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The Tonkin Gulf Resolution (officially, the Southeast Asia Resolution, Public Law 88-408) was a joint resolution of the United States Congress passed on August 7, 1964 in response to a sea battle between the North Vietnamese Navy's Torpedo Squadron 135^[1] and the destroyer USS Maddox on 02 August 1964, and an alleged second naval engagement between North Vietnamese torpedo boats and the US destroyers USS Maddox and USS Turner Joy on 04 August 1964, in the Tonkin Gulf; both naval actions are known collectively as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution is of historical significance because it gave U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson authorization, without a formal declaration of war by Congress, for the use of conventional military force in Southeast Asia. Specifically, the resolution authorized the President to do whatever necessary in order to assist "any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty." This included involving armed forces. The unanimous affirmative vote in the House of Representatives was 416-0. (However, Congressman Eugene Siler of Kentucky, who was not present but opposed the measure, was "paired" with another member who favored the resolution — i.e., his opposition was not counted, but the vote in favor was one less than it would have been.) ^[2] It was opposed in the Senate only by Senators Wayne Morse (D-OR) and Ernest Gruening (D-AK). Senator Gruening objected to "sending our American boys into combat in a war in which we have no business, which is not our war, into which we have been misguidedly drawn, which is steadily being escalated." ^[3] The Johnson administration subsequently relied upon the resolution to begin its rapid escalation of U.S. military involvement in South Vietnam and open warfare between North Vietnam and the United States.^[4]

Background and Congressional action

The USS Maddox (DD-731), a U.S. destroyer, was conducting a DESOTO patrol^[5] in the waters of the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2, 1964 when it was attacked by three North Vietnamese Navy torpedo boats from the 135th Torpedo Squadron^[6] which were attempting to close their range on the Maddox for effective torpedo fire (1,000 yards was maximum effective range for the torpedoes)^[7][8] Maddox fired over 280 5-inch shells^[9] and the boats expended their 6 torpedoes (all misses) and some 14.5mm machinegun fire. Breaking contact, the combatants commenced going their separate ways, when the three torpedo boats, T-333, T-336, and T-339 were then attacked by four USN F8 Crusader jet fighter bombers from the aircraft carrier USS Ticonderoga^[10]. The Crusaders reported no hits with their Zuni rockets, but scored hits on all three torpedo boats with their 20mm cannons; damaging all three boats.

Two days later, on 04 August the USS Maddox and the destroyer USS Turner Joy (DD-951) both reported to be under attack, again, by North Vietnamese torpedo boats; during this alleged engagement, the Turner Joy fired approximately 220 3-inch & 5-inch shells at radar controlled surface targets.^[11] Hanoi subsequently insisted that it had not launched a second attack. A later investigation by the Senate Foreign relations Committee revealed that the Maddox had been on an electronic intelligence (DeSoto) mission. It also learned that the U.S. Naval Communication Center in the Philippine Islands, in reviewing ships' messages, had questioned whether any second attack had actually occurred. ^[12]

Within hours, President Johnson ordered the launching of retaliatory air strikes (Operation Pierce Arrow) on the bases of the North Vietnamese torpedo boats and announced, in a television address to the American public that same evening, that U.S. naval forces had been attacked. Johnson requested approval of a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia". Stating that the resolution should express support "for all necessary action to protect our Armed Forces"– but repeated previous assurances that "the United States... seeks no wider war". As the nation entered the final three months of political campaigning for the 1964 elections (in which Johnson was standing for election), the president contended that the resolution would help "hostile nations... understand" that the United States was unified in its determination "to continue to protect its national interests."^[13]

The administration of President Richard Nixon, which took office in January 1969, initially opposed repeal, warning of "consequences for Southeast Asia [that] go beyond the war in Vietnam." In 1970 the administration began to shift its stance. It asserted that its conduct of operations in Southeast Asia was based not on the resolution but was a constitutional exercise of the President's authority, as Commander in Chief of U.S. military forces, to take necessary steps to protect American troops as they were gradually withdrawn^[14] (the U.S. had begun withdrawing its forces from Vietnam in 1969 under a policy known as “Vietnamization”).

Mounting public opinion against the war eventually led to the repeal of the resolution, which was attached to a bill that Nixon signed in January 1971.^[15] Seeking to restore limits on presidential authority to engage U.S. forces without a formal declaration of war Congress passed the War Powers Resolution in 1973, over Nixon's veto. The War Powers Resolution, which is still in effect, sets forth certain requirements for the President to consult with Congress in regard to decisions that engage U.S. forces in hostilities or imminent hostilities.

Notes

Reference

• Moise, Edwin E. Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. (1996), The University of North Carolina Press. ISBN 0-8078-2300-7.

External links

• Original Document: Tonkin Gulf Resolution
• Ourdocuments.gov

From Wikisource

Sec. 2.

The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

Sec. 3.

This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

Approved August 10, 1964

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).