Idea: Wikis

Advertisements
  
  
  

Note: Many of our articles have direct quotes from sources you can cite, within the Wikipedia article! This article doesn't yet, but we're working on it! See more info or our list of citable articles.

Encyclopedia

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The light bulb symbol of 'having an idea.'

In the most narrow sense, an idea is just whatever is before the mind when one thinks. Very often, ideas are construed as representational images; i.e. images of some object. In other contexts, ideas are taken to be concepts, although abstract concepts do not necessarily appear as images.[1] Many philosophers consider ideas to be a fundamental ontological category of being.

The capacity to create and understand the meaning of ideas is considered to be an essential and defining feature of human beings.

In a popular sense, an idea arises in a reflex, spontaneous manner, even without thinking or serious reflection, for example, when we talk about the idea of a person or a place.

Contents

Innate and adventitious ideas

One view on the nature of ideas is that there exist some ideas (called innate ideas) which are so general and abstract, that they could not have arisen as a representation of any object of our perception, but rather were, in some sense, always in the mind before we could learn them. These are distinguished from adventitious ideas which are images or concepts which are accompanied by the judgment that they are caused by some object outside of the mind.[2]

Another view holds that we only discover ideas in the same way that we discover the real world, from personal experiences. The view that humans acquire all or almost all their behavioral traits from nurture (life experiences) is known as tabula rasa ("blank slate"). Most of the confusions in the way of ideas arise at least in part from the use of the term "idea" to cover both the representation percept and the object of conceptual thought. This can be illustrated in terms of the doctrines of innate ideas, "concrete ideas versus abstract ideas", as well as "simple ideas versus complex ideas". [3]

Philosophy

Advertisements

Plato

Plato was one of the earliest philosopher to provide a detailed discussion of ideas. He considered the concept of idea in the realm of metaphysics and its implications for epistemology. He asserted that there is realm of Forms or Ideas, which exist independently of anyone who may have thought of these ideas. Material things are then imperfect and transient reflections or instantiations of the perfect and unchanging ideas. From this it follows that these Ideas are the principal reality (see also idealism). In contrast to the individual objects of sense experience, which undergo constant change and flux, Plato held that ideas are perfect, eternal, and immutable. Consequently, Plato considered that knowledge of material things is not really knowledge; real knowledge can only be had of unchanging ideas.

René Descartes

Descartes often wrote of the meaning of idea as an image or representation, often but not necessarily "in the mind", which was well known in the vernacular. In spite of the fact that Descartes is usually credited with the invention of the non-Platonic use of the term, we find him at first following this vernacular use.b In his Meditations on First Philosophy he says, "Some of my thoughts are like images of things, and it is to these alone that the name 'idea' properly belongs." He sometimes maintained that ideas were innate [4] and uses of the term idea diverge from the original primary scholastic use. He provides multiple non-equivalent definitions of the term, uses it to refer to as many as six distinct kinds of entities, and divides ideas inconsistently into various genetic categories. [1] For him knowledge took the form of ideas and philosophical investigation is the deep consideration of these ideas. Many times however his thoughts of knowledge and ideas were like those of Plotinus and Neoplatonism. In Neoplatonism the Intelligence (Nous) is the true first principle -- the determinate, referential 'foundation' (arkhe) -- of all existents; for it is not a self-sufficient entity like the One, but rather possesses the ability or capacity to contemplate both the One, as its prior, as well as its own thoughts, which Plotinus identifies with the Platonic Ideas or Forms (eide)[2]. A non-philosophical definition of Nous is good sense (a.k.a. "common sense"). Descartes is quoted as saying, "Of all things, good sense is the most fairly distributed: everyone thinks he is so well supplied with it that even those who are the hardest to satisfy in every other respect never desire more of it than they already have."[3]

John Locke

In striking contrast to Plato’s use of idea [5] is that of John Locke in his masterpiece An Essay Concerning Human Understanding in the Introduction where he defines idea as "It being that term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking ; and I could not avoid frequently using it." He said he regarded the book necessary to examine our own abilities and see what objects our understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with. In his philosophy other outstanding figures followed in his footsteps - Hume and Kant in the 18th century, Arthur Schopenhauer in the 19th century, and Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Karl Popper in the 20th century. Locke always believed in good sense - not pushing things to extremes and on taking fully into account the plain facts of the matter. He considered his common sense ideas "good-tempered, moderate, and down-to-earth." c

David Hume

Hume differs from Locke by limiting "idea" to the more or less vague mental reconstructions of perceptions, the perceptual process being described as an "impression."[6] Hume shared with Locke the basic empiricist premise that it is only from life experiences (whether their own or others') that humans' knowledge of the existence of anything outside of themselves can be ultimately derived, that they shall carry on doing what they are prompted to do by their emotional drives of varying kinds. In choosing the means to those ends, they shall follow their accustomed associations of ideas.d Hume has contended and defended the notion that "reason alone is merely the 'slave of the passions'"[7][8]

"Modern Book Printing" from the Walk of Ideas

Immanuel Kant

Immanuel Kant defines an "idea" as opposed to a "concept". "Regulator ideas" are ideals that one must tend towards, but by definition may not be completely realized. Liberty, according to Kant, is an idea. The autonomy of the rational and universal subject is opposed to the determinism of the empirical subject.[9] Kant felt that it is precisely in knowing its limits that philosophy exists. The business of philosophy he thought was not to give rules, but to analyze the private judgements of good common sense.e

Rudolf Steiner

Whereas Kant declares limits to knowledge ("we can never know the thing in itself"), in his epistemological work, Rudolf Steiner sees ideas as "objects of experience" which the mind apprehends, much as the eye apprehends light. In Goethean Science (1883), he declares, "Thinking… is no more and no less an organ of perception than the eye or ear. Just as the eye perceives colors and the ear sounds, so thinking perceives ideas." He holds this to be the premise upon which Goethe made his natural-scientific observations.

