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The Beagle Conflict
Main: Beagle conflict
1881–1970: Beagle Channel cartography
1971–1977: Beagle Channel Arbitration
1977–1978: Direct Negotiations
1978: Operation Soberanía
1979–1984: Papal Mediation
1984: Treaty of Peace and Friendship
Mine field in Isla Grande de Tierra del Fuego, photograph from 2006.

In 1971 Chile and Argentina agreed to binding arbitration to settle a boundary dispute (Beagle Channel Arbitration). On 22 May 1977 Queen Elizabeth II announced the judgment, which awarded the Picton, Nueva and Lennox islands to Chile. On 25 January 1978 Argentina rejected the decision and attempted to militarily coerce[1][2][3][4] Chile into negotiating a division of the islands that would produce a maritime boundary consistent with Argentine claims.

The Argentine military planned an operation codenamed "Operación Soberanía" (Operation Sovereignty). The date for the assault was fixed for either 21 or 22 December 1978.

Contents

The military imbalance

At the time of the crisis, the Argentine military was substantially larger than that of Chile; in addition, the Chilean regime was more politically isolated and had suffered deteriorating relations with its chief suppliers of arms. The Chilean military, however, had the advantage of defending difficult terrain, as well as being a more professional force[5][6][7][8]. On the other hand decades of intervention by the Argentine armed forces in day-to-day politics had degraded their professional skills[9].

There was considerable international condemnation of the Chilean regime's human rights record, with the United States expressing particular concern after Orlando Letelier's 1976 assassination in Washington D.C. The United States banned the export of weapons to Chile through the Kennedy Amendment, later International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976[10][11]. 16 Northrop F-5's were delivered to Chile before the embargo took effect, but they arrived without any armament.[12]. In 1980 Chile was excluded from UNITAS joint naval maneuvers because of human rights violations[13]. Germany[14], Austria[15] and the United Kingdom[16], the traditional supplier of the Chilean Armed Forces, did not supply weapons to Chile.

Galtieri during military drill in Malargüe, Mendoza

France, Germany, and Austria continued the export of weapons to Argentina even during the critical phase of the Beagle conflict, as Argentina had already rejected the international binding Arbitral Award. In December 1978, when the outbreak of war appeared unavoidable, the German shipbuilding and engineering works Blohm + Voss and the Argentine Junta agreed to the building of four destroyers[17]. In 1978 France sold two corvettes to Argentina, originally built for the apartheid Regime in South Africa. The corvettes, Good Hope and Transvaal, could not be delivered because of anti-apartheid embargos. In Argentina they were renamed ARA Drummond and ARA Guerrico .

In 1978, the United States extended the Kennedy amendment to Argentina because of its human rights record[18], although President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) would later improve relations[19].

The United Kingdom delivered Type 42 destroyers to the Argentine junta. On 19 September 1977 the ARA Hércules (built and completed in the UK) sailed to Argentina from the Vickers Shipbuilding yard in Barrow-in-Furness; on 28 November 1981 the ARA Santísima Trinidad (built in Argentina, completed in the UK) sailed from Portsmouth [20].

An overview of both countries' defence spending[21]:

1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Chile
defense spending* 487 566 713 951 1,128 949
percentage of the GNP 3.5 3.5 4.1 4.6 5.2
Argentina
defense spending* 2,702 2,225 2,339 2,641 2,126 2,241
percentage of the GNP 2.2 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.0


* Costs in Millions of USA Dollars 1979.

The Argentines' numerical advantage was counterbalanced by the following factors:

  • Chile spent a higher portion of its gross domestic product on defense
  • Defense is less risky than attack
  • The politicization of the Argentine armed forces diminished their military readiness[22]
  • The Andes mountain range is a difficult natural barrier[23] and the geography of the Tierra del Fuego provided advantages to Chilean naval forces in the immediate operational theatre[24]

The Ambassador of the United States in Argentina (1978) Raúl Castro described the attitude of the Argentine military towards a possible war with the following words:

"They supposed that they were going to invade Chile, Santiago especially. It seemed to them something very easy; Just a matter of crossing the border and that the Chileans were going to surrender right away. And I told them: No, no, you're are mistaken. They have a better Navy than yours. They are well armed, and are very strong"[25]

Augusto Pinochet foresaw a long and bloody war, a kind of partisan war:

"a guerrilla war, killing every day, shooting people, by both sides, and in the end, by a matter of fatigue, we would have reached peace"[26]

Argentina solicited a Peruvian attack in Chile's north, but Peru rejected this demand and ordered only a partial mobilitation.[27]

The Argentine Plan

Attack position of Argentine Forces during the Operation Soberania against Chile on 22. Dec. 1978.

