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I
The greatest of the Florentines has likened worldly fame to the
breath of the wind that blows now one way and now another way, and
changes name as it changes quarter. From every quarter and all the
points of the historical compass, veering gusts of public judgment
have carried incessantly along from country to country and from
generation to generation, with countless mutations of aspect and of
innuendo, the sinister renown of Machiavelli. Before he had been
dead fifty years, his name had become a byword and a proverb. From
Thomas Cromwell and Elizabeth; from the massacre of St.
Bartholomew, through League and Fronde, through Louis XIV.,
Revolution, and Empire, down to the third Napoleon and the days of
December; from the Lutheran Reformation down to the blood and iron
of Prince Bismarck; from Ferdinand the Catholic down to Don Carlos;
from the Sack of Rome down to Gioberti, Mazzini, and Cavour: in all
the great countries all over the West, this strange shade is seen
haunting men's minds; exciting, frightening, provoking, perplexing,
like some unholy necromancer bewildering reason and conscience by
paradox and riddle. So far from withering or fading, his repute and
his writing seem to attract deeper consideration as time goes on,
and they have never been objects of more copious attention
throughout Europe than in the half-century that is now closing.[1]
In the long and fierce struggle from the fifteenth century
onwards, among rival faiths and between contending forces in civil
government, Machiavelli was hated and attacked from every side. In
the great rising up of new types of life in the Church and of life
in the State, his name stood for something that partisans of old
and new alike abhorred. The Church at first tolerated, if it did
not even patronise, his writings; but soon, under the double stress
of the Reformation in Germany on the one hand, and the pagan
Renaissance in Italy on the other, it placed him in that Index of
forbidden books which now first (1557), in dread of the new art of
printing, crept into formal existence. Speedily he came to be
denounced as schismatical, heretical, perverse, the impious foe of
faith and truth. He was burnt in effigy. His book was denounced as
written with the very fingers of Satan himself. The vituperation of
the sixteenth century in the whole range of its controversies has
never been surpassed in any age either among learned or unlearned
men, and the dead Machiavelli came in for his full share of
unmeasured words. As Voltaire has said of Dante that his fame is
secure because nobody reads him, so in an inverse sense the bad
name of Machiavelli grew worse, because men reproached, confuted,
and cursed, but seldom read. Catholics attacked him as the enemy of
the Holy See, and Protestants attacked him because he looked to a
restoration of the spirit of ancient Rome, instead of a restoration
of the faith and discipline of the primitive Church. While both of
them railed against him, Catholic and Protestant each reviled the
other as Machiavellist. In France national prejudice against the
famous Italian queen-mother hit Machiavelli too, for his book was
declared to be the oracle of Catherine dei Medici, to whose father
it was dedicated; it was held responsible for the Huguenot wars and
the Bartholomew massacre. In Spain opposite ground was taken, and
he who elsewhere was blamed as the advocate of persecution, was
abominated here as the enemy of wars of religion, and the advocate
of that monstrous thing, civil toleration. In England, royalists
called him an atheist, and roundheads called him a Jesuit. A recent
German writer has noted three hundred and ninety-five references to
him in our Elizabethan literature, all fixing him with the craft,
malice, and hypocrisy of the Evil One.[2] Everybody
knows how Hudibras finds in his Christian name the origin of our
domestic title for the devil, though scholars have long taught us
to refer it to Nyke, the water-goblin of Norse mythology.[3]
Some divines scented mischief in the comparative method, and
held up their hands at the impudent wickedness that dared to find a
parallel between people in the Bible and people in profane history,
between King David and Philip of Macedon. Whenever a bad name
floated into currency, it was flung at Machiavelli, and his own
name was counted among the worst that could be flung at a bad man.
Averroes for a couple of centuries became a conventional label for
a scoffer and an atheist; and Machiavelli, though he cared no more
for the abstract problems that exercised the Moslem thinker, than
he would have cared for the inward sanctities of Thomas à Kempis,
was held up to odium as an Averroist. The
Annals of Tacitus were discovered: his dark ironies on Tiberius
and the rest did not prevent one school of politicians from
treating his book as a manual for tyrants, while another school
applied it against the Holy Roman Empire; his name was caught up in
the storms of the hour, and Machiavellism and Tacitism became
convertible terms.[4]
It is not possible here to follow the varying fates of
Machiavelli's name and books.[5] The tale of
Machiavellian criticism in our own century is a long one. That
criticism has followed the main stream of political events in
continental Europe; for it is events after all that make the
fortune of books. Revolution in France, unification in Italy,
unification in Germany, the disappearance of the Temporal Power,
the principle of Nationality, the idea of the Armed People, have
all in turn raised the questions to which Machiavelli gave such
daring point. On the medallion that commemorates him in the church
of Santa Croce at Florence, are the words, Tanto nomini nullum
par elogium, So great a name no praise can match. We only need
to think of Michelangelo and Galileo reposing near him, in order to
realise the extravagance of such a phrase, and to understand that
reaction in his favour has gone almost as intolerably far as the
old diatribes against him.
It may be doubted whether in this country Machiavelli has ever
been widely read, though echoes have been incessant. Thomas
Cromwell, the powerful minister of Henry VII., the malleus
monachorum, told Cardinal Pole that he had better fling aside
dreamers like Plato, and read a new book by an ingenious Italian
who treated the arts of government practically. Cromwell in his
early wanderings had been more than once in Italy, and he was
probably at Florence at the very time when Machiavelli was writing
his books at his country farm.[6] But a more
shining figure in English history than Cromwell, was even more
profoundly attracted by the genius of Machiavelli; this was Bacon.
It was natural for that vast and comprehensive mind to admire the
extension to the sphere of civil government of the same method that
he was advocating in the investigation of external nature. 'We are
much beholden,' Bacon said, 'to Machiavel and others that wrote
what men do, and not what they ought to do.' The rejection of a
priori and abstract principles, and of authority as the test
of truth; the substitution of chains of observed fact for syllogism
with major premiss unproved—-such a revolution in method could not
be reserved for one department of thought. Bacon's references are
mainly to the Discourses and not to the
Prince, but
he had well digested both.[7] The Essays bear the impress of Machiavelli's
positive spirit, and Bacon's ideal of history is his. 'Its true
office is to represent the events themselves, together with the
counsels, and to leave the observations and conclusions thereupon
to the liberty and faculty of every man's judgment.' His own
history of Henry VIII. is a good example of such a life as
Machiavelli would have written of such a hero.[8]
The most powerful English thinker of Machiavelli's political
school is Hobbes. He drew similar lessons from a similar
experience—the distractions of Civil War at home, and the growth,
which he watched during many years of exile, of centralised
monarchy abroad. Less important is Harrington, whose
Oceana or model of a commonwealth was once so famous, and
is in truth one of the most sensible productions of that kind of
literature. Harrington travelled in Italy, was much at home with
Italian politics and books on politics, and perhaps studied
Machiavelli more faithfully than any other of his countrymen. He
tells us, writing after the Restoration, that his works had then
fallen into neglect.[9] Clarendon has a remarkable
passage (Hist., bk. X. §169) vindicating Machiavelli
against the ill name that he had got from people who did not well
consider his words and his drift, and applying judicially enough
the Italian's view of Borgia to our great Oliver and his
counsellors. Scattered through the Patriot King and other
writings of Bolingbroke are half a dozen references to
Machiavelli,[10] but they have the air, to use a
phrase of Bacon's, of being but cloves stuck in to spice the dish;
the Italian's pregnant thinking has no serious place in an author
whose performances are little more than splendid beating of the
wind. Hume had evidently read the Discourses, the
Prince, and the History of Florence, with
attention; and with his usual faculty for hitting the nail on the
head, he avows a suspicion that the world is still too young to fix
many general truths in politics. We have not as yet had experience
of three thousand years. We do not know, says Hume, of what great
changes human nature may show itself susceptible, nor what great
revolutions may come about in men's customs and principles.[11]
Benjamin Constant said there were only two books that he had
read with pleasure since the Revolution, the Memoirs of
Cardinal de Retz and Machiavelli's History of
Florence. It would take a long chapter to draw a full
comparison between Machiavelli and Montesquieu, who was undoubtedly
set by him on some trains of thinking both in his short book on the
Romans, and his more memorable one on Laws. It may be too much to
say, as some critics have said, that all the great modern ideas
have their beginning in Montesquieu. But this at least is true
among other marked claims to be made for him, that in spite of much
looseness of definition and a thousand imperfections in detail, he
launched effectually on European thought the conception of social
phenomena as being no less subject to general laws than all other
phenomena. Of a fundamental extension of this kind, Machiavelli was
in every way incapable, nor did the state of any of the sciences at
that date permit it. As for secondary differences, it is enough to
say that Machiavelli put the level of human character low, and
Montesquieu put it high; that one was always looking to fact, the
other to idea; that one was sombre, the other buoyant, cheerful,
and an optimist; Montesquieu confident in the moral forces of
mankind, Machiavelli leaving moral forces vague, not knowing where
to look for them. Finally, 'Montesquieu's book is a study,
Machiavelli's is a political act, an attempt at political
resurrection.'[12]
II
Machiavelli was born in 1469 (two years later than Erasmus), and
when he turned to serious writing, he was five-and-forty. His life
had been interesting and important. For fifteen years he held the
post of secretary of one of the departments in the government of
Florence, where he was brought into close relations with some of
the most remarkable personages and events of his time. He went four
times on a mission to the King of France; he was with Cæsar Borgia
in the ruthless campaign of 1502; he did the business of his
republic with Pope Julius II. at Rome, and with the Emperor
Maximilian at Innsbruck. The modern practice of resident
ambassadors had not yet established itself in the European system,
and Machiavelli was never more than an envoy of secondary rank.[13] But he was in personal
communication with sovereigns and ministers, and he was a watchful
observer of all their ways and motives. We need not here concern
ourselves with the thousand chances and changes of Italian policies
in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In the long struggle
between freedom and tyranny in his native Florence, Machiavelli
belonged to the popular party. When they fell in 1512, and the
Medici came back, he was turned out of his post, thrown into
prison, put to the question with ropes and pulleys according to the
hard fashion of the time, shared the benefit of the amnesty
accorded when Leo X. ascended the papal throne, and then withdrew
to San Casciano. This was the time when he composed most of the
writings that have made him famous. Here is his picture of himself,
in a letter to a friend (December 10, 1513):—
- 'I am at my farm; and, since my last misfortunes, have
not been in Florence twenty days. I rise with the sun, and go into
a wood of mine that is being cut, where I remain two hours
inspecting the work of the previous day and conversing with the
woodcutters, who have always some trouble on hand among themselves
or with their neighbours. When I leave the wood, I proceed to a
well, and thence to the place which I use for snaring birds, with a
book under my arm—Dante, or Petrarch, or one of the minor poets,
like Tibullus or Ovid. I read the story of their passions, and let
their loves remind me of my own, which is a pleasant pastime for a
while. Next I take the road, enter the inn door, talk with the
passers-by, inquire the news of the neighbourhood, listen to a
variety of matters, and make note of the different tastes and
humours of men. This brings me to dinner-time, when I join my
family and eat the poor produce of my farm. After dinner I go back
to the inn, where I generally find the host and a butcher, a
miller, and a pair of bakers. With these companions I play the fool
all day at cards or backgammon: a thousand squabbles, a thousand
insults and abusive dialogues take place, while we haggle over a
farthing, and shout loud enough to be heard from San Casciano. But
when evening falls, I go home and enter my writing-room. On the
threshold I put off my country habit, filthy with mud and mire, and
array myself in royal courtly garments; thus worthily attired, I
make my entrance into the ancient courts of the men of old, where
they receive me with love, and where I feed upon that food which
only is my own, and for which I was born. I feel no shame in
conversing with them and asking them the reason of their actions.
