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This article presents the historiography of the Volyn tragedy after World War II.

Contents

Polish historiography

Communist Poland

The Polish historiography of the Volyn tragedy during the dictatorship of the communist party can be broken down into 3 periods:[1]

  1. End 1950-1960s.
  2. First half of the 1970s
  3. Second half of the 1980s

In the early People's Republic of Poland, the question of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict was never a subject of independent studies. A Ukrainian historian Roman Hrytskiv believes that the Polish Communists avoided this subject as it could raise questions regarding the Polish population in Western Ukraine.[2] Paweł Machcewicz from the Polish Institute of National Remembrance suggests two reasons why, in fact up until the collapse of communism, censorship blocked the subject of the massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia perpetrated by the OUN-UPA:[3]

  • Ukrainians were considered a friendly Soviet nation (a member of the USSR) and any mentions of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict would be seen as anti-Soviet(fact).
  • Previously Polish territories of Volhynia and Eastern Galicia were incorporated into Soviet Union, therefore any reference to those lost lands would be treated as anti-Soviet revisionism.

As the subject dealing with anti-Polish action in Volhynia and Eastern Galica was prohibited, in the Polish popular remembrance of the UPA, the site of the mass killings was transferred to Bieszczady and Eastern Lubelszczyzna; and thus communists were able to portray the Operation Vistula as the only effective way of liquidating UPA network.[4] The theme of UPA "terrorism" was occasionally brought up in order to affirm the actions of the "people's government". According to Hrytskiv, Polish studies branded all Ukrainian nationalist organizations as anti-Polish, criminal and collaborationist.[5]

New studies were initiated in the early 1970s based on factual information, however under the influence of the Soviet historiography, Polish historians continued to expound the mistaken Soviet concept of Ukrainian bourgeoise nationalists, although viewed in their own specific manner.[6] This category includes the works [6] of Ryszard Torzecki,[7] who explained the reason for the conflict as Hitlerite politics based on the tenet of divide and conquer, the chauvinism of Ukrainian nationalists, Ukrainian-Polish disagreements in the interbellum, which were used by the Nazis in their interests. Similar concepts were formulated by A. Szczesiak and W. Szota in a publication[8] that was soon removed form sale and libraries. Officially the book was dedicated to the activities of the Ukrainian nationalists in the interbellum but it also explained that the conflict had its origins in the late 19th century, and that the Volyn tragedy was a continuation of the terror campaigns of 1918-1939. This work also investigated in detail the Ukrainian-Polish negotiations from 1942-45 to stop the conflict and to unite to fight a common foe - the USSR. This study brought about a re-evaluation of the UPA within the USSR itself.

The next significant study was published in the mid 1980's by Edward Prus - "Heroes under the sign of the Trident"[9] (1985) which employed a journalistic and propagandistic style.[10] Prus was the first to introduce the terms and concepts such as the Ukrainian "slaughter" Polish: rzeź of Poles.[11] He compares the anti-Polish actions in Volyn and Galicia without the use of academic citations.[10] According to Hryckiw, Prus's work has no scientific merit. In his opinion, the use of a journalistic style, falsification and manipulation only reflect the state at which Polish historiography had reached in the last years of the communist Poland.[11]

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Independent Poland

Year 1989 marked the end of the Polish totalitarian state and a new era in Polish historiography. In the light of Polish independence the subject of the Ukrainian-Polish relations became a growing concern. The first study to be published was Tadeusz Olszański[12] (1989) article which shattered previous understandings of the OUN.[11] The reason for the Volyn tragedy is ascribed by him to the inadequate policies of the Polish government in the interbellum and the destruction of the moral society during the Soviet and German occupations. Olszański introduces the term "de-polonisation" and suggests that the OUN expected a return to the situation that existed in 1918. De-polonisation started in Volyn in 1943 and Olszański divides it into 3 periods:

  1. Individual assassinations up till December 1942
  2. Activation and de-polonisation January-April 1943;
  3. Organized attacks on Polish self defence from May 1943.