No Argentine documents or statements concerning the planning of the war of aggression[28] against Chile have been released. But so many individual accounts exist among the Argentine ranks that the existence of a plan has not been disputed.

The Argentine Government planned to first occupy the islands around Cape Horn and then, in a second phase, either to stop or continue hostilities according to the Chilean reaction[29]. Argentina had already drafted a declaration of war.

An Argentine complaint in the UN Security Council over Chile's military occupation of the disputed islands was to precede the attack.

Rubén Madrid Murúa in "La Estrategia Nacional y Militar que planificó Argentina, en el marco de una estrategia total, para enfrentar el conflicto con Chile el año 1978", ("Memorial del Ejército de Chile", Edición Nº 471, Santiago, Chile, 2003, S. 54-55), stated that the Argentine General Staff planned the operation under the name "Planeamiento Conjunto de Operaciones Previstas contra Chile".

The Argentines planned amphibious landings to seize the islands southwards of the Beagle Channel, along with massive land-based attacks:

  1. at 20:00 on 22 December 1978 a task force of the Argentine Navy and the Naval Infantry (Batallón N° 5) under the command of Humberto José Barbuzzi would seize the islands Horn, Freycinet, Hershell, Deceit and Wollaston.
  2. at 22:00 on 22 December 1978 the Argentine task force (with Batallones N° 3 und N° 4 of the Naval Infantry) would seize Picton, Nueva und Lennox islands and secure for the navy the east mouth of the Beagle Channel.
  3. at 24:00 on 22 December 1978 the invasion of continental Chile would begin. The Fifth Army Corps under command of José Antonio Vaquero would seize Punta Arenas and Puerto Natales, the largest two cities of the Chilean Magallanes Region.
  4. at 06:00 on 23 December 1978 the Argentine Argentine Air Force would destroy the Chilean Air Force.
  5. Later, Third Army Corps under the command of Luciano Benjamín Menéndez would start an offensive through the Andean asses of "Libertadores", "Maipo" and "Puyehue" (today Cardenal Samore Pass) to seize Santiago, Valparaíso and the Los Lagos Region.

The Second Army Corps under the command of Leopoldo Galtieri would protect the north of Argentina from a potential Brazilian attack and its II Brigada de Caballería blindada would protect the Argentine region of Río Mayo in Chubut Province from a possible Chilean attack.

The Argentine Armed Forces expected between 30,000 and 50,000 dead in the course of the war.[30][31][32]

Plans after the invasion

For the postwar phase of the operation, the Argentine Navy prepared political instructions to be followed in the southern zone after the disputed islands were under Argentinian sovereignty. They defined the new border, navigation rights for Chilean ships, instructions in case of confrontations with the Chilean Navy, dealing with injured personnel, prisoners of war, etc.[33]

Chilean Preparedness

There was no surprise factor, since the Chilean military kept movements of the Argentine fleet under surveillance and monitored the buildup of Argentine troops. Chilean troops were deployed along the border, ready to stop an attack.

Chile planted mines in certain areas along its borders with Argentina, Bolivia and Peru[34] and dynamited some mountain passes[35].

The combat-ready Chilean fleet sailed on 22 December 1978 from the fjords of Hoste Island to frustrate an Argentine landing. Rear Admiral Raúl López, Chief of the Chilean fleet, kept silent as to whether he would simply wait or initiate an attack on the enemy navy.

Apart from the book «La escuadra en acción» about the Chilean Navy in 1978, no other Chilean defensive plans have been released.

The operation is aborted

Argentine General Luciano Benjamin Menendez inspects cavalry troops at the border to Chile on the eve of the war

On D-day, a severe storm impeded Argentine operations in the disputed area. Meanwhile Pope John Paul II, alarmed by the situation, decided to act personally and informed both governments that he was sending his personal envoy, Cardinal Antonio Samoré, to both capitals. Six hours before landing, the Argentine fleet turned back and Operation Soberanía was called off[36].