They, moved by their humanity, make answer; for four hours' space I
feel no annoyance, I forget all care; poverty cannot frighten, nor
death appal me. I am carried away to their society. And since Dante
says "that there is no science unless we retain what we have
learned," I have set down what I have gained from their discourse,
and composed a treatise, De Principatibus, in which I
enter as deeply as I can into the science of the subject, with
reasonings on the nature of principality, its several species, and
how they are acquired, how maintained, how lost. If you ever liked
any of my scribblings, this ought to suit your taste. To a prince,
and especially to a new prince, it ought to prove acceptable.
Therefore I am dedicating it to the Magnificence of Giuliano.'[14]
Machiavelli was not meant either by temperament or principle to
be a willing martyr. Not for him was the stern virtue of Dante, who
accepted lifelong exile rather than restoration with dishonour,
content from any corner of the earth to wonder at the sun and the
stars, and under any sky to meditate all sweetest truths (le
dolcissime verità). Not for the ambitious and practical
politician was the choice of Savonarola, who at the moment when
Machiavelli was crossing the threshold of public life, had taken
death by its savage hand, rather than cease from his warnings, that
no good could come to Florence were it not from the fear of God and
the reform of manners. Nobody had in him less of the Stoic than
Machiavelli; his character was no more austere than the Italian
morality of his day; his purse was painfully lean; his active and
restless mind sulfered from that 'malady of lost power' which is
apt to afflict members of Opposition, and he longed to be back in
the business of the State. So he dedicated his book to Lorenzo, in
the hope that such speaking proof of experience and capacity would
induce those who had destroyed the freedom of his city, to give him
public employment. His suppleness did not pay. Nothing came of the
dedication for several years. Then some trivial duties were found
for Machiavelli, and one important literary task was intrusted to
him, the history of Florence. This he completed and dedicated to
Clement VII. in 1525. To the same period belongs a comedy, which
some have described as worthy of Aristophanes and hardly second to
Molière's Tartufe. Like Bacon and some others who
have written the shrewdest things on human conduct and the arts of
success, he had made but a sorry mess of his own chances and gifts.
It must always interest us to watch how men take ill usage from the
world, and sad ironical miscarriages of life. Machiavelli's was one
of those grave intellects, apt for serious thought, yet that easily
turn to levity; console themselves for failure by mockery of
themselves; and repay Fortune with her own banter. This is the vein
of the brilliant burlesque and satire, with which this versatile
genius diversified his closing days. Still, with indomitable
perseverance he clung to public things, and he now composed the
dialogues on the Art of War, to induce his
countrymen to substitute for mercenary armies a national
militia—to-day one of the organic ideas of the European system.
Amo la patria mia più dell' anima, he wrote to a friend
just before his death, and one view of Machiavelli is that he was
ever the lion masquerading in the fox's skin, an impassioned
patriot, under all his craft and all his bitter mockery. Even
Mazzini—so little a disciple of his that he explained the ruin of
Italy by the disastrous fact of Machiavelli having prevailed over
Dante—admits that he had 'a profoundly Italian heart.' In 1527 he
died. The Prince was not printed and published until five
years later.
Machiavelli's active life, then, was passed in council-chambers,
camps, courts. He pondered over all that he had seen in the light
of such antique books as he had read,—Livy, Polybius, Tacitus, some
portion of Aristotle's Politics, Dante, Petrarch,
Cicero's Offices, Caesar, Latin Poets, extracts from
Thucydides (probably in Latin versions). He owns his debt to
ancient writers, and in a sense nobody borrowed more, yet few are
more original. If he had mastered Thucydides, he would have
recalled that first great chapter in European literature, still
indeed the greatest in its kind, of reflections on a revolution,
where with incomparable insight and fidelity the historian analyses
the demoralisation of the Hellenic world as it lay, like the
Italian world long ages after, a prey to intestine faction and the
ruinous invocation of foreign aid.[15] These
terrible calamities, says Thucydides (iii. 82–84), always have been
and always will be, so long as human nature remains the same. Words
cease to have the same relations to things, and their meanings are
changed to suit the ingenuities of enterprise and the atrocities of
revenge. Frantic energy is the quality most valued, and the man of
violence is the man who is trusted. The simplicity that is a chief
ingredient of a noble nature, men laugh to scorn. Inferior
intellects succeed best. Revenge becomes dearer than
self-preservation, and men actually have a sweeter pleasure in the
revenge that goes with perfidy, than if it were open. All this was
just as true of Florence in the sixteenth century, as it was of
Athens, Corinth, and Corcyra in the fifth century before Christ.
The postulate of Thucydides, that human nature should remain the
same, still held good, as it has indeed held good at many a stormy
period since, the social progress of the ages notwithstanding.
Whether the moral state of Italy was intrinsically and
substantially worse than that of other European nations, is a
question which those who know most, are least disposed to answer
offhand.[16] Machiavelli was as little
capable of the fine and true saying of the Greek historian about
Simplicity, as he was of the Greek poet's famous lines about love
of power against right.[17] Still Italy presents some
peculiarities that shed over her civilisation at this time a
curious and deadly iridescence. Passions moved in strange orbits.
Private depravity and political debasement went with one of the
most brilliant intellectual awakenings in the history of the
western world. Selfishness, violence, craft, and corruption
darkened and defiled the administration of sacred things. If
politics were divorced from morals, so was theology. Modern
conscience is shocked by the resort to hired crime and stealthy
assassination, especially by poison. Mariana, the famous Spanish
Jesuit, tells us (De Rege, i. 7) that when he was teaching
theology in Sicily (1567), a certain young prince asked him whether
it was lawful to slay a tyrant by poison. The theologian did not
find it easy to draw a distinction between poison and steel, but at
last he fell upon a reason (and a most absurd reason it was) for
his decision that a poniard is permitted and white powder is
forbidden. What distinguishes the Italian Renaissance from such
epochs of luxury and corruption as the French Regency, is this
contempt of human life, the fury of private revenge, the spirit of
atrocious faithlessness and crime. 'Italian society admired the
bravo almost as much as Imperial Rome admired the gladiator: it
assumed that genius combined with force of character released men
from the shackles of ordinary morality.' Only a giant like
Michelangelo escaped the deadly climate. We see the violence of
Michelangelo's sublime despair in the immortal marbles of the
Medicean chapel, executed while Machiavelli was still
alive—Lorenzo, nephew of Pope Leo X., and father of Catherine dei
Medici, silent, pensive, finger upon lip, seeming to meditate under
the shadow of his helmet some stroke of dubious war or craft, while
the sombre superhuman figures of Night and Dawn and Day proclaim
'it is best to sleep and be of stone, not to see and not to feel,
while such misery and shame endure.'
Machiavelli's merit in the history of political literature is
his method. We may smile at the uncritical simplicity with which he
discusses Romulus and Remus, Moses, Cyrus, and Theseus, as if they
were all astute politicians of Florentine faction. He recalls the
orator in the French Constituent Assembly who proposed to send to
Crete for an authentic copy of the laws of Minos. But he withdrew
politics from scholasticism, and based their consideration upon
observation and experience. It is quite true that he does not
classify his problems; he does not place them in their proper
subordination to one another; he often brings together facts that
are not of the same order and do not support the same
conclusion.[18] Nothing, again, is easier than
to find contradictions in Machiavelli. He was a man of the world
reflecting over the things that he had seen in public life; more
systematic than observers like Retz or Commynes—whom good critics
call the French Machiavelli—but not systematic as Hobbes is. Human
things have many sides and many aspects, and an observant man of
the world does not confine himself to one way of looking at them,
from fear of being thought inconsistent. To put on the blinkers of
system was alien to his nature and his object. Contradictions were
inevitable, but the general texture of his thought is close
enough.[19]
Machiavelli was not the first of his countrymen to write down
thoughts on the problems of the time, though it has been observed
that he is the first writer, still celebrated, 'who discussed grave
questions in modern language' (Mackintosh). Apart from Dante and
Petrarch, various less famous men had theorised about affairs of
state. Guicciardini, the contemporary and friend of Machiavelli,
like him a man of public business and of the world, composed
observations on government, of which Cavour said that they showed a
better comprehension of affairs than did the author of the
Prince and the Discourses. But then the latter
had the better talent of writing. One most competent Italian critic
calls his prose 'divine,'[20] and a foreigner has perhaps no
right to differ; only what word is then left for the really great
writers, who to intellectual strength add moral grandeur? Napoleon
hated a general who made mental pictures of what he saw, instead of
looking at the thing clearly as through a field-glass.
Machiavelli's is the style of the field-glass. 'I want to write
something,' he said, 'that may be useful to the understanding man;
it seems better for me to go behind to the real truth of things,
rather than to a fancy picture.' Every sentence represents a
thought or a thing. He is never open to the reproach thrown by
Aristotle at Plato: 'This is to talk poetic metaphor.' As has been
said much less truly of Montesquieu, reflection is not broken by
monuments and landscapes. He has the highest of all the virtues
that prose-writing can possess—save the half-dozen cases in
literature of genius with unconquerable wings,—he is simple,
unaffected, direct, vivid, and rational. He possesses that truest
of all forms of irony, which consists in literal statement, and of
which you are not sure whether it is irony or naïveté. He
disentangles his thought from the fact so skilfully and so clean,
that it looks almost obvious. Nobody has ever surpassed him in the
power of throwing pregnant vigour into a single concentrated word.
