Palestinian political violence: Wikis


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The Victims of Acts of Terror Memorial, a monument to victims of Palestinian political violence, Mount Herzl, Jerusalem

Palestinian political violence refers to acts of violence undertaken to further the political objectives of Palestinians. These political objectives include self-determination in and sovereignty over Palestine,[1][2] the "liberation of Palestine" and establishment of a Palestinian state, either in place of both Israel and the Palestinian territories or solely in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories[3][4][5] Periodically directed toward more limited goals such as the release of Palestinian prisoners, another key aim is to advance the Palestinian right of return.[6]

Palestinian groups that have carried out or support politically-motivated violent acts have included Hamas, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Abu Nidal Organization.[7]

Palestinian political violence has targeted Israeli Jews and supporters of Israel, but also has led to the death and injury of Palestinians and foreign citizens who did not support Israel. Israeli statistics state that 3,500 Israelis[8][9] have been killed and 25,000 have been wounded as a result of Palestinian violence since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948.[10][11]

While violence is one tactic that Palestinians have used in pursuit of their national aspirations, the Palestinian struggle has also employed non-violent measures such as peaceful protests, public relations and negotiations.




Early political violence

A Jewish bus equipped with wire screens to protect against rock, glass, and grenade throwing, late 1930s

Incidents included the riots of April, 1920, the riots in Palestine of May, 1921, the 1929 Hebron massacre and Safed massacre, and the 1936-1939 Arab revolt in Palestine. Prominent leaders of the Palestinian groups were Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, who was killed by the British army, and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin Al-Husseini, who fled the country.

Partition of Palestine to establishment of PLO (1947–1964)

According to an article in FrontPage Magazine "From 1949 to 1956, Egypt waged a terror war against Israel, launching c. 9,000 attacks from cells set up in the refugee camps of the Gaza Strip." [1]. Around 400 Palestinian infiltrators were killed by Israeli Security Forces each year in 1951, 1952 and 1953; a similar number and probably far more were killed in 1950. 1,000 or more were killed in 1949. At least 100 were killed during 1954-6. In total upward of 2,700 and possibly as many as 5,000 infiltrators were killed by the IDF, police, and civilians along Israel's borders between 1949 and 1956. In all probability the majority of those killed were unarmed 'economic' and social infiltrators.[12] Throughout the period 1949-56 the Egyptian government opposed the movement of refugees from the Gaza strip into Israel, but following the IDF's Gaza Raid on 28 February 1955 the Egyptian authorities facilitated terrorist infiltration but still continued to oppose civilian infiltration.[13] At first, Palestinians were trying to go back to their houses or to retrieve property but after 1950 these acts became much more violent and included killings of civilians in nearby cities. After Israel's Operation Black Arrow in 1955 which came as a result of a series of massacres in the city of Rehovot, the Palestinian fedayeen were incorporated into an Egyptian unit.[14] John Bagot Glubb, a high-ranking British army general who worked with the Arab Legion, explained in his autobiographical history of the period how he convinced the Legion to arm and train the fedayeen for free.[15] The Israeli government cites dozens of these attacks as "Major Arab Terrorist Attacks against Israelis prior to the 1967 Six-Day War". [2] [3] Between 1951 and 1956, 400 Israelis were killed and 900 wounded by fedayeen attacks. [4] [5]; according to the Anti-Defamation League "[i]n 1955 alone, 260 Israeli citizens were killed or wounded by fedayeen". [6]

Establishment of PLO to First Intifada (1964–1987)