Olszański underlines the influence of numerous provocations by the NKVD and Soviet partisans in the occupied zones in directing conflict against the UPA.[13] Retaliatory actions by Polish forces and the negative view of the Polish underground to Ukrainian independence were also factors. In the second period Olszański states that the Polish underground and the communists initiated a number of anti-Ukrainian terrorist actions.[13] Ukrainian responses were restrained as at this time negotiations were being undertaken for a united Ukrainian-Polish front against Moscow. This was the first step to an understanding with the Poles, which in 1945 was affirmed by the tactical understanding between the UIA and AK,. In the words of Olszawski, this was the end of conflict between these national movements toward a joint battle against the communist regime in Poland [14]

Olszański notes that in pre-war Poland Ukrainian nationalist movement could develop relatively freely even in the most radical (using terror) forms, and that Polish state wasn't able to solve problems concerning coexistence of Poles and Ukrainians, which resulted in popularization of nationalist and communist movements among the latter ones. Olszański suggests that the OUN expected return to situation from 1918 when Poles and Ukrainians fought over disputed territories, and that Ukrainian leadership wanted to possess the fait-accompli argument of absence of Polish population and Polish military activity. De-polonization action started in March 1943. Contrary to what Ukrainian emigree authors claim, the fact of Ukrainian initiative (i.e. unprovoked character of the action) is indisputably confirmed by the German documents. In the article from 1991, he divides Volhynian terror into the following stages:[15]

  • Up till December 1942 - murders of individual Poles and Polish families.
  • From the beginning of 1943 - growth in attacks against Poles, which reached critical point in March 1943 - when one can speak of mass-terror.
  • July – August 1943 – apogee of terror; Ukrainians also assault Polish self-defence; spread of terror to Eastern Galician districts.
  • From September 1943 – attacks are declining and Polish-Ukrainian fightings gradually become more military in nature.

The UPA was unable to conduct the action alone, therefore it mobilized Ukrainian peasants on a large scale, who were later given Polish properties. Vast numbers of peasants participating in anti-Polish attacks, together with UPA units or individually, were also motivated by numerous Banderist agitators and additionally by communist agents from the north of Volhynia. Olszański sees the role of Soviets in the events as insufficiently explained. He points that field organizations of the OUN were penetrated by communist agents and in some instances Soviet units disguised as UPA murdered Poles to gain support of local Polish population.[15]

According to Olszański, the responsibility for the terror lies mostly at the OUN-B leadership, which decided about large-scale anti-polish action and, when suitable, about its ending.[15]

Olszański expressed view that the goal of the action was to expel Poles and not to exterminate them. Ten years later, in the Post Scriptum to his previous article he admitted that he was wrong: More and more documents prove not only that de-polonization action was a planned military operation and that the order from OUN-UPA leadership existed (though still not found), but also that the purpose of this operation was physical extermination (murder) of at least most of the Polish population of these lands, and not only - as I erroneously believed - expulsion. Thus it was the crime of genocide.[15]

Zbigniew Kowalewski's study (1993)[16] stated that the role of the auxiliary police and its collaboration with Soviet Polish diversionist-partisan groups provoked the Ukrainians to use force, however these actions were not just those of the OUN and UPA, but also Soviet partisans, auxiliary police and other independent groups. Kowalewski introduces the thesis regarding the reason why OUN changed its strategy regarding the Poles in 1944-45 in order to form a unified Polish-Ukrainian front against the USSR. This would explain the wave of OUN propaganda spread in the Polish population regarding the formation of a unified front and the cessation of retributive actions. The Ukrainian and some sections of the Polish population understood that without an independent Poland there could not be an independent Ukraine.[14]

The destruction of the totalitarian system in Poland allowed another tendency in Polish historical studies fuelled by the previous studies publishd under the Communist regime.[17] One of the first such studies was undertaken by J. Turowski and Władysław Siemaszko in 1990, based on 350 eyewitness accounts by veterans of the Polish Home army regarding the anti-Polish terror in Volyn.

