.Pragmatism is a philosophical movement that includes those who claim that an ideology or proposition is true if it works satisfactorily, that the meaning of a proposition is to be found in the practical consequences of accepting it, and that unpractical ideas are to be rejected.^A philosophical movement or system having various forms, but generally stressing practical consequences as constituting the essential criterion in determining meaning, truth or value.
Apollo Feedback: On Energy Pragmatism: Yes, No, But : Apollo Alliance7 January 2010 23:023 UTCapolloalliance.org [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^Hence such pragmatic aphorisms as 'truth is useful' or 'truth is a matter of practical consequences' mean essentially that all assertions must be _tested by being applied to a real problem of knowing._ What is signified by such statements is that no 'truth' must be accepted merely on account of the insistence of its claim, but that every idea must be tested by the consequences of its working.
Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.fullbooks.com [Source type: Original source]
^The end result is that over a thousand years of English common law, ours is a system that is a patch work of ideologies (or philosophies) - brought to us by the mechanism of pragmatism.
Obama and Pragmatism: Thinking Through Values | Robert Reich's Blog7 January 2010 23:023 UTCtpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
.Pragmatism, in William James' eyes, was that the truth of an idea needed to be tested to prove its validity.^Peirce's metaphysical writings contain a speculative, idealistic version of pragmatism which he called "pragmaticism" in order to disassociate his philosophy from the pragmatisms of William James and James's disciple F. C. S. Schiller.
Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.pragmatism.org [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^If, as pragmatism maintains, there is no true idea but that constructed, there can be no given or established idea of truth that can be verified.
Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.marxists.org [Source type: Original source]
^In other words, however much a 'truth' has been validated, it is always possible to test it further.
Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.fullbooks.com [Source type: Original source]
.Pragmatism began in the late nineteenth century with Charles Sanders Peirce and his pragmatic maxim.^Permalink The pragmatic maxim, also known as the maxim of pragmatism or the maxim of pragmaticism, is a maxim of logic formulated by Charles Sanders Peirce.
Obama and Pragmatism: Thinking Through Values | Robert Reich's Blog7 January 2010 23:023 UTCtpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^It was William James who, in 1897, credited Charles S. Peirce, his friend and admirer, with having originated pragmatism.
Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.pragmatism.org [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^His aim is both to defend a particular view of pragmatism originating with the work of Charles Sanders Peirce and, at the same time, argue in favour of a new view of deliberative democracy developed from Talisse’s Peircean pragmatism.
.Through the early twentieth-century it was developed further in the works of William James, John Dewey and—in a more unorthodox manner—by George Santayana.^At Harvard, in the first decades of the twentieth century, George Santayana criticized William James and John Dewey for failing to subordinate "practical thought" to eternal Platonic values.
Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.pragmatism.org [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^In fact, on my reading of the strand of pragmatism running from Emerson through James to Dewey, the pluralism of the Emersonian democrat depends on certain metaphysical commitments.
^Abstract The revival of philosophical pragmatism has generated a wealth of intramural debates between neopragmatists like Richard Rorty and contemporary scholars devoted to explicating the classical pragmatism of John Dewey and William James.
^Wright also argued for a neutral view of science with regard to moral and religious values, and for John Stuart Mill's utilitarian, relativistic theory of objective morality.
Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.pragmatism.org [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^Again we cannot simply bring under the rubric "pragmatism" the philosophies of Aristotle, Spinoza, or Santayana or of any other thinker who espouses this relativistic view of values, when in fact there are so many nonempirical aspects present in their philosophies, such as Aristotle's "unmoved mover," Spi- .
Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.pragmatism.org [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
.Pragmatism enjoyed renewed attention from the 1960s on when a new analytic school of philosophy (W. V. O. Quine and Wilfrid Sellars) put forth a revised pragmatism criticizing the logical positivism dominant in the United States and Britain since the 1930s.^Reconstructing Dewey: the philosophy of critical pragmatism.
http://www.infoplease.com/encyclopedia/pragmatism7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.infoplease.com [Source type: Academic]
^In this section I compare pragmatism with logical positivism which remains the dominating philosophy of science.
Pragmatism and Umwelt-theory7 January 2010 23:023 UTChome.comcast.net [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^During the first quarter of the 20th century, pragmatism was the most influential philosophy in the United States, exerting an impact on the study of law, education , political and social theory, art, and religion .
pragmatism (philosophy) -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.britannica.com [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
pragmatism (philosophy) :: Major theses of philosophic pragmatism -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.britannica.com [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
.Richard Rorty further developed and widely publicized the concept of naturalized epistemology; his later work grew closer to continental philosophy and is considered relativistic by its critics.^The concepts worked out by the masses and those worked out by scientists are not essentially different in nature.
Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.marxists.org [Source type: Original source]
^We thereby hope to extend our critical resources and contribute to the further development of constructive visions of what democracy, in the concrete, may mean for us today.
HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind 7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.hf.uni-koeln.de [Source type: Original source]
^The book develops his concept of experience in the most subtle and complex way and can, in this respect, only be complemented by the later volume "Art as Experience."
HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind 7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.hf.uni-koeln.de [Source type: Original source]
.Contemporary pragmatism is divided into a strict analytic tradition, a more relativistic strand (in the wake of Rorty), and "neo-classical" pragmatism (such as Susan Haack) that adheres to the work of Peirce, James, and Dewey.^Peirce's metaphysical writings contain a speculative, idealistic version of pragmatism which he called "pragmaticism" in order to disassociate his philosophy from the pragmatisms of William James and James's disciple F. C. S. Schiller.
Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.pragmatism.org [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^A. J. Ayer, The Origins of Pragmatism (San Francisco, 1968) is less historical and mostly critical of James and Peirce.
Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.pragmatism.org [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^It was William James who, in 1897, credited Charles S. Peirce, his friend and admirer, with having originated pragmatism.
Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.pragmatism.org [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^Both he and Peirce were very critical of the subjective individualism of William James.
Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.pragmatism.org [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^Permalink The pragmatic maxim, also known as the maxim of pragmatism or the maxim of pragmaticism, is a maxim of logic formulated by Charles Sanders Peirce.
Obama and Pragmatism: Thinking Through Values | Robert Reich's Blog7 January 2010 23:023 UTCtpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
.The term pragmatism was first used in print by James, who credited Peirce with coining the term during the early 1870s.^The original formulation of pragmatism by Peirce applied to epistemology (the idea that knowledge must be tested by its usefulness), but the concept was quickly extended by James.
Pragmatist Ethic 7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.qcc.cuny.edu [Source type: Original source]
^But as H S Thayer points out, it was first cobbled together by members of the "Metaphysical Club" which Peirce, Henry James and others founded in Cambridge in the 1870s [2] .
Radical Faith - exploring faith in a changed world7 January 2010 23:023 UTChomepages.which.net [Source type: Original source]
^With these words, William James, one of the great minds of American philosophy, captures the power of pragmatism, a theory first developed by Charles S. Peirce.
.Prompted by James' use of the term and its attribution to him, Peirce also wrote and lectured on pragmatism to make clear his own interpretation.^Famously, James misremembered seeing the term pragmatism in Peirces How to Make Our Ideas Clear.
C.S. Peirce's Pragmatism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.utm.edu [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^Both Peirce and James, in different years, gave lectures on Pragmatism.
Pragmatism, Ethics and Education [Encyclopaedia of Philosophy of Education] 7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.vusst.hr [Source type: Original source]
^With these words, William James, one of the great minds of American philosophy, captures the power of pragmatism, a theory first developed by Charles S. Peirce.
.Peirce eventually coined the new name pragmaticism to mark what he regarded as the original idea, for clarity's sake and possibly (but not certainly) because he disagreed with James (cf.^Philosophy A movement consisting of varying but associated theories, originally developed by Charles S. Peirce and William James and distinguished by the doctrine that the meaning of an idea or a proposition lies in its observable practical consequences.
Pragmatism Definition | Definition of Pragmatism at Dictionary.com7 January 2010 23:023 UTCdictionary.reference.com [Source type: Reference]
^PG10] Legal pragmatism has its roots in the writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. As a young man in Boston, Holmes had engaged in lengthy conversations with William James and Charles S. Peirce regarding the then still new philosophy of pragmatism.
SOME THOUGHTS ON THE MERITS OF PRAGMATISM AS A GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.bc.edu [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^The logician Charles Peirce, whom James credited with codifying the pragmatic method, preferred pragmaticism , in part because he hoped that ugly duckling would discourage overuse.
What Pragmatism Ain't | Metropolis Magazine | July 20017 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.metropolismag.com [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
Menand 2001 on the former interpretation; below on the latter). He claimed the term was so ugly, nobody would be tempted to steal it (Haack 1998).
.James and Peirce, inspired by crucial links among belief, conduct, and disposition, stated belief is a proposition on which a person is prepared to act.^One wants this agreement because a belief is what one is prepared to act upon, and only actions based on beliefs that agree with the facts promise to lead to the desired outcomes.
Pragmatism, Ethics and Education [Encyclopaedia of Philosophy of Education] 7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.vusst.hr [Source type: Original source]
^At one point in his works, James states, "…the ultimate test for us of what a truth means is the conduct it dictates or inspires."
http://philosophy.lander.edu/intro/introbook2.1/c8397.html7 January 2010 23:023 UTCphilosophy.lander.edu [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^Post an opinion, a question, a link to your favorite site, or a poem or short story inspired by the masterpieces of William James.
William James Lecture Hall: William James Pragmatism The Principles of Psychology The Varieties of Religious Experience7 January 2010 23:023 UTCmobydicks.com [Source type: General]
Inspiration for the pragmatists were:
Francis Bacon who coined the phrase "knowledge is power",
David Hume for his naturalistic account of knowledge and action,
.The pragmatist proceeds from the basic premise that the human capability of theorizing is integral to intelligent practice.^But the perspectives of human beings are not restricted to the past and the present; as intelligent subjects, they are also capable of temporal projection and a certain level of control of future events.
Mike Sandbothe: Mats Bergman: The New Wave of Pragmatism in Communication Studies7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.sandbothe.net [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^Concepts, he tells us, are "tools slowly fashioned by the practical intelligence for the mastery of experience" (Studies in Humanism , p.
CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Pragmatism7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.newadvent.org [Source type: Original source]
.Theory and practice are not separate spheres; rather, theories and distinctions are tools or maps for finding our way in the world.^Since knowledge thus grows through our attempts to push the world around (and see what happens as a result), it follows that knowers as such must be agents; as a result, the ancient dualism between theory and practice must go by the board.
Pragmatism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.utm.edu [Source type: Original source]
Pragmatism [The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.iep.utm.edu [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^James meant by this memorable phrase that, rather than a ready-made essence waiting to be discovered, truth is the consequence of our ongoing experience and practice.
ns 70 (Spring/Summer 2008) // the minnesota review7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.theminnesotareview.org [Source type: Original source]
^In ordinary English parlance, to be pragmatic is to exhibit concern with everyday affairs and common practice rather than abstract speculation or theory.
UNLV PHILOSOPHY (PRAGMATISM, SPRING 2006)7 January 2010 23:023 UTCfaculty.unlv.edu [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
.As John Dewey put it, there is no question of theory versus practice but rather of intelligent practice versus uninformed, stupid practice and noted in a conversation with William Pepperell Montague that "[h]is effort had not been to practicalize intelligence but to intellectualize practice". (Quoted in Eldridge 1998, p. 5) Theory is an abstraction from direct experience and ultimately must return to inform experience in turn.^There is no need to choose between (1) an anthropological, natural–historical, social–practice inquiry, and (2) a formal, mathematically inspired, model–theoretic semantics.
William James Studies | Vol. 3 No. 1 | WESLEY COOPER: Pragmatism in the 21st century7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwilliamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^If one were to accuse the monist of "semantic tricks," it might be pointed out that linguistic oneness is, in fact, one of several essentially pragmatic "unities" that inform the question raised previously regarding what practical difference unity versus plurality might involve.
Term Papers on pragmatism | pragmatism essays | AcaDemon7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.academon.com [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^But the legacy of best known pragmatists, John Dewey and William James, in the form of their departure from Platonism thought, has burden our own contemporary world with a very different version of the practical.
Pragmatism7 January 2010 23:023 UTCbatr.org [Source type: Original source]
Thus an organism navigating his or her environment is the grounds for pragmatist inquiry.
Anti-reification of concepts and theories
.Dewey, in The Quest For Certainty, criticized what he called "the philosophical fallacy": philosophers often take categories (such as the mental and the physical) for granted because they don't realize that these are merely nominal concepts that were invented to help solve specific problems.^It's interesting to note that false dichotomies were one of the critiques of philosophy by pragmatists: Dewey, in The Quest For Certainty, criticized what he called "the philosophical fallacy": philosophers often take categories (such as the mental and the physical) for granted because they don't realize that these are merely nominal concepts that were invented to help solve specific problems. PERMALINK .
On Pragmatism | observer2's Blog7 January 2010 23:023 UTCtpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
Ola Bini: Programming Language Synchronicity: Pragmatic Static Typing18 September 2009 14:12 UTCola-bini.blogspot.com [Source type: Original source]
^Philosophers are puzzled by this question because they confuse percepts with concepts.
Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.fullbooks.com [Source type: Original source]
This causes metaphysical and conceptual confusion. .Various examples are the "ultimate Being" of Hegelian philosophers, the belief in a "realm of value", the idea that logic, because it is an abstraction from concrete thought, has nothing to do with the act of concrete thinking, and so on.^An indigenous American philosophical theory that explains both meaning and truth in terms of the application of ideas or beliefs to the performance of actions that have observable practical outcomes.
^James assures us that it can contribute to the truth of a theological proposition that it has ‘a value for concrete life’ (1907: 40); and this can occur because the idea of God possesses a majesty which can ‘yield religious comfort to a most respectable class of minds’ (1907: 40).
Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)7 January 2010 23:023 UTCplato.stanford.edu [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^Our thoughts and beliefs 'pass,' so long as nothing challenges them, just as bank-notes pass so long as nobody refuses them.
William James: Pragmatism: Lecture 6: Pragmatism's Conception of Truth7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.d.umn.edu [Source type: Original source]
.David L. Hildebrand sums up the problem: "Perceptual inattention to the specific functions comprising inquiry led realists and idealists alike to formulate accounts of knowledge that project the products of extensive abstraction back onto experience."^A concept cut out of the continuum of experience at any moment no more represents the reality of science than a cross-section of a tissue represents the specific vital function of that tissue.
CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Pragmatism7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.newadvent.org [Source type: Original source]
^In taking up the problem of how women are misinterpreted, for example, Carol Gilligan and Deborah Tannen have provided sensitive and perceptive accounts of "women's experience" that help the reader to understand what that experience may look and feel like from within.
Audrey Thompson - Political Pragmatism and Educational Inquiry7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.ed.uiuc.edu [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^I believe that the best problem solvers are those who are both noble-minded (idealists) AND realists (pragmatists).
When in conflict, should idealism be valued over pragmatism? - CreateDebate7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.createdebate.com [Source type: General]
(Hildebrand 2003)
Naturalism and anti-Cartesianism
.From the outset, pragmatists wanted to reform philosophy and bring it more in line with the scientific method as they understood it.^We want to bring more people with us.
Principles and Pragmatism: The Dallas Principles offer a ''No Delay, No Excuses'' roadmap to GLBT equality: Feature Story at Metro Weekly magazine - News articles from Washington DC newspaper7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.metroweekly.com [Source type: Original source]
^As for pragmatics: the syntax/semantics/pragmatics model, especially if understood hierarchically (see the use of "above" above) is rather problematic and antiquated in linguistics itself, and more so in the philosophy of language.
In Praise of Scripting: Real Programming Pragmatism | Lambda the Ultimate7 January 2010 23:023 UTClambda-the-ultimate.org [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^It is not, however, necessary that philosophy should investigate all the forms of scientific knowledge, for they are recorded and retained in the collective consciousness.
Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.marxists.org [Source type: Original source]
.They argued that idealist and realist philosophy had a tendency to present human knowledge as something beyond what science could grasp.^Is there a chance they could be on to something?
Obama and Pragmatism: Thinking Through Values | Robert Reich's Blog7 January 2010 23:023 UTCtpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^The other important factor is that it requires the philosophy of science as its foundation — it relies on knowledge of cause and effect to be able to determine correct action to accomplish the intended ends.
Pragmatism, Viewed Pragmatically - Opinionator Blog - NYTimes.com7 January 2010 23:023 UTCopinionator.blogs.nytimes.com [Source type: Original source]
^In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries philosophy was one aspect of culture, and existentialism gradually became a reaction to several aspects of culture, for example, crisis in human identity, politics and society, knowledge and truth, science, technology, the arts, and religion.
Term Papers on pragmatism | pragmatism essays | AcaDemon7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.academon.com [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
.These philosophies then resorted either to a phenomenology inspired by Kant or to correspondence theories of knowledge and truth.^A fact is true if these things and relations do exist (a correspondence theory of truth).
Pragmatism and Umwelt-theory7 January 2010 23:023 UTChome.comcast.net [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^Lovejoy thus insisted that there are incompatible theories of knowledge, of truth, and of values present in these diverse ideas maintained by different pragmatists.
Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.pragmatism.org [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^The correspondence theory, then, does not _test_ the truth-claim of the assertion; it only gives a fresh definition of it.
Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.fullbooks.com [Source type: Original source]
.Pragmatists criticized the former for its a priorism, and the latter because it takes correspondence as an unanalyzable fact.^In fact, it becomes quite difficult to hire a senior official into important positions in countries because of the judicial risks that people are taking.
Transcript of an IMF Book Forum -- Pragmatisn: Latin America's New 'Ism'?7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.imf.org [Source type: Original source]
.Pragmatism instead tries to explain, psychologically and biologically, how the relation between knower and known 'works' in the world.^Philosophers today tend to be very wary of a view that cannot make sense of our causal relation to the world as giving us genuine knowledge of how the world is.
Pragmatism, Philosophical and Political - The Brooklyn Rail7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.brooklynrail.org [Source type: Original source]
^But as Obama tried to explain his position; maintaining it was a bad bill but an acceptable compromise for now, I couldn’t help but feel comforted by the pragmatism in his reasoning.
Organizing for America | Posts with the tag pragmatism7 January 2010 23:023 UTCmy.barackobama.com [Source type: General]
^An analysis of what pragmatism really means explains why Mr. Obama's plan has not (and cannot) work.
The emptiness of Obama's pragmatism / The Christian Science Monitor - CSMonitor.com7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.csmonitor.com [Source type: News]
.In "The Fixation of Belief" (1877), C.S. Peirce denied that introspection and intuition (staple philosophical tools at least since Descartes) were valid methods for philosophical investigation.^Its methods of investigation are difficult, since direct experiment is impossible.
Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.marxists.org [Source type: Original source]
He argued that intuition could lead to faulty reasoning, e.g. when we reason intuitively about infinity. .Furthermore, introspection does not give privileged access to knowledge about the mind - the self is a concept that is derived from our interaction with the external world and not the other way around.^The other is growth around the world, in the U.S. and in the other areas.
Transcript of an IMF Book Forum -- Pragmatisn: Latin America's New 'Ism'?7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.imf.org [Source type: Original source]
^Since knowledge thus grows through our attempts to push the world around (and see what happens as a result), it follows that knowers as such must be agents; as a result, the ancient dualism between theory and practice must go by the board.
Pragmatism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.utm.edu [Source type: Original source]
^Whichever way one has it, it seems clear that our theorizing about human cognition should seek to represent and express such an open and evolving quality of mind.
Bredo / COGNITIVISM, SITUATED COGNITION, AND DEWEYIAN PRAGMATISM7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.ed.uiuc.edu [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
.(De Waal 2005, pp. 7–10) At the same time he held steadily that pragmatism and epistemology in general could not be derived from principles of psychology understood as a special science[1]: what we do think is too different from what we should think.^We should also add that truth, at the same time as being a social and human thing, is also something living.
Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.marxists.org [Source type: Original source]
^Again, in his last chapter, James criticized the doctrine of Spencer that all the principles of thought, all its general truths and axioms, were derived from impressions of the external world.
Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.fullbooks.com [Source type: Original source]
^Nothing authorises us to think that the affective capacities of men of former times were radically different from our own.
Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.marxists.org [Source type: Original source]
[2].This is an important point of disagreement with most other pragmatists, who advocate a more thorough naturalism and psychologism.^The "pragmatists" have a good point in the short run, but they forget about what happens to energy and intention in the log run, for example, when they find themselves having to promote a person (or party) who has signed on to more killing in Iraq!
Mother's Day 2008: Peaceful Idealism v. Political Pragmatism | CommonDreams.org7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.commondreams.org [Source type: General]
^The most important of the ‘classical pragmatists’ were Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), William James (1842–1910) and John Dewey (1859-1952).
Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)7 January 2010 23:023 UTCplato.stanford.edu [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^Is there, in fact, anything amounting to a univocal central pragmatist doctrine, or do calls to pragmatism advocate little more than a set of priorities or attitudes?
UNLV PHILOSOPHY (PRAGMATISM, SPRING 2006)7 January 2010 23:023 UTCfaculty.unlv.edu [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
.Richard Rorty expanded on these and other arguments in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature in which he criticized attempts by many philosophers of science to carve out a space for epistemology that is entirely unrelated to - and sometimes thought of as superior to - the empirical sciences.^The other important factor is that it requires the philosophy of science as its foundation — it relies on knowledge of cause and effect to be able to determine correct action to accomplish the intended ends.
Pragmatism, Viewed Pragmatically - Opinionator Blog - NYTimes.com7 January 2010 23:023 UTCopinionator.blogs.nytimes.com [Source type: Original source]
^But it is a philosophy uneasy with ideologies of all kinds, wary of turning ideas into rigid prescriptions, carving grooves for thought so deep that other ways of thinking disappear from view.
Pragmatism and its discontents By Philip Zelikow | Shadow Government7 January 2010 23:023 UTCshadow.foreignpolicy.com [Source type: News]
^One is left wishing that other schools of thought, such as idealism and Thomism, had found American soil as congenial as pragmatism did; and one also wishes that the major American philosopher of our time were someone other than Richard Rorty.
At the End of Pragmatism7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.leaderu.com [Source type: Original source]
At the End of Pragmatism | First Things7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.firstthings.com [Source type: Original source]
.W.V. Quine, instrumental in bringing naturalized epistemology back into favor with his essay Epistemology Naturalized (Quine 1969), also criticized 'traditional' epistemology and its "Cartesian dream" of absolute certainty.^The existence of absolute certainty is denied, and the demand for it, in a world which contains only the practical sort, merely plays into the hands of scepticism.
Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.fullbooks.com [Source type: Original source]
^In order to enrich the picture of Quine's place in the pragmatist tradition, some neopragmatist criticisms of his ideas (e.g., by Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty) are also discussed.
.The dream, he argued, was impossible in practice as well as misguided in theory because it separates epistemology from scientific inquiry.^Most strongly Ian Hacking, in Representing and Intervening, makes such a plea to look at inquiry as practical action in upholding a scientific realism.
Symmetrical Archaeology: Symmetrical archaeology, pragmatism and archaeological hope7 January 2010 23:023 UTChumanitieslab.stanford.edu [Source type: Original source]
^The ‘pattern of inquiry’ that he describes is common to practical problem solving, common sense investigations of our surroundings, scientific inquiry, the information gathering of animals and so on.
Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)7 January 2010 23:023 UTCplato.stanford.edu [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^We argue, however, that Kennedy's Vietnam talk concerned itself with principles, as well as practicalities.
John Kennedy's Vietnam Rhetoric7 January 2010 23:023 UTCmcadams.posc.mu.edu [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
Hilary Putnam asserts that the combination of antiskepticism and fallibilism is a central feature of pragmatism.
The reconciliation of anti-skepticism and fallibilism
Hilary Putnam has suggested that the reconciliation of antiskepticism and fallibilism is the central goal of American pragmatism. .Although all human knowledge is partial, with no ability to take a 'God's-eye-view,' this does not necessitate a globalized skeptical attitude.^Putnam’s realism acknowledges that knowledge is always from a human’s, never a God’s eye, view.
In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism7 January 2010 23:023 UTCusers.california.com [Source type: Original source]
In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism7 January 2010 23:023 UTCusers.sfo.com [Source type: Original source]
^Can we imagine new ways to diminish human suffering and increasing the ability of all human children to start life with an equal chance at happiness?
Pragmatism and Atheistic Hope7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.atheistichope.com [Source type: Original source]
^There is no such thing as the pragmatist party-line: not only have pragmatists taken different views on major issues (for example, truth, realism, skepticism, perception, justification, fallibilism, realism, conceptual schemes, the function of philosophy, etc.
Pragmatism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.utm.edu [Source type: Original source]
Pragmatism [The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.iep.utm.edu [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
Peirce insisted that contrary to Descartes' famous and influential methodology in the Meditations on First Philosophy, doubt cannot be feigned or created for the purpose of conducting philosophical inquiry. .Doubt, like belief, requires justification.^Religious and moral questions require a separate criterion of justification, and this is where a pragmatic method determines what difference I take some such belief to have, and why it is reasonable to hold that belief.
C.S. Peirce's Pragmatism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.utm.edu [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^For Dewey, Peirce, and like-minded pragmatists, knowledge (or warranted assertion) is the product of inquiry, a problem-solving process by means of which we move from doubt to belief.
Pragmatism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.utm.edu [Source type: Original source]
Pragmatism [The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.iep.utm.edu [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
.It arises from confrontation with some specific recalcitrant matter of fact (which Dewey called a 'situation'), which unsettles our belief in some specific proposition.^On a more serious note, a lot of policies which may seem painful for us arise from our fundamental belief in the principle of Pragmatism.
Singaporean Pragmatism « THE INTELLIGENT SINGAPOREAN7 January 2010 23:023 UTCintelligentsingaporean.wordpress.com [Source type: Original source]
^This is not to suggest that our spiritual beliefs do not guide our ethics, but it does suggest that our political moves cannot be stymied whenever religious objections arise by any faction, which they surely will on any matter.
The Dialectic of Chiropractic7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.stoprondberg.org [Source type: Original source]
^We can describe what we do with the word ‘true’: we use it to express our endorsement of beliefs and sentences, and sometimes we might find it useful to express our fallibility by saying that some of our beliefs may not be true.
Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)7 January 2010 23:023 UTCplato.stanford.edu [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
.Inquiry is then the rationally self-controlled process of attempting to return to a settled state of belief about the matter.^This sort of self-hypnosis may be useful as a psychological technique for a depressed person attempting to develop a positive attitude, however manufacturing fact from metaphysical belief is not a useful process in law enforcement administration.
William James' Pragmatism as a policing philosophy?7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.kardasz.org [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^Emerging first in the United States in the late 1800's, pragmatism attempted to apply scientific and social developments of the era to prior metaphysical beliefs.
William James' Pragmatism as a policing philosophy?7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.kardasz.org [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^I believe that ideas (intellectual and rational processes) also result from action and devolve for the sake of the better control of action.
John Dewey My Pedagogic Creed7 January 2010 23:023 UTCdewey.pragmatism.org [Source type: Original source]
Note that anti-skepticism is a reaction to modern academic skepticism in the wake of Descartes. .The pragmatist insistence that all knowledge is tentative is actually quite congenial to the older skeptical tradition.^You are a polytheist if you think that there is no actual or possible object of knowledge that would permit you to commensurate and rank all human needs.
The Revival of Pragmatism7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.nytimes.com [Source type: Original source]
^The pragmatist tradition 4.1 Skepticism and fallibilism 4.2 Inquiry 4.3 The pragmatist conception of experience 4.4 Representations 5.
Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)7 January 2010 23:023 UTCplato.stanford.edu [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^Nevertheless, it is possible to identify certain ideas that have loomed large in the pragmatist tradition—though that is not to say that these ideas are the exclusive property of pragmatists, nor that they are endorsed by all pragmatists.
Pragmatism [The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.iep.utm.edu [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
.The epistemology of early pragmatism was heavily influenced by Charles Darwin.^Another influence of pragmatism in The Glass Key shows itself in the critical view of practicing social Darwinism.
Hammett's Pragmatismby Josef Hoffmann7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.thrillingdetective.com [Source type: Original source]
^According to Menand, the two greatest influences on pragmatism were the Civil War and Darwin's "Origin of Species."
Harvard Gazette: Menand brings pragmatists of the Metaphysical Club to life7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.news.harvard.edu [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^Abstract: Pragmatism, a philosophical movement that had considerable influence in the United States in the early twentieth century, has recently undergone an intellectual revival.
SOME THOUGHTS ON THE MERITS OF PRAGMATISM AS A GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.bc.edu [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
.Pragmatism was not the first to apply evolution to theories of knowledge: Schopenhauer advocated a biological idealism as what's useful to an organism to believe might differ wildly from what is true.^But, ideally, other systems might be used.
Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.fullbooks.com [Source type: Original source]
CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Pragmatism7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.newadvent.org [Source type: Original source]
^To use one easily understood example, a pragmatic president might look at the insurmountable obligations hanging over the Social Security program and decide that, at the least, some form of means testing might be applied to recipients.
Obama, Pragmatism and the Keynesian Fallacy -- Seeking Alpha7 January 2010 23:023 UTCseekingalpha.com [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
.Here knowledge and action are portrayed as two separate spheres with an absolute or transcendental truth above and beyond any sort of inquiry organisms use to cope with life.^We are used to separate perception and action.
Pragmatism and Umwelt-theory7 January 2010 23:023 UTChome.comcast.net [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^The two central premises here are that "knowledge and truths .
RENASCENT PRAGMATISM: STUDIES IN LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.bsos.umd.edu [Source type: Academic]
^The interaction of ideas, theories, beliefs, questions and inquiries held by various people and groups of people being put into action eventually 'point towards the truth'.
Newsletter7 January 2010 23:023 UTCmind-werx.com [Source type: Original source]
.Pragmatism challenges this idealism by providing an "ecological" account of knowledge: inquiry is how organisms can get a grip on their environment.^And how did this dynamic new philosophy challenge the doubts expressed by the Sceptics about the nature and extent of knowledge?
BBC - Radio 4 In Our Time - Pragmatism7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.bbc.co.uk [Source type: General]
^Knowledge and inquiry : essays on the pragmatism of Isaac Levi / edited by Erik Olsson.
Franklin Subject Browse Demo7 January 2010 23:023 UTCdevplw.library.upenn.edu [Source type: Reference]
^Peirce's writing provide a sophisticated and historically informed account of just how the method of science can work.
Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)7 January 2010 23:023 UTCplato.stanford.edu [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
.Real and true are functional labels in inquiry and cannot be understood outside of this context.^If we say (with Peirce) that the truth is what would be accepted at the end of inquiry, it seems we cannot be absolutely certain that an opinion of ours is true unless we know with certainty that we have reached the end of inquiry.
Pragmatism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.utm.edu [Source type: Original source]
Pragmatism [The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.iep.utm.edu [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^For we cannot know whether our beliefs are correspondence-true: if the Given is a myth, we cannot justify theories by comparing them with an unconceptualized reality.
Pragmatism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.utm.edu [Source type: Original source]
^We don't have to think of inquiry as trying to find the one true account of reality but rather that we can use whatever descriptions are useful for whatever purposes they are useful for.
Pragmatism and Atheistic Hope7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.atheistichope.com [Source type: Original source]
.It is not realist in a traditionally robust sense of realism (what Hilary Putnam would later call metaphysical realism), but it is realist in how it acknowledges an external world which must be dealt with.^The Platonist treats our physical world of sight and touch, which we think the most real of all, as a mere illusion compared to the 'Ideas' of his metaphysical world.
Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.fullbooks.com [Source type: Original source]
^For, granting that it is the intent of every thought to correspond with reality, we must yet inquire how the alleged correspondence is to be made out.
Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.fullbooks.com [Source type: Original source]
^Humanism is neither an Optimism nor a Pessimism--both of which must consistently, in their extreme form, deny that reality can be improved--but concedes to man the right and duty to improve the world.
Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.fullbooks.com [Source type: Original source]
.With the tendency of philosophers to group all views as either idealistic or realistic, (along with William James' occasional penchant for eloquence at the expense of public understanding), pragmatism was seen as a form of subjectivism or idealism.^William James' Pragmatism as a policing philosophy?
William James' Pragmatism as a policing philosophy?7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.kardasz.org [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]
^In all of its forms, however, pragmatism idealizes action.
At the End of Pragmatism | First Things7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.firstthings.com [Source type: Original source]
Pragmatism Textbooks | Find your Pragmatism Textbook - Textbooks.com7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.textbooks.com [Source type: Reference]
.Many of James' best-turned phrases—truth's cash value (James 1907, p. 200) and the true is only the expedient in our way of thinking (James 1907, p. 222)— were taken out of context and caricatured in contemporary literature as representing the view where any idea with practical utility is true.^For James, the truth is what is 'expedient', and it is because it is advantageous that it is good and has value.
Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth7 January 2010 23:023 UTCwww.marxists.org [Source type: Original source]
^According to the pragmatic criterion of truth, true ideas have practical value, false ideas do not.