The Palestine Liberation Organization was founded in 1964. At its first convention in Cairo, hundreds of Palestinians met to, "call for the right of self-determination and the upholding of the rights of the Palestinian nation."[16] In order to achieve these goals, a Palestinian army of liberation was thought to be essential; thus, the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) was established with the support of the Arab states.[16] Fatah, a Palestinian group founded in the late 1950s to organize the armed resistance against Israel, and headed by Yasser Arafat, soon rose to prominence within the PLO. The PLO charter called for, "an end to the State of Israel, a return of Palestinians to their homeland, and the establishment of a single democratic state throughout Palestine."[17] After the 1967 war, Palestinians realized that reliance on the Arab states would lead nowhere and that only they could liberate their homeland, which led to the emergence of many more Palestinian guerrilla factions, who took up armed struggle as a primary means of achieving their goals.[17]

In the wake of the Six-Day War, confrontations between Palestinian guerrillas in Jordan and government forces became a major problem within the kingdom. By early 1970, at least seven Palestinian guerrilla organizations were active in Jordan, one of the most important being the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) led by George Habash. Based in the Jordanian refugee camps, the fedayeen developed a virtual state within a state, receiving funds and arms from both the Arab states and Eastern Europe and openly flouting the law of the country. The guerrillas initially focused on attacking Israel, but by late 1968, the main fedayeen activities in Jordan appeared to shift to attempts to overthrow the Jordanian monarchy.[18]

Various clashes between the fedayeen and the army occurred between the years 1968-1970. The situation climaxed in September 1970, when the PFLP carried out multiple jet hijackings within a short time. A bitterly fought 10-day civil war known as Black September ensued, drawing involvement by Syria and Iraq, and sparking troop movements by Israel and the United States Navy. The number of fighters killed on all sides was estimated as high as 3,500.[18]

Battles between Palestinian guerrilla forces and the Jordanian army continued during the closing months of 1970 and the first six months of 1971. In November 1971, members of the Palestinian Black September group, who took their name from the civil war, assassinated Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal in Cairo. In December the group made an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the Jordanian ambassador to Britain.[18]

In the aftermath of Black September in Jordan, many Palestinians arrived in Lebanon, among them Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). In the early 1970s their presence exacerbated an already tense situation in Lebanon, and in 1975 the Lebanese Civil War broke out. Beginning with street fighting in Beirut between Christian Phalangists and Palestinian militiamen, the war quickly deteriorated into a conflict between two loosely defined factions: the side wishing to preserve the status quo, consisting primarily of Maronite militias, and the side seeking change, which included a variety of militias from leftist organizations and guerrillas from rejectionist Palestinian (nonmainstream PLO) organizations. The Lebanese civil war lasted until 1990 and resulted in an estimated 130,000 to 250,000 civilian fatalities and one million wounded.[19]

Charred remains of the bus that was hijacked and burnt by Palestinian militants in 1978 in the Coastal Road massacre

After Black September, the PLO and its offshoots waged an international campaign against the Israeli state. Notable events were the Munich Olympics massacre (1972) , the hijacking of several civilian airliners (some were thwarted, see for example: Entebbe Operation), the Savoy Hotel attack, the Zion Square explosive refrigerator and the Coastal Road massacre. During the 1970s and the early 1980s, Israel suffered attacks from PLO bases in Lebanon, such as the Avivim school bus massacre in 1970, the Maalot massacre in 1974 (where Palestinian terrorists massacred 21 school children) and the attack led by Samir Kuntar in 1979. Following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, called "Operation Peace for Galilee" by the IDF, and the exile of the PLO to Tunis, Israel had a relatively quiet decade.[citation needed]

First Intifada (1987–1993)

The First Intifada was characterized more by grassroots and non-violent political actions from among the population in the Israeli occupied Palestinian territories.[20] A total of 75 Israelis and 1,124 Palestinians were killed over its five years, which ended with the signing of the Oslo Accords.[21] The strategy of non-violence, though widespread among Palestinians, was not always adhered to, and there were youth who threw molotov cocktails and stones, with such violence generally directed against Israeli soldiers and settlers.[22]