Whether the Argentine infantry actually crossed the border into Chile or only waited at the border for the result of the naval combat cannot be established. Argentine sources insist that they crossed the border[37][38], which would be inconsistent with the two-phase war plan.

Alejandro Luis Corbacho, in "Predicting the probability of war during brinkmanship crisis: The Beagle and the Malvinas conflicts" [3] considers the reasons for cancelling the operation (p. 45):

The newspaper Clarín explained some years later that such caution was based, in part, on military concerns. In order to achieve a victory, certain objectives had to be reached before the seventh day after the attack. Some military leaders considered this not enough time due to the difficulty involved in transportation through the passes over the Andean Mountains.

On p. 46:

According to Clarín, two consequences were feared. First, those who were dubious feared a possible regionalization of the conflict. Second, as a consequence, the conflict could acquire great power proportions. In the first case decisionmakers speculated that Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Brazil might intervene. Then the great powers could take sides. In this case, the resolution of the conflict would depend not on the combatants, but on the countries that supplied the weapons.

Analysis

Unlike the prelude to the 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands, from the beginning of Operation Soberania there were no critical misconceptions on Argentina's side about Chile's commitment to defend its territory: the entire Chilean Navy was in the disputed area, an unequivocal fact at Cape Horn[39]. Regarding the duties, resources and effectiveness of the Chilean navy, the Chilean newspaper El Mercurio on 18 January 1998 wrote[40]:

«… on 22 December 1978 the Chilean navy succeeded, met the challenge, the enemy fleet withdrew and the international crisis finished. There is nothing more corroborative than success.…»

The unyielding position of the United States that any military action would not be accepted was stated by U.S. National Security Advisor Robert Pastor to Argentine diplomats in Washington, D.C.[41]:

«…If you invade a simple rock, the government of the United States and its NATO allies will consider you the aggressor. …»

The Pope's intervention moved the Argentine junta to change their position and accept mediation and the immediate cessation of military operations.

Argentine Falklands War veteran Martín Balza, Chief of Staff of the Argentine Army (1991-1999), caused a stir in 2003 when he declared his conviction that in 1978, Chile would have won the war had it broken out.[42].

In a interview with the argentine magazin Perfil Basilio Lami Dozo, chief of the Argentine Air Force during the Falklands war, stated that Argentina purposed (again) to attack Chile after the Falklands war:

On top of that Leopoldo Galtieri said in a speech: "[Chile] have to know that what we are doing now, because they will be the next in turn.[43]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ See David R. Mares, Natural Gas Pipelines in the Southern Cone, Mai 2004, Working Paper #29, page 9, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Energy Forum, retrieved on 26 August 2008
  2. ^ See Alejandro Luis Corbacho, Predicting the Probability of War During Brinkmanship Crises: The Beagle and the Malvinas Conflicts, page 6, retrieved 26.August 2008:
    «When it became clear that the Chileans wanted full acceptance of the [Court of Arbitration] resolution, the Argentine position hardened, and Argentina began to challenge the Chilean commitment to defend the territory»
  3. ^ During a summit in Puerto Montt in February 1978 President of Argentina Jorge Videla threatened, See General Juan E. Gugliamelli: "Cuestión del Beagle. Negociación directa o diálogo de armas", (Spanish Language) compiled from articles in magazin "Estrategia", Buenos Aires Nr:49/50, January-Frebuary 1978:
    «… las negociaciones directas constituyen la única vía pacífica para solucionar el conflicto …»
    (Transl.:«…the direct negotiations are the only peaceful last resort to resolve the conflict …»)
  4. ^ See Rubén Madrid Murúa, "La Estrategia Nacional y Militar que planificó Argentina, en el marco de una estrategia total, para enfrentar el conflicto con Chile el año 1978", page 55:
    «Al no llegar a un acuerdo entre ambos países, comienza durante las diversas negociaciones, la tercera fase de su maniobra, pasando a una estrategia de la disuasión directa, efectuando para lo anterior actitudes de amedrentamiento, desplazamientos de fuerzas y aumento sistemático de las violaciones a los espacios aéreos y marítimos chilenos.»:
    (Transl.:«As the two nations didn't agree [to change the award], it began the third phase of the [Argentine] plan, coming to a strategy of direct dissuasion, with intimidation, strong-arm tactics and a systematic air and maritime Chilean space violations»)
  5. ^ See "Democratization and Strategic Thinking: What the Militaries in Argentina and Chile Learned in the 1990s" de Kristina Mani, Columbia University, page.7:
    ...that Chile had a significant defender’s advantage, given the professional quality of Chilean troops and well-developed supply and communications lines.
  6. ^ See Michael A. Morris, "The Strait of Magellan", Clemson University, South Carolina, USA, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, page 160:
    "Chile, nevertheless, benefits from considerable advantages in the far south, including good ports, control over the Strait of Magellan, as well as the Fuegian and Patagonian channels, branching off laterally from the strait, which gives Chile geographical and logistical advantages in the Drake Passage."
  7. ^ See Karl Hernekamp , "Der argentinisch-chilenisch Grenzstreit am Beagle-Kanal", page 84:
    "Umgekehrt hätte für Chile positiv zu Buche geschlagen die von militärischen Fachleuten als allgemein höher bewertete Kampfkraft der chilenischen Streitkräfte."
    (translation:
    "On the other hand, in accordance with the military experts, Chile was benefited of the higher combat strength of the armed forces")
  8. ^ The reputation built upon professionalism of the Chilean armed forces impressed the observer since the end of the War of the Pacific. On 5 November 1900, that is 78 years ago, in a similar strained situation, Julio de Arellano, Ministry Plenipotenciary of Spain in Buenos Aires informed to his government in Madrid about the danger of a war between Chile and Argentina. About the strengt of the forces told:
    La Républica Argentina es, sin duda, el estado más rico de Sud América, su marina es más fuerte en número y en calidad de buques que la de Chile, posee elementos de guerra para armar un ejército de 300.000 hombres y en sus arsenales y depósitos militares, se ha gastado y se gasta sin reparar en cifras con tal de que se hayen provistos de armamento de último modelo; pero en este país se carece de homogeneidad de población que caracteriza a Chile ... donde es unánime la exaltación patriótica y donde ha podido formarse un Ejército, que los oficiales alemanes proclaman comparable en su organización y cualidades al mejor de Europa (See Pedro Santos Martínez, "Documentos Diplomáticos sobre historia argentina, 1850-1954"), Tomo V: 1890-1909. Centro de Estudios e Investigaciones Históricas "Cuyo", Mendoza, 2002, ISBN 987-43-1155-X, pág. 124, documento nr.:368
  9. ^ See interview with General Martin Balza for the Chilean newspaper La Tercera on 21 December 2001:
    "Estoy convencido [that Chile would have won the war], por razones que he expuesto en mis libros "Dejo constancia" (2001) y "Malvinas, gesta e incompetencia" (2003). Ahí expreso cuál era la situación de las Fuerzas Armadas, fundamentalmente del Ejército, en 1982.... [En 1978] Chile estaba en unas inmejorables condiciones, porque la defensa es muy fuerte, sobre todo cuando se puede actuar mediante la dinámica propia, que no margina reacciones ofensivas dentro de la concepción defensiva."
  10. ^ See "Published Airpower Journal", Spring 1999, "US Arms Transfer Policy for Latin America Lifting the Ban on Fighter Aircraft", Dr. Frank O. Mora, Lt. Col. Antonio L. Palá, USAF in http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj99/spr99/mora.html :
    «The 1976 Arms Export Control Act, proposed by Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.), began to limit presidential ability to transfer weapons to other nations by giving the United States Congress veto power over sales and extending the notification period to 30 days. Against the wishes of the Ford administration, several countries were placed under even tighter restrictions based on their human rights records. Such was the case with Chile in 1976 under Public Law 94-329. This legislation, commonly referred to as the Kennedy Amendment, prohibited security assistance, military training, and arms sales to Gen Augusto Pinochet’s repressive military regime in Chile» cited from US Code, vol. 22, sec. 2370 (1976).
  11. ^ See also Una enmienda clave para la región in Argentine newspaper "La Nacion" on Thuersday 27. August 2009 (retrieved 27. August 2009):
    La enmienda impedía vender armas a Chile hasta que se verificaran tres condiciones: un progreso significativo en el respeto de los derechos humanos en ese país; garantías de que la dictadura de Pinochet no encubriría a terroristas internacionales y que, por lo tanto, iba a juzgar a los implicados en el asesinato de Letelier, y que la venta del armamento fuera de interés nacional para Estados Unidos.
  12. ^ See article "Chileans Try an Air Force Their Way" in The New York Times on July 9, 1988:
    «When the embargo took effect, the Chilean Air Force had just taken delivery of 16 Northrup-built F-5's…»
  13. ^ See Michael Morris, «The Strait of Magellan», published by Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Netherlands, 1989, page 128
  14. ^ See Der Spiegel on 6 March 1978:
    «… seit 1974 verhalf Bonn zudem den Streitkräften fast aller südamerikanischen Meeresanrainer (Ausnahme: Chile) zu stärkerer Seetüchtigkeit…»
    (Transl.:«since 1974 Bonn [Germany] strengthened the navies of all south american coastal states (exception: Chile)»)
  15. ^ See Historia general de las Relaciones Exteriores de la República Argentina by Andrés Cisneros y Carlos Escudé in cema:
    «… en el mismo mes de junio de 1981, la Argentina adquirió 57 tanques austríacos, operación que generó los recelos del lado chileno, pues en 1980 el mismo país proveedor de esos tanques les negó a los militares trasandinos la compra de 100 unidades …»
    (Transl.:«on juni 1981 Argentina bought 57 austrian tanks, this operation arouse suspicion on the Chilean side because 1980 Austria refused to sell 100 tanks to Chile»)
  16. ^ See "The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964: To Secure Our Rightful Share", Mark Phythian, published by Manchester University Press, 2000, ISBN 0719059070, 9780719059070, 352 pages, (page 105 and f.). The UK signed contracts prior to the Coup d'État for delivery of 7 Hawker Hunters, two Leander class frigate (Chilean frigate Almirante Condell (PFG-06) and Chilean frigate Almirante Lynch (PFG-07)), two Oberon class submarines ("O'Brien" and "Hyatt"), spare parts and the overhaul of Hawker Hunter turbines. The James Callaghan government delivered the vessels, submarines and planes behind schedule and the aero-engines and the submarine spare parts were "blacked" by the unions until October 1978 as they were removed from the East Kilbride plant by a combination of police, haulage contractors, sheriff's officers and Chilean representatives:
    "The union convenor at the East Kilbride plant indicated that the engines were all rusting away anyway, because they have been left packed in crates and left outside the warehouse ever since the overhaul work had been completed in 1975".
    The relations between Chile and UK has been also seriously damaged by the Sheila Cassidy affair, the use of British made planes during the Coup d'État and the violations of human rights by the Pinochet regime. In October 1981, under Margareth Thatcher, the UK announced its first significant arms sale with the sale of the country class destroyer HMS Norfolk (F230) and the naval tanker RFA Tidepool (A76).
  17. ^ See "Wie geschmiert - Rüstungsproduktion und Waffenhandel im Raum Hamburg" Kriegsschiffe für Argentinien (German Language)
