamed the Mosquitoes. More T-6s and more pilots were acquired.[52] The 6147th TCG became one squadron working as three man Tactical Air Control Parties in radio jeeps, and two squadrons of aerial forward air controllers. C-47s were also used by the group as Airborne Command and Control Centers.[53]

Although the T-6 entered the FAC role as a "hot" aircraft, it was soon encumbered with numerous adaptations that degraded its performance. A belly tank was added to extend its range. Both members of the crew wore complete survival gear, and the plane was loaded up with smoke grenades. Eventually, a dozen smoke rockets were added under each wing for marking targets. With half a ton of added weight, the T-6 was slowed to 100 miles per hours top speed, and its service ceiling was considerably reduced. The lower performance was not the only detriment to the T-6's role in forward air control. It is a low wing monoplane; consequently, the plane often had to be flown tilted to one side for visibility.[52] However, the Texan's ruggedness, easy maintenance, and ability to operate from small rough airfields outweighed the disadvantages.[54] The 6147th tested the L-19, later known as the O-1 Bird Dog. The L-19 offered no better performance than the Texan and was unarmored. It was rejected because of its vulnerability to ground fire.[52] There was also an abortive attempt to use the L-17 Navion as a FAC bird. The Navion's low wing design precluded any success in observation.[55]

During 1950, the 6147th Tactical Control Group operated as far as 50 miles into enemy territory, using relay aircraft to remain in radio contact.[51] The Mosquitoes proved their worth by directing the limited number of air strikes against the most important enemy targets, optimizing the United Nations firepower.[54]

Positional warfare

By July, 1951, the war had ground to a stalemate. As a consequence, North Korean and Chinese ground fire had become such a threat that Mosquitoes penetrated only a couple of miles into enemy lines. The enemy had also noted that the T-6s operated at low altitude, and often flew below cloud cover to navigate. Being adaptable and ingenious, the communists took to stringing wire cables from ridgetop to ridgetop to catch Mosquitoes. They even infiltrated the United Nations lines to string up cables on the friendly side.

In mid-November, 1952, the Mosquito T-6s were called upon to direct the battlefield interdiction strikes being flown for Operation Cherokee. Unlike the Close Air Support missions usually improvised by the FACs, the Cherokee strikes were preplanned raids of about 50 aircraft. Although planned interdiction raids would not seem to need guidance, the size of the attacking force tended to overwhelm TACPs. Mosquitoes marking the targets with smoke rockets helped lighten the load. The Cherokee strikes were successful in destroying enough supplies to hamper the Communist effort.[56]

By war's end, the United Nations air campaign had become so dependent on airborne FAC's directing strikes on targets invisible to ground FACs that the latter could go three months without directing a strike.[57]

The Mosquitoes flew through war's end, amassing 40,354 sorties, two Presidential Unit Citations, and a Korean Presidential Unit Citation.[52] The Mosquitoes lost 33 men and 42 aircraft during the course of the war.[53] The Mosquitoes were disbanded in 1956, as they were considered a wartime expedient. After they were disbanded, the United States once again had no Forward Air Control capabilities.[52]

Forward air control during the Vietnam War

L-19/O-1 Bird Dog, used by Forward Air Controllers during the Vietnam War.


The United States unleashed a tremendous amount of air power during the Vietnam War. It would be controlled by the most widespread forward air control in history.[58] The rugged jungle terrain readily hid communist troop movements. American fighter-bombers were so fast that pilots had great difficulty in distinguishing between enemy troops, friendly troops, and civilians. Forward air controllers directing air strikes thus became essential in usage of air power.[59] Visual reconnaissance formed the core FAC mission during the Vietnam War, as the FAC flew light aircraft slowly over the rough terrain at low altitude to maintain constant aerial surveillance. By patrolling the same area constantly, the FACs grew very familiar with the terrain, and they learned to detect any changes that could indicate enemy forces hiding below.[60] Tracks on the ground, misplaced vegetable patches, an absence of water buffalo, smoke from cooking fires in the jungle, too many farmers working the fields—all could indicate enemy troops in a vicinity.[61]

Flying low and slow over enemy forces was very dangerous; however the enemy usually held his fire to avoid discovery.[62] Each of the O-1 FAC aircraft originally used carried three different radios for coordinating with everyone involved in an air strike: an FM radio for the ground forces, a UHF radio for the fighter aircraft, and a VHF radio for contact with the Air Force Tactical Air Control Party to coordinate approvals and requests for air support.[63] The FAC radioed for strike aircraft after spotting the enemy. He marked the target with smoke grenades or white-phosphorus rockets to pinpoint targets. After directing the fighter-bombers' attacks, the FAC would fly low over the target to assess the damage.[64]

Forward air control advisors in Vietnam

In 1961, the USAF sent five FACs to Bien Hoa Air Base to train the Vietnam Air Force in directing air strikes from O-1 Bird Dogs. The USAF FACs were fighter pilots with expertise in delivering air-to-ground ordnance. American and South Vietnamese FACs began to fly combat missions together, but only the Vietnamese could control air strikes by delivering ordnance. Also, all air strikes required the approval of the South Vietnamese government.[65][66]