There were two attacks that represented new developments in terms of political violence inside Israel in this period. The first Palestinian suicide attack took place on 6 July 1989 when a member of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad boarded the Tel Aviv Jerusalem bus 405. He walked up to the driver and pulled the wheel to the right, driving the vehicle into an abyss, killing 16 people.[23] The end of the intifada also saw the first use of suicide bombing as a tactic by Palestinian militants. On 16 April 1993, Hamas carried out the Mehola Junction bombing, in which operative Saher Tamam al-Nabulsi detonated his explosives-laden car between two buses. One person, a Palestinian, other than the attacker was killed, and 21 were wounded.[24]

Oslo Accords to Camp David Summit (1993–2000)

The years between the intifadas were marked by intense diplomatic activity between Israel and Palestinians as well as the creation of the Palestinian National Authority. In this period, suicide bombings of Israeli buses and crowded spaces as a regular tactic, particularly by Hamas and Islamic Jihad.[citation needed] Notable[citation needed] attacks during this period include the Beit Lid massacre, a double-suicide bombing at a crowded junction that killed 21, and the Dizengoff Center massacre, a suicide bombing outside a Tel Aviv shopping mall that killed 13.

Second Intifada (2000–2005)

According to B'Tselem, as of 10 July 2005, over 400 members of the Israeli Security forces, and 821 Israeli civilians have been killed by Palestinians since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, 553 of whom were killed within the 1949 Armistice lines, mainly by suicide bombings. Targets of attacks included buses, IDF checkpoints, restaurants, discothèques, shopping malls, a university, and civilian homes in Israeli settlements within the West Bank and Gaza Strip. [7],[8].[25] During the Second Intifada alone 1,137 Israelis were killed by Palestinians, according to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (counted since 29 September 2000, retrieved at 26 December 2007 [9]).

An Israeli child wounded by a Hamas Grad rocket fired on the city of Beer Sheva is taken to a hospital

Involvement of governments

Many allege that the Palestinian Authority (PA) does not do enough to prevent attacks, or to reduce Palestinian public support for acts of violence. Some accuse the PA of sponsoring groups that carry out acts of violence, such as Fatah's Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, and of using the official PA television, radio, press, and education system to facilitate attacks upon Israel. Palestinians assert that it is not realistic to expect the kind of control Israel demands from the PA to curtail these groups, as the PA does not have actual control of most cities or adequate law-enforcement resources, and has suffered severe infrastructural damage to much of its security apparatus during confrontations with the Israel Defense Force.

Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq, donated $25,000 to the families of suicide bombers, and $10,000 to the families of Palestinian civilians killed by the Israeli military.[26]

Involvement of children


In the 1930s, the emergence of organized youth cadres was rooted in the desire to form a youth paramilitary along German and Italian Fascist lines. It was believed that armed youth might bring an end to British hegemony in the Middle East as well as the very existence of Jewry. Youth were cajoled into violence by Palestinian political figures and newspapers that glorified violence and death. The Palestinian Arab Party sponsored the development of storm troops consisting solely of children and youth patterned on the German model. A British report from the period stated that "the growing youth and scout movements must be regarded as the most probable factors for the disturbance of the peace".[27]

As a youngster, Yasir Arafat led neighborhood children in marching and drills, beating those who did not obey. In the 1940s, Arafat's father organized a group of militants in Gaza which included Yasir Arafat and his brothers. The leader, Abu Khalid, a mathematics teacher in Gaza, gave Arafat the name Yasir in honor of the militant Yasir al-Bireh.[28]


There have been instances where Palestinian children were involved in attacks, either as child suicide bombers or bomb transporters. On 16 March 2005, an Israeli border guard found a bomb in the school bag of 12-year-old Abdullah Quran at a military checkpoint near Nablus. His life was saved only because a cell phone rigged to detonate the 13-pound bomb failed to set off the explosive at the checkpoint as it had been designed to do. Eight days later, on March 24, 16-year-old Hussam Abdo was captured wearing an explosive belt, having allegedly been paid by Fatah's Tanzim branch to blow himself up at the same checkpoint. The world's media watched as an EOD team disarmed the explosive belt with a police-sapper robot. [10] [11] (video). The BBC reported that the child was "paraded in front of the international media", and journalists were not allowed to interview the children and had to rely on the army's account of the incidents.[29]

