Philosophic Burden of Proof is the obligation on a party in an epistemic dispute to provide sufficient warrant for their position. In any such dispute, both parties will hold a burden of proof. However, their respective burdens of proof will often be unequal or asymmetrical. The burden of proof has been demonstrated to be a useful tool in public debate and scientific methodology.
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When debating any issue, there is an implicit burden of proof on him or her making a claim.[1] This burden does not demand a mathematical or strictly logical proof (although many strong arguments do rise to this level such as in logical syllogisms), but rather demands an amount of evidence that is established or accepted by convention or community standards.[2][3]
This burden of proof is often asymmetrical and typically falls more heavily on the party that makes either an ontologically positive claim, or makes a claim more "extraordinary"[4], that is farther removed from conventionally accepted facts. See below.
For any given argument (e.g., the existence/nonexistence of fairies), both sides of the proposition carry a burden of proof. However, the burden of proof will often be asymmetrical, meaning that it will fall harder on one side of an argument than the other. There are any number of factors which can influence the symmetry of the burden. Two of the most common are
Other considerations might include:
This list of epistemic claims about fairies below serves to highlight some of the more important aspects of burden of proof.
| Statement | Burden of Proof |
|---|---|
| Fairies exist. | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Fairies probably exist. | ---------------------------------------------------- |
| Fairies possibly exist. | -------------------------------- |
| I don't know whether fairies exist. | |
| Fairies possibly do not exist. | -- |
| Fairies probably do not exist. | ---- |
| Fairies do not exist. | ------ |
The graphic above serves as a useful place to begin discussing burden of proof symmetry:
As a starting point, the person who does not know whether fairies exist is not subject to any burden. It is only when one has an opinion an argues this opinion publicly that the burden of proof takes effect. In this case, the party making no claim about fairies has no burden of proof.
Once a party begins to form a belief or makes a claim, the burden of proof is initiated, and that burden is often not symmetrical to the opposing belief or claim. There are many reasons why the burden might not be symmetrical. However, two common reasons are that the claim goes against conventional or community standards or that the claim is ontologically positive. The asymmetry in this example stems mainly from conventional knowledge informing the epistemic dispute over fairies.
Regarding conventional or community wisdom, initially both parties must be aware of the prevailing knowledge in order for the burden of proof asymmetry to occur. And it is that prevailing knowledge which creates the asymmetry. In this example, it is assumed that both parties have ample knowledge of the community (in this case, most parts of the world, and especially the scientific community) knowledge, that fairies are mythological. Among other things, this leads to the burden of proof asymmetry.
Conventional knowledge is is not always universal, and can carry different weight with different parties of various ideologies and cultures. For instance, scientists tend to value scientific community knowledge, but often this wisdom has very little stay-power and is often rejected by those who value other forms of knowledge. On the other hand, many cultural groups place a higher value on folk wisdom, which is noted for its stay-power. Scientist often refer to folk wisdom as myth or superstition, while cultural groups often consider science shallow and ever-changing. In any case, the power of different kinds of community wisdom will hold different power depending on the community.
Again, it is the conventional wisdom which primarily creates the uneven burden in the above example, but the status of the claim as ontologically positive can also unbalance the burden. Ontologically "positive claims" are those that would extend the current body of knowledge. There is always an added burden upon him making the ontologically positive claim. (Though some, such as Adler, contend that challengers to the ontologically positive claim also carry some, though a lighter, burden.[5]) The fairy example contains an ontologically positive claim: that fairies exist. (While both "fairies exist" and "fairies are imaginary" are syntactically positive, only the former is ontologically positive.) Therefore, since fairies exist is an ontologically positive claim, an added burden is placed on the proposition.
Conventional wisdom and ontological considerations are distinct and do not depend on the other. For instance, conventional wisdom can work either for or against for an ontologically positive claim. And, the ontological burden will exist even in a vacuum of conventional wisdom. What might be called "raw" positive claims (claims that find themselves untethered from, unburdened by, or free from conventional knowledge) will still have a burden of proof attached to their ontological position. However, as should be clear, the two often work at the same time in a given situation. In addition, these two are not the only operators on burden of proof asymmetry. Thus, the important realization is that the symmetry of the burden is usually not even, but can be altered by conventional wisdom, ontology, and other issues.