In December, 1961, the Tactical Air Control System was set up as part of Operation Farm Gate to handle air offensive operations, including airborne forward air control. On 8 February 1962, the Air Operations Center for Vietnam was set up at Tan Son Nhut on the outskirts of Saigon; it would be the command and control network for forward air control.[67] On 15 April 1962, two FAC O-1s from Marine Observation Squadron 2 were with the first U. S. Marine Corps troops to enter Vietnam.[68] They would fly along with the Air Force.[69]

In early 1962, American ground FACs began to supply on the job training to South Vietnamese counterparts in Tactical Air Control Parties, in an effort to improve poor performance by the local FACs. However, rough terrain, limited sight lines, and difficulty in communication plagued ground FAC efforts in Southeast Asia.[70] Also in 1962, the communists began to attack convoys moving supplies within South Vietnam. A program of shadowing truck convoys with FAC O-1s began; no escorted convoy was ambushed during early 1963.[71]

As the war escalated, the VNAF needed more FACs. The USAF responded by activating the 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron at Bien Hoa in July 1963 to train South Vietnamese pilots in forward air control, visual reconnaissance, combat support, and observer procedures. After one year, the 19th TASS was to turn its O-1s over to the VNAF, but the Tonkin Gulf incident in August 1964 changed everything.[72]

Forward air control expansion

After the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the United States began to add large numbers of ground and air forces in South Vietnam. As of January, 1965, there were only 144 USAF airborne FACs, as well as 68 VNAF FACs; yet the Rules of Engagement mandated a forward air controller direct all air ordnance used in South Vietnam.[73][74] To direct close air support of the U.S. units, a rapid expansion of the forward air control effort was needed.[75] By April 1966, five Tactical Air Support Squadrons filled out the Air Force combat units of the 504th Tactical Air Support Group.[76] The Group served mostly for logistics, maintenance, and administrative functions. It comprised only 250 O-1 Bird Dog FACs for all South Vietnam.[77] They were supposed to be assigned two per maneuver battalion. However, they were assigned to brigades and lived and worked with the battalions that needed them for operations.[78][79]

In the midst of the FAC buildup, in September 1965, the first Airborne Command and Control Center was launched. ABCCC would become the inflight nerve center of the Vietnam air war. It not only kept track of all other aircraft, it served "to assure proper execution of the fragged missions and to act as, a central control agency in diversion of the strike force to secondary and lucrative targets." ABCCC would expand into a twenty-four hour per day program directing all air activity in the war.[80] In 1966, the U.S. used FACs to increase its interdiction efforts into the southern portion of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. FACs from the 20th TASS, flying O-1s and later O-2s, directed air strikes. They also adjusted gunfire from U.S. Navy ships if a U.S. Marine artillery spotter was flying with them.[81] As part of this effort, the Marines pioneered Fast FACs in Vietnam, using two-seated F9F Panther jets in this area, as well on deep targets on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

By October, 1965, the U. S. Air Force realized it had an insufficient number of FACs. Although the Rules of Engagement were changed to lessen the workload on the FAC force, the USAF continued short of trained Forward Air Controllers until the U. S. drawdown of troops lessened demand. One hundred percent manning of the FAC effort would finally come in December, 1969.[82]

Marine Observation Squadron 2 came ashore in its entirety in May 1966.[68] Shortly thereafter, they would transition from the O-1 to UH-1E helicopters.[83] June, 1966 saw the first Australian FAC join the 19th TASS. Before their assignments ended in December, 1971, 36 Australians would have served with the USAF, with one of them, Flight Lieutenant Gerry Cooper, being recommended for the Medal of Honor by Major General Julian Ewell. Following the Australians’ lead, New Zealand also placed 14 of its FACs under U. S. command over much the same time span.[84][85] The U. S. Army also had aviation companies of 0-1 Bird Dogs operating in Vietnam; at least seven of these companies directed air strikes upon occasion, in addition to their artillery direction duties.[86][87] The U. S. Army had eight aviation companies of 0-1 Bird Dogs operating in Vietnam, but official doctrine limited them to what they had been trained for: visual reconnaissance and directing artillery. Nonetheless, despite only USAF FACs being authorized to direct air strikes, Army pilots did so when there was a pressing tactical requirement and Air Force FACs were not immediately available.[86][87] The 220th Reconnaissance Airplane Company ‘Catkillers’, under operation control of 3rd MARDIV in I Corps, was the only Army company officially authorized to direct air strikes. Due to the Marine pilots of VMO-6 being overstretched by the intensity of combat operations in the DMZ, pilots of the 220th were, uniquely, given the Marine designation of Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne). As TACAs, they were formally approved to run air strikes in addition to directing artillery and Naval gunfire.[88] By November, 1968, a minimum of 736 FACs were deemed necessary; however, only 612 were available.[89]