Involvement of women

The loss of Palestinian political rights that followed the signing of the Oslo Accords is partially attributed to the inefficacy of the the non-militant approach adopted during the First Intifada. Due to this perception, the "male-militancy path" has met with greater social acceptance in Palestinian society than the "female/grassroots path". Women in particular have increasingly associated political violence with expanded citizenship rights due to the perceived failure of nonmilitaristic tactics to achieve political goals, primary amongst these, the achievement of Palestinian autonomy.[30]

The profile of the female Palestinian suicide bombers has been the subject of study by Katherine VanderKaay, who presented her profiling of the subjects at the American Psychological Association's annual meeting. While the first suicide bombing undertaken by a Palestinian took place in 1994, the first female suicide bomber from among Palestinian society did not emerge until January 2002. The bomber was Wafa Idris, a paramedic, reported to be 28, secular, Westernised and only nominally religious.[31][32]

Designations of Terrorism

The United States[33] and European Union[34] have designated the Abu Nidal Organisation, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Palestine Liberation Front, the PFLP and PFLP-GC as terrorist organisations. A United States Congress decision from 1987 also described the PLO as a terrorist organization[35]

Palestinian attitudes towards political violence

A study conducted by Mkhaimer Abusada of Al-Azhar University explored attitudes towards the use of political violence. Four questions were posed on the subject of political violence to over a thousand respondents randomly selected from localities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The first question was: "Do you support the continuing resort of some Palestinian factions to armed operations against Israeli targets in Gaza and Jericho?" Overall, 56% of respondents responded negatively. Those affiliated with leftist groups showed the highest levels of support for armed attacks against Israelis (74%), while those affiliated with parties supporting the peace process showed the lowest levels (24%). The Islamic opposition was split, with slightly over half in favor, and slightly less than half opposed.[36]

In September 1995, survey participants were asked whether they supported, opposed or had no opinion with regard to "armed attacks against Israeli army targets," "armed attacks against Israeli settlers," and "armed attacks against Israeli civilian targets." The majority supported the use of armed attacks against Israeli military targets and settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Support crossed all party lines and groups, and was highest among the Islamic opposition (91% and 84%) and the leftists (90% and 89%), though a significant majority of those who supported the peace process also supported armed attacks on military targets and settlers (69% and 73%). To explain the apparent paradox in the latter position, Abusada quotes Shikaki (1996) who, "contends that Palestinian support for the use of armed attacks against Israeli military targets and settlers does not indicate 'opposition to the peace process but Palestinian insistence that the process entails an end to occupation and settlements.'"[36] Palestinian support for armed attacks against Israeli civilian targets in Israel was 20% overall, with support being highest among those affiliated with the Islamic opposition (42%) and the leftists (32%), and lowest among supporters of the peace process (12%) and the National Independents (10%).[36]

A July 2001 poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy & Survey Research (PSR) found that 58 percent of Palestinians supported armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel and 92 percent supported armed confrontations against the Israeli army in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.[37] A May 2002 poll by the center found that support for bombings of civilians inside Israel dropped to 52 percent, but support for armed attacks against Israeli settlers remained "very high" at 89 percent. Support for armed attacks against soldiers stood at 92 percent.[38] A poll after the 2003 Maxim restaurant suicide bombing, in which 20 Israelis were killed, found that 75 percent of Palestinians supported the attack, with support higher, "in the Gaza Strip (82%) compared to the West Bank (70%), in refugee camps (84%) compared to towns and villages (69%), among women (79%) compared to men (71%), among the young (78%) compared to the old (66%), among students (81%) compared to professionals (33%), and among supporters of Hamas (92%) compared to supporters of Fateh (69%)."[39]

