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The Great Leap Forward (simplified Chinese: 大跃进traditional Chinese: 大躍進pinyin: Dàyuèjìn) of the People's Republic of China (PRC) was an economic and social plan used from 1958 to 1961 which ostensibly aimed to use China's vast population to rapidly transform China from an agrarian economy into a modern communist society through the process of agriculturalization,[citation needed] industrialization, and collectivization. Mao Zedong led the campaign based on the Theory of Productive Forces, and intensified it after being informed of the impending disaster from grain shortages. Chief changes in the lives of rural Chinese included the introduction of a mandatory process of agricultural collectivisation, which was introduced incrementally. Private farming was prohibited, and those engaged in it were labelled and struggled against. Restrictions on rural people were enforced through public struggle sessions, social pressure, and violence. Food rationing was introduced, in some cases leaving rural Chinese with less than 250g (half a jin) of grain per day. The Great Leap ended in catastrophe, triggering a widespread famine that resulted in up to thirty million deaths.[1]

Contents

Background

In October 1949 after the defeat of the Kuomintang, the Chinese Communist Party proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China. Immediately, landlords and wealthier peasants had their land holdings forcibly redistributed to poorer peasants. In the agricultural sectors, crops deemed by the Party to be "full of evil" such as the opium crop, were destroyed and replaced with crops such as rice. Within the Party, there was major debate about redistribution. A moderate faction within the party and Politburo member Liu Shaoqi argued that change should be gradual and any collectivization of the peasantry should wait until industrialization, which could provide the agricultural machinery for mechanized farming. A more radical faction led by Mao Zedong agreed that the best way to finance industrialization was for the Government to take control of agriculture, thereby establishing a monopoly over grain distribution and supply. This would allow the State to buy at a low price and sell much higher, thus raising the capital necessary for the industrialization of the country. It was realized that this policy would be unpopular with the peasants and therefore it was proposed that the peasants should be brought under Party control by the establishment of agricultural collectives which would also facilitate the sharing of tools and draft animals. This policy was gradually pushed through between 1949 and 1958, first by establishing "mutual aid teams" of 5-15 households, then in 1953 "elementary agricultural cooperatives" of 20-40 households, then from 1956 in "higher co-operatives" of 100-300 families. These reforms (sometimes now referred to as The Great Leap Forward) were generally unpopular with the peasants and usually implemented by summoning them to meetings and making them stay there for days and sometimes weeks until they "voluntarily" agreed to join the collective.[citation needed]

Besides these economic changes, the Party implemented major social changes in the countryside including the banishing of all religious and mystic institutions and ceremonies and replacing them with political meetings and propaganda sessions. Attempts were made to enhance rural education and the status of women (allowing females to initiate divorce if they desired) and ending foot-binding, child marriage and opium addiction. Internal passports (called the hukou system) were introduced in 1956, forbidding travel without appropriate authorisation. Highest priority was given to the urban proletariat for whom a welfare state was created.

The first phase of collectivization was not a great success and there was widespread famine in 1956, though the Party's propaganda machine announced progressively higher harvests. Moderates within the Party, including Zhou Enlai, argued for a reversal of collectivisation. The position of the moderates was strengthened by Khrushchev's 1956 Secret speech at the 20th Congress which uncovered Stalin's crimes and highlighted the failure of his agricultural policies including collectivisation in the USSR.

In 1957 Mao responded to the tensions in the Party by promoting free speech and criticism under the 100 Flowers Campaign. In retrospect, some have come to argue that this was a ploy to allow critics of the regime, primarily intellectuals but also low ranking members of the party critical of the agricultural policies, to identify themselves.[2] Some claim that Mao simply swung to the side of the hard-liners once his policies gained strong opposition. Once he had done so, at least half a million were purged under the Anti-Rightist campaign organized by Deng Xiaoping, which effectively silenced any opposition from within the Party or from agricultural experts to the changes which would be implemented under the Great Leap Forward.