While burden of proof issues are most often pointed out in the realm of public debate, in fact the burden is used every day from the mundane to the academic to the very practical. On the other hand, invocation of the burden is not always necessary.
The primary value of the burden of proof in science lies in the principle of ontological parsimony and the economics of epistemology. The number of logically possible entities is infinite. Human cognition and longevity are less than infinite. If we were to default to a tentative acceptance of every logical claim that came our way, we would quickly find ourselves with a bloated and unwieldy ontology that would hinder the progress of scientific inquiry.
Scientists, in addition to limits to cognition and longevity, must deal with limited funds and resources. When forming hypotheses, they default to the heuristic of methodological naturalism, a tool of science that is based on induction. Immaterial causes and effects are usually not added to the list of possible causes and effects, not because they are logically impossible, but because induction has taught us not to expect immaterial causes and effects, and ignoring these is efficient. The expectation is, instead, that each new mysterious phenomenon will have a material cause, and there is a legitimate heavy burden of proof on those who claim that the cause is found in an immaterial domain, a domain that has not yet been confirmed by science. In whatever domain of proposed solutions there is a lower expectation of a viable solution due to an inductive determination that such a domain has had little or no historical success in advancing science, scientists are warranted in ignoring this domain until scientific successes begin to confirm the explanatory and predictive efficacy of this domain and its proposed agents of causation.
Burden of proof is also an important concept in the public arena of ideas. Assuming both sides have agreed to reasoned discourse in hope of convergence to the truth[6], burden of proof can serve as an effective tool to ensure that all relevant arguments from both sides of an issue are introduced. After common assumptions are established[7][8][9], the mechanism of burden of proof takes over to keep those engaged in discourse focused on providing evidential warrant and cogent arguments for their positions.
A commitment to the heuristic of burden of proof also eliminates game stoppers in discourse in which negative evidence is demanded by the party making the positive claim. The party making the positive claim that fairies exists, for example, cannot demand that disbelievers provide evidence that fairies do not exist. The best way to ensure ontological parsimony and an efficient reasoned discourse is to have the side making the positive claim provide the positive evidence.
For claims outside the realm of logical possibility, especially within the realm of debate, the burden of proof need not be invoked. If a claim contains an absurd or illogical concept such as the claim of a square circle, the entire claim can be dismissed on the grounds of logical incoherence without any need to invoke burden of proof.
The fallacy of demanding negative proof is a fallacious inversion of the burden of proof principle that the individual making the ontologically positive claim bears an initial burden of proof. The ontologically positive claim must must first be substantiated with evidence and argument before the burden of proof shifts to the ontologically negative side. In other words, X (an ontologically positive claim) is not proven simply because "not X" cannot be proven.
A popular form of the fallacy is the argument from ignorance.
Since the fallacy of demanding negative proof depends on how the burden of proof is allotted, it works best in the absence of other factors which affect that burden. For instance, an objector might effetely wield the fallacy of demanding negative proof in the face of one presenting a new scientific theory. However, when other factors create a burden asymmetry, the fallacy loses much of its force, such as when conventional or community wisdom is strong. So, a burden of negative proof might be appropriate when there already exists strong community wisdom on the subject.
Lastly, the fallacy of requiring negative proof does not apply to an ontologically negative claim. In other words, one is justified in making an ontologically negative claim and then requiring proof of the opposite. For example, it would be a fallacy of requiring negative proof to say, "A chair sits beside me; prove me wrong." On the other hand, it would not be fallacy to exclaim, "No chair sits beside me; prove me wrong."
As a general rule, the less coherent and less embedded within conventional knowledge a claim appears, the heavier the burden of proof lies on the person asserting the claim. The scientific consensus on cold fusion is a good example. The majority of physicists believe cold fusion is not possible, since it would force the alteration or abandonment of a great many other tested and generally accepted theories about nuclear physics.
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