Mohamed al-Kahtani: Wikis

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Mohamed Mani Ahmad al-Kahtani
Mohammed al Quahtani.jpg
Born 1979 (age 30–31)
Dalam, Saudi Arabia
Detained at Guantanamo
Alternate name Muhammed Al Kahtani
ISN 63
Charge(s) Charged February 2008, after six years of extrajudicial detention -- was subjected to torture in 2002; charges dropped in May 2008; habeas case reinstated.
Occupation businessman

Mohamed Mani Ahmad al-Kahtani (Arabic: محمد مانع أحمد القحطاني‎, Muḥammad Māniʾ ʼAḥmad al-Qaḥṭānī) — sometimes transliterated Muhammed al-Qahtani — is currently detained in Camp Four of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. He was born in 1979 in Dalam, Saudi Arabia. Mohammed is a Saudi national from a large Bedouin family. His father served as a police officer for 28 years. Mohammed’s mother remained at home to raise her thirteen children. Mohammed has eight brother and four sisters, who range in age from 42 – 14 years of age. According to family members, his favorite class in school was art. He has no criminal record and no record of any violence.

Mohammed al-Kahtani allegedly intended to come to the United States to take part in the September 11, 2001 attacks as a "muscle hijacker". Mustafa al-Hawsawi, one of the organizers of the September 11 attacks, referred to al-Kahtani in intercepted telephone calls as "the last one" to "complete the group". Mohammad al-Kahtani was refused entry due to suspicions that he was attempting to immigrate. Since January 2002, al-Kahtani has been extrajudicially detained in the Guantanamo Bay detention camps.

Contents

Documented abuses while in Guantanamo

At Guantánamo, Mohammed Al Kahtani was subjected to a regime of aggressive interrogation techniques, known as the “First Special Interrogation Plan” that were authorized by US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and implemented under the supervision and guidance of Secretary Rumsfeld and the commander of Guantánamo, Major General Geoffrey Miller.[1]

In November 2006, senior investigators with the Defense Department's Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF) told msnbc.com that military prosecutors said al-Kahtani would be "unprosecutable" because he was tortured during interrogation.[2]

Susan Crawford, a senior Pentagon official, stated on January 14, 2009 that "his treatment met the legal definition of torture...The techniques they used were all authorized, but the manner in which they applied them was overly aggressive". As convening authority of military commissions, Crawford is responsible for overseeing Guantanamo practices.[3]

Charged before a military commission

The original ten presidentially-authorized Military Commissions were convened in the former terminal building in the discontinued airfield on the Naval Base's Eastern Peninsula.
The Bush Presidency planned to hold up to 80 of the new Congressionally authorized Military Commissions in a $12 million tent city.[4]

The New York Times reported on February 9, 2008 that the Office of Military Commissions was close to laying charges against six of the more high value detainees, including Al Qahtani.[5]

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Charges laid

He was charged on February 11, 2008 with war crimes and murder, and faces the death penalty if convicted.[5]

Gitanjali Gutierrez, an attorney with the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), will be representing al-Kahtani against the war crime and murder charges. Attorneys at CCR denounce the systematic use of torture as well as challenge the validity of the military commission and the use of evidence obtained via torture in his death penalty case. In a recent press release, CCR claimed that “the military commissions at Guantanamo allow secret evidence, hearsay evidence, and evidence obtained through torture. They are unlawful, unconstitutional, and a perversion of justice.” [6]

Charges dropped

On May 11, 2008 the charges against Mohamed were dropped.[7][8] Commander Jeffrey Gordon, a Pentagon spokesman, told reporters that it was possible for the charges to be re-instated, at a later date, because they had been dropped "without prejudice". The reasons for the dismissal were not made public.

New charges announced

On 18 November 2008 Chief Prosecutor Lawrence Morris announced that he was filing new charges against al Qahtani.[9] When announcing the new charges Morris stated that the new charges were based on “independent and reliable evidence”. He stated:

“His conduct is significant enough that he falls into the category of people who ought to be held accountable by being brought to trial.”

