Peace process in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict: Wikis

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Part of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict
and Arab–Israeli conflict series
Israeli–Palestinian
Peace Process
Israel with the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights
      Israel
      West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights a
Negotiating Parties
Palestinian territories
Palestinians
Israel
Israel
History
Camp David Accords · Madrid Conference
Oslo Accords / Oslo II · Hebron Protocol
Wye River / Sharm el-Sheikh Memoranda
2000 Camp David Summit · Taba Summit
Road Map · Annapolis Conference
Primary Negotiation Concerns
Final borders  · Compensation for Jewish refugees from Arab countries  · Israeli settlements
Palestinian refugees  · Security concerns
Status of Jerusalem  · Water
Secondary Negotiation Concerns
Antisemitic incitements
Israeli West Bank barrier · Jewish state
Palestinian political violence
Places of worship
Palestinian territories  Current Leaders  Israel
Mahmoud Abbas
Salam Fayyad
Benjamin Netanyahu
Shimon Peres
International Brokers
Diplomatic Quartet · Arab League · Egypt
United Nations European Union Russia United States Arab League Egypt
Other Proposals
Arab Peace Initiative · Elon Peace Plan
Lieberman Plan · Geneva Accord · Hudna
Israel's unilateral disengagement plan
Israel's realignment plan
Peace-orientated projects · Peace Valley  · Isratin · One-state solution · Two-state solution · Three-state solution · Middle East economic integration
Major projects, groups and NGOs
Peace-orientated projects · Peace Valley  · Alliance for Middle East Peace · Aix Group · Peres Center for Peace

a The Golan Heights are not part of the Israeli-Palestinian process.

The UN Partition Plan

The peace process in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has taken shape over the years, despite the ongoing violence in the Middle East and an "all or nothing" attitude about a lasting peace, "which prevailed for most of the twentieth century".[1] Since the 1970s there has been a parallel effort made to find terms upon which peace can be agreed to in both the Arab–Israeli conflict and in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Some countries have signed peace treaties, such as the Egypt–Israel (1979) and Jordan–Israel (1994) treaties, whereas some have not yet found a mutual basis to do so.

William B. Quandt, in the introduction of his book Peace Process, says:

"Sometime in the mid-1970s the term peace process began widely used to describe the American-led efforts to bring about a negotiated peace between Israel and its neighbors. The phrase stuck, and ever since it has been synonymous with the gradual, step-by-step approach to resolving one of the world’s most difficult conflicts. In the years since 1967 the emphasis in Washington has shifted from the spelling out of the ingredients of 'peace' to the 'process' of getting there. … Much of US constitutional theory focuses on how issues should be resolved – the process – rather than on substance – what should be done. … The United States has provided both a sense of direction and a mechanism. That, at its best, is what the peace process has been about. At worst, it has been little more than a slogan used to mask the marking of time.”[2]

Since the November 2007 Annapolis Conference, the current outline for a Palestinian–Israeli peace agreement has been a two-state solution.

Contents

Views of the peace process

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Palestinian views of the peace process

See Palestinian views of the peace process

Palestinians have held diverse views and perceptions of the peace process. A key starting point for understanding these views is an awareness of the differing objectives sought by advocates of the Palestinian cause. 'New Historian' Israeli academic Ilan Pappe says the cause of the conflict from a Palestinian point of view dates back to 1948 with the creation of Israel (rather than Israel’s views of 1967 being the crucial point and the return of occupied territories being central to peace negotiations), and that the conflict has been a fight to bring home refugees to a Palestinian state.[3] Therefore this for some was the ultimate aim of the peace process and for groups such as Hamas still is. However Slater says that this ‘maximalist’ view of a destruction of Israel in order to regain Palestinian lands, a view held by Arafat and the PLO initially, has steadily moderated from the late 1960s onwards to a preparedness to negotiate and instead seek a two-state solution.[4] The Oslo Accords demonstrated the recognition of this acceptance by the then Palestinian leadership of the state of Israel’s right to exist in return for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and West Bank.[5] However there are recurrent themes prevalent throughout peace process negotiations including a feeling that Israel offers too little and a mistrust of its actions and motives.[3][6] Yet, the demand for the "Right of Return" (ROR) by descendants of Palestinian refugees to Israel has remained a cornerstone of the Palestinian view and has been repeatedly enunciated by Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas who is leading the Palestinian peace effort.