New tactics and equipment

Fast FACs

The communists’ reaction to FAC efforts was to gradually improve their antiaircraft defenses. In addition to antiaircraft artillery, the communists deployed surface-to-air missiles southward. As they became available, communist troops also started using man-portable, shoulder-fired SA-7 Grail missiles. The USAF had to change its tactics in turn. By 1967, the threat from communist antiaircraft defenses made it too dangerous for propeller-driven FACs to support the interdiction campaign in the southern part of North Vietnam. Therefore, the Air Force’s response was the use of fast FACs. The F-100 Super Sabre Fast FACS, call sign Misty, were armed with 20 mm cannon and two rocket launchers for marking targets and fast enough to survive in a high-threat area. In 1968, the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, based at Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Base, started using F4 Phantom IIs, call sign Wolf, in the Fast FAC role, and other F-4 units soon followed.[90] A further refinement of the Fast FAC mission was the use of photo reconnaissance planes in conjunction with the Fast FAC. The photo plane performed visual reconnaissance for the FAC, as well as pre- and post-strike photography of targets, leading to an increase of strike control and the tripling of bomb damage assessment.[91]

FAC losses still ran high; in the three years following July 1967, 42 Fast FACs were shot down. The program was not cancelled because it was considered too valuable.[92]

The same was not true for night-time Fast FAC operations. Owl FACs using laser designators to guide 500, 1,000, and 2,000 pound bombs from fighter-bombers began flying missions on 18 October 1969, but were cancelled in January, 1970 due to unacceptable losses.[93]

Search for better Slow FAC planes

The Air Force also looked for a better FAC aircraft. The O-1 Bird Dog had many shortcomings. Its speed made it slow to arrive over target. It was vulnerable to enemy small arms fire. Its small size limited its payload. Its radio system was makeshift, with only one channel available at a time for any radio. Also, the Bird Dog lacked night flight instruments.[94]

An interim solution was the O-2 Skymaster, an adaptation of the civilian Cessna 337. With twin engines, the O-2 had greater speed, could carry more equipment and ordnance, and had night instrumentation. Nevertheless, this aircraft also had limited capabilities. In 1968, the Vietnam FACs received the first purpose-built forward air control aircraft. The OV-10 Bronco was armored, was nearly twice as fast as the O-1, and carried its own onboard ordnance for attacking targets of opportunity.[95] Performance wasn’t all. The Bronco had unparalleled visibility; the pilot could lean outboard in the bubble canopy and see directly below the plane. There were self-sealing fuel tanks, all systems had a backup, and it had ejection seats.

Most important of all were the radios. Instead of three radios, only one of which could be used at a given moment, the OV-10 had eight radios, usable simultaneously, all with a scrambler system available to disguise messages.[96] By 1968, there were 668 Air Force FACs in country, scattered at 70 forward operating locations throughout South Vietnam.[97] As a result, the communists largely ceased daytime activities in areas surveilled by FACs. This led to a shift to night FAC operations by O-2s.[98]

Coordination of operations

Fast FACs and slow ones both found advantages in cooperation with one another. A slow FAC could flee AAA fire and call for a fast FAC to take over. A fast mover that couldn't make out sufficient details of a target could call for a slow FAC who could loiter and observe closely.[99]

U. S. Navy aviation, as late as December 1967, was having difficulty flying missions in support of the navy’s riverine patrols in the Mekong Delta. A short loiter time to seek targets resulted in only one combat sortie that month. On 3 January 1969, the U. S. Navy raised its own forward air control squadron, Light Attack Squadron 4, using OV-10 Broncos borrowed from the Marine Corps. VAL-4 was stationed at Binh Thuy and Vung Tau, and would fly 21,000 combat sorties before its disbandment on 10 April 1972. Those sorties would be a mix of light strike missions and forward air control.[100]

Forward air control in Laos

Beginning in 1959, the communists began building a secret logistical road system through neutral Laos and Cambodia. The Truong Son Road—called by Americans the Ho Chi Minh Trail--consisted of a network of roads and hiding places concealed by the jungle.[101] It would eventually develop into an intricate system of over 3,000 miles of interweaving roadways and trails. Associated with it were other roads running into northern Laos, to Sam Neua and through Dien Bien Phu across the border into Laos.[102] Laotian neutrality prevented the overt use of American ground troops to block the Trail. However, the U.S. obtained permission from the Laotian government in 1964 to conduct aerial interdiction strikes along the trail. Stringent Rules of Engagement over Laos mandated the use of FACs. Since the U.S. could not legally send military personnel to Laos, the USAF initially used enlisted Combat Controllers garbed as civilians, with the call sign Butterfly, to direct air strikes from civilian aircraft[103] flown by Air America. In 1965, the air war over Laos expanded into two different operations.

  • Operation Steel Tiger continued to provide aerial interdiction under FAC auspices along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the southern panhandle of Laos.
  • Operation Barrel Roll provided aerial interdiction and close air support for the Laotian forces fighting the communists in northern Laos. These fighter-bomber strikes were also directed by FACs.