Crawford orders charges dropped due to torture

Susan Crawford, the senior official in charge of the Office of Military Commissions has the final authority over whether charges were laid. On January 14, 2009 Crawford ruled that charges could not be laid against Al Qahtani because the interrogation techniques he was subjected to in Guantanamo rose to the level of torture.[10] Bryan Whitman, a DoD spokesman, claimed the techniques were legal, at the time they were applied.

al Kahtani's habeas case reinstated

Mr. al Kahtani's habeas corpus case was reinstated in July 2008 after the Supreme Court ruled on Boumediene v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States, stating that Guantanamo detainees have a constitutional right to habeas corpus.[11]

Arrest and deportation by US immigration

On August 3, 2001, al-Kahtani flew into Orlando, Florida, from Dubai. He was questioned by officials dubious he could support himself with only $2,800 cash to his name, and suspicious that he intended to become an illegal immigrant as he was using a one-way ticket.[12] He was sent back to Dubai, and subsequently returned to Pakistan.

Second capture, transfer to Guantanamo

Captured in the Battle of Tora Bora, al-Kahtani was sent to the United States Navy base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. He continued giving a false name, and insisting he had been in the area solely pursuing an interest in falconry.[12]

After ten months, U.S. authorities took a fingerprint sample and discovered that he was the same person who had tried to enter the United States just before the September 11th attacks. Seizing the airport surveillance tapes, the FBI claimed they were able to identify the car of Mohammed Atta at the airport, ostensibly waiting to pick up al-Kahtani.[12]

He was interrogated.[13] After details of his status were leaked, the US Department of Defense issued a press release stating that Kahtani had admitted:

  • He had been sent to the US by Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the lead architect of the 9/11 attack;
  • That he had met Osama Bin Laden on several occasions;
  • That he had received terrorist training at two al-Qaeda camps;
  • That he had been in contact with many senior al-Qaeda leaders.

Another military account stated that Mohammed Al Qahtani was identified as someone who had previously been turned away due to visa problems—by fingerprints, "taken in Southwest Asia".[14]

Shortly after September 26, 2002, a Gulfstream jet carrying David Addington, Alberto Gonzales, John Rizzo, William Haynes II, two Justice Department lawyers, Alice S. Fisher and Patrick F. Philbin, and the Office of Legal Counsel's Jack Goldsmith flew to Camp Delta to view al-Kahtani, then to Charleston, South Carolina to view Jose Padilla, and finally to Norfolk, Virginia to view Yaser Esam Hamdi.[12]

Interrogation log

On March 3, 2006, Time magazine published the secret log of 49 days of 20-hour-per-day interrogation.[15][16] The log described how al-Kahtani was forcibly administered intravenous fluids, and drugs, and was forcibly given enemas, in order to keep his body functioning well enough for the interrogations to go on.

The log, titled SECRET ORCON INTERROGATION LOG DETAINEE 063, offers a daily, detailed view of the interrogation techniques used to obtain confession from him from November 23, 2002, to January 11, 2003. These include the following:

  • Restraint on a swivel chair for long periods
  • Deprivation of sleep for long periods
  • Loud music and white noise played to prevent the detainee from sleeping
  • Various humiliations, such as training the detainee to act as a dog and forcing him to watch puppet shows depicting sexual acts between him and Osama bin Laden at his mock birthday party.
  • Lowering the temperature in the room, then throwing water to the detainee's face
  • Forcing the detainee to pray to Osama Bin Laden
  • Various interrogation techniques described as "pride & ego down", "circumstantial evidence", "fear-up", or "Al Qaeda falling apart"
  • Threats of extraordinary rendition to countries that torture more than the United States
  • Threats made against his family, including female members
  • Strip searches
  • Body searches
  • Forced nudity, including in the presence of female personnel
  • Forced to submit to an enema.
  • Prohibiting detainee from praying for prolonged times and during Ramadan
  • Threatening to desecrate the Koran in front of him
  • Forced to pick up trash with his hands cuffed while being called "a pig"
  • Placed in prolonged stress positions
  • Placed in tight restraints for many months or days and nights
  • Beatings
  • Exposure to low temperatures for prolonged times
  • Forcible administration of IVs by medical staff during interrogation, which were described by Mr. al-Kahtani as "repetitive stabs" each day