Israeli views of the peace process

See Israeli views of the peace process

There are several Israeli views of the peace process. One Israeli view is that the conflict stems from the 1967 Six Day War and consequently the peace process should stem from this and thus have negotiated on the basis of giving up some control of the occupied territories in return for a stop to the conflict and violence.[3] Hardliners believe that no territorial concessions should be given to Palestinians and want to maintain an Israeli sovereign state over the whole area it currently occupies, or if it does negotiate with territory in the peace process only with the Gaza Strip.[5] Israelis view the peace process as hindered and near impossible due to terrorism on the part of Palestinians and do not trust Palestinian leadership to maintain control.[5] In fact, Pedahzur goes as far as to say that suicide terrorism succeeded where peace negotiations failed in encouraging withdrawal by Israelis from cities in the West Bank.[7] The Oslo Accords and the Camp David 2000 summit negotiations revealed the possibility of a two state system being accepted as a possible peace solution by Israeli leadership. However the violence of the second intifada has strengthened the resolve that peace and negotiation is not possible and a two state system is not the answer [5] which is further enforced by the coming to power of Hamas. A common theme throughout the peace process has been a feeling that the Palestinians ask for too much in their peace demands and offer little in return.

US views of the peace process

There are many divergent views on the peace process held by US officials, citizens and lobbying groups. The US government has contributed significant levels of financial and military support to Israel for decades. US aid to Israel exceeds the amount of foreign aid that the US provides to any other country. In 2002, the US began providing limited financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority (about $100 million annually), and has encouraged European nations to contribute as well, leading to a total contribution of more than one billion dollars.

The US has veto power in the UN Security Council and is able to block resolutions it opposes, and it has frequently vetoed resolutions critical of Israel's actions that do not comply with the Negroponte doctrine - that the US will veto any resolution criticizing Israel that does not also equally criticize terrorism and actions of Arab groups it deems to be terrorist.[8]

All recent US presidents have maintained a policy that Israel must give up some of the land that it conquered in the 1967 war in order to achieve peace;[citation needed] that the Palestinians must actively prevent terrorism; and that Israel has an unconditional right to exist.

Major current issues between the two sides

There are numerous issues to resolve before a lasting peace can be reached, including the following:

From the Israeli perspective, a key concern is security, and whether the major Palestinian figures and institutions are in fact trying to fight terrorism and promote tolerance and co-existence with Israel. Israeli concerns are based on abundant documentary and empirical evidence of many Palestinian leaders having in fact promoted and supported terrorist groups and activities. Furthermore, there is much concrete evidence of Palestinians having supported and expressed incitement against Israel, its motives, actions, and basic rights as a state. The election of Hamas has provided evidence for this view, with the Hamas charter stating unequivocally that it does not recognize Israel's right to exist.[9] However there remain some activists on the Palestinian side who claim that there are still some positive signs on the Palestinian side, and that Israel should use these to cultivate some positive interactions with the Palestinians, even in spite of Hamas's basic opposition to the existence of the Jewish State.

A further concern is whether, as a result of this security argument, Israel will in fact allow the Palestinian community to emerge as a viable and sovereign political unit, a viable and contiguous state. There are also various economic and political restrictions placed on Palestinian people, activities, and institutions which have had a detrimental effect on the Palestinian economy and quality of life.[10] Israel has said repeatedly that these restrictions are necessary due to security concerns, and in order to counteract ongoing efforts which promote terrorism which incite opposition to Israel's existence and rights as a country. The key obstacle therefore remains the Israeli demand for security versus Palestinian claims for statehood.[11]

Furthermore, the identification of 'Palestinian' with 'terrorist' can be construed as problematic, and Sayigh argues that this association is used as a rationale for maintaining the status qou, and that only by recognising the status of Jewish immigrants as 'settlers' can we conceptually move forwards [12] However, it is the case that the Palestinian resort to militancy has made such conceptual clarity difficult to achieve.

