Hannah Arendt: Wikis


Note: Many of our articles have direct quotes from sources you can cite, within the Wikipedia article! This article doesn't yet, but we're working on it! See more info or our list of citable articles.


From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Hannah Arendt

Hannah Arendt in german stamp issued in 1988 in the Women in German history series
Full name Hannah Arendt
Born October 14, 1906(1906-10-14)
Hannover, Germany
Died December 4, 1975 (aged 69)
New York, United States
Era 20th-century philosophy
Region Western Philosophers
School Phenomenology
Main interests Political theory, modernity, philosophy of history

Hannah Arendt (October 14, 1906 – December 4, 1975) was an influential German Jewish political theorist. She has often been described as a philosopher, although she refused that label on the grounds that philosophy is concerned with "man in the singular." She described herself instead as a political theorist because her work centers on the fact that "men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world[1]."

Arendt's work deals with the nature of power, and the subjects of politics, authority, and totalitarianism. Much of her work focuses on affirming a conception of freedom which is synonymous with collective political action among equals.



Hannah Arendt was born into a family of secular German Jews in the city of Linden (now part of Hannover), and grew up in Königsberg, the birthplace of Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant, since 1946 renamed as Kaliningrad after Soviet leader Mikhail Kalinin, now the capital of Russia's Kaliningrad Oblast and Berlin.

At the University of Marburg, she studied philosophy with Martin Heidegger, with whom, as related by her only German Jewish classmate Hans Jonas, she embarked on a long, stormy and romantic relationship for which she was later criticized because of Heidegger's support for the Nazi party while he was rector of Freiburg University.[2]

In the wake of one of their breakups, Arendt moved to Heidelberg, where she wrote her dissertation on the concept of love in the thought of Saint Augustine, under the existentialist philosopher-psychologist Karl Jaspers, then married to a German Jewish woman. She married Günther Stern, later known as Günther Anders, in 1929 in Berlin (they divorced in 1937).

The dissertation was published the same year, but Arendt was prevented from habilitating, a prerequisite for teaching in German universities, because she was Jewish. She worked for some time researching anti-Semitism before being interrogated by the Gestapo, and thereupon fled Germany for Paris. There she met and befriended the literary critic and Marxist philosopher Walter Benjamin, her first husband's cousin. While in France, Arendt worked to support and aid Jewish refugees. She was imprisoned in Camp Gurs but was able to escape after a couple of weeks.

However, with the German military occupation of northern France during World War II, and the deportation of Jews to Nazi concentration camps, even by the Vichy collaborator regime in the unoccupied south, Arendt was forced to flee France. In 1940, she married the German poet and Marxist philosopher Heinrich Blücher, by then a former Communist Party member.

In 1941, Arendt escaped with her husband and her mother to the United States with the assistance of the American diplomat Hiram Bingham IV, who illegally issued visas to her and around 2500 other Jewish refugees, and an American, Varian Fry, who paid for her travels and helped in securing these visas. Arendt then became active in the German-Jewish community in New York. From 1941 to 1945, she wrote a column for the German-language Jewish newspaper, Aufbau. From 1944, she directed research for the Commission of European Jewish Cultural Reconstruction and traveled frequently to Germany in this capacity.[3]

After World War II she returned to Germany and worked for Youth Aliyah. She became a close friend of Karl Jaspers and his Jewish wife,[4] developing a deep intellectual friendship with him and began corresponding with Mary McCarthy.[5]

In 1950, she became a naturalized citizen of the United States.[6] Arendt served as a visiting scholar at the University of California, Berkeley, Princeton University and Northwestern University. She also served as a professor on the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago, as well as at The New School in New York City, and served as a fellow on the faculty at Yale University and Wesleyan University in the Center for Advanced Studies (1961-1962,1962-1963).[7] In 1959, she became the first woman appointed to a full professorship at Princeton, though the university first admitted female students as late as 1969.