William James's Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/pragmatism.html">www.angelfire.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="173"><a href="#citable__173"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The pragmatists stress the “cash value” of ideas.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism — Ayn Rand Lexicon</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/pragmatism.html">aynrandlexicon.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
William James wrote:</div>
<blockquote class="toccolours" style="float:none; padding: 10px 15px 10px 15px; display:table;">
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">It is high time to urge the use of a little imagination in philosophy. <a name="citable__128" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="128">The unwillingness of some of our critics to read any but the silliest of possible meanings into our statements is as discreditable to their imaginations as anything I know in recent philosophic history.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="128"><a href="#citable__128"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The unwillingness of some of our critics to read any but the silliest of possible meanings into our statements is as discreditable to their imaginations as anything I know in recent philosophic history.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James: Pragmatism: Lecture 6: Pragmatism's Conception of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.d.umn.edu/%7Edcole/phillang/WilliamJamesPragmatismLecture6.htm">www.d.umn.edu</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="128"><a href="#citable__128"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Why is it possible to know anything at all?</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism: Where It Breaks Down [and Why You Should Care] | Fallen and Flawed</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fallenandflawed.com/pragmatism-breaks-down/">www.fallenandflawed.com</a> [Source type: General]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="128"><a href="#citable__128"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>For pragmatists “there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice.” Meaning thus has a predictive component, and some pragmatists came close to identifying the meaning of a term or proposition with the process of its verification.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>pragmatism (philosophy) -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/473717/pragmatism">www.britannica.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li><li> <em><c_title>pragmatism (philosophy) :: Major theses of philosophic pragmatism -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/473717/pragmatism/68581/Major-theses-of-philosophic-pragmatism">www.britannica.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__27" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="27">Schiller says the truth is that which 'works.'</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="27"><a href="#citable__27"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Schiller says the true is that which 'works.'</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James: Pragmatism: Lecture 6: Pragmatism's Conception of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.d.umn.edu/%7Edcole/phillang/WilliamJamesPragmatismLecture6.htm">www.d.umn.edu</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="27"><a href="#citable__27"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Russell says that Jamess pragmatic view of truth requires that a belief is deemed true when its effect are good or when it 'works.'</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>bethinking.org - Truth + Tolerance - Some Problems with Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.bethinking.org/truth-tolerance/advanced/some-problems-with-pragmatism.htm">www.bethinking.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="27"><a href="#citable__27"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Truth is what we say about ideas that work when we apply them to our experience.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James's Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/pragmatism.html">www.angelfire.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__306" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="306">Thereupon he is treated as one who limits verification to the lowest material utilities.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="306"><a href="#citable__306"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Thereupon he is treated as one who limits verification to the lowest material utilities.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James: Pragmatism: Lecture 6: Pragmatism's Conception of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.d.umn.edu/%7Edcole/phillang/WilliamJamesPragmatismLecture6.htm">www.d.umn.edu</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="306"><a href="#citable__306"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Translating such an abstract concept as to who and how someone can be pragmatic is one of those typical academic propositions that is limited in terms of real life application.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism | World Cunsulting Group</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://blog.worldconsultinggroup.com/Pragmatism/">blog.worldconsultinggroup.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="306"><a href="#citable__306"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>He is treated as one who believes in calling everything true which, if it were true, would be pleasant.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James: Pragmatism: Lecture 6: Pragmatism's Conception of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.d.umn.edu/%7Edcole/phillang/WilliamJamesPragmatismLecture6.htm">www.d.umn.edu</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__266" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="266">Dewey says truth is what gives 'satisfaction'! He is treated as one who believes in calling everything true which, if it were true, would be pleasant.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="266"><a href="#citable__266"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>He is treated as one who believes in calling everything true which, if it were true, would be pleasant.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James: Pragmatism: Lecture 6: Pragmatism's Conception of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.d.umn.edu/%7Edcole/phillang/WilliamJamesPragmatismLecture6.htm">www.d.umn.edu</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="266"><a href="#citable__266"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Dewey says truth is what gives 'satisfaction!</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James: Pragmatism: Lecture 6: Pragmatism's Conception of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.d.umn.edu/%7Edcole/phillang/WilliamJamesPragmatismLecture6.htm">www.d.umn.edu</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="266"><a href="#citable__266"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Paul says, “God sends them a strong delusion, so that they may believe what is false, in order that all may be condemned who did not believe the truth but had pleasure in unrighteousness ” (vv.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pastors, Pragmatism, Pleasure, and Pride :: Desiring God Christian Resource Library</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.desiringgod.org/ResourceLibrary/TasteAndSee/ByDate/2007/2343_Pastors_Pragmatism_Pleasure_and_Pride/">www.desiringgod.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
(James 1907, p. 90)</div>
</blockquote>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__389" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="389">In reality, James asserts, the theory is a great deal more subtle.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="389"><a href="#citable__389"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Platonic realism; where Hume had applied the same demand to the notion of cause, and Berkeley to that of material substance; James applied it, in a still more fundamental manner, to the notion of truth itself.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Arthur O. Lovejoy: Pragmatism and Realism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject/Lovejoy/Lovejoy_1909b.html">www.brocku.ca</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="389"><a href="#citable__389"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>From those of you who are familiar with classical pragmatism, any references to texts that deal with this subject in Dewey, James or Pierce would be a great help.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>EMPIRICISM VS. PRAGMATISM</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.california.com/~mcmf/cqmail1.html">users.california.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="389"><a href="#citable__389"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Pragmatist theories of truth 3.1 Peirce on truth and reality 3.2 James on truth 4.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
(See Dewey 1910 for a 'FAQ')</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__162" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="162">The role of belief in representing <a href="/Reality" title="Reality">reality</a> is widely debated in pragmatism.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="162"><a href="#citable__162"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Pragmatism denies that objective concepts, eternal judgments, and universal reasoning processes can represent reality.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism: Right for Postmodern America?</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.character-education.us/pragma.htm">www.character-education.us</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="162"><a href="#citable__162"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Judge Richard Posner's recent book Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy is a major contribution to the ongoing debate over the best conception of democracy and the role of judicial review within it.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Posner's Democratic Pragmatism - George Mason Law</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.law.gmu.edu/pubs/papers/04-09">www.law.gmu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="162"><a href="#citable__162"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The story is an exaggeration of the pragmatic way in which a mistaken belief can become reality.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James' Pragmatism as a policing philosophy?</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.kardasz.org/james_pragmatism.html">www.kardasz.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__110" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="110">Is a belief valid when it represents reality?</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="110"><a href="#citable__110"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>It has also been urged that there is no extra-linguistic reality for us to represent—no mind-independent world to which our beliefs are answerable.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title> Pragmatism [The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/p/pragmati.htm">www.iep.utm.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="110"><a href="#citable__110"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The educational equivalent of this belief is the view that knowledge representing how the world really is must be transmitted to students.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Bredo / COGNITIVISM, SITUATED COGNITION, AND DEWEYIAN PRAGMATISM</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-yearbook/94_docs/BREDO.HTM">www.ed.uiuc.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="110"><a href="#citable__110"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>For example, Rorty asks us to stop asking whether our beliefs correctly represent reality.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Atheistic Hope</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.atheistichope.com/">www.atheistichope.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__331" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="331"><em>Copying is one (and only one) genuine mode of knowing,</em> (James 1907, p. 91).</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="331"><a href="#citable__331"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>When William James produced his book Pragmatism in 1907, it encapsulated for the academia of Harvard and Yale all they “needed” to know and think (as well as, sadly, teach).</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>A World to Win | Resources |</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.aworldtowin.net/resources/pragmatism.html">www.aworldtowin.net</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="331"><a href="#citable__331"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>In particular, Russill approves of the way James accounts for the need of active grouping and organisation by an agent in How Two Minds Can Know One Thing.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Mike Sandbothe: Mats Bergman: The New Wave of Pragmatism in Communication Studies</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.sandbothe.net/648.98.html">www.sandbothe.net</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="331"><a href="#citable__331"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Russell says that if this idea is to be useful (which is only fitting given the pragmatists view of truth) one must know two things before we know if a belief is true: .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>bethinking.org - Truth + Tolerance - Some Problems with Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.bethinking.org/truth-tolerance/advanced/some-problems-with-pragmatism.htm">www.bethinking.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__160" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="160">Are beliefs dispositions which qualify as true or false depending on how helpful they prove in inquiry and in action?</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="160"><a href="#citable__160"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Be they false or be they true, the meaning of them is this meliorism."</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James Studies | Vol. 2 No. 1 | MATHEW A. FOUST: William James and the Promise of Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/2.1/foust.html">williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="160"><a href="#citable__160"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Certainly, optimism lifts the soul; however, optimistic thoughts are either true or false, no matter how happy they may make one.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>bethinking.org - Truth + Tolerance - Some Problems with Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.bethinking.org/truth-tolerance/advanced/some-problems-with-pragmatism.htm">www.bethinking.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="160"><a href="#citable__160"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The other definition is more of a standard definition which is the idea that beliefs do not represent reality, they are simply dispositions which prove to be either true or false according to how much they help the believer accomplish his goals.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Transcript of an IMF Book Forum -- Pragmatisn: Latin America's New 'Ism'?</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2006/tr060523.htm">www.imf.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__198" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="198">Is it only in the struggle of <a href="/Intelligence" title="Intelligence">intelligent</a> <a href="/Organism" title="Organism">organisms</a> with the surrounding environment that beliefs acquire meaning?</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="198"><a href="#citable__198"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Because ideas only acquire real meaning in the context of acting on them -- and the context for action constantly changes.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and its discontents By Philip Zelikow | Shadow Government</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/01/28/pragmatism_and_its_discontents">shadow.foreignpolicy.com</a> [Source type: News]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="198"><a href="#citable__198"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>And not only our priorities, but our beliefs about what means can and should be used to address them, will differ widely.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Idealism versus pragmatism in government - Democratic Underground</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=103x230549">www.democraticunderground.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="198"><a href="#citable__198"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for the struggle to attain belief.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Hammett's Pragmatismby Josef Hoffmann</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.thrillingdetective.com/non_fiction/e011.html">www.thrillingdetective.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__79" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="79">Does a belief only become true when it succeeds in this struggle?</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="79"><a href="#citable__79"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>If life is defined as succeeding at what one does then whatever enables one to succeed will become one’s controlling influence (dare we say god?</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>The Challenge of Pragmatism - Part 2</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.svchapel.org/resources/articles/21-church-trends/611-the-challenge-of-pragmatism-part-2">www.svchapel.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="79"><a href="#citable__79"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>In short, James does not hold that a belief can be properly held as true despite the absence of adequate evidence supporting it.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Radical Faith - exploring faith in a changed world</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://homepages.which.net/%7Eradical.faith/subjects/pragmatism.htm">homepages.which.net</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="79"><a href="#citable__79"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Only if they are "good" is the claim validated and the reasoning judged to be "right": only if they are tested does the theory of truth become intelligible and that of error explicable.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism - LoveToKnow 1911</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.1911encyclopedia.org/Pragmatism">www.1911encyclopedia.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__205" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="205">In Pragmatism nothing practical or useful is held to be necessarily true, nor is anything which helps to survive merely in the short term.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="205"><a href="#citable__205"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>With more exposure to current best practices and tools, good old German pragmatism will help to lead the way to the new pragmatism of leveraging and managing open source.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Black Duck Blog » Blog Archive » Good Old German Pragmatism and Open Source</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://blog.blackducksoftware.com/?p=323">blog.blackducksoftware.com</a> [Source type: General]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="205"><a href="#citable__205"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>James got rich and famous, or at least richer and more famous, with his book on Pragmatism , which held that truth is nothing more than what happens to work for you.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Taki’s Magazine, edited by Taki Theodoracopulos</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.takimag.com/site/article/the_pragmatism_of_russell_kirk">www.takimag.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="205"><a href="#citable__205"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Another question we will address is that of what, exactly, we should take pragmatism to be, since it, like analytic philosophy and post-modernism is a term that has been used in numerous ways by numerous proponents.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>UNLV PHILOSOPHY (PRAGMATISM, SPRING 2006)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://faculty.unlv.edu/rwilburn/406.htm">faculty.unlv.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__405" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="405">For example, to believe my <a href="/Cheating" title="Cheating">cheating</a> spouse is faithful may help me feel better now, but it is certainly not useful from a more long-term perspective because it doesn't accord with the facts (and is therefore not true).</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="405"><a href="#citable__405"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Better just to use key terms.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.des.emory.edu/mfp/james.html">www.des.emory.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li><li> <em><c_title>William James</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.emory.edu/education/mfp/james.html">www.emory.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="405"><a href="#citable__405"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Judge Posner suggests that this may be an example of a "law of necessity" that trumps the Constitution; I think it is better understood as an aspect of constitutional power that defies regulation.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism Trumps Suicide - October 20, 2006 - The New York Sun</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.nysun.com/arts/pragmatism-trumps-suicide/41962/">www.nysun.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="405"><a href="#citable__405"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>For example, if you believe in a god that doesn’t recognise homosexual union, of course you can’t say “well now that i’m at the polling booth and away from the religion i keep at home, i can in good conscience vote for this marriage law amendment”.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism: Where It Breaks Down [and Why You Should Care] | Fallen and Flawed</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fallenandflawed.com/pragmatism-breaks-down/">www.fallenandflawed.com</a> [Source type: General]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="wikipedia_Pragmatism_in_other_fields_of_philosophy">Pragmatism in other fields of philosophy</span></h2>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__322" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="322">While pragmatism started out simply as a criterion of meaning, it quickly expanded to become a full-fledged epistemology with wide-ranging implications for the entire philosophical field.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="322"><a href="#citable__322"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>When, however, the CUCB starts to develop and transfer becomes mainly pragmatic and knowledge transfer , individual learners begin to play a more ...</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>interlanguage</c_title></em> <c_date>18 September 2009 14:12 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.gxnu.edu.cn/Personal/szliu/pragmatic_transfer.html">www.gxnu.edu.cn</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="322"><a href="#citable__322"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>A philosophical movement or system having various forms, but generally stressing practical consequences as constituting the essential criterion in determining meaning, truth or value.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title> Apollo Feedback: On Energy Pragmatism: Yes, No, But : Apollo Alliance</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://apolloalliance.org/feedback/apollo-feedback-on-energy-pragmatism-yes-no-but/">apolloalliance.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="322"><a href="#citable__322"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>As such, it shares with the pragmatic maxim an experiential or practical criterion of meaning; for both, a proposition must have some observable effect in the world to be meaningful.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>C.S. Peirce's Pragmatism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/p/PeircePr.htm">www.utm.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__165" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="165">Pragmatists who work in these fields share a common inspiration, but their work is diverse and there are no received views.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="165"><a href="#citable__165"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>There is no doubt it has been the inspiration of recent terrorist plots in North America, not to mention in the United Kingdom, or Spain before that.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>An argument for pragmatism | Arab Washingtonian</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.arabwashingtonian.org/english/article.php?issue=19&articleID=507">www.arabwashingtonian.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="165"><a href="#citable__165"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Thus, as I see it, we come down to the idealist, who, even though it may be unrealistic, has a hope for something to come, or the pragmatist, who works toward nothing in general.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>When in conflict, should idealism be valued over pragmatism? - CreateDebate</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.createdebate.com/debate/show/When_in_conflict_should_idealism_be_valued_over_pragmatism">www.createdebate.com</a> [Source type: General]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="165"><a href="#citable__165"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>There is no such thing as the pragmatist party-line: not only have pragmatists taken different views on major issues (for example, truth, realism, skepticism, perception, justification, fallibilism, realism, conceptual schemes, the function of philosophy, etc.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/p/pragmati.htm">www.utm.edu</a> [Source type: Original source]</li><li> <em><c_title> Pragmatism [The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/p/pragmati.htm">www.iep.utm.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<h3><span class="mw-headline" id="wikipedia_Philosophy_of_science">Philosophy of science</span></h3>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__226" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="226">In the philosophy of science, <a href="/Instrumentalism" title="Instrumentalism">instrumentalism</a> is the view that concepts and theories are merely useful instruments whose worth is measured not by whether the concepts and theories somehow mirror reality, but by how effective they are in explaining and predicting phenomena.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="226"><a href="#citable__226"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Dewey ranks with the greatest thinkers of this or any age on the subjects of pedagogy, philosophy of mind, epistemology, logic, philosophy of science, and social and political theory.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>John Dewey</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://dewey.pragmatism.org/">dewey.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="226"><a href="#citable__226"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Responsive to idealism and evolutionary theory , pragmatists emphasized the “plastic” nature of reality and the practical function of knowledge as an instrument for adapting to reality and controlling it.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>pragmatism (philosophy) -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/473717/pragmatism">www.britannica.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li><li> <em><c_title>pragmatism (philosophy) :: Major theses of philosophic pragmatism -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/473717/pragmatism/68581/Major-theses-of-philosophic-pragmatism">www.britannica.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="226"><a href="#citable__226"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>He identified the ‘traditional view’ that, for early scientists, the ‘clearness, beauty and simplification’ provided by their theories led them to think that they had deciphered authentically the eternal thoughts of the Almighty.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__410" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="410">Instrumentalism does not state that truth doesn't matter, but rather provides a specific answer to the question of what truth and falsity mean and how they function in science.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="410"><a href="#citable__410"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>None of the banks provided specific answers.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title> Docudharma:: Bad Pragmatism pt. V: Reconstituting Capitalism </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.docudharma.com/showDiary.do?diaryId=11136">www.docudharma.com</a> [Source type: General]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="410"><a href="#citable__410"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>If you mean passing from north of him to east, then south, then west, then the answer to the question is ‘yes’.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="410"><a href="#citable__410"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Pragmatists interpret ideas as instruments and plans of action rather than as images of reality; more specifically, they are suggestions and anticipations of possible conduct, hypotheses or forecasts of what will result from a given action, or ways of organizing behavior.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Review - Pragmatism - Philosophy</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=4745&cn=394">metapsychology.mentalhelp.net</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__177" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="177">One of <a href="/C.I._Lewis" title="C.I. Lewis" class="mw-redirect">C.I. Lewis</a>' main arguments in <em>Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge</em> was that science does not merely provide a copy of reality but must work with conceptual systems and that those are chosen for pragmatic reasons, that is, because they aid inquiry.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="177"><a href="#citable__177"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>They provide immediate cash-flow relief for poor people, but also address the problems of human capital by tying the aid to improved education and improved health care.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Transcript of an IMF Book Forum -- Pragmatisn: Latin America's New 'Ism'?</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2006/tr060523.htm">www.imf.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="177"><a href="#citable__177"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>It is because they can be shown to be true or false either deductively, by reason alone (i.e., by inference from an idea known to be true) or inductively by reason and observation.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="177"><a href="#citable__177"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The end result is that over a thousand years of English common law, ours is a system that is a patch work of ideologies (or philosophies) - brought to us by the mechanism of pragmatism.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Obama and Pragmatism: Thinking Through Values | Robert Reich's Blog</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/robert_reich/2009/05/obama-and-pragmatism-thinking.php">tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__103" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="103">Lewis' own development of multiple <a href="/Modal_logic" title="Modal logic">modal logics</a> is a case in point.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="103"><a href="#citable__103"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>There is a more fruitful development of the pragmatic logic of valuation in Dewey, C. I. Lewis, and their followers by assuming that our value judgments .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
Lewis is sometimes called a 'conceptual pragmatist' because of this. (Lewis 1929)</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__364" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="364">Another development is the cooperation of <a href="/Logical_positivism" title="Logical positivism">logical positivism</a> and pragmatism in the works of <a href="/Charles_W._Morris" title="Charles W. Morris">Charles W. Morris</a> and <a href="/Rudolph_Carnap" title="Rudolph Carnap" class="mw-redirect">Rudolph Carnap</a>.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="364"><a href="#citable__364"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>His aim is both to defend a particular view of pragmatism originating with the work of Charles Sanders Peirce and, at the same time, argue in favour of a new view of deliberative democracy developed from Talisse’s Peircean pragmatism.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__201" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="201">The influence of pragmatism on these writers is mostly limited to the incorporation of the <a href="/Pragmatic_maxim" title="Pragmatic maxim">pragmatic maxim</a> into their epistemology.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="201"><a href="#citable__201"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>These discussions had a profound influence on Holmess legal thinking which, in many instances, applied pragmatic ideas to legal institutions and theories.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>SOME THOUGHTS ON THE MERITS OF PRAGMATISM AS A GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/lawreviews/meta-elements/journals/bcealr/31_1/01_TXT.htm">www.bc.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="201"><a href="#citable__201"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Scholars have not, however, examined how presidents incorporate these two appeals, nor have they analyzed the particular functions that idealistic and pragmatic arguments may serve for a president.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>John Kennedy's Vietnam Rhetoric</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/goldzwig.htm">mcadams.posc.mu.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="201"><a href="#citable__201"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The author examines these two principles and discusses the reasons and effects of their incorporation into the U.S. foreign policy.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Term Papers on pragmatism | pragmatism essays | AcaDemon</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.academon.com/pragmatism">www.academon.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__106" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="106">Pragmatists with a broader conception of the movement don't often refer to them.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="106"><a href="#citable__106"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Stout has given a typical pragmatic argument against essentialism, but he has not, as pragmatists are often accused of having done, given up on the concept of truth or conflated truth with justification.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Atheistic Hope</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.atheistichope.com/">www.atheistichope.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__229" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="229"><a href="/W._V._Quine" title="W. V. Quine" class="mw-redirect">W. V. Quine</a>'s paper "<a href="/Two_Dogmas_of_Empiricism" title="Two Dogmas of Empiricism">Two Dogmas of Empiricism</a>," published 1951, is one of the most celebrated papers of twentieth-century philosophy in the analytic tradition.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="229"><a href="#citable__229"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries philosophy was one aspect of culture, and existentialism gradually became a reaction to several aspects of culture, for example, crisis in human identity, politics and society, knowledge and truth, science, technology, the arts, and religion.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Term Papers on pragmatism | pragmatism essays | AcaDemon</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.academon.com/pragmatism">www.academon.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="229"><a href="#citable__229"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Pragmatism then, in this twentieth-century version, is another name for the operational theory of scientific method, and is closely linked to logical empiricism.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="229"><a href="#citable__229"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>I think that analytic philosophy culminates in Quine, the later Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Davidson – which is to say that it transcends and cancels itself.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Richard Rorty's Platonists, Positivists, and Pragmatists</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__270" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="270">The paper is an attack on two central tenets of the logical positivists' philosophy.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="270"><a href="#citable__270"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The pragmaticisation of analytic philosophy gratified the logical positivists’ hopes, but not in the fashion which they had envisaged.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Richard Rorty's Platonists, Positivists, and Pragmatists</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="270"><a href="#citable__270"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>I offered in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, the history of that movement has been marked by a gradual “pragmaticisation” of the original tenets of logical positivism.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Richard Rorty's Platonists, Positivists, and Pragmatists</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="270"><a href="#citable__270"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>This marks a crucial difference between the two and logical positivist like Carnap would no doubt feel uncomfortable with Peirces claims here.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>C.S. Peirce's Pragmatism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/p/PeircePr.htm">www.utm.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__416" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="416">One is the distinction between analytic truths, statements which are true simply in value of the meanings of their words ('all bachelors are unmarried'), and synthetic truths, which are grounded in empirical fact.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="416"><a href="#citable__416"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The distinction between the literal meaning of a sentence ...</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>interlanguage</c_title></em> <c_date>18 September 2009 14:12 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.gxnu.edu.cn/Personal/szliu/pragmatic_transfer.html">www.gxnu.edu.cn</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="416"><a href="#citable__416"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The positivist sees him as lending aid and comfort to Platonism by leveling down the distinction between Objective Truth – the sort of true sentence attained by “the scientific method” – and sentences which lack the precious “correspondence to reality” which only that method can induce.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Richard Rorty's Platonists, Positivists, and Pragmatists</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="416"><a href="#citable__416"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>(II) There is something out there in addition to the world called “the truth about the world” (what James sarcastically called “this tertium quid intermediate between the facts per se, on the one hand, and all knowledge of them, actual or potential, on the other”).</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Richard Rorty's Platonists, Positivists, and Pragmatists</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__290" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="290">The other is reductionism, the theory that each meaningful statement gets its meaning from some logical construction of terms which refers exclusively to immediate experience.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="290"><a href="#citable__290"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>And if acceptance of some theory or other always precedes and directs observation, we must break with the classical empiricist assumption that theories are derived from independently discovered data or facts.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/p/pragmati.htm">www.utm.edu</a> [Source type: Original source]</li><li> <em><c_title> Pragmatism [The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/p/pragmati.htm">www.iep.utm.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="290"><a href="#citable__290"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>What this suggests is that predicates acquire their meanings not by virtue of what they are true of -- since some perfectly meaningful predicates are and could be true of nothing at all, but rather by virtue of the theories, broadly speaking, in which they occur.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Language</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.ditext.com/macbeth/macbeth.html">www.ditext.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="290"><a href="#citable__290"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Competition maps the structure and logic of the Constitution, which arms rival institutions with the means and the motives to resist each other’s ambitions and encroachments.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>AEI - How to Think about Constitutional Change, Part II</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.aei.org/outlook/22942">www.aei.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__234" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="234">Quine's argument brings to mind Peirce's insistence that axioms aren't a priori truths but synthetic statements.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="234"><a href="#citable__234"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>But Rorty does not seem to see that once this last vestige of the empiricist conception of concepts is given up it is Quine's argument against the analytic/synthetic distinction that collapses.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Language</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.ditext.com/macbeth/macbeth.html">www.ditext.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="234"><a href="#citable__234"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The argument Quine gives, however, rests on the particular way he understands the claim that the unit of empirical significance is not the statement but rather a whole theory (and in the limit the whole language).</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Language</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.ditext.com/macbeth/macbeth.html">www.ditext.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="234"><a href="#citable__234"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Of particular interest, is her insistence on the importance of pragmatism to Peirces account of truth.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>C.S. Peirce's Pragmatism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/p/PeircePr.htm">www.utm.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<h3><span class="mw-headline" id="wikipedia_Logic">Logic</span></h3>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Later in his life Schiller became famous for his attacks on logic in his textbook "Formal Logic." <a name="citable__108" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="108">By then, Schiller's pragmatism had become the nearest of any of the classical pragmatists to an ordinary language philosophy.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="108"><a href="#citable__108"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>This is not, to be sure, the fault of philosophy of language, but of the pragmatist.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Richard Rorty's Platonists, Positivists, and Pragmatists</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="108"><a href="#citable__108"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The following is a selection of items (artistic styles or groups, constructions, events, fictional characters, organizations, publications) associated with "pragmatism" instrumentalism (philosophy) philosophy pragmatist MAGAZINES SOURCES CLASSICS EBOOKS Column.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>pragmatism (philosophy) -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/473717/pragmatism">www.britannica.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="108"><a href="#citable__108"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The paper relates that the truth in pragmatist philosophy lies in the quest for ever-elusive answers, which in turn become questions, and this is what becomes the point of departure for all three philosophers.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Term Papers on pragmatism | pragmatism essays | AcaDemon</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.academon.com/pragmatism">www.academon.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__224" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="224">Schiller sought to undermine the very possibility of formal logic, by showing that words only had meaning when used in an actual context.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="224"><a href="#citable__224"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Meaning' is propounded by the failure of Formal Logic.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="224"><a href="#citable__224"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>And Latin America is suffering today from not only this deep intellectual bankruptcy for which we lack very useful prescriptions of what to do, but from two corruptions.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Transcript of an IMF Book Forum -- Pragmatisn: Latin America's New 'Ism'?</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2006/tr060523.htm">www.imf.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="224"><a href="#citable__224"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>This convenient assumption, however, ultimately necessitates an abstraction from meaning, though Formal Logic does not avow this openly.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
The least famous of Schiller's main works was the constructive sequel to his destructive book "Formal Logic." <a name="citable__15" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="15">In this sequel, "Logic for Use," Schiller attempted to construct a new logic to replace the formal logic he had just decimated in "Formal Logic."</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="15"><a href="#citable__15"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>"We use our past experiences to construct new and better ones in the future."</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="15"><a href="#citable__15"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>In any formal language, e.g., of logic or mathematics, the "rules of formation" determine what statements are "well formed" combinations of the elements of the language used.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="15"><a href="#citable__15"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>His Wittgensteinian or analytic pragmatism offers a new way of thinking about (Fregean) meaning and (Wittgensteinian) use, including a logic of the relations between meaning and use.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James Studies | Vol. 3 No. 1 | WESLEY COOPER: Pragmatism in the 21st century</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/3.1/cooper.html">williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__213" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="213">What he offers is something philosophers would recognize today as a logic covering the context of discovery and the hypothetico-deductive method.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="213"><a href="#citable__213"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Logical deduction, cryptarithmetic, chess-playing, disease diagnosis, mechanical fault-finding, and scientific discovery are examples.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Bredo / COGNITIVISM, SITUATED COGNITION, AND DEWEYIAN PRAGMATISM</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-yearbook/94_docs/BREDO.HTM">www.ed.uiuc.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="213"><a href="#citable__213"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>A post-philosophical culture, then, would be one in which men and women felt themselves alone, merely finite, with no links to something Beyond.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Richard Rorty's Platonists, Positivists, and Pragmatists</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="213"><a href="#citable__213"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>He offered a detailed account of the cognitive activities we carried out when we used the method of science: these consisted in the three kinds of inference, inductive, deductive and abductive.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__239" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="239">Whereas F.C.S. Schiller actually dismissed the possibility of formal logic, most pragmatists are critical rather of its pretension to ultimate validity and see logic as one logical tool among others - or perhaps, considering the multitude of formal logics, one <em>set</em> of tools among others.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="239"><a href="#citable__239"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>It should be admitted at once that, by temperamental disposition, rather than by force of logic , the Pragmatist is inclined to uphold the vital and social importance of positive religious faith .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12333b.htm">www.newadvent.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="239"><a href="#citable__239"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>One of the most successfully cultivated branches of philosophy in our time is what is called inductive logic, the study of the conditions under which our sciences have evolved.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Philosophical Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.articlesbase.com/non-fiction-articles/philosophical-pragmatism-494343.html">www.articlesbase.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="239"><a href="#citable__239"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>This convenient assumption, however, ultimately necessitates an abstraction from meaning, though Formal Logic does not avow this openly.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
This is the view of C.I. Lewis. <a name="citable__86" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="86">C.S. Peirce developed multiple methods for doing formal logic.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="86"><a href="#citable__86"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>However, Peirce develops the pragmatic maxim and the clarifying method that it represents with some very particular purpose in mind.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>C.S. Peirce's Pragmatism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/p/PeircePr.htm">www.utm.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="86"><a href="#citable__86"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>His logic of relations went far beyond the classical logic, Peirce developing logic as a continuation and generalization of the subject-predicate logic of statements, after De Morgan and Boole.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="86"><a href="#citable__86"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>C. S. Peirce was the best equipped of the American founders of pragmatism to develop the operational logic of mathematical and physical science, and to extend it to the analysis of philosophical concepts and problems of meaning.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__48" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="48">Stephen Toulmin's <em>The Uses of Argument</em> inspired scholars in informal logic and rhetoric studies (although it is actually an epistemological work).</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="48"><a href="#citable__48"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Through the alternate use of these two arguments, Kennedy provided himself with rich rhetorical resources.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>John Kennedy's Vietnam Rhetoric</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/goldzwig.htm">mcadams.posc.mu.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="48"><a href="#citable__48"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The first of these claims is that Rorty is guilty of another incoherency besides contradiction: He is using arguments which do not actually support the position he claims they support.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.california.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.california.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.sfo.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.sfo.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="48"><a href="#citable__48"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Although the eventuality of using history for practical and individual ends is perhaps not impossible, it has nothing to do with historical studies and the establishment of historical truth as such.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
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<h3><span class="mw-headline" id="wikipedia_Metaphysics">Metaphysics</span></h3>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__155" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="155">James and Dewey were <a href="/Empiricism" title="Empiricism">empirical</a> thinkers in the most straightforward fashion: experience is the ultimate test and experience is what needs to be explained.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="155"><a href="#citable__155"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The most important of the ‘classical pragmatists’ were Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), William James (1842–1910) and John Dewey (1859-1952).</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="155"><a href="#citable__155"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The pragmatist clarification revealed all the information we would need for testing hypotheses and theories empirically.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="155"><a href="#citable__155"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>What he needs is some way of explaining our experience of these things.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>C.S. Peirce's Pragmatism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/p/PeircePr.htm">www.utm.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__130" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="130">They were dissatisfied with ordinary empiricism because in the tradition dating from Hume, empiricists had a tendency to think of experience as nothing more than individual sensations.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="130"><a href="#citable__130"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>"I think there's more to be said for doctrine-driven thinking than some of this rhetoric implies" .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title> Matthew Yglesias (March 10, 2008) - Obama's Pragmatism (Foreign Policy) </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://matthewyglesias.theatlantic.com/archives/2008/03/obamas_pragmatism.php">matthewyglesias.theatlantic.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="130"><a href="#citable__130"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Because they are at once semantic and commitments, they come to nothing in the absence of propositional commitments much as one's commitment to one set of rules for a game rather than another comes to nothing if one does not play.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Language</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.ditext.com/macbeth/macbeth.html">www.ditext.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="130"><a href="#citable__130"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>"Democracy is the faith that the process of experience is more important than any special result attained, so that special results achieved are of ultimate value only as they are used to enrich and order the ongoing process.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__421" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="421">To the pragmatists, this went against the spirit of empiricism: we should try to explain all that is given in experience including connections and meaning, instead of explaining them away and positing sense data as the ultimate reality.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="421"><a href="#citable__421"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Was it because they had tested them against a given reality, against spirits, for example, or against divinities of which they had had real experience?</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="421"><a href="#citable__421"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Say a bunch of pretty words that have heartfelt emotion and common sense- but are totally devoid of reality or history or real world application- and yes- by all means blame Bush.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>'Principled pragmatism' on human rights - Ben Smith - POLITICO.com</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/1209/Principled_pragmatism_on_human_rights.html">www.politico.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="421"><a href="#citable__421"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>It is argued that while there are pragmatist elements in Quine's position, this is not sufficient to classify him as a pragmatist in any strong historical sense; indeed, he was not even clear himself what it means to be a pragmatist.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__105" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="105"><a href="/Radical_empiricism" title="Radical empiricism">Radical empiricism</a>, or Immediate Empiricism in Dewey's words, wants to give a place to meaning and value instead of explaining them away as subjective additions to a world of whizzing atoms.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="105"><a href="#citable__105"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>He took America to a higher place by explaining what we all knew and felt but giving it a larger and nobler frame.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Obama and Pragmatism: Thinking Through Values | Robert Reich's Blog</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/robert_reich/2009/05/obama-and-pragmatism-thinking.php">tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="105"><a href="#citable__105"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Empiricism thus gives no real account of the scientific rational order of the world.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="105"><a href="#citable__105"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>We do not know all the concepts worked out by our own civilisation; and in addition, we individualise them, and give words a particular meaning which they do not have.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
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<a name="citable__366" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="366">The "Chicago Club" including Whitehead, Mead and Dewey.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="366"><a href="#citable__366"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Dewey emerged as a major figure during his decade at the University of Chicago, where fellow pragmatist G.H. Mead (1863-1931) was a colleague and collaborator.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/p/pragmati.htm">www.utm.edu</a> [Source type: Original source]</li><li> <em><c_title> Pragmatism [The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/p/pragmati.htm">www.iep.utm.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
Pragmatism is sometimes called <em>American Pragmatism</em> because so many of its proponents were and are Americans.</div>
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<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">William James gives an interesting example of this philosophical shortcoming:</div>
<blockquote class="toccolours" style="float:none; padding: 10px 15px 10px 15px; display:table;">
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">[A young graduate] began by saying that he had always taken for granted that when you entered a philosophic classroom you had to open relations with a universe entirely distinct from the one you left behind you in the street. <a name="citable__301" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="301">The two were supposed, he said, to have so little to do with each other, that you could not possibly occupy your mind with them at the same time.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="301"><a href="#citable__301"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>But at the same time you have the regulation of the system.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Transcript of an IMF Book Forum -- Pragmatisn: Latin America's New 'Ism'?</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2006/tr060523.htm">www.imf.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="301"><a href="#citable__301"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>After all, amplifying your voice allows you to use the same voice tone and dynamics that you would if you were in a small room with the listener - the equipment will project your voice and make you heard.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>CORRUPT.org: Paving Way For HBD Awareness, Conservatism And Personal Development Since '98</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.corrupt.org/">www.corrupt.org</a> [Source type: General]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="301"><a href="#citable__301"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>After all, if you perceive me as your true and loyal friend, when in reality I am a cheat and a liar who will take advantage of you when the time is right, which matters more to you: what you perceive me to be, or what I truly am?</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James' Pragmatism as a policing philosophy?</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.kardasz.org/james_pragmatism.html">www.kardasz.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__343" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="343">The world of concrete personal experiences to which the street belongs is multitudinous beyond imagination, tangled, muddy, painful and perplexed.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="343"><a href="#citable__343"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Indeed, James cites the "restlessness" 9 of the conflict between theoretical temperaments and describes the world as "unfinished" 10 and our experience of and within it as "tangled, muddy, painful and perplex[ing]."</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James Studies | Vol. 2 No. 1 | MATHEW A. FOUST: William James and the Promise of Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/2.1/foust.html">williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="343"><a href="#citable__343"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Papini's "magical" pragmatism owes the adjective to his own emphasis on the personal power of ideas to transform what we experience by a romantic activity of the "imitative" imagination.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="343"><a href="#citable__343"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Concepts themselves go even further beyond our personal experience; for they are formed by what a whole series of generations has experienced.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__111" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="111">The world to which your philosophy-professor introduces you is simple, clean and noble.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="111"><a href="#citable__111"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>If I grow up in Eskimo society, and my mother teaches me the philosophy "never take your coat off when you are outside".</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Obama and Pragmatism: Thinking Through Values | Robert Reich's Blog</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/robert_reich/2009/05/obama-and-pragmatism-thinking.php">tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="111"><a href="#citable__111"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Your view shows me that you clearly have very limited experience in real world situations.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism: The Death of Reason | The Next Right</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.thenextright.com/markamerica/pragmatism-the-death-of-reason">www.thenextright.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="111"><a href="#citable__111"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>God’s in his heaven; all’s right with the world!’–THAT’S the heart of your theology, and for that you need no rationalist definitions.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism - Lecture III. Some Metaphysical Problems Pragmatically Considered (by William James)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.authorama.com/pragmatism-4.html">www.authorama.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
The contradictions of real life are absent from it. [...] <a name="citable__116" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="116">In point of fact it is far less an account of this actual world than a clear addition built upon it [...] It is no explanation of our concrete universe (James 1907, pp.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="116"><a href="#citable__116"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>For our New World I consider far less important for what it has done, or what it is, than for results to come."</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>The Revival of Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/d/dickstein-pragmatism.html">www.nytimes.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="116"><a href="#citable__116"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Aside from the fact that words have enormous power and we need to use them with far greater care, we need a wholesale re-examination of our priorities, worldview, etc.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Jeffrey Feldman: The Voice Of American Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeffrey-feldman/the-voice-of-american-pra_b_165631.html">www.huffingtonpost.com</a> [Source type: General]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="116"><a href="#citable__116"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The fact that it receives higher IMDb rating than Dellamorte Dellamore and equal rating to Dawn of the Dead , proves my point.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>CORRUPT.org: Paving Way For HBD Awareness, Conservatism And Personal Development Since '98</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.corrupt.org/">www.corrupt.org</a> [Source type: General]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
8-9)</div>
</blockquote>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__278" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="278"><a href="/F.C.S._Schiller" title="F.C.S. Schiller" class="mw-redirect">F.C.S. Schiller</a>'s first book, "Riddles of the Sphinx", was published before he became aware of the growing pragmatist movement taking place in America.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="278"><a href="#citable__278"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>So we have to take very seriously these two questions: first, what social pact we want for Latin America, and above all, what Latin American countries want for themselves -- and this is not fixed, the social pacts.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Transcript of an IMF Book Forum -- Pragmatisn: Latin America's New 'Ism'?</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2006/tr060523.htm">www.imf.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="278"><a href="#citable__278"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>For the pragmatist philosophers, as we have already said several times, experience can take place on one level only .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