There is a lively debate around the shape that a lasting peace settlement would take. See for example the One-state solution and Two-state solution. Authors like Cook have argued that the one-state solution is opposed by Israel because the very nature of Zionism and Jewish nationalism calls for a Jewish majority state, whilst the two-state solution would require the difficult relocation of 'half a million Jewish settlers living in the occupied Palestinian territories'.[13] But as stated above, this presupposes a Palestinian leadership that recognizes Israel's right to exist.

For a detailed account of the issues in the conflict see the History of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Attempts to make peace

Madrid and Oslo (1991-93)

In 1991, just after the First Gulf War, a breakthrough occurred when US president George H.W. Bush (with the help of Secretary of State James Baker) called a conference in Madrid, Spain between Israel and the Arab nations "directly involved in the Arab–Israeli conflict ... which ... was to serve only as a preamble to direct bilateral and multilateral talks between Israel and its neighbors", dubbed the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991.[14] Talks continued in Washington, DC, but with few results, and were replaced by a series of clandestine meetings between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators hosted by Norway. These meetings produced the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords between Palestinians and Israel, a plan discussing the necessary elements and conditions for a future Palestinian state "on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338".[15] The agreement, officially titled the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP), was signed on the White House lawn on September 13, 1993. Rabin, Arafat and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres were awarded the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts.

After the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, the peace process eventually slowed to a grinding halt. The Palestinians living in the territories did not see their living conditions improve. No attempt was made to dismantle the Israeli settlements (seen by the Palestinians as one of the largest obstacles to peace), in fact the opposite was the case. The settlements' population almost doubled in the West Bank. Later sporadic suicide bombing attacks from Palestinian militant groups and the subsequent retaliatory actions from the Israeli military made conditions for peace negotiations untenable.

1996-1999 agreements

Newly elected Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared a new policy following the many suicide attacks by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad since 1993, including a wave of suicide attacks prior to the Israeli elections of May 1996. Netanyahu declared a tit-for-tat policy which he termed "reciprocity," whereby Israel would not engage in the peace process if Arafat continued with what Netanyahu defined as the Palestinian revolving door policy, i.e., incitement and direct or indirect support of terrorism. The Hebron and Wye Agreements were signed during this period, after Israel considered that its conditions where partially met.

Hebron agreement

Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, also known as The Hebron Protocol or Hebron Agreement, began January 7 and was concluded from January 15 to January 17, 1997 between Israel and the PLO. This agreement dealt with the redeployment of Israeli military forces in Hebron in accordance with the Oslo Accords. The agreement dealt with redeployments in Hebron, security issues and other concerns.

Wye River Memorandum

The Wye River Memorandum was a political agreement negotiated to implement the Oslo Accords, completed on 23 October 1998. It was signed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. It was negotiated at Wye River, MD (at the Wye River Conference Center) and signed at the White House with President Bill Clinton as the official witness. On 17 November 1998, Israel's 120-member parliament, the Knesset, approved the Wye River Memorandum by a vote of 75-19. The agreement dealt with further redeployments in the West Bank, security issues and other concerns.

Camp David 2000 Summit

In 2000, US President Bill Clinton convened a peace summit between Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. The Israeli prime minister, Ehud Barak reportedly[16] offered the Palestinian leader approximately 95% of the West Bank and the entire Gaza Strip, as well as Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem, if 69 Jewish settlements (which comprise 85% of the West Bank's Jewish settlers) be ceded to Israel. He also proposed "temporary Israeli control" indefinitely over another 10% of the West Bank territory—an area including many more Jewish settlements.[citation needed] According to Palestinian sources, the remaining area would be under Palestinian control, yet certain areas would be broken up by Israeli bypass roads and checkpoints. Depending on how the security roads would be configured, these Israeli roads might impede free travel by Palestinians throughout their proposed nation and reduce the ability to absorb Palestinian refugees.

President Arafat rejected this offer and did not propose a counter-offer. No tenable solution was crafted which would satisfy both Israeli and Palestinian demands, even under intense U.S. pressure. Clinton blamed Arafat for the failure of the Camp David Summit. In the months following the summit, Clinton appointed former US Senator George J. Mitchell to lead a fact-finding committee that later published the Mitchell Report. Later at the Taba summit (at Taba) in January 2001, the Israeli negotiation team presented a new map. The proposition removed the "temporarily Israeli controlled" areas, and the Palestinian side accepted this as a basis for further negotiation. However, Prime Minister Ehud Barak did not conduct further negotiations at that time; the talks ended without an agreement and the following month the right-wing Likud party candidate Ariel Sharon was elected as Israeli prime minister in February 2001.