Of some pages it has been well said that they are written with the
point of a stiletto. He uses few of our loud easy words of praise
and blame, he is not often sorry or glad, he does not smile and he
does not scold, he is seldom indignant and he is never surprised.
He has not even our mastering human infirmity of trying to
persuade. His business is that of the clinical lecturer, explaining
the nature of the malady, the proper treatment, the chances of
recovery. He strips away the flowing garments of convention and
commonplace; closes his will against sympathy and feeling; ignores
pity as an irrelevance, just as the operating surgeon does. In the
phrase about Fontenelle, he shows as good a heart as can be made
out of brains. What concerns Machiavelli, the Italian critic truly
says, 'is not a thing being reasonable, or moral, or beautiful, but
that it is.' Yet at the bottom of all the con- fused clamour
against him, people knew what they meant, and their instinct was
not unsound. Mankind, and well they know it, are far too profoundly
concerned in right and wrong, in mercy and cruelty, in justice and
oppression, to favour a teacher who, even for a scientific purpose
of his own, forgets the awful difference. Commonplace, after all,
is exactly what contains the truths that are indispensable.
III
Like most of those who take a pride in seeing human nature as it
is, Machiavelli only saw half of it. We must remember the
atmosphere of craft, suspicion, fraud, violence, in which he had
moved, with Borgias, Medici, Pope Julius, Maximilian, Louis XII.,
and the reckless factions of Florence. His estimate was low.
Mankind, he says, are more prone to evil than to good. We may say
this of them generally, that they are ungrateful, fickle,
deceivers, greedy of gain, runaways before peril. While you serve
them, they are all yours—lives, goods, children—so long as no
danger is at hand: when the hour of need draws nigh, they turn
their backs. They are readier to seek revenge for wrong, than to
prove gratitude for service: as Tacitus says of people who lived in
Italy long ages before, readier to pay back injury than kindness.
Men never do anything good, unless they are driven; and where they
have their choice, and can use what licence they will, all is
filled with disorder and confusion. They are taken in by
appearances. They follow the event. They easily become corrupted.
Their will is weak. They know not how to be either thoroughly good
or thoroughly bad; they vacillate between; they take middle paths,
the worst of all. Men are a little breed.[21]
All this is not satire, it is not misanthropy; it is the student
of the art of government, thinking over the material with which he
has to deal. These judgments of Machiavelli have none of the wrath
of Juvenal, none of the impious truculence of Swift. They cut
deeper into simple reality than polished oracles from the moralists
of the boudoir. They have not the bitterness that hides in the
laugh of Molière, nor the chagrin and disdain with which Pascal
broods over unhappy man and his dark lot. Least of all are they the
voice of the preacher calling sinners to repentance. The tale is
only a rather grim record, from inspection, of the foundations on
which the rulers of states must do their best to build.
Goethe's maxim that, if you would improve a man, it is no bad
thing to let him suppose that you already think him that which you
would have him to be, would have seemed to Machiavelli as foolish
for his purpose as if you were to furnish an architect with clay,
and bid him to treat it as if it were iron. He will suffer no
abstraction to interrupt positive observation.[22] Man is
what he is, and so he needs to be bitted and bridled with laws, and
new and again to be treated to a stiff dose of 'medicine
forti,' in the shape of fire, bullet, axe, halter, and
dungeon. At any rate, Machiavelli does not leave human nature out,
and this is one secret of his hold. It is not with pale opinion
that he argues, it is passions and interests in all the flush of
action. It is, in truth, in every case,—Burke, Rousseau,
Tocqueville, Hobbes, Bentham, Mill, and the rest—always the
moralist who interests men most within the publicist. Machiavelli
was assuredly a moralist, though of a peculiar sort, and this is
what makes him, as he has been well called, a contemporary of every
age and a citizen of all countries.
To the question whether the world grows better or worse,
Machiavelli gave an answer that startles an age like ours,
subsisting on its faith in progress. The world, he says, neither
grows better nor worse; it is always the same. Human fortunes are
never still; they are every moment either going up or sinking down.
Yet among all nations and states, the same desires, the same
humours prevail; they are what they always were. Men are for
travelling on the beaten track. Diligently study bygone things, and
in every State you will be able to discover the things to come. All
the things that have been, may be again. Just as the modern
physicist tells us that neither physical nor chemical
transformation changes the mass nor the weight of any quantity of
matter, so Machiavelli judged the good and evil in the world to be
ever identical.
'This bad and this good shift from land to land,' he says, 'as
we may see from ancient empires; they rose and fell with the
changes of their usage, but the world remained as it was. The only
difference was that it concentrated its power (virtù) in
Assyria, then in Media, then in Persia, until at last it came to
Italy and Rome.'
In our age, when we think of the chequered course of human time,
of the shocks of irreconcilable civilisation, of war, trade,
faction, revolution, empire, laws, creeds, sects, we look for a
clue to the vast maze of historic and pre-historic fact.
Machiavelli seeks no clue to his distribution of good and evil. He
seeks no moral interpretation for the mysterious scroll. We obey
laws that we do not know, but cannot resist. We can only make an
effort to seize events as they whirl by; to extort from them a
maxim, a precept, or a principle, that may serve our immediate
turn. Fortune, he says,—that is, Providence, or else Circumstance,
or the Stars,—is mistress of more than half we do. What is her deep
secret, he shows no curiosity to fathom. He contents himself with a
maxim for the practical man (Prince,
XXV.),—that it is better to be adventurous than cautious,
for Fortune is a woman, and to master her, she must be boldly
handled.
Whatever force or law may control this shifting distribution of
imperial destinies, nothing, said Machiavelli, could prevent any
native of Italy or of Greece, unless the Greek had turned Turk, or
the Italian Transalpine, from blaming his own time and praising the
glories of time past. 'What,' he cries, 'can redeem an age from the
extremity of misery, shame, reproach, where there is no regard to
religion, to laws, to arms, where all is tainted and tarnished with
every foulness. And these vices are all the more hateful, as they
most abound in those who sit in the judgment-seat, are men's
masters, and seek men's reverence. I, at all events,' he concludes,
with a glow that almost recalls the moving close of the
Agricola, 'shall make bold to say how I regard old times
and new, so that the minds of the young who shall read these
writings of mine, may shun the new examples and follow old. For it
is the duty of a good man, at least to strive that he may teach to
others those sound lessons which the spite of time or fortune hath
hindered him from executing, so that many having learned them, some
better loved by heaven may one day have power to apply them.'
What were the lessons? They were in fact only one, that the
central secret of the ruin and distraction of Italy was weakness of
will, want of fortitude, force, and resolution. The abstract
question of the best form of government—perhaps the most barren of
all the topics that have ever occupied speculative minds—was with
Machiavelli strictly secondary. He saw small despotic states
harried by their petty tyrants, he saw republics worn out by
faction and hate. Machiavelli himself had faith in free republics
as the highest type of government; but whether you have republic or
tyranny matters less, he seems to say, than that the governing
power should be strong in the force of its own arms, intelligent,
concentrated, resolute. We might say of him that he is for half his
time engaged in examining the fitness of means to other people's
ends, himself neutral. But then, as nature used to be held to abhor
a vacuum, so the impatience of man is loth to tolerate neutrality.
He has been charged with inconsistency, because in the Prince he
lays down the conditions on which an absolute ruler, rising to
power by force of genius backed by circumstance, may maintain that
power with safety to himself and most advantage to his subjects;
while in the Discourses he examines the rules that enable
a self-governing State to retain its freedom. The cardinal precepts
are the same. In either ease, the saving principle is one:
self-sufficiency, military strength, force, flexibility,
address,—above all, no half-measures. In either case, the
preservation of the State is equally the one end, reason of State
equally the one adequate test and justification of the means. The
Prince deals with one problem, the Discourses
with the other, but the spring of Machiavelli's political
inspirations is the same, to whatever type of rule they are
applied—the secular State supreme; self-interest and self-regard
avowed as the single principles of State action; material force the
master key to civil policy. Clear intelligence backed by unsparing
will, unflinching energy, remorseless vigour, the brain to plan and
the hand to strike—here is the salvation of States, whether
monarchies or republics. The spirit of humility and resignation
that Christianity had brought into the world, he contemns and
repudiates. That whole scheme of the Middle Ages in which invisible
powers rule all our mortal affairs, he dismisses. Calculation,
courage, fit means for resolute ends, human force,—only these can
rebuild a world in ruins.[23]
Some will deem it inconsistent, that with so few illusions about
the weaknesses of human nature, yet he should have been so firm, in
what figures in current democracy as trust in the people. Like
Aristotle, he held the many to be in the long-run the best judges;
but, unlike Goethe, who said that the public is always in a state
of self-delusion about details though scarcely ever about broad
truths, Machiavelli declared that the public may go wrong about
generalities, while as to particulars they are usually right.[24] The people are less ungrateful
than a prince, and where they are ungrateful, it is from less
dishononrable motive. The multitude is wiser and more constant than
a prince. Furious and uncontrolled multitudes go wrong, but then so
do furious and uncontrolled princes. Both err, when not held back
by fear of consequences. The people are fickle and thankless, but
so are princes. 'As for prudence and stability, I say that a people
is more prudent, more stable, and of better judgment than a
prince.' Never let a prince, he said—and perhaps we might say,
never let a parliament—complain of the faults of a people under his
rule, for they are due either to his own negligence, or else to his
own example, and if you consider a people given to robbery and
outrages against law, you will generally find that they only copy
their masters. Above all and in any case the ruler, whether
hereditary or an usurper, can have no safety unless he founds
himself on popular favour and goodwill. This he repeats a hundred
times. 'Better far than any number of fortresses, is not to be
hated by your people.'
It is then to the free Roman commonwealth that Machiavelli would
turn his countrymen. In that strong respect for law, that devotion
to country, that unquailing courage, that energy of purpose, which
has been truly called the essence of free Rome, he found the
pattern that he wanted. Modern Germans, for good reasons of their
own, have taken to praise him, but Machiavelli has nothing to do
with that most brilliant of German scholars, who idolises Julius
Cæsar, then despatches Cato as a pedant and Cicero as a coxcomb.
You will hardly find in Machiavelli a good word for any destroyer
of a free government. Let nobody, he says, be cheated by the glory
of Cæsar. Historians have been spoiled by his success, and by the
duration of the empire that continued his name. If you will only
follow the history of the empire, then will you soon know, with a
vengeance, what is the debt of Rome, Italy, and the world, to
Cæsar.