By the completion of the first 5 Year Economic Plan in 1957, Mao had come to doubt that the path to socialism that had been taken by the Soviet Union was appropriate for China. He was critical of Khrushchev's reversal of Stalinist policies and alarmed by the uprisings that had taken place in East Germany, Poland and Hungary, and the perception that the USSR was seeking "Peaceful coexistence" with the Western powers. Mao had become convinced that China should follow its own path to Communism.

According to Jonathan Mirsky, a historian and journalist specializing in Chinese affairs, China's isolation from most of the rest of the world, along with the Korean War, had accelerated Mao's attacks on his perceived domestic enemies. It led him to accelerate his designs to develop an economy where the regime would get maximum benefit from rural taxation.[3]

Before the Great Leap, peasants farmed their own small pockets of land, and observed traditional practices connected to markets—festivals, banquets, and paying homage to ancestors.[3] Starting in 1954, peasants were encouraged to form and join collectives, which would putatively increase their efficiency without robbing them of their own land or restricting their livelihoods.[3] By 1958, however, private ownership was entirely abolished and households all over China were forced into state-operated communes. Mao insisted that the communes must produce more grain for the cities and earn foreign exchange from exports.[3]

The Great Leap Forward

Impact on world population growth rate
Propaganda poster of the steel production objective. The text reads: "Take steel as the key link, leap forward in all fields", the text below is pinyin.

The Great Leap Forward was the name given to the Second Five Year Plan which was scheduled to run from 1958–1963, though the name is now generally limited to the first three years of this period. Mao unveiled the Great Leap Forward at a meeting in January 1958 in Nanjing. The central idea behind the Great Leap was that rapid development of China's agricultural and industrial sectors should take place in parallel. The hope was to industrialize by making use of the massive supply of cheap labour and avoid having to import heavy machinery. To achieve this, Mao advocated that a further round of collectivisation modelled on the USSR's "Third Period" was necessary in the Chinese countryside where the existing collectives would be merged into huge People's Communes. An experimental commune was established at Chayashan in Henan in April 1958. Here for the first time private plots were entirely abolished and communal kitchens were introduced. At the Politburo meetings in August 1958, it was decided that these people's communes would become the new form of economic and political organization throughout rural China. By the end of the year approximately 25,000 communes had been set up, with an average of 5,000 households each. The communes were relatively self sufficient co-operatives where wages and money were replaced by work points.

Based on his fieldwork, Ralph A. Thaxton Jr. describes the people's communes as a form of "apartheid system" for Chinese farm households. The commune system was aimed at maximising production for provisioning the cities and constructing offices, factories, schools, and social insurance systems for urban-dwelling workers, cadres and officials. Citizens in rural areas who criticised the system were labelled "dangerous." Escape was also difficult or impossible, and those who attempted were denied by "party-orchestrated public struggle," which further jeopardized their survival.[4] Besides agriculture, communes also incorporated some light industry and construction projects.

Mao saw grain and steel production as the key pillars of economic development. He forecast that within 15 years of the start of the Great Leap, China's steel production would surpass that of the UK. In the August 1958 Politburo meetings, it was decided that steel production would be set to double within the year, most of the increase coming through backyard steel furnaces. Mao was shown an example of a backyard furnace in Hefei, Anhui in September 1958 by provincial first secretary Zeng Xisheng[citation needed]. The unit was claimed to be manufacturing high quality steel (though in fact the finished steel had probably been manufactured elsewhere).[citation needed]