She died at age 69 in 1975, and was buried at Bard College in Annandale-on-Hudson, New York, where her husband taught for many years.[8]

Hannah Arendt's gravestone at the Bard College cemetery in Annandale-on-Hudson, New York

Arendt was instrumental in the creation of Structured Liberal Education (SLE) at Stanford University. She wrote a letter to the then president of Stanford University to convince the university to enact Mark Mancall's vision of a residentially-based humanities program.


Arendt theorizes freedom as public, performative and associative, drawing on examples from the Greek "polis", American townships, the Paris Commune, the civil rights movements of the 1960s, and the Hungarian uprising of 1956 to illustrate this conception of freedom. Another key concept in her work is "natality", the capacity to bring something new into the world, such as the founding of a government that endures. Natality signs the contingent, indeterminate and so political future that we don't know anything about.

Arendt's first major book was The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), which traced the roots of Stalinist Communism and Nazism in both anti-Semitism and imperialism. The book was controversial because it suggested, arguably, that an essential identity existed between the two phenomena. She further contends that Jewry was not the operative factor in the Holocaust, but merely a convenient proxy. Totalitarianism in Germany, in the end, was about megalomania and consistency, not eradicating Jews.

Arguably her most influential work, The Human Condition (1958) distinguishes between labour, work, and action, and explores the implications of these distinctions. These categories, which attempt to bridge the gap between ontological and sociological structures, are rigidly delineated. Her theory of political action, corresponding to the existence of a public realm, is extensively developed in this work. While Arendt concerns labour and work in the realm of "the social", she favors the human condition of action as "the political" that is both existential and aesthetic.

Another of Arendt's important books is the collection of essays Men in Dark Times. These intellectual biographies provide insight into the lives of some of the creative and moral figures of the 20th century, among them Walter Benjamin, Karl Jaspers, Rosa Luxemburg, Hermann Broch, Pope John XXIII, and Isak Dinesen.

In her reporting of the Eichmann trial for The New Yorker, which evolved into Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963), she coined the phrase "the banality of evil" to describe Eichmann. She raised the question of whether evil is radical or simply a function of thoughtlessness—the tendency of ordinary people to obey orders and conform to mass opinion without critically thinking about the results of their action or inaction.

Arendt was extremely critical of the way that Israel conducted the trial. She was also critical of the way that many Jewish leaders (notably M. C. Rumkowski) acted during the Holocaust, which caused an enormous controversy and resulted in a great deal of animosity directed toward Arendt within the Jewish community. Her friend Gershom Scholem, a major scholar of Jewish Mysticism, broke off relations with her. Arendt was criticized by many Jewish public figures, who charged her with coldness and lack of sympathy for the victims of the Shoah. Due to this lingering criticism, her book has only recently been translated into Hebrew. Arendt ended the book by endorsing the execution of Eichmann, writing:

Just as you [Eichmann] supported and carried out a policy of not wanting to share the earth with the Jewish people and the people of a number of other nations — as though you and your superiors had any right to determine who should and who should not inhabit the world — we find that no one, that is, no member of the human race, can be expected to want to share the earth with you. This is the reason, and the only reason, you must hang.

Arendt published another book in the same year that was controversial in its own right: On Revolution, a study of the two most famous revolutions of the 18th century. Arendt went against the grain of Marxist and leftist thought by contending that the American Revolution was a successful revolution, whereas the French Revolution was not. When the masses of France gained the sympathy of revolutionaries, the French Revolution turned away from the legal stability of constitutional government and toward the lawless satisfaction of the constantly regenerating economic needs of these masses. Some saw in this argument a post-Holocaust anti-French sentiment. Nevertheless, it was inveterate in the history of political philosophy, echoing that of Edmund Burke.

Arendt also argued that the revolutionary spirit endemic to the founding had not been preserved in America because the majority of people had no role to play in politics other than voting. She admired Thomas Jefferson's idea of dividing counties into townships, similar to the soviets that appeared during the Russian Revolution. Arendt's interest in such a "council system", which she saw as the only alternative to the state, continued all her life.