Nobody has stated the argument against the revolutionary
dictator more clearly or tersely than Machiavelli. He applauded the
old Romans because their policy provided by a regular ordinance for
an emergency, by the institution of a constitutional dictator for a
fixed term, and to meet a definite occasion. 'In a republic nothing
should be left to extraordinary modes of government; because though
such a mode may do good for the moment, still the example does
harm, seeing that a practice of breaking the laws for good ends
lends a colour to breaches of law for ends that are bad.' Occasions
no doubt arise when no ordinary means will produce reform, and then
you must have recourse to violence and arms: a man must make
himself supreme. But then, unfortunately, if he make himself
supreme by violence, he is probably a bad man, for by such means a
good man will not consent to climb to power. No more will a bad man
who has become supreme in this way be likely to use his ill-gotten
power for good ends. Here is the eternal dilemma of a State in
convulsion. (Disc. i. 34, 18, 10; ii. 2.)
He forbids us in any case to call it virtue to slay
fellow-citizens, to betray friends, to be without faith, without
mercy, without religion; such practices may win empire, but not
fair fame. A prince who clears out a population—here we may think
of James 1. and Cromwell in Ireland, and the authors of many a
sweeping clearance since—and transplants them from province to
province, as a herdsman moves his flock, does what is most cruel,
most alien, not only to Christianity, but to common humanity. Far
better for a man to choose a private life, than be a king on the
terms of making havoc such as this with the lives of other men
(Disc. i. 26).
IV
It may be true, as Danton said, that 'twere better to be a poor
fisherman than to meddle with the government of men. Yet nations
and men find themselves inexorably confronted by the practical
question. Government they must find. Given a corrupt, a divided, a
distracted community, how are you to restore it? The last chapter
of the Prince is an eloquent appeal to the representative
of the House of Medici to heal the bruises and bind up the wounds
of his torn and enslaved country. The view has been taken[25] that this last chapter has
nothing to do with the fundamental ideas of the book; that its glow
is incompatible with the iron harshness of all that has gone
before; that it was an afterthought, dictated partly by
Machiavelli's personal hopes, and then picked up later by his
defenders as whitewashing guilty maxims by ascribing them to large
and lofty purpose. The balance of argument seems on the whole to
lean this way, and Machiavelli for five-and-twenty chapters was
thinking of new princes generally, and not of a great Italian
deliverer. Yet he was not a man cast in a single mould. It may be
that on reviewing his chapters, his heart became suddenly alive to
their frigidity, and that the closing words flowed from the deeps
of what was undoubtedly sincere and urgent feeling.
However this may be, whether the whole case of Italy, or the
special case of any new prince, was in his contemplation, the
quality of the man required is drawn in four chapters (XV.–XVIII.)
with piercing eye and a hand that does not flinch. The ruler's
business is to save the State. He cannot practise all virtues,
first because he is not very likely to possess them, and next
because, where so many people are bad, he would not be a match for
the world if he were perfectly good. Still he should be on his
guard against all vices, so far as possible; he should scrupulously
abstain from every vice that might endanger his government. There
are two ways of carrying on the light—one by laws, the other by
force. The first is the proper and peculiar distinction of man; the
second is the mark of the brute. As the first is not always enough,
you must sometimes resort to the second. You must be both lion and
fox, and the man who is only lion cannot be wise. A wise prince
neither can, nor ought to, keep his word, when to keep his word
would injure either himself or the State, or when the reasons that
made him give a promise have passed away. If men were all good, a
maxim like this would be bad; but as men are inclined to evil, and
would not all keep faith with you, why should you keep faith with
them? Nostra cattività, la lor—our badness, their badness
(Mandrag. ii. 6). There are some good qualities that the
new ruler need not have; yet he should seem to have them. It is
well to appear merciful, faithful, religious, and it is well to be
so. Religion is the most necessary of all for a prince to seek
credit for. But the new prince should know how to change to the
contrary of all these things, when they are in the way of the
public good. For it is frequently necessary for the upholding of
the State—and here is the sentence that has done so much to damn
its writer—to go to work against faith, against charity, against
humanity, against religion. It is not possible for a new prince to
observe all the rules for which men are reckoned good.
The property of his subjects he will most carefully leave alone;
a man will sooner forgive the slaying of his father than the
confiscation of his patrimony. He should try to have a character
for mercy, but this should never be allowed to prevent severity on
just occasion. He must bear in mind the good saying reported in
Livy, that many people know better how to keep themselves from
doing wrong, than how to correct the wrong-doing of others. Never
ought he to let excess of trust make him careless, nor excess of
distrust to make him intolerable. He would be lucky if he could
make himself both loved and feared; but if circumstance should
force a choice, then of the two he had better be feared. To be
feared is not the same as to be hated, and the two things to be
most diligently avoided of all are hatred on the one hand, and
contempt on the other.
Test there is none, save reason of State. We should never
condemn a man for extraordinary acts to which he has been compelled
to resort in establishing his empire or founding a republic. In a
case where the safety of a country is concerned, whether it be
princedom or republic, no regard is to be paid to justice or
injustice, to pity or severity, to glory or shame; every other
consideration firmly thrust aside, that course alone is to be
followed which may preserve to the country its existence and its
freedom. Diderot pithily put the superficial impression of all
this, when he said that you might head these chapters as 'The
circumstances under which it is right for a Prince to be a
Scoundrel.' A profounder commentary of a concrete kind is furnished
by Mommsen's account of Sulla[26]—an
extraordinary literary masterpiece, even in the view of those who
think its politics most perverse. Such a Sulla was the real type of
Machiavelli's reformer of a rotten State.
It has been a commonplace of reproachful criticism that
Machiavelli should have chosen for his hero Cæsar Borgia.[27] Not only was Borgia a monster,
it is said, but he failed. For little more than four years the
baleful meteor flamed across the sky, then vanished. If only
success should command admiration, Borgia and his swiftly shattered
fortunes might well be indifferent to Machiavelli and the world for
which he was writing. What Machiavelli says is this—'I put him
forward, as a model for such as climb to power by good fortune and
the help of others. He did everything that a long-headed and
capable man could do, who desires to strike root. I will show you
how broad were the foundations that he laid for the fabric of his
future power. I do not know what better lessons I could teach a new
prince (i.e. an usurper) than his example. True, what he
did failed in the end; that was due to the extreme malignity of
fortune.' He makes no hero of him, except as a type of character
well fitted for a given task.
Machiavelli knew him at close quarters.[28] He was
sent on a mission to Borgia in the crisis of his fortunes, and he
thought that he discerned in Cæsar those very qualities of action,
force, combat, calculation, resolution, that the weakness of the
age required. Machiavelli was in his train when terrible things
were done. Cæsar was close, solitary, secret, quick. When any
business is on foot, said Machiavelli, he knows nothing of rest or
weariness or risk. He no sooner reached a place, than you heard
that he had left it. He was loved by his troopers, for though he
meted stern punishment for an offence against discipline, he was
liberal in pay and put little restraint on freedom. Though no
talker, yet when he had to make a case he was so pressing and
fluent, that it was hard to find an answer. He was a great judge of
occasion. Bold, crafty, resolute, deep, and above all well known
never to forget or forgive an injury, he fascinated men with the
terror of the basilisk. His firm maxim was to seek order by giving
his new subjects a good and firm government, including a civil
tribunal with a just president. Remiro was his first governor in
the Romagna. It is uncertain how Remiro incurred his master's
displeasure, but one morning Machiavelli walked out into the
market-place at Cesena, and saw Remiro, as he puts it, in two
pieces, his head on a lance, and his body still covered with his
fine clothes, resting on a block with a blood-stained axe by the
side of it. His captains, beginning to penetrate Cæsar's designs,
and fearing that he would seize their petty dominions one by
one—like the leaves of an artichoke, as he said—revolted.
Undaunted, he gathered new forces. Fresh bands of mercenaries
flocked to the banners of a chief who had money, skill, and a happy
star. The conspirators were no match for him in swiftness,
activity, or resource; they allowed him to sow the seeds of
disunion; he duped them into making a convention with him, which
they had little thought of keeping. Everybody who knew his
revengeful and implacable spirit was sure that the conspirators
were doomed. When Machiavelli came near one of them he felt, he
says, the deadly odour of a corpse. With many arts, the duke got
them to meet him at Sinigaglia. He received their greetings
cordially, pressed their hands, and gave them the accolade. They
all rode into the town together, talking of military things. Cæsar
courteously invited them to enter the palace, then he quitted them
and they were forthwith seized. 'I doubt if they will be alive
tomorrow morning,' the Florentine secretary wrote without emotion
to his government. They went through some form of trial, before
daybreak two of them were strangled, and two others shared the same
fate as soon as Cæsar was sure that the Pope had carried out his
plans for making away by poison with the Cardinal who headed the
rebellious faction at Rome.
Let us pause for a moment. One of the victims of Sinigaglia was
Oliverotto da Fermo. His story is told in the eighth chapter of the
Prince. He had been brought up from childhood by an uncle;
he went out into the world to learn military service; in course of
time, one day he wrote to his uncle at Fermo that he should like
once more to see him and his paternal city, and, by way of showing
his good compatriots that he had won some honour in his life, he
proposed to bring a hundred horsemen in his company. He came, and
was honourably received. He invited his uncle and the chief men of
Fermo to a feast, and when the feast was over, his soldiers sprang
upon the guests and slew them all, and Oliverotto became the tyrant
of the place. We may at any rate forgive Cæsar for making sure work
of Oliverotto a year later. When his last hour came, he struggled
to drive his dagger into the man with the cord. Here indeed were
lions, foxes, catamounts.
This is obviously the key to Machiavelli's admiration for
Borgia's policy. The men were all bandits together. Romagna is not
and never was, said Dante two hundred years before, without war in
the hearts of her tyrants (Inf xxvii. 37). So it
was now. It was full, says Machiavelli, of those who are called
gentlemen, who live in idleness and abundance on the revenues of
their estates, without any care of cultivating them, or of
incurring any of the fatigue of getting a living; such men are
pernicious anywhere, most of all when they are lords of castles,
and have subjects under obedience to them. These lords, before the
Pope and his terrible son took them in hand, were poor, yet had a
mind to live as if they were rich, and so there was nothing for it
but rapine, extortion, and all iniquity. Whether Cæsar and the Pope
had wider designs than the reduction of these oppressors to order,
we can never know. Machiavelli and most contemporaries thought that
they had, but the various historians of to-day differ. Probably the
contemporaries knew best, but nothing can matter less.
