MQV (Menezes-Qu-Vanstone) is an authenticated protocol for key agreement based on the Diffie-Hellman scheme. Like other authenticated Diffie-Hellman schemes, MQV provides protection against an active attacker. The protocol can be modified to work in an arbitrary finite group, and, in particular, elliptic curve groups, where it is known as elliptic curve MQV (ECMQV).
MQV was initially proposed by Menezes, Qu and Vanstone in 1995. It was modified with Law and Solinas in 1998. There are one-, two- and three-pass variants.
MQV is incorporated in the public-key standard IEEE P1363.
Some variants of MQV are claimed in patents assigned to Certicom [1].
MQV has some weaknesses that were fixed by HMQV in 2005 [2]; see [3], [4], [5] for an alternative viewpoint.
ECMQV has been dropped from the National Security Agency's Suite B set of cryptographic standards.
Both MQV and HMQV have weaknesses, that are fixed in the FHMQV protocol (see [6])
Contents |
Alice has a key pair (A,a) with A her public key and a her private key and Bob has the key pair (B,b) with B his public key and b his private key.
| Step | Operation |
|---|---|
| 1 | Alice generate a key pair (X,x) by generating randomly x and calculating X=xP with P a point on an elliptic curve. |
| 2 | Bob generate a key pair (Y,y) by the same way than Alice. |
| 3 | Now, Alice calculate Sa = x + Xa(mod n). and send X to Bob. |
| 4 | Bob calculate Sb = y + Xb(mod n).. |
| 5 | Alice calculate K = h *
Sa(X +
xL) and Bob calculate K = h *
Sa(Y +
yL) with xL and yL the first L
bits of x and y where
and where h is the cofactor (generally 4 for ECMQV) |
| 6 | The communication of secret K was successful |
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MQV (Menezes-Qu-Vanstone) is an authenticated protocol for key agreement based on the Diffie-Hellman scheme. MQV provides protection against an active attacker.
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