At no point during the interrogation log does al-Kahtani explicitly admit to being a member of Al Qaeda, although his stated reasons for travelling to the United States and Afghanistan - what the US interrogators refer to as his cover story - appear inconsistent. Furthermore, the entry for January 1, 2003 relates how al-Kahtani blames Osama bin Laden for deceiving the 19 9/11 hijackers ("his friends"):

2A0780 asked how one man, Bin Laden, convince [sic] 19 young men to kill themselves, (detainee was starting to fade he was going in and out of sleep.) The question was repeated, detainee stated that they were tricked, that he distorted the picture if [sic] front of them, 2A0780 asked detainee if this made him mad, detainee stated yes, (detainee did not realize that 2A780 [sic] had not started putting detainee into the picture) 2A0780 asked detainee if he was mad that his friends had been tricked, detainee said yes. 2A0780 asked detainee if his friends knew about the plan, detainee said no, 2A0780 asked if detainee knew about the plan, detainee stated that he didn't know. 2A0780 asked detainee if it made him mad that he killed his friends, detainee stated yes. 2A0780 asked detainee if he was glad that he didn’t die on the plane, detainee stated yes. 2A0780 asked detainee if his parents were happy that he didn’t die detainee stated yes. 2A0780 stated "he killed your friends" detainee stated yes.[17]

When asked about his greatest sins in his life, al-Kahtani responded that he had not taken care of his parents properly, had not finished school and had not been able to repay $20,000 he had borrowed from his aunt.

Recantation

On March 3, 2006, al-Kahtani's lawyer was allowed to reveal that her client had recanted the accusations he had levelled against his fellow detainees.[18] He had told his lawyer that he was forced to falsely confess, and name names, in order to get his "extended interrogation" to end. Al-Kahtani had accused 30 other detainees of being former bodyguards of Osama bin Laden.

Prospects of trial uncertain

In November 2006, senior investigators with the Defense Department's Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF) told msnbc.com that they were told by military prosecutors that al-Kahtani would be "unprosecutable" because of what was done to him during interrogation.[19]

Post interrogation conditions of incarceration

On September 6, 2006, President Bush announced that 14 detainees who had been held in previously secret overseas CIA interrogation centres, and subjected to interrogation techniques, like waterboarding and mock executions, had been sent to Guantanamo. The Washington Post reports that the new inmates will be held in conditions similar to those imposed on al-Kahtani, including isolation and 24 hours of continuous light.[20]

Combatant Status Review

Initially the Bush administration asserted they could withhold the protections of the Geneva Conventions from captives in the War on Terror, while critics argued the Conventions obligated the United States to conduct competent tribunals to determine the status of prisoners.[21] Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted Combatant Status Review Tribunals, to determine whether the captives met the new definition of an "enemy combatant".

Detainees do not have the right to a lawyer before the CSRTs or to access the evidence against them. The CSRTs are not bound by the rules of evidence that would apply in court, and the government’s evidence is presumed to be “genuine and accurate.”[22]

From July 2004 through March 2005, a CSRT was convened to make a determination whether each captive had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Mohamed al-Kahtani was among the one-third of prisoners for whom there was no indication they chose to participate in their tribunals.[23]

In the landmark case Boumediene v. Bush, the U.S. Supreme Court found that CSRTs are not an adequate substitute for the constitutional right to challenge one's detention in court, in part because they do not have the power to order detainees released.[24] The Court also found that "there is considerable risk of error in the tribunal’s findings of fact."[25]

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for the tribunal, listing the alleged facts that led to his detainment. His memo accused him of the following:

[26]:

a. The detainee is a member of al Qaida:
  1. The detainee swore a bayat to Usama Bin Laden.
  2. The detainee received training in the use of small arms, grenades, small unit tactics, and specialized weapons at a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan.
  3. The detainee was sent to the United States by al Qaida to "serve your religion" and "do something good."
  4. The detainee was denied entry into the United States by INS officials on 04 August 2001.
b. The detainee participated in military operations against the United States and its coalition partners.
  1. The detainee was present with Usama Bin Laden at the battle of Tora Bora.
  2. The detainee retreated along with 29 other mujahadeen from Tora Bora to the Pakistani Border, where they were captured by Pakistani Forces in December 2001.