We may as well finish Cæsar's story, because we never know until
a man's end, whether the play has been tragedy or comedy. He seemed
to be lord of the ascendant, when in the summer after the
transaction of Sinigaglia (1503) the Pope and he were one evening
both stricken with malarious fever at Rome. There was talk of
poison, but the better opinion seems to be that this is fable.[29] Alexander VI. died; Cæsar in
the prime of his young man's strength, made a better fight for it,
but when he at last recovered, his star had set. Machiavelli saw
him and felt that Fortune this time had got the better of
virtù. His subjects in the Romagna stood by him for a
time, and then tyranny and disorder came back. The new Pope, Julius
II., was not his friend; for though Cæsar had made the Spanish
cardinals support his election, Julius had some old scores to pay,
and as Machiavelli profoundly remarked, anybody who supposes that
new services bring great people to forget old injuries, makes a
dire mistake. So Cæsar found his way to Naples, with a safe-conduct
from Gonsalvo, the Great Captain. He reaped as he had sown. Once he
had said, 'It is well to cheat those who have been masters in
treachery.' He now felt the force of his maxim. At Naples he was
cordially received by Gonsalvo, dined often at his table, talked
over all his plans, and suddenly one night as he was about to pass
the postern, in spite of the safe-conduct an officer demanded his
sword in the name of the King of Aragon.[30] To Spain
he was sent. For some three years he went through strange and
obscure adventures, lighting fortune with the aid of his indwelling
demon to the very last. He was struck down in a fight at Viana in
Navarre (1507), after a furious resistance; was stripped of his
fine armour by men who did not know who he was; and his body was
left naked, bloody, and riddled with wounds, on the ground. He was
only thirty-one. His father, who was quite. as desperate an
evil-doer, died in his bed at seventy-two. So history cannot safely
draw a moral.[31]
V
From this digression let us return to mark some of the problems
that Machiavelli raises, noting as we pass, how besides their
profound effect upon active principles of statesmanship and
progress, they lie at the very root of historic judgment on
conspicuous men and memorable movements in bygone times. In one
sense we are shocked by his maxims in proportion to our
forgetfulness of history. There have been, it is said, only two
perfect princes in the world—Marcus Aurelius and Louis IX. of
France. If you add to princes, even presidents and prime ministers,
the percentage might still be low. Among the canonised saints of
the Roman Church there have only been a dozen kings in eight
centuries, and no more than four popes in the same period. So hard
has it been 'to govern the world by paternosters.'[32] It is well to take care lest in
blaming Machiavelli for openly prescribing hypocrisy, men do not
slip unperceived into something like hypocrisy of their own.
Take the subordination of religious creed to policy. In the age
that immediately followed Machiavelli, three commanding figures
stand out, and are cherished in the memories of men—William the
Silent, Henry of Navarre, and Elizabeth of England. It needs no
peevish or pharisaic memory to trace even in these imposing
personalities some of the lineaments of Machiavelli's hated and
scandalous picture. William the Silent changed from Lutheran to
Catholic, then back to Lutheran, and then again from Lutheran to
Calvinist. His numerous children were sometimes baptized in one of
the three communions, sometimes in another, just as political
convenience served. Henry of Navarre abjured his Huguenot faith,
then he returned to it, then he abjured it again. Our great
Elizabeth, of famous memory, notoriously walked in tortuous and
slippery paths. Again, the most dolorous chapter in all history is
that which recounts how men and women were burned, hanged, shot,
and cruelly tormented, for heresy; and there is a considerable body
of authors, who through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
used against heretics Machiavelli's arguments for making short work
with rebels, and asked with logical force why their reason of
Church was not just as good as his reason of State.[33] What is the real difference
between the practices tolerated in the Prince for the
self-preservation of a secular State, and all the abominations
perpetrated in the name and for the sake of religious unity? Again,
how many of the wars of faith, from Monophysite, Arian, Iconoclast,
downwards, have been at bottom far less concerned with opinion than
with conflicts of race, nationality, property, and policy, and have
been conducted on maxims of purely secular expediency?
Frederick the Great is the hero of the most picturesque of
modern English historians. That strong ruler, as we all know, took
it into his head to write a refutation of the Prince.
'Sir,' said Voltaire, 'I believe the very first advice that
Machiavelli would have given to a disciple, would have been that he
should begin by writing a refutation of his book.' Carlyle
contemptuously regrets that his hero should have taken any trouble
about the Italian's 'perverse little book' and its incredible
sophistries; pity he was not refuted by a kick from old Frederick
William's jackboot; he deserved no more. Thus Carlyle does not let
us forget that nobody so quickly turns cynic as your high-flying
transcendentalist, just as nobody takes wickedness so easily as the
Antinomian who holds the highest doctrine about the
incorruptibility of man's spiritual nature. The plain truth is that
Frederick, alike on his good side and his bad side, alike as the
wise law-maker, the thrifty steward, the capable soldier, and as
the robber of Silesia, and a leading accomplice, if not the
inspirer, of the partition of Poland, was the aptest of all modern
types of the perverse book.[34] It was
reserved for the following century to see even that type depraved
and distorted by the mighty descendant of a fugitive family from
Tuscany, who found their way to Corsica about the time of
Machiavelli's death.[35]
The most imposing incarnation of the doctrine that reason of
State covers all, is Napoleon. Tacitus, said Napoleon, writes
romances; Gibbon is no better than a man of sounding words;
Machiavelli is the only one of them worth reading. No wonder that
he thought so. All those maxims that have most scandalised mankind
in the Italian writer of the sixteenth century, were the daily
bread of the Italian soldier who planted his iron heel on the neck
of Europe in the nineteenth. Yet Machiavelli at least sets decent
limits and conditions. The ruler may under compulsion be driven to
set at nought pity, humanity, faith, religion, for the sake of the
State; but though he should know how to enter upon evil when
compelled, he should never turn from what is good when he can avoid
it. Napoleon sacrificed pity, humanity, faith, and public law, less
for the sake of the State than to satisfy an exorbitant passion for
personal domination. Napoleon, Charles IX., the Committee of Public
Safety, would all have justified themselves by reason of State, and
the Bartholomew massacre, the September massacres, and the murder
of the Duc d'Enghien, only show what reason of State may come to in
any age, in the hands of practical logicians with a knife in their
grasp.[36]
Turn from the Absolutist camp to the Republican. Mazzini is in
some respects the loftiest moral genius of the century, and he said
that though he did not approve the theory of the dagger, nay he
deplored it, yet he had not the heart to curse the fact of the
dagger. 'When a man,' he says, 'seeks by every possible artifice to
betray old friends to the police of the Foreign Ruler, and then
somebody arises and slays the Judas in broad daylight in the public
streets—I have not the courage to cast the first stone at one who
thus takes upon himself to represent social justice and hatred of
tyranny.'[37]
Even in modern democracy, many a secret and ugly spring works
under decorous mechanism, and recalls Machiavelli's precept to keep
the name and take away the thing. Salvagnoli, minister for religion
and public instruction in a liberal government of modern Italy,
laid it down broadly to the scandal, real or affected, of
reactionary opponents, Colla verità non si governa. What
shall we say of two great rival Powers, each professing with no
little sincerity its earnest desire to spread all the boons of
civilisation, yet adjusting their own quarrel by solemn bargain and
mutual compact that binds down some weak buffer-state in
backwardness and barbarism? Yet such inconsistency between practice
and profession may be detected in the newspaper telegrams any month
by a reader who keeps his eye upon the right quarter. Is our
general standard really so far removed at last from Sir Walter
Ralegh's description, which has a Machiavellian twang about
it,—'Know ye not, said Ahab, that Ramoth Gilead is
ours? He knew this before, and was quiet enough, till opinion
of his forces made him look unto his right. Broken titles to
kingdoms or provinces, maintenance of friends and partisans,
pretended wrongs, and indeed whatsoever it pleaseth him to allege,
that thinks his own sword sharpest.' An eminent man endowed with
remarkable compass of mind, not many years ago a professor in this
university, imagined a modem writer with the unflinching
perspicacity of Machiavelli, analysing the party leader as the
Italian analysed the tyrant or the prince.[38] Such a
writer, he said, would find that the party leader, though possessed
of every sort of private virtue, yet is debarred by his position
from the full practice of the great virtues of veracity, justice,
and moral intrepidity; he can seldom tell the full truth; can never
be fair to anybody but his followers and his associates; can rarely
be bold except in the interests of his faction. This hint of
Maine's is ingenious and may perhaps be salutary, but we must not
overdo it. Party government is not the Reign of the Saints, but we
should be in no hurry to let the misgivings of political
valetudinarianism persuade us that there is not at least as good a
stock of veracity, justice, and moral intrepidity inside the world
of parliaments or congress, as there is in the world without. But
these three or four historic instances may serve to illustrate the
ἀπορίαι and awkward points that Machiavelli's writings
have propounded for men capable of political reflection in Europe,
for many generations past.
If one were to try to put the case for the Machiavellian
philosophy in a modern way, it would, I suppose, be something of
this kind:—Nature does not work by moral rules. Nature, 'red in
tooth and claw,' does by system all that good men by system avoid.
Is not the whole universe of sentient being haunted all day and all
night long by the haggard shapes of Hunger, Cruelty, Force, Fear?
War again is not conducted by moral rules. To declare war is to
suspend not merely habeas corpus but the Ten Commandments, and some
other good commandments besides. A military manual, by an
illustrious hand of our own day, warns us: 'As a nation we are
brought up to feel it a disgrace even to succeed by falsehood. We
keep hammering along with the conviction that honesty is the best
policy, and that truth always wins in the long run. These
sentiments do well for a copy-book, but a man who acts upon them
had better sheath his sword for ever.' This, by the way, may be one
reason among others why we should keep the sword sheathed as long
as we can.
Why should the ruler of a State be bound by a moral code from
which the soldier is free? Why should not he have the benefit of
what has been called the evolutionary beatitude,—Blessed are the
strong, for they shall prey on the weak? Right and wrong, cause and
effect,—are they not two sides of one question? Has it not been
well said that 'morality is the nature of things'? We must include
in the computation the whole sum of consequences, and consider acts
of State as worked out to their furthest results. Bishop Butler
tells you that we cannot give the whole account of any one single
thing whatever,—not of all its causes, its ends, its necessary
adjuncts. In short, means and end are only one transaction. You
must regard policy as a whole. The ruler as an individual is, like
other men, no more than the generation of leaves, fleeting, a
shadow, a dream. But the State lives on after he shall have
vanished. He is a trustee for times to come. He is not shaping his
own life only; he guides the distant fortunes of a nation. Leaves
fall, the tree stands.