In it, Schiller argues for a middle ground between materialism and absolute metaphysics. <a name="citable__12" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="12">The result of the split between these two explanatory schemes that are comparable to what William James called tough-minded empiricism and tender-minded rationalism, Schiller contends, is that mechanistic naturalism cannot make sense of the "higher" aspects of our world (freewill, consciousness, purpose, universals and some would add God), while abstract metaphysics cannot make sense of the "lower" aspects of our world (the imperfect, change, physicality).</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="12"><a href="#citable__12"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>We need to make some tough calls and downsize.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatic Plato</c_title></em> <c_date>18 September 2009 14:12 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://pragmaticplato.blogspot.com/">pragmaticplato.blogspot.com</a> [Source type: General]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="12"><a href="#citable__12"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Hope that all makes some sense.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Ola Bini: Programming Language Synchronicity: Pragmatic Static Typing</c_title></em> <c_date>18 September 2009 14:12 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://ola-bini.blogspot.com/2008/04/pragmatic-static-typing.html">ola-bini.blogspot.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="12"><a href="#citable__12"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world’ (p.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.california.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.california.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.sfo.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.sfo.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__385" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="385">While Schiller is vague about the exact sort of middle ground he is trying to establish, he suggests metaphysics as a tool that can aid inquiry and is only valuable insofar as it actually does help in explanation.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="385"><a href="#citable__385"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>In my last post I wrote about Rorty's characterization of metaphysics as the project of trying to get past appearances to reality as it really is.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Atheistic Hope</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.atheistichope.com/">www.atheistichope.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="385"><a href="#citable__385"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>It is of particular actuality because it does not only refer to linguistic conditions and presuppositions of thought, but also to culture as the relevant context in which our thinking takes place.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="385"><a href="#citable__385"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>This does not mean that all metaphysical and epistemological writings are of equal value.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.california.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.california.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.sfo.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.sfo.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__380" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="380">In the second half of the twentieth century, <a href="/Stephen_Toulmin" title="Stephen Toulmin">Stephen Toulmin</a> argued that the need to distinguish between reality and appearance only arises within an explanatory scheme and therefore that there is no point in asking what 'ultimate reality' consists of.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="380"><a href="#citable__380"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Basically, therefore, a rationalist mind is present there, perhaps in an unsophisticated form, but nevertheless enough to prove that the need to understand is universal and essentially human.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="380"><a href="#citable__380"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>For this there is no need for spectacular reform to be passed in a parliament that will be fragmented into three parts anyway.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Transcript of an IMF Book Forum -- Pragmatisn: Latin America's New 'Ism'?</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2006/tr060523.htm">www.imf.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="380"><a href="#citable__380"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Unluckily, this theory can only assert, and neither explains nor proves, the connection between the thought and the reality it desiderates.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
More recently, a similar idea has been suggested by the <a href="/Postanalytic_philosophy" title="Postanalytic philosophy">postanalytical philosopher</a> <a href="/Daniel_Dennett" title="Daniel Dennett">Daniel Dennett</a>, who argues that anyone who wants to understand the world has to adopt the intentional stance and acknowledge both the 'syntactical' aspects of reality (i.e. whizzing atoms) and its emergent or 'semantic' properties (i.e. meaning and value).</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__422" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="422">Radical Empiricism gives interesting answers to questions about the limits of science if there are any, the nature of meaning and value and the workability of <a href="/Reductionism" title="Reductionism">reductionism</a>.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="422"><a href="#citable__422"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Candidly, it is impossible to give any answer to this question.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism - Lecture III. Some Metaphysical Problems Pragmatically Considered (by William James)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.authorama.com/pragmatism-4.html">www.authorama.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="422"><a href="#citable__422"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>At present there are different answers to this question.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="422"><a href="#citable__422"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The consequence is that James tends to see pragmatism, and his philosophy, as the stepping off point where materialist and purely intellectualist sciences fail to answer our questions about which beliefs are justifiable.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>C.S. Peirce's Pragmatism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/p/PeircePr.htm">www.utm.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__97" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="97">These questions feature prominently in current debates about the <a href="/Relationship_between_religion_and_science" title="Relationship between religion and science">relationship between religion and science</a>, where it is often assumed - most pragmatists would disagree - that science degrades everything that is meaningful into 'merely' <a href="/Materialism" title="Materialism">physical phenomena</a>.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="97"><a href="#citable__97"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Putnam does recognize that to some degree these philosophical questions are unavoidable, but he sees this as a realist position that makes him less of a pragmatist.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.california.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.california.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.sfo.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.sfo.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="97"><a href="#citable__97"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>That is just the issue about the status of intuitions, which I said above was the real issue between the pragmatist and the realist.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Richard Rorty's Platonists, Positivists, and Pragmatists</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="97"><a href="#citable__97"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>When we look at what Rorty says about the relationship between epistemology and empirical psychology in 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,' we can see that he makes similar mistakes in most of his arguments.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.california.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.california.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.sfo.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.sfo.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<h3><span class="mw-headline" id="wikipedia_Philosophy_of_mind">Philosophy of mind</span></h3>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__274" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="274">Both <a href="/John_Dewey" title="John Dewey">John Dewey</a> in <em>Nature and Experience</em> (1929) and half a century later <a href="/Richard_Rorty" title="Richard Rorty">Richard Rorty</a> in his monumental <em>Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature</em> (1979) argued that much of the debate about the relation of the mind to the body results from conceptual confusions.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="274"><a href="#citable__274"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>John Deweys Philosophie des ‚experience' in interaktionistisch-konstruktivistischer Interpretation.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="274"><a href="#citable__274"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Websites about John Dewey .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>John Dewey</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://dewey.pragmatism.org/">dewey.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="274"><a href="#citable__274"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Books about John Dewey .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>John Dewey</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://dewey.pragmatism.org/">dewey.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__60" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="60">They argue instead that there is no need to posit the mind or mindstuff as an <a href="/Ontological" title="Ontological" class="mw-redirect">ontological</a> category.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="60"><a href="#citable__60"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>There is no need to use capitals.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.des.emory.edu/mfp/james.html">www.des.emory.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li><li> <em><c_title>William James</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.emory.edu/education/mfp/james.html">www.emory.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="60"><a href="#citable__60"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>There is no need to choose between (1) an anthropological, natural–historical, social–practice inquiry, and (2) a formal, mathematically inspired, model–theoretic semantics.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James Studies | Vol. 3 No. 1 | WESLEY COOPER: Pragmatism in the 21st century</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/3.1/cooper.html">williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="60"><a href="#citable__60"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>It is argued that while there are pragmatist elements in Quine's position, this is not sufficient to classify him as a pragmatist in any strong historical sense; indeed, he was not even clear himself what it means to be a pragmatist.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__7" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="7">Pragmatists disagree over whether philosophers ought to adopt a quietist or a naturalist stance toward the mind-body problem.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="7"><a href="#citable__7"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The problem with metaphysics is not whether the various philosophers and theologians have developed good reasoning in their various systems.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Atheistic Hope</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.atheistichope.com/">www.atheistichope.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="7"><a href="#citable__7"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The latter implies that facts about the mind are stance–dependent, relative to the purposes of those who adopt intentional descriptions because of their predictive value.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James Studies | Vol. 3 No. 1 | WESLEY COOPER: Pragmatism in the 21st century</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/3.1/cooper.html">williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="7"><a href="#citable__7"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>So philosophy professors on the Continent are casting longing glances toward analytic philosophy – and particularly toward the “realist” analytic philosophers who take Philosophical problems seriously.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Richard Rorty's Platonists, Positivists, and Pragmatists</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__417" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="417">The former (Rorty among them) want to do away with the problem because they believe it's a pseudo-problem, whereas the latter believe that it is a meaningful empirical question.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="417"><a href="#citable__417"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Because the logical positivists believed that each sentence was atomistic and needed no help from any other sentence, they could also believe that it was possible to throw away sentences above a certain level of abstraction and leave the concrete observation sentences intact.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.california.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.california.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.sfo.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.sfo.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="417"><a href="#citable__417"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>But theories can not be used to disprove other theories because they are questionable themselves.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Umwelt-theory</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://home.comcast.net/%7Esharov/biosem/txt/umwelt.html">home.comcast.net</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="417"><a href="#citable__417"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>(And because Rorty believes that all thought is linguistic, this also means that there is no world that exists outside of our thought.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.california.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.california.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.sfo.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.sfo.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
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<h3><span class="mw-headline" id="wikipedia_Ethics">Ethics</span></h3>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__411" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="411">Pragmatism sees no fundamental difference between practical and theoretical reason, nor any ontological difference between facts and values.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="411"><a href="#citable__411"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Thus, there is no qualitative difference between facts and theories.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Umwelt-theory</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://home.comcast.net/%7Esharov/biosem/txt/umwelt.html">home.comcast.net</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="411"><a href="#citable__411"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Pragmatism is the practice of reason.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism: The Death of Reason | The Next Right</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.thenextright.com/markamerica/pragmatism-the-death-of-reason">www.thenextright.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="411"><a href="#citable__411"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>As it stands, I see no reason to settle.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>In Iowa, It's Clinton Pragmatism Vs. Obama Fever | Mother Jones</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://motherjones.com/politics/2007/11/iowa-its-clinton-pragmatism-vs-obama-fever">motherjones.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__214" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="214">Both facts and values have cognitive content: knowledge is what we should believe; values are hypotheses about what is good in action.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="214"><a href="#citable__214"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>In such a case, James asserts, I have the “right to believe” — precisely because such a belief may help bring about the fact believed in.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/james/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="214"><a href="#citable__214"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>God recognizes good, which means that we should be able to cut out the middle man and appeal to whatever standard God uses to recognize right and wrong without needing to believe in God.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Atheistic Hope</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.atheistichope.com/">www.atheistichope.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="214"><a href="#citable__214"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>In the 1870s, Peirces account of possibility and necessity are based on the epistemological facts about believers in relation to some statement containing modal terms.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>C.S. Peirce's Pragmatism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/p/PeircePr.htm">www.utm.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__193" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="193">Pragmatist ethics is broadly <a href="/Humanism" title="Humanism">humanist</a> because it sees no ultimate test of morality beyond what matters for us as humans.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="193"><a href="#citable__193"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>He interprets human problem solving as a matter of education and growth and philosophy as a general theory of education (see Garrison 1998).</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="193"><a href="#citable__193"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>And no matter how clearly we see our ideals, taking action to make them real requires tough choices.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>'Principled pragmatism' on human rights - Ben Smith - POLITICO.com</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/1209/Principled_pragmatism_on_human_rights.html">www.politico.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="193"><a href="#citable__193"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>It may happen that some systems (e.g., the solar system, atom) appear to us as mechanisms simply because we have not found an appropriate spatial and temporal scales to see their intentionality.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Umwelt-theory</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://home.comcast.net/%7Esharov/biosem/txt/umwelt.html">home.comcast.net</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__384" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="384">Good values are those for which we have good reasons, viz.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="384"><a href="#citable__384"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>There are inexhaustible descriptions of a thing that can be used for different purposes, but there is no good reason that I can think of to take any one of those description and call it the essence of a thing.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Atheistic Hope</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.atheistichope.com/">www.atheistichope.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
the <a href="/Good_Reasons_approach" title="Good Reasons approach" class="mw-redirect">Good Reasons approach</a>. <a name="citable__121" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="121">The pragmatist formulation pre-dates those of other philosophers who have stressed important similarities between values and facts such as <a href="/Jerome_Schneewind" title="Jerome Schneewind" class="mw-redirect">Jerome Schneewind</a> and <a href="/John_Searle" title="John Searle">John Searle</a>.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="121"><a href="#citable__121"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Moreover, it stresses the necessity to focus on such humanly important—and irreducibly somatic—phenomena as grief and eros.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="121"><a href="#citable__121"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>But there are facts which contradict this assertion of the pragmatists, and which show that there can be antagonism between thought and action.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="121"><a href="#citable__121"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Why should we value decisions that are the products of voting after open debate over private decision-making and then voting, over bargaining, or over elimination of those who disagree with us?</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
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William James tried to show the meaningfulness of (some kinds of) spirituality but, like other pragmatists, refused to see religion as the basis of meaning or morality.</div>
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<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__337" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="337"><strong>William James'</strong> contribution to ethics, as laid out in his essay <em>The Will to Believe</em> has often been misunderstood as a plea for relativism or irrationality.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="337"><a href="#citable__337"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Essays about William James .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.des.emory.edu/mfp/james.html">www.des.emory.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li><li> <em><c_title>William James</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.emory.edu/education/mfp/james.html">www.emory.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="337"><a href="#citable__337"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Essays/books about William James .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.des.emory.edu/mfp/james.html">www.des.emory.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li><li> <em><c_title>William James</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.emory.edu/education/mfp/james.html">www.emory.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="337"><a href="#citable__337"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>James and Dewey believed that we could never get out of the fly bottle and therefore we must learn how to struggle with the metaphysical/epistemological questions as best we can.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.california.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.california.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.sfo.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.sfo.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__189" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="189">On its own terms it argues that ethics always involves a certain degree of trust or faith and that we cannot always wait for adequate proof when making moral decisions.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="189"><a href="#citable__189"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>We cannot wait to teach children until we are certain that we are not being racist, sexist, or otherwise oppressive; but we also cannot afford to leave the inquiry to others and implement it later.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Audrey Thompson - Political Pragmatism and Educational Inquiry</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-yearbook/96_docs/thompson.html">www.ed.uiuc.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="189"><a href="#citable__189"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Yet, in ethics, we have been taught to demand a foundation for ethical arguments that will make them so convincing as to convince even these moral incompetents of their truth.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Atheistic Hope</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.atheistichope.com/">www.atheistichope.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="189"><a href="#citable__189"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>But we trust in Dewey's belief that every age will do it own reconstructions, anyway, of its relevant ideas and communications from the view of those involved and affected.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
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<blockquote class="toccolours" style="float:none; padding: 10px 15px 10px 15px; display:table;">
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Moral questions immediately present themselves as questions whose solution cannot wait for sensible proof. <a name="citable__87" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="87">A moral question is a question not of what sensibly exists, but of what is good, or would be good if it did exist.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="87"><a href="#citable__87"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>James could say that the belief was ‘good for so much’ but it would only be ‘wholly true’ if it did not ‘clash with other vital benefits’.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="87"><a href="#citable__87"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>What we need to do is to learn to tell a good story about moral or scientific progress, how we got to where we are now, and where we would like to go next.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Atheistic Hope</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.atheistichope.com/">www.atheistichope.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="87"><a href="#citable__87"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>It would simply be admiration of exceptional men and women who were very good at doing the quite diverse kinds of things they did.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Richard Rorty's Platonists, Positivists, and Pragmatists</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
[...] <a name="citable__118" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="118">A social organism of any sort whatever, large or small, is what it is because each member proceeds to his own duty with a trust that the other members will simultaneously do theirs.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="118"><a href="#citable__118"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>A social organism of any sort is what it is because each member proceeds to his own duty with a trust that the other members will simultaneously do theirs….</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/james/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="118"><a href="#citable__118"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>From this it follows that, whatever goes on below the surface, inside the organisms where we cannot see it, there must be a large part of that iceberg showing above the surface.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Bredo / COGNITIVISM, SITUATED COGNITION, AND DEWEYIAN PRAGMATISM</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-yearbook/94_docs/BREDO.HTM">www.ed.uiuc.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="118"><a href="#citable__118"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Moreover, producing offspring can be considered as a sort of communication because an organism is a genetical message.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Umwelt-theory</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://home.comcast.net/%7Esharov/biosem/txt/umwelt.html">home.comcast.net</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__263" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="263">Wherever a desired result is achieved by the co-operation of many independent persons, its existence as a fact is a pure consequence of the precursive faith in one another of those immediately concerned.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="263"><a href="#citable__263"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Many facts appear as if expressly designed in view of one another.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism - Lecture III. Some Metaphysical Problems Pragmatically Considered (by William James)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.authorama.com/pragmatism-4.html">www.authorama.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="263"><a href="#citable__263"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The gist of Pluralism is that "Things are 'with' one another in many ways, but nothing includes everything or dominates over everything" (ibid., p.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12333b.htm">www.newadvent.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="263"><a href="#citable__263"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Far too many of our books, articles, training, and conversations seem to operate at the level of what works rather than what is most faithful to Scripture. .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism, Pragmatism Everywhere! - 9Marks</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.9marks.org/CC/article/0,,PTID314526|CHID598016|CIID2482402,00.html">www.9marks.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__183" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="183">A government, an army, a commercial system, a ship, a college, an athletic team, all exist on this condition, without which not only is nothing achieved, but nothing is even attempted.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="183"><a href="#citable__183"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>A government, an army, a commercial system, a ship, a college, an athletic team, all exist on this condition, without which not only is nothing achieved, but nothing is even attempted (WB, 24).</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/james/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="183"><a href="#citable__183"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>For example, existing law requires that federally funded educational institutions must observe federal antidiscrimination rules—including sex quotas for athletic teams—so long as even a single student receives federal aid.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>AEI - How to Think about Constitutional Change, Part II</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.aei.org/outlook/22942">www.aei.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="183"><a href="#citable__183"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Just as we here assume Japan to exist without ever having been there, because it works to do so, everything we know conspiring with the belief, and nothing interfering, so we assume that thing to be a clock.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James: Pragmatism: Lecture 6: Pragmatism's Conception of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.d.umn.edu/%7Edcole/phillang/WilliamJamesPragmatismLecture6.htm">www.d.umn.edu</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
(James 1896)</div>
</blockquote>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__296" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="296">Of the classical pragmatists, <strong>John Dewey</strong> wrote most extensively about morality and democracy.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="296"><a href="#citable__296"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>John Dewey, Democracy and Education (1916, p.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Bredo / COGNITIVISM, SITUATED COGNITION, AND DEWEYIAN PRAGMATISM</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-yearbook/94_docs/BREDO.HTM">www.ed.uiuc.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="296"><a href="#citable__296"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Websites about John Dewey .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>John Dewey</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://dewey.pragmatism.org/">dewey.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="296"><a href="#citable__296"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Books about John Dewey .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>John Dewey</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://dewey.pragmatism.org/">dewey.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__47" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="47">(Edel 1993) In his classic article <em>Three Independent Factors in Morals</em> (Dewey 1930), he tried to integrate three basic philosophical perspectives on morality: the right, the virtuous and the good.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="47"><a href="#citable__47"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>One meta-philosophical moral drawn by Dewey (and seconded by Quine) was that we should embrace naturalism: the idea that philosophy is not prior to science, but continuous with it.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/p/pragmati.htm">www.utm.edu</a> [Source type: Original source]</li><li> <em><c_title> Pragmatism [The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/p/pragmati.htm">www.iep.utm.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="47"><a href="#citable__47"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>If you are going to say, as theologians do, that God is good, you must then say that right and wrong have some meaning which is independent of God's fiat, because God's fiats are good and not bad independently of the mere fact that he made them.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Atheistic Hope</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.atheistichope.com/">www.atheistichope.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="47"><a href="#citable__47"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Pragmatism therefore lacks those basic characteristics which one has the right to expect of a philosophical doctrine.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__154" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="154">He held that while all three provide meaningful ways to think about moral questions, the possibility of conflict among the three elements cannot always be easily solved.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="154"><a href="#citable__154"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>After all of our thinking about alternative energy sources, post-petroleum vehicles , and so on, ecological survival for global society will require a transformation from the "consumer society" to the "conserver society."</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Daily Kos: Bad pragmatism in political decisionmaking</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.dailykos.com/story/2008/7/1/10055/56840/445/544685">www.dailykos.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="154"><a href="#citable__154"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The paper relates that the truth in pragmatist philosophy lies in the quest for ever-elusive answers, which in turn become questions, and this is what becomes the point of departure for all three philosophers.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Term Papers on pragmatism | pragmatism essays | AcaDemon</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.academon.com/pragmatism">www.academon.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="154"><a href="#citable__154"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>It is no surprise that this way of thinking about experience can easily lead to skepticism about the external world.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
(Anderson, SEP)</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__159" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="159">Dewey also criticized the dichotomy between <strong>means and ends</strong> which he saw as responsible for the degradation of our everyday working lives and education, both conceived as merely a means to an end.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="159"><a href="#citable__159"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The dichotomy between the passive given of experience and the rich results of our active conceptualization is not supported by our experience.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="159"><a href="#citable__159"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The end result is that over a thousand years of English common law, ours is a system that is a patch work of ideologies (or philosophies) - brought to us by the mechanism of pragmatism.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Obama and Pragmatism: Thinking Through Values | Robert Reich's Blog</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/robert_reich/2009/05/obama-and-pragmatism-thinking.php">tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="159"><a href="#citable__159"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The above quote is taken from the essay "Construction and Criticism" that Dewey wrote at the end of the 1920s.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__367" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="367">He stressed the need for meaningful labor and a conception of education that viewed it not as a preparation for life but as life itself.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="367"><a href="#citable__367"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>He knows the value of educating all cultures and creeds with the concept that there is no need for suffering, that there is no need to lay down the life of a child or young man or woman to protect financial interests of a self elected government leader.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>In Iowa, It's Clinton Pragmatism Vs. Obama Fever | Mother Jones</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://motherjones.com/politics/2007/11/iowa-its-clinton-pragmatism-vs-obama-fever">motherjones.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="367"><a href="#citable__367"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Experience provides the material for knowledge and conceptualization, but it does not itself have a content that is informed by concepts, practical needs, or anything else non-sensory.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="367"><a href="#citable__367"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Since growth is the characteristic of life, education is all one with growing; it has no end beyond itself.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
(Dewey 2004 [1910] ch. 7; Dewey 1997 [1938], p. 47)</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__43" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="43">Dewey was opposed to other ethical philosophies of his time, notably the <a href="/Emotivism" title="Emotivism">emotivism</a> of <a href="/Alfred_Ayer" title="Alfred Ayer" class="mw-redirect">Alfred Ayer</a>.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="43"><a href="#citable__43"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>A Time for Being Ethical: Levinas and Pragmatism Rosenthal, Sandra B. The Journal of Speculative Philosophy , Volume 17, Number 3, 2003 (New Series) , pp.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__313" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="313">Dewey envisioned the possibility of ethics as an experimental discipline, and thought values could best be characterized not as feelings or imperatives, but as hypotheses about what actions will lead to satisfactory results or what he termed <em>consummatory experience</em>.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="313"><a href="#citable__313"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>It is no surprise that this way of thinking about experience can easily lead to skepticism about the external world.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="313"><a href="#citable__313"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>But this is not possible in pragmatist doctrine, since it holds that individual judgements are at the root of all human thought: no purely individual judgement could ever become an objective truth.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="313"><a href="#citable__313"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Dewey is very clear about what it means that we - as observers, participants and agents - can never foresee all potential consequences or implications of our observations, participations and actions.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__355" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="355">A further implication of this view is that ethics is a fallible undertaking, since human beings are frequently unable to know what would satisfy them.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="355"><a href="#citable__355"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>I do not know any competent philosopher or student of ethics who would make such an indefensible claim, especially in a setting where so much is at stake.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James' Pragmatism as a policing philosophy?</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.kardasz.org/james_pragmatism.html">www.kardasz.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="355"><a href="#citable__355"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Such people would not be those who knew a Secret, who had won through to the Truth, but simply people who were good at being human.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Richard Rorty's Platonists, Positivists, and Pragmatists</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="355"><a href="#citable__355"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Moreover, since human needs and social circumstances are frequently in flux, social institutions need frequent reform.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>SOME THOUGHTS ON THE MERITS OF PRAGMATISM AS A GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/lawreviews/meta-elements/journals/bcealr/31_1/01_TXT.htm">www.bc.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__63" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="63">A recent pragmatist contribution to <a href="/Meta-ethics" title="Meta-ethics">meta-ethics</a> is Todd Lekan's "Making Morality" (Lekan 2003).</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="63"><a href="#citable__63"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Yet, in ethics, we have been taught to demand a foundation for ethical arguments that will make them so convincing as to convince even these moral incompetents of their truth.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Atheistic Hope</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.atheistichope.com/">www.atheistichope.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="63"><a href="#citable__63"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Euthanasia, Unnecessary Suffering, and the Proper Aims of Medicine .” In Science and Ethics: Can Science Help Us Make Wise and Moral Judgments?</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>John Robert Shook</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://shook.pragmatism.org/vita.htm">shook.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__176" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="176">Lekan argues that morality is a fallible but rational practice and that it has traditionally been misconceived as based on theory or principles.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="176"><a href="#citable__176"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Wright also argued for a neutral view of science with regard to moral and religious values, and for John Stuart Mill's utilitarian, relativistic theory of objective morality.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="176"><a href="#citable__176"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Jeffrey Stout, in Ethics After Babel , argues that there is a practical limit to how much disagreement there can be on morals.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Atheistic Hope</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.atheistichope.com/">www.atheistichope.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="176"><a href="#citable__176"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>In the moral battle between the principles of freedom and communism in Vietnam, Kennedy argued that the United States "will do whatever must be done to provide for...</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>John Kennedy's Vietnam Rhetoric</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/goldzwig.htm">mcadams.posc.mu.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__31" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="31">Instead, he argues, theory and rules arise as tools to make practice more intelligent.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="31"><a href="#citable__31"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Had not Kant himself as good as admitted that our faculties might distort reality instead of making it intelligible?</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="31"><a href="#citable__31"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>He and his wife make less, but have more quality time over for each other instead, and their patients are happier.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>CORRUPT.org: Paving Way For HBD Awareness, Conservatism And Personal Development Since '98</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.corrupt.org/">www.corrupt.org</a> [Source type: General]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="31"><a href="#citable__31"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Instead he takes on the more modest task of arguing that we are not forced to be moral nihilists, moral relativists, or moral skeptics.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Atheistic Hope</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.atheistichope.com/">www.atheistichope.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<h3><span class="mw-headline" id="wikipedia_Aesthetics">Aesthetics</span></h3>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__99" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="99">John Dewey's <em>Art as Experience</em>, based on the William James lectures he delivered at <a href="/Harvard_University" title="Harvard University">Harvard</a>, was an attempt to show the integrity of art, culture and everyday experience.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="99"><a href="#citable__99"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Courses that William James taught at Harvard .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.des.emory.edu/mfp/james.html">www.des.emory.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li><li> <em><c_title>William James</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.emory.edu/education/mfp/james.html">www.emory.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="99"><a href="#citable__99"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The most important of the ‘classical pragmatists’ were Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), William James (1842–1910) and John Dewey (1859-1952).</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="99"><a href="#citable__99"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>This rule remained unnoticed for twenty years, until it was taken up by Professor William James in his address delivered at the University of California in 1898.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12333b.htm">www.newadvent.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__24" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="24">(Field, IEP) Art, for Dewey, is or should be a part of everyone's creative lives and not just the privilege of a select group of artists.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="24"><a href="#citable__24"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Selected works on a variety of aspects of Dewey's philosophy ----Just a sampling of the enormous commentary on Dewey of recent years.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>John Dewey</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://dewey.pragmatism.org/">dewey.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="24"><a href="#citable__24"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Even if everyone agrees that we should do whatever is most likely to improve the lives of people on the ground, we won’t agree on what course of action fits that description in every case.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>'Principled pragmatism' on human rights - Ben Smith - POLITICO.com</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/1209/Principled_pragmatism_on_human_rights.html">www.politico.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
He also emphasizes that the audience is more than a passive recipient. <a name="citable__192" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="192">Dewey's treatment of art was a move away from the <a href="/Transcendental" title="Transcendental">transcendental</a> approach to <a href="/Aesthetics" title="Aesthetics">aesthetics</a> in the wake of <a href="/Immanuel_Kant" title="Immanuel Kant">Immanuel Kant</a> who emphasized the unique character of art and the disinterested nature of aesthetic appreciation.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="192"><a href="#citable__192"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Secular and scientific thought has moved away from religious thought; art has moved away from religious ceremonies; morality and law have moved away from ritual.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">A notable contemporary pragmatist aesthetician is <a href="/Joseph_Margolis" title="Joseph Margolis">Joseph Margolis</a>. <a name="citable__286" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="286">He defines a work of art as "a physically embodied, culturally emergent entity", a human "utterance" that isn't an ontological quirk but in line with other human activity and culture in general.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="286"><a href="#citable__286"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>First, the owner of the physical object in which the work is embodied is generally entitled to use the work in ways that do not materially impinge upon the work's integrity or that are reasonable under the circumstances.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/IPCoop/cotter.html">cyber.law.harvard.edu</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="286"><a href="#citable__286"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>It does this by making abstract commitments about the entities encountered while performing those other activities.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.california.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.california.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.sfo.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.sfo.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="286"><a href="#citable__286"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Pragmatism claims that all human activity presupposes some kind of abstract theorizing, and abstract theorizing gets all of its meaning from it’s ability to guide and effect some other human activity.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.california.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.california.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.sfo.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.sfo.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__307" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="307">He emphasizes that works of art are complex and difficult to fathom, and that no determinate interpretation can be given.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="307"><a href="#citable__307"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>To determine whether a work qualifies as a "work of recognized stature," the court stated that "a plaintiff must make a two-tiered showing: (1) that the visual art in question has "stature,' i.e.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/IPCoop/cotter.html">cyber.law.harvard.edu</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="307"><a href="#citable__307"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>What we experience is shaped by our habits of expectation and there is no basis for extracting from this complex process the kind of ‘thin given’ beloved of sense datum theorists.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="307"><a href="#citable__307"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The theory is complex and I will not explore it further here, beyond emphasizing, once again, that the content of a thought is determined by the ways in which we can use it in inference and the planning of action.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<h3><span class="mw-headline" id="wikipedia_Philosophy_of_religion">Philosophy of religion</span></h3>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__325" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="325">Both Dewey and James have investigated the role that religion can still play in contemporary society, the former in <em>A Common Faith</em> and the latter in <em>The Varieties of Religious Experience</em>.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="325"><a href="#citable__325"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Varieties of religious experience.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="325"><a href="#citable__325"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>A Truth Commission to Investigate Bush-Cheney Administration Abuses The Huffington Post community has played a vital role pursuing, demanding, and exposing the Bush-Cheney administration's numerous abuses.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Jeffrey Feldman: The Voice Of American Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeffrey-feldman/the-voice-of-american-pra_b_165631.html">www.huffingtonpost.com</a> [Source type: General]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="325"><a href="#citable__325"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>One hundred years after the publication of William James' The Varieties of Religious Experience , the Center for the Study of Science and Religion and the John Templeton Foundation brought together a group of influential scholars to reevaluate the significance of the classic work that analyzes religious experience within the context of psychology and philosophy.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.des.emory.edu/mfp/james.html">www.des.emory.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li><li> <em><c_title>William James</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.emory.edu/education/mfp/james.html">www.emory.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__246" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="246">It should be noted, from a general point of view, that for William James, something is true <em>only insofar</em> as it works.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="246"><a href="#citable__246"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Berthelot had been struck by the resemblances between the views of William James, John Dewey, Nietzsche, Bergson, Poincaré, and certain Catholic Modernists.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>The Revival of Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/d/dickstein-pragmatism.html">www.nytimes.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="246"><a href="#citable__246"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>James could say that the belief was ‘good for so much’ but it would only be ‘wholly true’ if it did not ‘clash with other vital benefits’.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="246"><a href="#citable__246"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Rather than teaching error or denying truth, it does something far more subtle, but just as effective from the enemy's point of view.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>But Does It Work?</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.biblebb.com/files/MAC/pragmatism.htm">www.biblebb.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__248" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="248">Thus, the statement, for example, that prayer is heard may work on a psychological level but (a) will not actually help to bring about the things you pray for (b) may be better explained by referring to its soothing effect than by claiming prayers are actually heard.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="248"><a href="#citable__248"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>You're better than this.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Obama and Pragmatism: Thinking Through Values | Robert Reich's Blog</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/robert_reich/2009/05/obama-and-pragmatism-thinking.php">tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="248"><a href="#citable__248"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>I have not seen anything from him, except empty rhetoric about "hope and change" that leads me to believe he will really bring those things...AND...I have written extensively about Hillary...</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Mother's Day 2008: Peaceful Idealism v. Political Pragmatism | CommonDreams.org</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2008/05/11/8879">www.commondreams.org</a> [Source type: General]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="248"><a href="#citable__248"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>My dinner properly is over, and in the heat of the conversation I am hardly aware of what I do; but the perception of the fruit, and the fleeting notion that I may eat it, seem fatally to bring the act about.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/james/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__235" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="235">As such, pragmatism isn't antithetical to religion but it isn't an apologetic for faith either.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="235"><a href="#citable__235"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>He looks for pragmatic solutions, but isn't afraid to take a stand on core values either.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Obama and Pragmatism: Thinking Through Values | Robert Reich's Blog</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/robert_reich/2009/05/obama-and-pragmatism-thinking.php">tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="235"><a href="#citable__235"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>I think pragmatism can be one such alternative that could gain tranction in America as a way of thinking that is an alternative to religious faith especially since it is American in origin.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Atheistic Hope</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.atheistichope.com/">www.atheistichope.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__149" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="149"><a href="/Joseph_Margolis" title="Joseph Margolis">Joseph Margolis</a>, in <em>Historied Thought, Constructed World</em> (California, 1995), makes a distinction between "existence" and "reality". He suggests using the term "exists" only for those things which adequately exhibit Peirce's <em>Secondness</em>: things which offer brute physical resistance to our movements.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="149"><a href="#citable__149"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Things in that state do not yet exist, they are indeterminate in nature, and therefore not susceptible to thought.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="149"><a href="#citable__149"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Our answer is that reality, whatever it is, is far from resistant to any form of distinction, and to some degree tends of itself towards it.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="149"><a href="#citable__149"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Distinction is thus a need of conceptual thought, but it already exists in things as it does in the mind.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
In this way, such things which affect us, like numbers, may be said to be "real", though they do not "exist". Margolis suggests that God, in such a linguistic usage, might very well be "real", causing believers to act in such and such a way, but might not "exist".</div>
<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="wikipedia_Analytical_2C_neoclassical_and_neopragmatism">Analytical, neoclassical and neopragmatism</span></h2>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__30" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="30"><a href="/Neopragmatism" title="Neopragmatism">Neopragmatism</a> is a broad contemporary category used for various thinkers, some of them radically opposed to one another.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="30"><a href="#citable__30"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>These variations occur not only in time but also in space, that is to say, not only from one type of historical society to another but also among the individuals of the same society.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__0" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="0">The name neopragmatist signifies that the thinkers in question incorporate important insights of, and yet significantly diverge from, the classical pragmatists.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="0"><a href="#citable__0"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The most important of the ‘classical pragmatists’ were Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), William James (1842–1910) and John Dewey (1859-1952).</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="0"><a href="#citable__0"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>It would be wrong to conclude that pragmatism was restricted to the United States or that the only important pragmatist thinkers were Peirce, James and Dewey.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="0"><a href="#citable__0"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>And yet almost every chapter is filled with references to thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, or Hume, and to the grand metaphysical questions they struggled with.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.california.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.california.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.sfo.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.sfo.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
This divergence may occur either in their philosophical methodology (many of them are loyal to the analytic tradition) or in actual conceptual formation (<a href="/C.I._Lewis" title="C.I. Lewis" class="mw-redirect">C.I. Lewis</a> was very critical of Dewey; <a href="/Richard_Rorty" title="Richard Rorty">Richard Rorty</a> dislikes Peirce). <a name="citable__33" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="33">Important analytical neopragmatists include the aforementioned Lewis, <a href="/W.V.O._Quine" title="W.V.O. Quine" class="mw-redirect">W.V.O. Quine</a>, <a href="/Donald_Davidson" title="Donald Davidson">Donald Davidson</a>, <a href="/Hilary_Putnam" title="Hilary Putnam">Hilary Putnam</a> and the early <a href="/Richard_Rorty" title="Richard Rorty">Richard Rorty</a>.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="33"><a href="#citable__33"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>"Almost Pragmatism: the Jurisprudence of Richard Posner, Richard Rorty and Donald Dworkin."</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>RICHARD RORTY</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.phillwebb.net/History/TwentiethCentury/Pragmatism/Rorty/Rorty.htm">www.phillwebb.net</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="33"><a href="#citable__33"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>In order to enrich the picture of Quine's place in the pragmatist tradition, some neopragmatist criticisms of his ideas (e.g., by Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty) are also discussed.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a href="/Stanley_Fish" title="Stanley Fish">Stanley Fish</a>, the later Rorty and <a href="/J%C3%BCrgen_Habermas" title="Jürgen Habermas">Jürgen Habermas</a> are closer to <a href="/Continental_philosophy" title="Continental philosophy">continental thought</a>.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__398" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="398">Neoclassical pragmatism denotes those thinkers who consider themselves inheritors of the project of the classical pragmatists.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="398"><a href="#citable__398"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Far from disempowering those of us to carry the fight on after he is no longer President is wishful thinking from the far right and those with no skill of pragmatism themselves.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Barack Obama's nonideological pragmatism will backfire - Michael Lerner - POLITICO.com</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0509/22707.html">www.politico.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="398"><a href="#citable__398"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>In Part I, I will discuss, in greater detail, the fundamental principles espoused by pragmatic thinkers, including leading philosophical pragmatists, environmental pragmatists, and jurisprudential pragmatic scholars.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>SOME THOUGHTS ON THE MERITS OF PRAGMATISM AS A GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/lawreviews/meta-elements/journals/bcealr/31_1/01_TXT.htm">www.bc.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="398"><a href="#citable__398"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>But there were cautions, expressed by those who considered nuclear energy to be a useful bet – despite the price – and others who assert that nukes are a bad idea, period.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title> Apollo Feedback: On Energy Pragmatism: Yes, No, But : Apollo Alliance</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://apolloalliance.org/feedback/apollo-feedback-on-energy-pragmatism-yes-no-but/">apolloalliance.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a href="/Sidney_Hook" title="Sidney Hook">Sidney Hook</a> and <a href="/Susan_Haack" title="Susan Haack">Susan Haack</a> (known for the theory of <a href="/Foundherentism" title="Foundherentism">foundherentism</a>) are well-known examples.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Not all pragmatists are easily characterized. <a name="citable__427" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="427">It is probable, considering the advent of <a href="/Postanalytic_philosophy" title="Postanalytic philosophy">postanalytic philosophy</a> and the diversification of Anglo-American philosophy, that more philosophers will be influenced by pragmatist thought without necessarily publicly committing themselves to that philosophical school.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="427"><a href="#citable__427"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The pragmatist philosophers, and Schiller in particular, deny that thought has a speculative value.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__188" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="188"><a href="/Daniel_Dennett" title="Daniel Dennett">Daniel Dennett</a>, a student of Quine's, falls into this category, as does <a href="/Stephen_Toulmin" title="Stephen Toulmin">Stephen Toulmin</a>, who arrived at his philosophical position via <a href="/Ludwig_Wittgenstein" title="Ludwig Wittgenstein">Wittgenstein</a>, whom he calls "a pragmatist of a sophisticated kind" (foreword for Dewey 1929 in the 1988 edition, p.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="188"><a href="#citable__188"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Action does not call for that kind of fixity.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="188"><a href="#citable__188"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>David Axelrod, one of his chief advisors whom I admire enormously, recently called him a "ruthless pragmatist."</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Obama and Pragmatism: Thinking Through Values | Robert Reich's Blog</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/robert_reich/2009/05/obama-and-pragmatism-thinking.php">tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
