Pierre Duhem: Wikis

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Pierre Duhem
Full name Pierre Duhem
Born 9 June 1861
Paris, France
Died 14 September 1916
Cabrespine, France
Era 19th-century philosophy
Region Western Philosophy
Main interests Physics, Philosophy of Science, History of Science, Epistemology
Notable ideas Confirmation Holism, Gibbs-Duhem Equation

Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem (10 June 1861 – 14 September 1916) was a French physicist, mathematician and philosopher of science, best known for his writings on the indeterminacy of experimental criteria and on scientific development in the Middle Ages. Duhem also made major contributions to the science of his day, particularly in the fields of hydrodynamics, elasticity, and thermodynamics.

Contents

Philosophy

Duhem's views on the philosophy of science are explicated in La théorie physique: son objet et sa structure.[1] In this work, he opposed Newton's statement that the Principia's law of universal mutual gravitation was deduced from 'phenomena', including Kepler's second and third laws. Newton's claims in this regard had already been attacked by critical proof-analyses of the German logician Leibniz and then most famously by Immanuel Kant, following Hume's logical critique of induction. But the novelty of Duhem's work was his proposal that Newton's theory of universal mutual gravity flatly contradicted Kepler's Laws of planetary motion because the interplanetary mutual gravitational perturbations caused deviations from Keplerian orbits. Since no proposition can be validly logically deduced from any it contradicts, according to Duhem, Newton must not have logically deduced his law of gravitation directly from Kepler's Laws.[1][2][3][4]

Duhem's name is given to the Duhem-Quine thesis, which holds that for any given set of observations there are an innumerably large number of explanations. This thesis is the same as the Duhem-Quine under-determination thesis. It is, in essence, the same as Hume's critique of induction: all three variants point at the fact that empirical evidence cannot force the choice of a theory or its revision. The only known alternatives to induction are Duhem's instrumentalism and Popper's thesis that we learn from falsification, a thesis that Duhem rejected and Quine endorsed.

As popular as the Duhem-Quine thesis may be in the philosophy of science, in reality Pierre Duhem and Willard Van Orman Quine stated very different theses. Pierre Duhem believed that experimental theory in physics is fundamentally different from fields like physiology and certain branches of chemistry. Also Duhem's conception of theoretical group has its limits, since not all concepts are connected to each other logically. He did not include at all a priori disciplines such as logic and mathematics within these theoretical groups in physics which can be tested experimentally. Quine, on the other hand, conceived this theoretical group as a unit of a whole human knowledge. To Quine, even mathematics and logic must be revised in light of recalcitrant experience, a thesis that Duhem never held.

Opposition to the English inductivist tradition

Duhem argues that physics is subject to certain methodological limitations that do not affect other sciences. In his The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (1914), Duhem provided a devastating critique of Baconian crucial experiments. According to Duhem, an experiment in physics is not simply an observation, but rather an interpretation of observations by means of a theoretical framework. Furthermore, no matter how well one constructs one's experiment, it is impossible to subject an isolated single hypothesis to an experimental test. Instead, it is a whole interlocking group of hypotheses, background assumptions, and theories that is tested. This thesis has come to be known as holism. This inevitable holism, according to Duhem, renders crucial experiments impossible. More generally, Duhem was critical of Newton's description of the method of physics as a straightforward "deduction" from facts and observations.

In the appendix to The Aim and Structure, entitled "Physics of a Believer," Duhem draws out the implications that he sees his philosophy of science as having for those who argue that there is a conflict between physics and religion. He writes, "metaphysical and religious doctrines are judgments touching on objective reality, whereas the principles of physical theory are propositions relative to certain mathematical signs stripped of all objective existence. Since they do not have any common term, these two sorts of judgments can neither contradict nor agree with each other" (p. 285). Nonetheless, Duhem argues that it is important for the theologian or "metaphysician" to have detailed knowledge of physical theory in order not to make illegitimate use of it in speculations.

History of Science

Nicole Oresme, a prominent medieval scholar. Duhem came to regard the medieval scholastic tradition as the origin of modern science

Duhem is well known for his work on the history of science, which resulted in the ten volume Le système du monde: histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic (The System of World: A History of Cosmological Doctrines from Plato to Copernicus).[5] Unlike many former historians (e.g. Voltaire and Condorcet), who denigrated the Middle Ages, he endeavored to show that the Roman Catholic Church had helped foster Western science in one of its most fruitful periods. His work in this field was originally prompted by his research into the origins of statics, where he encountered the works of medieval mathematicians and philosophers such as John Buridan, Nicole Oresme and Roger Bacon, whose sophistication surprised him. He consequently came to regard them as the founders of modern science, having in his view anticipated many of the discoveries of Galileo Galilei and later thinkers. Duhem concluded that "the mechanics and physics of which modern times are justifiably proud to proceed, by an uninterrupted series of scarcely perceptible improvements, from doctrines professed in the heart of the medieval schools."[6]

Thermodynamics

Duhem is also known for his work in thermodynamics, being in part responsible for the development of what is known as the Gibbs–Duhem relation and the Duhem–Margules equation. Duhem thought that from thermodynamics first principles physicists should be able to derive all the other fields of physics—e.g., chemistry, mechanics, and electromagnetism.[7]