Publication of captives' CSR Tribunal documents

Mohammed Al Qahtani had a writ of habeas corpus filed on his behalf.[27] In September 2007 the Department of Justice published dossiers of unclassified documents arising from the Combatant Status Review Tribunals of 179 captives.[28 ] The unclassified documents arising from Mohammed al Qahtani's CSR Tribunal were withheld. The US Government has not offered an explanation as to why Al Qahtani's unclassified documents have been withheld.

Administrative Review Board hearings

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[29]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat—or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

First annual Administrative Review Board hearing

The factors for and against his continued detention were [30]

Primary factors in favor of continued detention

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee said he first traveled to Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia around the beginning of 2001 to participate in jihad, which he deemed a religious obligation. Once in Afghanistan, the detainee attended training at the al Farouq training camp.
  2. The detainee said he completed his training approximately three months after he entered Afghanistan, and he was then compelled to swear bayat to Usama bin Laden. The detainee stated he did this in person with Usama bin Laden, without any witnesses, while at Usama bin Laden's residence in Kandahar.
  3. The detainee stated that sometimes in the summer of 2001, after he swore bayat to Usama bin Laden, he was approached and asked to conduct a martyr mission from Usama bin Laden.
  4. At the time the detainee agreed to conduct the mission there was no specific plan in place, however, the detainee knew that his bayat and obligation he would be called upon at a later time to conduct a martyr mission.
  5. The detainee said his decision to agree to conduct a mission stemmed from three basic fatwas. First was a fatwa in which he felt obliged to participate in jihad in Afghanistan. Second was a fatwa in which he felt obligated to swear bayat to Usama bin Laden. And third was a fatwa in which the detainee felt obligated to do whatever Usama bin Laden asked of him, including conducting a martyr mission, because he had sworn bayat to Usama bin Laden.
  6. The detainee was instructed by a senior al Qaida official to obtain British and United States visas. The detainee was then provided airline tickets from Dubai to London to Orlando by his facilitator.
  7. The detainee traveled to Orlando, Florida on 4 August 2001. He was unable answer questions at airport customs and did not have a return ticket. After being denied entry into the United States, he returned to Dubai, United Arab Emirates. He applied for a second United States visa, and after it was denied he traveled to Afghanistan.
  8. The detainee answered affirmatively when asked whether he would have completed whatever mission he was assigned when going to the United States.
b. Training
  1. The detainee stated that after the completion of his basic training at al Farouq, he attended a city tactics course in Kandahar, Afghanistan, which lasted approximately one and a half months.
  2. The detainee attended al Farouq training [sic] for a total of five to six months. His initial training lasted approximately two to three months and consisted of indoctrination, small arms (AK-47, handguns, grenades), and physical training. His advanced training also lasted approximately two to three months and consisted of small unit tactics and specialized weapons training.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee identified two senior al Qaida members. He admitted to knowing these two individuals and meeting them in a safe house in Kandahar, Afghanistan prior to 11 September 2001.
  2. The detainee met personally with Usama bin Laden on four different occasions.
  3. In February 2001 the detainee traveled from the Arab guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan to Usama bin Laden's house in Kandahar, Afghanistan to give his allegiance to Usama bin Laden.
  4. In April 2001, after graduating from advanced training, the detainee visited Usama bin Laden at his house to honor and praise him. The detainee told Usama bin Laden that he would continue to serve him as he would the prophet Mohammad. During this visit, Usama bin Laden instructed the detainee to contact a senior al Qaida official for instructions on how to serve his religion.
  5. In June 2001, on his own initiative, the detainee met with Usama bin Laden again at Usama bin Laden's house in Kandahar, Afghanistan to greet him and to tell him he was ready for his mission to the United States. Usama bin Laden called a senior al Qaida official and advised him that the detainee had returned from the front line and was ready to complete his mission to America.
  6. In August 2001 the detainee met Usama bin Laden again at Usama bin Laden's house in Kandahar after the detainee returned from his failed mission to the United States.
  7. When the detainee returned to Afghanistan after his failed mission to America, he saw a known suicide bomber at different guesthouses on two separated occasions.
  8. The detainee was detained while trying to cross into Pakistan from Afghanistan on 15 December 2001 with 30 suspected al Qaida members.