xiii). <a name="citable__399" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="399">Another example is <a href="/Mark_Johnson_(professor)" title="Mark Johnson (professor)" class="mw-redirect">Mark Johnson</a> whose <a href="/Embodied_philosophy" title="Embodied philosophy" class="mw-redirect">embodied philosophy</a> (Lakoff and Johnson 1999) shares its psychologism, direct realism and anti-cartesianism with pragmatism.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="399"><a href="#citable__399"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>It is also shown that neither Quine's philosophy nor pragmatism are as anti-metaphysical as has sometimes been thought.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="399"><a href="#citable__399"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Genealogical Pragmatism: Philosophy, Experience, and Community (review) Gayman, Cynthia J. The Journal of Speculative Philosophy , Volume 13, Number 2, 1999 (New Series) , pp.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__281" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="281">Conceptual pragmatism is a theory of knowledge originating with the work of the philosopher and logician <a href="/Clarence_Irving_Lewis" title="Clarence Irving Lewis">Clarence Irving Lewis</a>.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="281"><a href="#citable__281"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Lewis, Clarence Irving, 1883-1964.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="281"><a href="#citable__281"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Epistemological Relativism and Relativistic Epistemology: Richard Rorty and the Possibility of a Philosophical Theory of Knowledge .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>RICHARD RORTY</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.phillwebb.net/History/TwentiethCentury/Pragmatism/Rorty/Rorty.htm">www.phillwebb.net</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__424" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="424">The epistemology of conceptual pragmatism was first formulated in the 1929 book <em>Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge</em>.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="424"><a href="#citable__424"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Pragmatic theory of knowledge .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12333b.htm">www.newadvent.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="424"><a href="#citable__424"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Pragmatic approach Experience, Conceptual approach Knowledge ...</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>interlanguage</c_title></em> <c_date>18 September 2009 14:12 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.gxnu.edu.cn/Personal/szliu/pragmatic_transfer.html">www.gxnu.edu.cn</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="424"><a href="#citable__424"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>First, the philosophical writings of a leading pragmatist like C. S. Peirce are concerned with and defend theories of truth and reality that are not merely procedural, behavioristic, transitional, or conceptual.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">'French Pragmatism' is attended with theorists like <a href="/Bruno_Latour" title="Bruno Latour">Bruno Latour</a>, <a href="/Michel_Crozier" title="Michel Crozier">Michel Crozier</a> and <a href="/Luc_Boltanski" title="Luc Boltanski">Luc Boltanski</a> and <a href="/Laurent_Th%C3%A9venot" title="Laurent Thévenot">Laurent Thévenot</a>. <a name="citable__161" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="161">It is often seen as opposed to structural problems connected to the French <a href="/Critical_Theory" title="Critical Theory" class="mw-redirect">Critical Theory</a> of <a href="/Pierre_Bourdieu" title="Pierre Bourdieu">Pierre Bourdieu</a>.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="161"><a href="#citable__161"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Critics of pragmatism often wish to condemn the doctrine as sheer opportunism, or as "guilt by association" with such self-styled "pragmatic" theories as Georges Sorel's doctrine of violence.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="wikipedia_Contemporary_Reverberations">Contemporary Reverberations</span></h2>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__378" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="378">In the twentieth century, the movements of <a href="/Logical_positivism" title="Logical positivism">logical positivism</a> and <a href="/Ordinary_language_philosophy" title="Ordinary language philosophy">ordinary language philosophy</a> have similarities with pragmatism.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="378"><a href="#citable__378"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Early twentieth-century developments in logic and philosophy of science led away from Comte's positivism and Mill's psychologism to the Viennese school of logical positivists with whom many pragmatists share an operational and antimetaphysical viewpoint.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="378"><a href="#citable__378"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Pragmatism then, in this twentieth-century version, is another name for the operational theory of scientific method, and is closely linked to logical empiricism.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="378"><a href="#citable__378"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Peirce made his first published attempts at formulating pragmatism in the 1870s, and the maxim he developed there is often regarded as a prototype of the verification principle proposed by logical positivists in the early twentieth century.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>C.S. Peirce's Pragmatism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/p/PeircePr.htm">www.utm.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__133" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="133">Like pragmatism, logical positivism provides a verification criterion of meaning that is supposed to rid us of nonsense metaphysics.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="133"><a href="#citable__133"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>He promised that pragmatism would show us the way to overcome this dilemma and, having thus shown us its importance, he proceeded, in the second lecture, to explain ‘What Pragmatism Means’.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="133"><a href="#citable__133"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>In Germany we had nothing like the pragmatic reconstruction of metaphysics for which Dewey and others stand in America.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="133"><a href="#citable__133"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>As such, it shares with the pragmatic maxim an experiential or practical criterion of meaning; for both, a proposition must have some observable effect in the world to be meaningful.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>C.S. Peirce's Pragmatism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/p/PeircePr.htm">www.utm.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__402" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="402">However, logical positivism doesn't stress action like pragmatism does.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="402"><a href="#citable__402"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>This convenient assumption, however, ultimately necessitates an abstraction from meaning, though Formal Logic does not avow this openly.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="402"><a href="#citable__402"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>However, this claim is contestable; while James does expand pragmatism in many ways, e.g.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Mike Sandbothe: Mats Bergman: The New Wave of Pragmatism in Communication Studies</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.sandbothe.net/648.98.html">www.sandbothe.net</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="402"><a href="#citable__402"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Wagner, like most in the church growth movement, claims that the "consecrated pragmatism" he advocates does not allow compromise of doctrine or ethics.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>But Does It Work?</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.biblebb.com/files/MAC/pragmatism.htm">www.biblebb.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__172" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="172">Furthermore, the pragmatists rarely used their maxim of meaning to rule out all metaphysics as nonsense.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="172"><a href="#citable__172"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>We have been giving into the gang of profiteers, ideologues, and pragmatists for all these years and time has run out.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title> Apollo Feedback: On Energy Pragmatism: Yes, No, But : Apollo Alliance</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://apolloalliance.org/feedback/apollo-feedback-on-energy-pragmatism-yes-no-but/">apolloalliance.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="172"><a href="#citable__172"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The means they used was to take objective reality as their object, since it must necessarily be the same for all men, given its independence from the observing subject.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="172"><a href="#citable__172"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>But Apollo is making a place for itself in all of this and I think there are candidates out there from top to bottom who would use such well researched analysis.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title> Apollo Feedback: On Energy Pragmatism: Yes, No, But : Apollo Alliance</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://apolloalliance.org/feedback/apollo-feedback-on-energy-pragmatism-yes-no-but/">apolloalliance.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__138" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="138">Usually, pragmatism was put forth to correct metaphysical doctrines or to construct empirically verifiable ones rather than to provide a wholesale rejection.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="138"><a href="#citable__138"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>There might conceivably be some genuine empirically-oriented, sane pragmatism that does not fit this definition, but this is not the pragmatism the political class invokes and it is not the one we are discussing.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism, Viewed Pragmatically - Opinionator Blog - NYTimes.com</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/12/pragmatism-viewed-pragmatically/?ref=opinion">opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="138"><a href="#citable__138"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>For a confirmation of this doctrine Pragmatism appeals to the history of scientific truth, which has shown a continuous correction of 'truths,' which were re-valued as 'errors,' as better statements for them became available.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="138"><a href="#citable__138"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The method of Rorty's pragmatism which focuses on language rather than experience seems to be to say, "instead of asking X, try asking question Y instead.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Atheistic Hope</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.atheistichope.com/">www.atheistichope.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__197" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="197"><a href="/Ordinary_language_philosophy" title="Ordinary language philosophy">Ordinary language philosophy</a> is closer to pragmatism than other <a href="/Philosophy_of_language" title="Philosophy of language">philosophy of language</a> because of its <a href="/Nominalism" title="Nominalism">nominalist</a> character and because it takes the broader functioning of language in an environment as its focus instead of investigating abstract relations between <em>language</em> and <em>world</em>.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="197"><a href="#citable__197"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>I'm happy to see language-oriented programming and polyglot programming get more traction, because they improve a programmers pragmatic sensibilities.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Ola Bini: Programming Language Synchronicity: Pragmatic Static Typing</c_title></em> <c_date>18 September 2009 14:12 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://ola-bini.blogspot.com/2008/04/pragmatic-static-typing.html">ola-bini.blogspot.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="197"><a href="#citable__197"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The method of Rorty's pragmatism which focuses on language rather than experience seems to be to say, "instead of asking X, try asking question Y instead.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Atheistic Hope</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.atheistichope.com/">www.atheistichope.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="197"><a href="#citable__197"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Peirce, on the other hand, particular in his later work, sees the whole of philosophy embedded within a scientific system and the pragmatic maxim centrally embedded in philosophy.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>C.S. Peirce's Pragmatism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/p/PeircePr.htm">www.utm.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__330" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="330">Pragmatism has ties to <a href="/Process_philosophy" title="Process philosophy">process philosophy</a>.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="330"><a href="#citable__330"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Culture Gender and Work Gender Space Gender Studies Patterns of governance -structure & process Feminist Philosophy Pragmatism William James Sociology Feminist Sociology Feminist Theory ( More ) ( Collapse ) .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Academia.edu | People | People who have Pragmatism as a research interest (155)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.academia.edu/People?discipline_path=Pragmatism&discipline_path_id=Philosophy%2FPragmatism">www.academia.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="330"><a href="#citable__330"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>C. I. Lewis: Toward Categories of Process and a Metaphysics of Pragmatism Rosenthal, Sandra B. Journal of the History of Philosophy , Volume 15, Number 2, April 1977 , pp.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__277" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="277">Much of their work developed in dialogue with process philosophers like <a href="/Henri_Bergson" title="Henri Bergson">Henri Bergson</a> and <a href="/Alfred_North_Whitehead" title="Alfred North Whitehead">Alfred North Whitehead</a>, who aren't usually considered pragmatists because they differ so much on other points.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="277"><a href="#citable__277"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The problem is that people like Reich like to push people's buttons about how much the top earner's make, without acknowledging how much they contribute.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Obama and Pragmatism: Thinking Through Values | Robert Reich's Blog</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/robert_reich/2009/05/obama-and-pragmatism-thinking.php">tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="277"><a href="#citable__277"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>If they are common to all, is it not because they are the work of the community?</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="277"><a href="#citable__277"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Because otherwise it will turn into a media/political circus, with all the usual entrenched political interests covering each others backs as they did during the Iran-Contra hearings.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Obama and Pragmatism: Thinking Through Values | Robert Reich's Blog</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/robert_reich/2009/05/obama-and-pragmatism-thinking.php">tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
(Douglas Browning et al. 1998; Rescher, SEP)</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a href="/Behaviorism" title="Behaviorism">Behaviorism</a> and <a href="/Functional_psychology" title="Functional psychology">functionalism</a> in psychology and sociology also have ties to pragmatism, which is not surprising considering that James and Dewey were both scholars of psychology and that <a href="/George_Herbert_Mead" title="George Herbert Mead">Mead</a> became a sociologist.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__261" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="261"><a href="/Utilitarianism" title="Utilitarianism">Utilitarianism</a> has some significant parallels to Pragmatism and <a href="/John_Stuart_Mill" title="John Stuart Mill">John Stuart Mill</a> espoused similar values.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="261"><a href="#citable__261"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Wright also argued for a neutral view of science with regard to moral and religious values, and for John Stuart Mill's utilitarian, relativistic theory of objective morality.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="261"><a href="#citable__261"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>No wonder then that Peirce's "Guess at the Riddle of the Universe" was not taken seriously by the more hardheaded utilitarian followers of John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, and the "Social Darwinists" of his day.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="261"><a href="#citable__261"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>John Ryder and Emil Visnovsky, eds., Pragmatism and Values: The Central European Pragmatist Forum, Volume One (2004).</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>John Robert Shook</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://shook.pragmatism.org/vita.htm">shook.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<h3><span class="mw-headline" id="wikipedia_Influence_of_pragmatism_in_social_sciences">Influence of pragmatism in social sciences</span></h3>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Increasing attention is being given to pragmatist epistemology in social sciences, which have struggled with divisive debates over the status of social scientific knowledge <sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_2" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-2"><span>[</span>3<span>]</span></a></sup><sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_3" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-3"><span>[</span>4<span>]</span></a></sup></div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Enthusiasts suggest that pragmatism offers an approach which is both pluralist and practical <sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_4" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-4"><span>[</span>5<span>]</span></a></sup>.</div>
<h3><span class="mw-headline" id="wikipedia_Influence_of_Pragmatism_in_Public_Administration">Influence of Pragmatism in Public Administration</span></h3>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__178" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="178">The classical pragmatism of <a href="/John_Dewey" title="John Dewey">John Dewey</a>, <a href="/William_James" title="William James">William James</a> and <a href="/Charles_Sanders_Peirce" title="Charles Sanders Peirce">Charles Sanders Peirce</a> has influenced research in the field of <a href="/Public_Administration" title="Public Administration" class="mw-redirect">Public Administration</a>.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="178"><a href="#citable__178"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Permalink The pragmatic maxim, also known as the maxim of pragmatism or the maxim of pragmaticism, is a maxim of logic formulated by Charles Sanders Peirce.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Obama and Pragmatism: Thinking Through Values | Robert Reich's Blog</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/robert_reich/2009/05/obama-and-pragmatism-thinking.php">tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="178"><a href="#citable__178"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>His aim is both to defend a particular view of pragmatism originating with the work of Charles Sanders Peirce and, at the same time, argue in favour of a new view of deliberative democracy developed from Talisse’s Peircean pragmatism.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="178"><a href="#citable__178"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>This method draws on the pragmatic philosophy of John Dewey and recommends an experimental approach to solving moral problems in clinical practice.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__114" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="114">Scholars claim classical pragmatism had a profound influence on the origin of the field of Public Administration.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="114"><a href="#citable__114"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Contemporary scholars of classical pragmatism defend experience as the heart of pragmatism while neopragmatists drop the concept of experience in favor of a thoroughly linguistic pragmatism.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_5" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-5"><span>[</span>6<span>]</span></a></sup><sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_6" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-6"><span>[</span>7<span>]</span></a></sup> At the most basic level, public administrators are responsible for making programs "work" in a pluralistic, problems oriented environment. Public administrators are also responsible for the day to day work with citizens. Dewey's participatory democracy can be applied in this environment. Dewey and James notion of theory as a tool, helps administrators craft theories to resolve policy and administrative problems. Further, the birth of American public administration coincides closely with the period of greatest influence of the classical pragmatists.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__251" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="251">Which pragmatism (classical pragmatism or neo-pragmatism) makes the most sense in public administration has been the source of debate.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="251"><a href="#citable__251"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The patchwork model is the most efficable, pratical, the one that makes the most sense.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Obama and Pragmatism: Thinking Through Values | Robert Reich's Blog</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/robert_reich/2009/05/obama-and-pragmatism-thinking.php">tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
The debate began when Patricia Shields introduced Dewey's notion of the Community of Inquiry.<sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_7" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-7"><span>[</span>8<span>]</span></a></sup> Hugh Miller objected to one element of the community of inquiry (problematic situation, scientific attitude, participatory democracy) - Scientific attitude.<sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_8" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-8"><span>[</span>9<span>]</span></a></sup> A debate that included responses from a practitioner <sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_9" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-9"><span>[</span>10<span>]</span></a></sup>, an economist,<sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_10" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-10"><span>[</span>11<span>]</span></a></sup> a planner,<sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_11" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-11"><span>[</span>12<span>]</span></a></sup> other Public Administration Scholars,<sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_12" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-12"><span>[</span>13<span>]</span></a></sup><sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_13" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-13"><span>[</span>14<span>]</span></a></sup> and noted philosophers <sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_14" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-14"><span>[</span>15<span>]</span></a></sup><sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_15" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-15"><span>[</span>16<span>]</span></a></sup> followed. Miller <sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_16" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-16"><span>[</span>17<span>]</span></a></sup> and Shields <sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_17" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-17"><span>[</span>18<span>]</span></a></sup><sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_18" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-18"><span>[</span>19<span>]</span></a></sup> also responded.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__88" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="88">In addition, applied scholarship of public administration that assesses <a href="/Charter_schools" title="Charter schools" class="mw-redirect">charter schools</a> <sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_19" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-19"><span>[</span>20<span>]</span></a></sup>,contracting out or <a href="/Outsourcing" title="Outsourcing">outsourcing</a><sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_20" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-20"><span>[</span>21<span>]</span></a></sup>,financial management,<sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_21" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-21"><span>[</span>22<span>]</span></a></sup> <a href="/Performance_measurement" title="Performance measurement">performance measurement</a><sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_22" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-22"><span>[</span>23<span>]</span></a></sup>, urban quality of life initiatives<sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_23" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-23"><span>[</span>24<span>]</span></a></sup>, and <a href="/Urban_planning" title="Urban planning">urban planning</a><sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_24" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-24"><span>[</span>25<span>]</span></a></sup> explicitly draws on the ideas of classical pragmatism in the development of the conceptual framework and focus of analysis.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="88"><a href="#citable__88"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>If, in classical rationalism, thought has this character of 'rigidity', for which pragmatism criticises it, it is because in rationalism truth is conceived of as a simple thing, a thing quasi-divine, that draws its whole value from itself.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<h3><span class="mw-headline" id="wikipedia_Pragmatism_and_Feminism">Pragmatism and Feminism</span></h3>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__46" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="46">Since the mid 1990s, feminist philosophers have re-discovered classical pragmatism as a source of feminist theories.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="46"><a href="#citable__46"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Thus, pragmatism can be integrated with the theory of natural selection if it is re-interpreted as perception at the level of lineages.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Umwelt-theory</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://home.comcast.net/%7Esharov/biosem/txt/umwelt.html">home.comcast.net</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="46"><a href="#citable__46"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>It is not only that since the mid-1990s you have lower and lower inflation, but year after year the anchoring that is being pursued.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Transcript of an IMF Book Forum -- Pragmatisn: Latin America's New 'Ism'?</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2006/tr060523.htm">www.imf.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="46"><a href="#citable__46"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Peirce returned repeatedly to his early formulations and especially in his later life and worked and re-worked his pragmatic theories, particularly in reaction to the work of William James.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>C.S. Peirce's Pragmatism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/p/PeircePr.htm">www.utm.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__64" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="64">Works by Seigfried,<sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_25" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-25"><span>[</span>26<span>]</span></a></sup> Duran,<sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_26" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-26"><span>[</span>27<span>]</span></a></sup> Keith,<sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_27" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-27"><span>[</span>28<span>]</span></a></sup> and Whipps <sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_28" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-28"><span>[</span>29<span>]</span></a></sup> explore the historic and philosophic links between feminism and pragmatism.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="64"><a href="#citable__64"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>It is here that we can establish a PARALLEL BETWEEN PRAGMATISM AND SOCIOLOGY. By applying the historical point of view to the order of things human, sociology is led to set itself the same problem.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="64"><a href="#citable__64"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Seigfried, Charlene Haddock, 1943- Pragmatism and feminism: reweaving the social fabric.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__218" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="218">The connection between pragmatism and feminism took so long to be rediscover because pragmatism itself was eclipsed by logical positivism during the middle decades of the 20th century.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="218"><a href="#citable__218"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Pragmatism, which levels everything, deprives itself of the means of making this interpretation by failing to recognise the duality that exists between the mentality which results from individual experiences and that which results from collective experiences.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="218"><a href="#citable__218"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>It is here that we can establish a PARALLEL BETWEEN PRAGMATISM AND SOCIOLOGY. By applying the historical point of view to the order of things human, sociology is led to set itself the same problem.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="218"><a href="#citable__218"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>If, in classical rationalism, thought has this character of 'rigidity', for which pragmatism criticises it, it is because in rationalism truth is conceived of as a simple thing, a thing quasi-divine, that draws its whole value from itself.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
As a result it was lost from feminine discourse. <a name="citable__231" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="231">The very features of pragmatism that led to its decline are the characteristics that feminists now consider its greatest strength.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="231"><a href="#citable__231"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Nevertheless, this preoccupation with action, which has been seen as the defining characteristic of pragmatism, is not, in my view, its major feature.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__237" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="237">These are “persistent and early criticisms of positivist interpretations of scientific methodology; disclosure of value dimension of factual claims”; viewing aesthetics as informing everyday experience; subordinating logical analysis to political, cultural and social issues; linking the dominant discourses with domination; “realigning theory with praxis; and resisting the turn to epistemology and instead emphasizing concrete experience” <sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_29" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-29"><span>[</span>30<span>]</span></a></sup>.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="237"><a href="#citable__237"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The same observations could be made about the early family, which is at one and the same time, for example, a social, religious, political and legal unit.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="237"><a href="#citable__237"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>A Culture of Justification: The Pragmatist’s Epistemic Argument for Democracy Cheryl Misak Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology , Volume 5, Issue 1, 2008 , pp.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
These feminist philosophers point to <a href="/Jane_Addams" title="Jane Addams">Jane Addams</a> as a founder of classical pragmatism. <a name="citable__69" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="69">In addition, the ideas of Dewey, Mead and James are consistent with many feminist tenets.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="69"><a href="#citable__69"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Of course, the very different varieties of pragmatism of James, Peirce, Mead, and Dewey can hardly be held responsible for either the Marxist or fascist interpretations of James.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="69"><a href="#citable__69"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>If we rely on Dewey’s original ideas, rather than Rorty’s reinterpretations of Dewey, these problems can be radically transformed, and in many cases dissolved.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.california.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.california.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.sfo.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.sfo.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="69"><a href="#citable__69"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>This is because Peirce's philosophical writings consist of a great number of papers and manuscripts and because Dewey wrote so many books that it would be impossible to list all of them.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__406" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="406">Jane Addams, John Dewey & George Herbert Mead developed their philosophies as all three became friends, influenced each other and were engaged in the Hull-House experience and women’s rights causes.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="406"><a href="#citable__406"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>John Deweys Philosophie des ‚experience' in interaktionistisch-konstruktivistischer Interpretation.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="406"><a href="#citable__406"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Mead, George Herbert, 1863-1931.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="406"><a href="#citable__406"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Dewey, John: political philosophy .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="wikipedia_Criticism">Criticism</span></h2>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__350" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="350">Although many later pragmatists such as <a href="/W.V.O._Quine" title="W.V.O. Quine" class="mw-redirect">W.V.O. Quine</a> were actually analytic philosophers, the most vehement criticisms of classical pragmatism came from within the analytic school.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="350"><a href="#citable__350"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Abstract This paper discusses critically W.V. Quine's relation to the tradition of pragmatism.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="350"><a href="#citable__350"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>How does it happen that, with such defects, pragmatism has imposed itself on so many minds?</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="350"><a href="#citable__350"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>After discussing the present impasse, I describe a third version of pragmatism which involves a reconstruction of the classical pragmatist concept of experience in light of the criticisms of foundationalism crucial to the neopragmatist linguistic turn.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__302" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="302"><a href="/Bertrand_Russell" title="Bertrand Russell">Bertrand Russell</a> was especially known for his vituperative attacks on what he considered little more than epistemological relativism and short-sighted practicalism.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="302"><a href="#citable__302"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Yet in the choice of these man-made formulas we cannot be capricious with impunity any more than we can be capricious on the common-sense practical level.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James: Pragmatism: Lecture 6: Pragmatism's Conception of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.d.umn.edu/%7Edcole/phillang/WilliamJamesPragmatismLecture6.htm">www.d.umn.edu</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="302"><a href="#citable__302"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Berkeley’s treatment of the notion of matter is so well known as to need hardly more than a mention.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism - Lecture III. Some Metaphysical Problems Pragmatically Considered (by William James)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.authorama.com/pragmatism-4.html">www.authorama.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="302"><a href="#citable__302"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>He identifies ‘Cartesianism’ as a philosophical pathology that lost sight of the insights that were both fundamental to scholastic thought and also more suited than Cartesianism to the philosophical needs of his own time.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__354" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="354">Realists in general often could not fathom how pragmatists could seriously call themselves empirical or realist thinkers and thought pragmatist epistemology was only a disguised manifestation of <a href="/Idealism" title="Idealism">idealism</a>.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="354"><a href="#citable__354"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>How then should we do epistemology from a pragmatist perspective?</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.california.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.california.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.sfo.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.sfo.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="354"><a href="#citable__354"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Because of reductionism, love, free will, consciousness, creativity, rationality, and morality are thought to only be explicable if humans have an extra-added supernatural ingredient called a soul.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Atheistic Hope</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.atheistichope.com/">www.atheistichope.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="354"><a href="#citable__354"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>But this is not possible in pragmatist doctrine, since it holds that individual judgements are at the root of all human thought: no purely individual judgement could ever become an objective truth.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
(Hildebrand 2003)</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Louis Menand argues<sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_30" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-30"><span>[</span>31<span>]</span></a></sup> that during the <a href="/Cold_War" title="Cold War">Cold War</a>, the intellectual life of the United States became dominated by ideologies. Since pragmatism seeks "to avoid the violence inherent in abstraction," it was not very popular at the time.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__22" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="22"><a href="/Neopragmatism" title="Neopragmatism">Neopragmatism</a> as represented by Richard Rorty has been criticized as relativistic both by neoclassical pragmatists such as <a href="/Susan_Haack" title="Susan Haack">Susan Haack</a> (Haack 1997) and by many analytic philosophers (Dennett 1998).</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="22"><a href="#citable__22"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Richard Rorty: the Making of an American Philosopher, 1931-1982 .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>RICHARD RORTY</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.phillwebb.net/History/TwentiethCentury/Pragmatism/Rorty/Rorty.htm">www.phillwebb.net</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="22"><a href="#citable__22"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Richard Rorty: Critical Dialogues .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>RICHARD RORTY</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.phillwebb.net/History/TwentiethCentury/Pragmatism/Rorty/Rorty.htm">www.phillwebb.net</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="22"><a href="#citable__22"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Rorty and Pragmatism: the Philosopher Responds to his Critics .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>RICHARD RORTY</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.phillwebb.net/History/TwentiethCentury/Pragmatism/Rorty/Rorty.htm">www.phillwebb.net</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__157" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="157">Rorty's early analytical work, however, differs notably from his later work which some, including Rorty himself, consider to be closer to <a href="/Literary_criticism" title="Literary criticism">literary criticism</a> than to philosophy - most criticism is aimed at this latter phase of Rorty's thought.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="157"><a href="#citable__157"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The latter would like to recapture the spirit of the early logical positivists, the sense that philosophy is the accumulation of “results” by patient, rigorous, preferably cooperative work on precisely stated problems (the spirit characteristic of the younger, rather than of the older, Wittgenstein).</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Richard Rorty's Platonists, Positivists, and Pragmatists</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="157"><a href="#citable__157"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>By attacking this latter distinction, the holistic “pragmaticising” strain in analytic philosophy has helped us see how the metaphysical urge – common to fuzzy Whiteheadians and razor-sharp “scientific realists” – works.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Richard Rorty's Platonists, Positivists, and Pragmatists</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="157"><a href="#citable__157"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>When we look at what Rorty says about the relationship between epistemology and empirical psychology in 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,' we can see that he makes similar mistakes in most of his arguments.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.california.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.california.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li><li> <em><c_title>In the battlebetween Pragmatism and Realism, Rorty is currently seen as the most adamantspokesman for Pragmatism</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://users.sfo.com/~mcmf/rorty.html">users.sfo.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="wikipedia_A_list_of_pragmatists">A list of pragmatists</span></h2>
<table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" class="multicol" style="background:transparent; width:100%;">
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<h3><span class="mw-headline" id="wikipedia_Classical_pragmatists__281850_1950_29">Classical pragmatists (1850-1950)</span></h3>
<a name="citable__371" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="371"><ul>
<li><a href="/Charles_Sanders_Peirce" title="Charles Sanders Peirce">Charles Sanders Peirce</a> (1839–1914): was the founder of American pragmatism (later called by Peirce <a href="/Pragmaticism" title="Pragmaticism">pragmaticism</a>).</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="371"><a href="#citable__371"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Permalink The pragmatic maxim, also known as the maxim of pragmatism or the maxim of pragmaticism, is a maxim of logic formulated by Charles Sanders Peirce.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Obama and Pragmatism: Thinking Through Values | Robert Reich's Blog</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/robert_reich/2009/05/obama-and-pragmatism-thinking.php">tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="371"><a href="#citable__371"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>His aim is both to defend a particular view of pragmatism originating with the work of Charles Sanders Peirce and, at the same time, argue in favour of a new view of deliberative democracy developed from Talisse’s Peircean pragmatism.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="371"><a href="#citable__371"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Pragmatism, Tradition, and Truth in Psychoanalysis Hanly, Charles, 1930- American Imago , Volume 63, Number 3, Fall 2006 , pp.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
He wrote on a wide range of topics, from mathematical logic and semiotics to psychology.</li>
<li><a href="/William_James" title="William James">William James</a> (1842–1910): influential <a href="/Psychology" title="Psychology">psychologist</a> and theorist of <a href="/Religion" title="Religion">religion</a>, as well as philosopher. First to be widely associated with the term "pragmatism" due to Peirce's lifelong unpopularity.</li>
<li><a href="/John_Dewey" title="John Dewey">John Dewey</a> (1859–1952): prominent <a href="/Philosophy_of_education" title="Philosophy of education">philosopher of education</a>, referred to his brand of pragmatism as <a href="/Instrumentalism" title="Instrumentalism">instrumentalism</a>.</li>
<li><a href="/F.C.S._Schiller" title="F.C.S. Schiller" class="mw-redirect">F.C.S. Schiller</a> (1864–1937): one of the most important pragmatists of his time, Schiller is largely forgotten today.</li>
</ul>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><strong>Important protopragmatists or related thinkers</strong></div>
<ul>
<li><a href="/George_Herbert_Mead" title="George Herbert Mead">George Herbert Mead</a> (1863–1931): philosopher and sociological <a href="/Social_psychology" title="Social psychology">social psychologist</a>.</li>
<li><a href="/Ralph_Waldo_Emerson" title="Ralph Waldo Emerson">Ralph Waldo Emerson</a> (1803–1882): the American protopragmatist.</li>
<li><a href="/Josiah_Royce" title="Josiah Royce">Josiah Royce</a> (1855–1916): colleague of James who employed pragmatism in an idealist metaphysical framework, he was particularly interested in the philosophy of religion and community; his work is often associated with <a href="/Neo-Hegelianism" title="Neo-Hegelianism" class="mw-redirect">neo-Hegelianism</a>.</li>
<li><a href="/George_Santayana" title="George Santayana">George Santayana</a> (1863–1952): often not considered to be a canonical pragmatist, he applied pragmatist methodologies to <a href="/Naturalism_(philosophy)" title="Naturalism (philosophy)">naturalism (philosophy)</a>, exemplified in his early masterwork, <em><a href="/The_Life_of_Reason" title="The Life of Reason">The Life of Reason</a></em>.</li>
</ul>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><strong>Fringe figures</strong></div>
<ul>
<li><a href="/Giovanni_Papini" title="Giovanni Papini">Giovanni Papini</a> (1881–1956): Italian essayist, mostly known because James occasionally mentioned him.</li>
<li><a href="/Giovanni_Vailati" title="Giovanni Vailati">Giovanni Vailati</a> (1863–1909): Italian analytic and pragmatist philosopher.</li>
<li><a href="/Hu_Shi" title="Hu Shi" class="mw-redirect">Hu Shi</a> (1891–1962): Chinese intellectual and reformer, student and translator of Dewey's and advocate of pragmatism in China.</li>
<li><a href="/Reinhold_Niebuhr" title="Reinhold Niebuhr">Reinhold Niebuhr</a> (1892–1971): American Philosopher and Theologian, inserted Pragmatism into his theory of Christian Realism.</li>
</ul>
<h3><span class="mw-headline" id="wikipedia_Neoclassical_pragmatists__281950__29">Neoclassical pragmatists (1950-)</span></h3>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Neoclassical pragmatists stay closer to the project of the classical pragmatists than neopragmatists do.</div>
<ul>
<li><a href="/Sidney_Hook" title="Sidney Hook">Sidney Hook</a> (1902–1989): a prominent New York intellectual and philosopher, a student of Dewey at Columbia.</li>
<li><a href="/Isaac_Levi" title="Isaac Levi">Isaac Levi</a> (1930): seeks to apply pragmatist thinking in a decision-theoretic perspective.</li>
<li><a href="/Susan_Haack" title="Susan Haack">Susan Haack</a> (1945): teaches at the University of Miami, sometimes called the intellectual granddaughter of C.S. Peirce, known chiefly for <a href="/Foundherentism" title="Foundherentism">foundherentism</a>.</li>
<li><a href="/Larry_Hickman" title="Larry Hickman">Larry Hickman</a>: philosopher of technology and important Dewey scholar as head of the <a href="/Center_for_Dewey_Studies" title="Center for Dewey Studies">Center for Dewey Studies</a>.</li>
<li><a href="/David_Hildebrand" title="David Hildebrand" class="mw-redirect">David Hildebrand</a>: like other scholars of the classical pragmatists, Hildebrandt is dissatisfied with neopragmatism and argues for the continued importance of the writings of John Dewey.</li>
<li><a href="/Nicholas_Rescher" title="Nicholas Rescher">Nicholas Rescher</a></li>
</ul>
</td>
<td align="left" valign="top" style="padding-left:3em;">
<h3><span class="mw-headline" id="wikipedia_Analytical_2C_neo__and_other_pragmatists__281950__29">Analytical, neo- and other pragmatists (1950-)</span></h3>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">(Often labelled neopragmatism as well.)</div>
<a name="citable__145" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="145"><ul>
<li><a href="/W._V._Quine" title="W. V. Quine" class="mw-redirect">Willard van Orman Quine</a> (1908–2000): pragmatist philosopher, concerned with <a href="/Philosophy_of_language" title="Philosophy of language">language</a>, <a href="/Logic" title="Logic">logic</a>, and <a href="/Philosophy_of_mathematics" title="Philosophy of mathematics">philosophy of mathematics</a>.</li>
<li><a href="/Clarence_Irving_Lewis" title="Clarence Irving Lewis">Clarence Irving Lewis</a> (1883–1964).</li>
<li><a href="/Richard_Rorty" title="Richard Rorty">Richard Rorty</a> (1931–2007): famous author of <em><a href="/Philosophy_and_the_Mirror_of_Nature" title="Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature">Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature</a></em>.</li>
<li><a href="/Hilary_Putnam" title="Hilary Putnam">Hilary Putnam</a>: in many ways the opposite of Rorty and thinks classical pragmatism was too permissive a theory.</li>
<li><a href="/Stanley_Fish" title="Stanley Fish">Stanley Fish</a>: Literary and Legal Studies pragmatist.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="145"><a href="#citable__145"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Lewis, Clarence Irving, 1883-1964.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="145"><a href="#citable__145"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Richard Rorty: the Making of an American Philosopher, 1931-1982 .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>RICHARD RORTY</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.phillwebb.net/History/TwentiethCentury/Pragmatism/Rorty/Rorty.htm">www.phillwebb.net</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="145"><a href="#citable__145"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Milton has been invoked in religion, politics, and most recently in philosophy, specifically as an advocate of American pragmatism and its postmodern descendant, the neo-pragmatism routinely associated with Stanley Fish in the 1980s and 1990s.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__314" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="314">Criticizes Rorty's and Posner's legal theories as "almost pragmstism"<sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_31" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-31"><span>[</span>32<span>]</span></a></sup> and authored the afterword in the collection <em>The Revival of Pragmatism</em><sup id="wikipedia_cite_ref_32" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-32"><span>[</span>33<span>]</span></a></sup>.</li>
<li><a href="/Richard_Shusterman" title="Richard Shusterman">Richard Shusterman</a>: philosopher of art.</li>
<li><a href="/Mike_Sandbothe" title="Mike Sandbothe">Mike Sandbothe</a>: Applied Rorty's neopragmatism to media studies and developed a new branch that he called Media Philosophy.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="314"><a href="#citable__314"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>In order to enrich the picture of Quine's place in the pragmatist tradition, some neopragmatist criticisms of his ideas (e.g., by Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty) are also discussed.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="314"><a href="#citable__314"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Abstract The revival of philosophical pragmatism has generated a wealth of intramural debates between neopragmatists like Richard Rorty and contemporary scholars devoted to explicating the classical pragmatism of John Dewey and William James.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="314"><a href="#citable__314"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Revival of pragmatism: new essays on social thought, law, and culture.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
Together with authors like Juergen Habermas, Hans Joas, Sami Pihlstroem, Mats Bergmann, Michael Esfeld and Helmut Pape he belongs to a group of European Pragmatists who make use of Peirce, James, Dewey, Rorty, Brandom, Putnam and other representatives of American pragmatism in continental philosophy.</li>
<li><a href="/Stephen_Toulmin" title="Stephen Toulmin">Stephen Toulmin</a>: student of Wittgenstein, known especially for his <em>The Uses of Argument</em>.</li>
<li><a href="/John_Hawthorne" title="John Hawthorne">John Hawthorne</a>: Defends a pragmatist form of <a href="/Contextualism" title="Contextualism">contextualism</a> to deal with the <a href="/Lottery_paradox" title="Lottery paradox">lottery paradox</a> in his <em>Knowledge and Lotteries</em>.</li>
<li><a href="/Jason_Stanley" title="Jason Stanley">Jason Stanley</a>: Defends a pragmatist form of contextualism against semantic varieties of contextualism in his <em>Knowledge and Practical Interest</em>.</li>
<li><a href="/Arthur_Fine" title="Arthur Fine">Arthur Fine</a>: Philosopher of Science who proposed the Natural Ontological Attitude to the debate of <a href="/Scientific_realism" title="Scientific realism">scientific realism</a>.</li>
<li><a href="/Joseph_Margolis" title="Joseph Margolis">Joseph Margolis</a> still proudly defends the original Pragmatists and sees his recent work on Cultural Realism as extending and deepening their insights, especially the contribution of <a href="/Charles_Sanders_Peirce" title="Charles Sanders Peirce">Peirce</a> and <a href="/Dewey" title="Dewey">Dewey</a>, in the context of a rapprochement with Continental philosophy.</li>
</ul>
<h3><span class="mw-headline" id="wikipedia_Other_pragmatists">Other pragmatists</span></h3>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><strong>Legal pragmatists</strong></div>
<ul>
<li><a href="/Oliver_Wendell_Holmes,_Jr." title="Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.">Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.</a>: justice of the <a href="/Supreme_Court_of_the_United_States" title="Supreme Court of the United States">Supreme Court of the United States</a>.</li>
<li><a href="/Stephen_Breyer" title="Stephen Breyer">Stephen Breyer</a>: <a href="/U.S._Supreme_Court" title="U.S. Supreme Court" class="mw-redirect">U.S. Supreme Court</a> Associate Justice.</li>
<li><a href="/Richard_Posner" title="Richard Posner">Richard Posner</a>: Judge on <a href="/U.S._Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Seventh_Circuit" title="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit" class="mw-redirect">U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</a>.</li>
</ul>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><strong>Pragmatists in the extended sense</strong></div>
<ul>
<li><a href="/Cornel_West" title="Cornel West">Cornel West</a>: thinker on race, politics, and religion; operates under the sign of "prophetic pragmatism".</li>
<li><a href="/Wilfrid_Sellars" title="Wilfrid Sellars">Wilfrid Sellars</a>: broad thinker, attacked <a href="/Foundationalism" title="Foundationalism">foundationalism</a> in the analytic tradition.</li>
<li><a href="/Frank_P._Ramsey" title="Frank P. Ramsey">Frank P. Ramsey</a></li>
<li><a href="/Karl-Otto_Apel" title="Karl-Otto Apel">Karl-Otto Apel</a></li>
<li><a href="/Randolph_Bourne" title="Randolph Bourne">Randolph Bourne</a></li>
<li><a href="/Jurgen_Habermas" title="Jurgen Habermas" class="mw-redirect">Jurgen Habermas</a></li>
</ul>
</td>
</tr>
</table>
<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="wikipedia_Bibliography">Bibliography</span></h2>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><strong>IEP</strong> <a href="http://www.iep.utm.edu" class="external text" rel="nofollow">Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a> <strong>SEP</strong> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu" class="external text" rel="nofollow">Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a></div>
<ul>
<li>Elizabeth Anderson. <a name="citable__194" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="194"><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-moral/" class="external text" rel="nofollow"><em>Dewey's Moral Philosophy</em></a>.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="194"><a href="#citable__194"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>This method draws on the pragmatic philosophy of John Dewey and recommends an experimental approach to solving moral problems in clinical practice.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="194"><a href="#citable__194"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Abstract This paper presents a method of moral problem solving in clinical practice that is inspired by the philosophy of John Dewey.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__324" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="324">Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.</li>
<li>Douglas Browning, William T. Myers (Eds.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="324"><a href="#citable__324"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>F. Rossi-Landi, article on Vailati in Encyclopedia of Philosophy , ed.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="324"><a href="#citable__324"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Skillen, Anthony, 1996, “William James, ‘A Certain Blindness’ and an Uncertain Pluralism,” in Philosophy and Pluralism , ed.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/james/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="324"><a href="#citable__324"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>William James page from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.des.emory.edu/mfp/james.html">www.des.emory.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li><li> <em><c_title>William James</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.emory.edu/education/mfp/james.html">www.emory.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
) <em>Philosophers of Process.</em> 1998.</li>
<li>Robert Burch. <a name="citable__117" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="117"><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce/" class="external text" rel="nofollow"><em>Charles Sanders Peirce</em></a>.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="117"><a href="#citable__117"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914 -- Correspondence.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="117"><a href="#citable__117"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__190" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="190">Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.</li>
<li>John Dewey.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="190"><a href="#citable__190"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>William James (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Cite this entry .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/james/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="190"><a href="#citable__190"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Dissertation: John Deweys Early Philosophy: The Foundations of Instrumentalism .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>John Robert Shook</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://shook.pragmatism.org/vita.htm">shook.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="190"><a href="#citable__190"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>John Deweys Philosophie des ‚experience' in interaktionistisch-konstruktivistischer Interpretation.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
Donald F. Koch (ed.) <em>Lectures on Ethics 1900–1901.</em> 1991.</li>
<li>Daniel Dennett. <a href="http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/postmod.tru.htm" class="external text" rel="nofollow">Postmodernism and Truth</a>. <a name="citable__35" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="35">1998.</li>
<li>John Dewey.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="35"><a href="#citable__35"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Garrison, J. (1998): John Dewey's Philosophy as Education.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__17" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="17"><em>The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action.</em> 1929.</li>
<li>John Dewey.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="17"><a href="#citable__17"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>John Dewey and C. I. Lewis and their pragmatistic followers have criticized the "emotivist" view by showing how ideas, reflection, and knowledge of the consequences of actions modify emotional responses and behavior.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="17"><a href="#citable__17"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Although Dewey undoubtedly saw the aspects of selective interests and choices in all communities, he partly underestimates power relations and their dislocating effects on the construction of knowledge.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="17"><a href="#citable__17"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Russill, Chris (2006) For a Pragmatist Perspective on Publics: Advancing Careys Cultural Studies through John Dewey and Michel Foucault?</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Mike Sandbothe: Mats Bergman: The New Wave of Pragmatism in Communication Studies</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.sandbothe.net/648.98.html">www.sandbothe.net</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__175" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="175"><em>Three Independent Factors in Morals.</em> 1930.</li>
<li>John Dewey.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="175"><a href="#citable__175"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>This method draws on the pragmatic philosophy of John Dewey and recommends an experimental approach to solving moral problems in clinical practice.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="175"><a href="#citable__175"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Abstract This paper presents a method of moral problem solving in clinical practice that is inspired by the philosophy of John Dewey.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="175"><a href="#citable__175"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Dewey, John: moral philosophy .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a href="http://spartan.ac.brocku.ca/~lward/Dewey/Dewey_1910b/Dewey_1910_toc.html" class="external text" rel="nofollow"><em>The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays</em></a>. <a name="citable__222" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="222">1910.</li>
<li>John Dewey.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="222"><a href="#citable__222"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The most important of the ‘classical pragmatists’ were Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), William James (1842–1910) and John Dewey (1859-1952).</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="222"><a href="#citable__222"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>John Deweys Struggle with American Realism, 1904-1910. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society v.31 n.3 (Summer 1995): 542-566.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>John Robert Shook</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://shook.pragmatism.org/vita.htm">shook.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<em>Experience & Education.</em> 1938.</li>
<li>Cornelis De Waal. <em>On Pragmatism.</em> 2005.</li>
<li>Abraham Edel. <a href="http://www.crvp.org/book/Series01/I-11/chapter_i.htm" class="external text" rel="nofollow">Pragmatic Tests and Ethical Insights</a>. In: Ethics at the Crossroads: Normative Ethics and Objective Reason. George F. McLean, Richard Wollak (eds.) 1993.</li>
<li>Michael Eldridge. <a name="citable__372" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="372"><em>Transforming Experience: John Dewey's Cultural Instrumentalism.</em> 1998.</li>
<li>Richard Field.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="372"><a href="#citable__372"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Dissertation: John Deweys Early Philosophy: The Foundations of Instrumentalism .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>John Robert Shook</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://shook.pragmatism.org/vita.htm">shook.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="372"><a href="#citable__372"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>John Deweys Philosophie des ‚experience' in interaktionistisch-konstruktivistischer Interpretation.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="372"><a href="#citable__372"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Inquiry, Agency, and Art: John Dewey’s Contribution to Pragmatic Cosmopolitanism Leonard J. Waks Education and Culture , Volume 25, Number 2, 2009 , pp.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__34" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="34"><a href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/d/dewey.htm#H5" class="external text" rel="nofollow"><em>John Dewey (1859-1952)</em></a>.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="34"><a href="#citable__34"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Dewey, John, 1859-1952 -- Influence.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="34"><a href="#citable__34"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Dewey, John, 1859-1952.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.</li>