In 1966, the USAF FACs began guiding air interdiction missions against the Truong Son Road from both east and west. Friendly forces were also supported. Another forward air control unit was created in 1966 for service in Laos, as a successor to the Butterfly program. Volunteer FACs in Vietnam with at least six months experience could join the Raven FACs. They were temporarily assigned to the 56th Special Operations Wing at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base, but operated within and throughout Laos in direct support of Laotian ground forces. Even as the Butterflies before them, these pilots carried no military identification and wore civilian clothing. They flew unmarked O-1s, U-17s, and T-28 Trojans. They supported indigenous troops in Laos who opposed the North Vietnamese invaders, and they flew with "Backseaters" provided by local commanders. The Ravens' unique situation was their authority to attack any target in Laos. The other FACs operating over Laos—Covey FACs from Da Nang and the Nail FACs from Nakhon Phanom—could only attack targets in their assigned areas.[104] The FAC effort in Laos ended with the withdrawal of the last of the Ravens in September, 1973.[105]

Operations in Cambodia

The communists stockpiled large amounts of military supplies in Cambodia that they had brought down the Ho Chi Minh Trail and up the Sihanouk Trail from the port of Kompong Son on the Gulf of Thailand. Also, they had attacked South Vietnam from sanctuaries in Cambodia. On 30 April 1970, the U.S. and South Vietnam sent ground forces into Cambodia to destroy communist supplies and sanctuaries. Although American ground forces withdrew from Cambodia, the air interdiction campaign continued; USAF FACs were there to support the effort. A detachment of the 19th TASS patrolled Cambodia in support of the Cambodian troops and used the call sign Rustic. To communicate with the Cambodian forces, the Rustics flew with French-speaking interpreters.[106] The American FACs would covertly support the Cambodian non-communists by directing massive U. S. air strikes until 15 August 1973.[105]


During the Southeast Asian War, FACs participated in every major military action against the enemy except the strategic bombing campaign against North Vietnam.[107] American fighter-bombers dropped over four times the weight of bombs dropped in all of World War II—nine and a half million tons. Laos became the most heavily bombed country in history. All fighter-bomber ordnance dropped in that nation was directed via forward air control. Much of the bombing in South Vietnam and Cambodia was also FACed; so was the bombing in southern North Vietnam.[108] A total of 338 USAF forward air controllers were lost in action.

Moreover, the FACs in Southeast Asia also helped pioneer many of the weapons and tactics used today. Flying O-2As equipped with flares and Starlight night vision scopes, they directed air power against the communists at night. Experimenting with laser designators, they helped lead the way toward today's laser-guided precision munitions, and the development of the Fast FACs led to the modern versions used effectively in the heavily defended skies over the Balkans and Southwest Asia.[109]

Nevertheless, the United States once again closed down Forward Air Control at a war's end.[110]

Indo-Pakistani War

Major Atma Singh, of the Indian Air Force, flying the forward air control mission in a HAL Krishak, played a crucial part in this successful defense against steep odds. The Pakistani loss of armor was one of the most severe since the great armored clashes of World War II. Major Singh won the Maha Vir Chakra for his performance under heavy ground fire.[111][112]


During the Rhodesian Bush War the Rhodesian Air Force mounted Airborne FACs in Aeromachi AL60 B Trojans and Lynx aircraft.[113][114][115]

South Africa

South Africa deployed both Airborne (in AM.3CM Bosboks[116]) and ground based FACs[117] during the Border War including the Battle of Cassinga[118]

Present day doctrines


NATO is making efforts to increase the safety and reduce the risk of fratricide in air to ground operations. Co-operation between different NATO agencies such as the NATO Standardization Agency and the JAPCC resulted in the development of common standards for Forward Air Controllers and these are now set out in STANAG 3797 (Minimum Qualifications for Forward Air Controllers)[119]. NATO FACs are trained to request, plan, brief and execute CAS operations both for Low Level and Medium/High Level operations and their training NATO FACs includes electronic warfare, suppression of enemy air defences, enemy air defence, air command and control, attack methods and tactics and weaponeering.[120]

United Kingdom Armed Forces Today

FACs in the United Kingdom are trained at the Joint Forward Air Controller Training Standards Unit (JFACTSU) [121]. In light of operational experience British TACs now form part of Fire Support Teams able to direct a wide range of fires[122] some FACs are also provided by the Royal Marines (and Royal Marines Reserve)[123] and occasionally RAF Regiment[124] Tactical Air Control Parties. The Army Air Corps also provides Airborne Forward Air Contollers[125][126] Cornet Prince Henry of Wales, the third in line to the British throne, served as a FAC on Operation Herrick during 2007 and 2008[127].

United States Marine Corps

The United States Marine Corps is the only United States service to refer to its JTACs as FACs. The USMC requires that FACs [128][129]:

  • must be winged Naval Aviators or NFO with at least 2 years operational flying experience.
  • must have attended and graduated from the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group (EWTG) Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) course.
  • Must be male[130]

At the completion of the TACP course Aviators are granted the 7502 FAC MOS and are considered certified and qualified JTACs.

Non-aviator FACs in the United States Marine Corps must meet the following requirements[citation needed].:

  • They must be a Staff Noncommissioned Officer or above, and must have a combat arms Military Occupational Specialty.
  • To be eligible for JTAC training the individual must be in or slated to serve in a JTAC billet per unit T/O's.
  • Must complete JTAC primer course at Expeditionary Warfare Training Group(EWTG) (Soon to be a distance learning program).
  • Must attend and graduate from EWTG TACP (Certified but not qualified) at this point the Marine is authorized the 9986 Skill designator.
  • Must complete the 300 level training syllabus after TACP school per the USMC TACP T&R (Qualified JTAC)

After completion of one the DoD's JTAC courses non-aviator Marines are given the secondary MOS of 9986, that of a qualified JTAC/FAC[citation needed].