Wilhelm Wundt

Wundt widens the term from Kant's usage to include conscious representation of some object or process of the external world. In so doing, he includes not only ideas of memory and imagination, but also perceptual processes, whereas other psychologists confine the term to the first two groups. One of Wundt's main concerns was to investigate conscious processes in their own context by experiment and introspection. He regarded both of these as exact methods, interrelated in that experimentation created optimal conditions for introspection. Where the experimental method failed, he turned to other objectively valuable aids, specifically to those products of cultural communal life which lead one to infer particular mental motives. Outstanding among these are speech, myth, and social custom. Wundt designed the basic mental activity apperception - a unifying function which should be understood as an activity of the will. Many aspects of his empirical physiological psychology are used today. One is his principles of mutually enhanced contrasts and of assimilation and dissimilation (i.e. in color and form perception and his advocacy of objective methods of expression and of recording results, especially in language. Another is the principle of heterogony of ends - that multiply motivated acts lead to unintended side effects which in turn become motives for new actions.[10]

Charles Sanders Peirce

C. S. Peirce published the first full statement of pragmatism in his important works "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (1878) and "The Fixation of Belief" (1877) [11]. In "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" he proposed that a clear idea (in his study he uses concept and idea as synonymic) is defined as one, when it is apprehended such as it will be recognized wherever it is met, and no other will be mistaken for it. If it fails of this clearness, it is said to be obscure. He argued that to understand an idea clearly we should ask ourselves what difference its application would make to our evaluation of a proposed solution to the problem at hand. Pragmatism (a term he appropriated for use in this context), he defended, was a method for ascertaining the meaning of terms (as a theory of meaning). The originality of his ideas is in their rejection of what was accepted as a view and understanding of knowledge by scientists for some 250 years, i.e. that, he pointed, knowledge was an impersonal fact. Peirce contended that we acquire knowledge as participants, not as spectators. He felt "the real" is which, sooner or later, information acquired through ideas and knowledge with the application of logical reasoning would finally result in. He also published many papers on logic in relation to ideas.

G. F. Stout and J. M. Baldwin

G. F. Stout and J. M. Baldwin, in the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology [4], define "idea" as "the reproduction with a more or less adequate image, of an object not actually present to the senses." They point out that an idea and a perception are by various authorities contrasted in various ways. "Difference in degree of intensity", "comparative absence of bodily movement on the part of the subject", "comparative dependence on mental activity", are suggested by psychologists as characteristic of an idea as compared with a perception.

It should be observed that an idea, in the narrower and generally accepted sense of a mental reproduction, is frequently composite. That is, as in the example given above of the idea of chair, a great many objects, differing materially in detail, all call a single idea. When a man, for example, has obtained an idea of chairs in general by comparison with which he can say "This is a chair, that is a stool", he has what is known as an "abstract idea" distinct from the reproduction in his mind of any particular chair (see abstraction). Furthermore a complex idea may not have any corresponding physical object, though it particular constituent elements may severally be the reproductions of actual perceptions. Thus the idea of a centaur is a complex mental picture composed of the ideas of man and horse, that of a mermaid of a woman and a fish.

In anthropology and the social sciences

Diffusion studies explore the spread of ideas from culture to culture. Some anthropological theories hold that all cultures imitate ideas from one or a few original cultures, the Adam of the Bible or several cultural circles that overlap. Evolutionary diffusion theory holds that cultures are influenced by one another, but that similar ideas can be developed in isolation.

In mid-20th century, social scientists began to study how and why ideas spread from one person or culture to another. Everett Rogers pioneered diffusion of innovations studies, using research to prove factors in adoption and profiles of adopters of ideas. In 1976, in his book The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins suggested applying biological evolutionary theories to spread of ideas. He coined the term 'meme' to describe an abstract unit of selection, equivalent to the gene in evolutionary biology.

Semantics

Dr. Samuel Johnson

James Boswell recorded Dr.Samuel Johnson' s opinion about ideas. Johnson claimed that they are mental images or internal visual pictures. As such, they have no relation to words or the concepts which are designated by verbal names.

He was particularly indignant against the almost universal use of the word idea in the sense of notion or opinion, when it is clear that idea can only signify something of which an image can be formed in the mind. We may have an idea or image of a mountain, a tree, a building; but we cannot surely have an idea or image of an argument or proposition. Yet we hear the sages of the law 'delivering their ideas upon the question under consideration;' and the first speakers in parliament 'entirely coinciding in the idea which has been ably stated by an honourable member;' — or 'reprobating an idea unconstitutional, and fraught with the most dangerous consequences to a great and free country.' Johnson called this 'modern cant.'

Boswell's Life of Johnson, Tuesday, 23 September 1777

Validity of ideas

In the objective worth of our ideas there remains the problem of the validity. As all cognition is by ideas, it is obvious that the question of the validity of our ideas in this broad sense is that of the truth of our knowledge as a whole. Otherwise to dispute this is to take up the position of skepticism. This has often been pointed out as a means intellectual suicide. Any chain of reasoning (common sense) by which it is attempted to demonstrate the falsity of our ideas has to employ the very concept of ideas itself. Then insofar as it demands assent to the conclusion, it implies belief in the validity of all the ideas employed in the premises of the argument.