With no personal knowledge of metallurgy, Mao encouraged the establishment of small backyard steel furnaces in every commune and in each urban neighborhood. Huge efforts on the part of peasants and other workers were made to produce steel out of scrap metal. To fuel the furnaces the local environment was denuded of trees and wood taken from the doors and furniture of peasants' houses. Pots, pans, and other metal artifacts were requisitioned to supply the "scrap" for the furnaces so that the wildly optimistic production targets could be met. Many of the male agricultural workers were diverted from the harvest to help the iron production as were the workers at many factories, schools and even hospitals. Although the output consisted of low quality lumps of pig iron which was of negligible economic worth, Mao had a deep distrust of intellectuals and faith in the power of the mass mobilization of the peasants. Moreover, the experience of the intellectual classes following the Hundred Flowers Campaign silenced those aware of the folly of such a plan. According to his private doctor, Li Zhisui, Mao and his entourage visited traditional steel works in Manchuria in January 1959 where he found out that high quality steel could only be produced in large scale factories using reliable fuel such as coal. However, he decided not to order a halt to the backyard steel furnaces so as not to dampen the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses. The program was only quietly abandoned much later in that year.

Substantial effort was expended during the Great Leap Forward on large-scale, but often on poorly planned capital construction projects, such as irrigation works often built without input from trained engineers.

Chinese propaganda poster showing larger-than-human melon

On the communes, a number of radical and controversial agricultural innovations were promoted at the behest of Mao. Many of these were based on the ideas of now discredited Soviet biologist Trofim Lysenko and his followers. The policies included close cropping, whereby seeds were sown far more densely than normal on the incorrect assumption that seeds of the same class would not compete with each other. Deep plowing (up to 2m deep) was encouraged on the mistaken belief that this would yield plants with extra large root systems. Moderately productive land was left unplanted with the belief that concentrating manure and effort on the most fertile land would lead to large per-acre productivity gains. Altogether, these untested innovations generally led to decreases in grain production rather than increases.[5]

Meanwhile, local leaders were pressured into falsely reporting ever-higher grain production figures to their political superiors. Participants at political meetings remembered production figures being inflated up to 10 times actual production amounts as the race to please superiors and win plaudits – like the chance to meet Mao himself – intensified. The state was later able to force many production groups to sell more grain than they could spare based on these false production figures.[6]

The initial impact of the Great Leap Forward was discussed at the Lushan Conference in July/August 1959. Although many of the more moderate leaders had reservations about the new policy, the only senior leader to speak out openly was Marshall Peng Dehuai. Mao used the conference to dismiss Peng from his post as Defence Minister and denounce both Peng (who came from a poor peasant family) and his supporters as "bourgeois," and launch a nationwide campaign against "rightist opportunism." Peng was replaced by Lin Biao, who began a systematic purge of Peng's supporters from the military.

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Treatment of villagers

The ban on private holdings ruined peasant life at its most basic level, according to Mirsky. Villagers were unable to secure enough food to go on living, because the traditional means of being able to rent, sell, or use their land as collateral for loans was deprived of them by the commune system.[3] In one village, once the commune was operational the Party boss and his colleagues "swung into manic action, herding villagers into the fields to sleep and to work intolerable hours, and forcing them to walk, starving, to distant additional projects."[3]

Edward Friedman, a political scientist at the University of Wisconsin, Paul Pickowicz, a historian at the University of California at San Diego and Mark Selden, a sociologist at Binghamton University, write about the dynamic of interaction between the Party and villagers:

Beyond attack, beyond question, was the systemic and structured dynamic of the socialist state that intimidated and impoverished millions of patriotic and loyal villagers.[7]

The authors present a similar picture to Thaxton in depicting the Communist Party's destruction of the traditions of Chinese villagers. Traditionally prized local customs were deemed signs of "feudalism" to be extinguished, according to Mirsky. "Among them were funerals, weddings, local markets, and festivals. The Party thus destroyed 'much that gave meaning to Chinese lives. These private bonds were social glue. To mourn and to celebrate is to be human. To share joy, grief, and pain is humanising.'"[8] Failure to participate in the CCP's political campaigns--though the aims of such campaigns were often conflicting--"could result in detention, torture, death, and the suffering of entire families."[8]