Such, I take it, is the defence of reason of State, of the
worship of nation and empire. Everything that policy requires,
justice sanctions. Success is the test. There are no crimes in
politics, only blunders. 'The man of action is essentially
conscienceless' (Goethe). 'Praised be those,' said one, in words
much applauded by Machiavelli, 'who love their country rather than
the safety of their souls.' 'Let us be Venetians first,' said
Father Paul, 'and Christians after.'
We see now the deep questions that lie behind these sophistries,
and all the alarming propositions in which they close. How are we
to decide the constant question in national concerns, when and
whether one duty overrules another that points the contrary way? It
is easy to assert that the authority of moral law is paramount, but
who denies that cases may arise of disputable and conflicting moral
obligations? Do you condemn Prussia for violating in 1813 the
treaties imposed by Napoleon after Jena? Does morality apply only
to end and not to means? Is the State means or end? What does it
really exist for? For the sake of the individual, his moral and
material well-being, or is he mere cog or pinion in the vast
thundering machine? How far is it true that citizenship dominates
all other relations and duties, and is the most important of them?
Are we to test the true civilisation of a State by anything else
than the predominance of justice, right, equality, in its laws, its
institutions, its relations to neighbours? Is one of the most
important aspects of national policy its reaction upon the
character of the nation itself, and can States enter on courses of
duplicity and selfish violence, without paying the penalty in
national demoralisation? What are we to think of such sayings as
d'Alembert's motto for a virtuous man, 'I prefer my family to
myself, my country to my family, and humanity to my country'? Is
this the true order of honourable attachments for a man of
self-respect and conscience? To Machiavelli all these questions
would have been futile. Yet the world, in spite of a thousand
mischances, and at tortoise-pace, has steadily moved away from him
and his Romans.
The modern conception of a State has long made it a moral
person, capable of right and wrong, just as are the individuals
composing it. Civilisation is taken to advance, exactly in
proportion as communities leave behind them the violences of
external nature, and the unspeakable brutalities of man in a state
of war. The usages of war are constantly undergoing mitigation. The
inviolability of treaties received rude shocks between the first
Napoleon and Prince Bismarck. 'You are always talking to me of
principles,' said Alexander I. to Talleyrand, 'as if your public
law were anything to me. I do not know what it means. What do you
suppose that all your parchments and your treaties signify to me?'
Yet the sanctity of national faith has gained ground rather than
lost, and even naked invasions of it seek the decorum of a
diplomatic fig-leaf. Though it is said even now not to be wholly
purged of lying, fraud, and duplicity, diplomacy still is conscious
of having a character to keep up for truth and plain dealing, so
far as circumstances allow. Such conferences, again, as those at
Berlin and Brussels in our own day, imperfectly as they have
worked, mark the recognition of duty towards inferior races, All
these improvements in the character of nations were in the minds of
the best men in Machiavelli's day. Reason of State has always been
a plea for impeding and resisting them. Las Casas and other
churchmen, Machiavelli's contemporaries, fought nobly at the
Spanish court against the inhuman treatment of Indians in the New
World, and they were defeated by arguments that read like maxims
from the Prince.[39] Grotius had forerunners in his
powerful contribution towards assuaging the abominations of war,
but both letter and spirit in Machiavelli made all the other
way[40] Times have come and gone since
Machiavelli wrote down his deep truths, but in the great cycles of
human change he can have no place among the strong thinkers, the
orators, the writers, who have elevated the conception of the
State, have humanised the methods and maxims of government, have
raised citizenship to be 'a partnership in every virtue and in all
perfection.' He turned to the past, just as scholars, architects,
sculptors, turned to it; but the idea of reconstructing a society
that had once been saturated with the great ruling conceptions of
the thirteenth century—as seen and symbolised in Dante, for
example—by trying to awaken the social energy of ancient Rome, was
just as much of an anachronism as Julian the Apostate. 'Our
religion,' said Machiavelli of Christianity, 'has glorified men of
humble and meditative life, and not men of action. It has planted
the chief good in lowliness and contempt of mundane things;
paganism placed it in highmindedness, in bodily force, in all the
other things that make men strong. If our religion calls for
strength in us, it is for strength to suffer rather than to do.
This seems to have rendered the world weak.' This 'discarding the
presuppositions of Christianity,' as it has been well described,
marks with exactitude the place of Machiavelli in the development
of modern European thought. The Prince—the most direct,
concentrated, and unflinching contribution ever made to the
secularisation of politics—brings into a full light, never before
shed upon it, the awful manicheism of human history, the fierce and
unending collision of type, ideal, standard, and endeavour.
Machiavelli has been supposed to put aside the question of right
and wrong, just as the political economist or the analytical jurist
used to do. Truly has it been said that the practical value of all
sciences founded on abstractions, depends on the relative
importance of the elements rejected and the elements retained in
the process of abstraction. The view that he rejected moral
elements of government for a scientific purpose and as a
hypothetical postulate, seems highly doubtful. Is he not more
intelligible, if we take him as following up the divorce of
politics from theology, by a divorce from ethics also? He was
laying down certain maxims of government as an art; the end of that
art is the security and permanence of the ruling power; and the
fundamental principle from which he silently started, without
shadow of doubt or misgiving as to its soundness, was that the
application of moral standards to this business, is as little to
the point as it would be in the navigation of a ship.
The effect was fatal even for his own purpose, for what he put
aside, whether for the sake of argument or because he thought them
in substance irrelevant, were nothing less than the living forces
by which societies subsist and governments are strong. A remarkable
illustration occurred in his own century. Three or four years
before all this on secular and ecclesiastical princedoms was
written, John Calvin was born (1509). With a union of fervid
religious instinct and profound political genius, almost unexampled
in European history, Calvin did in fact what Machiavelli tried to
do on paper; he actually created a self-governed state, ruled it,
defended it, maintained it, and made that little corner of Europe
both the centre of a movement that shook France, England, Scotland,
America, for long days to come, and at the same time he set up a
bulwark against all the forces of Spanish and Roman reaction in the
pressing struggles of his own immediate day. In one sense,
Florence, Geneva, Holland, hold as high a place as the greatest
States of Europe in the development of modern civilisation; but
anybody with a turn for ingenious or idle speculation might ask
himself whether, if the influence of Florence on European culture
had never existed, the loss to mankind would have been as deep as
if the little republic of Geneva had been wiped out by the dukes of
Savoy. The unarmed prophet, said Machiavelli, thinking of
Savonarola, is always sure to be destroyed, and his institutions
must come to nought. If Machiavelli had been at Jerusalem two
thousand years ago, he might have found nobody of any importance in
his eyes, save Pontius Pilate and the Roman legionaries. He forgot
the potent arms of moral force, and it was with these that, in the
main, Calvin fought his victorious battle. We need not, however,
forget that Calvin never scrupled to act on some of these Italian
maxims that have been counted most hateful. He was as ready to
resort to carnal weapons as other people. In spite of all the
sophistries of sectarian apologists, Calvin's vindictive
persecution of political opponents, and his share in the crime of
burning Servetus, can only be justified on principles that are much
the same as, and certainly not any better than, those prescribed
for the tyrant in the Prince. Still the republic of Geneva
was a triumph of moral force. So was the daughter system in
Scotland. It is true that tyrannical theocracy does not in either
case by any means escape the familiar reproaches addressed by
history to Jesuits and Inquisitors.
In Italy Savonarola had attempted a similar achievement. It was
the last effort to reconcile the spirit of the new age to the old
faith, but Italy was for a second time in her history in the
desperate case of being able to endure nec vitia nec
remedia, neither ills nor cure. In a curious passage
(Disc. iii. 1), Machiavelli describes how Dominic and
Francis in older days kindled afresh an expiring flame. He may have
perceived that for Italy in this direction all was by his time
over.
The sixteenth century in Italy in some respects resembles the
eighteenth in France. In both, old faiths were assailed and new
lamps were kindled. But the eighteenth century was a time of belief
in the better elements of mankind. An illusion, you may say. Was it
a worse illusion than disbelief in mankind? Machiavelli and his
school saw only cunning, jealousy, perfidy, ingratitude, dupery;
and yet on such a foundation as this they dreamed that they could
build. What idealist or doctrinaire ever fell into a stranger
error? Surrounded by the ruins of Italian nationality, says a
writer of genius, 'Machiavelli organises the abstract theory of the
country with all the energy of the Committee of Public Safety,
supported on the passion of twenty-five millions of Frenchman. He
carries in him the genius of the Convention. His theories strike
like acts' (Quinet). Yet after all has been said, energy as an
abstract theory is no better than a bubble.
'The age of Machiavel,' it has been said, 'was something like
ours, in being one of religious eclipse, attended by failure of the
traditional foundation of morality. A domination of self-interest
without regard for moral restriction was the result' (Goldwin
Smith). We may hope to escape this capital disaster. Yet it is true
to say that Machiavelli represents certain living forces in our
actual world; that Science, with its survival of the fittest,
unconsciously lends him illegitimate aid; that 'he is not a
vanishing type, but a constant and contemporary influence' (Acton).
This is because energy, force, will, violence, still keep alive in
the world their resistance to the control of justice and
conscience, humanity and right. In so far as he represents one side
in that unending struggle, and suggests one set of considerations
about it, he retains a place in the literature of modern political
systems and of Western morals.
Notes
- ↑ The most complete
account of the voluminous literature about Machiavelli up to 1858
is given in Robert Mohl's Geschichte und Literatur der
Staatswissenschaften, iii. 521, etc.
A later list is given by Tommasini, La Vita et Gli Scritti di
N. M., i. 56–8. See also Villari; of Lord Acton's learned
Introduction to the Prince; and especially the
bibliography attached to Mr. Burd's valuable chapter vol. i. of the
Cambridge Modern History, pp. 719–26.
Of the French contributions, Nourrisson's Machiavel
(edition of 1883) seems much the most vigorous, in spite of
occasional outbreaks of the curious feeling between Frenchmen and
Italians. Among political pamphlets may be named Dialogue aux
enfers, entre Machiavel et Montesquieu, ou la politique de
Machiavel au 19 siècle: Par un Contemporain (1864)—an
energetic exposure of the Second Empire.—Machiavel, et
l'influence de sa doctrine, sur les opinions, les mœurs, de la
politique de la France pendant la Révolution: par M. de
Mazères; Paris, 1816—a royalist indictment of Machiavelli, as the
inspirer alike of Jacobins and Bonaparte. M. Tassin's Gianotti,
sa vie, son temps, et ses doctrines (1869), published on the
eve of the overthrow of the Second Empire, and seeming to use the
Italian publicist mainly as a mask for condemning the French
government of the day. Gianotti (1492–1572) was of Savonarola's
school, and M. Tassin uses him as a foil for Machiavelli. Others of
less quality are: Dante, Michel-Ange,
Machiavel. Par C. Calemard de Lafayette. Paris,
1852.—Essai sur les œuvres et la doctrine de Machiavel.