  18. ^ See also Una enmienda clave para la región in Argentine newspaper "La Nacion" on Thuersday 27. August 2009 (retrieved 27. August 2009):
    A través de la enmienda Humphrey-Kennedy, la Argentina también vio congelada en 1978 la ayuda militar de Estados Unidos a raíz de las violaciones de los derechos humanos.
  19. ^ See Human Rights Watch Argentina (retrieved 16.August.2008):
    «By contrast, President Ronald Reagan went to great lengths to patch up relations between the two countries that it considered had been damaged by Carter's human rights-based policies: inviting Argentina's military leaders to Washington, exaggerating improvements in respect for human rights, and moving to repeal the Humphrey-Kennedy amendment.»
  20. ^ Navy History of Argentina, retrieved 16 August 2008
  21. ^ See Distribución de capacidades en el Cono Sur, Sabrina Melidoni, Buenos Aires, 2006 (p. 45).(Spanish Language)
  22. ^ See article En 1978, Chile hubiese derrotado a la Argentina, an interview with General Martin Balza, Chief of Staff of the Argentine Army (1991-1999), in the Chilean newspaper "La Tercera" on 21 December 2003, stored in seprin, retrieved 30 August 2008:
    «… La incursión [de las fuerzas armadas] en los gobiernos de facto de 1955 y fundamentalmente la dictadura de 1976 habían alejado a las Fuerzas Armadas del profesionalismo que todos deseábamos …»
    (Transl.:«the incursion [of the armed forces] into the (daily) politics as de facto government 1955 (Revolución Libertadora) and mainly the dictatorship of 1976 (Dirty War) disconnected the Argentine armed forces from its professional duty»)
  23. ^ See Alejandro Luis Corbacho,reasons of the call off:«…Some military leaders considered this not enough time due to the difficulty involved in transportation through the passes over the Andean Mountains…»
  24. ^ Michael Morris in «The Strait of Magellan», published by Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Netherlands, 1989, page 150 cited secure Chilean internal lines of communication between the Beagle Channel and the Strait of Magellan through the Fueguian channels and that the Chilean capacity to surge its fleet out quickly from the Straits of Magellan into the Atlantic threatened the precarious Argentine supply line to forces south of the Strait.
  25. ^ See Interview with Raúl Castro in Clarín, Argentina, on Sunday 20. December 1998. Original as published in Spanish:
    "Ellos suponían que iban a invadir Chile, Santiago, especialmente. Les parecía algo muy fácil; una cuestión de cruzar la frontera y que los chilenos se iban a dar por vencidos. Y yo les decía: No, no, se equivocan. Ellos tienen una armada mejor que la de ustedes. Están bien armados, son muy fuertes"
  26. ^ Interview with María Eugenia Oyarzún in Augusto Pinochet, diálogos con su historia, 1999. Original as pulished:
    "una guerra de montonera, matando todos los días, fusilando gente, tanto por parte de los argentinos como por nuestra parte, y al final, por cansancio, se habría llegado a la paz"
  27. ^ See The state, war, and the state of war by Kalevi Jaakko Holsti, page 159 [1]
  28. ^ See Clarín Buenos Aires, Argentina, 20 December 1998 ... la mediación del papa Juan Pablo II fue providencial para la Argentina: no sólo evitó una guerra de agresión contra Chile ....
    See Clarín, Argentina, 20 December 1998: "De hecho, Chile no iba a ser el país atacante. Lo tenía todo: las islas y más aún. Era el generalato argentino el que auspiciaba el estallido.".
    See La Nación, Argentina 12 August 1996: "Se tomó, por tanto, la decisión de invadir a Chile y se puso en marcha el reloj de la cuenta regresiva.".
    See pages 242 and 243 from "Argentina in the twentieth Century" or "Breve Historia Contemporanea de la Argentina", Luis Alberto Romero, 1994, Pennsylvania State University Press or Fondo de Cultura Economica, ISBN 0-271-02191-8 or ISBN 0-271-02192-6: "The aggression against Chile ...".
    See Pacho O'Donnell, "Historias Argentinas", 1. Edicion, Buenos Aires, Sudamerica, 2006 ISBN 950-07-2749-8, Chapter: Se necesita una guerra (page 315).
    See Interview with Pio Laghi, Nuntius in Argentina in 1978, Clarín 20 December 1998:"El ministro de Economía, Martínez de Hoz, y el jefe del Ejército, general Viola, que no querían que estallara el conflicto, me informaron en una cena diplomática que se había tomado la decisión de desencadenar la guerra" .
    See Robert Pastor, US-national security advisor, to the Argentine Junta: "Si ustedes toman una sola roca, por minúscula que sea, el gobierno de los Estados Unidos y sus aliados de la OTAN los van a calificar de agresores. Le pediría que transmitiera este mensaje con claridad absoluta a Buenos Aires. El presidente Carter está al tanto de nuestra conversación..." La Nación, Argentina, 21 December 2003