Public criticism sessions were often used to intimidate the peasants into obeying local cadres; they increased the death rate of the famine in several ways, according to Thaxton. "In the first case, blows to the body caused internal injuries that, in combination with physical emaciation and acute hunger, could induce death." In one case, after a peasant stole two cabbages from the common fields, the thief was publicly criticised for half a day. He collapsed, fell ill, and never recovered. Others were sent to labor camps.[9]

Modes of resistance

According to over 20 years of research by Ralph Thaxton, professor of politics at Brandeis University, villagers turned against the CCP during and after the Great Leap, seeing it as autocratic, brutal, corrupt, and mean-spirited.[3] The CCP's policies, which included plunder, forced labor, and starvation, according to Thaxton, lead villagers "to think about their relationship with the Communist Party in ways that do not bode well for the continuity of socialist rule."[3]

Often, villagers composed doggerel to show their defiance to the regime, and "perhaps, to remain sane." During the Great Leap, one jingle ran: "Flatter shamelessly—eat delicacies.... Don't flatter—starve to death for sure."[8]

Climate conditions and famine

Propaganda poster displaying the production of grains as if it were rockets shooting into the sky

Despite the harmful agricultural innovations, the weather in 1958 was very favorable and the harvest promised to be good. Unfortunately, the amount of labour diverted to steel production and construction projects meant that much of the harvest was left to rot uncollected in some areas. This problem was exacerbated by a devastating locust swarm, which was caused when their natural predators were killed as part of the Great Sparrow Campaign. Although actual harvests were reduced, local officials, under tremendous pressure from central authorities to report record harvests in response to the new innovations, competed with each other to announce increasingly exaggerated results. These were used as a basis for determining the amount of grain to be taken by the State to supply the towns and cities, and to export. This left barely enough for the peasants, and in some areas, starvation set in. During 1958–1960 China continued to be a substantial net exporter of grain, despite the widespread famine experienced in the countryside, as Mao sought to maintain face and convince the outside world of the success of his plans.

In 1959 and 1960 the weather was less favorable, and the situation got considerably worse, with many of China's provinces experiencing severe famine. Droughts, floods, and general bad weather caught China completely by surprise. In July 1959, the Yellow River flooded in East China. According to the Disaster Center [10], it directly killed, either through starvation from crop failure or drowning, an estimated 2 million people.

In 1960, at least some degree of drought and other bad weather affected 55 percent of cultivated land, while an estimated 60 percent of northern agricultural land received no rain at all [11].

With dramatically reduced yields, even urban areas suffered much reduced rations; however, mass starvation was largely confined to the countryside, where, as a result of drastically inflated production statistics, very little grain was left for the peasants to eat. Food shortages were bad throughout the country; however, the provinces which had adopted Mao's reforms with the most vigor, such as Anhui, Gansu and Henan, tended to suffer disproportionately. Sichuan, one of China's most populous provinces, known in China as "Heaven's Granary" because of its fertility, is thought to have suffered the greatest absolute numbers of deaths from starvation due to the vigor with which provincial leader Li Jinquan undertook Mao's reforms. During the Great Leap Forward, cases of cannibalism also occurred in the parts of China that were severely affected by drought and famine.[12]

The agricultural policies of the Great Leap Forward and the associated famine would then continue until January 1961, where, at the Ninth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, the restoration of agricultural production through a reversal of the Great Leap policies was started. Grain exports were stopped, and imports from Canada and Australia helped to reduce the impact of the food shortages, at least in the coastal cities.

Consequences

The Great Leap Forward is widely seen, inside and outside China, as a major humanitarian and economic disaster, effectively a "Great Leap Backward" that affected China in the years that followed. As inflated statistics reached planning authorities, orders were given to divert human resources into industry rather than agriculture. The official toll of excess deaths recorded in China for the years of the GLF is 14 million, but scholars have estimated the number of famine victims to be between 20 and 43 million.[13]

The three years between 1959 and 1962 were known as the "Three Bitter Years" and the Three Years of Natural Disasters. Many local officials were tried and publicly executed for giving out misinformation[14].

