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Perdurantism or perdurance theory is a
philosophical theory of persistence and identity.[1]
The perdurantist view is often defined as being the claim that
objects have distinct temporal parts as opposed to endurantism
(endurantism is the view that an individual is wholly present at
every moment of its existence).[1]
The use of "endure" and "perdure" to distinguish two ways in which
an object can be thought to persist can be traced to David
Kellogg Lewis (1986). However, contemporary debate has
demonstrated the difficulties in defining perdurantism (and also
endurantism). For instance, the work of Ted Sider (2001) has
suggested that even enduring objects can have temporal parts, and
it is more accurate to define perdurantism as being the claim that
objects have a temporal part at every instant that they exist.
Zimmerman (1996) has said that this won't work, as there have been
many self-professed perdurantists who believe that time is 'gunky' and that for every interval of
time, there is a sub-interval. Consequently there are no instants,
since these are defined as intervals of time with no subintervals,
and Sider's definition must be altered to admit of this fact.
Currently there is no universally acknowledged definition of
perdurantism (see also McKinnon (2002) and Merricks (1999)).
Worm theorists and stage
theorists
Perdurantists break into two distinct sub-groups. The former are
'worm theorists'. They believe that a persisting object is composed
of the various temporal parts that it has. So all persisting
objects are four-dimensional 'worms' that stretch across
space-time, and that you are mistaken in believing that chairs,
mountains and people are actually three-dimensional. This is to be
contrasted to a more recent twist called 'stage theory'. Stage
theorists take you to be identical with a particular temporal part
at any given time. So, in a manner of speaking, a subject only
exists for an instantaneous period of time. However there are other
temporal parts at other times which that subject is related to in a
certain way (Sider talks of 'modal counterpart relations', whilst
Hawley talks of 'non-Humean relations') such that when someone says
that they were a child, or that they will be an elderly person,
these things are true because they bear a special "indentity-like"
relation to a temporal part that is a child (that exists in the
past) or a temporal part that is an elderly person(that exists in
the future). Stage theorists are sometimes called
'exdurantists'.
Reasons to be a
perdurantist
There are many reasons on offer to become a perdurantist,
ranging from problems in logic, to the problem of temporary
intrinsics, to the problems of the Ship of Theseus. An excellent survey
can be found in Sider (2001).
Notable
perdurantists
- Yuri V. Balashov who has produced a large amount of literature
concerning perdurantism and special relativity. (Not to be confused
with Yuri S. Balashov)
- Jonathan Edwards who argued
that the sum of every stage of every person could be considered as
one enormous whole. In doing so, he controversially alleged he had
solved the problem of Original Sin: it is not unfair of God to
punish you for the sins of Adam and Eve, for God is merely
punishing the enormous whole that has Adam and Eve as temporal
parts, and so the enormous whole is guilty of sin. Your being
punished is merely an unfortunate side effect of this.
- Leonard Goodman
- Katherine Hawley
- Mark Heller
- Hud Hudson
- David
Lewis argued perdurance theory was necessary for time travel
- Orlando
Patterson
- Robin Le Poidevin
- Ted Sider
- J.J.C. Smart
- W.V. Quine
- Alfred Whitehead
Notes
References
- Temporal parts - Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Lewis,
D.K. 1986. On the Plurality of
Worlds Oxford: Blackwell
- McKinnon, N. 2002. "The Endurance/Perdurance Distinction",
The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80:3 p.
288-306.
- Merricks, T. 1999. "Persistence, Parts and Presentism", Noûs 33 p. 421-38.
- Sider, T. 2001. Four-Dimensionalism Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
- Zimmerman, D. 1996. "Persistence and Presentism",
Philosophical Papers 25: 2.
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