To assent the fundamental mathematical and logical axioms, including that of the principle of contradiction, implies admission of the truth of the ideas expressed in these principles. With respect to the objective worth of ideas, as involved in perception generally, the question raised is that of the existence of an independent material world comprising other human beings. The idealism of David Hume and John Stuart Mill would lead logically to solipsism (the denial of any others besides ourselves). The main foundation of all idealism and skepticism is the assumption (explicit or implicit), that the mind can never know what is outside of itself. This is to say that an idea as a cognition can never go outside of itself. This can be further expressed as we can never reach to and mentally apprehend anything outside of anything of what is actually a present state of our own consciousness.

  • First, this is based on a prior assumption for which no real proof is or can be given
  • Second, it is not only not self-evident, but directly contrary to what our mind affirms to be our direct intellectual experience.

What is possible for a human mind to apprehend cannot be laid down beforehand. It must be ascertained by careful observations and by study of the process of cognition. This postulates that the mind cannot apprehend or cognize any reality existing outside of itself and is not only a self-evident proposition, it is directly contrary to what such observation and the testimony of mankind affirms to be our actual intellectual experience.

John Stuart Mill and most extreme idealists have to admit the validity of memory and expectation. This is to say that in every act of memory or expectation which refers to any experience outside the present instant, our cognition is transcending the present modifications of the mind and judging about reality beyond and distinct from the present states of consciousness. Considering the question as specially concerned with universal concepts, only the theory of moderate realism adopted by Aristotle and Saint Thomas can claim to guarantee objective value to our ideas. According to the nominalist and conceptualist theories there is no true correlate in rerum naturâ corresponding to the universal term.

Mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, and the rest claim that their universal propositions are true and deal with realities. It is involved in the very notion of science that the physical laws formulated by the mind do mirror the working of agents in the external universe. The general terms of these sciences and the ideas which they signify have objective correlatives in the common natures and essences of the objects with which these sciences deal. Otherwise these general statements are unreal and each science is nothing more than a consistently arranged system of barren propositions deduced from empty arbitrary definitions. These postulates then have no more genuine objective value than any other coherently devised scheme of artificial symbols standing for imaginary beings. However the fruitfulness of science and the constant verifications of its predictions are incompatible with such a hypothesis.[5]

Relationship of ideas to modern legal time- and scope-limited monopolies

Relationship between ideas and patents

On Susceptibility to Exclusive Property

Thomas Jefferson, letter to Isaac McPherson, 13 August 1813

"It has been pretended by some, (and in England especially,) that inventors have a natural and exclusive right to their inventions, and not merely for their own lives, but inheritable to their heirs. But while it is a moot question whether the origin of any kind of property is derived from nature at all, it would be singular to admit a natural and even an hereditary right to inventors. It is agreed by those who have seriously considered the subject, that no individual has, of natural right, a separate property in an acre of land, for instance.

By a universal law, indeed, whatever, whether fixed or movable, belongs to all men equally and in common, is the property for the moment of him who occupies it, but when he relinquishes the occupation, the property goes with it. Stable ownership is the gift of social law, and is given late in the progress of society. It would be curious then, if an idea, the fugitive fermentation of an individual brain, could, of natural right, be claimed in exclusive and stable property.

If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.

That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space, without lessening their density in any point, and like the air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation. Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.

Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this may or may not be done, according to the will and convenience of the society, without claim or complaint from anybody. Accordingly, it is a fact, as far as I am informed, that England was, until we copied her, the only country on earth which ever, by a general law, gave a legal right to the exclusive use of an idea. In some other countries it is sometimes done, in a great case, and by a special and personal act, but, generally speaking, other nations have thought that these monopolies produce more embarrassment than advantage to society; and it may be observed that the nations which refuse monopolies of invention, are as fruitful as England in new and useful devices."

To protect the cause of invention and innovation, the legal constructions of Copyrights and Patents was established. Patent law regulates various aspects related to the functional manifestation of inventions based on new ideas or an incremental improvements to existing ones. Thus, patents have a direct relationship to ideas.

Relationship between ideas and copyrights

In some cases, authors can be granted limited legal monopolies on the manner in which certain works are expressed. This is known colloquially as copyright, although the term intellectual property is used mistakenly in place of copyright. Copyright law regulating the aforementioned monopolies generally does not cover the actual ideas. The law does not bestow the legal status of property upon ideas per se. Instead, laws purport to regulate events related to the usage, copying, production, sale and other forms of exploitation of the fundamental expression of a work, that may or may not carry ideas. Copyright law is fundamentally different to patent law in this respect: patents do grant monopolies on ideas (more on this below).

A copyright is meant to regulate some aspects of the usage of expressions of a work, not an idea. Thus, copyrights have a negative relationship to ideas.

Work means a tangible medium of expression. It may be an original or derivative work of art, be it literary, dramatic, musical recitation, artistic, related to sound recording, etc. In (at least) countries adhering to the Berne Convention, copyright automatically starts covering the work upon the original creation and fixation thereof, without any extra steps. While creation usually involves an idea, the idea in itself does not suffice for the purposes of claiming copyright.

Relationship of ideas to confidentiality agreements

Confidentiality and nondisclosure agreements are legal instruments that assist corporations and individuals in keeping ideas from escaping to the general public. Generally, these instruments are covered by contract law.