Thaxton's final judgement of the effect on villager's of the famine was that "Village people... had come to associate socialism with starvation and the agents of the party-state with the specter of death."[3]

Starting in the early 1980s, critics of the Great Leap added quantitative muscle to their arsenal. U.S. Government employee Judith Banister published what became an influential article in the China Quarterly, and since then estimates as high as 30 million deaths in the Great Leap became common in the U.S. press. However, Wim F Wertheim, emeritus professor from the University of Amsterdam, disagrees with the numbers presented on the basis that they lack scientific support.[15] Critics of this position point to the numerous studies by individuals such as Aird in 1982, Ashton et al. in 1984, and Peng in 1987 that specifically sought to quantify the Great Leap's demographic impact. A lingering problem that all scholars point to is the assumptions regarding birth rate used in the most widely cited projections of famine deaths. These assumptions make it difficult to precisely gauge the death toll with a high degree of accuracy.

Dr Ping-ti Ho, professor of history at the University of Chicago, and an expert in Chinese Demography in a book titled Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953 (Harvard East Asian Studies No 4, 1959), also mentioned numerous flaws in the 1953 census on which famine death projections are made, though acknowledging the lack of more accurate sources.

Critics of Jung Chang and Jon Halliday's book Mao: The Unknown Story often cite these studies as evidence that their body count (38 million) may be exaggerated. However, one authoritative account of the famine, a 1,100 page study by Yang Jisheng, a long time communist party member and a reporter for the official Chinese news agency Xinhua, puts the number of deaths from the Great Chinese Famine at 36 million. His book, entitled Tombstone, challenges the official Communist Party line that the famine was largely a result of "Three Years of Natural Disasters" and puts the blame squarely on Maoist policies, such as diverting agricultural workers to steel production instead of growing crops, and exporting grain at the same time.[16][17]

Yang notes that local party officials were indifferent to the large number of people dying around them, as their primary concern was the delivery of grain, which Mao wanted to use to pay back debts to the USSR totaling 1.973 billion yuan. In Xinyang, people died of starvation at the doors of grain warehouses.[18] Mao refused to open the state granaries as he dismissed reports of food shortages and accused the peasants of hiding grain.[19]

Like in the USSR during the famine of 1932-33, peasants were confined to their starving villages by a system of household registration,[20] and the worst effects of the famine were directed against enemies of the regime.[21] Those labeled as "black elements" (religious leaders, rightists, rich peasants, etc.) in any previous campaign were given the lowest priority in the allocation of food, and therefore died in the greatest numbers.[21] Further, not all deaths during the Great Leap were from starvation, as many were tortured and killed by communist officials for failing to meet grain quotas.[21]

During the Great Leap, the Chinese economy initially grew. Iron production increased 45% in 1958 and a combined 30% over the next two years, but plummeted in 1961, and did not reach the previous 1958 level until 1964.

Despite the risks to their careers, some Communist Party members openly laid blame for the disaster at the feet of the Party leadership and took it as proof that China must rely more on education, acquiring technical expertise and applying bourgeois methods in developing the economy. Liu Shaoqi made a speech in 1962 at Seven Thousand Man's Assembly criticizing that "The economic disaster was 30% fault of nature, 70% human error."[22]

Mao stepped down as State Chairman of the PRC in 1959, predicting he would take most of the blame for the failure of the Great Leap Forward, though he did retain his position as Chairman of the CCP. Liu Shaoqi (the new PRC Chairman) and Deng Xiaoping (CCP General Secretary) were left in charge to bring about economic recovery. Mao's Great Leap Forward policy came under open criticism at a party conference at the Lushan Conference in Jiangxi. The attack was led by Minister of National Defense Peng Dehuai, who had become troubled by the potentially adverse effect Mao's policies would have on the modernization of the armed forces. Peng argued that "putting politics in command" was no substitute for economic laws and realistic economic policy; unnamed party leaders were also admonished for trying to "jump into communism in one step." After the Lushan showdown, Peng Dehuai, who allegedly had been encouraged by Nikita Khrushchev to oppose Mao, was deposed. Peng was replaced by Lin Biao.

