| Operation Tidal Wave | |||||||
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| Part of Oil Campaign of World War II | |||||||
![]() A B24 called "Sandman" during a bomb run over the Ploesti Astra Romana refinery during Operation Tidal Wave.[1][2] |
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| Belligerents | |||||||
| Commanders | |||||||
| Jacob E. Smart, Uzal Girard Ent |
Alfred Gerstenberg | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 178 B-24s (162 over the target)[6] | Heavy anti-aircraft defenses, 52 Bf 109s and Bf 110s and IAR-80s | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 53 B-24s 440 KIA, 220 POW/MIA |
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Operation Tidal Wave was a strategic bombing mission executed by the American Air Forces in August 1943, during World War II intended to put nine Romanian oil refineries around Ploiesti "out of action."[5] The mission was unsuccessful in that it resulted in "no curtailment of overall product output"[7].
In terms of loss of life, this mission was one of the costliest for the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) in the European Theatre, accounting for the loss of 53 aircraft and 660 aircrewmen. It was the worst loss ever suffered by the US air forces on a single mission. The day that it took place is known as "Black Sunday." Five Medals of Honor and numerous Distinguished Service Crosses were awarded to Operation Tidal Wave crew members.
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Following the June 1942 HALPRO (Halverson project) raid against Ploiesti (the first American mission against a European target), Luftwaffe General Alfred Gerstenberg built one of the heaviest and best-integrated air defense networks in Europe. Defenses included several hundred anti-aircraft artillery pieces (105 mm—88 mm) and small-caliber guns in haystacks and false structures (e.g., false-sided rolling stock that was actually mobile).[citation needed] A Luftwaffe air command center in Lipesk controlled three fighter groups (Bf 110 night fighters & Bf 109s) within flight range of Ploiesti[4]:157 (Romanian fighters plus 52 Luftwaffe fighters). Gerstenberg also relied on signal intelligence based in Athens, Greece, to achieve greater awareness of preparations being made by the 9th Air Force from as far away as North Africa.
For political reasons, the city of Ploiesti would not be bombed by accident.[5]
Colonel Jacob E. Smart devised the operation based on the experiences from the HALPRO raid. The 9th Air Force (98th and 376th Bombardment Groups) was responsible for the overall conduct of the raid, and the partially formed 8th Air Force provided three additional bomb groups (44th, 93rd, and 389th). The minimal air defenses encountered during the HALPRO raid contributed to the decision to use a daylight, low-level attack in order to counter the German radar coverage.[citation needed] Training included extensive review of detailed sand table models, practice raids over a mock-up of the target in the Libyan desert and practical exercises over a number of secondary targets in July to prove the viability of such a low level strike. The B-24 Liberators to be used were re-equipped with bomb bay fuel tanks to increase their fuel capacity to 3,100 gallons. The operation was to consist of 178 bombers with a total of 1,764 aircrewmen, being one of the largest commitments of American heavy bombers and crewmen up to that time. The route from airfields near Benghazi, Libya, was across the Mediterranean Sea and the Adriatic Sea, past the island of Corfu, over the Albanian Pindus Mountains, and across southern Yugoslavia. Following a series of pre-determined check points, the formation next turned toward PloieÅŸti and simultaneously struck their multiple targets from the north.