The fall of the Communist system in Poland also gave fuel to two directions in Polish historiography regarding the Ukrainian-Polish conflicts:[18]

  1. Liberal-democrаtic and
  2. Nationalistic.

The first group has focused on the reasons for the inter-ethnic conflict in Western Ukraine. This group is subscribed to by most professional historians. The second group focuses on the problems of anti-Polish terror by the UPA. This movement is supported by former inhabitants of Volyn and Galicia and members of the various Kresy societies.

Тhe Polish emigre centre in London at this time began to actively support a nationalist view on the Volyn tragedy.[19] In 1992, a magazine called "Na rubieży" began publishing studies by W. Siemaszko, E. Prus and Wiktor Poliszczuk. Attempts were made to document the Polish victims of Ukrainian nationalists with the inclusion of unchecked or sometimes falsified information.[19] Numerous memoirs were also published dominated by the works of E. Prus[20]. Many of these publications were printed by the newly established Nortom publishing house in Wrocław.

The liberal-democratic movement is represented by works by Ryszard Torzecki[21] which reviewed the thesis put forward during the communist administration and developed an orienteer for further scholarship. Torzecki argues that the territorial integrity of Volyn lay in the Polish population. From this point of view the author examines anti-Polish actions and the spontaneous actions of the peasants and the influence of OUN propaganda on their fight for social justice. Describing concrete incidence of terror in Volyn, he states that the pivotal moment for the development of bloodshed came with the transfer of armed Ukrainian police into the forests. This act raised the number of OUN-B dependent groups with people previously experienced in the ethnic cleansing of Jews. Secondly it initiated a mass movement of Poles into the ranks of he auxiliary police, which further escalated the situation. The author however postulates that anti-Polish terror may have been planned, it had as its main purpose to chase out the Poles. Torzecki also states that the raid by Sydir Kovpak introduce a significant destabilizing factor to the region and initiated the formation of Ukrainian National Defence - the group which first initiated the anti-Polish actions. The discussions between the Polish and Ukrainian sides were doomed to failure because they were based on tactical considerations.[22]

Although Torzecki states that in 1943-44 the attempts to curtail the conflict between Ukrainian and Polish nationalism[22] were doomed to failure, in his opinion it was OUN-UPA that could have stopped the conflict and did not. In his evaluation of the problem he also lays blame personally on Roman Shukhevych who was accustomed to dealing with problems from a position of force and would consider using terror on the civilian population.[22]

In his 1997 study[23], Filar came to the conclusion that the sole result of the actions of OUN and UPA were to destroy the Polish population. This he bases on a command given by "Klym Savur" regarding the liquidation of he urban Polish population. Information about this command was obtained from a criminal deposition of Yuri Stelmashchuk which existed in the archive of the SBU in Volyn. The command was apparently a secret one given orally by D. Kliachkivsky to liquidate all Polish elements in the region. Filar comes to the conclusion that UPA consciously aimed their actions against the civilian Polish population. He also concludes that the UPA made its priority the extermination of Polish elements rather than fighting the occupiers.[24] Filar's arguments were aimed at providing credible reasons for the undertaking of the Operation Wisła by the Polish Communist government.[25]

Filar's thesis was criticized as being tantamount to rehabilitating the acts of the communist administration and as being politically incorrect by Grzegorz Motyka and Rafał Wnuk.[26] The authors put forward the thesis that in order not to have a repetition of the acts following 1918, the leaders of the UPA proclaimed to the Polish population that they were to leave Ukrainian territories by July 1943 and in order to speed up this exodus a "planned restricted terror" was launched. However, due to certain conditions (in particular the Soviet aligned partisans) the situation in Volyn went out of control. Mass murders began on July 11, 1943 when in 167 population centres simultaneous actions were launched. This created a panic in the Polish population. Rather than the expected results of population migration many Poles joined partisan groups or the auxiliary police and organised defense leagues. As a result the actions of the OUN and UPA provoked the Poles to "bloody counter actions".[27]