Primary factors in favor of release or transfer

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11, and he also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.
b. The detainee insisted that he was a different person now than he was back in the summer of 2001. He then insisted that he would not have done a mission that involved killing women and children. The detainee said he would have refused to participate in that type of operation and would have asked that he be allowed to return to Afghanistan.

Transcript

There is no record that Mohammed al-Qahtani participated in his first annual Administrative Review Board hearing.

Second annual Administrative Review Board hearing

He did attend his second annual Administrative Review Board hearing.[31]

Enemy Combatant election form

Mohammed al-Qahtani's Assisting Military Officer report that they met for a pre-hearing interviews on October 12, 2006 and October 13, 2006. His Assisting Military Officer described him as "cooperative and attentive".

Primary factors in favor of continued detention

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee stated he first traveled to Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia around the beginning of 2001 in order to participate in jihad, which he deemed a religious obligation. Once in Afghanistan, the detainee attended training at the al Farouq training camp.
  2. The detainee stated he completed his training approximately three months after he entered Afghanistan, and he was then compelled to swear bayat to Usama bin Laden. The detainee stated he did this in person with Usama bin Laden, without any witnesses, while at Usama bin Laden's residence in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
  3. The detainee stated that sometime in the summer of 2001, after he swore bayat to Usama bin Laden, the detainee was approached and asked to conduct a martyr mission for Usama bin Laden.
  4. The detainee was instructed by a senior al Qaida operative to obtain British and United States visas. The detainee was then provided airline tickets from Dubai, United Arab Emirates through London, England to Orlando, Florida.
  5. The detainee stated that at the time he agreed to conduct the mission there was no specific plan in place. However the detainee knew that per his bayat and obligation, he would be called upon at a later time to conduct a martyr mission.
  6. The detainee stated he traveled to Orlando, Florida, on 4 August 2001. The detainee was unable to answer questions at airport customs and did not have a return ticket. After being denied entry into the United States, the detainee returned to Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The detainee applied for a second United States visa and after it was denied, he traveled to Afghanistan.
  7. The detainee stated his decision for agreeing to conduct a mission stemmed from three basic fatwas. First was a fatwa in which the detainee felt obligated to participate in jihad in Afghanistan. Second was a fatwain which the detainee felt obligated to swear bayat to Usama bin Laden. The third was a fatwa in which the detainee felt obligated to do whatever Usama bin Laden asked of him; including conducting a martyr mission, because he had given bayat to Usama bin Laden.
  8. When asked whether he would have completed whatever mission he was assigned when going to the United States, the detainee nodded head [sic] indicating he would.
b. Training
  1. The detainee stated after the completion of his basic training at al Farouq, he attended a city tactic course in Kandahar, Afghanistan, which lasted approximately one and a half months.
  2. The detainee attended al Farouq Training Camps for a total of five to six months; initial training lasted approximately two to three months and consisted of indoctrination, small arms (AK, handguns, grenades) and physical training. The second advanced segment of training also lasted approximately two to three months and consisted of small unit tactics and specialized weapons training.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee identified two senior al Qaida members. The detainee admitted to knowing these two individuals and meeting them in a safe house in Kandahar, Afghanistan prior to 11 September 2001.
  2. The detainee stated that on approximately 12 February 2001, he traveled from the Arab guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan to Usama bin Laden's house in Kandahar, Afghanistan to give his allegiance to Usama bin Laden.
  3. The detainee stated that on approximately 24 April 2001, after graduating from advanced, he visited Usama bin Laden at his house to honor and praise him. The detainee told Usama bin Laden that he would continue to serve him as he would the prophet Mohammed. During this visit, Usama bin Laden instructed the detainee to contact a senior al Qaida official for instructions on how to serve his religion.
  4. The detainee stated that on approximately 22 June 2001, on his own initiative, he met with Usama bin Laden again at Usama bin Laden's house in Kandahar, Afghanistan to greet him and to tell him that he was ready for his mission to the United States. Usama bin Laden called a senior al Qaida operative and advised him that the detainee had returned from the front line and was ready to complete his mission to America.
  5. The detainee stated that on approximately 27 August 2001, he met Usama bin Laden again at Usama bin Laden's house in Kandahar, Afghanistan after the detainee returned from his failed mission to the United States.
  6. The detainee was detained while trying to cross into Pakistan from Afghanistan on 15 December 2001 with thirty suspected al Qaida members.
  7. The detainee stated that when he returned to Afghanistan after his failed mission to America he saw a known suicide bomber at different guest houses on separate occasions.