Early on the morning of 1 August 1943 the five groups comprising the strike force began lifting off from their home air fields around Benghazi. Large amounts of dust kicked up during take-off caused limited visibility and strained engines already carrying the burden of large bomb loads and additional fuel. These conditions contributed to the loss of one aircraft during take-off, but 177 of the planned 178 aircraft departed safely. The formation reached the Adriatic Sea without further incident, however aircraft #28 "Wingo Wango" belonging to the 376th Bombardment Group (the lead group, about 40 B-24s)[6] and piloted by Lt. Brian Flavelle began to fly erratically before plunging into the sea due to unknown causes. Lt. Guy Iovine, a personal friend of Flavelle and piloting aircraft #23 "Desert Lilly" descended from the formation in order to look for survivors, narrowly missing aircraft #36V "Brewery Wagon" piloted by Lt. John Palm. No apparent survivors were seen, and due to the additional weight of fuel, Iovine was unable to regain altitude to rejoin the formation and resume course to PloieÅŸti. The resulting confusion was compounded by the inability to regain cohesion due to strict radio silence maintained as per mission guidance. Ten other aircrews opted to return to friendly air fields following the incident and those aircraft which remained faced the 9,000 foot climb over the Pindus mountains, which were shrouded in cloud cover. Although all five groups made the climb around 11,000 feet, the 376th and 93rd, utilizing high power settings, began to lose the trailing formations, causing variations in speed and time which disrupted the careful synchronization of the group attacks deemed so important by Smart.
The possible threat to successful execution was deemed to be of secondary concern to the operational security of the mission by senior leadership. The American leaders were unaware that while their intentions were not precisely known, their presence had been duly noted by the Germans. Although the need to rebuild their formations was clear and well within the contingency for breaking radio silence, the strike would proceed without correction, a judgment that would later prove costly.
Although now well strung out on approach to Piteşti, all five groups would make the navigational check point 65 miles from Ploiesti. At Campina, the 389th Bomb Group departed as planned for its separate but synchronous approach to the mission target. Continuing from Piteşti, Col. Keith K. Compton and Gen. Ent made a navigational judgment that would prove especially costly. At Târgovişte, halfway to the next check point at Floreşti, Compton followed the incorrect railway line for his turn toward Ploieşti, setting his group and Lt. Col. Addison Baker's 93rd Bomb Group on a course for Bucharest. In the process, Ent and Compton went against the advice of their airplane's navigator and the Halverson Project (HALPRO) veteran Cpt. Harold Wicklund. Now in the face of a impending disaster, many crews chose to break radio silence and draw attention to the navigational error. Meanwhile, both groups flew headlong into Gerstenberg's extensive air defenses around the Bucharest area, which they would now face in addition to those still awaiting them around Ploieşti.
Despite Compton and Ent's lead, Baker in his aircraft "Hell's Wench" realized the navigational mistake and quickly made appropriate course adjustments, resuming a proper heading toward PloieÅŸti. This decision would place Baker and the 93rd well off of the original route now maintained by the three trail groups and now placed his group both on a different heading on approach and time into the target area. Compton would continue farther toward Bucharest, before finally admitting his error and also resuming course for Ploiesti. The 93rd now led the attack into PloieÅŸti, alone and with German and Romanian defenses well-prepared for their arrival.
Baker and his co-pilot Maj. John L. Jerstad, who had already flown a full tour of duty while stationed in England, would now bear witness to the extensive air defense array prepared for them by Gen. Gerstenberg. Continuing through the withering maelstrom, the damage to "Hell's Wench" forced Baker and Jerstad to loose their bomb load in order to maintain lead of the formation over their target at the Columbia Aquila refinery. Despite heavy losses by the 93rd, Baker and Jerstad maintained course and, once clear, began to climb away. Realizing the aircraft was a loss, both men maintained the climb in order to permit the crew to abandon the ship. Although none survived, both Baker and Jerstad would be posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for maintaining their successful approach to Columbia Aquila and their efforts to save the crew of "Hell's Wench."[1]:77
Maj. Ramsay D. Potts flying "The Duchess" and Maj. George S. Brown aboard "Queenie," encountering heavy smoke over Columbia Aquila, would take two additional elements of the 93rd and successfully drop their payloads over the Astra Romana, Unirea Orion, and Columbia Aquila refineries. In all the 93rd lost 11 aircraft over their targets in PloieÅŸti.
