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John Randolph Lucas FBA (born 18 June 1929) is a British
philosopher.
Overview
John Lucas was educated at Winchester College and Balliol College, Oxford, where
he studied first maths, then Greats (Philosophy and Ancient History),
obtaining first class honors, and proceeding to an MA in Philosophy
in 1954. He spent the 1957-58 academic year at Princeton
University, deepening his understanding of mathematics and
logic. For 36 years, until his 1996 retirement, he was a Fellow and
Tutor of Merton College, Oxford, and
remains an emeritus member of the University Faculty of Philosophy. He is a
Fellow of the British Academy.
Lucas is perhaps best known for his paper "Minds, Machines and Gödel,"
arguing that an automaton cannot represent a human mathematician,
essentially refuting computationalism.
A prolific author with unusually diverse teaching and research
interests, Lucas has written on the philosophy of mathematics,
especially the implications of Gödel's
incompleteness theorem, the philosophy of mind, free will and determinism, the philosophy of science including
two books on physics coauthored with Peter E. Hodgson, causality, political philosophy, ethics and business
ethics, and the philosophy of religion.
The son of a Church of England clergyman, and an
Anglican himself, Lucas describes himself as "a dyed-in-the-wool
traditional Englishman." He and Morar Portal have four children,
among them Edward Lucas, Central and
Eastern European correspondent of The Economist. Sartorially
independent, he had the cool-weather habit of wearing a tie over
his sweater and under a jacket.
In addition to his philosophical career, Lucas has a practical
interest in business ethics. He helped found the
Oxford Consumers' Group,[1] and was
its first Chairman in 1961-3, serving again in 1965.
Main philosophical
contributions
Free will
Lucas (1961) began a lengthy
and heated debate over the implications of
Gödel's incompleteness
theorems for the anthropic mechanism thesis, by
arguing that:[2]
- Determinism ↔
For any human h there exists at least one (deterministic)
logical system L(h) which
reliably predicts h's actions in all circumstances.
- For any logical system L a sufficiently skilled mathematical
logician (equipped with a sufficiently powerful computer if
necessary) can construct some statements T(L)
which are true but unprovable in L. (This follows from
Gödel's first theorem.)
- If a human m is a sufficiently skillful mathematical
logician (equipped with a sufficiently powerful computer if
necessary) then if m is given L(m), he
or she can construct T(L(m)) and
- Determine that they are true--which L(m)
cannot do.
- Hence L(m) does not reliably predict
m's actions in all circumstances.
- Hence m has free will.
- It is implausible that the qualitative difference between
mathematical logicians and the rest of the population is such that
the former have free will and the latter do not.
His argument was strengthened by the discovery by Hava Siegelmann
in the 1990s that sufficiently complex analog recurrent neural
networks were not Turing Machines[3]
Space, time and
causality
Lucas wrote several books on the philosophy of science and
space-time (see below). In A treatise on time and space he
introduced a transcendental derivation of the Lorenz
Transformations based on Red and Blue exchanging messages (in
Russian and Greek respectively) from their respective frames of
reference which demonstrates how these can be derived from a
minimal set of philosophical assumptions.
In The Future Lucas gives a detailed analysis of tenses
and time, arguing that "the Block universe gives a
deeply inadequate view of time. It fails to account for the passage
of time, the pre-eminence of the present, the directedness of time
and the difference between the future and the past"[4] and in
favour of a tree structure in which there is only one past or
present (at any given point in spacetime) but a large number of
possible futures. "We are by our own decisions in the face of other
men's actions and chance circumstances weaving the web of history
on the loom of natural necessity"[5]
Career
highlights
- 1942-7. Scholar of Winchester College
- 1947-51. Attended Balliol College, Oxford on a
scholarship.
- 1951. BA with 1st Class Honours, Greats.
- 1951-3. Harmsworth Senior Scholar, Merton College, Oxford.
- 1952. John Locke Scholarship, Oxford
University.
- 1953-6. Junior Research Fellow, Merton College, Oxford.
- 1956-9. Fellow and Assistant Tutor, Corpus Christi College,
Cambridge.
- 1957-8. Jane Eliza Procter Visiting Fellow, Princeton
University.
- 1959-60. Leverhulme Research Fellow, the University
of Leeds.
- 1960-96. Fellow and Tutor of Merton College, Oxford.
- 1988. Elected a Fellow of the British Academy.
- 1990-6. Reader in Philosophy, Oxford
University.
- 1991-3. President, British Society for the Philosophy of
Science.
Notes
Books
- 1966. Principles of Politics (edited). ISBN
0-19-824774-5
- 1970. The Concept of Probability. ISBN
0-19-824340-5
- 1970. The Freedom of the Will. ISBN 0-19-824343-X
- 1972. The Nature of
Mind. (with A. J. P. Kenny, H. C. Longuet-Higgins,
and C. H. Waddington; 1972 Gifford
Lectures) ISBN 0-85-224235-2
- 1973. The Development of
Mind. (with A. J. P. Kenny, H.C.Longet-Higgins, and
C.H.Waddington; 1973 Gifford Lectures) ISBN
0-85-224263-8
- 1973. A Treatise on Time and Space. ISBN
0-416-75070-2
- 1976. Essays on Freedom and Grace. ISBN
0-281-02932-6
- 1976. Democracy and Participation. ISBN
0-14-021882-3
- 1978. Butler's Philosophy of Religion Vindicated. ISBN
0-907078-06-0
- 1980. On Justice. ISBN 0-19-824598-X
- 1985. Space, Time and Causality (with Peter E.
Hodgson). ISBN 0-19-875057-9
- 1989. The Future. ISBN 0-631-16659-9
- 1990. Spacetime and Electromagnetism (with P. E.
Hodgson). ISBN 0-19-852038-7
- 1993. Responsibility. ISBN 0-19-823578-X
- 1997. Ethical Economics (with M. R. Griffiths). ISBN
0-312-16398-3
- 1999. Conceptual Roots of Mathematics. ISBN
0-415-20738-X
- 2003. An Engagement with Plato's Republic (with B.G.
Mitchell). ISBN 0-7546-3366-7
- 2006. Reason and Reality, freely available as a series
of .pdf files on Lucas's website (below).
External
links
| Persondata |
| NAME |
Lucas, John |
| ALTERNATIVE
NAMES |
|
| SHORT
DESCRIPTION |
British philosipher |
| DATE OF BIRTH |
18 June 1929 |
| PLACE OF
BIRTH |
|
| DATE OF DEATH |
|
| PLACE OF
DEATH |
|