Primary factors in favor of release or transfer

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United Stated or United States' interest.
b. The detainee insisted he is a different person now than he was back in the summer of 2001. He then insisted that he would not have done a mission that involved killing women and children. The detainee said that he would have refused to participate in that type of operation and would have asked that he be allowed to return to Saudi Arabia.[32]

Mohammed al Qahtani's written statement

Mohammed al Qahtani provided a written statement where he denied all the allegations against him and stated that it was all based on confessions coerced from him during the months when he was being subjected to extended interrogation methods.

He said that all the information he confessed to had been offered to him by his interrogators.

He said that when the use of extreme interrogation techniques were curtailed, in early 2003, he had insisted to his interrogators that none of the information coerced from him through the use of extreme interrogation techniques was true.

He insisted he was a businessman who did not believe in violence.

Mohammed al Qahtani's Comments from his Enemy Combatant election form

Mohammed al Qahtani's Assisting Military Officer read out:

In response to any of the statements in the Unclassified Summary of Evidence that mention that he swore bayat to Osama bin Laden, or that he wanted to be a martyr, the detainee disagreed stating they were not true. The detainee stated that he told those thing to the interrogators when he was being tortured a few months after he arrived at Camp X-ray, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Mohammed al Qahtani added that he had never said any of those things.

Board Member:

I am a little confused. The statement that was just read said that you told the interrogators these things about swearing bayat and wanting to be a martyr. Reading from the statement, "when he was being tortured a few months after he arrived at Camp X-ray, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba", the statement you just made, as translated, said that you never even said these things. Which one is it?

Mohammed al Qahtani:

Since you asked about it, I will respond and I will make my statement later on. I said some of the stuff while I was under torture. I never said some of the other things that are written. Whether under torture or on my own. I have never said that I swore bayat to Usama bin Laden or that I wanted to be a martyr.

Board Member: Thank you.
Mohammed al Qahtani:

You are welcome.

Even during the interrogations, they never heard that from me. There might be a confusion or a mix up that it was written that way.

Board Member: Did you ever meet with Usama bin Laden?
Mohammed al Qahtani:

Are we starting to have questions and answers? I thought I was going to speak about this later on and because of the time.

Presiding Officer:

In that case we will wait to ask that question if we need to ask it later so you can make that statement.

Mohammed al Qahtani: To answer your question, no.

Translation problems

Mohammed al Qahtani's Presiding Officer noticed that the version of his statement that had been previously translated into English and distributed to the Board members differed markedly from the version read out by the translator.