This loss in Mao's regime meant that Mao became a "dead ancestor," as he labeled himself: a person who was respected but never consulted, occupying the political background of the Party. Furthermore, he also stopped appearing in public. All of this he later regretted, as he relaunched his cult of personality with the Great Yangtze Swim.

In agrarian policy, the failures of food supply during the Great Leap were met by a gradual de-collectivization in the 1960s that foreshadowed further de-collectivization under Deng Xiaoping. Political scientist Meredith Jung-En Woo argues: "Unquestionably the regime failed to respond in time to save the lives of millions of peasants, but when it did respond, it ultimately transformed the livelihoods of several hundred million peasants (modestly in the early 1960s, but permanently after Deng Xiaoping's reforms subsequent to 1978.)"[23]

After the death of Mao and the start of Chinese economic reform under Deng Xiaoping, the tendency within the Chinese government was to see the Great Leap Forward as a major economic disaster and to attribute it to the cult of personality under Mao Zedong, and to regard it as one of the serious errors he made after the founding of the PRC.[citation needed]

See also

Internet video

References

  1. ^ Tao Yang 2008, pp. 1-29
  2. ^ Chang, Jung and Jon Halliday, p. 435
  3. ^ a b c d e f g h i Mirsky, Jonathan. "The China We Don't Know," New York Review of Books Volume 56, Number 3 · February 26, 2009
  4. ^ Thaxton 2008 p. 3
  5. ^ Hinton, William (1984). Shenfan: The Continuing Revolution in a Chinese Village. New York: Vintage Books. p. 236–245. ISBN 0394723783. 
  6. ^ Hinton 1984, pp. 234–240, 247-249
  7. ^ Friedman, Edward, Paul G. Pickowicz, and Mark Selden. (2006) "Revolution, Resistance, and Reform in Village China, Yale University Press.
  8. ^ a b c Mirsky, Jonathan. "China: The Shame of the Villages," The New York Review of Books, Volume 53, Number 8 · May 11, 2006
  9. ^ Thaxton 2008, p. 212
  10. ^ The Most Deadly 100 Natural Disasters of the 20th Century as of 3 July, 2006, The Disaster Center (accessed 3 July, 2006)
  11. ^ Mao and Lincoln (Part 2): The Great Leap Forward not all bad, Asia Times, 1 April, 2004 (accessed 3 July, 2006)
  12. ^ Horror of a Hidden Chinese Famine, New York Times
  13. ^ Peng Xizhe (彭希哲), "Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China's Provinces," Population and Development Review 13, no. 4 (1987), 639-70.
    For a summary of other estimates, refer to link
  14. ^ Chinese Village, Socialist State By Edward Friedman, Kay Johnson, page 243, as seen in Google Book Search[1]
  15. ^ Mao and Lincoln (Part 2): The Great Leap Forward not all bad, Asia Times, 1 April, 2004 (accessed 3 July, 2006)
  16. ^ Verna Yu. Chinese author of book on famine braves risks to inform new generations. The New York Times, November 18, 2008
  17. ^ Anne Applebaum. When China Starved. The Washington Post, August 12, 2008
  18. ^ Mark O'Neill. A hunger for the truth: A new book, banned on the mainland, is becoming the definitive account of the Great Famine. South China Morning Post, 2008-7-6.
  19. ^ Jasper Becker. Hungry Ghosts: Mao's Secret Famine. Holt Paperbacks, 1998. ISBN 0805056688 p. 81
  20. ^ Benjamin A. Valentino. Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century Cornell University Press, 2004. p. 127. ISBN 0801439655
  21. ^ a b c Valentino 2004, p. 128.
  22. ^ Twentieth Century China: Third Volume, Beijing, 1994, Page 430
  23. ^ The Political Ecology of Famine: The North Korean Catastrophe and Its LessonsPDF (807 KiB), Meredith Woo-Cummings, ADB Institute Research Paper 31, January 2002. URL Accessed 3 July, 2006