The firing of rockets from Beit Hanoun into Israel was acceptable to about three quarters of the Palestinian public in the occupied territories, and was higher in the West Bank (78%) compared to the Gaza Strip (71%), among students (83%) compared to merchants (63%), and among supporters of Hamas (86%) compared to supporters of Fatah (73%). While firing rockets from Beit Hanoun was supported by a majority of Palestinians (75%), 59% of the residents of Beit Hanoun rejected this practice. 83% of Palestinians favored a mutual cessation of violence.[40]

A report by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, a Palestinian organization, showing trends based on polls conducted since 1997, indicated that Palestinian support for military operations against Israeli targets stood at 34-40 percent in 1997-1999, climbed to 65-85 percent in 2000-2004, and dropped back to 41 percent at the end of 2004. "Military operations" were defined as including shootings, car bombs and mortar rocket attacks, but not suicide bombings.[41] A 2005 poll by the center indicated that 53 percent of Palestinians supported "the continuation of [the] Al-Aqsa Intifada, 50 percent supported "suicide bombings against Israeli civilians", and 36 percent supported "the resumption of military operations against Israeli targets".[42]

A 2009 report by PSR noted that the level of support for armed attack against Israeli civilians inside Israel increased significantly with 67% supporting and 31% opposed, compared to support by 40% in 2005 and 55% in 2006. A suicide bombing that killed one Israeli woman in Dimona after the Gaza War was supported by 77% and opposed by 19%. An overwhelming majority of 84 percent supported the March 2008 Mercaz HaRav massacre, in which a Palestinian gunman killed eight students and wounded eleven in a Jerusalem school. Support for the attack was 91 percent in the Gaza Strip compared to 79 percent in the West Bank. Similar suicide attacks in 2005 had been less widely supported, with 29% support for a suicide attack that took place in Tel Aviv, and 37% support for another one in Beersheba.[43]

A 2004 study by Victoroff et al. was conducted on a group of 52 boys, all 14 years old, from the al-Shati camp in Gaza. Forty-three percent of the boys reported that a family member had been wounded or killed by the IDF, and half lived in households where the father's employment was lost following the outbreak of the Second Intifada. "Sympathy for terrorism" was found to be correlated with depression and anxiety scores, as well as with the level of "perceived oppression," and "emotional distress". Of those who felt subject to unjust treatment, 77 percent expressed sympathy for terrorism.[44]

Palestinian groups involved in political violence

Sub-groups of the PLO

Groups associated with Fatah

  • Tanzim (founded 1995)
    • Means "organization" in Arabic
    • Loosely organized Fatah militia
    • Led by Marwan Barghouti until his arrest in 2002.
  • Force 17 (early 1970s-2007)
    • Elite unit of the PLO once under Yasser Arafat's direct guidance.
    • Acts as a versatile unit for combat and intelligence-gathering.
    • Dismantled in 2007 and incorporated into the Palestinian Presidential Guard.
  • Fatah Special Operations Group (Fatah-SOG)
    • Founded in the early 1970s by Col. Abdullah Abd al-Hamid Labib
    • Also known as the Martyrs of Tel Al Za'atar, Hawari, and Amn Araissi.
    • Recently inactive (as of 2004)
  • Ahmed Abu Reish Brigade
    • Extremist off-shoot of Fatah.
    • Was involved in July 17, 2004 kidnappings in the Gaza Strip.
    • Possibly linked to the Popular Resistance Committees
    • Led by Ahmed Abu Reish
  • Al Aqsa Marytrs Brigade
    • Responsible for many suicide bombings and shootings of Israeli civilians
    • Responsible for executing suspected conspirators and leaders of opposition against Arafat
    • Funded by Fatah and the Palestinian Authority[citation needed]
    • Offshoot of this group, Fatah Hawks, has carried out guerrilla attacks against Israeli military personnel in the Gaza Strip.
  • Black September Organization (1970–1973)