Par Paul Deltuf. Paris, 1867.—Machiavel,
Montesquieu, Rousseau. Von Jacob Venedy. Berlin,
1850. Written after the events of 1848 in Germany, the author's
object being to show that the three writers named were the
representatives of the only three possible systems of government,
and of these three Machiavelli stands for all that is wicked and
reactionary, Rousseau for progress and humanity. The book is
composed, not from any scientific point of view, but to illustrate
contemporary politics. Louis Philippe is said (p. 66) to be the
greatest scholar that Machiavelli ever had, and there are a good
many remarks on the death of 'Machiavellismus' in France and
Germany, which have hardly been borne out by history since
1850.
- ↑ Machiavelli
and the Elizabethan Drama. Von Edward Meyer. Wiemar, 1897, p.
xi. Mr. Courthope, History of English Poetry (ii. ch. 12),
has shown how much Marlowe had studied Machiavelli, and states his
view of the effect of this study as follows: 'What we find in
Marlowe is Seneca's exaltation of the freedom of the human will,
dissociated from the idea of Necessity, and joined with
Machiavelli's principle of the excellence of virtù. This
principle is represented under a great variety of aspects;
sometimes in the energy of a single heroic character, as in
Tamburlaine; sometimes in the pursuit of unlawful
knowledge, as in Faustus: again, in The Jew of
Malta, in the boundless hatred and revenge of Barabas; in
Guise plotting the massacre of the Huguenots out of cold-blooded
policy; and in Mortimer planning the murder of Edward II. from
purely personal ambition. Incidentally, no doubt, in some of these
instances, the indulgence of unrestrained passion brings ruin in
its train; but it is not so much for the sake of the moral that
Marlowe composed his tragedies, as because his imagination
delighted in the exhibition of the vast and tremendous consequences
produced by the determined exercise of will in pursuit of selfish
objects.'—P. 405.
The reader will remember that Machiavelli speaks the prologue to
The Jew of Malta, with these two lines:—
-
-
- 'I count religion but a childish toy,
- And hold there is no sin but ignorance.'
It is not denied by Herr Meyer or others, that Marlowe had studied
Machiavelli in the original, and Mr. Courthope seems to make good
his contention that it was Marlowe's conception of M.'s principle
of virtù that revolutionised the English drama.
- ↑ 'Old Nick is the
vulgar name for the Evil Being in the north of England, and is a
name of great antiquity. We borrowed it from the title of an evil
genius among the ancient Danes,' etc. etc. On the line in
Hudibras, ' We may observe that he was called Old Nick
many ages before the famous, or rather infamous, Nicholas Machiavel
was born.'—Brand's Popular Antiquities, ii. 364. (Ed.
1816.)
- ↑ See Tommasini, i.
27–30. Our excellent Ascham declares that he honoured the old
Romans as the best breeders and bringers up for well-doing in all
civil affairs that ever was in the world, but the new Rome was the
home of devilish opinions and unbridled sin, and one of the worst
patriarchs of its impiety was Machiavelli.—Schoolmaster
(1563–8), Mayor's Edition, 1863, p. 86. Fuller, quoted in Mayor's
note, expresses a better opinion of Machiavelli, and says that
'that which hath sharpened the pens of many against him is his
giving so many cleanly wipes to the foul noses of the pope and the
Italian prelacy' (1642).
'At the beginning of the seventeenth century the Venetian senate
was asked to permit the publication of Boccalini's Commentaries
on Tacitus. The request was referred to five of the senators
for examination. "It is the teaching of Tacitus," they said, "that
has produced Machiavelli, and the other bad authors who would
destroy public virtue. We should replace Tacitus by Livy and
Polybius—historians of the happier and more virtuous times of the
Roman republic, and by Thucydides, the historian of the Greek
republic, who found themselves in circumstances like those of
Venice." '—Sclopia, Revue Hist. de droit français et
étranger (1856), ii. 25.
For the literary use made of Tacitus against the Spanish domination
in Italy, see Ferrari, Hist. de la Raison d'Etat, p.
315.
- ↑ The edition of the
Prince, published by the Clarendon Press, with Mr. Burd's
most competent and copious critical apparatus, and Lord Acton's
closely packed introduction, supplies all that is wanted. The same
Press has republished the English translation of the Prince by N.
H. Thomson, who has also executed a translation of the Discourses (1883), and now
(1906) of the Florentine History.
- ↑ An interesting
article appeared in the Nineteenth Century (December
1896), designed to show the effect of Machiavelli on the English
statesmen of the Reformation. The writer admits that there is no
evidence to prove that the action of Elizabeth was consciously
based on a study of the Prince, but he finds, as he thinks, proof
positive that Burleigh had studied Machiavelli in a paper of advice
from the Lord Treasurer to the Queen. The proof consists in such
sentences as these: 'Men's natures are apt to strive not only
against the present smart, but in revenging by past injury, though
they be never so well contented thereafter';—'no man loves one the
better for giving him the bastinado, though with never so little a
cudgel';—'the course of the most wise estates hath ever been to
make an assurance of friendship, or to take away all power of
enmity'; and so forth. Burleigh very likely may have read the
Prince, but it is going too far to assume that a sage
statesman must have learned the commonplaces of political prudence
out of a book.
'Cecil asked English ambassadors abroad to procure him copies, and
even that harmless gossip, Sir Richard Morison, wiled away his
leisure hours at the Emperor's Court in perusing it, making
frequent reference to it in his correspondence (see State
Papers, Foreign Series, Edward VI. passim; Sloane
MSS. 1523; and Harleian MSS. 353, ff 130–9).'—Pollard's
England under Protector Somerset, p. 284.
- ↑ Dr. Abbott,
attacking Bacon with the same bitterness with which Machiavelli was
attacked for three centuries (Francis Bacon, 1885, pp. 325
and 457–60), insists that the Florentine secretary was the
chancellor's master; but such criticism seems to show as one-sided
a misapprehension of one as of the other. Dr. Fowler, once
President of Corpus Christi College, has dealt conclusively, as I
judge, with Dr. Abbott's case, in the preface to his second edition
of the Novum
Organum (1889), pp. xii–xx, and in his excellent short
monograph on Bacon (1881), pp. 41–5.
- ↑ Mackintosh
reproached Bacon for this way of treating history. Spedding stoutly
defends it, rather oddly appealing to the narrative of the New
Testament, as an example of the most wicked of all judgments,
recounted four times 'without a single indignant comment or a
single vituperative expression.'—Works, Spedding and
Heath, vol. vi. pp. 8–16.
On this last point Pascal says: 'The style of the gospel is
admirable among other ways in this, that there is not a word of
invective against the murderers or foes of Jesus Christ. For there
is none against Judas, Pilate, or any of the Jews; and so
forth.'—Pensées, Art. xix. 2, Ed. Havet, ii. 39.
See also Havet's note, p. 44.
Bacon says M. made a wise and apt choice of method for
government—'namely, discourse upon histories or examples; for
knowledge drawn freshly, and in our view, out of particulars,
findeth its way best to particulars again; and it hath much greater
life in practice when the discourse attendeth upon the example than
when the example attendeth upon the discourse.'
- ↑ Harrington's view
is expressed in such a sentence as this: 'Corruption in government
is to be read and considered in Machiavel, as diseases in a man's
body are to be read and considered in Hippocrates. Neither
Hippocrates nor Machiavel introduced diseases into man's body nor
corruption into government, which were before their time; and
seeing they do but discover them, it must be confessed that so much
as they have done tends not to the increase but to the cure of
them, which is the truth of these two authors.'—System of
Politics, ch. x.
Elsewhere he compares the Italian to one who exposes the tricks of
a juggler.
- ↑ E.g. Patriot
King, pp. 106, 118. On the Policy of the Athenians,
p. 213.
- ↑ Essays,
i. 156; ii. 391, where he remarks that historians have been almost
always friends of virtue, but that the politician is much less
scrupulous as to acts of power.
- ↑ This sentence is
Treverret's, L'Italie au 16ième Siècle, i. 179.
Sainte-Beuve has a short comparison between the two in
Causeries, vii. 67–70. 'Machiavelli attached himself to
particular facts, and proposed expedients. Montesquieu tried to
ascend to general principles, and drew from them consequences that
were capable of explaining a long series of social phenomena. The
Florentine secretary was a man of action, and reproduced in his
writings the impressions that he had received from his intercourse
with men and business. Montesquieu is always a man of the closet;
he studies men in books.'—Sclopis, Revue Hist. de droit
français et étranger (1856), ii. p. 18.
Comte has worked out the place of Montesquieu and of Machiavelli,
Philos. Pos. iv. 178–85, and Pol. Pos. iii.
539.
- ↑ La
diplomatie au temps de Machiavel. Par Maulde-la-Clavière.
1892. 3 vols. i. 306, etc. The French gave the signal for the
inevitable attack upon the ancient privileges of Latin as the
language of diplomacy. At the beginning of the sixteenth century
Spain strove to displace French, but did not succeed even when the
Spanish power was at its meridian. In the East, the Turk would have
nothing to do with Latin. A Turkish envoy to Venice in 1500, though
acquainted with Latin, made it a point of honour only to speak
Greek. Charles VIII. did not know Italian, and Louis XII.
understood it with difficulty. Machiavelli preferred Italian to
Latin.—Maulde-la-Clavière, ch. ii. and ch. vi.
- ↑ Symonds's
translation, Age of the Despots, 244–6.
- ↑ Thucydides was
translated by Laurentius Valla in 1452, and a revised version of
the translation was produced thirty years later. One of the fullest
of the few references to Thucydides is Disc. III.
XVI.
- ↑ See Jacob
Burckhardt's admirable work on the Civilisation of the
Renaissance in Italy (English translation by Middlemore), ii.
211. 'Was Germany in the fifteenth century so much better with its
godless wars against the Hussites, the crimes of Vehmgericht, the
endless feuds of the temporal princes, the shameless oppression of
the wretched peasant?'—Thudichum, p. 68.
- ↑
Phœnissæ, 524.
- ↑ Janet's
Hist. de la Science Politique, i. 539 (3rd ed.).