Her posthumous book, The Life of the Mind (1978, edited by Mary McCarthy), was incomplete at her death. Stemming from her Gifford Lectures at the University of Aberdeen in Scotland, this book focuses on the mental faculties of thinking and willing (in a sense moving beyond her previous work concerning the vita activa). In her discussion of thinking, she focuses mainly on Socrates and his notion of thinking as a solitary dialogue between me and myself. This appropriation of Socrates leads her to introduce novel concepts of conscience (which gives no positive prescriptions, but instead tells me what I cannot do if I would remain friends with myself when I re-enter the two-in-one of thought where I must render an account of my actions to myself) and morality (an entirely negative enterprise concerned with non-participation in certain actions for the sake of remaining friends with one's self). In her volume on Willing, Arendt, relying heavily on Augustine's notion of the will, discusses the will as an absolutely free mental faculty that makes new beginnings possible.

In the third volume, Arendt was planning to engage the faculty of judgment by appropriating Kant's Critique of Judgment ; however, she did not live to write it. Nevertheless, although we will never fully understand her notion of judging, Arendt did leave us with manuscripts ("Thinking and Moral Considerations", "Some Questions on Moral Philosophy,") and lectures (Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy ) concerning her thoughts on this mental faculty. The first two articles were edited and published by Jerome Kohn, who was an assistant of Arendt and is a director of Hannah Arendt Center at The New School, and the last was edited and published by Ronald Beiner, who is a professor of political science at the University of Toronto.

Her personal library was deposited at Bard College at the Stevenson Library in 1976, and includes approximately 4,000 books, ephemera, and pamphlets from Arendt's last apartment. The college has begun digitally archiving some of the collection, which is available at The Hannah Arendt Collection


Selected works

  • Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin. Versuch einer philosophischen Interpretation (1929)
  • The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951). Rev. ed.; New York: Schocken, 2004. (Includes all the prefaces and additions from the 1958, 1968, and 1972 editions.)
  • The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).
  • Rahel Varnhagen: the life of a Jewess. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston (1958). Complete ed.; Ed. Liliane Weissberg (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), also in March 2000. 400 pages . ISBN-10: 080186335X . ISBN-13: 978-0801863356
  • Die ungarische Revolution und der totalitäre Imperialismus (1958)
  • Between Past and Future: Six exercises in political thought (New York: Viking, 1961). (Two more essays were added in 1968.)
  • On Revolution (New York: Viking, 1963).
  • Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963). (Rev. ed. New York: Viking, 1968).
  • Men in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968).
  • On Violence. Harvest Books (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1970) (Also included in Crises of the Republic.)
  • Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics; Civil Disobedience; On Violence; Thoughts on Politics and Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1972). "Civil Disobedience" originally appeared, in somewhat different form, in The New Yorker. Versions of the other essays originally appeared in The New York Review of Books.
  • The Jew as Pariah: Jewish Identity and Politics in the Modern Age, edited with an introduction by Ron H. Feldman (1978)
  • Life of the Mind Ed. Mary McCarthy, 2 vols. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978).
  • Hannah Arendt/Karl Jaspers Correspondence, 1926–1969 Edited by Lotte Kohler and Hans Saner, translated by Robert Kimber and Rita Kimber (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992).
  • Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism, Ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1994), Paperback ed. (New York: Schocken, 2005).
  • Love and Saint Augustine Edited with an Interpretive Essay by Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Scott (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996/1998).
  • Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy. Edited and with an Interpretive Essay by Ronald Beiner (The University of Chicago Press, 1992).
  • Within Four Walls: The Correspondence between Hannah Arendt and Heinrich Blücher, 1936-1968. Edited by Lotte Kohler, translated by Peter Constantine (New York: Harcourt, 1996).
  • Responsibility and Judgment. Edited with an introduction by Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken, 2003).
  • Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger. Letters, 1925–1975, Ed. Ursula Ludz, translated Andrew Shields (New York: Harcourt, 2004).
  • The Promise of Politics. Edited with an Introduction by Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken, 2005).
  • Arendt und Benjamin: Texte, Briefe, Dokumente. Edited by Detlev Schöttker and Erdmut Wizisla. (2006)
  • The Jewish Writings. Edited by Jerome Kohn and Ron H. Feldman. Schocken Books. (2007)