See also

Bibliography

  • Paul Natorp, Platons Ideenlehre (Leipzig 1930)
  • W. D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas (Oxford 1951)
  • M. H. Carre, Realists and Nominalists (Oxford 1946)
  • Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York 2001)
  • J. W. Yolton, John Lock and the Way of Ideas (Oxford 1956)
  • Eugenio Garin, La Theorie de I'idee suivant I'ecole thomiste (Paris 1932)
  • Peter Watson, Ideas: A History from Fire to Freud, Weidenfeld & Nicolson (London 2005).
  • A. G. Balz, Idea and Essence in the Philosophy of Hobbes and Spinoza (New York 1918)
  • William Rose Benet, The Reader's Encyclopedia 1965, Library of Congress Card No. 65-12510
  • Melchert, Norman (2002). The Great Conversation: A Historical Introduction to Philosophy. McGraw Hill. ISBN 0-19-517510-7.  

Notes

  1. ^ Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy
  2. ^ Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy
  3. ^ The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, MacMillian Publishing Company, New York, 1973 ISBN 0028949501 ISBN 978-0028949505 Vol 4: 120 - 121
  4. ^ Vol 4: 196 - 198
  5. ^ Vol 4: 487 - 503
  6. ^ Vol 4: 74 - 90
  7. ^ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/#inmo
  8. ^ Hume, David: A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. (1739–40)
  9. ^ Vol 4: 305 - 324
  10. ^ Vol 8: 349 -351
  11. ^ Pierce's pragmatism

References

  • The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, MacMillian Publishing Company, New York, 1973 ISBN 0028949501 ISBN 978-0028949505
  • Dictionary of the History of Ideas Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1973-74, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-7943 SBN 684-16425-6
- Nous
¹ Volume IV 1a, 3a
² Volume IV 4a, 5a
³ Volume IV 32 - 37
- Ideas
Idealogy
Authority
Education
Liberalism
Idea of God
Pragmatism
Chain of Being
  • The Story of Thought, DK Publishing, Bryan Magee, London, 1998, ISBN 0-7894-4455-0
aka The Story of Philosophy, Dorling Kindersley Publishing, 2001, ISBN 0-7894-7994-X
(subtitled on cover: The Essential Guide to the History of Western Philosophy)
a Plato, pages 11 - 17, 24 - 31, 42, 50, 59, 77, 142, 144, 150
b Descartes, pages 78, 84 - 89, 91, 95, 102, 136 - 137, 190, 191
c Locke, pages 59 - 61, 102 - 109, 122 - 124, 142, 185
d Hume, pages 61, 103, 112 - 117, 142 - 143, 155, 185
e Kant, pages 9, 38, 57, 87, 103, 119, 131 - 137, 149, 182
f Pierce, pages 61, How to Make Our Ideas Clear 186 - 187 and 189
g Saint Augustine, pages 30, 144; City of God 51, 52, 53 and The Confessions 50, 51, 52
- additional in the Dictionary of the History of Ideas for Saint Augustine and Neo-Platonism
h Stoics, pages 22, 40, 44; The governing philosophy of the Roman Empire on pages 46 - 47.
- additional in Dictionary of the History of Ideas for Stoics, also here, and here, and here.
  • The Reader's Encyclopedia, 2nd Edition 1965, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Library of Congress No. 65-12510
An Encyclopedia of World Literature
¹apage 774 Plato (c.427-348 BC)
²apage 779 Francesco Petrarca
³apage 770 Charles Sanders Peirce
¹bpage 849 the Renaissance

Wiktionary

Up to date as of January 15, 2010
(Redirected to idea article)

Definition from Wiktionary, a free dictionary

Contents

English

Most common English words: electronic « sea « necessary « #458: idea » reached » appeared » spoke

Etymology

< Latin idea (a (Platonic) idea; archetype) < Ancient Greek ἰδέα (idea), notion, pattern) < εἴδω (eidō), I see).

Pronunciation

Noun

Wikipedia-logo.png
Wikipedia has an article on:

Wikipedia

Singular
idea

Plural
ideas

idea (plural ideas)

  1. The transcript, image, or picture of a visible object that is formed by the mind; also, a similar image of any object whatever, whether sensible or spiritual.
  2. That which exists in the mind as the result of mental activity; a thought or a concept
    Ideas won't go to jail.—A. Whitney Griswold (1952)
  3. Someone's opinion, belief or conviction that is accepted as true
  4. An intuitive notion; a feeling or hunch
  5. A plan or scheme for doing something, or an intention
  6. (music) A musical theme or melodic subject

Synonyms

  • (mental transcript, image, or picture): image

Descendants

  • Japanese: aidia

Derived terms

Related terms

Translations

The translations below need to be checked and inserted above into the appropriate translation tables, removing any numbers. Numbers do not necessarily match those in definitions. See instructions at Help:How to check translations.

External links

  • idea in Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary, G. & C. Merriam, 1913
  • idea in The Century Dictionary, The Century Co., New York, 1911

Anagrams


Czech

Pronunciation

Noun

idea f.

  1. idea (that which exists in the mind as the result of mental activity)

Related terms


Finnish

Noun

idea

  1. idea

Declension


Italian

Etymology

Ancient Greek ἰδέα (idea), notion, pattern), from εἴδω (eidō), I see).

Noun

idea f. (plural idee)

  1. idea

Verb

idea

  1. third-person singular present tense of ideare
  2. second-person singular imperative of ideare

Related terms


Spanish

Etymology

Ancient Greek ἰδέα (idea), notion, pattern), from εἴδω (eidō), I see). Compare Portuguese ideia.

Pronunciation

  • IPA: /iˈðea/

Noun

idea f. (plural ideas)

Singular
idea f.

Plural
ideas f.