When deployed on operations each USMC infantry company is allocated a JTAC, it is proposed that standard squad leaders will be trained as Squad Fires Observers and permitted to act as FACs for less complex CAS missions[131]

See also


  • Mosquitoes to Wolves: The Evolution of the Airborne Forward Air Controller. Gary Robert Lester. Air University Press, 1987. ISBN 1585660337, 9781585660339.
  • Hit My Smoke!: Forward Air Controllers in Southeast Asia. Jan Churchill. Sunflower University Press, 1997. ISBN 0897452151, 9780897452151.
  • Strike from the Sky: the History of Battlefield Air Attack, 1911-1945. Richard Hallion. Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989. ISBN 0874744520, 9780874744521.
  • Korean Air War. Robert F. Dorr, Warren Thompson. Zenith Imprint, 2003. ISBN 0760315116, 9780760315118.
  • Upward and Onward: Life of Air Vice-Marshal John Howe CB, CBE, AFC. Bob Cossey. Pen and Sword, 2009. ISBN 1844158209, 9781844158201.
  • Dirty Little Secrets of the Vietnam War: Military Information You're Not Supposed to Know. James F. Dunnigan, Albert A. Nofi. Macmillan, 2000. ISBN 031225282X, 9780312252823.
  • A Hundred Feet Over Hell: Flying With the Men of the 220th Recon Airplane Company Over I Corps and the DMZ, Vietnam 1968-1969. Jim Hooper. Zenith Imprint, 2009. ISBN 0760336334, 9780760336335.