G. Motyka and R. Wnuk point out that at the end of WWII there was a real potential for Polish-Ukrainian dialogue and understanding. As a result the two anti-communist forces UPA and WiN signed tactical agreements regarding further cooperation. A new era in Polish-Ukrainian relations for the struggle for freedom meant that former conflicts were lost their principle meaning.[28]

In a further study in 1999 Motyka states that the conflict between the Ukrainian and Polish peoples ended in 1945. After that UPA fought against the Communist government in Poland and not against the Polish population, as opposed to the Poles who continued their terror against the Ukrainian population and the Polish communists who under the guise of fighting the Ukrainian nationalist underground deported the Ukrainian population in 1947[29]. Motyka states that the anti-Polish terror in the Fall of 1943 and the conflict in the Lublin area in January-March 1944 were a result of the "Vilyn massacre" and the attempts by the Poles to make a Polish corridor to Lviv in their "Storm" (Burza) operation.

After the marking of the "Wisla" action the theisi of a planned "Volyn terror" became mainstream in Polish historiography. Attempts were made to blame OUN and UPA in crimes against the civilian population. More eye witness accounts were collected and published in 2000 (edited by W and E Siemaszkos) collection "Genocide, done by Ukrainian nationalists against the Polish population of Volyn 1939-1945"[30].

On a solid documentary base, the authors attempted to convince the reader of the genocidal character of the anti-Polish actions of the UPA. The first volume gives a chronological and geographical listing of 1686 witnesses, archival information etc. The second volume gives the authors interpretation of these events, a summation of Polish casualties, names of the perpetrators and other documents.

However, the authors shed their academism aside when they included numerous unsupported statements [31] such as that the anti-Polish terror was part of a wider plan, apparently devised at the III conference of the OUN etc. Despite the numerous criticism, until recently the work has been the most thorough study in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict of this period.

With the 60th anniversary of the Volyn tragedy in 2003 a third era in the study of Ukrainian-Polish conflict has started.

In 2002 Grzegorz Motyka, finding all the previous concepts regarding the anti-Polish actions of the UPA inadequate,[32] suggested viewing the Ukrainian-Polish relations from the point of view of the question of Ukrainian insurrection during the war. Encouraged by the mass desertion of the Ukrainian police, Dmytro Kliachkivsky initiated a wave of UPA attacks against the Nazi and the Soviet partisan forces in February 1943, despite the contrary decisions of the III Conference of the OUN. In order to optimize conditions, "unwanted elements" which allegedly collaborated with the Germans and the Soviets were removed.[32] According to Motyka[33] , "Klym Savur" gave the liquidation order on July 11. The initial attacks were directed against the Polish underground. In February 1944 because of the Collaboration of the Poles with the Soviets the decision was made to resettle the Polish population back to within its ethnic borders. In cases where this did not happen the Ukrainians were to liquidate all males (Motyka notes that in all the commands it is noted that women, children and the elderly were to be left untouched) and burn property. However, by Autumn 1944 anti-Polish actions stopped and terror was used only against those who co-operated with the NKVD, and that the Ukrainians leaders had understood that it was time to unite with the Poles against the USSR. Polish actions against the Ukrainian civilian population were restricted and punitive in their nature according to Motyka. They were done by the Polish auxiliary police, the self defense leagues and the AK and also by Red partisans formed from ethnic Poles. In his latest studies,[citation needed] Motyka attempts to synthesize the main concepts of both current directions in Polish historiography, analyzing and understanding the problem of anti-Polish terror in Volyn, the reasons and the results (Polish reaction) in order to induce the Ukrainians to officially condemn the activities of the OUN and UPA.