<li>David L. Hildebrand. <a name="citable__327" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="327"><em>Beyond Realism & Anti-Realism.</em> 2003.</li>
<li>David L. Hildebrand.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="327"><a href="#citable__327"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Beyond Realism and Anti-Realism : John Dewey and the Neopragmatists , Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="327"><a href="#citable__327"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Hildebrand, David L., 1964- Beyond realism and antirealism: John Dewey and the neopragmatists.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a href="http://davidhildebrand.org/articles/hildebrand_neopragmatist.pdf" class="external text" rel="nofollow"><em>The Neopragmatist Turn</em></a>. Southwest Philosophy Review Vol. 19, no. 1. January, 2003.</li>
<li>William James. <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/5116" class="external text" rel="nofollow"><em>Pragmatism, A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, Popular Lectures on Philosophy</em></a>. 1907.</li>
<li>William James <a href="http://falcon.jmu.edu/~omearawm/ph101willtobelieve.html" class="external text" rel="nofollow"><em>The Will to Believe</em></a>. 1896.</li>
<li>George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. <a name="citable__242" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="242"><em>Philosophy in the Flesh : The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought.</em> 1929.</li>
<li>Todd Lekan.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="242"><a href="#citable__242"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Philosophy History of Analytic Philosophy Critical Theory and Frankfurt School Friedrich Nietzsche Nineteenth-Century Continental Philosophy Embodied Mind and Cognition Neurophenomenology Pragmatism .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Academia.edu | People | People who have Pragmatism as a research interest (155)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.academia.edu/People?discipline_path=Pragmatism&discipline_path_id=Philosophy%2FPragmatism">www.academia.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__228" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="228"><em>Making Morality: Pragmatist Reconstruction in Ethical Theory.</em> 2003.</li>
<li>C.I. Lewis.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="228"><a href="#citable__228"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>In ethical theory, pragmatists will be either "emotivists" (following Wright, James, F. C. S. Schiller), or "cognitivists" (following Dewey, Mead, or C. I. Lewis).</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="228"><a href="#citable__228"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>We can begin with James's ‘radical empiricism’, of which he said that ‘the establishment of the pragmatist theory of truth [was] a step of first-rate importance in making [it] prevail’ (1909: 6f).</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__344" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="344"><em>Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge.</em> 1929.</li>
<li>Keya Maitra.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="344"><a href="#citable__344"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Mind and the World Order , New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<em>On Putnam.</em> 2003.</li>
<li>Joseph Margolis. <em>Historied Thought, Constructed World.</em> 1995.</li>
<li>Louis Menand. <a name="citable__374" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="374"><em>The Metaphysical Club.</em> 2001.</li>
<li>Hilary Putnam <em>Reason, Truth and History.</em> 1981.</li>
<li>W.V.O. Quine.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="374"><a href="#citable__374"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>For it, truth, reason and morality are the results of a becoming that includes the entire unfolding of human history.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="374"><a href="#citable__374"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Hilary Putnam denies that he is a pragmatist because he does not think that a pragmatist account of truth can be sustained.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="374"><a href="#citable__374"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>A fourth law student, John Fiske, who occasionally came to the Metaphysical Club, turned from law to history.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a href="http://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html" class="external text" rel="nofollow"><em>Two Dogmas of Empiricism</em></a>. Philosophical Review. January 1951.</li>
<li>W.V.O. Quine <em>Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.</em> 1969.</li>
<li>N. Rescher. <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/process-philosophy/" class="external text" rel="nofollow"><em>Process Philosophy</em></a>. <a name="citable__98" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="98">The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.</li>
<li>Richard Rorty <em>Rorty Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="98"><a href="#citable__98"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Bibliography of the Writings of Richard Rorty.” The Philosophy of Richard Rorty , ed.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>John Robert Shook</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://shook.pragmatism.org/vita.htm">shook.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="98"><a href="#citable__98"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Richard Rorty has described his philosophy as ‘pragmatist’ on a number of occasions.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="98"><a href="#citable__98"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Rorty, R. (1998): Truth and Progress.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
Volume 3.</em> 1998.</li>
<li>Stephen Toulmin. <em>The Uses of Argument.</em> 1958.</li>
<li>William Egginton/<a href="/Mike_Sandbothe" title="Mike Sandbothe">Mike Sandbothe</a> (Eds.) <a name="citable__85" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="85"><em>The Pragmatic Turn in Philosophy.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="85"><a href="#citable__85"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The Pragmatic Turn in Philosophy: Contemporary Engagements between Analytic and Continental Thought .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Mike Sandbothe: Mats Bergman: The New Wave of Pragmatism in Communication Studies</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.sandbothe.net/648.98.html">www.sandbothe.net</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="85"><a href="#citable__85"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The Pragmatic Turn in Philosophy: Contemporary Engagements Between Analytic and Continental Thought eds.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>interlanguage</c_title></em> <c_date>18 September 2009 14:12 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.gxnu.edu.cn/Personal/szliu/pragmatic_transfer.html">www.gxnu.edu.cn</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="85"><a href="#citable__85"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The Pragmatic Turn in Philosophy : Contemporary Engagements between Analytic and Continental thought .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>RICHARD RORTY</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.phillwebb.net/History/TwentiethCentury/Pragmatism/Rorty/Rorty.htm">www.phillwebb.net</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
Contemporary Engagement between Analytic and Continental Thought.</em> 2004.</li>
<li><a href="/Mike_Sandbothe" title="Mike Sandbothe">Mike Sandbothe</a>. <em>Pragmatic Media Philosophy.</em> 2005.</li>
</ul>
<h3><span class="mw-headline" id="wikipedia_Notes_and_other_sources">Notes and other sources</span></h3>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Papers and online encyclopedias are part of the bibliography. Other sources may include interviews, reviews and websites.</div>
<ul>
<li><a href="/Gary_A._Olson" title="Gary A. Olson">Gary A. Olson</a> and Stephen Toulmin. <em>Literary Theory, Philosophy of Science, and Persuasive Discourse: Thoughts from a Neo-premodernist.</em> Interview in <a href="http://jac.gsu.edu/jac/13.2/Articles/1.htm" class="external text" rel="nofollow">JAC 13.2</a>. 1993.</li>
<li>Susan Haack. <a href="http://www.newcriterion.com/archive/16/nov97/menand.htm" class="external text" rel="nofollow"><em>Vulgar Rortyism</em></a>. Review in The New Criterion. <a name="citable__61" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="61">November 1997.</li>
<li>Pietarinen, A.V. “Interdisciplinarity and Peirce's classification of the Sciences: A Centennial Reassessment," <em>Perspectives on Science</em>, 14(2), 127-152 (2006).</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="61"><a href="#citable__61"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Peirce's "Classification of the Sciences" was composed for his Lowell Institute Lectures in 1903.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
vvv</li>
</ul>
<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="wikipedia_See_also">See also</span></h2>
<ul>
<li><a href="/American_philosophy" title="American philosophy">American philosophy</a></li>
<li><a href="/Charles_Sanders_Peirce_bibliography" title="Charles Sanders Peirce bibliography">Charles Sanders Peirce bibliography</a></li>
<li><a href="/Instrumentalism" title="Instrumentalism">Instrumentalism</a></li>
<li><a href="/Pragmaticism" title="Pragmaticism">Pragmaticism</a></li>
<li><a href="/Pragmatic_maxim" title="Pragmatic maxim">Pragmatic maxim</a></li>
<li><a href="/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth" title="Pragmatic theory of truth">Pragmatic theory of truth</a></li>
<li><a href="/Scientific_method" title="Scientific method">Scientific method#Pragmatic model</a></li>
<li><a href="/Pragmatic_Buddhism" title="Pragmatic Buddhism">Pragmatic Buddhism</a></li>
</ul>
<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="wikipedia_Notes_and_references">Notes and references</span></h2>
<div class="references-small">
<ol class="references">
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_0"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-0">^</a></strong> Kasser, Jeff (1998), "Peirce's Supposed Psychologism" in <em>Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society</em>, v. 35, n. 3, summer 1999, pp. 501–527. Arisbe <a href="http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/kasser/psychol.htm" class="external text" rel="nofollow">Eprint</a>.</li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_1"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-1">^</a></strong> Peirce held that (philosophical) logic is a normative field, that pragmatism is a method developed in it, and that philosophy, though not deductive or so general as mathematics, still concerns positive phenomena in general, including phenomena of matter and mind, without depending on special experiences or experiments such as those of <a href="/Optics" title="Optics">optics</a> and <a href="/Experimental_psychology" title="Experimental psychology">experimental psychology</a>, in both of which Peirce was active. See quotes under "<a href="http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/philosophy.html" class="external text" rel="nofollow">Philosophy</a>" at the <em>Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms</em>. Peirce also harshly criticized the Cartesian approach of starting from hyperbolic doubts rather than from the combination of established beliefs and genuine doubts. See the opening of his 1868 "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities", <em>Journal of Speculative Philosophy</em> v. 2, n. 3, pp. 140–157. Reprinted <em>Collected Papers</em> v. 5, paragraphs 264–317, <em>Writings</em> v. 2, pp. 211–42, and <em>Essential Peirce</em> v. 1, pp. 28–55. <a href="http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/conseq/cn-frame.htm" class="external text" rel="nofollow">Eprint</a>.</li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_2"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-2">^</a></strong> Baert, P. (2004). Pragmatism as a philosophy of the social sciences. <em>European Journal of Social Theory</em>, 7(3), 355-369.</li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_3"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-3">^</a></strong> Biesta, G.J.J. & Burbules, N. (2003). <em>Pragmatism and educational research</em>. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.</li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_4"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-4">^</a></strong> Cornish, F. & Gillespie, A. (2009). <a href="http://gcal.academia.edu/FloraCornish/Papers/107681/A-pragmatist-approach-to-the-problem-of-knowledge-in-health-psychology" class="external text" rel="nofollow">A pragmatist approach to the problem of knowledge in health psychology</a> <em>Journal of Health Psychology</em>, 14(6), 1-10.</li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_5"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-5">^</a></strong> Shields, Patricia M. 2008. Rediscovering the Taproot: Is Classical Pragmatism the Route to Renew Public Administration? Public Administration Review 68(2) 205-221</li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_6"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-6">^</a></strong> Hildebrand, David L. 2008. Public Administration as Pragmatic, Democratic and Objective. Public Administration Review.68(2) 222-229</li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_7"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-7">^</a></strong> Shields, Patricia 2003. The community of Inquiry: Classical Pragmatism and Public Administration." Administration & Society 35(5): 510-538. <a href="http://aas.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/35/5/510" class="external text" rel="nofollow">abstract</a></li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_8"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-8">^</a></strong> Miller, Hugh. 2004. "Why Old Pragmatism Needs an Upgrade. Administration & Society 36(2), 234-249.</li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_9"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-9">^</a></strong> Stolcis, Gregory 2004. "A view from the Trenches: Comment on Miller's 'Why Old Pragmatism needs and upgrade" Administration & Society 36(3):326-369</li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_10"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-10">^</a></strong> Webb, James "Comment on Hugh T. Miller's 'Why old Pragmatism needs and upgrade' Administration & Society, 36(4) 479-495.</li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_11"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-11">^</a></strong> Hoch C. 2006. "What Can Rorty teach an old pragmatist doing public administration or planning? Administration & Society. 38(3):389-398.<a href="http://aas.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/38/3/389" class="external text" rel="nofollow">abstract</a></li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_12"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-12">^</a></strong> Evans, Karen. 2005. "Upgrade or a different animal altogether?: Why Old Pragmatism Better Informs Public Management and New Pragmatism Misses the Point." Administration & Society 37(2): 248-255</li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_13"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-13">^</a></strong> Snider, Keith. 2005. Rortyan PRagmatism: 'Where's the beef' for public administration." Administration & Society 37(2):243-247</li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_14"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-14">^</a></strong> Hildebrand, David. 2005. "Pragmatism, Neopragmatism and public administration." Administration & Society 37(3): 360-374. <a href="http://aas.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/3/345" class="external text" rel="nofollow">abstract</a></li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_15"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-15">^</a></strong> Hickman, Larry 2004. "On Hugh T. Miller on 'Why old pragmatism needs an upgrade." Administration & Society 36(4): 496-499.</li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_16"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-16">^</a></strong> Miller, Hugh 2005. "Residues of foundationalism in Classical Pragmatism. Administration & Society. 37(3):345-359.</li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_17"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-17">^</a></strong> Shields, Patricia. 2004. "Classical Pragmatism: Engaging practitioner experience." Administration & Society, 36(3): 351-361</li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_18"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-18">^</a></strong> Shields, Patricia. 2005. "Classical Pragmatism does not need an upgrade: Lessons for Public Administration. Administration & Society. 37(4):504-518. <a href="http://aas.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/4/504" class="external text" rel="nofollow">abstract</a></li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_19"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-19">^</a></strong> Perez, Shivaun, "Assessing Service Learning Using Pragmatic Principles of Education: A Texas Charter School Case Study" (2000). Applied Research Projects. Texas State University Paper 76. <a href="http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/76" class="external free" rel="nofollow">http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/76</a></li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_20"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-20">^</a></strong> Alexander, Jason Fields, "Contracting Through the Lens of Classical Pragmatism: An Exploration of Local Government Contracting" (2009). Applied Research Projects. Texas State University. Paper 288. <a href="http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/288" class="external free" rel="nofollow">http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/288</a></li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_21"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-21">^</a></strong> Bartle, John R. and Shields, Patricia M., "Applying Pragmatism to Public Budgeting and Financial Management" (2008). Faculty Publications-Political Science. Paper 48. <a href="http://ecommons.txstate.edu/polsfacp/48" class="external free" rel="nofollow">http://ecommons.txstate.edu/polsfacp/48</a></li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_22"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-22">^</a></strong> Wilson, Timothy L., "Pragmatism and Performance Measurement: An Exploration of Practices in Texas State Government" (2001). Applied Research Projects. Texas State University. Paper 71. <a href="http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/71" class="external free" rel="nofollow">http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/71</a></li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_23"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-23">^</a></strong> Howard-Watkins, Demetria C., "The Austin, Texas African-American Quality of Life Initiative as a Community of Inquiry: An Exploratory Study" (2006). Applied Research Projects. Texas State University. Paper 115. <a href="http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/115" class="external free" rel="nofollow">http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/115</a></li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_24"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-24">^</a></strong> Johnson, Timothy Lee, "The Downtown Austin Planning Process as a Community of Inquiry: An Exploratory Study" (2008). Applied Research Projects. Paper 276. <a href="http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/276" class="external free" rel="nofollow">http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/276</a>.</li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_25"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-25">^</a></strong> Seigfried, C.H. (2001). Feminist interpretations of John Dewey. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press; Seigfried, C.H. (1996). Pragmatism and feminism: Reweaving the social fabric. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press; Seigfried, C. H. (1992). Where are all the pragmatists feminists? Hypatia, 6, 8-21.</li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_26"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-26">^</a></strong> Duran, J. (2001). A holistically Deweyan feminism. Metaphilosophy, 32, 279-292. Duran, J. (1993). The intersection of pragmatism and feminism. Hypatia, 8</li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_27"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-27">^</a></strong> Keith, H. (1999). Feminism and pragmatism: George Herbert Mead’s ethics of care. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 35, 328-344.</li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_28"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-28">^</a></strong> Whipps, J. D. (2004). Jane Addams social thought as a model for a pragmatist-feminist communitarianism. Hypatia, 19, 118-113.</li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_29"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-29">^</a></strong> Seigfried, C.H. (1996). Pragmatism and feminism: Reweaving the social fabric. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. p. 21</li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_30"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-30">^</a></strong> <a href="http://www.hno.harvard.edu/gazette/2004/02.26/15-menand.html" class="external text" rel="nofollow">Harvard Gazette Feb 26 2004</a></li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_31"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-31">^</a></strong> in: Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech, Oxford University Press, 1994.</li>
<li id="wikipedia_cite_note_32"><strong><a href="#cite_ref-32">^</a></strong> Ed. Morris Dickstein, Duke University Press, 1998</li>
</ol>
</div>
<ul>
<li><a href="/James_Mark_Baldwin" title="James Mark Baldwin">Baldwin, James Mark</a> (ed., 1901–1905), <em><a href="/James_Mark_Baldwin" title="James Mark Baldwin">Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology</a></em>, 3 volumes in 4, Macmillan, New York, NY.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><a href="/John_Dewey" title="John Dewey">Dewey, John</a> (1900–1901), <em>Lectures on Ethics 1900–1901</em>, Donald F. Koch (ed.), <a name="citable__170" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="170">Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL, 1991.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Dewey, John (1910), <em>How We Think</em>, <a href="/D.C._Heath" title="D.C. Heath" class="mw-redirect">D.C. Heath</a>, Lexington, MA, 1910. Reprinted, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY, 1991.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Dewey, John (1929), <em>The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action</em>, Minton, Balch, and Company, New York, NY. Reprinted, pp. 1–254 in <em>John Dewey, The Later Works, 1925–1953, Volume 4: 1929</em>, Jo Ann Boydston (ed.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="170"><a href="#citable__170"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Produced by The Johns Hopkins University Press in collaboration with The Milton S. Eisenhower Library.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="170"><a href="#citable__170"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Dewey and Taoism: Teleology and Art Crispin Sartwell The Journal of Aesthetic Education , Volume 43, Number 1, Spring 2009 , pp.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="170"><a href="#citable__170"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Inquiry, Agency, and Art: John Dewey’s Contribution to Pragmatic Cosmopolitanism Leonard J. Waks Education and Culture , Volume 25, Number 2, 2009 , pp.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
), Harriet Furst Simon (text. ed.), <a href="/Stephen_Toulmin" title="Stephen Toulmin">Stephen Toulmin</a> (intro.), <a name="citable__418" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="418"><a href="/Southern_Illinois_University" title="Southern Illinois University">Southern Illinois University</a> Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL, 1984.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Dewey, John (1932), <em>Theory of the Moral Life</em>, Part 2 of John Dewey and James H. Tufts, <em>Ethics</em>, Henry Holt and Company, New York, NY, 1908. 2nd edition, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1932. Reprinted, Arnold Isenberg (ed.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="418"><a href="#citable__418"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>This method draws on the pragmatic philosophy of John Dewey and recommends an experimental approach to solving moral problems in clinical practice.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="418"><a href="#citable__418"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Abstract This paper presents a method of moral problem solving in clinical practice that is inspired by the philosophy of John Dewey.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="418"><a href="#citable__418"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Oppenheim, Frank M., 1925- Reverence for the relations of life: re-imagining pragmatism via Josiah Royce's interactions with Peirce, James, and Dewey.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
), Victor Kestenbaum (pref.), <a name="citable__2" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="2">Irvington Publishers, New York, NY, 1980.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Dewey, John (1938), <em>Logic: The Theory of Inquiry</em>, Henry Holt and Company, New York, NY, 1938. Reprinted, pp. 1–527 in <em>John Dewey, The Later Works, 1925–1953, Volume 12: 1938</em>, Jo Ann Boydston (ed.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="2"><a href="#citable__2"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>In fact, Dewey explicitly acknowledges his debt, and extols Peirce as the first writer on logic to make inquiry and its methods the primary and ultimate source of logical subject-matter (LW 12:17 [1938]).</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Mike Sandbothe: Mats Bergman: The New Wave of Pragmatism in Communication Studies</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.sandbothe.net/648.98.html">www.sandbothe.net</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="2"><a href="#citable__2"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Hence the need for a new Theory of Knowledge and a thorough reform of Logic.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="2"><a href="#citable__2"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Russill connects this to Deweys theory of inquiry; the aim is to discover or develop a rational course of action that enables agents to overcome obstacles in a democratic and pluralistic setting.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Mike Sandbothe: Mats Bergman: The New Wave of Pragmatism in Communication Studies</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.sandbothe.net/648.98.html">www.sandbothe.net</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
), Kathleen Poulos (text. ed.), <a href="/Ernest_Nagel" title="Ernest Nagel">Ernest Nagel</a> (intro.), <a name="citable__19" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="19"><a href="/Southern_Illinois_University" title="Southern Illinois University">Southern Illinois University</a> Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL, 1986.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><a href="/William_James" title="William James">James, William</a> (1902), "<a href="/Baldwin_Dictionary_Definition_of_Pragmatic_(1)_and_(2)_Pragmatism#wikisource" class="extiw" title="s:Baldwin Dictionary Definition of Pragmatic (1) and (2) Pragmatism">Pragmatic and Pragmatism</a>", 1 paragraph, vol.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="19"><a href="#citable__19"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Abstract With the centenary of the publication of William James's Pragmatism (1907) fast approaching, this paper explores two questions.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__179" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="179">2, pp. 321–322 in J.M. Baldwin (ed., 1901–1905), <em>Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology</em>, 3 volumes in 4, Macmillan, New York, NY. Reprinted, CP 5.2 in C.S. Peirce, <em>Collected Papers</em>.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>James, William (1907), <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/5116" class="external text" rel="nofollow"><em>Pragmatism, A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, Popular Lectures on Philosophy</em></a>, Longmans, Green, and Company, New York, NY.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>James, William (1909), <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/5117" class="external text" rel="nofollow"><em>The Meaning of Truth, A Sequel to 'Pragmatism</em></a>, Longmans, Green, and Company, New York, NY.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Lundin, Roger (2006) <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0742521745" class="external text" rel="nofollow"><em>From Nature to Experience: The American Search for Cultural Authority</em></a> Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><a href="/Charles_Sanders_Peirce" title="Charles Sanders Peirce">Peirce, C.S.</a>, <em><a href="/Charles_Sanders_Peirce_bibliography" title="Charles Sanders Peirce bibliography">Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce</a></em>, vols.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="179"><a href="#citable__179"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>His aim is both to defend a particular view of pragmatism originating with the work of Charles Sanders Peirce and, at the same time, argue in favour of a new view of deliberative democracy developed from Talisse’s Peircean pragmatism.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="179"><a href="#citable__179"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The Journal of Speculative Philosophy , Volume 16, Number 1, 2002 (New Series) , pp.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="179"><a href="#citable__179"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Good Questions and Bad Answers in Talisse’s A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy Colin Koopman Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy , Volume 45, Number 1, Winter 2009 , pp.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
1–6, <a href="/Charles_Hartshorne" title="Charles Hartshorne">Charles Hartshorne</a> and <a href="/Paul_Weiss_(philosopher)" title="Paul Weiss (philosopher)">Paul Weiss</a> (eds.), vols. 7–8, <a href="/Arthur_W._Burks" title="Arthur W. Burks" class="mw-redirect">Arthur W. Burks</a> (ed.), <a name="citable__151" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="151">Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1931–1935, 1958. Cited as CP vol.para.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Peirce, C.S., <em><a href="/Charles_Sanders_Peirce_bibliography" title="Charles Sanders Peirce bibliography">The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings</a>, Volume 1 (1867–1893)</em>, Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel (eds.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="151"><a href="#citable__151"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Cambridge University Press, 1983.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="151"><a href="#citable__151"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Philosophical writings of Peirce .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Umwelt-theory</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://home.comcast.net/%7Esharov/biosem/txt/umwelt.html">home.comcast.net</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="151"><a href="#citable__151"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press ––– 2004.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
), <a name="citable__156" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="156">Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, 1992.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Peirce, C.S., <em>The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2 (1893–1913)</em>, Peirce Edition Project (eds.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="156"><a href="#citable__156"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Southern Illinois University Press has been publishing a definitive edition of Dewey's works.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="156"><a href="#citable__156"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Philosophical writings of Peirce .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Umwelt-theory</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://home.comcast.net/%7Esharov/biosem/txt/umwelt.html">home.comcast.net</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="156"><a href="#citable__156"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Transactions of the Peirce Society is a quarterly edited and published by University of Massachusetts Press and contains a supplementary list of Peirce's unpublished papers as well as articles on his philosophy.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
), <a name="citable__356" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="356">Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, 1998.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><a href="/Hilary_Putnam" title="Hilary Putnam">Putnam, Hilary</a> (1994), <em>Words and Life</em>, James Conant (ed.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="356"><a href="#citable__356"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The Cambridge Companion to William James , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="356"><a href="#citable__356"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Gerald Myers's William James: His Life and Thought just out, Yale University Press.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>William James</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.des.emory.edu/mfp/james.html">www.des.emory.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li><li> <em><c_title>William James</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.emory.edu/education/mfp/james.html">www.emory.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="356"><a href="#citable__356"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Logical Principles and Philosophical Attitudes: Peirce's Response to James' Pragmatism’ in Putnam R.A. (ed), 145-165.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
), <a name="citable__220" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="220">Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><a href="/W.V._Quine" title="W.V. Quine" class="mw-redirect">Quine, W.V.</a> (1951), "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", <em>Philosophical Review</em> (January 1951).</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="220"><a href="#citable__220"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Cambridge, MA (MIT Press).</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="220"><a href="#citable__220"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Cambridge and New York (Cambridge University Press).</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="220"><a href="#citable__220"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Cambridge MA. (Cambridge University Press).</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
Reprinted, pp. 20–46 in W.V. Quine, <em>From a Logical Point of View</em>, 1980.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Quine, W.V. (1980), <em>From a Logical Point of View, Logico-Philosophical Essays</em>, 2nd edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1980.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><a href="/Frank_Plumpton_Ramsey" title="Frank Plumpton Ramsey" class="mw-redirect">Ramsey, F.P.</a> (1927), "Facts and Propositions", <em>Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7</em>, 153–170. Reprinted, pp. 34–51 in F.P. Ramsey, <em>Philosophical Papers</em>, David Hugh Mellor (ed.), <a name="citable__200" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="200">Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1990.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Ramsey, F.P. (1990), <em>Philosophical Papers</em>, David Hugh Mellor (ed.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="200"><a href="#citable__200"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Cambridge University Press, 1983.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="200"><a href="#citable__200"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Transactions of the Peirce Society is a quarterly edited and published by University of Massachusetts Press and contains a supplementary list of Peirce's unpublished papers as well as articles on his philosophy.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="200"><a href="#citable__200"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>David G. Schultenover (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2009), pp.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>John Robert Shook</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://shook.pragmatism.org/vita.htm">shook.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.</li>
</ul>
<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="wikipedia_Further_reading">Further reading</span></h2>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__23" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="23"><strong>Important introductory primary texts</strong><br />
Note that this is an <em>introductory</em> list: some important works are left out and some less monumental works that are excellent introductions are included.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="23"><a href="#citable__23"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>They are interested in what works, not involving some ideology either on the left or the right, with perhaps some limited exceptions.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Transcript of an IMF Book Forum -- Pragmatisn: Latin America's New 'Ism'?</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2006/tr060523.htm">www.imf.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="23"><a href="#citable__23"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>So far, however, my description of pragmatism has left an important distinction out of account.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Richard Rorty's Platonists, Positivists, and Pragmatists</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<ul>
<li>C.S. Peirce, <a href="/The_Fixation_of_Belief#wikisource" class="extiw" title="s:The Fixation of Belief">The Fixation of Belief</a> (paper)</li>
<li>C.S. Peirce, <a href="/How_to_Make_Our_Ideas_Clear#wikisource" class="extiw" title="s:How to Make Our Ideas Clear">How to Make Our Ideas Clear</a> (paper)</li>
<li>C.S. Peirce, A Definition of Pragmatism (paper)</li>
<li>William James, Pragmatism (especially lectures I, II and VI)</li>
<li>John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy</li>
<li>John Dewey, Three Independent factors in Morals (paper)</li>
<li>John Dewey, <a href="http://spartan.ac.brocku.ca/~lward/Dewey/Dewey_1910b/Dewey_1910_06.html" class="external text" rel="nofollow">A short catechism concerning truth</a> (chapter)</li>
<li>W.V.O. Quine, Three Dogmas of Empiricism (paper)</li>
</ul>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><strong>Secondary texts</strong></div>
<a name="citable__203" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="203"><ul>
<li>Cornelis De Waal, <em>On Pragmatism</em></li>
<li>Louis Menand, <em>The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America</em></li>
<li>Hilary Putnam, <em>Pragmatism: An Open Question</em></li>
<li>Abraham Edel, <a href="http://www.crvp.org/book/Series01/I-11/chapter_i.htm" class="external text" rel="nofollow"><em>Pragmatic Tests and Ethical Insights</em></a></li>
<li>D. S. Clarke, <em>Rational Acceptance and Purpose</em></li>
<li>Haack, Susan & Lane, Robert, Eds.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="203"><a href="#citable__203"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>In order to enrich the picture of Quine's place in the pragmatist tradition, some neopragmatist criticisms of his ideas (e.g., by Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty) are also discussed.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="203"><a href="#citable__203"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Lane, Robert (Robert Edwin) Pragmatism.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="203"><a href="#citable__203"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>A History of Philosophy in America, 1720-2000, and: Native Pragmatism: Rethinking the Roots of American Philosophy (review) Mackey, Louis.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
(2006). <a name="citable__53" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="53"><em>Pragmatism Old and New: Selected Writings</em>.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="53"><a href="#citable__53"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Pragmatism: A New Name for some Old Ways of Thinking , Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1975.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="53"><a href="#citable__53"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The next section explores some of the "old ways of thinking" for which "pragmatism is only a new name," as James put it.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="53"><a href="#citable__53"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Pragmatism, Old and New Amherst NY: Prometheus Menand, L. (ed) 1998.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
New York: Prometheus Books.</li>
<li>Louis Menand, ed., <em>Pragmatism: A Reader</em> (includes essays by Peirce, James, Dewey, Rorty, others)</li>
</ul>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><strong>Journals</strong><br />
There are several peer-reviewed journals dedicated to pragmatism, for example</div>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.peircesociety.org/transactions.html" class="external text" rel="nofollow">Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society</a></li>
<li><a href="/Contemporary_Pragmatism" title="Contemporary Pragmatism">Contemporary Pragmatism</a></li>
<li><a href="http://williamjamesstudies.press.uiuc.edu/" class="external text" rel="nofollow">William James Studies</a></li>
<li><a href="http://lnx.journalofpragmatism.eu/" class="external text" rel="nofollow">European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy</a></li>
</ul>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><strong>Online resources</strong></div>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.pragmatism.org" class="external text" rel="nofollow">Pragmatism Cybrary</a></li>
<li><a href="http://neopragmatism.org" class="external text" rel="nofollow">Neopragmatism.org</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.nordprag.org/" class="external text" rel="nofollow">Nordic Pragmatism Network</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.pragmatisme.nl/" class="external text" rel="nofollow">Dutch Pragmatism Foundation</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.associazionepragma.com/" class="external text" rel="nofollow">Associazione Culturale Pragma (Italy)</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.cspeirce.org/" class="external text" rel="nofollow">Arisbe: The Peirce Gateway</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.peirce.org/" class="external text" rel="nofollow">Charles S. Peirce Studies</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/history/inourtime/inourtime_20051117.shtml" class="external text" rel="nofollow">BBC Radio 4's In Our Time programme on Pragmatism</a> (requires <a href="/RealAudio" title="RealAudio">RealAudio</a>)</li>
<li><a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GlrEbffVVjM" class="external text" rel="nofollow">A short film about the pragmatist revival</a></li>
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href="/Psychoanalysis" title="Psychoanalysis">Psychoanalysis</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Solipsism" title="Solipsism">Solipsism</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Philosophical_realism" title="Philosophical realism">Realism</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Relativism" title="Relativism">Relativism</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Scholasticism" title="Scholasticism">Scholasticism</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Philosophical_skepticism" title="Philosophical skepticism">Skepticism</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Stoicism" title="Stoicism">Stoicism</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Structuralism" title="Structuralism">Structuralism</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a 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<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a href="/Philosophical_logic" title="Philosophical logic">Philosophical logic</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Philosophy_of_language" title="Philosophy of language">Philosophy of language</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Philosophy_of_science" title="Philosophy of science">Philosophy of science</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Ordinary_language_philosophy" title="Ordinary language philosophy">Ordinary language philosophy</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <strong><a href="/Index_of_analytic_philosophy_articles" title="Index of analytic philosophy articles">more...</a></strong></div>
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<td class="navbox-group" style=";background-color:#fff;;">Concepts in Analytic philosophy</td>
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<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a href="/Analysis" title="Analysis">Analysis</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Analytic-synthetic_distinction" title="Analytic-synthetic distinction">Analytic-synthetic distinction</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Denotation" title="Denotation">Denotation</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Definite_description" title="Definite description">Definite description</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Description" title="Description">Description</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Meaning_(linguistics)" title="Meaning (linguistics)">Meaning</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Sense_data" title="Sense data">Sense data</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Sense_and_Reference" title="Sense and Reference" class="mw-redirect">Sense and Reference</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Paradox_of_analysis" title="Paradox of analysis">Paradox of analysis</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Postanalytic_philosophy" title="Postanalytic philosophy">Postanalytic philosophy</a></div>
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<td class="navbox-group" style=";background-color:#fff;;"><a href="/Category:Philosophical_theories" title="Category:Philosophical theories">Theories in Analytic philosophy</a></td>
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<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a href="/Direct_reference_theory" title="Direct reference theory">Direct reference theory</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Empiricism" title="Empiricism">Empiricism</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Holism" title="Holism">Holism</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Logical_atomism" title="Logical atomism">Logical atomism</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Logical_positivism" title="Logical positivism">Logical positivism</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Naturalism_(philosophy)" title="Naturalism (philosophy)">Naturalism</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Naturalized_epistemology" title="Naturalized epistemology">Naturalized epistemology</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Neutral_monism" title="Neutral monism">Neutral monism</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Moral_particularism" title="Moral particularism">Particularism</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <strong class="selflink">Pragmatism</strong><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Reductionism" title="Reductionism">Reductionism</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Scientism" title="Scientism">Scientism</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> Sense data theory<span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Skepticism" title="Skepticism">Skepticism</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Verificationism" title="Verificationism">Verificationism</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <strong><a href="/Analytic_philosophy" title="Analytic philosophy">more...</a></strong></div>
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<td class="navbox-group" style=";background-color:#fff;;"><a href="/Category:Analytic_philosophers" title="Category:Analytic philosophers">Analytic philosophers</a></td>
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<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a href="/J._L._Austin" title="J. L. Austin">J. L. Austin</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Alfred_Jules_Ayer" title="Alfred Jules Ayer">Alfred Ayer</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Berlin_Circle" title="Berlin Circle">Berlin Circle</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/G._E._M._Anscombe" title="G. E. M. Anscombe">G. E. M. Anscombe</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/C._D._Broad" title="C. D. Broad">C. D. Broad</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Rudolf_Carnap" title="Rudolf Carnap">Rudolf Carnap</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Patricia_Churchland" title="Patricia Churchland">Patricia Churchland</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Daniel_Dennett" title="Daniel Dennett">Daniel Dennett</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Michael_Dummett" title="Michael Dummett">Michael Dummett</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Gottlob_Frege" title="Gottlob Frege">Gottlob Frege</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Paul_Grice" title="Paul Grice">Paul Grice</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Saul_Kripke" title="Saul Kripke">Saul Kripke</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Carl_Gustav_Hempel" title="Carl Gustav Hempel">Carl Hempel</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/G._E._Moore" title="G. E. Moore">G. E. Moore</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Hilary_Putnam" title="Hilary Putnam">Hilary Putnam</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Willard_Van_Orman_Quine" title="Willard Van Orman Quine">W.V.O. Quine</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Bertrand_Russell" title="Bertrand Russell">Bertrand Russell</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Gilbert_Ryle" title="Gilbert Ryle">Gilbert Ryle</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Peter_Strawson" title="Peter Strawson" class="mw-redirect">Peter Strawson</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <strong><a href="/Vienna_Circle" title="Vienna Circle">Vienna Circle</a></strong><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span></div>
<a href="/John_Wisdom" title="John Wisdom">John Wisdom</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Ludwig_Wittgenstein" title="Ludwig Wittgenstein">Ludwig Wittgenstein</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <strong>more ...</strong></div>
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<div><span style="white-space:nowrap">Portal <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Category:Analytic_philosophy" title="Category:Analytic philosophy">Category</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap">Task Force <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Category:Philosophy_stubs" title="Category:Philosophy stubs">Stubs</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap">Discussion</span></div>
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<div style="padding:0em 0.25em"><strong><a href="/Metaphysics" title="Metaphysics">Metaphysics</a></strong><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Philosophy_of_artificial_intelligence" title="Philosophy of artificial intelligence">Philosophy of artificial intelligence</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Philosophy_of_information" title="Philosophy of information">Philosophy of information</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Philosophy_of_perception" title="Philosophy of perception">Philosophy of perception</a></div>
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<td class="navbox-group" style=";background:#fffacd;;">Concepts in mind</td>
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<div style="padding:0em 0.25em"><a href="/Abstract_object" title="Abstract object">Abstract object</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Artificial_intelligence" title="Artificial intelligence">Artificial intelligence</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Chinese_room" title="Chinese room">Chinese room</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Cognition" title="Cognition">Cognition</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Concept" title="Concept">Concept</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Concept_and_object" title="Concept and object">Concept and object</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <strong><a href="/Consciousness" title="Consciousness">Consciousness</a></strong><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Idea" title="Idea">Idea</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Identity_(philosophy)" title="Identity (philosophy)">Identity</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Ingenuity" title="Ingenuity">Ingenuity</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <strong><a href="/Intelligence" title="Intelligence">Intelligence</a></strong><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Intentionality" title="Intentionality">Intentionality</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Introspection" title="Introspection">Introspection</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Intuition_(knowledge)" title="Intuition (knowledge)">Intuition</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Language_of_thought" title="Language of thought">Language of thought</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Materialism" title="Materialism">Materialism</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Mental_event" title="Mental event">Mental event</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Mental_image" title="Mental image">Mental image</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Mental_process" title="Mental process">Mental process</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Mental_property" title="Mental property">Mental property</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Mental_representation" title="Mental representation">Mental representation</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Mind" title="Mind">Mind</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <strong><a href="/Mind-body_dichotomy" title="Mind-body dichotomy" class="mw-redirect">Mind-body dichotomy</a></strong><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Pain_(philosophy)" title="Pain (philosophy)">Pain</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Problem_of_other_minds" title="Problem of other minds">Problem of other minds</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Propositional_attitude" title="Propositional attitude">Propositional attitude</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <strong><a href="/Qualia" title="Qualia">Qualia</a></strong><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Self_(philosophy)" title="Self (philosophy)">Self</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Tabula_rasa" title="Tabula rasa">Tabula rasa</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <a href="/Understanding" title="Understanding">Understanding</a><span style="font-weight:bold;"> ·</span> <strong><a href="/Index_of_philosophy_of_mind_articles" title="Index of philosophy of mind articles">more…</a></strong></div>
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<td class="navbox-group" style=";background:#fffacd;;">Theories of mind</td>
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<div style="padding:0em 0.25em"><a href="/Behaviourism" title="Behaviourism" class="mw-redirect">Behaviourism</a> <strong>·</strong> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Biological_naturalism" title="Biological naturalism">Biological naturalism</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><strong><a href="/Dualism_(philosophy_of_mind)" title="Dualism (philosophy of mind)">Dualism</a></strong> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Eliminative_materialism" title="Eliminative materialism">Eliminative materialism</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Emergent_materialism" title="Emergent materialism">Emergent materialism</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Epiphenomenalism" title="Epiphenomenalism">Epiphenomenalism</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind)" title="Functionalism (philosophy of mind)">Functionalism</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Identity_theory" title="Identity theory" class="mw-redirect">Identity theory</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Interactionism_(philosophy_of_mind)" title="Interactionism (philosophy of mind)">Interactionism</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Materialism" title="Materialism">Materialism</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Mind-body_problem" title="Mind-body problem" class="mw-redirect">Mind-body problem</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><strong><a href="/Monism" title="Monism">Monism</a></strong> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Na%C3%AFve_realism" title="Naïve realism">Naïve realism</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Neutral_monism" title="Neutral monism">Neutral monism</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Phenomenalism" title="Phenomenalism">Phenomenalism</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Phenomenology_(philosophy)" title="Phenomenology (philosophy)">Phenomenology</a> <small><em>(<a href="/Existential_phenomenology" title="Existential phenomenology">Existential phenomenology</a>)</em></small> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Physicalism" title="Physicalism">Physicalism</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><strong class="selflink">Pragmatism</strong> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Property_dualism" title="Property dualism">Property dualism</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Representational_theory_of_mind" title="Representational theory of mind">Representational theory of mind</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Solipsism" title="Solipsism">Solipsism</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Substance_dualism" title="Substance dualism" class="mw-redirect">Substance dualism</a> <strong>·</strong></span> <span style="white-space:nowrap"><a href="/Type_physicalism" title="Type physicalism">Type physicalism</a></span></div>
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<td class="navbox-group" style=";background:#fffacd;;"><a href="/Category:Philosophers_of_mind" title="Category:Philosophers of mind">Philosophers of mind</a></td>
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<div class="section-delimeter"></div>
<div class="section" id="wikiquote">
<h1 class="section-title">
<a name="wikiquote">Quotes</a>
</h1>
<span class="core-uptodate">Up to date as of January 14, 2010</span>
<div class="fragment">
<div id="citable_wikis_fragments">
<div id="wikiquote_bodyContent">
<h3 id="wikiquote_siteSub">From Wikiquote</h3>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a href="/Pragmatism#wikipedia" class="extiw"
title="wikipedia:Pragmatism">wikipedia:Pragmatism</a>.</div>
<a name="citable__256" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="256"><ul>
<li>"Nature to be commanded must be obeyed" <a
href="/Francis_Bacon" title="Francis Bacon">Francis Bacon</a>
<ul>
<li><a
href="http://rebirthofreason.com/Articles/Schieder/Our_Capacity_To_Think.shtml"
class="external text" rel="nofollow">Source</a></li>
<li>Also sometimes written as "Reality to be conquered must be
obeyed".</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="/If_the_mountain_won%27t_come_to_Muhammad#wikipedia"
class="extiw"
title="wikipedia:If the mountain won't come to Muhammad">If the
mountain won't come to Muhammad, Muhammad will go to the
mountain</a>.</li>
<li>"Good Poets Borrow.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="256"><a href="#citable__256"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Whether the mind was reflecting on its own internal ideas, or whether it was undergoing impressions which it supposed to come from an external source, all that was really happening was a succession of detached sensations.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__219" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="219">Great Poets Steal"
<ul>
<li><a
href="http://nancyprager.wordpress.com/2007/05/08/good-poets-borrow-great-poets-steal-not/"
class="external text" rel="nofollow">Source</a></li>
<li>This statement has been applied to other fields of creative
activity, including <a href="/Philosophy#wikipedia" class="extiw"
title="wikipedia:Philosophy">wikipedia:Philosophy</a> and <a
href="/Software_development#wikipedia" class="extiw"
title="wikipedia:Software development">wikipedia:Software
development</a>.</li>
<li>Corollaries:
<ul>
<li>"Good programmers write.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="219"><a href="#citable__219"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>"Creative activity is our great need; but criticism, self-criticism, is the road to its release."</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="219"><a href="#citable__219"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Pass The Tax Credits We desperately need the renewable energy tax credits if we are to continue to develop solar, wind, geothermal and other alternate energy sources.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title> Apollo Feedback: On Energy Pragmatism: Yes, No, But : Apollo Alliance</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://apolloalliance.org/feedback/apollo-feedback-on-energy-pragmatism-yes-no-but/">apolloalliance.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="219"><a href="#citable__219"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>They have a core question, and a core answer and the philosophy that worked to answer that question is then applied to all other questions throughout society regardless to the ends.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Obama and Pragmatism: Thinking Through Values | Robert Reich's Blog</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/robert_reich/2009/05/obama-and-pragmatism-thinking.php">tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__298" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="298">Great Reuse"</li>
<li><a
href="http://catb.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/cathedral-bazaar/ar01s02.html"
class="external text" rel="nofollow">Source</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>"The gods help them that help themselves" <a href="/Aesop"
title="Aesop">Aesop</a>
<ul>
<li>from "Hercules and the Wagoner"</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>"The reasonable man adapts himself to the world: the
unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="298"><a href="#citable__298"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>For ideas do not function in a void; they have to work in a world of fact, and to adapt themselves to all facts, though they may succeed in transforming them in the end.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="298"><a href="#citable__298"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Man cannot at one and the same time be both entirely within himself and entirely outside himself.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man."
<ul>
<li><a href="/George_Bernard_Shaw"
title="George Bernard Shaw">George Bernard Shaw</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>"In Rome, act like a Roman".
<ul>
<li>Common proverb.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
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<td class="header_title"><strong><span id="wikisource_header_title_text">Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of
Thinking</span></strong><br />
<em>by <a href="/Author:William_James"
title="Author:William James"><span id="wikisource_header_author_text">William
James</span></a></em></td>
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<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">To the Memory of John Stuart Mill from whom I first learned the
pragmatic openness of mind and whom my fancy likes to picture as
our leader were he alive to-day.</div>
<table id="wikisource_toc" class="toc">
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<td>
<div id="wikisource_toctitle">
<h2>Contents</h2>
</div>
<ul>
<li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-1"><a href="#Preface"><span
class="tocnumber">1</span> <span
class="toctext">Preface</span></a></li>
<li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-2"><a
href="#Lecture_I:_The_Present_Dilemma_in_Philosophy"><span
class="tocnumber">2</span> <span class="toctext">Lecture I: The
Present Dilemma in Philosophy</span></a></li>
<li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-3"><a
href="#Lecture_II:_What_Pragmatism_Means"><span
class="tocnumber">3</span> <span class="toctext">Lecture II: What
Pragmatism Means</span></a></li>
<li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-4"><a
href="#Lecture_III:_Some_Metaphysical_Problems_Pragmatically_Considered">
<span class="tocnumber">4</span> <span class="toctext">Lecture III:
Some Metaphysical Problems Pragmatically Considered</span></a></li>
<li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-5"><a
href="#Lecture_IV:_The_One_and_the_Many"><span
class="tocnumber">5</span> <span class="toctext">Lecture IV: The
One and the Many</span></a></li>
<li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-6"><a
href="#Lecture_V:_Pragmatism_and_Common_Sense"><span
class="tocnumber">6</span> <span class="toctext">Lecture V:
Pragmatism and Common Sense</span></a></li>
<li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-7"><a
href="#Lecture_VI:_Pragmatism.27s_Conception_of_Truth"><span
class="tocnumber">7</span> <span class="toctext">Lecture VI:
Pragmatism's Conception of Truth</span></a></li>
<li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-8"><a
href="#Lecture_VII:_Pragmatism_and_Humanism"><span
class="tocnumber">8</span> <span class="toctext">Lecture VII:
Pragmatism and Humanism</span></a></li>
<li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-9"><a
href="#Lecture_VIII:_Pragmatism_and_Religion"><span
class="tocnumber">9</span> <span class="toctext">Lecture VIII:
Pragmatism and Religion</span></a></li>
</ul>
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</table>
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<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="wikisource_Preface">Preface</span></h2>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The lectures that follow were delivered at the Lowell Institute
in Boston in November and December, 1906, and in January, 1907, at
Columbia University, in New York. They are printed as delivered,
without developments or notes. The pragmatic movement, so-called--I
do not like the name, but apparently it is too late to change it--
seems to have rather suddenly precipitated itself out of the air. A
number of tendencies that have always existed in philosophy have
all at once become conscious of themselves collectively, and of
their combined mission; and this has occurred in so many countries,
and from so many different points of view, that much unconcerted
statement has resulted. I have sought to unify the picture as it
presents itself to my own eyes, dealing in broad strokes, and
avoiding minute controversy. Much futile controversy might have
been avoided, I believe, if our critics had been willing to wait
until we got our message fairly out.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">If my lectures interest any reader in the general subject, he
will doubtless wish to read farther. I therefore give him a few
references.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">In America, John Dewey's 'Studies in Logical Theory' are the
foundation. Read also by Dewey the articles in <em><a
href="/The_Philosophical_Review"
title="The Philosophical Review">The Philosophical Review</a></em>,
vol. xv, pp. 113 and 465, in <em><a href="/Mind_(journal)"
title="Mind (journal)">Mind</a></em>, vol. xv, p. 293, and in
<em><a href="/The_Journal_of_Philosophy"
title="The Journal of Philosophy">The Journal of
Philosophy</a></em>, vol. iv, p. 197.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Probably the best statements to begin with however, are <a
href="/Author:Ferdinand_Canning_Scott_Schiller"
title="Author:Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller">F. C. S.