Bibliography

Further reading

This article incorporates public domain text from the United States Library of Congress Country Studies. - China
  • WERTHEIM, Wim F. Third World whence and whither? Protective State versus Aggressive Market. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1995. 211 pp. ISBN 9055890820
  • Yang, Dali. Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change since the Great Leap Famine. Stanford University Press, 1996.
  • Li, Wei, and Dennis Tao Yang. 2005. The Great Leap Forward: Anatomy of a Central Planning Disaster. Journal of Political Economy 113 (4):840-877.
  • Bachman, David. 1991. Bureaucracy, Economy, and Leadership in China: The Institutional Origins of the Great Leap Forward. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  • Macfarquhar, Roderick. 1983. Origins of the Cultural Revolution: Vol 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Wiktionary

Up to date as of January 15, 2010

Definition from Wiktionary, a free dictionary

English

Noun

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Singular
Great Leap Forward

Plural
uncountable

Great Leap Forward (uncountable)

  1. An economic and social plan used from 1958 to 1961 which aimed to use China's vast population to rapidly transform China from a primarily agrarian economy by peasant farmers into a modern communist society through the process of agriculturalization and industrialization

Simple English

The Great Leap Forward (Simplified Chinese: 大跃进; Traditional Chinese: 大躍進; Pinyin: Dàyuèjìn) was a plan that was created to increase China's economy and industry. It was started by the Communist leader Chairman Mao Zedong in 1957 and ended in 1960. The Great Leap Forward was bad for the Chinese people, as it ended up with many people dead. Some people think it to be the biggest famine in history.[1][2]

Contents

Agriculture and farms

File:1958 農業大躍進.jpg
Propaganda poster:Production of grains shoot up like rockets

Mao wanted China to be able to make food for the country and make food to export; he also wanted China to produce a lot of goods. He started the Great Leap Forward to do this. Some people were forced to give their land to the government. Many people had to work on farms for the government, also called agricultural cooperatives.[1] Later, these cooperatives were put together to involve thousands of people.[3] In 1958, ninety-eight percent (98%) of people who worked on farms were in these cooperatives.[4]

In 1958, there was a good harvest. However, this began to change the year after.

People believed that planting plants close together was good. They thought this because Stalin thought so too.[2] However, crops did not grow as well when they were close together. This led to lower grain harvests in 1959. After that the harvests were bad also because resources were not used well. This lasted at least until 1961.[4]

Industry

The change in China was put on a schedule. Mao wanted China to have a greater industrial output than Britain in fifteen years. He later shortened this to one year. If people did not like the fast pace of the schedule, they were usually killed. By 1958, 550,000 people were killed because they did not agree with the government.[1]

Because the government spent a lot of money on industry, the country increased its debt.[1] Many people wanted to help the government meet its goals, so they would build furnaces in their backyard.[1] They would then try to make iron for tools. However, this did not work very well. People ended up melting good things, turning them into unusable things.[3]

Famine

Leaders competed with each other to see who could make the most things. This led the farms to be forgotten. Leaders would also lie about the amount of crops being grown. They would tell the government that they were making more than they actually were. In 1959, the country began running out of food. This is because they sold their grain to other countries.[1] This problem was made worse because the output of farms was decreasing. People were also not allowed to leave the areas they were living in. That meant that they could not look for food in other places.[3] Some villages had one-fourth or one-third of people dying in them. Girls and old people were underfed. Infants and the very old were the first to die.[2]

The famine is thought to have killed between 16.5 million and 40 million people.[1]

Aftermath

The government tried to stop the famine by canceling orders for technology. Instead, they imported food for people to eat. However, the economy of China continued to fall after the end of the Great Leap Forward. Workers were stressed, and the Soviet Union took away its support of China.[4]

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