According to Roman Hrytskiv[34] a characteristic of Polish historiography is the national component in its understanding of the problem. This is evident by the treatment of the Ukrainian-Polish conflict as an episode of purely Polish history; focusing attention to the anti-Polish terror of the UPA and demanding that the Ukrainians condemn these actions; the treatment of the anti-Ukrainian actions of the Polish underground to a secondary position, and the moralisatory and emotional style of exposition of materials the inclusion of materials whose authenticity is questionable[35] (memoirs, eye witness accounts, works of literature etc). At the same time, it is in Poland that the professional study of Ukrainian-Polish conflict was started. Polish historians were the first to thoroughly study and analyse the facts of this conflict, developed a periodization, collected a significant number of Polish historic sources and developed a number of alternative methods of studying the problem.

Ukrainian historiography

The issue of the Volyn massacres was largely non-existent in Ukrainian scholarly literature for many years, and until very recently, Ukrainian historiography did not undertake any objective research of the events in Volyn.[36] Until 1991 any independent Ukrainian historic research was only possible abroad, mainly in the USA and the Canadian diaspora. However, despite publishing a number of works devoted to the history of UPA, the Ukrainian emigration researchers (with only few exceptions) remained completely mute about the Volyn events for tens of years. What is worse, until very recently much of the remaining documents were closed in Ukrainian state archives and were not available for researchers.[36] In the result Ukrainian historiography lacks broader reliable research of the events and in fact any presence of the issue in Ukrainian publications is still very limited. What is worse, even the young generation of Ukrainian historians is often infected with Ukrainocentism, and often borrows the stereotypes and myths about Poland and Poles from the biased publications of Ukrainian diaspora.[37]

The active collection and publication of information regarding the Volyn Tragedy began in the Summer of 2002 after it became known that by Kresy organizations (made up of AK veterans and various Associations) was planning to hold commemorations in memory of only the Polish victims of the conflict. The I. Krypiakevych Institute of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine began to collect accounts. (Tetiana Kostenko focusing on the region of Dubno, Ivan Pusko regions of Volyn, Volodymyr Sobchuk, the area around Kremenets. Yaroslav Tsaruk began collecting accounts from the area around Volodymyr-Volyns'k in 1985 and became more active in the 1990s stimulated by the writings of Yu. Turovsky and V. Siemaszko when he noticed that the accounts in their writings did not correspond with his own findings. Travelling by bicycle throughout the area he collected accounts from those who remembered the events, and made lists of those who died or were wounded during the war, including accounts about Poles, Ukrainians and others. He counterchecked the accounts against information that was collected immediately after the war and again in 1976. The post war account paralleled his findings, whereas the 1976 account was specially written to show all ani-soviet actions in a negative light[38].

According to the Ukrainian historian[39] Yaroslav Tsaruk[40], who studied the materials collected by Siemaszko from Polish villagers, the number of ethnic Poles given by them in some of the villages he's familiar with does not correspond to recorded Ukrainian statistical data.[41]. According to Tsaruk, Siemaszko included in the number of Polish casualties those who emigrated before the commencement of these hostilities, and that Siemaszko in his book included colonies, subdivisions of villages and population points which were never separate administrative units, enlarging the number of Polish population points.[42].

According to the information collected by the Siemaszkos in the Volodymyr-Volynsk region only 80 Ukrainians were murdered. According to materials collected by Ya. Tsaruk 1454 Ukrainians died form the hands of Polish paramilitary groups (the names of 1244 victims have been collected)[43]. Tsaruk stated that in the Volodymyr region initially there were attacks on Ukrainian villages by Polish-German police units which were retaliated in self-defence. According to Siemaszko 1915 Poles died form the hands of Ukrainian Nationalists. According to Tsaruk - 430[43] .

In the village of Biskupychy Verkhni (Nekhvoroshchi) Ya. Tsaruk notes 11 murdered Ukrainians (including a 3 year old girl and a 95 year old grandmother) which happened May 20, 1943. Siemaszko's book mentions the murder of 90 Poles on July 11, but doesn't mention the murder of the Ukrainians that, according to Tsaruk, took place on May 20. Tsaruk gives the names of 9 Ukrainians murdered on May 20 in the village of Khmeliv, among the victims, an 18 month old child[44]. Siemaszko states that 11 Poles were murdered there at the beginning of August, again neglecting, according to Tsaruk, to mention the previous Ukrainian victims[43].