Air defenses were heavy over the 376th's target (Romana Americana), and Gen. Ent instructed Compton to attack "targets of opportunity." Most of the 376th B-24s bombed the Steaua Română refinery at Campina from the east, and five headed directly into the already smoldering conflagration over the Concordia Vega refinery. At Campina, air defenses on overlooking hills were able to fire down into the formation, and IAR 80 aircraft downed 376th aircraft.[citation needed]
With the 93rd and 376th engaged over the target area, Col. John R. Kane of the 98th Bomb Group and Col. Leon W. Johnson of the 44th Bomb Group made their prescribed turn at Floresti and proceeded to their respective targets at the Asta Romana and Columbia Aquila refineries. Both groups would find German and Romanian defenses on full alert and faced the full effects of now raging oil fires, heavy smoke, secondary explosions, and delayed-fuse bombs dropped by Baker's 93rd Bomb Group on their earlier run. Both Kane and Johnson's approach, parallel to the Floresti-to-Ploiesti railway had the unfortunate distinction of encountering Gerstenberg’s disguised flak train. At tree-top level, around 50 feet above the ground, the 98th would find themselves to the left and the 44th on the right. The advantage, however, would rest with the 98th and 44th, whose gunners quickly responded to the threat, disabling the locomotive and killing multiple air defense crews.
With the effects of the 93rd and 376th's runs causing difficulties locating and bombing their primary targets, both Kane and Johnson did not deviate from their intended targets, taking heavy losses in the process. Their low approach even enabled gunners to engage in continued ground suppression of air defense crews from directly above their targets. For their leadership and heroism, both were awarded the Medal of Honor. Lt. Col. James T. Posey took 21 of the 44th's aircraft on a separate assigned attack run on the Creditul Minier refinery just south of PloieÅŸti. Although air defense batteries had already heavily engaged the 93rd, Posey was fully received by the same emplacements. Maintaining a continued low-level approach into the target area took some of the still heavily laden aircraft through tall grass and damage was caused by low-level obstructions. Posey and his aircraft, equipped with heavier 1,000-pound bombs, managed to successfully find their marks at Creditul Minier, without loss to the formation.
The last TIDAL WAVE attack bombed the Steaua Română refinery (eight miles northwest of Ploiesti)[4]:161 at Câmpina. The 389th attack led by Col. Jack Wood was as rehearsed at Benghazi. The damage caused by the 376th and 389th attacks heavily damaged the refinery, which did not resume production for the duration of the war.[1]:76 The 389th lost four aircraft over the target area, including B-24 "Ole Kickapoo" flown by 2nd Lt. Lloyd Herbert Hughes. After hits to the "Ole Kickapoo" only 30 feet over the target area, the detonation of previously dropped bombs had ignited fuel leaking from the B-24. Hughes maintained course for bombardier 2nd Lt. John A. McLoughlin to bomb, and the B-24 subsequently crash-landed in a river bed.[4]:187 Hughes (who posthumously received the Medal of Honor) and five crewmembers were killed, four survived the crash but died of injuries, and two gunners became prisoners of war.
Only 88 B-24s returned to Libya, of which 55 had battle damage.[2]:222 Losses included 44 to air defenses and additional B-24s that ditched in the Mediterranean Sea or were interned (e.g., a few landed in the neutral country Turkey). Some were diverted (e.g., to the RAF airfield on Cyprus[2]:196), and one B-24 with 365 shell holes in it landed in Libya 14 hours after departing.[1]
310 aircrewmen were killed, 108 were captured by the Axis, and 78 were interned in Turkey.[1]:76 Three of the five Medals of Honor (the most for any single air action in history) were awarded posthumously.[1]:77 Allied assessment of the attack estimated a loss of 40% of the refining capacity at the Ploiesti refineries,[1]:75 although some refineries were largely untouched. Most of the damage was repaired within weeks, after which the net output of fuel was greater than before the raid.[1]:75 Circa September, the Enemy Oil Committee appraisal of Ploiesti bomb damage indicated "no curtailment of overall product output"[7] as many of the refineries had been operating previously below maximum capacity.
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