- ↑ The
contradictions were noted very early. Bodin's Republic
appeared, in 1576, and there he says: 'Machiavel s'est bien fort
méconté, de dire que l'estat populaire est le meilleur; et
néanmoins ayant oublié sa première opinion, il a tenu en un autre
lieu, que pour restituer l'Italie en sa liberté, il faut qu'il n'y
ait qu'un prince; et de fait, il s'est efforcé de former un estat
le plus tyrannique du monde; et en autre lieu il confesse que
l'estat de Venise est le plus beau de tous, lequel est une pure
aristocratie, s'il en fut oncques: tellement qu'il ne scait à quoi
se tenir' (vi. ch. 4).
The argument that the Prince and Discourses are
really one work is best stated by Nourrisson, ch. viii.
137–44.
'The modern study of politics, however, begins with Machiavelli.
Not that he made any definite or permanent contribution to
political theory which can be laid hold of as a principle fertile
of new consequence. His works are more concerned with the details
of statecraft than with the analysis of the state. But we find in
him, for the first time since Aristotle, the pure, passionless
curiosity of the man of science.'—Sir Frederick Pollock in the
History of the Science of Politics, ch. ii.
Tocqueville says: 'I have been reading Machiavelli's History of
Florence very attentively. The Machiavel of the history is to
me the Machiavel of the Prince. I do not conceive how the
reading of the first can leave the least doubt as to the author of
the second. In his history he sometimes praises great and fine
actions, but we see that it is with him only an affair of
imagination. The bottom of his thought is that all actions are
indifferent in themselves, and must be judged by the skill and the
success that they exhibit. For him the world is a great arena from
which God is absent, where conscience has nothing to do with it,
and where everybody gets on with things as best he
can.'—Tocqueville, Correspond. i. 326–7.
As for Tocqueville, when he came to handle public business in
difficult times, some notions with a slightly Machiavellian flavour
began to lodge in his mind. For instance:—'As if you could ever
satisfy men, by only busying yourself with their general good,
without taking account of their vanity and of their private and
personal interests.'—Souvenirs, p. 343.
'The versatility of men, and the vanity of these great words of
patriotism and right, with which the small passions cover
themselves.'—Ib. 347.
'My secret consisted in flattering their self-love [Members of
Parliament and Cabinet Colleagues], while I took good care to
neglect their advice.... I had discovered that it is with the
vanity of men that you can do the best business, for you often get
from it very substantial things, while giving very little substance
in return. You will never make as good a bargain with their
ambition or their greed. Yet it is true that to deal profitably
with the vanity of others, you must lay aside your own and look
only to the success of your scheme; and this is what will always
make that kind of trade very difficult.'—Ib. 361–2.
'Nations are like men; they are still prouder of what flatters
their passions, than of what serves their interests.'—Ib.
394.
- ↑ De Sanctis,
Storm della Let. Ital., ii. 82.
- ↑ 'However we
brave it out, we men are a little breed.'—Tennyson's Maud,
i. 5.
- ↑ Sainte-Beuve has
pointed out (Port-Royal, iii. 362–3, ed. 1860) how
Machiavelli is here related to Pascal. Pascal's reason allows no
sort of abstraction to mix itself up with social order. He had seen
the Fronde at close quarters, for he was a man of the world at that
epoch. He had meditated on Cromwell. The upshot of it was to place
man at the mercy of custom, and at the same time to condemn those
who shake off the yoke of custom. 'Custom ought to be followed only
because it is custom, and not because it is reasonable or just.
People follow it because they think it is reasonable, and take
antiquity for the proof that it is so,' etc. etc.—Pensées, Art. vi. 40.
Ed. Havet, i. 82.
- ↑ See Ferrari's
Hist. de la Raison d'État, p. 260; de Sanctis, Storia
della Let. Italiana, ii. 74–89; Quinet, Révolutions
d'Italie, ii. 122.
- ↑ Disc.
i. 47. Aristotle, Politics, iii. 11; Jowett
(Notes, p. 129) has an uneasy note upon the point. On the
whole, Machiavelli seems to take broader and sounder ground than
anybody else.
- ↑ Baumgarten's
view is elaborately stated in his Geschichte Karls V. i.;
Anhang, 522–36, and Signor Villari's answer in his Niccolò
Machiavelli, 496–502.
Guido da Montefeltro says in the Inferno
(xxvii. 75): L'opere mie non furon leonine, ma divolpe—'My
deeds were those of the fox, and not of the lion.' Bacon, in a
well-known passage, uses a more common figure: 'It is not possible
to join serpentine wisdom with the columbine simplicity, except men
know all the conditions of the serpent.'—Advancement of
Learning', ii. 21, 9.
- ↑ Hist. of Rome, IV. X. vol. iii. 380–91
(Eng. Trans.).
- ↑ E.g.
Scherer, Études Crit. vi. 102, etc.
- ↑ See Tommasini,
i. 242–65; Villari, Bk. I. ch. v., i. 392. For M.'s picture of the
Italian princes, see Arte della Guerra, Bk. vii.
- ↑ Gregorovius
thinks that there are too many arguments both ways for us to form a
decided opinion.—Lucrezia Borgia, II. c. v. Pastor is
confident that it was Roman fever, and goes fully into the medical
question.—Gesch. der Päpste, iii. 471–2. Dr. Garnett
argues strongly against poison, English Historical
Review, 1894, ix. 335–9.—Creighton, iv. 43–4.
- ↑ Prescott,
Hist. Ferd. and Isabella, ii. p. 498.
- ↑ See Cæsar
Borgia. Par Charles Yriarte. Paris, 1889.
The Borgian policy is set out with much reason and force in Bishop
Creighton's History of the Popes, Bk. v. ch. xi. vol. iv.
pp. 44–53. Also the character of Cæsar Borgia, pp. 64–6. Dr.
Pastor, writing from the catholic point of view, does not shrink
froma completely candid estimate of Alexander VI.—See Gesch.
der Päpste, iii.
- ↑ The saying of
Cosmo de' Medici, Ist. Fior. Lib. VII., where Machiavelli
reports others of his sayings, and gives a vivid account of
Cosmo.
Bacon tells us in characteristic language that Henry VII. desired
to bring celestial honour into the house of Lancaster, and begged
Pope Julius to canonise Henry VI.; but Julius refused, as some
said, because the king would not come to his rates, more probably,
however, because he knew that Henry VI. was a very simple man, and
he did not choose to let the world suppose that saint and simpleton
were the same thing.—History of Henry VII.; Works, vi. 233
(Spedding and Heath).
- ↑ Ferrari,
Hist. de la Raison d'Etat, 300. Per la fè il tutto
lice. Ger. Lib., iv. 26.
- ↑ 'Frederick the
Great of Prussia, in November 1760, published military instructions
for the use of his generals, which were based on a wide, practical
knowledge of the matter. . . . When he could not procure himself
spies among the Austrians, owing to the careful guard which their
light troops kept around their camp, the idea occurred to him, and
he acted on it with success, of utilising the suspension of arms
that was customary after a skirmish between hussars, to make these
officers the means of conducting epistolary correspondence with the
officers on the other side. "Spies of compulsion," he explained in
this way. When you wish to convey false information to an enemy,
you take a trustworthy soldier and compel him to pass to the
enemy's camp to represent there all that you wish the enemy to
believe. You also send by him letters to excite the troops to
desertion; and in the event of its being impossible to obtain
information about the enemy, Frederick prescribes the following:
Choose some rich citizen who has land and a wife and children, and
another man disguised as his servant or coachman, who understands
the enemy's language. Force the former to take the latter with him
to the enemy's camp to complain of injuries sustained, threatening
him that if he fails to bring the man back with him after having
stayed long enough for the desired object, his wife and children
shall be hanged and his house burnt. "I was myself," he adds,
"constrained to have recourse to this method, and it succeeded."
'—Maine, International Law, 150–1.
- ↑ 'A monarch's
promises,' Alva writes to Philip II. (1573), 'were not to be
considered so sacred as those of humbler mortals. Not that the king
should directly violate his word, but at the same time,' continued
the Duke, 'I have thought all my life, and I have learned it from
the Emperor, your Majesty's father, that the negotiations of kings
depend upon different principles from those of us private gentlemen
who walk the world; and in this manner I always observe that your
Majesty's father, who was so great a gentleman and so powerful a
prince, conducted his affairs.'—Motley, Dutch Republic,
Pt. 3, ch. 9.
More than one historian has pointed out as a merit of Louis XI.
(1461–83), that it was he who substituted in government
intellectual means for material means, craft for force, Italian
policy for feudal policy. There was plenty of lying and of fraud,
but it was a marked improvement in the tactics of power to put
persuasion, address, skilful handling of men, into the place of
impatient, reckless resort to naked force. Since the days of Louis
XI., so it is argued, we have made a further advance; we have
introduced publicity and open dealing instead of lies, and justice
instead of egotism.—Guizot's Hist. de la Civilisation en
Europe, xi. p. 307.
- ↑ The late Lord
Lytton delivered a highly interesting address, on National and
Individual Morality Compared, when he was Lord Rector at
Glasgow, and he said this about the case of the Duc d'Enghien: 'The
first Napoleon committed many such offences against private
morality. But the language of private morality cannot be applied to
his public acts without limitations. The kidnapping of the Duc
d'Enghien, and his summary execution after a sham trial, was about
as bad an act as well could be. But I should certainly hesitate to
describe it as a murder in the ordinary sense. Morally, I think, it
was worse than many murders for which men have been tried and
punished by law. But I do not think that the English Government in
1815 could, with any sort of propriety, have delivered up Napoleon
to Louis XVIII., to be tried for that offence like a common
criminal.'
- ↑ Life and
Writings of Mazzini (ed. 1891), vi. 275–6.
- ↑ Popular
Government. By Sir Henry Maine. 1885, p. 99.
A recent German pamphlet (Promachiavell, von Friedrich
Thudichum: Stuttgart, 1897) hopes for a second Machiavelli, who
will trace out for us, 'with rich experiences and a genial artistic
hand,' the inner soul of the Jesuit and of the Demagogue.—p.
107.
- ↑ See an
interesting chapter by Professor Nys of Brussels, Les
Publicistes Espagnols du 16ième Siècle (1890).
- ↑ Nys, Les
Précurseurs de Grotius, p. 128.
During the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries Machiavelli's
maxims became the centre of a large body of literature, of which
the reader will find a full account in Ferrari's Hist. de la
Raison d'Etat, part ii. Some interesting points on the
Neo-Machiavellism of the nineteenth century are marked by Henry
Sidgwick, in his little volume Practical Ethics (1898),
pp. 52–83.