Ya. Tsaruk gives hundreds of examples of Siemaszko's selective use of information where previously Ukrainian civilians were murdered by Polish military units such as: Radekhiv, Mokrets, Zashkovychi, Volytsia, Koluna, Oryshchi, Zavydiv, Rykovychi, which Siemaszko did not mention at all[45].

Władysław Siemaszko however, stated that Tsaruk isn't a historian or a reliable source, that his research is based on reports from the locals long after war, while Siemaszko's sources were published and are widely available. He further stated that "almost every Ukrainian family in Volhynia was involved in the murder of Poles", and that "there is a desperate attempt to paint a completely false picture of the number of the alleged Ukrainian victims at the hands of Poles, explained by psychological defence mechanisms, which in some appear as the denial of crimes".[46]

According to the Polish historian Grzegorz Motyka Tsaruk's research didn't change his point of view on Volhynia events, that the Ukrainian nationalists were responsible for beginning and escalating the massacres of Poles, that the evidence of victims of Polish paramilitaries, and Polish cooperation with Germans was not true.[47]

Notes

  1. ^ Грицьків, pp. 148
  2. ^ Грицьків, pp. 148-149
  3. ^ Pawel Machcewicz, The Institute of National Remembrance and Coming to Terms with a Difficult Past: World War II and the Communist Dictatorship, Collegium Civitas, Warsaw, p.6 [1]
  4. ^ Rafał Wnuk, Recent Polish historiography on Polish-Ukrainian relations during World War II and its aftermaths, IPN
  5. ^ Грицьків, pp. 149
  6. ^ a b Грицьків, pp. 150
  7. ^ Torzecki R. "Kwestia ukraińska w polityce III Rzeszy 1933-1945" - Warszawa, 1972
  8. ^ Szczesniak A. B., Szota. W. Z. "Droga do nikąd. Działalność Organizacji Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów i jej likwidacja w Polsce" - Warszawa, 1973
  9. ^ Prus E. "Herosi spod znaku tryzuba: Konowalec - Bandera - Szuchewicz" - Warszawa, 1985
  10. ^ a b Грицьків, pp. 153
  11. ^ a b c Грицьків, pp. 154
  12. ^ Łukaszów Jan (Olszański T. A.) Walki polsko-ukraińskie 1943-1947 //Zeszyty Historyczne 1989 - 90 - pp. 159-199
  13. ^ a b Грицьків, pp. 155
  14. ^ a b Грицьків, pp. 156
  15. ^ a b c d Tadeusz A. Olszański, Konflikt polsko-ukrainski 1943-1947, Niezależne czasopismo kulturoznawcze "JI", No.20/2001 [2]
  16. ^ Ковалевсяький З. Поляське питання у повоєнній стратегії УПА - Україна. Наука і Кулятура - 1993. - Вип. 26-27 - с. 200-235 (First published in 1990)
  17. ^ Грицьків, pp. 157
  18. ^ Грицьків, pp. 158
  19. ^ a b Грицьків, pp. 159
  20. ^ Prus E. Bluff XX wieku. Londyn, 1992, Idem. UPA armia powstańcza czy kurenie rizunów? - Wrocław, 1994
  21. ^ Torzecki R. "Polacy i Ukraińcy. Sprawa ukraińska w czasie II wojny światowej na terenie II Rzeczypospolitej" - Warszawa, 1993.
  22. ^ a b c Грицьків, pp. 160
  23. ^ Filar W. "Burza" na Wołyniu. Z dziejów 27 Wołyńskiej dywizji Piechoty Armii Krajowej - Warszawa, 1997
  24. ^ Filar W. "Burza" na Wołyniu - pp. 46-77