Beirut summit

The Beirut summit took place in March 2002, and held to present plans to defuse the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres welcomed it and said, "... the details of every peace plan must be discussed directly between Israel and the Palestinians, and to make this possible, the Palestinian Authority must put an end to terror, the horrifying expression of which we witnessed just last night in Netanya", [1] referring to Netanya suicide attack perpetrated on previous evening which the Beirut Summit has failed to address. The main aspects of the Arab Peace Initiative that Israel was unready to implement were the "full withdrawal to 1967 borders and the right of return for the Palestinian refugees".[17]

The "Road Map" for peace

In July 2002, the "quartet" of the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia outlined the principles of a "road map" for peace, including an independent Palestinian state. The road map was released in April 2003 after the appointment of Mahmoud Abbas (AKA Abu Mazen) as the first-ever Palestinian Authority Prime Minister. Both the US and Israel called for a new Prime Minister position, as both refused to work with Arafat anymore.

The plan called for independent actions by Israel and the Palestinian Authority, with disputed issues put off until a rapport can be established. In the first step, the Palestinian Authority must "undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere" and a "rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus" must "begin sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure." Israel was then required to dismantle settlements established after March 2001, freeze all settlement activity, remove its army from Palestinian areas occupied after 28 September 2000, end curfews and ease restrictions on movement of persons and goods.[2]

Neither party has yet fulfilled its obligations under this peace plan. Israel has dismantled only minor post-March 2001 settlements and has actually expanded others. Israel also evacuated (sometimes forcibly) the whole Gaza Strip in August 2005, dismantling all Jewish settlements there. The Israeli army also withdrew completely from the Gaza Strip. The Israeli army still regularly patrols and redeploys into Palestinian-controlled areas, in what it describes as actions to combat terrorism. Palestinians have not made much progress in reducing violent actions of Palestinian against Israel and Israelis. They state that this is because of disputes between resistance factions (e.g: then-prime-minister Abbas had stated that he could not act against Hamas without causing a civil war) and continued Israeli attacks. Initially, Hamas and Islamic Jihad unilaterally declared a 45-day temporary ceasefire ("hudna"), conditional on Israel ceasing its assassinations of Palestinian leaders and a mass release of thousands of Palestinians held in Israeli prisons without trial or charges. Israel rejected the proposal.

Alternative peace proposals

With the road map in difficulties, pressure has grown to find an alternative way forward. On 7 December 2003, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert proposed a unilateral withdrawal from large parts of the West Bank and Gaza strip, abandoning some Jewish settlements while annexing some other territory. This was interpreted by many as a trial balloon on behalf of Ariel Sharon, who followed it up with a speech on December 18 giving the Palestinian Authority "a few months" to comply with the road map before Israel took "unilateral steps". The speech was strongly criticised by the United States government, which warned against pre-empting the road map's outcome, and by many on the Israeli right, who cite security concerns and the need for achieving reciprocal concessions in return for the withdrawal.

Another approach was taken by a team of negotiators led by former Israeli Justice Minister Yossi Beilin, and former Palestinian Information Minister Yasser Abed Rabbo following two and a half years of secret negotiations. On December 1, the two parties signed an unofficial suggested plan for peace in Geneva (dubbed the Geneva Accord). In sharp contrast to the road map, it is not a plan for a temporary ceasefire but a comprehensive and detailed solution aiming at all the issues at stake, in particular, Jerusalem, the settlements and the refugee problem. It was met with bitter denunciation by the Israeli government and many Palestinians, with the Palestinian Authority staying non-committal, but it was warmly welcomed by many European governments and some significant elements of the Bush Administration, including Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Yet another approach was proposed by a number of parties inside and outside Israel: a "binational solution" whereby Israel would formally annex the Palestinian territories but would make the Palestinian Arabs citizens in a unitary secular state. Championed by Edward Said and New York University professor Tony Judt, the suggestion aroused both interest and condemnation. It was not actually a new idea, dating back as far as the 1920s, but it was given extra prominence by the growing demographic issues raised by a rapidly expanding Arab population in Israel and the territories. Somewhat surprisingly, some Israeli settler groups supported it, seeing it as a way by which Israel could permanently legitimise its hold on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Considering the huge political and demographic issues that it would raise, however, it seems an improbable solution to the problem.