Concluding statements

Mohammed al Qahtani's Presiding Officer thanked him for being respectful. His Presiding Officer said he hoped he appreciated that they had been patient and respectful in return. His Presiding Officer explicitly stated that they heard his account of torture, and they would bear it in mind when they were presented with the classified evidence. His Presiding Officer encouraged him to encourage other captives to attend their Board hearings.

Board members wanted to ask Mohammed al Qahtani questions about his statement, and his responses to the allegations against him. His Presiding Officer ruled that Mohammed al Qahtani had been clear that he wanted to follow his lawyer's advice and decline from answering questions. Mohammed al Qahtani offered this final concluding statement:

To be honest with you, I just want to summarize the most important things to you. I just want to mention to you that there are other things that happened like torture and abuse. I do not want to put the image of the United States down. To be honest with you, I have been here five years and I have mentioned any of these things to the outside because I do not want to ruin the reputation of the United States military. That's not proper. Let's be more serious and more practical. I just want to mention to you about the torture and the things that happened to me. I just want to talk about what was said regarding me in the past and also prove to you that in the future I will not pose any threat to you or the United States.

Third annual Administrative Review Board hearing

A four page Summary of Evidence memo was prepared on January 17, 2008 for Al Qahtani's third annual review.[33]

See also

References

  1. ^ "Interrogation Log Detainee 063" (PDF). Center for Constitutional Rights. 2002-11-23. http://ccrjustice.org/files/Publication_AlQahtaniLog.pdf. Retrieved 2008-02-29.  
  2. ^ "Can the ‘20th hijacker’ of Sept. 11 stand trial? Aggressive interrogation at Guantanamo may prevent his prosecution". October 24 2006. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15361462/. Retrieved 2006-11-05.  
  3. ^ "Detainee Tortured, Says U.S. Official". http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/13/AR2009011303372.html. Retrieved 2009-01-14.  
  4. ^ Carol Rosenberg (2007-09-06). "Big Savings: Trials in tents". Miami Herald. http://www.miamiherald.com/1240/story/264882.html. Retrieved 2008-10-05.   mirror
  5. ^ a b "A Guantanamo Trial". New York Times. February 9, 2008. http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2008/02/09/washington/gitmoFull.gif. Retrieved 2008-02-10. "Mohammed al-Qahtani, (captured) December 2001, believed by US officials to have been the planned 20th hijacker. A month before the attacks, he flew to Orlando but was denied entry."  
  6. ^ "CCR challenges validity of military commissions and use of torture evidence in new death penalty cases". Center for Constitutional Rights. 2008-02-11. http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/ccr-challenges-validity-military-comissions-and-use-torture-evidence-new-dea. Retrieved 2008-02-28.  
  7. ^ "Key 9/11 suspect charges dropped". BBC News. May 13, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7398953.stm. Retrieved 2008-05-13.  
  8. ^ "Charges against 9/11 man dropped". The Australian. May 14, 2008. http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23696355-2703,00.html. Retrieved 2008-05-13.  
  9. ^ William Glaberson (2008-11-18). "Detainee Will Face New War-Crimes Charges". New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/us/19gitmo.html?bl&ex=1227243600&en=21630a148c19f857&ei=5087%0A. Retrieved 2008-11-20.   mirror
  10. ^ Donna Miles (2009-01-14). "Detainee Treatment Remains Key as Officials Weigh Guantanamo’s Future". American Forces Press Service. http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/news.php?storyId=1527. Retrieved 2009-07-24.  
  11. ^ "al Qahtani v. Bush, al Qahtani v. Gates". Center for Constitutional Rights. 2009-11-04. http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/al-qahtani-v.-bush%2C-al-qahtani-v.-gates. Retrieved 2009-11-04.  
  12. ^ a b c d Mayer, Jane, "The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned Into a War on American Ideals", 2008. p. 140