Schiller</a>'s in his 'Studies in Humanism,' especially the essays
numbered i, v, vi, vii, xviii and xix. His previous essays and in
general the polemic literature of the subject are fully referred to
in his footnotes.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Furthermore, see G. Milhaud: le Rationnel, 1898, and the fine
articles by Le Roy in the Revue de Metaphysique, vols. 7, 8 and 9.
Also articles by Blondel and de Sailly in the Annales de
Philosophie Chretienne, 4me Serie, vols. 2 and 3. Papini announces
a book on Pragmatism, in the French language, to be published very
soon.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">To avoid one misunderstanding at least, let me say that there is
no logical connexion between pragmatism, as I understand it, and a
doctrine which I have recently set forth as 'radical empiricism.'
The latter stands on its own feet. One may entirely reject it and
still be a pragmatist.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Harvard University, April, 1907.</div>
<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="wikisource_Lecture_I:_The_Present_Dilemma_in_Philosophy">Lecture I: The
Present Dilemma in Philosophy</span></h2>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">In the preface to that admirable collection of essays of his
called 'Heretics,' Mr. Chesterton writes these words: "There are
some people--and I am one of them--who think that the most
practical and important thing about a man is still his view of the
universe. We think that for a landlady considering a lodger, it is
important to know his income, but still more important to know his
philosophy. We think that for a general about to fight an enemy, it
is important to know the enemy's numbers, but still more important
to know the enemy's philosophy. We think the question is not
whether the theory of the cosmos affects matters, but whether, in
the long run, anything else affects them."</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">I think with Mr. Chesterton in this matter. I know that you,
ladies and gentlemen, have a philosophy, each and all of you, and
that the most interesting and important thing about you is the way
in which it determines the perspective in your several worlds. You
know the same of me. And yet I confess to a certain tremor at the
audacity of the enterprise which I am about to begin. For the
philosophy which is so important in each of us is not a technical
matter; it is our more or less dumb sense of what life honestly and
deeply means. It is only partly got from books; it is our
individual way of just seeing and feeling the total push and
pressure of the cosmos. I have no right to assume that many of you
are students of the cosmos in the class-room sense, yet here I
stand desirous of interesting you in a philosophy which to no small
extent has to be technically treated. I wish to fill you with
sympathy with a contemporaneous tendency in which I profoundly
believe, and yet I have to talk like a professor to you who are not
students. Whatever universe a professor believes in must at any
rate be a universe that lends itself to lengthy discourse. A
universe definable in two sentences is something for which the
professorial intellect has no use. No faith in anything of that
cheap kind! I have heard friends and colleagues try to popularize
philosophy in this very hall, but they soon grew dry, and then
technical, and the results were only partially encouraging. So my
enterprise is a bold one. The founder of pragmatism himself
recently gave a course of lectures at the Lowell Institute with
that very word in its title-flashes of brilliant light relieved
against Cimmerian darkness! None of us, I fancy, understood ALL
that he said--yet here I stand, making a very similar venture.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">I risk it because the very lectures I speak of DREW--they
brought good audiences. There is, it must be confessed, a curious
fascination in hearing deep things talked about, even tho neither
we nor the disputants understand them. We get the problematic
thrill, we feel the presence of the vastness. Let a controversy
begin in a smoking-room anywhere, about free-will or God's
omniscience, or good and evil, and see how everyone in the place
pricks up his ears. Philosophy's results concern us all most
vitally, and philosophy's queerest arguments tickle agreeably our
sense of subtlety and ingenuity.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Believing in philosophy myself devoutly, and believing also that
a kind of new dawn is breaking upon us philosophers, I feel
impelled, per fas aut nefas, to try to impart to you some news of
the situation.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Philosophy is at once the most sublime and the most trivial of
human pursuits. It works in the minutest crannies and it opens out
the widest vistas. It 'bakes no bread,' as has been said, but it
can inspire our souls with courage; and repugnant as its manners,
its doubting and challenging, its quibbling and dialectics, often
are to common people, no one of us can get along without the
far-flashing beams of light it sends over the world's perspectives.
These illuminations at least, and the contrast-effects of darkness
and mystery that accompany them, give to what it says an interest
that is much more than professional.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain
clash of human temperaments. Undignified as such a treatment may
seem to some of my colleagues, I shall have to take account of this
clash and explain a good many of the divergencies of philosophers
by it. Of whatever temperament a professional philosopher is, he
tries when philosophizing to sink the fact of his temperament.
Temperament is no conventionally recognized reason, so he urges
impersonal reasons only for his conclusions. Yet his temperament
really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly
objective premises. It loads the evidence for him one way or the
other, making for a more sentimental or a more hard-hearted view of
the universe, just as this fact or that principle would. He trusts
his temperament. Wanting a universe that suits it, he believes in
any representation of the universe that does suit it. He feels men
of opposite temper to be out of key with the world's character, and
in his heart considers them incompetent and 'not in it,' in the
philosophic business, even tho they may far excel him in
dialectical ability.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Yet in the forum he can make no claim, on the bare ground of his
temperament, to superior discernment or authority. There arises
thus a certain insincerity in our philosophic discussions: the
potentest of all our premises is never mentioned. I am sure it
would contribute to clearness if in these lectures we should break
this rule and mention it, and I accordingly feel free to do so.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Of course I am talking here of very positively marked men, men
of radical idiosyncracy, who have set their stamp and likeness on
philosophy and figure in its history. Plato, Locke, Hegel, Spencer,
are such temperamental thinkers. Most of us have, of course, no
very definite intellectual temperament, we are a mixture of
opposite ingredients, each one present very moderately. We hardly
know our own preferences in abstract matters; some of us are easily
talked out of them, and end by following the fashion or taking up
with the beliefs of the most impressive philosopher in our
neighborhood, whoever he may be. But the one thing that has COUNTED
so far in philosophy is that a man should see things, see them
straight in his own peculiar way, and be dissatisfied with any
opposite way of seeing them. There is no reason to suppose that
this strong temperamental vision is from now onward to count no
longer in the history of man's beliefs.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Now the particular difference of temperament that I have in mind
in making these remarks is one that has counted in literature, art,
government and manners as well as in philosophy. In manners we find
formalists and free-and-easy persons. In government, authoritarians
and anarchists. In literature, purists or academicals, and
realists. In art, classics and romantics. You recognize these
contrasts as familiar; well, in philosophy we have a very similar
contrast expressed in the pair of terms 'rationalist' and
'empiricist,' 'empiricist' meaning your lover of facts in all their
crude variety, 'rationalist' meaning your devotee to abstract and
eternal principles. No one can live an hour without both facts and
principles, so it is a difference rather of emphasis; yet it breeds
antipathies of the most pungent character between those who lay the
emphasis differently; and we shall find it extraordinarily
convenient to express a certain contrast in men's ways of taking
their universe, by talking of the 'empiricist' and of the
'rationalist' temper. These terms make the contrast simple and
massive.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">More simple and massive than are usually the men of whom the
terms are predicated. For every sort of permutation and combination
is possible in human nature; and if I now proceed to define more
fully what I have in mind when I speak of rationalists and
empiricists, by adding to each of those titles some secondary
qualifying characteristics, I beg you to regard my conduct as to a
certain extent arbitrary. I select types of combination that nature
offers very frequently, but by no means uniformly, and I select
them solely for their convenience in helping me to my ulterior
purpose of characterizing pragmatism. Historically we find the
terms 'intellectualism' and 'sensationalism' used as synonyms of
'rationalism' and 'empiricism.' Well, nature seems to combine most
frequently with intellectualism an idealistic and optimistic
tendency. Empiricists on the other hand are not uncommonly
materialistic, and their optimism is apt to be decidedly
conditional and tremulous. Rationalism is always monistic. It
starts from wholes and universals, and makes much of the unity of
things. Empiricism starts from the parts, and makes of the whole a
collection-is not averse therefore to calling itself pluralistic.
Rationalism usually considers itself more religious than
empiricism, but there is much to say about this claim, so I merely
mention it. It is a true claim when the individual rationalist is
what is called a man of feeling, and when the individual empiricist
prides himself on being hard- headed. In that case the rationalist
will usually also be in favor of what is called free-will, and the
empiricist will be a fatalist-- I use the terms most popularly
current. The rationalist finally will be of dogmatic temper in his
affirmations, while the empiricist may be more sceptical and open
to discussion.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">I will write these traits down in two columns. I think you will
practically recognize the two types of mental make-up that I mean
if I head the columns by the titles 'tender-minded' and
'tough-minded' respectively.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">THE TENDER-MINDED</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Rationalistic (going by 'principles'), Intellectualistic,
Idealistic, Optimistic, Religious, Free-willist, Monistic,
Dogmatical.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">THE TOUGH-MINDED</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Empiricist (going by 'facts'), Sensationalistic, Materialistic,
Pessimistic, Irreligious, Fatalistic, Pluralistic, Sceptical.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Pray postpone for a moment the question whether the two
contrasted mixtures which I have written down are each inwardly
coherent and self-consistent or not--I shall very soon have a good
deal to say on that point. It suffices for our immediate purpose
that tender-minded and tough-minded people, characterized as I have
written them down, do both exist. Each of you probably knows some
well-marked example of each type, and you know what each example
thinks of the example on the other side of the line. They have a
low opinion of each other. Their antagonism, whenever as
individuals their temperaments have been intense, has formed in all
ages a part of the philosophic atmosphere of the time. It forms a
part of the philosophic atmosphere to-day. The tough think of the
tender as sentimentalists and soft-heads. The tender feel the tough
to be unrefined, callous, or brutal. Their mutual reaction is very
much like that that takes place when Bostonian tourists mingle with
a population like that of Cripple Creek. Each type believes the
other to be inferior to itself; but disdain in the one case is
mingled with amusement, in the other it has a dash of fear.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Now, as I have already insisted, few of us are tender-foot
Bostonians pure and simple, and few are typical Rocky Mountain
toughs, in philosophy. Most of us have a hankering for the good
things on both sides of the line. Facts are good, of course--give
us lots of facts. Principles are good--give us plenty of
principles. The world is indubitably one if you look at it in one
way, but as indubitably is it many, if you look at it in another.
It is both one and many--let us adopt a sort of pluralistic monism.
Everything of course is necessarily determined, and yet of course
our wills are free: a sort of free-will determinism is the true
philosophy. The evil of the parts is undeniable; but the whole
can't be evil: so practical pessimism may be combined with
metaphysical optimism. And so forth--your ordinary philosophic
layman never being a radical, never straightening out his system,
but living vaguely in one plausible compartment of it or another to
suit the temptations of successive hours.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But some of us are more than mere laymen in philosophy. We are
worthy of the name of amateur athletes, and are vexed by too much
inconsistency and vacillation in our creed. We cannot preserve a
good intellectual conscience so long as we keep mixing
incompatibles from opposite sides of the line.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">And now I come to the first positively important point which I
wish to make. Never were as many men of a decidedly empiricist
proclivity in existence as there are at the present day. Our
children, one may say, are almost born scientific. But our esteem
for facts has not neutralized in us all religiousness. It is itself
almost religious. Our scientific temper is devout. Now take a man
of this type, and let him be also a philosophic amateur, unwilling
to mix a hodge- podge system after the fashion of a common layman,
and what does he find his situation to be, in this blessed year of
our Lord 1906? He wants facts; he wants science; but he also wants
a religion. And being an amateur and not an independent originator
in philosophy he naturally looks for guidance to the experts and
professionals whom he finds already in the field. A very large
number of you here present, possibly a majority of you, are
amateurs of just this sort.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Now what kinds of philosophy do you find actually offered to
meet your need? You find an empirical philosophy that is not
religious enough, and a religious philosophy that is not empirical
enough for your purpose. If you look to the quarter where facts are
most considered you find the whole tough-minded program in
operation, and the 'conflict between science and religion' in full
blast. Either it is that Rocky Mountain tough of a Haeckel with his
materialistic monism, his ether-god and his jest at your God as a
'gaseous vertebrate'; or it is Spencer treating the world's history
as a redistribution of matter and motion solely, and bowing
religion politely out at the front door:--she may indeed continue
to exist, but she must never show her face inside the temple. For a
hundred and fifty years past the progress of science has seemed to
mean the enlargement of the material universe and the diminution of
man's importance. The result is what one may call the growth of
naturalistic or positivistic feeling. Man is no law-giver to
nature, he is an absorber. She it is who stands firm; he it is who
must accommodate himself. Let him record truth, inhuman tho it be,
and submit to it! The romantic spontaneity and courage are gone,
the vision is materialistic and depressing. Ideals appear as inert
by- products of physiology; what is higher is explained by what is
lower and treated forever as a case of 'nothing but'--nothing but
something else of a quite inferior sort. You get, in short, a
materialistic universe, in which only the tough-minded find
themselves congenially at home.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">If now, on the other hand, you turn to the religious quarter for
consolation, and take counsel of the tender-minded philosophies,
what do you find?</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Religious philosophy in our day and generation is, among us
English- reading people, of two main types. One of these is more
radical and aggressive, the other has more the air of fighting a
slow retreat. By the more radical wing of religious philosophy I
mean the so- called transcendental idealism of the Anglo-Hegelian
school, the philosophy of such men as Green, the Cairds, Bosanquet,
and Royce. This philosophy has greatly influenced the more studious
members of our protestant ministry. It is pantheistic, and
undoubtedly it has already blunted the edge of the traditional
theism in protestantism at large.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">That theism remains, however. It is the lineal descendant,
through one stage of concession after another, of the dogmatic
scholastic theism still taught rigorously in the seminaries of the
catholic church. For a long time it used to be called among us the
philosophy of the Scottish school. It is what I meant by the
philosophy that has the air of fighting a slow retreat. Between the
encroachments of the hegelians and other philosophers of the
'Absolute,' on the one hand, and those of the scientific
evolutionists and agnostics, on the other, the men that give us
this kind of a philosophy, James Martineau, Professor Bowne,
Professor Ladd and others, must feel themselves rather tightly
squeezed. Fair-minded and candid as you like, this philosophy is
not radical in temper. It is eclectic, a thing of compromises, that
seeks a modus vivendi above all things. It accepts the facts of
darwinism, the facts of cerebral physiology, but it does nothing
active or enthusiastic with them. It lacks the victorious and
aggressive note. It lacks prestige in consequence; whereas
absolutism has a certain prestige due to the more radical style of
it.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">These two systems are what you have to choose between if you
turn to the tender-minded school. And if you are the lovers of
facts I have supposed you to be, you find the trail of the serpent
of rationalism, of intellectualism, over everything that lies on
that side of the line. You escape indeed the materialism that goes
with the reigning empiricism; but you pay for your escape by losing
contact with the concrete parts of life. The more absolutistic
philosophers dwell on so high a level of abstraction that they
never even try to come down. The absolute mind which they offer us,
the mind that makes our universe by thinking it, might, for aught
they show us to the contrary, have made any one of a million other
universes just as well as this. You can deduce no single actual
particular from the notion of it. It is compatible with any state
of things whatever being true here below. And the theistic God is
almost as sterile a principle. You have to go to the world which he
has created to get any inkling of his actual character: he is the
kind of god that has once for all made that kind of a world. The
God of the theistic writers lives on as purely abstract heights as
does the Absolute. Absolutism has a certain sweep and dash about
it, while the usual theism is more insipid, but both are equally
remote and vacuous. What you want is a philosophy that will not
only exercise your powers of intellectual abstraction, but that
will make some positive connexion with this actual world of finite
human lives.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">You want a system that will combine both things, the scientific
loyalty to facts and willingness to take account of them, the
spirit of adaptation and accommodation, in short, but also the old
confidence in human values and the resultant spontaneity, whether
of the religious or of the romantic type. And this is then your
dilemma: you find the two parts of your quaesitum hopelessly
separated. You find empiricism with inhumanism and irreligion; or
else you find a rationalistic philosophy that indeed may call
itself religious, but that keeps out of all definite touch with
concrete facts and joys and sorrows.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">I am not sure how many of you live close enough to philosophy to
realize fully what I mean by this last reproach, so I will dwell a
little longer on that unreality in all rationalistic systems by
which your serious believer in facts is so apt to feel
repelled.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">I wish that I had saved the first couple of pages of a thesis
which a student handed me a year or two ago. They illustrated my
point so clearly that I am sorry I cannot read them to you now.
This young man, who was a graduate of some Western college, began
by saying that he had always taken for granted that when you
entered a philosophic class-room you had to open relations with a
universe entirely distinct from the one you left behind you in the
street. The two were supposed, he said, to have so little to do
with each other, that you could not possibly occupy your mind with
them at the same time. The world of concrete personal experiences
to which the street belongs is multitudinous beyond imagination,
tangled, muddy, painful and perplexed. The world to which your
philosophy-professor introduces you is simple, clean and noble. The
contradictions of real life are absent from it. Its architecture is
classic. Principles of reason trace its outlines, logical
necessities cement its parts. Purity and dignity are what it most
expresses. It is a kind of marble temple shining on a hill.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">In point of fact it is far less an account of this actual world
than a clear addition built upon it, a classic sanctuary in which
the rationalist fancy may take refuge from the intolerably confused
and gothic character which mere facts present. It is no EXPLANATION
of our concrete universe, it is another thing altogether, a
substitute for it, a remedy, a way of escape.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Its temperament, if I may use the word temperament here, is
utterly alien to the temperament of existence in the concrete.
REFINEMENT is what characterizes our intellectualist philosophies.
They exquisitely satisfy that craving for a refined object of
contemplation which is so powerful an appetite of the mind. But I
ask you in all seriousness to look abroad on this colossal universe
of concrete facts, on their awful bewilderments, their surprises
and cruelties, on the wildness which they show, and then to tell me
whether 'refined' is the one inevitable descriptive adjective that
springs to your lips.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Refinement has its place in things, true enough. But a
philosophy that breathes out nothing but refinement will never
satisfy the empiricist temper of mind. It will seem rather a
monument of artificiality. So we find men of science preferring to
turn their backs on metaphysics as on something altogether
cloistered and spectral, and practical men shaking philosophy's
dust off their feet and following the call of the wild.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Truly there is something a little ghastly in the satisfaction
with which a pure but unreal system will fill a rationalist mind.
Leibnitz was a rationalist mind, with infinitely more interest in
facts than most rationalist minds can show. Yet if you wish for
superficiality incarnate, you have only to read that charmingly
written 'Theodicee' of his, in which he sought to justify the ways
of God to man, and to prove that the world we live in is the best
of possible worlds. Let me quote a specimen of what I mean.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Among other obstacles to his optimistic philosophy, it falls to
Leibnitz to consider the number of the eternally damned. That it is
infinitely greater, in our human case, than that of those saved he
assumes as a premise from the theologians, and then proceeds to
argue in this way. Even then, he says:</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">"The evil will appear as almost nothing in comparison with the
good, if we once consider the real magnitude of the City of God.
Coelius Secundus Curio has written a little book, 'De Amplitudine
Regni Coelestis,' which was reprinted not long ago. But he failed
to compass the extent of the kingdom of the heavens. The ancients
had small ideas of the works of God. ... It seemed to them that
only our earth had inhabitants, and even the notion of our
antipodes gave them pause. The rest of the world for them consisted
of some shining globes and a few crystalline spheres. But to-day,
whatever be the limits that we may grant or refuse to the Universe
we must recognize in it a countless number of globes, as big as
ours or bigger, which have just as much right as it has to support
rational inhabitants, tho it does not follow that these need all be
men. Our earth is only one among the six principal satellites of
our sun. As all the fixed stars are suns, one sees how small a
place among visible things our earth takes up, since it is only a
satellite of one among them. Now all these suns MAY be inhabited by
none but happy creatures; and nothing obliges us to believe that
the number of damned persons is very great; for a VERY FEW
INSTANCES AND SAMPLES SUFFICE FOR THE UTILITY WHICH GOOD DRAWS FROM
EVIL. Moreover, since there is no reason to suppose that there are
stars everywhere, may there not be a great space beyond the region
of the stars? And this immense space, surrounding all this region,
... may be replete with happiness and glory. ... What now becomes
of the consideration of our Earth and of its denizens? Does it not
dwindle to something incomparably less than a physical point, since
our Earth is but a point compared with the distance of the fixed
stars. Thus the part of the Universe which we know, being almost
lost in nothingness compared with that which is unknown to us, but
which we are yet obliged to admit; and all the evils that we know
lying in this almost-nothing; it follows that the evils may be
almost-nothing in comparison with the goods that the Universe
contains."</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Leibnitz continues elsewhere: "There is a kind of justice which
aims neither at the amendment of the criminal, nor at furnishing an
example to others, nor at the reparation of the injury. This
justice is founded in pure fitness, which finds a certain
satisfaction in the expiation of a wicked deed. The Socinians and
Hobbes objected to this punitive justice, which is properly
vindictive justice and which God has reserved for himself at many
junctures. ... It is always founded in the fitness of things, and
satisfies not only the offended party, but all wise lookers-on,
even as beautiful music or a fine piece of architecture satisfies a
well-constituted mind. It is thus that the torments of the damned
continue, even tho they serve no longer to turn anyone away from
sin, and that the rewards of the blest continue, even tho they
confirm no one in good ways. The damned draw to themselves ever new
penalties by their continuing sins, and the blest attract ever
fresh joys by their unceasing progress in good. Both facts are
founded on the principle of fitness, ... for God has made all
things harmonious in perfection as I have already said."</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Leibnitz's feeble grasp of reality is too obvious to need
comment from me. It is evident that no realistic image of the
experience of a damned soul had ever approached the portals of his
mind. Nor had it occurred to him that the smaller is the number of
'samples' of the genus 'lost-soul' whom God throws as a sop to the
eternal fitness, the more unequitably grounded is the glory of the
blest. What he gives us is a cold literary exercise, whose cheerful
substance even hell-fire does not warm.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">And do not tell me that to show the shallowness of rationalist
philosophizing I have had to go back to a shallow wigpated age. The
optimism of present-day rationalism sounds just as shallow to the
fact-loving mind. The actual universe is a thing wide open, but
rationalism makes systems, and systems must be closed. For men in
practical life perfection is something far off and still in process
of achievement. This for rationalism is but the illusion of the
finite and relative: the absolute ground of things is a perfection
eternally complete.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">I find a fine example of revolt against the airy and shallow
optimism of current religious philosophy in a publication of that
valiant anarchistic writer Morrison I. Swift. Mr. Swift's anarchism
goes a little farther than mine does, but I confess that I
sympathize a good deal, and some of you, I know, will sympathize
heartily with his dissatisfaction with the idealistic optimisms now
in vogue. He begins his pamphlet on 'Human Submission' with a
series of city reporter's items from newspapers (suicides, deaths
from starvation and the like) as specimens of our civilized regime.
For instance:</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">"'After trudging through the snow from one end of the city to
the other in the vain hope of securing employment, and with his
wife and six children without food and ordered to leave their home
in an upper east side tenement house because of non-payment of
rent, John Corcoran, a clerk, to-day ended his life by drinking
carbolic acid. Corcoran lost his position three weeks ago through
illness, and during the period of idleness his scanty savings
disappeared. Yesterday he obtained work with a gang of city snow
shovelers, but he was too weak from illness and was forced to quit
after an hour's trial with the shovel. Then the weary task of
looking for employment was again resumed. Thoroughly discouraged,
Corcoran returned to his home late last night to find his wife and
children without food and the notice of dispossession on the door.'
On the following morning he drank the poison.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">"The records of many more such cases lie before me [Mr. Swift
goes on]; an encyclopedia might easily be filled with their kind.
These few I cite as an interpretation of the universe. 'We are
aware of the presence of God in His world,' says a writer in a
recent English Review. [The very presence of ill in the temporal
order is the condition of the perfection of the eternal order,
writes Professor Royce ('The World and the Individual,' II, 385).]
'The Absolute is the richer for every discord, and for all
diversity which it embraces,' says F. H. Bradley (Appearance and
Reality, 204). He means that these slain men make the universe
richer, and that is Philosophy. But while Professors Royce and
Bradley and a whole host of guileless thoroughfed thinkers are
unveiling Reality and the Absolute and explaining away evil and
pain, this is the condition of the only beings known to us anywhere
in the universe with a developed consciousness of what the universe
is. What these people experience IS Reality. It gives us an
absolute phase of the universe. It is the personal experience of
those most qualified in all our circle of knowledge to HAVE
experience, to tell us WHAT is. Now, what does THINKING ABOUT the
experience of these persons come to compared with directly,
personally feeling it, as they feel it? The philosophers are
dealing in shades, while those who live and feel know truth. And
the mind of mankind-not yet the mind of philosophers and of the
proprietary class-but of the great mass of the silently thinking
and feeling men, is coming to this view. They are judging the
universe as they have heretofore permitted the hierophants of
religion and learning to judge THEM. ...</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">"This Cleveland workingman, killing his children and himself
[another of the cited cases], is one of the elemental, stupendous
facts of this modern world and of this universe. It cannot be
glozed over or minimized away by all the treatises on God, and
Love, and Being, helplessly existing in their haughty monumental
vacuity. This is one of the simple irreducible elements of this
world's life after millions of years of divine opportunity and
twenty centuries of Christ. It is in the moral world like atoms or
sub-atoms in the physical, primary, indestructible. And what it
blazons to man is the ... imposture of all philosophy which does
not see in such events the consummate factor of conscious
experience. These facts invincibly prove religion a nullity. Man
will not give religion two thousand centuries or twenty centuries
more to try itself and waste human time; its time is up, its
probation is ended. Its own record ends it. Mankind has not sons
and eternities to spare for trying out discredited systems...."
[Footnote: Morrison I. Swift, Human Submission, Part Second,
Philadelphia, Liberty Press, 1905, pp. 4- 10.]</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Such is the reaction of an empiricist mind upon the rationalist
bill of fare. It is an absolute 'No, I thank you.' "Religion," says
Mr. Swift, "is like a sleep-walker to whom actual things are
blank." And such, tho possibly less tensely charged with feeling,
is the verdict of every seriously inquiring amateur in philosophy
to-day who turns to the philosophy-professors for the wherewithal
to satisfy the fulness of his nature's needs. Empiricist writers
give him a materialism, rationalists give him something religious,
but to that religion "actual things are blank." He becomes thus the
judge of us philosophers. Tender or tough, he finds us wanting.
None of us may treat his verdicts disdainfully, for after all, his
is the typically perfect mind, the mind the sum of whose demands is
greatest, the mind whose criticisms and dissatisfactions are fatal
in the long run.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">It is at this point that my own solution begins to appear. I
offer the oddly-named thing pragmatism as a philosophy that can
satisfy both kinds of demand. It can remain religious like the
rationalisms, but at the same time, like the empiricisms, it can
preserve the richest intimacy with facts. I hope I may be able to
leave many of you with as favorable an opinion of it as I preserve
myself. Yet, as I am near the end of my hour, I will not introduce
pragmatism bodily now. I will begin with it on the stroke of the
clock next time. I prefer at the present moment to return a little
on what I have said.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">If any of you here are professional philosophers, and some of
you I know to be such, you will doubtless have felt my discourse so
far to have been crude in an unpardonable, nay, in an almost
incredible degree. Tender-minded and tough-minded, what a barbaric
disjunction! And, in general, when philosophy is all compacted of
delicate intellectualities and subtleties and scrupulosities, and
when every possible sort of combination and transition obtains
within its bounds, what a brutal caricature and reduction of
highest things to the lowest possible expression is it to represent
its field of conflict as a sort of rough-and-tumble fight between
two hostile temperaments! What a childishly external view! And
again, how stupid it is to treat the abstractness of rationalist
systems as a crime, and to damn them because they offer themselves
as sanctuaries and places of escape, rather than as prolongations
of the world of facts. Are not all our theories just remedies and
places of escape? And, if philosophy is to be religious, how can
she be anything else than a place of escape from the crassness of
reality's surface? What better thing can she do than raise us out
of our animal senses and show us another and a nobler home for our
minds in that great framework of ideal principles subtending all
reality, which the intellect divines? How can principles and
general views ever be anything but abstract outlines? Was Cologne
cathedral built without an architect's plan on paper? Is refinement
in itself an abomination? Is concrete rudeness the only thing
that's true?</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Believe me, I feel the full force of the indictment. The picture
I have given is indeed monstrously over-simplified and rude. But
like all abstractions, it will prove to have its use. If
philosophers can treat the life of the universe abstractly, they
must not complain of an abstract treatment of the life of
philosophy itself. In point of fact the picture I have given is,
however coarse and sketchy, literally true. Temperaments with their
cravings and refusals do determine men in their philosophies, and
always will. The details of systems may be reasoned out piecemeal,
and when the student is working at a system, he may often forget
the forest for the single tree. But when the labor is accomplished,
the mind always performs its big summarizing act, and the system
forthwith stands over against one like a living thing, with that
strange simple note of individuality which haunts our memory, like
the wraith of the man, when a friend or enemy of ours is dead.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Not only Walt Whitman could write "who touches this book touches
a man." The books of all the great philosophers are like so many
men. Our sense of an essential personal flavor in each one of them,
typical but indescribable, is the finest fruit of our own
accomplished philosophic education. What the system pretends to be
is a picture of the great universe of God. What it is--and oh so
flagrantly!--is the revelation of how intensely odd the personal
flavor of some fellow creature is. Once reduced to these terms (and
all our philosophies get reduced to them in minds made critical by
learning) our commerce with the systems reverts to the informal, to
the instinctive human reaction of satisfaction or dislike. We grow
as peremptory in our rejection or admission, as when a person
presents himself as a candidate for our favor; our verdicts are
couched in as simple adjectives of praise or dispraise. We measure
the total character of the universe as we feel it, against the
flavor of the philosophy proffered us, and one word is enough.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">"Statt der lebendigen Natur," we say, "da Gott die Menschen
schuf hinein"--that nebulous concoction, that wooden, that
straight-laced thing, that crabbed artificiality, that musty
schoolroom product, that sick man's dream! Away with it. Away with
all of them! Impossible! Impossible!</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Our work over the details of his system is indeed what gives us
our resultant impression of the philosopher, but it is on the
resultant impression itself that we react. Expertness in philosophy
is measured by the definiteness of our summarizing reactions, by
the immediate perceptive epithet with which the expert hits such
complex objects off. But great expertness is not necessary for the
epithet to come. Few people have definitely articulated
philosophies of their own. But almost everyone has his own peculiar
sense of a certain total character in the universe, and of the
inadequacy fully to match it of the peculiar systems that he knows.
They don't just cover HIS world. One will be too dapper, another
too pedantic, a third too much of a job-lot of opinions, a fourth
too morbid, and a fifth too artificial, or what not. At any rate he
and we know offhand that such philosophies are out of plumb and out
of key and out of 'whack,' and have no business to speak up in the
universe's name. Plato, Locke, Spinoza, Mill, Caird, Hegel--I
prudently avoid names nearer home!--I am sure that to many of you,
my hearers, these names are little more than reminders of as many
curious personal ways of falling short. It would be an obvious
absurdity if such ways of taking the universe were actually true.
We philosophers have to reckon with such feelings on your part. In
the last resort, I repeat, it will be by them that all our
philosophies shall ultimately be judged. The finally victorious way
of looking at things will be the most completely IMPRESSIVE way to
the normal run of minds.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">One word more--namely about philosophies necessarily being
abstract outlines. There are outlines and outlines, outlines of
buildings that are FAT, conceived in the cube by their planner, and
outlines of buildings invented flat on paper, with the aid of ruler
and compass. These remain skinny and emaciated even when set up in
stone and mortar, and the outline already suggests that result. An
outline in itself is meagre, truly, but it does not necessarily
suggest a meagre thing. It is the essential meagreness of WHAT IS
SUGGESTED by the usual rationalistic philosophies that moves
empiricists to their gesture of rejection. The case of Herbert
Spencer's system is much to the point here. Rationalists feel his
fearful array of insufficiencies. His dry schoolmaster temperament,
the hurdy-gurdy monotony of him, his preference for cheap
makeshifts in argument, his lack of education even in mechanical
principles, and in general the vagueness of all his fundamental
ideas, his whole system wooden, as if knocked together out of
cracked hemlock boards--and yet the half of England wants to bury
him in Westminster Abbey.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Why? Why does Spencer call out so much reverence in spite of his
weakness in rationalistic eyes? Why should so many educated men who
feel that weakness, you and I perhaps, wish to see him in the Abbey
notwithstanding?</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Simply because we feel his heart to be IN THE RIGHT PLACE
philosophically. His principles may be all skin and bone, but at
any rate his books try to mould themselves upon the particular
shape of this, particular world's carcase. The noise of facts
resounds through all his chapters, the citations of fact never
cease, he emphasizes facts, turns his face towards their quarter;
and that is enough. It means the right kind of thing for the
empiricist mind.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The pragmatistic philosophy of which I hope to begin talking in
my next lecture preserves as cordial a relation with facts, and,
unlike Spencer's philosophy, it neither begins nor ends by turning
positive religious constructions out of doors--it treats them
cordially as well.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">I hope I may lead you to find it just the mediating way of
thinking that you require.</div>
<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="wikisource_Lecture_II:_What_Pragmatism_Means">Lecture II: What Pragmatism
Means</span></h2>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Some years ago, being with a camping party in the mountains, I
returned from a solitary ramble to find everyone engaged in a
ferocious metaphysical dispute. The corpus of the dispute was a
squirrel--a live squirrel supposed to be clinging to one side of a
tree-trunk; while over against the tree's opposite side a human
being was imagined to stand. This human witness tries to get sight
of the squirrel by moving rapidly round the tree, but no matter how
fast he goes, the squirrel moves as fast in the opposite direction,
and always keeps the tree between himself and the man, so that
never a glimpse of him is caught. The resultant metaphysical
problem now is this: DOES THE MAN GO ROUND THE SQUIRREL OR NOT? He
goes round the tree, sure enough, and the squirrel is on the tree;
but does he go round the squirrel? In the unlimited leisure of the
wilderness, discussion had been worn threadbare. Everyone had taken
sides, and was obstinate; and the numbers on both sides were even.
Each side, when I appeared, therefore appealed to me to make it a
majority. Mindful of the scholastic adage that whenever you meet a
contradiction you must make a distinction, I immediately sought and
found one, as follows: "Which party is right," I said, "depends on
what you PRACTICALLY MEAN by 'going round' the squirrel. If you
mean passing from the north of him to the east, then to the south,
then to the west, and then to the north of him again, obviously the
man does go round him, for he occupies these successive positions.
But if on the contrary you mean being first in front of him, then
on the right of him, then behind him, then on his left, and finally
in front again, it is quite as obvious that the man fails to go
round him, for by the compensating movements the squirrel makes, he
keeps his belly turned towards the man all the time, and his back
turned away. Make the distinction, and there is no occasion for any
farther dispute. You are both right and both wrong according as you
conceive the verb 'to go round' in one practical fashion or the
other."</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Altho one or two of the hotter disputants called my speech a
shuffling evasion, saying they wanted no quibbling or scholastic
hair-splitting, but meant just plain honest English 'round,' the
majority seemed to think that the distinction had assuaged the
dispute.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">I tell this trivial anecdote because it is a peculiarly simple
example of what I wish now to speak of as THE PRAGMATIC METHOD. The
pragmatic method is primarily a method of settling metaphysical
disputes that otherwise might be interminable. Is the world one or
many?--fated or free?--material or spiritual?--here are notions
either of which may or may not hold good of the world; and disputes
over such notions are unending. The pragmatic method in such cases
is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective
practical consequences. What difference would it practically make
to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true? If no
practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives
mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever
a dispute is serious, we ought to be able to show some practical
difference that must follow from one side or the other's being
right.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">A glance at the history of the idea will show you still better
what pragmatism means. The term is derived from the same Greek word
[pi rho alpha gamma mu alpha], meaning action, from which our words
'practice' and 'practical' come. It was first introduced into
philosophy by Mr. Charles Peirce in 1878. In an article entitled
'How to Make Our Ideas Clear,' in the 'Popular Science Monthly' for
January of that year [Footnote: Translated in the Revue
Philosophique for January, 1879 (vol. vii).] Mr. Peirce, after
pointing out that our beliefs are really rules for action, said
that to develope a thought's meaning, we need only determine what
conduct it is fitted to produce: that conduct is for us its sole
significance. And the tangible fact at the root of all our thought-
distinctions, however subtle, is that there is no one of them so
fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of
practice. To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object,
then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical
kind the object may involve--what sensations we are to expect from
it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these
effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of
our conception of the object, so far as that conception has
positive significance at all.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">This is the principle of Peirce, the principle of pragmatism. It
lay entirely unnoticed by anyone for twenty years, until I, in an
address before Professor Howison's philosophical union at the
university of California, brought it forward again and made a
special application of it to religion. By that date (1898) the
times seemed ripe for its reception. The word 'pragmatism' spread,
and at present it fairly spots the pages of the philosophic
journals. On all hands we find the 'pragmatic movement' spoken of,
sometimes with respect, sometimes with contumely, seldom with clear
understanding. It is evident that the term applies itself
conveniently to a number of tendencies that hitherto have lacked a
collective name, and that it has 'come to stay.'</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">To take in the importance of Peirce's principle, one must get
accustomed to applying it to concrete cases. I found a few years
ago that Ostwald, the illustrious Leipzig chemist, had been making
perfectly distinct use of the principle of pragmatism in his
lectures on the philosophy of science, tho he had not called it by
that name.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">"All realities influence our practice," he wrote me, "and that
influence is their meaning for us. I am accustomed to put questions
to my classes in this way: In what respects would the world be
different if this alternative or that were true? If I can find
nothing that would become different, then the alternative has no
sense."</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">That is, the rival views mean practically the same thing, and
meaning, other than practical, there is for us none. Ostwald in a
published lecture gives this example of what he means. Chemists
have long wrangled over the inner constitution of certain bodies
called 'tautomerous.' Their properties seemed equally consistent
with the notion that an instable hydrogen atom oscillates inside of
them, or that they are instable mixtures of two bodies. Controversy
raged; but never was decided. "It would never have begun," says
Ostwald, "if the combatants had asked themselves what particular
experimental fact could have been made different by one or the
other view being correct. For it would then have appeared that no
difference of fact could possibly ensue; and the quarrel was as
unreal as if, theorizing in primitive times about the raising of
dough by yeast, one party should have invoked a 'brownie,' while
another insisted on an 'elf' as the true cause of the phenomenon."
[Footnote: 'Theorie und Praxis,' Zeitsch. des Oesterreichischen
Ingenieur u. Architecten-Vereines, 1905, Nr. 4 u. 6. I find a still
more radical pragmatism than Ostwald's in an address by Professor
W. S. Franklin: "I think that the sickliest notion of physics, even
if a student gets it, is that it is 'the science of masses,
molecules and the ether.' And I think that the healthiest notion,
even if a student does not wholly get it, is that physics is the
science of the ways of taking hold of bodies and pushing them!"
(Science, January 2, 1903.)]</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">It is astonishing to see how many philosophical disputes
collapse into insignificance the moment you subject them to this
simple test of tracing a concrete consequence. There can BE no
difference any- where that doesn't MAKE a difference elsewhere--no
difference in abstract truth that doesn't express itself in a
difference in concrete fact and in conduct consequent upon that
fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, somewhere and somewhen. The
whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite
difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants of our
life, if this world- formula or that world-formula be the true
one.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">There is absolutely nothing new in the pragmatic method.
Socrates was an adept at it. Aristotle used it methodically. Locke,
Berkeley and Hume made momentous contributions to truth by its
means. Shadworth Hodgson keeps insisting that realities are only
what they are 'known-as.' But these forerunners of pragmatism used
it in fragments: they were preluders only. Not until in our time
has it generalized itself, become conscious of a universal mission,
pretended to a conquering destiny. I believe in that destiny, and I
hope I may end by inspiring you with my belief.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Pragmatism represents a perfectly familiar attitude in
philosophy, the empiricist attitude, but it represents it, as it
seems to me, both in a more radical and in a less objectionable
form than it has ever yet assumed. A pragmatist turns his back
resolutely and once for all upon a lot of inveterate habits dear to
professional philosophers. He turns away from abstraction and
insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons,
from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and
origins. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts,
towards action, and towards power. That means the empiricist temper
regnant, and the rationalist temper sincerely given up. It means
the open air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma,
artificiality and the pretence of finality in truth.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">At the same time it does not stand for any special results. It
is a method only. But the general triumph of that method would mean
an enormous change in what I called in my last lecture the
'temperament' of philosophy. Teachers of the ultra-rationalistic
type would be frozen out, much as the courtier type is frozen out
in republics, as the ultramontane type of priest is frozen out in
protestant lands. Science and metaphysics would come much nearer
together, would in fact work absolutely hand in hand.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Metaphysics has usually followed a very primitive kind of quest.