  1. idea

Wikispecies

Up to date as of January 23, 2010

From Wikispecies

Idea leuconoe

Taxonavigation

Main Page
Cladus: Eukaryota
Supergroup: Unikonta
Cladus: Opisthokonta
Regnum: Animalia
Subregnum: Eumetazoa
Cladus: Bilateria
Cladus: Nephrozoa
Cladus: Protostomia
Cladus: Ecdysozoa
Phylum: Arthropoda
Subphylum: Hexapoda
Classis: Insecta
Cladus: Dicondylia
Cladus: Pterygota
Cladus: Metapterygota
Cladus: Neoptera
Cladus: Eumetabola
Cladus: Endopterygota
Superordo: Panorpida
Cladus: Amphiesmenoptera
Ordo: Lepidoptera
Subordo: Glossata
Infraordo: Heteroneura
Divisio: Ditrysia
Sectio: Cossina
Subsection: Bombycina
Superfamilia: Papilionoidea
Series: Papilioniformes
Familia: Nymphalidae
Subfamilia: Danainae
Tribus: Danaini
Subtribus: Euploeina
Genus: Idea
Species: I. agamarschana - I. blanchardi - I. durvillei - I. electra - I. hypermnestra - I. iasonia - I. idea - I. leuconoe - I. lynceus - I. malabarica - I. stolli - I. tambisisiana

Name

Idea Fabricius, 1807

References

  • Treadaway, C.G. & H.G. Schroeder, 2003: Two new Philippine subspecies of the danaid Idea leuconoe Erichson (Lepidoptera: Nymphalidae: Danainae). Futoa 42: 18-20.

Bible wiki

Up to date as of January 23, 2010

From BibleWiki

(Lat. idea, forma, species; Gk. idea, eidos, from idein, to see; Fr. idée; Ger. Bild; Begriff)

Probably to no other philosophical term have there been attached so many different shades of meaning as to the word idea. Yet what this word signifies is of much importance. Its sense in the minds of some philosophers is the key to their entire system. But from Descartes onwards usage has become confused and inconstant. Locke, in particular, ruined the term altogether in English philosophical literature, where it has ceased to possess any recognized definite meaning. He tells us himself at the beginning of his "Essay on the Human Understanding" that in this treatise "the word Idea stands for whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks. I have used it to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about when thinking." In fact, with him it denotes, indifferently, a sensation, a perception, an image of the imagination, a concept of the intellect, an emotional feeling, and sometimes the external material object which is perceived or imagined.

Contents

HISTORY OF THE TERM

The word was originally Greek, but passed without change into Latin. It seems first to have meant form, shape, or appearance, whence, by an easy transition, it acquired the connotation of nature, or kind. It was equivalent to eidos, of which it is merely the feminine, but Plato's partiality for this form of the term and its adoption by the Stoics secured its ultimate triumph over the masculine. Indeed it was Plato who won for the term idea the prominent position in the history of philosophy that it retained for so many centuries. With him the word idea, contrary to the modern acceptance, meant something that was primarily and emphatically objective, something outside of our minds. It is the universal archetypal essence in which all the individuals coming under a universal concept participate. By sensuous perception we obtain, according to Plato, an imperfect knowledge of individual objects; by our general concepts, or notions, we reach a higher knowledge of the idea of these objects. But what is the character of the idea itself? What is its relation to the individual object? And what is its relation to the author or originator of the individual things? The Platonic doctrine of ideas is very involved and obscure. Moreover, the difficulty is further complicated by the facts that the account of the idea given by Plato in different works is not the same, that the chronological order of his writings is not certain, and, finally, still more because we do not know how far the mythological setting is to be taken literally. Approximately, however, Plato's view seems to come to this: — To the universal notions, or concepts, which constitute science, or general knowledge as it is in our mind, there correspond ideas outside of our mind. These ideas are truly universal. They possess objective reality in themselves. They are not something indwelling in the individual things, as, for instance, form in matter, or the essence which determines the nature of an object. Each universal idea has its own separate and independent existence apart from the individual object related to it. It seems to dwell in some sort of celestial universe (en ouranio topo). In contrast with the individual objects of sense experience, which undergo constant change and flux, the ideas are perfect, eternal, and immutable. Still, there must be some sort of community between the individual object and the corresponding idea, between Socrates and the idea "man", between this act of justice and the idea "justice". This community consists in "participation" (methexis). The concrete individual participates, or shares, in the universal idea, and this participation constitutes it an individual of a certain kind or nature. But what, then, is this participation, if the idea dwells in another sphere of existence? It seems to consist in imitation (mimesis). The ideas are models and prototypes, the sensible objects are copies, though very imperfect, of these models. The ideas are reflected in a feeble and obscure way in them. The idea is the archetype (paradeigma), individual objects are merely images (eidola). Finally, what precisely is the celestial universe in which the ideas have eternally existed, and what is their exact relation to God or to the idea of the good? For Plato allots to this latter a unique position in the transcendental region of ideas. Here we meet a fundamental difference between the answers from two schools of interpreters.