Sources of information

  1. ^ "Joint Air Operations Interim Joint warfare Publication 3-30". MoD. pp. 4–5. "CAS in defined as as air action against targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of these forces" 
  2. ^ "Tactical air control: the job explained". The Daily Telegraph. 24 Aug 2007. "The primary role of the forward air controller is to direct combat strike aircraft onto enemy targets in support of ground troops." 
  3. ^ "Joint Air Operations Interim Joint warfare Publication 3-30". MoD. pp. 4–5. 
  4. ^ "Training the RAF's eyes and ears". BBC. 14 February 2009. Retrieved 4 January 2010. "I ask if Prince Harry's deployment as a forward air controller, or what the Americans term a "JTAC" (joint tactical air controller or joint terminal attack controller), has boosted the number of volunteers for the job." 
  5. ^ Maj J Stallings (Jan 1968). "Close air Support and the Forward Observer". 
  6. ^ "DOD dictionary". "air interdiction DOD) Air operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives. Air interdiction is conducted at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required." 
  7. ^ Hit My Smoke: Forward Air Controllers in Southeast Asia. p. 3. 
  8. ^ Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack 1911 - 1945. pp. 20–21, 38–40. 
  9. ^
  10. ^ Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack 1911 - 1945. p. 21. 
  11. ^ Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack 1911 - 1945. pp. 70–74. 
  12. ^ Mosquitoes to Wolves: The Evolution of Airborne Forward Air Control. p. 7. 
  13. ^ Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack 1911 - 1945. pp. 69–70. 
  14. ^ Hit My Smoke: Forward Air Controllers in Southeast Asia. pp. 1–2. 
  15. ^ Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack 1911 - 1945. pp. 149–150. 
  16. ^ a b Hit My Smoke: Forward Air Controllers in Southeast Asia. p. 5. 
  17. ^ Matthew G. St. Clair, Major, USMC (February 2007). "The Twelfth US Air Force Tactical and Operational Innovations in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, 1943–1944.". Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. "The use of forward air controllers (FAC) was another innovative technique employed during Operation Avalanche. FACs were first employed in the Mediterranean by the British Desert Air Force in North Africa but not by the AAF until operations in Salerno. This type of C2 was referred to as “Rover Joe” by the United States and “Rover David” or “Rover Paddy” by the British." 
  18. ^ "Forward air control: a Royal Australian Air Force innovation". 
  19. ^ "RAF & ARMY CO-OPERATION". RAF. "The mobility of the tactical air forces in providing the close air support for the armies was best shown by the system originally used in Tunisia for the ground control of fighters; the fighter controller (now known as the Forward Air Controller (FAC)) rode in the leading tank or armoured car and then, by using VHF radio telephone, he directed aircraft forming a 'cab rank' above to whatever target appeared most suitable." 
  20. ^ Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack 1911 - 1945. pp. 229. 
  21. ^ Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack 1911 - 1945. pp. 181–182. 
  22. ^ Charles Pocock, Viper 7, 1966-67. "THE ANCESTRY OF FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS". FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATION. "fundamental feature of the system was use of waves of strike aircraft, with pre-briefed assigned targets but required to orbit near the line of battle for 20 minutes, subject to Rover preemption and use against fleeting targets of higher priority or urgency. If the Rovers did not direct the fighter-bombers, the latter attacked their pre-briefed targets. US commanders, impressed by British at the Salerno landings, adapted their own doctrine to include many features of the British system, leading to differentiation of British "Rover David", US "Rover Joe" and British "Rover Frank" controls, the last applying air strikes against fleeting German artillery targets." 
  23. ^ The Royal Air Force Air Power Review: Volume 6, Number 3, Autumn 2003. pp. 87. 
  25. ^ The Royal Air Force Air Power Review: Volume 6, Number 3, Autumn 2003. pp. 87–88. 
  26. ^ Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack 1911 - 1945. pp. 181–182. 
  27. ^ Hit My Smoke: Forward Air Controllers in Southeast Asia. p. 4. 
  29. ^ Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack 1911 - 1945. pp. 181–182. 
  30. ^ Hit My Smoke: Forward Air Controllers in Southeast Asia. p. 4. 
  31. ^ Hit My Smoke: Forward Air Controllers in Southeast Asia. p. 4. 
  32. ^ Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack 1911 - 1945. pp. 181–182. 
  33. ^ "Hawker Typhoon". "By the end of June the Typhoon squadrons had relocated to France, allowing them to increase the speed with which they could respond to calls for assistance. A crucial development was the use of the “Cab Rank” or “Taxi Rank” system. This involved maintaining a standing patrol of Typhoons over the battlefield. Below them would be a Forward Air Controller, whose job it was to direct the Typhoons onto the most important target at any moment. Once a target was identified, a stream of Typhoons would descend on it." 
  34. ^ Ian Gooderson. Air power at the battlefront. p. 29.,M1. 
  35. ^ "Operation Overlord". MoD. "Fighter bombers began a new direct support role, operating with the assistance of radio-equipped Forward Air Controllers (FACs). The fighter bombers were on call from "Cab Ranks", orbiting points close to the forward edge of the battle area. From these Cab Ranks, the FACs could very quickly call on air support for any targets of opportunity or threats to the troops in their area. The FACs were both RAF and Army personnel, specially trained to identify targets to the pilots and direct their fire. Also, and seemingly almost permanently, airborne over the beachheads were the Air Observation aircraft. These light aircraft directed fire from naval vessels off-shore initially, before they began directing artillery fire once the regiments were established on land. The light aircraft of the Army were also were the first to operate as airborne FACs, directing the fighter bombers themselves." 
  36. ^ a b;col1
  37. ^ Hit My Smoke: Forward Air Controllers in Southeast Asia. p. 2. 
