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Neutral monism, in philosophy, is the metaphysical view that the mental and the
physical are two ways of organizing or describing the very same
elements, which are themselves "neutral," that is, neither physical
nor mental. This view denies that the mental and the physical are
two fundamentally different things. Rather, neutral monism claims
the universe consists of only one kind of stuff, in the form of
neutral elements that are in themselves neither mental nor
physical. These neutral elements might have the properties of color
and shape, just as we experience those properties. But these shaped
and colored elements do not exist in a mind (considered as a
substantial entity, whether dualistically or physicalistically);
they exist on their own.
History
Some of the first views of the mind-body relationship in
philosophy can be attributed to C.D. Broad who in one of
his early works known simply as Broad's famous list of 1925 stated
the basis of what this theory was to become, no less than nine of
seventeen of his mind-body relationship theories are now classified
as falling under the category of Neutral monism. There are
considerably few self-proclaimed neutral monists, most of the
philosophers who are seen to have this view were classified after
their deaths. Some examples of this are Baruch Spinoza (1632-77), David Hume (1711-1776),
Ernst Mach
(1838-1916), Richard Avenarius (1843-96) and
Joseph Petzoldt (1862-1929)
William
James
James propounded the notion in his essay "Does Consciousness
Exist?" in 1904 (reprinted in Essays in Radical Empiricism in
1912).[1]
- Some subset of these elements form individual minds: the
subset of just the experiences that you have for the day, which are
accordingly just so many neutral elements that follow upon one
another, is your mind as it exists for that day. If instead you
described the elements that would constitute the sensory experience
of rock by the path, then those elements constitute that rock. They
do so even if no one observes the rock. The neutral elements exist,
and our minds are constituted by some subset of them, and that
subset can also be seen to constitute a set of empirical
observations of the objects in the world. All of this, however, is
just a matter of grouping the neutral elements in one way or
another, according to a physical or a psychological (mental)
perspective.
Bertrand
Russell
Bertrand
Russell 1921 later adopted a similar position to that of
William James[2].
Russell quotes from James's essay "Does 'consciousness' exist?" as
follows:
- "My thesis is," [James] says, "That if we start with the
supposition that there is only one primal stuff or material in the
world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call that
stuff 'pure experience,' then knowing can easily be explained as a
particular sort of relation towards one another into which portions
of pure experience may enter. The relation itself is a part of pure
experience; one of its 'terms' becomes the subject or bearer of the
knowledge, the knower, the other becomes the object known (p.
4)"[3].
Russell summarizes this notion as follows:
- "James's view is that the raw material out of which the world
is built up is not of two sorts, one matter and the other mind, but
that it is arranged in different patterns by its inter-relations,
and that some arrangements may be called mental, while others may
be called physical"[4].
Russell observes that "the same view of 'consciousness' is set
forth in [James's] succeeding essay, "a World of Pure Experience"
(ib., pp. 39-91)"[5]. In
addition to the role of James, Russell observes the role of two
American Realists:
- "the American realists . . . Professor R. B. Perry of Harvard
and Mr. Edwin B. Holt . . . have derived a strong impulsion from
James, but have more interest than he had in logic and mathematics
and the abstract part of philosophy. They speak of "neutral"
entities as the stuff out of which both mind and matter are
constructed. Thus Holt says: '... perhaps the least dangerous name
is neutral-stuff.'"[6].
Russell goes on to agree with James and in part with the
"American realists":
- "My own belief -- for which the reasons will appear in
subsequent lectures -- is that James is right in rejecting
consciousness as an entity, and that the American realists are
partly right, though not wholly, in considering that both mind and
matter are composed of a neutral-stuff which, in isolation is
neither mental nor material"[7].
David
Chalmers
David
Chalmers [8]
considers the consciousness of rocks as well as thermostats,
althoutgh he eschews the notion that rocks are conscious: "I do not
think it is strictly accurate to say that rocks (for example) have
experiences . . . although rocks may have experiences associated
with them. ... Personally, I am much more confident of naturalistic
dualism than I am of panpsychism. The latter issue seems to be very
much open. But I hope to have said enough to show that we ought to
take the possibility of some sort of panpsychism serious: there are
seem to be no knockdown arguments against the view, and there are
various positive reasons why one might embrace it." (Chalmers
1996:299)
In his 2002 Consciousness and its Place in Nature
Chalmers carefully considers neutral monism and panpsychism,
variants of what he calls "Type-F Monism"[9].
He admits that "The type-F view is admittedly speculative and it
can sound strange at first hearing. Many find it extremely
counterintuitive to suppose that fundamental physical systems have
phenomenal properties: e.g. that there is something it is like to
be an electron"[9].
Other
considerations
In strict parlance, neutral monism should be distinguished from
dual-aspect monism, which holds that all existence consists of one
kind (hence monism) of primal
substance, which in itself is neither mental nor physical, but is capable of distinct
mental and physical aspects or attributes that are two faces of the same
underlying reality in the one substance.
Emergent materialism is another
form of metaphysical monism that respects both mind and matter.
See also
References
and notes
- ^
William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, New York:
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912.
- ^
Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind, London, G. Allen
& Unwin; New York, Macmillan, 1921.
- ^
r.e. "(p. 4)" see next footnotes about source of James's quote. The
James quote appears at Russell 1921:10.
- ^
Russell 1921:10
- ^
Russell 1921:10. The ibid refers to footnote #5 on Russell
1921:9 with regards to the quotes from James derived from
Journal of Philosopy, Psychology and Scientific Method's," vol.
i, 1904. Reprinted in "Essays in Radical Empiricism (Longmans,
Green & Co., 1912), pp. 1-38.
- ^
Russell 1921:10-11
- ^
Russell 1921:11
- ^
1996:293-301 "4. Is Experience Ubiquitous?" which includes
subsections What is it like to be a thermostat?,
Whither pansychism?, and Constraining the
double-aspect principle
- ^ a
b
Chalmers 2002:264-267
Sources
- "Monism". Columbia
Encyclopedia. Columbia University Press. 2008. http://education.yahoo.com/reference/encyclopedia/entry/monism. Retrieved
2008-09-23.
- Bertrand Russell (1921) The Analysis of Mind,
republished 2005 by Dover Publications, Inc., Mineola, NY, ISBN
0-486-44551-8 (pbk.)
- Andrew Gluck (2007) Damasio's Error and Descartes' Truth:
An Inquiry into Epistemology, Metaphysics, and Consciousness,
University of Scranton Press, Scranton PA, ISBN 978-1-58966-127-1
((pb)).
- David Chalmers (1996) The Conscious Mind: In Search of a
Fundamental Theory, Oxford University Press, New York, ISBN
0-19-511789-1 (Pbk.)
- David Chalmers ed. (2002) Philosophy of Mind: Classical and
Contemporary Readings, Oxford University Press, New York, ISBN
0-19-514581-X (pbk. : alk. paper).
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