    See "En su lógica" Río Negro 5 September 2005: "Ahí, Argentina rompió reglas y apuró la guerra con el país vecino.".
    Siehe Interview with Sergio Onofre Jarpa, Ambassador Chile's in Argentina in 1978, La Tercera, Chile: "Había una campaña muy odiosa contra Chile a través de la prensa y los medios de comunicación, que demostraba cuál era la actitud del oficialismo.".
    See "Cartas desde el abismo" Clarín, Argentina, 20 Dezember 1998: "el drama que se estaba por abatir sobre la Argentina y Chile en 1978, impulsado por el afán belicista de los halcones del régimen militar argentino".
    See Interview with General es:Reynaldo Bignone in Clarín, Argentina, 20 December 1998:"Si hay tipos que pensaban que no había otra solución que la cachetada, allá ellos.". "Cachetada" ("a slap in the face") is Euphemism für Aggression war.
    See Interview of Augusto Pinochet with María Eugenia Oyarzún in "Augusto Pinochet: Diálogos con su historia", Editorial Sudamericana, Santiago, Chile, 1999. (S. 127): "Usted comprenderá que uno llega a estos grados pensando los pro y los contra de las cosas. Una guerra significa una detención o retroceso para un país de a lo menos 20 años. Hay que comenzar de nuevo. ¡No quiero guerra yo!; por lo demás, nosotros no habríamos peleado por ambiciones expansionistas sino defendiendo lo que teníamos, nada más. Ello, a pesar de que en el otro lado había deseos de agresión y vientos de guerra"
  29. ^ See Alejandro Luis Corbacho, Predicting the Probability of War During Brinkmanship Crises: The Beagle and the Malvinas Conflicts
  30. ^ See spanish newspaper El País on 06. October 1984 Satisfacción de los Gobiernos argentino y chileno al confirmar oficialmente la existencia de un acuerdo sobre el canal de Beagle
  31. ^ See El País on 25. January 1984 Los militares involucionistas argentinos consideran una traición el acuerdo sobre Beagle
  32. ^ See Argentine newspaper La Nación on 13 April 2005 La guerra que no ocurrió
  33. ^ See article "El belicismo de los dictadores" in ClarinInstrucciones Políticas Particulares para la Zona Austral para la Etapa Posterior a la Ejecución de Actos de Soberanía en las Islas en Litigio, Argentina, 20 December 1998
  34. ^ See Landmine Monitor Chile
  35. ^ See Newspaper El Centro, Chile, 1 November 2004 (Spanish Language)
  36. ^ See article Beagle: historia secreta de la guerra que no fue in Argentine newspaper "La Nación" on 12 August 1996, stored in "Base de Datos SER en el 2000", retrieved on 30 August 2008:
    «Finalmente se [la junta argentina] aceptó detener la cuenta regresiva, dar marcha atrás y esperar la llegada del enviado papal …»
    (Transl.:«finally they [the Argentina junta] accepted to stop the time counting, to withdraw the forces and to wait for the papal envoy … »)
  37. ^ See El belicismo de los dictadores in Clarín, Argentina, 20 December 1998:
    …Yo de esto hablé una vez con un teniente coronel que era jefe de un regimiento en la cordillera y que cuenta que sus patrullas cruzaron la frontera y entraron en Chile…
    (Transl.:«»)
  38. ^ See also article Beagle: historia secreta de la guerra que no fue in Argentine newspaper "La Nación" on 12 August 1996, stored in "Base de Datos SER en el 2000", retrieved on 30 August 2008:
    …«No restaba mucho tiempo: las primeras patrullas de infantería del Ejército pisaban ya suelo chileno…
    (Transl.:«»)
  39. ^ See Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America Latin American Politics and Society , Fall 2002 a Book recension by Aguilar, Manuela in [2]
    "In the Malvinas dispute, the United States and Great Britain failed to signal deterrence credibly. In the Beagle Channel dispute, however, Chile successfully signaled its willingness to follow through, and Argentina rightly understood that the costs of all-out war were too high."
  40. ^ See in ¿Por qué el Scorpene?(retrieved 30 August 2008)
    (original)« … en diciembre de 1978, la Armada de Chile cumplió su objetivo, presentó batalla, la flota opositora prefirió retirarse y la crisis internacional llegó a su fin. No hay nada más reafirmador que el éxito.…»
  41. ^ See in article Conflicto con Chile: la guerra que no fue in the Argentine newspaper "La Nación" on 21 December 2003, retrieved on 30 August 2008, original published in Spanish Language
    (original)«…Si ustedes toman una sola roca, por minúscula que sea, el gobierno de los Estados Unidos y sus aliados de la OTAN los van a calificar de agresores.…»
  42. ^ See interview with Martín Balza in the Chilean newspaper "La Tercera" on 21 December 2003, reproduced by http://www.seprin.com/menu/notas6620.htm (seprin), retrieved on 30 August 2008
  43. ^ Argentine magazine Perfil on 22 November 2009, retrieved on 22 November 2009:
    Para colmo, Galtieri dijo en un discurso: “Que saquen el ejemplo de lo que estamos haciendo ahora porque después les toca a ellos”.