  25. ^ Filar W. Rozważania i polemiki w sprawie operacji "Wisła"//Przed akcją Wisła był Wołyń / Oprac. red W. Filar. Warszawa 2000 - pp. 126-137
  26. ^ Motyka G. Wnuk R. "Pany i rezuny. Współpraca AK-WiN i UPA w latach 1956-1947" - Warszawa, 1997
  27. ^ Грицьків, pp. 163
  28. ^ Motyka G, Wnuk R. "Pany i rezuny", pp. 86-130
  29. ^ Grzegorz Motyka; "Tak bylo w Bieszczadach: Walki polsko - ukraińskie w latach 1943-1946", Warszawa, 1999. pp. 146-7, 442-443
  30. ^ Siemaszko W., iemaszko E. Ludobyjstwo dokonane przed nacionalistyw ukrainskich na ludnosci polskiej Wolynia 1939-1945 - Warszawa, 2000.
  31. ^ Грицьків, pp. 166
  32. ^ a b Грицьків, pp. 167
  33. ^ Грицьків, pp. 168
  34. ^ Грицьків, pp. 148-170
  35. ^ Грицьків, pp. 169
  36. ^ a b Ilyushin, p. 15
  37. ^ Ilyushin, p. 16
  38. ^ Ісаєвич Ярослав З хроніки трагічного протистояння в Трагедія Волинських Сіл 1943-44 рр. Націоналяна Академія НАук України, Інститут Українознавства ім І. Крипякевича. Львів, 2003
  39. ^ http://www.voladm.gov.ua/news.php?id=4395&today=2009.02.16&lang=ukr
  40. ^ Tsaruk publication
  41. ^ Царук Ярослав - Трагедія Волинських Сіл 1943-1944 рр. - Національна Академія Нaук України, Інститут Українознавства ім. І. Крип'якевича, Львів, 2003. p. 20 (Introduction with Table of Contents by Google translate, "Instead of preface" by Google translate)
  42. ^ Царук Ярослав - Трагедія Волинських Сіл 1943-1944 рр. - Національна Академія Нaук України, Інститут Українознавства ім. І. Крип'якевича, Львів, 2003.p. 20 ("Instead of preface")
  43. ^ a b c Царук Ярослав - Трагедія Волинських Сіл 1943-1944 рр. - Національна Академія Нaук України, Інститут Українознавства ім. І. Крип'якевича, Львів, 2003.p.21
  44. ^ Царук Ярослав - Трагедія Волинських Сіл 1943-1944 рр. - Національна Академія Нaук України, Інститут Українознавства ім. І. Крип'якевича, Львів, 2003.p/21 ("Instead of preface" by Google translate)
  45. ^ Царук Ярослав - Трагедія Волинських Сіл 1943-1944 рр. - Національна Академія Нaук України, Інститут Українознавства ім. І. Крип'якевича, Львів, 2003.p.24
  46. ^ Władysław Siemaszko, Ewa Siemaszko Ludobójstwo dokonane przez nacjonalistów ukraińskich na ludności polskiej Wołynia 1939-1945
  47. ^ Grzegorz Motyka, Ukraińska Partyzantka 1942-1960

References

  • (English) Recent Polish Historiography on Polish-Ukrainian Relations during World War II and its Aftermath, Rafał Wnuk, Institute of National Remembrance, Lublin
  • (Ukrainian) Грицьків, Роман - "Польська Історіографія Українсько-Польського збройного конфлікту часів Другої Світової війни" by Roman Hrytskiv, published in the collection "Українсько-Польський конфлікт під час другої світової війни"; Book 2, Lviv 2003
  • (Polish) Motyka, Grzegorz (2003) (in Polish). "Antypolska akcja OUN-UPA w ukraińskiej historiografii" in "Antypolska akcja OUN-UPA 1943-1944. Fakty i interpretacje". Warszawa: IPN. pp. 141–146. ISBN 83-89078-09-0. 
  • (Polish) Ilyushin, Ihor (2009) (in Polish). "UPA i AK. Konflikt w Zachodniej Ukrainie (1939-1945)". Warszawa: Związek Ukraińców w Polsce. ISBN 978-83-928483-0-1. 

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