Aristotle

Aristotle, who, his critics notwithstanding, was as competent as they to understand Plato, and was Plato's own pupil, teaches that his master ascribed to the various ideas an independent, autonomous existence. They are a multiplicity of isolated essences existing separated from the individual objects which copy them, and they are united by no common bond. All the relations subsisting in the hierarchies of our universal concepts, however, seem in Plato's view to be represented by analogous relations amongst the autonomous ideas. Aristotle's interpretation was accepted by St. Thomas and the main body of the later Scholastics; and much pain has been devoted to establishing the absurdity of this alleged theory of separation. But the ultra realism of the Platonic theory of ideas was susceptible of a more benevolent interpretation, which, moreover, was adopted by nearly all the early Fathers of the Church. Indeed they found it easier to Christianize his philosophy than did Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas to do the like for that of Aristotle. They unanimously understood Plato to locate this world of ideas in the Mind of God, and they explained his kosmos nontos as a system of Divine conceptions — the archetypes according to which God was to form in the future the various species of created beings. With respect to the origin of our knowledge of these universal ideas, Plato cannot consistently derive it from sensuous experience. He therefore teaches that our universal concepts, which correspond to these ideas, are, strictly speaking, innate, inherited by the soul from a previous state of existence. There, in that transcendental Eden, the soul, by direct contemplation of the ideas, acquired these concepts. Sensible experience of the objects around us now merely occasions the reminiscence of these pre-natal cognitions. The acquisition of knowledge is thus, strictly speaking, a process of recollection. Aristotle vigorously attacked Plato's theory of universal ideas. He himself teaches that sensible experience of the concrete individual is the beginning and foundation of all cognition. Intellectual knowledge, however, is concerned with the universal. But it must have been derived from the experience of the individual which, therefore, in some way contains the universal. The universal cannot exist, as such, apart from the individual. It is immanent in the individual as the essence, or nature, specifically common to all members of the class. Since this essence, or nature, constitutes the thing specifically what it is, man, horse, triangle, etc., it furnishes the answer to the question: What is the thing? (Quid est?). It has therefore been termed the quiddity of the thing. In Greek, according to Aristotle, the to ti en enai, eidos, morphe, and ousia deutera are one and the same thing — the essence, or quiddity, which determines the specific nature of the thing. This is the foundation for the general concept in the mind, which abstracts the universal form (eidos nonton) from the individual. Several of the early Fathers, as we have said, interpreted Plato benevolently, and sought to harmonize as much of his doctrine as possible with Christian theology. For them the ideas are the creative thoughts of God, the archetypes, or patterns, or forms in the mind of the Author of the universe according to which he has made the various species of creatures. "Ideæ principales formæ quædam vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quæ in divinâ intelligentiâ continentur" (St. August., "De Div.", Q. xlvi). These Divine ideas must not be looked on as distinct entities, for this would be inconsistent with the Divine simplicity. They are identical with the Divine Essence contemplated by the Divine Intellect as susceptible of imitation ad extra.

Scholastic Period

This doctrine of the Fathers received its complete elaboration from the Schoolmen in the great controversy concerning universals (de universalibus) which occupied a prominent place in the history of philosophy from the tenth to the thirteenth century. The ultra-realists tended towards the Platonic view in regard to the real existence of universal forms, as such, outside of the human mind, though they differed as to their explanation of the nature of this universality, and its participation by the individuals. Thus William of Champeaux seems to have understood the universal to exist essentially in its completeness in each individual of the species. In essence these individuals are but one, and whatever difference they have is one of accidents, not of substance. This would lead to a pantheistic conception of the universe, akin to that of Scotus Eriugena. On the other hand, the extreme Nominalist view, advocated by Roscelin, denies all real universality, except that of words. — A common name may be applied to the several objects of a species or genus, but neither in the existing individuals nor in the mind is there a genuine basis or correlate for this community of predication. The Aristotelean doctrine of moderate realism, which was already in possession before the eleventh century, held its ground throughout the whole period of Scholasticism, notwithstanding the appearance of distinguished champions of the rival hypothesis, and at last permanently triumphed with the establishment of the authority of St. Thomas. This theory, which in its complete form we may call the Scholastic doctrine of universals, distinguished universalia ante res, in rebus, et post res. The universal exists in the Divine Mind only as an idea, model, or prototype of a plurality of creatures before the individual is realized. Genus or species cannot in order of time precede the individual. Plato's separate ideas, did they physically exist, would have been individualized by their existence and have thus ceased to be universals. The universal exists in the individual only potentially or fundamentally, not actually or formally as universal. That is, in each of the individuals of the same species there is a similar nature which the mind, exercising its abstractive activity, can represent by a concept or idea as separate, or apart, from its individualizing notes. The nature, or essence, so conceived is capable of being realized in an indefinite number of individuals, and therefore was justly described as "potentially universal". Finally, by a subsequent reflective generalizing act, the mind considers this concept, or idea, as representative of a plurality of such individuals, and thereby constitutes it a formally universal concept, or idea. In fact, it is only in the concept, or idea, that true universality is possible, for only in the vital mental act is there really reference of the one to the many. Even a common name, or any other general symbol, viewed as an entity, is merely an individual. It is its meaning, or significant reference, that gives it universality. But the fact that in the external world individual beings of the same species, e. g., men, oak trees, gold, iron, etc., have perfectly similar natures, affords an objective foundation for our subjective universal ideas and thereby makes physical science possible.

Diverse Meaning of Idea with Medieval and Modern Scholastic Writers

We have just been using the term idea in its modern Scholastic sense as synonymous with "concept". By the Schoolmen the terms conceptio, conceptus mentis, species intelligibilis, and verbum mentale were all employed, sometimes as equivalents and sometimes as connoting slight differences, to signify the universal intellectual concepts of the mind. The term idea, however, probably in consequence of the Platonic usage, was for a long period employed chiefly, if not solely, to signify the forms or archetypes of things existing in the Divine Mind. Even when referred to the human mind, it commonly bore the significance of forma exemplaris, the model pictured by the practical intellect with a view to artistic production, rather than that of a representation effected in the intellect by the object apprehended. The former was described as an exercising of the "practical", the latter of the "speculative", intellect, though the faculty was recognized as really the same. St. Thomas, however, says that idea may stand for the act of the speculative intellect also — "Sed tamen si ideam communiter appellamus similitudinem vel rationem, sic idea etiam ad speculativam cognitionem pure pertinere potest" (QQ. Disp. de Ideis, a. 3). But I have not been able to find any passage in which he himself employs the word idea in the modern Scholastic sense, as equivalent to the intellectual concept of the human mind. The same is true as regards Suarez; so that the recognized general usage of the term in modern Scholastic textbooks does not seem to go much farther back than the time of Descartes.