You know how men have always hankered after unlawful magic, and you
know what a great part, in magic, WORDS have always played. If you
have his name, or the formula of incantation that binds him, you
can control the spirit, genie, afrite, or whatever the power may
be. Solomon knew the names of all the spirits, and having their
names, he held them subject to his will. So the universe has always
appeared to the natural mind as a kind of enigma, of which the key
must be sought in the shape of some illuminating or power-bringing
word or name. That word names the universe's PRINCIPLE, and to
possess it is, after a fashion, to possess the universe itself.
'God,' 'Matter,' 'Reason,' 'the Absolute,' 'Energy,' are so many
solving names. You can rest when you have them. You are at the end
of your metaphysical quest.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But if you follow the pragmatic method, you cannot look on any
such word as closing your quest. You must bring out of each word
its practical cash-value, set it at work within the stream of your
experience. It appears less as a solution, then, than as a program
for more work, and more particularly as an indication of the ways
in which existing realities may be CHANGED.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">THEORIES THUS BECOME INSTRUMENTS, NOT ANSWERS TO ENIGMAS, IN
WHICH WE CAN REST. We don't lie back upon them, we move forward,
and, on occasion, make nature over again by their aid. Pragmatism
unstiffens all our theories, limbers them up and sets each one at
work. Being nothing essentially new, it harmonizes with many
ancient philosophic tendencies. It agrees with nominalism for
instance, in always appealing to particulars; with utilitarianism
in emphasizing practical aspects; with positivism in its disdain
for verbal solutions, useless questions, and metaphysical
abstractions.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">All these, you see, are ANTI-INTELLECTUALIST tendencies. Against
rationalism as a pretension and a method, pragmatism is fully armed
and militant. But, at the outset, at least, it stands for no
particular results. It has no dogmas, and no doctrines save its
method. As the young Italian pragmatist Papini has well said, it
lies in the midst of our theories, like a corridor in a hotel.
Innumerable chambers open out of it. In one you may find a man
writing an atheistic volume; in the next someone on his knees
praying for faith and strength; in a third a chemist investigating
a body's properties. In a fourth a system of idealistic metaphysics
is being excogitated; in a fifth the impossibility of metaphysics
is being shown. But they all own the corridor, and all must pass
through it if they want a practicable way of getting into or out of
their respective rooms.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">No particular results then, so far, but only an attitude of
orientation, is what the pragmatic method means. THE ATTITUDE OF
LOOKING AWAY FROM FIRST THINGS, PRINCIPLES, 'CATEGORIES,' SUPPOSED
NECESSITIES; AND OF LOOKING TOWARDS LAST THINGS, FRUITS,
CONSEQUENCES, FACTS.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">So much for the pragmatic method! You may say that I have been
praising it rather than explaining it to you, but I shall presently
explain it abundantly enough by showing how it works on some
familiar problems. Meanwhile the word pragmatism has come to be
used in a still wider sense, as meaning also a certain theory of
TRUTH. I mean to give a whole lecture to the statement of that
theory, after first paving the way, so I can be very brief now. But
brevity is hard to follow, so I ask for your redoubled attention
for a quarter of an hour. If much remains obscure, I hope to make
it clearer in the later lectures.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">One of the most successfully cultivated branches of philosophy
in our time is what is called inductive logic, the study of the
conditions under which our sciences have evolved. Writers on this
subject have begun to show a singular unanimity as to what the laws
of nature and elements of fact mean, when formulated by
mathematicians, physicists and chemists. When the first
mathematical, logical and natural uniformities, the first LAWS,
were discovered, men were so carried away by the clearness, beauty
and simplification that resulted, that they believed themselves to
have deciphered authentically the eternal thoughts of the Almighty.
His mind also thundered and reverberated in syllogisms. He also
thought in conic sections, squares and roots and ratios, and
geometrized like Euclid. He made Kepler's laws for the planets to
follow; he made velocity increase proportionally to the time in
falling bodies; he made the law of the sines for light to obey when
refracted; he established the classes, orders, families and genera
of plants and animals, and fixed the distances between them. He
thought the archetypes of all things, and devised their variations;
and when we rediscover any one of these his wondrous institutions,
we seize his mind in its very literal intention.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But as the sciences have developed farther, the notion has
gained ground that most, perhaps all, of our laws are only
approximations. The laws themselves, moreover, have grown so
numerous that there is no counting them; and so many rival
formulations are proposed in all the branches of science that
investigators have become accustomed to the notion that no theory
is absolutely a transcript of reality, but that any one of them may
from some point of view be useful. Their great use is to summarize
old facts and to lead to new ones. They are only a man-made
language, a conceptual shorthand, as someone calls them, in which
we write our reports of nature; and languages, as is well known,
tolerate much choice of expression and many dialects.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Thus human arbitrariness has driven divine necessity from
scientific logic. If I mention the names of Sigwart, Mach, Ostwald,
Pearson, Milhaud, Poincare, Duhem, Ruyssen, those of you who are
students will easily identify the tendency I speak of, and will
think of additional names.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Riding now on the front of this wave of scientific logic Messrs.
Schiller and Dewey appear with their pragmatistic account of what
truth everywhere signifies. Everywhere, these teachers say, 'truth'
in our ideas and beliefs means the same thing that it means in
science. It means, they say, nothing but this, THAT IDEAS (WHICH
THEMSELVES ARE BUT PARTS OF OUR EXPERIENCE) BECOME TRUE JUST IN SO
FAR AS THEY HELP US TO GET INTO SATISFACTORY RELATION WITH OTHER
PARTS OF OUR EXPERIENCE, to summarize them and get about among them
by conceptual short-cuts instead of following the interminable
succession of particular phenomena. Any idea upon which we can
ride, so to speak; any idea that will carry us prosperously from
any one part of our experience to any other part, linking things
satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving labor; is
true for just so much, true in so far forth, true INSTRUMENTALLY.
This is the 'instrumental' view of truth taught so successfully at
Chicago, the view that truth in our ideas means their power to
'work,' promulgated so brilliantly at Oxford.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Messrs. Dewey, Schiller and their allies, in reaching this
general conception of all truth, have only followed the example of
geologists, biologists and philologists. In the establishment of
these other sciences, the successful stroke was always to take some
simple process actually observable in operation--as denudation by
weather, say, or variation from parental type, or change of dialect
by incorporation of new words and pronunciations--and then to
generalize it, making it apply to all times, and produce great
results by summating its effects through the ages.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The observable process which Schiller and Dewey particularly
singled out for generalization is the familiar one by which any
individual settles into NEW OPINIONS. The process here is always
the same. The individual has a stock of old opinions already, but
he meets a new experience that puts them to a strain. Somebody
contradicts them; or in a reflective moment he discovers that they
contradict each other; or he hears of facts with which they are
incompatible; or desires arise in him which they cease to satisfy.
The result is an inward trouble to which his mind till then had
been a stranger, and from which he seeks to escape by modifying his
previous mass of opinions. He saves as much of it as he can, for in
this matter of belief we are all extreme conservatives. So he tries
to change first this opinion, and then that (for they resist change
very variously), until at last some new idea comes up which he can
graft upon the ancient stock with a minimum of disturbance of the
latter, some idea that mediates between the stock and the new
experience and runs them into one another most felicitously and
expediently.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">This new idea is then adopted as the true one. It preserves the
older stock of truths with a minimum of modification, stretching
them just enough to make them admit the novelty, but conceiving
that in ways as familiar as the case leaves possible. An outree
explanation, violating all our preconceptions, would never pass for
a true account of a novelty. We should scratch round industriously
till we found something less excentric. The most violent
revolutions in an individual's beliefs leave most of his old order
standing. Time and space, cause and effect, nature and history, and
one's own biography remain untouched. New truth is always a
go-between, a smoother-over of transitions. It marries old opinion
to new fact so as ever to show a minimum of jolt, a maximum of
continuity. We hold a theory true just in proportion to its success
in solving this 'problem of maxima and minima.' But success in
solving this problem is eminently a matter of approximation. We say
this theory solves it on the whole more satisfactorily than that
theory; but that means more satisfactorily to ourselves, and
individuals will emphasize their points of satisfaction
differently. To a certain degree, therefore, everything here is
plastic.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The point I now urge you to observe particularly is the part
played by the older truths. Failure to take account of it is the
source of much of the unjust criticism leveled against pragmatism.
Their influence is absolutely controlling. Loyalty to them is the
first principle--in most cases it is the only principle; for by far
the most usual way of handling phenomena so novel that they would
make for a serious rearrangement of our preconceptions is to ignore
them altogether, or to abuse those who bear witness for them.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">You doubtless wish examples of this process of truth's growth,
and the only trouble is their superabundance. The simplest case of
new truth is of course the mere numerical addition of new kinds of
facts, or of new single facts of old kinds, to our experience--an
addition that involves no alteration in the old beliefs. Day
follows day, and its contents are simply added. The new contents
themselves are not true, they simply COME and ARE. Truth is what we
say about them, and when we say that they have come, truth is
satisfied by the plain additive formula.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But often the day's contents oblige a rearrangement. If I should
now utter piercing shrieks and act like a maniac on this platform,
it would make many of you revise your ideas as to the probable
worth of my philosophy. 'Radium' came the other day as part of the
day's content, and seemed for a moment to contradict our ideas of
the whole order of nature, that order having come to be identified
with what is called the conservation of energy. The mere sight of
radium paying heat away indefinitely out of its own pocket seemed
to violate that conservation. What to think? If the radiations from
it were nothing but an escape of unsuspected 'potential' energy,
pre- existent inside of the atoms, the principle of conservation
would be saved. The discovery of 'helium' as the radiation's
outcome, opened a way to this belief. So Ramsay's view is generally
held to be true, because, altho it extends our old ideas of energy,
it causes a minimum of alteration in their nature.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">I need not multiply instances. A new opinion counts as 'true'
just in proportion as it gratifies the individual's desire to
assimilate the novel in his experience to his beliefs in stock. It
must both lean on old truth and grasp new fact; and its success (as
I said a moment ago) in doing this, is a matter for the
individual's appreciation. When old truth grows, then, by new
truth's addition, it is for subjective reasons. We are in the
process and obey the reasons. That new idea is truest which
performs most felicitously its function of satisfying our double
urgency. It makes itself true, gets itself classed as true, by the
way it works; grafting itself then upon the ancient body of truth,
which thus grows much as a tree grows by the activity of a new
layer of cambium.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Now Dewey and Schiller proceed to generalize this observation
and to apply it to the most ancient parts of truth. They also once
were plastic. They also were called true for human reasons. They
also mediated between still earlier truths and what in those days
were novel observations. Purely objective truth, truth in whose
establishment the function of giving human satisfaction in marrying
previous parts of experience with newer parts played no role
whatever, is nowhere to be found. The reasons why we call things
true is the reason why they ARE true, for 'to be true' MEANS only
to perform this marriage-function.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The trail of the human serpent is thus over everything. Truth
independent; truth that we FIND merely; truth no longer malleable
to human need; truth incorrigible, in a word; such truth exists
indeed superabundantly--or is supposed to exist by
rationalistically minded thinkers; but then it means only the dead
heart of the living tree, and its being there means only that truth
also has its paleontology and its 'prescription,' and may grow
stiff with years of veteran service and petrified in men's regard
by sheer antiquity. But how plastic even the oldest truths
nevertheless really are has been vividly shown in our day by the
transformation of logical and mathematical ideas, a transformation
which seems even to be invading physics. The ancient formulas are
reinterpreted as special expressions of much wider principles,
principles that our ancestors never got a glimpse of in their
present shape and formulation.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Mr. Schiller still gives to all this view of truth the name of
'Humanism,' but, for this doctrine too, the name of pragmatism
seems fairly to be in the ascendant, so I will treat it under the
name of pragmatism in these lectures.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Such then would be the scope of pragmatism--first, a method; and
second, a genetic theory of what is meant by truth. And these two
things must be our future topics.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">What I have said of the theory of truth will, I am sure, have
appeared obscure and unsatisfactory to most of you by reason of us
brevity. I shall make amends for that hereafter. In a lecture on
'common sense' I shall try to show what I mean by truths grown
petrified by antiquity. In another lecture I shall expatiate on the
idea that our thoughts become true in proportion as they
successfully exert their go-between function. In a third I shall
show how hard it is to discriminate subjective from objective
factors in Truth's development. You may not follow me wholly in
these lectures; and if you do, you may not wholly agree with me.
But you will, I know, regard me at least as serious, and treat my
effort with respectful consideration.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">You will probably be surprised to learn, then, that Messrs.
Schiller's and Dewey's theories have suffered a hailstorm of
contempt and ridicule. All rationalism has risen against them. In
influential quarters Mr. Schiller, in particular, has been treated
like an impudent schoolboy who deserves a spanking. I should not
mention this, but for the fact that it throws so much sidelight
upon that rationalistic temper to which I have opposed the temper
of pragmatism. Pragmatism is uncomfortable away from facts.
Rationalism is comfortable only in the presence of abstractions.
This pragmatist talk about truths in the plural, about their
utility and satisfactoriness, about the success with which they
'work,' etc., suggests to the typical intellectualist mind a sort
of coarse lame second-rate makeshift article of truth. Such truths
are not real truth. Such tests are merely subjective. As against
this, objective truth must be something non-utilitarian, haughty,
refined, remote, august, exalted. It must be an absolute
correspondence of our thoughts with an equally absolute reality. It
must be what we OUGHT to think, unconditionally. The conditioned
ways in which we DO think are so much irrelevance and matter for
psychology. Down with psychology, up with logic, in all this
question!</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">See the exquisite contrast of the types of mind! The pragmatist
clings to facts and concreteness, observes truth at its work in
particular cases, and generalizes. Truth, for him, becomes a class-
name for all sorts of definite working-values in experience. For
the rationalist it remains a pure abstraction, to the bare name of
which we must defer. When the pragmatist undertakes to show in
detail just WHY we must defer, the rationalist is unable to
recognize the concretes from which his own abstraction is taken. He
accuses us of DENYING truth; whereas we have only sought to trace
exactly why people follow it and always ought to follow it. Your
typical ultra- abstractionist fairly shudders at concreteness:
other things equal, he positively prefers the pale and spectral. If
the two universes were offered, he would always choose the skinny
outline rather than the rich thicket of reality. It is so much
purer, clearer, nobler.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">I hope that as these lectures go on, the concreteness and
closeness to facts of the pragmatism which they advocate may be
what approves itself to you as its most satisfactory peculiarity.
It only follows here the example of the sister-sciences,
interpreting the unobserved by the observed. It brings old and new
harmoniously together. It converts the absolutely empty notion of a
static relation of 'correspondence' (what that may mean we must ask
later) between our minds and reality, into that of a rich and
active commerce (that anyone may follow in detail and understand)
between particular thoughts of ours, and the great universe of
other experiences in which they play their parts and have their
uses.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But enough of this at present? The justification of what I say
must be postponed. I wish now to add a word in further explanation
of the claim I made at our last meeting, that pragmatism may be a
happy harmonizer of empiricist ways of thinking, with the more
religious demands of human beings.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Men who are strongly of the fact-loving temperament, you may
remember me to have said, are liable to be kept at a distance by
the small sympathy with facts which that philosophy from the
present-day fashion of idealism offers them. It is far too
intellectualistic. Old fashioned theism was bad enough, with its
notion of God as an exalted monarch, made up of a lot of
unintelligible or preposterous 'attributes'; but, so long as it
held strongly by the argument from design, it kept some touch with
concrete realities. Since, however, darwinism has once for all
displaced design from the minds of the 'scientific,' theism has
lost that foothold; and some kind of an immanent or pantheistic
deity working IN things rather than above them is, if any, the kind
recommended to our contemporary imagination. Aspirants to a
philosophic religion turn, as a rule, more hopefully nowadays
towards idealistic pantheism than towards the older dualistic
theism, in spite of the fact that the latter still counts able
defenders.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But, as I said in my first lecture, the brand of pantheism
offered is hard for them to assimilate if they are lovers of facts,
or empirically minded. It is the absolutistic brand, spurning the
dust and reared upon pure logic. It keeps no connexion whatever
with concreteness. Affirming the Absolute Mind, which is its
substitute for God, to be the rational presupposition of all
particulars of fact, whatever they may be, it remains supremely
indifferent to what the particular facts in our world actually are.
Be they what they may, the Absolute will father them. Like the sick
lion in Esop's fable, all footprints lead into his den, but nulla
vestigia retrorsum. You cannot redescend into the world of
particulars by the Absolute's aid, or deduce any necessary
consequences of detail important for your life from your idea of
his nature. He gives you indeed the assurance that all is well with
Him, and for his eternal way of thinking; but thereupon he leaves
you to be finitely saved by your own temporal devices.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Far be it from me to deny the majesty of this conception, or its
capacity to yield religious comfort to a most respectable class of
minds. But from the human point of view, no one can pretend that it
doesn't suffer from the faults of remoteness and abstractness. It
is eminently a product of what I have ventured to call the
rationalistic temper. It disdains empiricism's needs. It
substitutes a pallid outline for the real world's richness. It is
dapper; it is noble in the bad sense, in the sense in which to be
noble is to be inapt for humble service. In this real world of
sweat and dirt, it seems to me that when a view of things is
'noble,' that ought to count as a presumption against its truth,
and as a philosophic disqualification. The prince of darkness may
be a gentleman, as we are told he is, but whatever the God of earth
and heaven is, he can surely be no gentleman. His menial services
are needed in the dust of our human trials, even more than his
dignity is needed in the empyrean.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Now pragmatism, devoted tho she be to facts, has no such
materialistic bias as ordinary empiricism labors under. Moreover,
she has no objection whatever to the realizing of abstractions, so
long as you get about among particulars with their aid and they
actually carry you somewhere. Interested in no conclusions but
those which our minds and our experiences work out together, she
has no a priori prejudices against theology. IF THEOLOGICAL IDEAS
PROVE TO HAVE A VALUE FOR CONCRETE LIFE, THEY WILL BE TRUE, FOR
PRAGMATISM, IN THE SENSE OF BEING GOOD FOR SO MUCH. FOR HOW MUCH
MORE THEY ARE TRUE, WILL DEPEND ENTIRELY ON THEIR RELATIONS TO THE
OTHER TRUTHS THAT ALSO HAVE TO BE ACKNOWLEDGED.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">What I said just now about the Absolute of transcendental
idealism is a case in point. First, I called it majestic and said
it yielded religious comfort to a class of minds, and then I
accused it of remoteness and sterility. But so far as it affords
such comfort, it surely is not sterile; it has that amount of
value; it performs a concrete function. As a good pragmatist, I
myself ought to call the Absolute true 'in so far forth,' then; and
I unhesitatingly now do so.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But what does TRUE IN SO FAR FORTH mean in this case? To answer,
we need only apply the pragmatic method. What do believers in the
Absolute mean by saying that their belief affords them comfort?
They mean that since in the Absolute finite evil is 'overruled'
already, we may, therefore, whenever we wish, treat the temporal as
if it were potentially the eternal, be sure that we can trust its
outcome, and, without sin, dismiss our fear and drop the worry of
our finite responsibility. In short, they mean that we have a right
ever and anon to take a moral holiday, to let the world wag in its
own way, feeling that its issues are in better hands than ours and
are none of our business.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The universe is a system of which the individual members may
relax their anxieties occasionally, in which the don't-care mood is
also right for men, and moral holidays in order--that, if I mistake
not, is part, at least, of what the Absolute is 'known-as,' that is
the great difference in our particular experiences which his being
true makes for us, that is part of his cash-value when he is
pragmatically interpreted. Farther than that the ordinary
lay-reader in philosophy who thinks favorably of absolute idealism
does not venture to sharpen his conceptions. He can use the
Absolute for so much, and so much is very precious. He is pained at
hearing you speak incredulously of the Absolute, therefore, and
disregards your criticisms because they deal with aspects of the
conception that he fails to follow.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">If the Absolute means this, and means no more than this, who can
possibly deny the truth of it? To deny it would be to insist that
men should never relax, and that holidays are never in order. I am
well aware how odd it must seem to some of you to hear me say that
an idea is 'true' so long as to believe it is profitable to our
lives. That it is GOOD, for as much as it profits, you will gladly
admit. If what we do by its aid is good, you will allow the idea
itself to be good in so far forth, for we are the better for
possessing it. But is it not a strange misuse of the word 'truth,'
you will say, to call ideas also 'true' for this reason?</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">To answer this difficulty fully is impossible at this stage of
my account. You touch here upon the very central point of Messrs.
Schiller's, Dewey's and my own doctrine of truth, which I cannot
discuss with detail until my sixth lecture. Let me now say only
this, that truth is ONE SPECIES OF GOOD, and not, as is usually
supposed, a category distinct from good, and co-ordinate with it.
THE TRUE IS THE NAME OF WHATEVER PROVES ITSELF TO BE GOOD IN THE
WAY OF BELIEF, AND GOOD, TOO, FOR DEFINITE, ASSIGNABLE REASONS.
Surely you must admit this, that if there were NO good for life in
true ideas, or if the knowledge of them were positively
disadvantageous and false ideas the only useful ones, then the
current notion that truth is divine and precious, and its pursuit a
duty, could never have grown up or become a dogma. In a world like
that, our duty would be to SHUN truth, rather. But in this world,
just as certain foods are not only agreeable to our taste, but good
for our teeth, our stomach and our tissues; so certain ideas are
not only agreeable to think about, or agreeable as supporting other
ideas that we are fond of, but they are also helpful in life's
practical struggles. If there be any life that it is really better
we should lead, and if there be any idea which, if believed in,
would help us to lead that life, then it would be really BETTER FOR
US to believe in that idea, UNLESS, INDEED, BELIEF IN IT
INCIDENTALLY CLASHED WITH OTHER GREATER VITAL BENEFITS.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">'What would be better for us to believe'! This sounds very like
a definition of truth. It comes very near to saying 'what we OUGHT
to believe': and in THAT definition none of you would find any
oddity. Ought we ever not to believe what it is BETTER FOR US to
believe? And can we then keep the notion of what is better for us,
and what is true for us, permanently apart?</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Pragmatism says no, and I fully agree with her. Probably you
also agree, so far as the abstract statement goes, but with a
suspicion that if we practically did believe everything that made
for good in our own personal lives, we should be found indulging
all kinds of fancies about this world's affairs, and all kinds of
sentimental superstitions about a world hereafter. Your suspicion
here is undoubtedly well founded, and it is evident that something
happens when you pass from the abstract to the concrete, that
complicates the situation.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">I said just now that what is better for us to believe is true
UNLESS THE BELIEF INCIDENTALLY CLASHES WITH SOME OTHER VITAL
BENEFIT. Now in real life what vital benefits is any particular
belief of ours most liable to clash with? What indeed except the
vital benefits yielded by OTHER BELIEFS when these prove
incompatible with the first ones? In other words, the greatest
enemy of any one of our truths may be the rest of our truths.
Truths have once for all this desperate instinct of
self-preservation and of desire to extinguish whatever contradicts
them. My belief in the Absolute, based on the good it does me, must
run the gauntlet of all my other beliefs. Grant that it may be true
in giving me a moral holiday. Nevertheless, as I conceive it,--and
let me speak now confidentially, as it were, and merely in my own
private person,--it clashes with other truths of mine whose
benefits I hate to give up on its account. It happens to be
associated with a kind of logic of which I am the enemy, I find
that it entangles me in metaphysical paradoxes that are
inacceptable, etc., etc.. But as I have enough trouble in life
already without adding the trouble of carrying these intellectual
inconsistencies, I personally just give up the Absolute. I just
TAKE my moral holidays; or else as a professional philosopher, I
try to justify them by some other principle.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">If I could restrict my notion of the Absolute to its bare
holiday- giving value, it wouldn't clash with my other truths. But
we cannot easily thus restrict our hypotheses. They carry
supernumerary features, and these it is that clash so. My disbelief
in the Absolute means then disbelief in those other supernumerary
features, for I fully believe in the legitimacy of taking moral
holidays.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">You see by this what I meant when I called pragmatism a mediator
and reconciler and said, borrowing the word from Papini, that he
unstiffens our theories. She has in fact no prejudices whatever, no
obstructive dogmas, no rigid canons of what shall count as proof.
She is completely genial. She will entertain any hypothesis, she
will consider any evidence. It follows that in the religious field
she is at a great advantage both over positivistic empiricism, with
its anti-theological bias, and over religious rationalism, with its
exclusive interest in the remote, the noble, the simple, and the
abstract in the way of conception.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">In short, she widens the field of search for God. Rationalism
sticks to logic and the empyrean. Empiricism sticks to the external
senses. Pragmatism is willing to take anything, to follow either
logic or the senses, and to count the humblest and most personal
experiences. She will count mystical experiences if they have
practical consequences. She will take a God who lives in the very
dirt of private fact-if that should seem a likely place to find
him.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Her only test of probable truth is what works best in the way of
leading us, what fits every part of life best and combines with the
collectivity of experience's demands, nothing being omitted. If
theological ideas should do this, if the notion of God, in
particular, should prove to do it, how could pragmatism possibly
deny God's existence? She could see no meaning in treating as 'not
true' a notion that was pragmatically so successful. What other
kind of truth could there be, for her, than all this agreement with
concrete reality?</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">In my last lecture I shall return again to the relations of
pragmatism with religion. But you see already how democratic she
is. Her manners are as various and flexible, her resources as rich
and endless, and her conclusions as friendly as those of mother
nature.</div>
<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="wikisource_Lecture_III:_Some_Metaphysical_Problems_Pragmatically_Considered">
Lecture III: Some Metaphysical Problems Pragmatically
Considered</span></h2>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">I am now to make the pragmatic method more familiar by giving
you some illustrations of its application to particular problems. I
will begin with what is driest, and the first thing I shall take
will be the problem of Substance. Everyone uses the old distinction
between substance and attribute, enshrined as it is in the very
structure of human language, in the difference between grammatical
subject and predicate. Here is a bit of blackboard crayon. Its
modes, attributes, properties, accidents, or affections,--use which
term you will,--are whiteness, friability, cylindrical shape,
insolubility in water, etc., etc. But the bearer of these
attributes is so much chalk, which thereupon is called the
substance in which they inhere. So the attributes of this desk
inhere in the substance 'wood,' those of my coat in the substance
'wool,' and so forth. Chalk, wood and wool, show again, in spite of
their differences, common properties, and in so far forth they are
themselves counted as modes of a still more primal substance,
matter, the attributes of which are space occupancy and
impenetrability. Similarly our thoughts and feelings are affections
or properties of our several souls, which are substances, but again
not wholly in their own right, for they are modes of the still
deeper substance 'spirit.'</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Now it was very early seen that all we know of the chalk is the
whiteness, friability, etc., all WE KNOW of the wood is the
combustibility and fibrous structure. A group of attributes is what
each substance here is known-as, they form its sole cash-value for
our actual experience. The substance is in every case revealed
through THEM; if we were cut off from THEM we should never suspect
its existence; and if God should keep sending them to us in an
unchanged order, miraculously annihilating at a certain moment the
substance that supported them, we never could detect the moment,
for our experiences themselves would be unaltered. Nominalists
accordingly adopt the opinion that substance is a spurious idea due
to our inveterate human trick of turning names into things.
Phenomena come in groups--the chalk-group, the wood-group,
etc.--and each group gets its name. The name we then treat as in a
way supporting the group of phenomena. The low thermometer to-day,
for instance, is supposed to come from something called the
'climate.' Climate is really only the name for a certain group of
days, but it is treated as if it lay BEHIND the day, and in general
we place the name, as if it were a being, behind the facts it is
the name of. But the phenomenal properties of things, nominalists
say, surely do not really inhere in names, and if not in names then
they do not inhere in anything. They ADhere, or COhere, rather,
WITH EACH OTHER, and the notion of a substance inaccessible to us,
which we think accounts for such cohesion by supporting it, as
cement might support pieces of mosaic, must be abandoned. The fact
of the bare cohesion itself is all that the notion of the substance
signifies. Behind that fact is nothing.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Scholasticism has taken the notion of substance from common
sense and made it very technical and articulate. Few things would
seem to have fewer pragmatic consequences for us than substances,
cut off as we are from every contact with them. Yet in one case
scholasticism has proved the importance of the substance-idea by
treating it pragmatically. I refer to certain disputes about the
mystery of the Eucharist. Substance here would appear to have
momentous pragmatic value. Since the accidents of the wafer don't
change in the Lord's supper, and yet it has become the very body of
Christ, it must be that the change is in the substance solely. The
bread-substance must have been withdrawn, and the divine substance
substituted miraculously without altering the immediate sensible
properties. But tho these don't alter, a tremendous difference has
been made, no less a one than this, that we who take the sacrament,
now feed upon the very substance of divinity. The substance-notion
breaks into life, then, with tremendous effect, if once you allow
that substances can separate from their accidents, and exchange
these latter.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">This is the only pragmatic application of the substance-idea
with which I am acquainted; and it is obvious that it will only be
treated seriously by those who already believe in the 'real
presence' on independent grounds.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">MATERIAL SUBSTANCE was criticized by Berkeley with such telling
effect that his name has reverberated through all subsequent
philosophy. Berkeley's treatment of the notion of matter is so well
known as to need hardly more than a mention. So far from denying
the external world which we know, Berkeley corroborated it. It was
the scholastic notion of a material substance unapproachable by us,
BEHIND the external world, deeper and more real than it, and needed
to support it, which Berkeley maintained to be the most effective
of all reducers of the external world to unreality. Abolish that
substance, he said, believe that God, whom you can understand and
approach, sends you the sensible world directly, and you confirm
the latter and back it up by his divine authority. Berkeley's
criticism of 'matter' was consequently absolutely pragmatistic.
Matter is known as our sensations of colour, figure, hardness and
the like. They are the cash-value of the term. The difference
matter makes to us by truly being is that we then get such
sensations; by not being, is that we lack them. These sensations
then are its sole meaning. Berkeley doesn't deny matter, then; he
simply tells us what it consists of. It is a true name for just so
much in the way of sensations.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Locke, and later Hume, applied a similar pragmatic criticism to
the notion of SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE. I will only mention Locke's
treatment of our 'personal identity.' He immediately reduces this
notion to its pragmatic value in terms of experience. It means, he
says, so much consciousness,' namely the fact that at one moment of
life we remember other moments, and feel them all as parts of one
and the same personal history. Rationalism had explained this
practical continuity in our life by the unity of our
soul-substance. But Locke says: suppose that God should take away
the consciousness, should WE be any the better for having still the
soul-principle? Suppose he annexed the same consciousness to
different souls, | should we, as WE realize OURSELVES, be any the
worse for that fact? In Locke's day the soul was chiefly a thing to
be rewarded or punished. See how Locke, discussing it from this
point of view, keeps the question pragmatic:</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Suppose, he says, one to think himself to be the same soul that
once was Nestor or Thersites. Can he think their actions his own
any more than the actions of any other man that ever existed? But |
let him once find himself CONSCIOUS of any of the actions of
Nestor, he then finds himself the same person with Nestor. ... In
this personal identity is founded all the right and justice of
reward and punishment. It may be reasonable to think, no one shall
be made to answer for what he knows nothing of, but shall receive
his doom, his consciousness accusing or excusing. Supposing a man
punished now for what he had done in another life, whereof he could
be made to have no consciousness at all, what difference is there
between that punishment and being created miserable?</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Our personal identity, then, consists, for Locke, solely in
pragmatically definable particulars. Whether, apart from these
verifiable facts, it also inheres in a spiritual principle, is a
merely curious speculation. Locke, compromiser that he was,
passively tolerated the belief in a substantial soul behind our
consciousness. But his successor Hume, and most empirical
psychologists after him, have denied the soul, save as the name for
verifiable cohesions in our inner life. They redescend into the
stream of experience with it, and cash it into so much small-change
value in the way of 'ideas' and their peculiar connexions with each
other. As I said of Berkeley's matter, the soul is good or 'true'
for just SO MUCH, but no more.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The mention of material substance naturally suggests the
doctrine of 'materialism,' but philosophical materialism is not
necessarily knit up with belief in 'matter,' as a metaphysical
principle. One may deny matter in that sense, as strongly as
Berkeley did, one may be a phenomenalist like Huxley, and yet one
may still be a materialist in the wider sense, of explaining higher
phenomena by lower ones, and leaving the destinies of the world at
the mercy of its blinder parts and forces. It is in this wider
sense of the word that materialism is opposed to spiritualism or
theism. The laws of physical nature are what run things,
materialism says. The highest productions of human genius might be
ciphered by one who had complete acquaintance with the facts, out
of their physiological conditions, regardless whether nature be
there only for our minds, as idealists contend, or not. Our minds
in any case would have to record the kind of nature it is, and
write it down as operating through blind laws of physics. This is
the complexion of present day materialism, which may better be
called naturalism. Over against it stands 'theism,' or what in a
wide sense may be termed 'spiritualism.' Spiritualism says that
mind not only witnesses and records things, but also runs and
operates them: the world being thus guided, not by its lower, but
by its higher element.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Treated as it often is, this question becomes little more than a
conflict between aesthetic preferences. Matter is gross, coarse,
crass, muddy; spirit is pure, elevated, noble; and since it is more
consonant with the dignity of the universe to give the primacy in
it to what appears superior, spirit must be affirmed as the ruling
principle. To treat abstract principles as finalities, before which
our intellects may come to rest in a state of admiring
contemplation, is the great rationalist failing. Spiritualism, as
often held, may be simply a state of admiration for one kind, and
of dislike for another kind, of abstraction. I remember a worthy
spiritualist professor who always referred to materialism as the
'mud-philosophy,' and deemed it thereby refuted.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">To such spiritualism as this there is an easy answer, and Mr.
Spencer makes it effectively. In some well-written pages at the end
of the first volume of his Psychology he shows us that a 'matter'
so infinitely subtile, and performing motions as inconceivably
quick and fine as those which modern science postulates in her
explanations, has no trace of grossness left. He shows that the
conception of spirit, as we mortals hitherto have framed it, is
itself too gross to cover the exquisite tenuity of nature's facts.
Both terms, he says, are but symbols, pointing to that one
unknowable reality in which their oppositions cease.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">To an abstract objection an abstract rejoinder suffices; and so
far as one's opposition to materialism springs from one's disdain
of matter as something 'crass,' Mr. Spencer cuts the ground from
under one. Matter is indeed infinitely and incredibly refined. To
anyone who has ever looked on the face of a dead child or parent
the mere fact that matter COULD have taken for a time that precious
form, ought to make matter sacred ever after. It makes no
difference what the PRINCIPLE of life may be, material or
immaterial, matter at any rate co-operates, lends itself to all
life's purposes. That beloved incarnation was among matter's
possibilities.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But now, instead of resting in principles after this stagnant
intellectualist fashion, let us apply the pragmatic method to the
question. What do we MEAN by matter? What practical difference can
it make NOW that the world should be run by matter or by spirit? I
think we find that the problem takes with this a rather different
character.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">And first of all I call your attention to a curious fact. It
makes not a single jot of difference so far as the PAST of the
world goes, whether we deem it to have been the work of matter or
whether we think a divine spirit was its author.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Imagine, in fact, the entire contents of the world to be once
for all irrevocably given. Imagine it to end this very moment, and
to have no future; and then let a theist and a materialist apply
their rival explanations to its history. The theist shows how a God
made it; the materialist shows, and we will suppose with equal
success, how it resulted from blind physical forces. Then let the
pragmatist be asked to choose between their theories. How can he
apply his test if the world is already completed? Concepts for him
are things to come back into experience with, things to make us
look for differences. But by hypothesis there is to be no more
experience and no possible differences can now be looked for. Both
theories have shown all their consequences and, by the hypothesis
we are adopting, these are identical. The pragmatist must
consequently say that the two theories, in spite of their
different-sounding names, mean exactly the same thing, and that the
dispute is purely verbal. [I am opposing, of course, that the
theories HAVE been equally successful in their explanations of what
is.]</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">For just consider the case sincerely, and say what would be the
WORTH of a God if he WERE there, with his work accomplished arid
his world run down. He would be worth no more than just that world
was worth. To that amount of result, with its mixed merits and
defects, his creative power could attain, but go no farther. And
since there is to be no future; since the whole value and meaning
of the world has been already paid in and actualized in the
feelings that went with it in the passing, and now go with it in
the ending; since it draws no supplemental significance (such as
our real world draws) from its function of preparing something yet
to come; why then, by it we take God's measure, as it were. He is
the Being who could once for all do THAT; and for that much we are
thankful to him, but for nothing more. But now, on the contrary
hypothesis, namely, that the bits of matter following their laws
could make that world and do no less, should we not be just as
thankful to them? Wherein should we suffer loss, then, if we
dropped God as an hypothesis and made the matter alone responsible?
Where would any special deadness, or crassness, come in? And how,
experience being what is once for all, would God's presence in it
make it any more living or richer?</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Candidly, it is impossible to give any answer to this question.