See also

Further reading

  • Elisabeth Young-Bruehl (1982), Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World, Yale University Press, ISBN 0-300-02660-9. (Paperback reprint edition, September 10, 1983, ISBN 0-300-03099-1; Second edition October 11, 2004 ISBN 0-300-10588-6.). 620 pages
  • Villa, Dana ed. (2000), The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 9780521645713 (hb).
  • Villa, Dana (1995), Arendt and Heidegger: the Fate of the Political, Princeton University Press, ISBN 0-691-04400-7.
  • Villa, Dana (1999), Politics, Philosophy, Terror: Essays on the Thought of Hannah Arendt, Princeton University Press, ISBN 0-691-00935-X.
  • Villa, Dana (2008), Public Freedom, Princeton University Press, ISBN 978-0-691-13594-6.
  • Harms, Klaus: Hannah Arendt und Hans Jonas. Grundlagen einer philosophischen Theologie der Weltverantwortung. Berlin: WiKu-Verlag (2003). ISBN 3-936749-84-1. (de)
  • Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth. Why Arendt Matters. New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 2006 (hardcover, ISBN 0-300-12044-3).
  • Dietz, Mary G. Turning Operations: Feminism, Arendt, and Politics, Routledge (2002). ISBN 0-415-93244-0.
  • Shlomo Avineri, "Where Hannah Arendt Went Wrong", Haaretz, 10 March, 2010.
  • Seyla Benhabib. The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt. Rowan and Littlefield Publishers. 2003. ISBN 9780742521513
  • Jennifer Nedelsky and Ronald Beiner, ed. Judgment, Imagination, and Politics: Themes from Kant and Arendt. Rowan and Littlefield Publishers. 2001. ISBN 9780847699711
  • Birmingham, Peg. Hannah Arendt and Human Rights: The Predicament of Common Responsibility. Indian University Press (2006) ISBN 9780253218650
  • Maurizio Passerin d'Entrèves. The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt. New York: Routledge, 1994. ISBN 9780415087902
  • Roger Berkowitz, Thomas Keenan, Jeffrey Katz, ed.Thinking in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt on Ethics and Politics Fordham University Press, 2009, ISBN: 9780823230761


  1. ^ Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Second ed. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1998. Print.
  2. ^ "Ron Rosenbaum, the author of “Explaining Hitler,” even extended the argument [of Heidegger's critic, Emmanuel Faye, that Heidegger’s thought is thoroughly tainted by Nazism] to the German Jewish philosopher Hannah Arendt, a former student and lover of Heidegger’s. Citing a recent essay by the historian Bernard Wasserstein, Mr. Rosenbaum wrote in Slate.com that Arendt’s thinking about the Holocaust and her famous formulation, “the banality of evil,” were contaminated by Heidegger and other anti-Semitic writings." An Ethical Question: Does a Nazi Deserve a Place Among Philosophers? by Patricia Cohen. New York Times. Published: November 8, 2009. [1]
  3. ^ Human, citizen, Jew - Haaretz - Israel News
  4. ^ Hannah Arendt & Karl Jaspers (1992) Correspondence 1926-1969, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, ISBN 0-15-107887-4
  5. ^ Hannah Arendt & Mary McCarthy (1995) Between Friends: The Correspondence of Hannah Arendt and Mary McCarthy 1949-1975, Secker & Warburg, ISBN 0-436-20251-4
  6. ^ Dear Hannah - Haaretz - Israel News
  7. ^ Wesleyan University
  8. ^ "Hannah Arendt, Political Scientist, Dead". New York Times. December 6, 1975. http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F00915F73D5C1A7493C4A91789D95F418785F9. Retrieved 2008-11-19. "Hannah Arendt, the political philosopher who escaped Hitler's Germany and later scrutinized its morality in "Eichmann in Jerusalem" and other books, died Thursday night in her apartment at 370 Riverside Drive." 
  9. ^ All aboard the Arendt express, Haaretz, 4 May 2007