The Elon Peace Plan is a solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict proposed in 2002 by former minister Binyamin Elon. The plan advocates the formal annexation of West Bank and Gaza by Israel and that Palestinians will be become either Jordanian citizens or permanent residents in Israel so long as they remained peaceful and law-abiding residents. All these actions should be done in agreement with Jordan and the Palestinian population. This solution is tied to the demographics of Jordan where it's claimed that Jordan is essentially already the Palestinian state, as it has so many Palestinian refugees and their descendants.[3]

The Peace Valley plan is an effort personally supported by Israeli President Shimon Peres, which seeks to promote a new approach based on economic cooperation, and promotion of joint economic and business projects. Currently, it entails the construction of several industrial parks in several locations within the West Bank. This is hoped to bring a new area of common effort which might then bring reconciliation in a variety of areas.[18]

In May 2008, Tony Blair, the special envoy for the Quartet announced a new plan for peace and for Palestinian rights, based heavily on the ideas of the Peace Valley plan.[19]

Some difficulties with past peace processes

A common feature of all attempts to create a path which would lead to peace is the fact that more often than not promises to carry out "good will measures" were not carried out by both sides.[20] Furthermore, negotiations to attain agreement on the "final status" have been interrupted due to outbreak of hostilities. The result is that both Israelis and Palestinians have grown weary of the process. Israelis point out the fact that the Gaza Strip is fully controlled by the Hamas who do not want peace with a Jewish state.[21] According to the Israeli view, this limits the ability of the Palestinians to make peace with Israel and enforce it over the long term. Furthermore, in the Israeli view, a violent overtake of the West Bank by the Hamas as a result of the creation of an unstable new state is likely.[22] The Palestinians point out to the extensive and continuing Israeli settlement effort in the West Bank restricting the area available to the Palestinian state.[23]

The underlying cause of the inability to proceed with the peace process is the mistrust of the sides in each other. To proceed, the Palestinians have to destroy the terror, but many Palestinians feel that if they do this then they would have no ability to have invfluence over the shape of a final settlement. So for some of them terror is an essential component of diplomacy. [24]. As long as the Palestinians do not act to destroy terror, Israelis feel they are not serious about wanting peace. The result is a total impass which according to today's rules of the game cannot be overcome[25].

Recently however, dramatic improvement in the economy of the West Bank has increased support among Palestinians for Fatah's and Mahmoud Abbas's stated intent to reduce political violence.

An attempt to change the rules was made by Condolesa Rice and Zippi Livni when they brought forth the concept of a shelf agreement[26]. The idea was to disengage the linkage between negotiations and actions on the ground. In theory this would allow negotiations until a "shelf agreement" defining peace would be obtained. Such an agreement would not entail implementation. It would just describe what peace is. It would stay on the shelf but eventually will guide the implementation. The difficulty with this notion is that it creates a dis-incentive for Israel to reach such an agreement. The lack of clarity about what happens after agreement is reached will result in insurmountable pressures on Abbas to demand immediate implementation. However from the Israeli point of view, given the fact that the Palestinians are not ready to create a stable state, such an implementation process will almost guarantee instability in the Palestinian areas with a possible Hamas takeover as happened in Gaza[27].

As things stand now this brings the process to another impasse. To avoid it some definition of what happens after a shelf agreement is needed. One possible idea by this essay is to agree ahead of time that following attainment of a final status agreement there will be a negotiated detailed and staged implementation agreement which would define a process which would allow the creation of a stable functional Palestinian state in stages and over time[28].

Another possibility is joint economic effort and cooperation which can lead to both parties achieving a state of equitable reconciliation, in the Peace Valley plan. In fact the relative quiet of the current period (winter 2010) may be partly due to the rapid rate of economic growth in the West Bank. However, as long as terrorist militias have not been disarmed, they can disrupt the quiet at will and prevent any real progress towards peace.