  13. ^ U.S. Said to Overstate Value of Guantánamo Detainees, New York Times, June 21, 2004
  14. ^ Donna Miles (2004-11-12). "Biometrics help to identify potential foes". The Morning Calm. http://imcom.korea.army.mil/imakoroweb/sites/local/news/MCW-PDF/2004/Vol3Issue6Nov12_2004.pdf. Retrieved 2009-02-26.   mirror
  15. ^ Interrogation log, US Department of Defense, November 23, 2002 through January 11, 2003
  16. ^ Steven Miles (2007). "Medical Ethics and the Interrogation of Guantanamo 063". The American Journal of Bioethics. http://bioethics.net/journal/j_articles.php?aid=1140. Retrieved 2009-03-25.  
  17. ^ Ibid. page 72. Reviewed on 2008-02-20.
  18. ^ Exclusive: "20th Hijacker" Claims That Torture Made Him Lie, Time, March 3, 2006
  19. ^ "Can the ‘20th hijacker’ of Sept. 11 stand trial? Aggressive interrogation at Guantanamo may prevent his prosecution". October 23 2006. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15361462/. Retrieved 2006-11-05.  
  20. ^ Guantanamo More Strict, Detainees Say: Defense Attorneys Relate Clients' 'Despair', Washington Post, September 8, 2006
  21. ^ "Q&A: What next for Guantanamo prisoners?". BBC News. 2002-01-21. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1773140.stm. Retrieved 2008-11-24.   mirror
  22. ^ Elsea, Jennifer K. (July 20, 2005). "Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: Report for Congress" (PDF). Congressional Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22173.pdf. Retrieved 2007-11-10.  
  23. ^ OARDEC, Index to Transcripts of Detainee Testimony and Documents Submitted by Detainees at Combatant Status Review Tribunals Held at Guantanamo Between July 2004 and March 2005, September 4, 2007
  24. ^ "Boumediene v. Bush". June 12, 2008. http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/06-1195.ZO.html. "... the procedural protections afforded to the detainees in the CSRT hearings ... fall well short of the procedures and adversarial mechanisms that would eliminate the need for habeas corpus review."  
  25. ^ "Boumediene v. Bush". June 12, 2008. http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/06-1195.ZO.html.  
  26. ^ OARDEC (October 21, 2004). "Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- AL QAHTANI, Muhammad Mani Ahmed Al Shai Lan". United States Department of Defense. pp. page 77. http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/000001-000100.pdf#77. Retrieved 2007-10-03.  
  27. ^ Gitanjali Gutierrez (2008-07-18). "Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation: Doc 159 -- Status report" (PDF). United States Department of Justice. http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1:2008mc00442/131990/159/0.pdf. Retrieved 2008-09-28.   mirror
  28. ^ OARDEC (August 8, 2007). "Index for CSRT Records Publicly Files in Guantanamo Detainee Cases" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/index_publicly_filed_CSRT_records.pdf. Retrieved 2007-09-29.  
  29. ^ (Spc Timothy Book (March 10, 2006). "Review process unprecedented". The Wire (JTF-GTMO). pp. 1. http://www.jtfgtmo.southcom.mil/wire/wire/WirePDF/v6/TheWire-v6-i049-10MAR2006.pdf#1. Retrieved 2007-10-12.  
  30. ^ OARDEC (October 31, 2005). "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Qahtani, Muhammad Mani Ahmed Al Shal Lan". United States Department of Defense. pp. page 91-93. http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/ARB_Round_1_Factors_000001-000098.pdf#91. Retrieved 2007-10-31.  
  31. ^ OARDEC (October 2006). "Summary of Evidence". United States Department of Defense. pp. pages 30-49. http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/ARB_Transcript_2000-2099.pdf#30. Retrieved 2007-11-10.  
  32. ^ As read out this factor said he would have asked to have been returned to Afghanistan, not Saudi Arabia. When Mohammed al Qahtani clarified this point his Presiding Officer directed the Board members to accept his word on the correction.
  33. ^ OARDEC (2008-01-17). "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Qahtani, Maad". United States Department of Defense. pp. pages 34-37. http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/08-F-0481_FactorsDocsBates510-650.pdf#34-37. Retrieved 2009-06-08.  

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