External links



Works on Arendt



Other languages


Up to date as of January 14, 2010

From Wikiquote

Man cannot be free if he does not know that he is subject to necessity, because his freedom is always won in his never wholly successful attempts to liberate himself from necessity.

Hannah Arendt (October 14, 1906December 4, 1975) was a German-American political philosopher.



  • What will happen once the authentic mass man takes over, we do not know yet, although it may be a fair guess that he will have more in common with the meticulous, calculated correctness of Himmler than with the hysterical fanaticism of Hitler, will more resemble the stubborn dullness of Molotov than the sensual vindictive cruelty of Stalin.
  • The concentration camps, by making death itself anonymous (making it impossible to find out whether a prisoner is dead or alive), robbed death of its meaning as the end of a fulfilled life. In a sense they took away the individual’s own death, proving that henceforth nothing belonged to him and he belonged to no one. His death merely set a seal on the fact that he had never existed.
    • The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), part 3, chapter 12, section 3
  • Man cannot be free if he does not know that he is subject to necessity, because his freedom is always won in his never wholly successful attempts to liberate himself from necessity.
  • In politics, love is a stranger, and when it intrudes upon it nothing is being achieved except hypocrisy. All the characteristics you stress in the Negro people: their beauty, their capacity for joy, their warmth, and their humanity, are well-known characteristics of all oppressed people. They grow out of suffering and they are the proudest possession of all pariahs. Unfortunately, they have never survived the hour of liberation by even five minutes. Hatred and love belong together, and they are both destructive; you can afford them only in private and, as a people, only so long as you are not free.
  • What makes it so plausible to assume that hypocrisy is the vice of vices is that integrity can indeed exist under the cover of all other vices except this one. Only crime and the criminal, it is true, confront us with the perplexity of radical evil; but only the hypocrite is really rotten to the core.
    • On Revolution (1963), ch. 2
  • Political questions are far too serious to be left to the politicians.
    • Men in Dark Times (1968)
  • The most radical revolutionary will become a conservative the day after the revolution.
    • The New Yorker, 12 September 1970
  • The sad truth is that most evil is done by people who never make up their minds to be good or evil.
    • The Life of the Mind (1978): "Thinking"
  • I've begun so late, really only in recent years, to truly love the world... Out of gratitude, I want to call my book [The Human Condition] on political theories Amor Mundi.
    • Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth (2004) Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. xxiv
  • The cultural treasures of the past, believed to be dead, are being made to speak, in the course of which it turns out that they propose things altogether different than what had been thought.
    • "Martin Heidegger at Eighty," in Michael Murray ed., Heidegger and Modern Philosophy: Critical Essays (New Haven: Yale, 1978), pp. 294-295

Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963)

Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963)