  38. ^ Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland. "Beginning the Fall Campaign in North Burma". Center of Military History, United States Army. "Though artillery played a most valuable part in the North Burma Campaign, it could not always accompany troops penetrating behind the Japanese lines, and close air support was the only possible substitute. By May 1944 the Air Forces in Burma had worked out the technique of forward air control. This was exercised by a party of one or two officers plus six to eight enlisted men. They approved targets selected by the Army, called up air strikes by radio, and if necessary guided the aircraft to the target. On occasion, liaison aircraft would observe the strike. In some cases, aircraft were on target thirty minutes after the request was made. This was the system controlling close air support during the fall 1944 campaign." 
  39. ^ "Chindits – A Reappraisal". Air Power Development Centre, CANBERRA. "The role of the officers (many of whom were Australian) was to arrange for air supply, and act as forward air controllers for Cochrane’s Mustang and Mitchell aircraft that provided the Special Force with close air support." 
  41. ^ Mosquitoes to Wolves: The Evolution of the Airborne Forward Air Controller. pp. 15–19. 
  42. ^ Pete Smith, 'Sidewinder 33/Drama 05, 19th TASS, 1967-68'. "RAAF FAC History". FAC Association. "During the Second World War the RAAF Order of Battle included several Army Co-operation Squadrons specializing in target identification and reconnaissance, and by war's end some experience had been gained with the Royal Air Force (RAF) liaison officers attached to British land formations in Europe and the Middle-East. Further experience was gained through working with the Mosquito FACs in Korea, and again during the long Malayan Emergency, where a limited number of RAAF officers were trained as ground FACs by the RAF." 
  43. ^ Bob Cossey. Upward and Onwards: Life of Air Vice-Marshal John Howe CB CBE AFC. Pen & Sword. ISBN 9781844158201. "He was posted to No 2 Squadron SAAF and sent to Korea to fly with South Africa's contribution to the war in support of the UN forces. There he flew the Mustang F-51D fighter-bombers in front-line action during his first tour. A second tour saw him with the US Infantry as a Forward Air Controller operating on the ground. As the political situation in South Africa became more extreme he resigned from the SAAF and came to England where he was asked by the RAF to fly their first jet fighters and later instruct on Vampires, converting later to the Hunter and joined 222 Squadron at Leuchars. During the Suez crisis he again operated as a Forward Ground Controller and landed on the beaches with 40 Commando." 
  44. ^ "Supporting Forces Pioneering Utilities". "The swan-song for the type was between January and December 1969 when a small number went to the Hunter-equipped No 20 Sqn which flew them on Forward Air Control missions in Borneo during the Indonesian confrontation. After this, the Pioneer passed out of RAF service, but continued in use with the air arms of Ceylon, Malaysia and Oman." 
  45. ^ "Mapping the coast of Mahra". The British-Yemeni Society. "e spent about a third of our time detached to Sharjah for the Jebel Akhdar Campaign, and another third doing forward air control (FAC) work up-country with the Aden Protectorate Levies. One day I was told that I was required for a FAC assignment in the Eastern Aden Protectorate (EAP), and that I was to be put ashore there from the survey ship HMS Owen." 
  46. ^ Winds of Destruction.,M1. "These specialists were also highly trained to conduct Forward Air Control(FAC) of strikes by bombers and fighter-bombers against enemy targets." 
  47. ^ "1946 to publisher=MoD". "On 1 st September 1957 the AAC joined the Order of Battle of the army with the primary roles of providing support in the form of observation and reconnaissance, artillery fire control, limited movement of men and materials and liaison. A number of additional roles soon evolved such as Forward Air Control, radio relay, etc and the AAC soon established itself as an indispensable supporting arm." 
  48. ^ "8 Squadron History". "The Sqn pilots led a mobile life, spending only about a third of their time at Khormaksar. The rest was spent on detachment or up country with the army as Air Liaison Officers (ALO). This was for forward air control" 
  49. ^ Gary Lester (August 1997). "Mosquitoes to Wolves The Evolution of the Airborne Forward Air Controller". Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. "The first comprehensive airborne forward air controller program was developed in Korea. Initiated almost immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities, the program grew from a makeshift, very specialized operation to a large, generalized, highly successful program. Within six months, the concept of the airborne FAC had been proven and appropriate techniques had been formulated." 
  50. ^ Hit My Smoke: Forward Air Controllers in Southeast Asia. pp. 6–7. 
  51. ^ a b Hit My Smoke: Forward Air Controllers in Southeast Asia. p. 8. 
  52. ^ a b c d e Hit My Smoke: Forward Air Controllers in Southeast Asia. pp. 6–9. 
  53. ^ a b
  54. ^ a b
  55. ^ Korean Air War. p. 22. 
  56. ^ The Korean War. p. 237. 
  57. ^ Mosquitoes to Wolves: The Evolution of the Airborne Forward Air Controller. p. 75. 
  58. ^ Dirty Little Secrets of the Vietnam War. p. 107. 
  59. ^
  60. ^
  61. ^ The History of the Airborne Forward Air Controller in Vietnam. pp. 55–56. 
  62. ^
  63. ^
  64. ^
  65. ^ Hit My Smoke!: Forward Air Controllers in Southeast Asia. p. 12. 
  66. ^ The History of the Airborne Forward Air Controller in Vietnam. pp. 27–28. 
  67. ^ The History of the Airborne Forward Air Controller in Vietnam. p. 29. 
  68. ^ a b
  69. ^ The History of the Airborne Forward Air Controller in Vietnam. p. 47. 
  70. ^ The History of the Airborne Forward Air Controller in Vietnam. p. 31. 
  71. ^ The History of the Airborne Forward Air Controller in Vietnam. p. 29. 
  72. ^
  73. ^ The History of the Airborne Forward Air Controller in Vietnam. p. 36. 
  74. ^ From Mosquitoes to Wolves: The Evolution of Airborne Air Controllers. p. 114. 
  75. ^
  76. ^
  77. ^ Hit My Smoke!: Forward Air Controllers in Southeast Asia. p. 36. 
  78. ^
  79. ^ The History of the Airborne Forward Air Controller in Vietnam. p. 44. 
  80. ^
  81. ^
  82. ^ From Mosquitoes to Wolves: The Evolution of Airborne Air Controllers. pp. 114–116, 119. 
  83. ^ The History of the Airborne Forward Air Controller in Vietnam. p. 47. 
  84. ^
  85. ^
  86. ^ a b
  87. ^ a b