References

  • Beagle Channel Arbitration between the Republic of Argentina and the Republic of Chile, Report and Decision of the Court of Arbitration
  • Mark Laudy: The Vatican Mediation of the Beagle Channel Dispute: Crisis Intervention and Forum Building in Words Over War of Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.
  • Alejandro Luis Corbacho: Predicting the Probability of War During Brinkmanship Crises: The Beagle and the Malvinas Conflicts, Universidad del CEMA, Argentina, Documento de Trabajo No. 244, September 2003, Spanish Language
  • Rubén Madrid Murúa: "La Estrategia Nacional y Militar que planificó Argentina, en el marco de una estrategia total, para enfrentar el conflicto con Chile el año 1978", Memorial del Ejército de Chile, Edición Nº 471, Santiago, Chile, 2003, Spanish Language
  • Karin Oellers-Frahm: Der Schiedsspruch in der Beagle-Kanal-Streitigkeit, Berichte und Urkunden: Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, German Language
  • Sergio Gutiérrez Olivos, Comentarios sobre el tratado de paz y amistad con Argentina, Academia Chilena de Ciencias Sociales, 1985, in Spanish language
  • Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile: Relaciones Chileno-Argentinas, La controversia del Beagle. Genf 1979, English and Spanish Language
  • Andrea Wagner: Der argentinisch-chilenische Konflikt um den Beagle-Kanal. Ein Beitrag zu den Methoden friedlicher Streiterledigung. Verlag Peter Lang, Frankfurt a.M. 1992, ISBN 3-631-43590-8, German Language
  • Karl Hernekamp: Der argentinisch-chilenisch Grenzstreit am Beagle-Kanal. Institut für Iberoamerika-Kunde, Hamburg 1980, German Language
  • Andrés Cisneros y Carlos Escudé, "Historia general de las Relaciones Exteriores de la República Argentina", Las relaciones con Chile, Cema, Argentina, Buenos Aires. Spanish Language
  • Annegret I. Haffa: Beagle-Konflikt und Falkland (Malwinen)-Krieg. Zur Außenpolitik der Argentinischen Militarregierung 1976-1983. Weltforum Verlag, München/Köln/London 1987, ISBN 3-8039-0348-3, German Language
  • Isaac F. Rojas und Arturo Medrano: Argentina en el Atlántico Chile en el Pacífico. Editorial Nemont, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1979, in spanischer Sprache.
  • Isaac F. Rojas, La Argentina en el Beagle y Atlántico sur 1. Parte. Editorial Diagraf, Buenos Aires, Argentina, Spanish Language
  • Carlos Escudé und Andrés Cisneros: Historia general de las relaciones exteriores de la República Argentina (here), in spanischer Sprache.
  • Fabio Vio Valdivieso: La mediación de su S.S. el Papa Juan Pablo II, Editorial Aconcagua, Santiago de Chile, 1984, Spanish Language
  • Alberto Marín Madrid: El arbitraje del Beagle y la actitud Argentina. 1984, Editorial Moisés Garrido Urrea, id = A-1374-84 XIII, Spanisch Language
  • Luis Alberto Romero, Argentina in the twentieth Century. Pennsylvania State University Press, translated by James P. Brennan, 1994, ISBN 0-271-02191-8
  • Divisionsgeneral (a.D.) Juan E. Gugliamelli: Cuestión del Beagle. Negociación directa o diálogo de armas (Trans.:The Beagle-Question, direct Negotiations or Dialog of the Weapons), in Spanish Language. (Book compiled from articles of Argentine Magazin "Estrategia", Buenos Aires Nr:49/50, enero-febrero 1978, erschienen sind.
  • General Martín Antonio Balza und Mariano Grondona: Dejo Constancia: memorias de un general argentino. Editorial Planeta, Buenos Aires 2001, ISBN 9504908136, Spanish Language
  • Francisco Bulnes Serrano und Patricia Arancibia Clavel: La Escuadra En Acción. Chile, Editorial Grijalbo, 2004, ISBN 9562582116, Spanish Language

External links

Territorial disputes involving Argentina







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