  • What stuck in the minds of these men who had become murderers was simply the notion of being involved in something historic, grandiose, unique ("a great task that occurs once in two thousand years"), which must therefore be difficult to bear. This was important, because the murderers were not sadists or killers by nature; on the contrary, a systematic effort was made to weed out all those who derived physical pleasure from what they did. The troops of the Einsatzgruppen had been drafted from the Armed S.S., a military unit with hardly more crimes in its record than any ordinary unit of the German Army, and their commanders had been chosen by Heydrich from the S.S. élite with academic degrees. Hence the problem was how to overcome not so much their conscience as the animal pity by which all normal men are affected in the presence of physical suffering. The trick used by Himmler — who apparently was rather strongly afflicted by these instinctive reactions himself — was very simple and probably very effective; it consisted in turning these instincts around, as it were, in directing them toward the self. So that instead of saying: What horrible things I did to people!, the murderers would be able to say: What horrible things I had to watch in the pursuance of my duties, how heavily the task weighed upon my shoulders!
    • Ch. VI
  • The case of the conscience of Eichmann, which is admittedly complicated but is by no means unique, is scarcely comparable to the case of the German generals, one of whom, when asked at Nuremberg, "How was it possible that all of you honorable generals could continue to serve a murderer with such unquestioning loyalty?," replied that it was "not the task of a soldier to act as judge over his supreme commander. Let history do that or God in Heaven."
    • Ch. VIII
  • Eichmann, much less intelligent and without any education to speak of, at least dimly realized that it was not an order but a law which had turned them all into criminals. The distinction between an order and the Führer's word was that the latter's validity was not limited in time and space, which is the outstanding characteristic of the former. This is also the true reason why the Führer's order for the Final Solution was followed by a huge shower of regulations and directives, all drafted by expert lawyers and legal advisors, not by mere administrators; this order, in contrast to ordinary orders, was treated as a law. Needless to add, the resulting legal paraphernalia, far from being a mere symptom of German pedantry and thoroughness, served most effectively to give the whole business its outward appearance of legality.

    And just as the law in civilized countries assumes that the voice of conscience tells everybody, "Thou shalt not kill," even though man's natural desires and inclinations may at times be murderous, so the law of Hitler's land demanded that the voice of conscience tell everybody: "Thou shalt kill," although the organizers of the massacres knew full well that murder is against the normal desires and inclinations of most people. Evil in the Third Reich had lost the quality by which most people recognize it — the quality of temptation.

    • Ch. VIII
  • The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal. From the viewpoint of our legal institutions and of our moral standards of judgment, this normality was much more terrifying than all the atrocities put together, for it implied — as had been said at Nuremberg over and over again by the defendants and their counsels — that this new type of criminal, who is in actual fact hostis generis humani, commits his crimes under circumstances that make it well-nigh impossible for him to know or to feel that he is doing wrong.
    • Epilogue
  • No punishment has ever possessed enough power of deterrence to prevent the commission of crimes. On the contrary, whatever the punishment, once a specific crime has appeared for the first time, its reappearance is more likely than its initial emergence could ever have been.
    • Epilogue

Crises of the Republic (1969)

  • The chief reason warfare is still with us is neither a secret death-wish of the human species, nor an irrepressible instinct of aggression, nor, finally and more plausibly, the serious economic and social dangers inherent in disarmament, but the simple fact that no substitute for this final arbiter in international affairs has yet appeared on the political scene.
    • "On Violence"
  • The point, as Marx saw it, is that dreams never come true.
    • "On Violence"
  • Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power's disappearance.
    • "On Violence"
  • The defiance of established authority, religious and secular, social and political, as a world-wide phenomenon may well one day be accounted the outstanding event of the last decade.
    • "Civil Disobedience"
  • Man's urge for change and his need for stability have always balanced and checked each other, and our current vocabulary, which distinguishes between two factions, the progressives and the conservatives, indicates a state of affairs in which this balance has been thrown out of order. No civilization — the man-made artifact to house successive generations — would ever have been possible without a framework of stability, to provide the wherein for the flux of change. Foremost among the stabilizing factors, more enduring than customs, manners and traditions, are the legal systems that regulate our life in the world and our daily affairs with each other.
    • "Civil Disobedience"
  • For the trouble with lying and decieving is that their efficiency depends entirely upon a clear notion of the truth that the liar and deceiver wishes to hide. In this sense, truth, even if it does not prevail in public, possesses an ineradicable primacy over all falsehoods.
    • "Lying in Politics"

External links

Wikipedia has an article about:
Wikimedia Commons has media related to:

Got something to say? Make a comment.
Your name
Your email address