  88. ^ A Hundred Feet Over Hell: Flying With the Men of the 220th Recon Airplane Company Over I Corps and the DMZ, Vietnam 1968-1969. p. 2. 
  89. ^ From Mosquitoes to Wolves: The Evolution of Airborne Air Controllers. p. 118. 
  90. ^
  91. ^ From Mosquitoes to Wolves: The Evolution of the Airborne Forward Air Controller. pp. 190–191. 
  92. ^ From Mosquitoes to Wolves: The Evolution of the Airborne Forward Air Controller. p. 192. 
  93. ^ From Mosquitoes to Wolves: The Evolution of the Airborne Forward Air Controller. p. 192. 
  94. ^ The History of the Airborne Forward Air Controller in Vietnam. p. 37. 
  95. ^
  96. ^ The History of the Airborne Forward Air Controller in Vietnam. pp. 41–42. 
  97. ^ The History of the Airborne Forward Air Controller in Vietnam. p. 48. 
  98. ^ Hit My Smoke!: Forward Air Controllers in Southeast Asia. p. 16. 
  99. ^ From Mosquitoes to Wolves: Evolution of the Forward Air Controller. p. 178. 
  100. ^ The History of the Airborne Forward Air Controller in Vietnam. pp. 44–45. 
  101. ^
  102. ^ Hit My Smoke!: Forward Air Controllers in Southeast Asia. p. 11. 
  103. ^
  104. ^
  105. ^ a b The History of the Airborne Forward Air Controller in Vietnam. p. 54. 
  106. ^
  107. ^
  108. ^ Dirty Little Secrets of the Vietnam War. p. 107. 
  109. ^
  110. ^ From Mosquitoes to Wolves: The Evolution of the Airborne Forward Air Controller. p. 194. 
  111. ^
  112. ^
  113. ^ "Rhodesian Air Force No 4 Squadron". "No 4 Squadron in conjunction with No 1 Squadron continued to work on airborne Forward Air Control (FAC) which had first been used in 1968." 
  114. ^ Kevin Douglas Stringer, John Adams Wickham. Military organizations for homeland defense and smaller-scale contingencies. 
  115. ^ "Flightglobal Archive". 
  116. ^ "Instalment 9 - The Bosbok". 
  117. ^ Morgan Norval. "Death in the Desert: The Namibian Tragedy". Selous Foundation Press, Washington DC. "The air force spectacular pyrotechnics, notwithstanding, Bestbier had a problem which further delayed Juliet's assault. His forward air controller could not contact the aircraft because of problems with his radio. Juliet could not press home the attack until Bestbier was certain the air bombardment was over. The resulting five minute delay gave the SWAPO defenders time to recover their wits and man their defenses. This, no doubt, was a factor in stiffening their resistance when the attack finally began." 
  118. ^ Edward Alexander. "The Cassanga Raid". University of South Africa. 
  120. ^ "Forward Air Controllers (FAC)". Royal Air Force. "Outline Of Syllabus The students will be taught how to request, plan, brief and execute CAS operations both for Low Level and Medium/High Level operations. The student will have an introduction into night CAS techniques, Fire Support Co-ordination and Airspace Co-ordination. Subject to cat 2 Medicals, students will have the opportunity to experience CAS operations from the rear seat of a JFACTSU Hawk Aircraft. The syllabus includes EW, SEAD, Air C2 Attack methods and tactics, and weaponeering. On successful completion of the course the students will be qualified in Laser Target Marker Operators (LTMOs) and FAC Limited Combat Ready (LCR)." 
  121. ^ "Training the RAF's eyes and ears". BBC News. 14 February 2009. Retrieved 4 January 2010. "In the bitter cold and wind of the North Yorkshire Moors, a group of soldiers, Royal Marines and others are learning how to call in air-strikes and become 'forward air controllers' on the front lines in Afghanistan." 
  122. ^ "Artillery Soldier". MoD. "GUNNER Obs Post as part of a Fire Support Team. Part of a tight knit six man team, working on the front line embedded in a manoeuvre unit. Trained to plan and coordinate fire from artillery, naval guns and mortars as well as control attack helicopters and fast jets. Kit includes image intensifiers, thermal sights, MSTAR man portable radar and UHF/VHF/HF radios. There are FSTs in all AS90 and Lt Gun Regts (inc Para and Cdo)." 
  123. ^ "Specialist Qualifications". MoD. "608 Tactical Air Control Party, or 608 TACP as it is known in the Corps, is part of RMR Merseyside. Every TACP has four members, including one officer, whose role is described in the Forward Air Controller section. RMR Merseyside trains personnel at both the Manchester and Liverpool Detachments to be part of the TACP. The role of this very professional small team is to provide accurate descriptions and locations of targets, and indicate those targets using sophisticated LASER technology, to fast jets and other attack aircraft carrying a wide variety of weaponry." 
  124. ^
  125. ^ "REVIEW OF UNITED KINGDOM MILITARY HELICOPTER LOW FLYING IN RESPONSE TO A RULE 43 LETTER FROM THE LOUTH AND SPILSBY CORONER". MoD. "It is a vital component of anti-tank helicopter operations and is also used in a wide variety of supporting roles - Air Observation Post to direct Artillery fire, Airborne Forward Air Controller to direct ground-attack aircraft, casualty evacuation, liaison, and command and control, and communications relay." 
  126. ^ "British Army Vehicles and Equipment". "It is a vital component of anti-tank helicopter operations and is also used in a wide variety of supporting roles: Air Observation Post (AOP) – to direct artillery fire; Airborne Forward Air Controller (ABFAC) – to direct ground-attack aircraft; casualty evacuation; liaison; command and control; and communications relay. It is equipped with a Ferranti AF 532 stabilised, magnifying observation aid." 
  127. ^ "'I think this is as normal as I'm ever going to get'". The Guardian. 29 February 2008. "The prince had retrained as an FAC after being refused permission to fight in Iraq alongside the men he had led in his regiment as troop leader." 
  128. ^ Maj Brian T Koch (Feb 07). "Evolution of ANGLICO". Marine Corps Gazette. 
  129. ^ "United States Marine Corps (USMC) Officer Job Descriptions". "Forward air controller/air officers direct and control close air support missions and advise commanders of ground units on matters pertaining to air support." 
  130. ^ "MARINE CORPS ORDER 1301.25B, ASSIGNMENT OF AVIATION OFFICERS AS FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS". "6. Eligibility Criteria a. In accordance with reference (a), female Marine aviators will not be assigned to FAC duty." 
  131. ^ Rupert Pengelley (November 2008). "USMC proposes to train more squad leaders to act as FACs". International Defence Digest: 4. 

External links


Got something to say? Make a comment.
Your name
Your email address