Splinter groups of the PLO

  • Splinter group from the PFLP, founded by Ahmed Jibril. Declared its focus would be military, not political. Was a member of the PLO, but left in 1974 for the same reasons as PFLP.

al-Qaeda linked groups

  • Army of Islam (Jaysh al-Islam)
    • Also known as Tawhid and Jihad Brigades and al-Qaeda in Palestine
    • The group are an armed Gaza clan named Doghmush who are affiliated with al-Qaeda and Abu Qatada
  • Jund Ansar Allah
    • al-Qaeda affiliated group in the Gaza Strip, who proclaimed the creation of an Islamic Emirate in Gaza and led an armed rebellion against Hamas. The group was led by Abdel Latif Moussa until his death in 2009 when he was killed in combat with Hamas
  • Fatah al-Islam
    • The group was established in 2006 by Shaker al-Abssi who led the group unil killed by Lebanese forces in 2007. The group was involved in a conflict with the Lebanese army in 2007 battling for control of Palestinian refugee camps, which caused the death of nearly 500 people.
  • Jund al-Sham (1999–2008)
    • Radical Islamist Group set up by Palestinians and Syrians which operated in different areas of the Middle East. The group was disbanded in 2008.
Violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: 2000 - 2001 - 2002 - 2003 - 2004 - 2005 - 2006 - 2007 - 2008 - 2009

See also


  1. ^ de Waart, 1994, p. 223. Referencing Article 9 of The Palestinian National Charter of 1968. The Avalon Project has a copy here
  2. ^ De Waal, 2004, pp. 29-30.
  3. ^ Schulz, 1999, p. 161.
  4. ^ Khaled Abu Toameh (July 22, 2009). "'Fatah has never recognized Israel'". The Jerusalem Post. Retrieved 2009-03-09. 
  5. ^ "Hamas drops call for destruction of Israel from manifesto". Guardian. January 12, 2006.,2763,1684472,00.html. 
  6. ^ Palestine Liberation Organization (1968). "PALESTINIAN NATIONAL CHARTER". United Nations. Retrieved August 19, 2009. 
  7. ^ Holly Fletcher (April 10, 2008). "Palestinian Islamic Jihad". Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 2009-09-03. 
  8. ^ Which Came First - Terrorism or "Occupation"? Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  9. ^
  10. ^ Terrorism deaths in Israel - 1920-1999
  11. ^
  12. ^ Morris, 1997, p. 147.
  13. ^ Morris, 1997, pp. 86-89.
  14. ^ Haya Regev, Dr. Avigail Oren, The operations in the 1950s, University of Tel Aviv, 1995
  15. ^ Glubb, John Bagot. A Soldier with the Arabs. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1957. p. 289.
  16. ^ a b Milton-Edwards, 2008, p. 132.
  17. ^ a b Kapitan, 1997, p. 30.
  18. ^ a b c Hussein - the Guerrilla Crisis Country Studies at the U.S. Library of Congress
  19. ^ Lebanese Civil War-Global
  20. ^ Crotty, 2005, p. 87.
  21. ^ Maoz, p. 264.
  22. ^ Den Boer and de Wilde, 2008, p. 190.
  23. ^ Moshe Elad, Why were we surprised?, Ynet News 07-02-2008
  24. ^ Katz, Samuel (2002). The Hunt for the Engineer. Lyons Press. ISBN 1585747491, pp.74-75
  25. ^ Harrison, Mark (2006). [ "Bombers and Bystanders in Suicide Attacks in Israel, 2000 to 2003"] (PDF). Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29 (2): 187–206. doi:10.1080/10576100500496998. 
  26. ^ Palestinians get Saddam funds
  27. ^ David M. Rosen, Armies of the Young: Child Soldiers in War and Terrorism, Rutgers University Press, pp. 104-106.
  28. ^ David M. Rosen, Armies of the Young: Child Soldiers in War and Terrorism, Rutgers University Press, pp. 109.
  29. ^ McGreal, Chris. BBC accused of bias against Israel, The Guardian, Thursday 1 April 2004
  30. ^ {{cite bookurl=|author=Karla J. Cunningham|editor=William J. Crotty|page=76|Democratic development & political terrorism: the global perspective|edition=Illustrated|publisher=UPNE|year=2005|ISBN=1555536255, 9781555536251}}
  31. ^ Wafaa Ali Idris, was secular, Westernised and only nominally religious. Daily Telegraph 31/01/2002.
  32. ^ Wafa Idris ... injured by rubber bullets. ... powerful incentives for her to avenge her people."
  33. ^ "Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)" - U.S. Department of State
  34. ^ "Council Common Position 2004/500/CFSP of 17 May 2004" - EU list of "persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts"
  35. ^ "The Congress determines that the PLO and its affiliates are a terrorist organization (1987)" - U.S. Code Collection
  36. ^ a b c Abusada, Mkhaimar S (June 22, 1998). "Palestinian party affiliation and political attitudes toward the peace process". Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ). 
  37. ^ Public Opinion Poll # 2, PSR - Survey Research Unit
  38. ^ Public Opinion Poll # 4, PSR - Survey Research Unit
  39. ^ Survey Research Unit: Results of Poll # 9, PSR - Survey Research Unit
  40. ^ Results of Poll # 13, PSR - Survey Research Unit
  41. ^ Palestinian Opinion Pulse 5/15, December 2004, p. 7
  42. ^ Poll no. 54, JMCC, pp. 5-6
  43. ^ Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (27), PSR - Survey Research Unit, 24-03-2008
  44. ^ Victoroff et al., 2006, pp. 230-232.
  45. ^ a b The Associated Press (February 13, 2010). "Ultraconservative jihadists challenge Hamas rule in Gaza". Haaretz. Retrieved 2010-02-14. 
  46. ^ Fatah Constitution (1964)