Modern Philosophy

Passing from the Schoolmen to modern philosophy, whilst, among those Catholic writers who adhered in general to the medieval philosophy, the term idea came to be more and more used to designate the intellectual concept of the human mind, outside of the Scholastic tradition it was no longer confined to intellectual acts. Descartes seems to have been the first influential thinker to introduce the vague and inaccurate use of the word idea which characterizes modern speculation generally. Locke, however, as we have mentioned, is largely responsible for the confusion in respect to the term which has prevailed in English philosophical literature. Descartes tells us that he designates generally by the term idea "all that is in our minds when we conceive a thing"; and he says, in another place, "idea est ipsa res cogitata quatenus est objective in intellectu." The Cartesian meaning of idea seems, then, to be the general psychical determinant of cognition. This wide signification was generally adopted by Gassendi, Hobbes, and many other writers, and the problem of the origin of ideas became that of the origin of all knowledge. There is, however, throughout, a reversal of the Platonic usage, for in its modern sense idea connotes something essentially subjective and intra-mental. With Plato, on the other hand, the ideas were emphatically objective. Spinoza defined idea as mentis conceptus, and warned his readers to distinguish it from phantasms of the imagination, imagines rerum quas imaginamus. We have cited at the beginning of this article Locke's vague definition. The confused and inconsistent usage to which he gave currency contributed much to the success of Berkeley's idealism and Hume's scepticism. From the position frequently adopted by Locke, that ideas are the object of our knowledge, that is, that what the mind knows or perceives are ideas, the conclusions drawn by Berkeley, that we have therefore no justification for asserting the existence of anything else but ideas, and that the hypothesis of a material world, the unperceived external causes of these ideas, is useless and unwarranted, was an obvious inference. Hume starts with the assumption that all cognitive acts of the mind may be divided into "impressions" (acts of perception), and "ideas", faint images of the former, and then lays down the doctrine that "the difference between these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike on the mind." He then shows without much difficulty that genuine knowledge of reality of any kind is logically impossible. Kant assigned quite a new meaning to the term. He defines ideas as "concepts of the unconditioned which is thought of as a last condition for every conditioned". The transcendental ideas of metaphysics with him are, God, freedom, and immortality, "a pure concept" (ein reiner Begriff) may be either a Verstandesbegriff (notion), or a Vernunftbegriff (idea), the difference being that "the latter transcends the possibility of experience." In the Hegelian philosophy the term again assumed an objective meaning, though not that of Plato. It is a name for the Absolute and the World process viewed as a logical category. It is the absolute truth of which everything that exists is the expression.

Such being the varying signification of the term in the history of philosophy, we may now return to consider more closely its adopted meaning among Catholic philosophers. The term idea, and especially universal idea, being generally accepted by them as equivalent to universal concept, it is the product of the intellect, or understanding, as distinguished from the sensuous faculties. It is an act of the mind which corresponds to a general term in ordinary speech. Thus, in the sentence, "water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen", the three words water, oxygen, and hydrogen stand for any genuine samples of these substances. The names have a definite yet universal meaning. The mental act by which that universal meaning is realized is the universal idea. It is a quite distinct thing from the particular sensation or image of the imagination, more or less vivid, which may accompany the intellectual act. The image may be distinct or confused, lively or feeble. It probably varies from moment to moment. It is felt to be of a subjective, contingent, and accidental character, differing considerably from the corresponding image in other persons' minds. It is, however, always an individualistic concrete entity, referring to a single object. Not so, however, with the intellectual idea. This possesses stability. It is unchangeable, and it is universal. It refers with equal truth to every possible specimen of the class. Herein lies the difference between thought and sensuous feeling, between spiritual and organic activity (see INTELLECT).

ORIGIN OF IDEAS

Given the fact that the human mind in mature life is in possession of such universal ideas, or concepts, the question arises: How have they been attained? Plato, as we have incidentally observed, conceives them to be an inheritance through reminiscence from a previous state of existence. Sundry Christian philosophers of ultra-spiritualist tendencies have described them as innate, planted in the soul at its creation by God. On the other hand, Empiricists and Materialists have endeavoured to explain all our intellectual ideas as refined products of our sensuous faculties. For a fuller account and criticism of the various theories we must refer the reader to any of the Catholic textbooks on psychology. We can give here but the briefest outline of the doctrine usually taught in the Catholic schools of philosophy. Man has a double set of cognitive faculties sensuous and intellectual. All knowledge starts from sensuous experience. There are no innate ideas. External objects stimulate the senses and effect a modification of the sensuous faculties which results in a sensuous percipient act, a sensation or perception by which the mind becomes cognizant of the concrete individual object, e. g., some sensible quality of the thing acting on the sense. But, because sense and intellect are powers of the same soul, the latter is now wakened, as it were, into activity, and lays hold of its own proper object in the sensuous presentation. The object is the essence, or nature of the thing, omitting its individualizing conditions. The act by which the intellect thus apprehends the abstract essence, when viewed as a modification of the intellect, was called by the Schoolmen species intelligibilis; when viewed as the realization or utterance of the thought of the object to itself by the intellect, they termed it the verbum mentale. In this first stage it prescinds alike from universality and individuality. But the intellect does not stop there. It recognizes its object as capable of indefinite multiplication. In other words it generalizes the abstract essence and thereby constitutes it a reflex or formally universal concept, or idea. By comparison, reflection, and generalization, the elaboration of the idea is continued until we attain to the distinct and precise concepts, or ideas, which accurate science demands.