Another difficulty may stem from the fact that The resolution of the Palestinian refugee issues may require regional cooperation to allow refugees to be resettled in various countries of the region as well as in the Palestinian state. This could be dome in the framework of the Arab Peace Plan. However as things stand now Saudi Arabia refuses to participate in peace talks until all of the preconditions of their peace proposal are met first. One of these preconditions involves the so called "Right of Return" which would allow any descendants of refugees to request to be admitted as a citizen of Israel. Such a condition is unlikely to be accepted by Israel. A large influx of Palestinian refugees into Israel may create an Arab Majority in Israel.

Joint economic effort and development

See Projects working for peace among Israelis and Palestinians.

Despite the long history of conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, there are many people working on peaceful solutions that respect the rights of peoples on both sides.

In March 2007, Japan proposed a plan for peace based on common economic development and effort, rather than on continuous wrangling over land. Both sides stated their support.[29] This became the Peace Valley plan, a joint effort of the Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian governments to promote economic cooperation, and new business initiatives which can help both sides work together, and create a better diplomatic atmosphere and better economic conditions. It is mainly designed to foster efforts in the private sector, once governments provide the initial investment and facilities.

Arab–Israeli peace diplomacy and treaties

See also

References

  1. ^ Eran, Oded. "Arab-Israel Peacemaking." The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. Ed. Avraham Sela. New York: Continuum, 2002, page 121
  2. ^ Quandt, William. Peace process: American diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1967. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution and University of California Press. ISBN 0 520 22374 8.  Accessible at Google Books
  3. ^ a b c Pappe, I., 2004, A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
  4. ^ Slater, J., 2001, What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, Political Science, Volume 116, Issue 2, Pages 171-199, page 176
  5. ^ a b c d Slater, J., 2001, What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, Political Science, Volume 116, Issue 2, Pages 171-199
  6. ^ Bregman, A. & El-Tahri, J., 1998, The Fifty Year War: Israel and the Arabs, London, Penguin Books
  7. ^ Pedahzur, A., 2005, Suicide Terrorism, Cambridge, Polity Press, page 65
  8. ^ Symbolic fight for Israel at UN
  9. ^ Mishal, S. and Sela, A, 'The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence' (Columbia University Press, 2006) p.275
  10. ^ Senker, C, 'the ArAb-Israeli Conflict', (UK, 2004) pp.4-9
  11. ^ Halliday, F., 'The Middle East in International Relations', (Cambridge, 2005), p.307
  12. ^ Sayigh, R., 'The Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries' (New York, 2007)p.200
  13. ^ Cook, J., 'Disappearing Palestine', (London, 2008), pp.244-246
  14. ^ Eran, Oded. "Arab-Israel Peacemaking." The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. Ed. Avraham Sela. New York: Continuum, 2002, page 137
  15. ^ Eran, Oded. "Arab-Israel Peacemaking." The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. Ed. Avraham Sela. New York: Continuum, 2002, page 138
  16. ^ "West Bank and Gaza Strip." ADL. 5 January 2009.
  17. ^ Eran, Oded. "Arab-Israel Peacemaking." The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. Ed. Avraham Sela. New York: Continuum, 2002, page 147
  18. ^ 'A valley of economic harmony by Yaakov Lappin, jpost.com, 1/18/08.
  19. ^ Israel may ease grip in Tony Blair deal to revive West Bank, The Times May 14, 2008
  20. ^ An Israeli view of Palestinian violations of the Road Map is presented in:http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=17666
  21. ^ http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=93695&sectionid=351020202
  22. ^ http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL0995750
  23. ^ http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1122544.html
  24. ^ This is clearly stated in a memo of the 2009 sixth Fatah convention http://www.passia.org/about_us/MahdiPapers/FatehConvention.pdf
  25. ^ http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1115671.html
  26. ^ http://gulfnews.com/news/region/palestinian-territories/rice-discusses-shelf-agreement-1.126656
  27. ^ Some discussion of the problems with a prematurely obtained "Shelf Agreement" are discussed here. http://reut-institute.org/Data/Uploads/PDFVer/20080417%20FEW%20Shelf%20Agreement%20and%202SS_1.pdf
  28. ^ Some such ideas are proposed in http://www.mideastweb.org/log/archives/00000619.htm
  29. ^ Israelis, Palestinians applaud Japanese development plan Associated Press via Haaretz.com, 3/15/07

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