  • Den Boer, Monica; de Wilde, Jaap (2008). The Viability of Human Security. Amsterdam University Press. ISBN 9053567968, 9789053567968. 
  • Crotty, William J. (2005). Democratic development & political terrorism: the global perspective. UPNE. ISBN 1555536255, 9781555536251. 
  • De Waal, Alexander (2004). Islamism and its enemies in the Horn of Africa. C. Hurst & Co. Publishers. ISBN 1850657300, 9781850657309. 
  • de Waart, P. J. I. M. (1994). Dynamics of self-determination in Palestine: protection of peoples as a human right. BRILL. p. 223. ISBN 9004098259, 9789004098251. 
  • Kapitan, Tomis (1997). Philosophical perspectives on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Illustrated ed.). M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 1563248786, 9781563248788. 
  • Laquer, Walter (2003title=The History of Zionism). Tauris Parke Paperbacks. ISBN 1860649327. </ref>
  • Maoz, Zeev (2009). Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security & Foreign Policy (Illustrated ed.). University of Michigan Press. ISBN 0472033417, 9780472033416. 
  • Milton-Edwards, Beverley (2008). The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A People's War (Illustrated ed.). Taylor & Francis. ISBN 0415410436, 9780415410434. 
  • Morris, Benny (1997). Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation and the Countdown to the Suez War. Clarendon Press. ISBN 0-198-29262-7. 
  • Schulz, Helena Lindholm (1999). The reconstruction of Palestinian nationalism: between revolution and statehood: New approaches to conflict analysis (Illustrated ed.). Manchester University Press ND. ISBN 0719055962, 9780719055966. 
  • Victoroff, Jeffrey Ivan; NATO Public Diplomacy Division (2006). Tangled roots: social and psychological factors in the genesis of terrorism (Illustrated ed.). IOS Press. ISBN 158603670X, 9781586036706. 


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