IDEA THE INSTRUMENT, NOT THE OBJECT, OF COGNITION

It is important to note that in the Scholastic theory the immediate object of the intellectual act of perception is not the idea or concept. It is the external reality, the nature or essence of the thing apprehended. The idea, when considered as part of the process of direct perception, is itself the subjective act of cognition, not the thing cognized. It is a vital, immanent operation by which the mind is modified and determined directly to know the object perceived. The psychologist may subsequently reflect upon this intellectual idea and make it the subject of his consideration, or the ordinary man may recall it by memory for purposes of comparison, but in the original act of apprehension it is the means by which the mind knows, not the object which it knows — "est id quo res cognoscitur non id quod cognoscitur". This constitutes a fundamental point of difference between the Scholastic doctrine of perception and that held by Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and a very large proportion of modern philosophers. For Locke and Berkeley the object immediately perceived is the idea. The existence of material objects, if we believe in them, can, in their view, only be justified as an inference from effect to cause. Berkeley and idealists generally deny the validity of that inference; and if the theory of immediate perception be altogether abandoned, it seems difficult to warrant the claim of the human mind to a genuine knowledge of external reality. In the Scholastic view, knowledge is essentially of reality, and this reality is not dependent on the (finite) mind which knows it. The knower is something apart from his actualized knowing, and the known object is something apart from its being actually known. The thing must be before it can be known; the act of knowledge does not set up but presupposes the object. It is of the object that we are directly conscious, not of the idea. In popular language we sometimes call the object "an idea", but in such cases it is in a totally different sense, and we recognize the term as signifying a purely mental creation.

VALIDITY OF IDEAS

There remains the problem of the validity, the objective worth, of our ideas, though this question is already in great part answered by what has gone before. As all cognition is by ideas, taken in their widest signification, it is obvious that the question of the validity of our ideas in this broad sense is that of the truth of our knowledge as a whole. To dispute this is to take up the position of complete scepticism, and this, as has often been pointed out, means intellectual suicide. Any chain of reasoning by which it is attempted to demonstrate the falsity of our ideas has to employ ideas, and, in so far as it demands assent to the conclusion, implies belief in the validity of all the ideas employed in the premises. Again, assent to the fundamental mathematical and logical axioms, including that of the principle of contradiction, implies admission of the truth of the ideas expressed in these principles. With respect to the objective worth of ideas, as involved in perception generally, the question raised is that of the existence of an independent material world comprising other human beings. The idealism of Hume and Mill, if consistently followed out, would lead logically to solipsism, or the denial of any other being save self. Finally, the main foundation of all idealism and scepticism is the assumption, explicit or implicit, that the mind can never know what is outside of itself, that an idea as a cognition can never transcend itself, that we can never reach to and mentally lay hold of or apprehend anything save what is actually a present state of our own consciousness, or a subjective modification of our own mind. Now, first, this is an a priori assumption for which no real proof is or can be given; secondly, it is not only not self-evident, but directly contrary to what our mind affirms to be our direct intellectual experience. What it is possible for a human mind to apprehend cannot be laid down a priori. It must be ascertained by careful observation and, study of the process of cognition. But that the mind cannot apprehend or cognize any reality existing outside of itself is not only not a self-evident proposition, it is directly contrary to what such observation and the testimony of mankind affirm to be our actual intellectual experience. Further, Mill and most extreme idealists have to admit the validity of memory and expectation; but, in every act of memory or expectation which refers to any experience outside the present instant, our cognition is transcending the present modifications of the mind and judging about reality beyond and distinct from the present states of consciousness. Considering the question as specially concerned with universal concepts, only the theory of moderate realism adopted by Aristotle and St. Thomas can claim to guarantee objective value to our ideas. According to the nominalist and conceptualist theories there is no true correlate in rerum naturâ corresponding to the universal term. Were this the case there would be no valid ground for the general statements which constitute science. But mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, and the rest claim that their universal propositions are true and deal with realities. It is involved in the very notion of science that the physical laws formulated by the mind do mirror the working of agents in the external universe. But unless the general terms of these sciences and the ideas which they signify have, corresponding to them, objective correlatives in the common natures and essences of the objects with which these sciences deal, then those general statements are unreal, and each science is nothing more than a consistently arranged system of barren propositions deduced from empty, arbitrary definitions, and postulates, having no more genuine objective value than any other coherently devised scheme of artificial symbols standing for imaginary beings. But the fruitfulness of science and the constant verifications of its predictions are incompatible with such an hypothesis.

Portions of this entry are taken from The Catholic Encyclopedia, 1907.
Facts about IdeaRDF feed

Simple English

Simple English Wiktionary has the word meaning for:

When a person thinks of something, that which he/she thinks about is called an "idea". Ideas are concepts created in the mind. No one really knows how this works. Ideas are the product of mental action.

One idea can change the whole world. If someone has a better idea, they can sell it to others.


Advertisements






Got something to say? Make a comment.
Your name
Your email address
Message