Bibliography

  • Les théories de la chaleur (1895)
  • Le mixte et la combinaison chimique. Essai sur l'évolution d'une idée (1902)
  • L'évolution de la mécanique (1902)
  • Les origines de la statique (1903)
  • La théorie physique son objet et sa structure (1906)
  • Études sur Léonard de Vinci. Paris, F. De Nobele, 1906-13; 1955. 3 v. 1. sér. I. Albert de Saxe et Léonard de Vinci. II. Léonard de Vinci et Villalpand. III. Léonard de Vinci et Bernardino Baldi. IV. Bernardino Baldi, Roberval dt Descartes. V. Thémon le fils du juif et Léonard de Vinci. VI. Léonard de Vinci, Cardan et Bernard Palissy. VII. La scientia de ponderibus et Léonard de Vinci. VIII. Albert de Saxe. 2. sér. IX. Léonard de Vinci et les deux infinis. X. Léonard de Vinci et la pluralité des mondes. XI. Nicolas de Cues et Léonard de Vinci. XII. Léonard de Vinci et les origines de la géologie. 3. sér. Les précurseurs parisiens de Galilée: XIII. Jean I. Buridan (de Béthune) et Léonard de Vinci. XIV. Le tradition de Buridan et la science italienne au XVIe siecle. XV. Dominique Soto et la scolastique parisienne.
  • Sozein ta phainomena. Essai sur la Notion de Théorie physique de Platon à Galilée (1908)
  • Traité de l'énergétique (1911)
  • Le Système du Monde. Histoire des Doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic, 10 vols., (1913—1959)

References

  1. ^ a b Duhem, Pierre; Philip P. Wiener (1954). The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Jules Vuillemin. Princeton University Press. ISBN 9780691025247.  
  2. ^ Lakatos, Imre; Paul Feyerabend, Matteo Motterlini (1999). For and Against Method: Including Lakatos's Lectures on Scientific Method and the Lakatos-Feyerabend Correspondence. University of Chicago Press. pp. 45–49. ISBN 9780226467740.  
  3. ^ Lakatos, Imre; John Worrall, Gregory Currie (1980). "5: Newton's Effect on Scientific Standards". The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521280310.  
  4. ^ Lakatos, Imre; John Worrall, Gregory Currie (1978). "5: The Method of Analysis-Synthesis". Mathematics, Science, and Epistemology. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521217699.  
  5. ^ Duhem, Pierre (1914). Le système du monde: histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic (The System of World: A History Cosmological Doctrines from Plato to Copernicus).  
  6. ^ Duhem, Pierre. Les origines de la statique (The Origins of Statics). 1. Harvard University Press. pp. 38.  
  7. ^ Roger Ariew (2007). "Pierre Duhem". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/duhem/. Retrieved 2009-11-7.  
  • Dijksterhuis, E.J. (1959). The Origins of Classical Mechanics from Aristotle to Newton M. Clagett (ed) Critical Problems in the History of Science, pp163–184 University of Wisconsin Proceedings 1957
  • Lowinger, Armand (1941). The Methodology of Pierre Duhem. Columbia University Press.  
  • Martin, R. N. D. (1991). Pierre Duhem: Philosophy and History in the Work of a Believing Physicist. ISBN 9780812691603.  
  • Moody, Ernest A. (1951). "Galileo and Avempace: The Dynamics of the Leaning Tower Experiment". Journal of the History of Ideas 12.  
  • Moody, Ernest A. (1966). "Galileo and his Precursors". Galileo Reappraised: 23–43.  
  • Stoffel, Jean-François; Stanley L. Jaki (1996). Pierre Duhem et ses doctorands: bibliographie de la littérature primaire et secondaire. Centre Interfacultaire d'Étude en Histoire des Sciences. pp. 325. ISBN 9782930175003.  
  • Stoffel, Jean-François; Jean Ladrière (2002). Le phénoménalisme problématique de Pierre Duhem. Brussels: Classe des lettres, Académie royale de Belgique. pp. 391. ISBN 9782803101900.  

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Quotes

Up to date as of January 14, 2010

From Wikiquote

Theoretical physics is not an autonomous science; it is subordinate to metaphysics.

Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem (10 June 186114 September 1916) was a French physicist, mathematician and philosopher of science, best known for his writings on the indeterminacy of experimental criteria and on scientific development in the Middle Ages. Duhem also made major contributions to the science of his day, particularly in the fields of hydrodynamics, elasticity, and thermodynamics.

Sourced

  • Now these two questions — Does there exist a material reality distinct from sensible appearances? and What is the nature of reality? — do not have their source in experimental method, which is acquainted only with sensible appearances and can discover nothing beyond them. The resolution of these questions transcends the methods used by physics; it is the object of metaphysics.
    Therefore, if the aim of physical theories is to explain experimental laws, theoretical physics is not an autonomous science; it is subordinate to metaphysics.
    • Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem, translated by Philip P. Wiener (1991). The aim and structure of physical theory. Princeton University Press. p. 10. ISBN 069102524X.  
  • Now, a symbol is not, properly speaking, either true or false; it is, rather, something more or less well selected to stand for the reality it represents, and pictures that reality in a more or less precise, or a more or less detailed manner.
    • Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem, translated by Philip P. Wiener (1991). The aim and structure of physical theory. Princeton University Press. p. 168. ISBN 069102524X.  

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