The actually experienced world is supposed to be the same in its
details on either hypothesis, "the same, for our praise or blame,"
as Browning says. It stands there indefeasibly: a gift which can't
be taken back. Calling matter the cause of it retracts no single
one of the items that have made it up, nor does calling God the
cause augment them. They are the God or the atoms, respectively, of
just that and no other world. The God, if there, has been doing
just what atoms could do--appearing in the character of atoms, so
to speak-- and earning such gratitude as is due to atoms, and no
more. If his presence lends no different turn or issue to the
performance, it surely can lend it no increase of dignity. Nor
would indignity come to it were he absent, and did the atoms remain
the only actors on the stage. When a play is once over, and the
curtain down, you really make it no better by claiming an
illustrious genius for its author, just as you make it no worse by
calling him a common hack.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Thus if no future detail of experience or conduct is to be
deduced from our hypothesis, the debate between materialism and
theism becomes quite idle and insignificant. Matter and God in that
event mean exactly the same thing--the power, namely, neither more
nor less, that could make just this completed world--and the wise
man is he who in such a case would turn his back on such a
supererogatory discussion. Accordingly, most men instinctively, and
positivists and scientists deliberately, do turn their backs on
philosophical disputes from which nothing in the line of definite
future consequences can be seen to follow. The verbal and empty
character of philosophy is surely a reproach with which we are, but
too familiar. If pragmatism be true, it is a perfectly sound
reproach unless the theories under fire can be shown to have
alternative practical outcomes, however delicate and distant these
may be. The common man and the scientist say they discover no such
outcomes, and if the metaphysician can discern none either, the
others certainly are in the right of it, as against him. His
science is then but pompous trifling; and the endowment of a
professorship for such a being would be silly.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Accordingly, in every genuine metaphysical debate some practical
issue, however conjectural and remote, is involved. To realize
this, revert with me to our question, and place yourselves this
time in the world we live in, in the world that HAS a future, that
is yet uncompleted whilst we speak. In this unfinished world the
alternative of 'materialism or theism?' is intensely practical; and
it is worth while for us to spend some minutes of our hour in
seeing that it is so.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">How, indeed, does the program differ for us, according as we
consider that the facts of experience up to date are purposeless
configurations of blind atoms moving according to eternal laws, or
that on the other hand they are due to the providence of God? As
far as the past facts go, indeed there is no difference. Those
facts are in, are bagged, are captured; and the good that's in them
is gained, be the atoms or be the God their cause. There are
accordingly many materialists about us to-day who, ignoring
altogether the future and practical aspects of the question, seek
to eliminate the odium attaching to the word materialism, and even
to eliminate the word itself, by showing that, if matter could give
birth to all these gains, why then matter, functionally considered,
is just as divine an entity as God, in fact coalesces with God, is
what you mean by God. Cease, these persons advise us, to use either
of these terms, with their outgrown opposition. Use a term free of
the clerical connotations, on the one hand; of the suggestion of
gross-ness, coarseness, ignobility, on the other. Talk of the
primal mystery, of the unknowable energy, of the one and only
power, instead of saying either God or matter. This is the course
to which Mr. Spencer urges us; and if philosophy were purely
retrospective, he would thereby proclaim himself an excellent
pragmatist.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But philosophy is prospective also, and, after finding what the
world has been and done and yielded, still asks the further
question 'what does the world PROMISE?' Give us a matter that
promises SUCCESS, that is bound by its laws to lead our world ever
nearer to perfection, and any rational man will worship that matter
as readily as Mr. Spencer worships his own so-called unknowable
power. It not only has made for righteousness up to date, but it
will make for righteousness forever; and that is all we need. Doing
practically all that a God can do, it is equivalent to God, its
function is a God's function, and is exerted in a world in which a
God would now be superfluous; from such a world a God could never
lawfully be missed. 'Cosmic emotion' would here be the right name
for religion.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But is the matter by which Mr. Spencer's process of cosmic
evolution is carried on any such principle of never-ending
perfection as this? Indeed it is not, for the future end of every
cosmically evolved thing or system of things is foretold by science
to be death and tragedy; and Mr. Spencer, in confining himself to
the aesthetic and ignoring the practical side of the controversy,
has really contributed nothing serious to its relief. But apply now
our principle of practical results, and see what a vital
significance the question of materialism or theism immediately
acquires.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Theism and materialism, so indifferent when taken
retrospectively, point, when we take them prospectively, to wholly
different outlooks of experience. For, according to the theory of
mechanical evolution, the laws of redistribution of matter and
motion, tho they are certainly to thank for all the good hours
which our organisms have ever yielded us and for all the ideals
which our minds now frame, are yet fatally certain to undo their
work again, and to redissolve everything that they have once
evolved. You all know the picture of the last state of the universe
which evolutionary science foresees. I cannot state it better than
in Mr. Balfour's words: "The energies of our system will decay, the
glory of the sun will be dimmed, and the earth, tideless and inert,
will no longer tolerate the race which has for a moment disturbed
its solitude. Man will go down into the pit, and all his thoughts
will perish. The uneasy, consciousness which in this obscure corner
has for a brief space broken the contented silence of the universe,
will be at rest. Matter will know itself no longer. 'Imperishable
monuments' and 'immortal deeds,' death itself, and love stronger
than death, will be as though they had never been. Nor will
anything that is, be better or be worse for all that the labour,
genius, devotion, and suffering of man have striven through
countless generations to effect." [Footnote: The Foundations of
Belief, p. 30.]</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">That is the sting of it, that in the vast driftings of the
cosmic weather, tho many a jeweled shore appears, and many an
enchanted cloud-bank floats away, long lingering ere it be
dissolved--even as our world now lingers, for our joy-yet when
these transient products are gone, nothing, absolutely NOTHING
remains, of represent those particular qualities, those elements of
preciousness which they may have enshrined. Dead and gone are they,
gone utterly from the very sphere and room of being. Without an
echo; without a memory; without an influence on aught that may come
after, to make it care for similar ideals. This utter final wreck
and tragedy is of the essence of scientific materialism as at
present understood. The lower and not the higher forces are the
eternal forces, or the last surviving forces within the only cycle
of evolution which we can definitely see. Mr. Spencer believes this
as much as anyone; so why should he argue with us as if we were
making silly aesthetic objections to the 'grossness' of 'matter and
motion,' the principles of his philosophy, when what really dismays
us is the disconsolateness of its ulterior practical results?</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">No the true objection to materialism is not positive but
negative. It would be farcical at this day to make complaint of it
for what it IS for 'grossness.' Grossness is what grossness
DOES--we now know THAT. We make complaint of it, on the contrary,
for what it is NOT-- not a permanent warrant for our more ideal
interests, not a fulfiller of our remotest hopes.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The notion of God, on the other hand, however inferior it may be
in clearness to those mathematical notions so current in mechanical
philosophy, has at least this practical superiority over them, that
it guarantees an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved. A
world with a God in it to say the last word, may indeed burn up or
freeze, but we then think of him as still mindful of the old ideals
and sure to bring them elsewhere to fruition; so that, where he is,
tragedy is only provisional and partial, and shipwreck and
dissolution not the absolutely final things. This need of an
eternal moral order is one of the deepest needs of our breast. And
those poets, like Dante and Wordsworth, who live on the conviction
of such an order, owe to that fact the extraordinary tonic and
consoling power of their verse. Here then, in these different
emotional and practical appeals, in these adjustments of our
concrete attitudes of hope and expectation, and all the delicate
consequences which their differences entail, lie the real meanings
of materialism and spiritualism--not in hair-splitting abstractions
about matter's inner essence, or about the metaphysical attributes
of God. Materialism means simply the denial that the moral order is
eternal, and the cutting off of ultimate hopes; spiritualism means
the affirmation of an eternal moral order and the letting loose of
hope. Surely here is an issue genuine enough, for anyone who feels
it; and, as long as men are men, it will yield matter for a serious
philosophic debate.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But possibly some of you may still rally to their defence. Even
whilst admitting that spiritualism and materialism make different
prophecies of the world's future, you may yourselves pooh-pooh the
difference as something so infinitely remote as to mean nothing for
a sane mind. The essence of a sane mind, you may say, is to take
shorter views, and to feel no concern about such chimaeras as the
latter end of the world. Well, I can only say that if you say this,
you do injustice to human nature. Religious melancholy is not
disposed of by a simple flourish of the word insanity. The absolute
things, the last things, the overlapping things, are the truly
philosophic concerns; all superior minds feel seriously about them,
and the mind with the shortest views is simply the mind of the more
shallow man.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The issues of fact at stake in the debate are of course vaguely
enough conceived by us at present. But spiritualistic faith in all
its forms deals with a world of PROMISE, while materialism's sun
sets in a sea of disappointment. Remember what I said of the
Absolute: it grants us moral holidays. Any religious view does
this. It not only incites our more strenuous moments, but it also
takes our joyous, careless, trustful moments, and it justifies
them. It paints the grounds of justification vaguely enough, to be
sure. The exact features of the saving future facts that our belief
in God insures, will have to be ciphered out by the interminable
methods of science: we can STUDY our God only by studying his
Creation. But we can ENJOY our God, if we have one, in advance of
all that labor. I myself believe that the evidence for God lies
primarily in inner personal experiences. When they have once given
you your God, his name means at least the benefit of the holiday.
You remember what I said yesterday about the way in which truths
clash and try to 'down' each other. The truth of 'God' has to run
the gauntlet of all our other truths. It is on trial by them and
they on trial by it. Our FINAL opinion about God can be settled
only after all the truths have straightened themselves out
together. Let us hope that they shall find a modus vivendi!</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Let me pass to a very cognate philosophic problem, the QUESTION
of DESIGN IN NATURE. God's existence has from time immemorial been
held to be proved by certain natural facts. Many facts appear as if
expressly designed in view of one another. Thus the woodpecker's
bill, tongue, feet, tail, etc., fit him wondrously for a world of
trees with grubs hid in their bark to feed upon. The parts of our
eye fit the laws of light to perfection, leading its rays to a
sharp picture on our retina. Such mutual fitting of things diverse
in origin argued design, it was held; and the designer was always
treated as a man-loving deity.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The first step in these arguments was to prove that the design
existed. Nature was ransacked for results obtained through separate
things being co-adapted. Our eyes, for instance, originate in
intra- uterine darkness, and the light originates in the sun, yet
see how they fit each other. They are evidently made FOR each
other. Vision is the end designed, light and eyes the separate
means devised for its attainment.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">It is strange, considering how unanimously our ancestors felt
the force of this argument, to see how little it counts for since
the triumph of the darwinian theory. Darwin opened our minds to the
power of chance-happenings to bring forth 'fit' results if only
they have time to add themselves together. He showed the enormous
waste of nature in producing results that get destroyed because of
their unfitness. He also emphasized the number of adaptations
which, if designed, would argue an evil rather than a good
designer. Here all depends upon the point of view. To the grub
under the bark the exquisite fitness of the woodpecker's organism
to extract him would certainly argue a diabolical designer.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Theologians have by this time stretched their minds so as to
embrace the darwinian facts, and yet to interpret them as still
showing divine purpose. It used to be a question of purpose AGAINST
mechanism, of one OR the other. It was as if one should say "My
shoes are evidently designed to fit my feet, hence it is impossible
that they should have been produced by machinery." We know that
they are both: they are made by a machinery itself designed to fit
the feet with shoes. Theology need only stretch similarly the
designs of God. As the aim of a football-team is not merely to get
the ball to a certain goal (if that were so, they would simply get
up on some dark night and place it there), but to get it there by a
fixed MACHINERY OF CONDITIONS--the game's rules and the opposing
players; so the aim of God is not merely, let us say, to make men
and to save them, but rather to get this done through the sole
agency of nature's vast machinery. Without nature's stupendous laws
and counterforces, man's creation and perfection, we might suppose,
would be too insipid achievements for God to have designed
them.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">This saves the form of the design-argument at the expense of its
old easy human content. The designer is no longer the old man-like
deity. His designs have grown so vast as to be incomprehensible to
us humans. The WHAT of them so overwhelms us that to establish the
mere THAT of a designer for them becomes of very little consequence
in comparison. We can with difficulty comprehend the character of a
cosmic mind whose purposes are fully revealed by the strange
mixture of goods and evils that we find in this actual world's
particulars. Or rather we cannot by any possibility comprehend it.
The mere word 'design' by itself has, we see, no consequences and
explains nothing. It is the barrenest of principles. The old
question of WHETHER there is design is idle. The real question is
WHAT is the world, whether or not it have a designer--and that can
be revealed only by the study of all nature's particulars.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Remember that no matter what nature may have produced or may be
producing, the means must necessarily have been adequate, must have
been FITTED TO THAT PRODUCTION. The argument from fitness to design
would consequently always apply, whatever were the product's
character. The recent Mont-Pelee eruption, for example, required
all previous history to produce that exact combination of ruined
houses, human and animal corpses, sunken ships, volcanic ashes,
etc., in just that one hideous configuration of positions. France
had to be a nation and colonize Martinique. Our country had to
exist and send our ships there. IF God aimed at just that result,
the means by which the centuries bent their influences towards it,
showed exquisite intelligence. And so of any state of things
whatever, either in nature or in history, which we find actually
realized. For the parts of things must always make SOME definite
resultant, be it chaotic or harmonious. When we look at what has
actually come, the conditions must always appear perfectly designed
to ensure it. We can always say, therefore, in any conceivable
world, of any conceivable character, that the whole cosmic
machinery MAY have been designed to produce it.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Pragmatically, then, the abstract word 'design' is a blank
cartridge. It carries no consequences, it does no execution. What
sort of design? and what sort of a designer? are the only serious
questions, and the study of facts is the only way of getting even
approximate answers. Meanwhile, pending the slow answer from facts,
anyone who insists that there is a designer and who is sure he is a
divine one, gets a certain pragmatic benefit from the term--the
same, in fact which we saw that the terms God, Spirit, or the
Absolute, yield us 'Design,' worthless tho it be as a mere
rationalistic principle set above or behind things for our
admiration, becomes, if our faith concretes it into something
theistic, a term of PROMISE. Returning with it into experience, we
gain a more confiding outlook on the future. If not a blind force
but a seeing force runs things, we may reasonably expect better
issues. This vague confidence in the future is the sole pragmatic
meaning at present discernible in the terms design and designer.
But if cosmic confidence is right not wrong, better not worse, that
is a most important meaning. That much at least of possible 'truth'
the terms will then have in them.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Let me take up another well-worn controversy, THE FREE-WILL
PROBLEM. Most persons who believe in what is called their free-will
do so after the rationalistic fashion. It is a principle, a
positive faculty or virtue added to man, by which his dignity is
enigmatically augmented. He ought to believe it for this reason.
Determinists, who deny it, who say that individual men originate
nothing, but merely transmit to the future the whole push of the
past cosmos of which they are so small an expression, diminish man.
He is less admirable, stripped of this creative principle. I
imagine that more than half of you share our instinctive belief in
free- will, and that admiration of it as a principle of dignity has
much to do with your fidelity.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But free-will has also been discussed pragmatically, and,
strangely enough, the same pragmatic interpretation has been put
upon it by both disputants. You know how large a part questions of
ACCOUNTABILITY have played in ethical controversy. To hear some
persons, one would suppose that all that ethics aims at is a code
of merits and demerits. Thus does the old legal and theological
leaven, the interest in crime and sin and punishment abide with us.
'Who's to blame? whom can we punish? whom will God punish?'--these
preoccupations hang like a bad dream over man's religious
history.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">So both free-will and determinism have been inveighed against
and called absurd, because each, in the eyes of its enemies, has
seemed to prevent the 'imputability' of good or bad deeds to their
authors. Queer antinomy this! Free-will means novelty, the grafting
on to the past of something not involved therein. If our acts were
predetermined, if we merely transmitted the push of the whole past,
the free-willists say, how could we be praised or blamed for
anything? We should be 'agents' only, not 'principals,' and where
then would be our precious imputability and responsibility?</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But where would it be if we HAD free-will? rejoin the
determinists. If a 'free' act be a sheer novelty, that comes not
FROM me, the previous me, but ex nihilo, and simply tacks itself on
to me, how can <em>I</em>, the previous I, be responsible? How can
I have any permanent CHARACTER that will stand still long enough
for praise or blame to be awarded? The chaplet of my days tumbles
into a cast of disconnected beads as soon as the thread of inner
necessity is drawn out by the preposterous indeterminist doctrine.
Messrs. Fullerton and McTaggart have recently laid about them
doughtily with this argument.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">It may be good ad hominem, but otherwise it is pitiful. For I
ask you, quite apart from other reasons, whether any man, woman or
child, with a sense for realities, ought not to be ashamed to plead
such principles as either dignity or imputability. Instinct and
utility between them can safely be trusted to carry on the social
business of punishment and praise. If a man does good acts we shall
praise him, if he does bad acts we shall punish him--anyhow, and
quite apart from theories as to whether the acts result from what
was previous in him or are novelties in a strict sense. To make our
human ethics revolve about the question of 'merit' is a piteous
unreality--God alone can know our merits, if we have any. The real
ground for supposing free-will is indeed pragmatic, but it has
nothing to do with this contemptible right to punish which had made
such a noise in past discussions of the subject.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Free-will pragmatically means NOVELTIES IN THE WORLD, the right
to expect that in its deepest elements as well as in its surface
phenomena, the future may not identically repeat and imitate the
past. That imitation en masse is there, who can deny? The general
'uniformity of nature' is presupposed by every lesser law. But
nature may be only approximately uniform; and persons in whom
knowledge of the world's past has bred pessimism (or doubts as to
the world's good character, which become certainties if that
character be supposed eternally fixed) may naturally welcome free-
will as a MELIORISTIC doctrine. It holds up improvement as at least
possible; whereas determinism assures us that our whole notion of
possibility is born of human ignorance, and that necessity and
impossibility between them rule the destinies of the world.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Free-will is thus a general cosmological theory of PROMISE, just
like the Absolute, God, Spirit or Design. Taken abstractly, no one
of these terms has any inner content, none of them gives us any
picture, and no one of them would retain the least pragmatic value
in a world whose character was obviously perfect from the start.
Elation at mere existence, pure cosmic emotion and delight, would,
it seems to me, quench all interest in those speculations, if the
world were nothing but a lubberland of happiness already. Our
interest in religious metaphysics arises in the fact that our
empirical future feels to us unsafe, and needs some higher
guarantee. If the past and present were purely good, who could wish
that the future might possibly not resemble them? Who could desire
free-will? Who would not say, with Huxley, "let me be wound up
every day like a watch, to go right fatally, and I ask no better
freedom." 'Freedom' in a world already perfect could only mean
freedom to BE WORSE, and who could be so insane as to wish that? To
be necessarily what it is, to be impossibly aught else, would put
the last touch of perfection upon optimism's universe. Surely the
only POSSIBILITY that one can rationally claim is the possibility
that things may be BETTER. That possibility, I need hardly say, is
one that, as the actual world goes, we have ample grounds for
desiderating.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Free-will thus has no meaning unless it be a doctrine of RELIEF.
As such, it takes its place with other religious doctrines. Between
them, they build up the old wastes and repair the former
desolations. Our spirit, shut within this courtyard of sense-
experience, is always saying to the intellect upon the tower:
'Watchman, tell us of the night, if it aught of promise bear,' and
the intellect gives it then these terms of promise.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Other than this practical significance, the words God,
free-will, design, etc., have none. Yet dark tho they be in
themselves, or intellectualistically taken, when we bear them into
life's thicket with us the darkness THERE grows light about us. If
you stop, in dealing with such words, with their definition,
thinking that to be an intellectual finality, where are you?
Stupidly staring at a pretentious sham! "Deus est Ens, a se, extra
et supra omne genus, necessarium, unum, infinite perfectum,
simplex, immutabile, immensum, aeternum, intelligens,"
etc.,--wherein is such a definition really instructive? It means
less, than nothing, in its pompous robe of adjectives. Pragmatism
alone can read a positive meaning into it, and for that she turns
her back upon the intellectualist point of view altogether. 'God's
in his heaven; all's right with the world!'--THAT'S the heart of
your theology, and for that you need no rationalist
definitions.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Why shouldn't we all of us, rationalists as well as pragmatists,
confess this? Pragmatism, so far from keeping her eyes bent on the
immediate practical foreground, as she is accused of doing, dwells
just as much upon the world's remotest perspectives.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">See then how all these ultimate questions turn, as it were, up
their hinges; and from looking backwards upon principles, upon an
erkenntnisstheoretische Ich, a God, a Kausalitaetsprinzip, a
Design, a Free-will, taken in themselves, as something august and
exalted above facts,--see, I say, how pragmatism shifts the
emphasis and looks forward into facts themselves. The really vital
question for us all is, What is this world going to be? What is
life eventually to make of itself? The centre of gravity of
philosophy must therefore alter its place. The earth of things,
long thrown into shadow by the glories of the upper ether, must
resume its rights. To shift the emphasis in this way means that
philosophic questions will fall to be treated by minds of a less
abstractionist type than heretofore, minds more scientific and
individualistic in their tone yet not irreligious either. It will
be an alteration in 'the seat of authority' that reminds one almost
of the protestant reformation. And as, to papal minds,
protestantism has often seemed a mere mess of anarchy and
confusion, such, no doubt, will pragmatism often seem to
ultra-rationalist minds in philosophy. It will seem so much sheer
trash, philosophically. But life wags on, all the same, and
compasses its ends, in protestant countries. I venture to think
that philosophic protestantism will compass a not dissimilar
prosperity.</div>
<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="wikisource_Lecture_IV:_The_One_and_the_Many">Lecture IV: The One and the
Many</span></h2>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">We saw in the last lecture that the pragmatic method, in its
dealings with certain concepts, instead of ending with admiring
contemplation, plunges forward into the river of experience with
them and prolongs the perspective by their means. Design,
free-will, the absolute mind, spirit instead of matter, have for
their sole meaning a better promise as to this world's outcome. Be
they false or be they true, the meaning of them is this meliorism.
I have sometimes thought of the phenomenon called 'total reflexion'
in optics as a good symbol of the relation between abstract ideas
and concrete realities, as pragmatism conceives it. Hold a tumbler
of water a little above your eyes and look up through the water at
its surface--or better still look similarly through the flat wall
of an aquarium. You will then see an extraordinarily brilliant
reflected image say of a candle-flame, or any other clear object,
situated on the opposite side of the vessel. No candle-ray, under
these circumstances gets beyond the water's surface: every ray is
totally reflected back into the depths again. Now let the water
represent the world of sensible facts, and let the air above it
represent the world of abstract ideas. Both worlds are real, of
course, and interact; but they interact only at their boundary, and
the locus of everything that lives, and happens to us, so far as
full experience goes, is the water. We are like fishes swimming in
the sea of sense, bounded above by the superior element, but unable
to breathe it pure or penetrate it. We get our oxygen from it,
however, we touch it incessantly, now in this part, now in that,
and every time we touch it we are reflected back into the water
with our course re- determined and re-energized. The abstract ideas
of which the air consists, indispensable for life, but irrespirable
by themselves, as it were, and only active in their re-directing
function. All similes are halting but this one rather takes my
fancy. It shows how something, not sufficient for life in itself,
may nevertheless be an effective determinant of life elsewhere.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">In this present hour I wish to illustrate the pragmatic method
by one more application. I wish to turn its light upon the ancient
problem of 'the one and the many.' I suspect that in but few of you
has this problem occasioned sleepless nights, and I should not be
astonished if some of you told me it had never vexed you. I myself
have come, by long brooding over it, to consider it the most
central of all philosophic problems, central because so pregnant. I
mean by this that if you know whether a man is a decided monist or
a decided pluralist, you perhaps know more about the rest of his
opinions than if you give him any other name ending in IST. To
believe in the one or in the many, that is the classification with
the maximum number of consequences. So bear with me for an hour
while I try to inspire you with my own interest in the problem.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Philosophy has often been defined as the quest or the vision of
the world's unity. We never hear this definition challenged, and it
is true as far as it goes, for philosophy has indeed manifested
above all things its interest in unity. But how about the VARIETY
in things? Is that such an irrelevant matter? If instead of using
the term philosophy, we talk in general of our intellect and its
needs we quickly see that unity is only one of these. Acquaintance
with the details of fact is always reckoned, along with their
reduction to system, as an indispensable mark of mental greatness.
Your 'scholarly' mind, of encyclopedic, philological type, your man
essentially of learning, has never lacked for praise along with
your philosopher. What our intellect really aims at is neither
variety nor unity taken singly but totality.[Footnote: Compare A.
Bellanger: Les concepts de Cause, et l'activite intentionelle de
l'Esprit. Paris, Alcan, 1905, p. 79 ff.] In this, acquaintance with
reality's diversities is as important as understanding their
connexion. The human passion of curiosity runs on all fours with
the systematizing passion.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">In spite of this obvious fact the unity of things has always
been considered more illustrious, as it were, than their variety.
When a young man first conceives the notion that the whole world
forms one great fact, with all its parts moving abreast, as it
were, and interlocked, he feels as if he were enjoying a great
insight, and looks superciliously on all who still fall short of
this sublime conception. Taken thus abstractly as it first comes to
one, the monistic insight is so vague as hardly to seem worth
defending intellectually. Yet probably everyone in this audience in
some way cherishes it. A certain abstract monism, a certain
emotional response to the character of oneness, as if it were a
feature of the world not coordinate with its manyness, but vastly
more excellent and eminent, is so prevalent in educated circles
that we might almost call it a part of philosophic common sense. Of
COURSE the world is one, we say. How else could it be a world at
all? Empiricists as a rule, are as stout monists of this abstract
kind as rationalists are.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The difference is that the empiricists are less dazzled. Unity
doesn't blind them to everything else, doesn't quench their
curiosity for special facts, whereas there is a kind of rationalist
who is sure to interpret abstract unity mystically and to forget
everything else, to treat it as a principle; to admire and worship
it; and thereupon to come to a full stop intellectually.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">'The world is One!'--the formula may become a sort of number-
worship. 'Three' and 'seven' have, it is true, been reckoned sacred
numbers; but, abstractly taken, why is 'one' more excellent than
'forty-three,' or than 'two million and ten'? In this first vague
conviction of the world's unity, there is so little to take hold of
that we hardly know what we mean by it.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The only way to get forward with our notion is to treat it
pragmatically. Granting the oneness to exist, what facts will be
different in consequence? What will the unity be known-as? The
world is one--yes, but HOW one? What is the practical value of the
oneness for US?</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Asking such questions, we pass from the vague to the definite,
from the abstract to the concrete. Many distinct ways in which
oneness predicated of the universe might make a difference, come to
view. I will note successively the more obvious of these ways.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">1. First, the world is at least ONE SUBJECT OF DISCOURSE. If its
manyness were so irremediable as to permit NO union whatever of it
parts, not even our minds could 'mean' the whole of it at once: the
would be like eyes trying to look in opposite directions. But in
point of fact we mean to cover the whole of it by our abstract term
'world' or 'universe,' which expressly intends that no part shall
be left out. Such unity of discourse carries obviously no farther
monistic specifications. A 'chaos,' once so named, has as much
unity of discourse as a cosmos. It is an odd fact that many monists
consider a great victory scored for their side when pluralists say
'the universe is many.' "'The universe'!" they chuckle--"his speech
bewrayeth him. He stands confessed of monism out of his own mouth."
Well, let things be one in that sense! You can then fling such a
word as universe at the whole collection of them, but what matters
it? It still remains to be ascertained whether they are one in any
other sense that is more valuable.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">2. Are they, for example, CONTINUOUS? Can you pass from one to
another, keeping always in your one universe without any danger of
falling out? In other words, do the parts of our universe HANG
together, instead of being like detached grains of sand?</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Even grains of sand hang together through the space in which
they are embedded, and if you can in any way move through such
space, you can pass continuously from number one of them to number
two. Space and time are thus vehicles of continuity, by which the
world's parts hang together. The practical difference to us,
resultant from these forms of union, is immense. Our whole motor
life is based upon them.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">3. There are innumerable other paths of practical continuity
among things. Lines of INFLUENCE can be traced by which they
together. Following any such line you pass from one thing to
another till you may have covered a good part of the universe's
extent. Gravity and heat-conduction are such all-uniting
influences, so far as the physical world goes. Electric, luminous
and chemical influences follow similar lines of influence. But
opaque and inert bodies interrupt the continuity here, so that you
have to step round them, or change your mode of progress if you
wish to get farther on that day. Practically, you have then lost
your universe's unity, SO FAR AS IT WAS CONSTITUTED BY THOSE FIRST
LINES OF INFLUENCE. There are innumerable kinds of connexion that
special things have with other special things; and the ENSEMBLE of
any one of these connexions forms one sort of system by which
things are conjoined. Thus men are conjoined in a vast network of
ACQUAINTANCESHIP. Brown knows Jones, Jones knows Robinson, etc.;
and BY CHOOSING YOUR FARTHER INTERMEDIARIES RIGHTLY you may carry a
message from Jones to the Empress of China, or the Chief of the
African Pigmies, or to anyone else in the inhabited world. But you
are stopped short, as by a non- conductor, when you choose one man
wrong in this experiment. What may be called love-systems are
grafted on the acquaintance-system. A loves (or hates) B; B loves
(or hates) C, etc. But these systems are smaller than the great
acquaintance-system that they presuppose.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Human efforts are daily unifying the world more and more in
definite systematic ways. We found colonial, postal, consular,
commercial systems, all the parts of which obey definite influences
that propagate themselves within the system but not to facts
outside of it. The result is innumerable little hangings-together
of the world's parts within the larger hangings-together, little
worlds, not only of discourse but of operation, within the wider
universe. Each system exemplifies one type or grade of union, its
parts being strung on that peculiar kind of relation, and the same
part may figure in many different systems, as a man may hold
several offices and belong to various clubs. From this 'systematic'
point of view, therefore, the pragmatic value of the world's unity
is that all these definite networks actually and practically exist.
Some are more enveloping and extensive, some less so; they are
superposed upon each other; and between them all they let no
individual elementary part of the universe escape. Enormous as is
the amount of disconnexion among things (for these systematic
influences and conjunctions follow rigidly exclusive paths),
everything that exists is influenced in SOME way by something else,
if you can only pick the way out rightly Loosely speaking, and in
general, it may be said that all things cohere and adhere to each
other SOMEHOW, and that the universe exists practically in
reticulated or concatenated forms which make of it a continuous or
'integrated' affair. Any kind of influence whatever helps to make
the world one, so far as you can follow it from next to next. You
may then say that 'the world IS One'--meaning in these respects,
namely, and just so far as they obtain. But just as definitely is
it NOT one, so far as they do not obtain; and there is no species
of connexion which will not fail, if, instead of choosing
conductors for it, you choose non- conductors. You are then
arrested at your very first step and have to write the world down
as a pure MANY from that particular point of view. If our intellect
had been as much interested in disjunctive as it is in conjunctive
relations, philosophy would have equally successfully celebrated
the world's DISUNION.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The great point is to notice that the oneness and the manyness
are absolutely co-ordinate here. Neither is primordial or more
essential or excellent than the other. Just as with space, whose
separating of things seems exactly on a par with its uniting of
them, but sometimes one function and sometimes the other is what
come home to us most, so, in our general dealings with the world of
influences, we now need conductors and now need non-conductors, and
wisdom lies in knowing which is which at the appropriate
moment.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">4. All these systems of influence or non-influence may be listed
under the general problem of the world's CAUSAL UNITY. If the minor
causal influences among things should converge towards one common
causal origin of them in the past, one great first cause for all
that is, one might then speak of the absolute causal unity of the
world. God's fiat on creation's day has figured in traditional
philosophy as such an absolute cause and origin. Transcendental
Idealism, translating 'creation' into 'thinking' (or 'willing to'
think') calls the divine act 'eternal' rather than 'first'; but the
union of the many here is absolute, just the same--the many would
not BE, save for the One. Against this notion of the unity of
origin of all there has always stood the pluralistic notion of an
eternal self-existing many in the shape of atoms or even of
spiritual units of some sort. The alternative has doubtless a
pragmatic meaning, but perhaps, as far as these lectures go, we had
better leave the question of unity of origin unsettled.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">5. The most important sort of union that obtains among things,
pragmatically speaking, is their GENERIC UNITY. Things exist in
kinds, there are many specimens in each kind, and what the 'kind'
implies for one specimen, it implies also for every other specimen
of that kind. We can easily conceive that every fact in the world
might be singular, that is, unlike any other fact and sole of its
kind. In such a world of singulars our logic would be useless, for
logic works by predicating of the single instance what is true of
all its kind. With no two things alike in the world, we should be
unable to reason from our past experiences to our future ones. The
existence of so much generic unity in things is thus perhaps the
most momentous pragmatic specification of what it may mean to say
'the world is One.' ABSOLUTE generic unity would obtain if there
were one summum genus under which all things without exception
could be eventually subsumed. 'Beings,' 'thinkables,'
'experiences,' would be candidates for this position. Whether the
alternatives expressed by such words have any pragmatic
significance or not, is another question which I prefer to leave
unsettled just now.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">6. Another specification of what the phrase 'the world is One'
may mean is UNITY OF PURPOSE. An enormous number of things in the
world subserve a common purpose. All the man-made systems,
administrative, industrial, military, or what not, exist each for
its controlling purpose. Every living being pursues its own
peculiar purposes. They co-operate, according to the degree of
their development, in collective or tribal purposes, larger ends
thus enveloping lesser ones, until an absolutely single, final and
climacteric purpose subserved by all things without exception might
conceivably be reached. It is needless to say that the appearances
conflict with such a view. Any resultant, as I said in my third
lecture, MAY have been purposed in advance, but none of the results
we actually know in is world have in point of fact been purposed in
advance in all their details. Men and nations start with a vague
notion of being rich, or great, or good. Each step they make brings
unforeseen chances into sight, and shuts out older vistas, and the
specifications of the general purpose have to be daily changed.
What is reached in the end may be better or worse than what was
proposed, but it is always more complex and different.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Our different purposes also are at war with each other. Where
one can't crush the other out, they compromise; and the result is
again different from what anyone distinctly proposed beforehand.
Vaguely and generally, much of what was purposed may be gained; but
everything makes strongly for the view that our world is
incompletely unified teleologically and is still trying to get its
unification better organized.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Whoever claims ABSOLUTE teleological unity, saying that there is
one purpose that every detail of the universe subserves, dogmatizes
at his own risk. Theologians who dogmalize thus find it more and
more impossible, as our acquaintance with the warring interests of
the world's parts grows more concrete, to imagine what the one
climacteric purpose may possibly be like. We see indeed that
certain evils minister to ulterior goods, that the bitter makes the
cocktail better, and that a bit of danger or hardship puts us
agreeably to our trumps. We can vaguely generalize this into the
doctrine that all the evil in the universe is but instrumental to
its greater perfection. But the scale of the evil actually in sight
defies all human tolerance; and transcendental idealism, in the
pages of a Bradley or a Royce, brings us no farther than the book
of Job did-- God's ways are not our ways, so let us put our hands
upon our mouth. A God who can relish such superfluities of horror
is no God for human beings to appeal to. His animal spirits are too
high. In other words the 'Absolute' with his one purpose, is not
the man-like God of common people.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">7. AESTHETIC UNION among things also obtains, and is very
analogous to ideological union. Things tell a story. Their parts
hang together so as to work out a climax. They play into each
other's hands expressively. Retrospectively, we can see that altho
no definite purpose presided over a chain of events, yet the events
fell into a dramatic form, with a start, a middle, and a finish. In
point of fact all stories end; and here again the point of view of
a many is that more natural one to take. The world is full of
partial stories that run parallel to one another, beginning and
ending at odd times. They mutually interlace and interfere at
points, but we cannot unify them completely in our minds. In
following your life-history, I must temporarily turn my attention
from my own. Even a biographer of twins would have to press them
alternately upon his reader's attention.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">It follows that whoever says that the whole world tells one
story utters another of those monistic dogmas that a man believes
at his risk. It is easy to see the world's history pluralistically,
as a rope of which each fibre tells a separate tale; but to
conceive of each cross-section of the rope as an absolutely single
fact, and to sum the whole longitudinal series into one being
living an undivided life, is harder. We have indeed the analogy of
embryology to help us. The microscopist makes a hundred flat
cross-sections of a given embryo, and mentally unites them into one
solid whole. But the great world's ingredients, so far as they are
beings, seem, like the rope's fibres, to be discontinuous
cross-wise, and to cohere only in the longitudinal direction.
Followed in that direction they are many. Even the embryologist,
when he follows the DEVELOPMENT of his object, has to treat the
history of each single organ in turn. ABSOLUTE aesthetic union is
thus another barely abstract ideal. The world appears as something
more epic than dramatic.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">So far, then, we see how the world is unified by its many
systems, kinds, purposes, and dramas. That there is more union in
all these ways than openly appears is certainly true. That there
MAY be one sovereign purpose, system, kind, and story, is a
legitimate hypothesis. All I say here is that it is rash to affirm
this dogmatically without better evidence than we possess at
present.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">8. The GREAT monistic DENKMITTEL for a hundred years past has
been the notion of THE ONE KNOWER. The many exist only as objects
for his thought--exist in his dream, as it were; and AS HE KNOWS
them, they have one purpose, form one system, tell one tale for
him. This notion of an ALL-ENVELOPING NOETIC UNITY in things is the
sublimest achievement of intellectualist philosophy. Those who
believe in the Absolute, as the all-knower is termed, usually say
that they do so for coercive reasons, which clear thinkers cannot
evade. The Absolute has far-reaching practical consequences, some
of which I drew attention in my second lecture. Many kinds of
difference important to us would surely follow from its being true.
I cannot here enter into all the logical proofs of such a Being's
existence, farther than to say that none of them seem to me sound.
I must therefore treat the notion of an All-Knower simply as an
hypothesis, exactly on a par logically with the pluralist notion
that there is no point of view, no focus of information extant,
from which the entire content of the universe is visible at once.
"God's consciousness," says Professor Royce,[Footnote: The
Conception of God, New York, 1897, p. 292.] "forms in its wholeness
one luminously transparent conscious moment"--this is the type of
noetic unity on which rationalism insists. Empiricism on the other
hand is satisfied with the type of noetic unity that is humanly
familiar. Everything gets known by SOME knower along with something
else; but the knowers may in the end be irreducibly many, and the
greatest knower of them all may yet not know the whole of
everything, or even know what he does know at one single
stroke:--he may be liable to forget. Whichever type obtained, the
world would still be a universe noetically. Its parts would be
conjoined by knowledge, but in the one case the knowledge would be
absolutely unified, in the other it would be strung along and
overlapped.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The notion of one instantaneous or eternal Knower--either
adjective here means the same thing--is, as I said, the great
intellectualist achievement of our time. It has practically driven
out that conception of 'Substance' which earlier philosophers set
such store by, and by which so much unifying work used to be
done--universal substance which alone has being in and from itself,
and of which all the particulars of experience are but forms to
which it gives support. Substance has succumbed to the pragmatic
criticisms of the English school. It appears now only as another
name for the fact that phenomena as they come are actually grouped
and given in coherent forms, the very forms in which we finite
knowers experience or think them together. These forms of
conjunction are as much parts of the tissue of experience as are
the terms which they connect; and it is a great pragmatic
achievement for recent idealism to have made the world hang
together in these directly representable ways instead of drawing
its unity from the 'inherence' of its parts--whatever that may
mean--in an unimaginable principle behind the scenes.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">'The world is one,' therefore, just so far as we experience it
to be concatenated, one by as many definite conjunctions as appear.
But then also NOT one by just as many definite DISjunctions as we
find. The oneness and the manyness of it thus obtain in respects
which can be separately named. It is neither a universe pure and
simple nor a multiverse pure and simple. And its various manners of
being one suggest, for their accurate ascertainment, so many
distinct programs of scientific work. Thus the pragmatic question
'What is the oneness known-as? What practical difference will it
make?' saves us from all feverish excitement over it as a principle
of sublimity and carries us forward into the stream of experience
with a cool head. The stream may indeed reveal far more connexion
and union than we now suspect, but we are not entitled on pragmatic
principles to claim absolute oneness in any respect in advance.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">It is so difficult to see definitely what absolute oneness can
mean, that probably the majority of you are satisfied with the
sober attitude which we have reached. Nevertheless there are
possibly some radically monistic souls among you who are not
content to leave the one and the many on a par. Union of various
grades, union of diverse types, union that stops at non-conductors,
union that merely goes from next to next, and means in many cases
outer nextness only, and not a more internal bond, union of
concatenation, in short; all that sort of thing seems to you a
halfway stage of thought. The oneness of things, superior to their
manyness, you think must also be more deeply true, must be the more
real aspect of the world. The pragmatic view, you are sure, gives
us a universe imperfectly rational. The real universe must form an
unconditional unit of being, something consolidated, with its parts
co-implicated through and through. Only then could we consider our
estate completely rational. There is no doubt whatever that this
ultra-monistic way of thinking means a great deal to many minds.
"One Life, One Truth, one Love, one Principle, One Good, One
God"--I quote from a Christian Science leaflet which the day's mail
brings into my hands--beyond doubt such a confession of faith has
pragmatically an emotional value, and beyond doubt the word 'one'
contributes to the value quite as much as the other words. But if
we try to realize INTELLECTUALLY what we can possibly MEAN by such
a glut of oneness we are thrown right back upon our pragmatistic
determinations again. It means either the mere name One, the
universe of discourse; or it means the sum total of all the
ascertainable particular conjunctions and concatenations; or,
finally, it means some one vehicle of conjunction treated as
all-inclusive, like one origin, one purpose, or one knower. In
point of fact it always means one KNOWER to those who take it
intellectually to-day. The one knower involves, they think, the
other forms of conjunction. His world must have all its parts
co-implicated in the one logical-aesthetical-teleological
unit-picture which is his eternal dream.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The character of the absolute knower's picture is however so
impossible for us to represent clearly, that we may fairly suppose
that the authority which absolute monism undoubtedly possesses, and
probably always will possess over some persons, draws its strength
far less from intellectual than from mystical grounds. To interpret
absolute monism worthily, be a mystic. Mystical states of mind in
every degree are shown by history, usually tho not always, to make
for the monistic view. This is no proper occasion to enter upon the
general subject of mysticism, but I will quote one mystical
pronouncement to show just what I mean. The paragon of all monistic
systems is the Vedanta philosophy of Hindostan, and the paragon of
Vedantist missionaries was the late Swami Vivekananda who visited
our shores some years ago. The method of Vedantism is the mystical
method. You do not reason, but after going through a certain
discipline YOU SEE, and having seen, you can report the truth.
Vivekananda thus reports the truth in one of his lectures here:</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">"Where is any more misery for him who sees this Oneness in the
Universe...this Oneness of life, Oneness of everything? ...This
separation between man and man, man and woman, man and child,
nation from nation, earth from moon, moon from sun, this separation
between atom and atom is the cause really of all the misery, and
the Vedanta says this separation does not exist, it is not real. It
is merely apparent, on the surface. In the heart of things there is
Unity still. If you go inside you find that Unity between man and
man, women and children, races and races, high and low, rich and
poor, the gods and men: all are One, and animals too, if you go
deep enough, and he who has attained to that has no more delusion.
... Where is any more delusion for him? What can delude him? He
knows the reality of everything, the secret of everything. Where is
there any more misery for him? What does he desire? He has traced
the reality of everything unto the Lord, that centre, that Unity of
everything, and that is Eternal Bliss, Eternal Knowledge, Eternal
Existence. Neither death nor disease, nor sorrow nor misery, nor
discontent is there ... in the centre, the reality, there is no one
to be mourned for, no one to be sorry for. He has penetrated
everything, the Pure One, the Formless, the Bodiless, the
Stainless, He the Knower, He the Great Poet, the Self-Existent, He
who is giving to everyone what he deserves."</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Observe how radical the character of the monism here is.
Separation is not simply overcome by the One, it is denied to
exist. There is no many. We are not parts of the One; It has no
parts; and since in a sense we undeniably ARE, it must be that each
of us is the One, indivisibly and totally. AN ABSOLUTE ONE, AND I
THAT ONE--surely we have here a religion which, emotionally
considered, has a high pragmatic value; it imparts a perfect
sumptuosity of security. As our Swami says in another place:</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">"When man has seen himself as one with the infinite Being of the
universe, when all separateness has ceased, when all men, all
women, all angels, all gods, all animals, all plants, the whole
universe has been melted into that oneness, then all fear
disappears. Whom to fear? Can I hurt myself? Can I kill myself? Can
I injure myself? Do you fear yourself? Then will all sorrow
disappear. What can cause me sorrow? I am the One Existence of the
universe. Then all jealousies will disappear; of whom to be
jealous? Of myself? Then all bad feelings disappear. Against whom
will I have this bad feeling? Against myself? There is none in the
universe but me. ... Kill out this differentiation; kill out this
superstition that there are many. 'He who, in this world of many,
sees that One; he who in this mass of insentiency sees that One
Sentient Being; he who in this world of shadow catches that
Reality, unto him belongs eternal peace, unto none else, unto none
else.'"</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">We all have some ear for this monistic music: it elevates and
reassures. We all have at least the germ of mysticism in us. And
when our idealists recite their arguments for the Absolute, saying
that the slightest union admitted anywhere carries logically
absolute Oneness with it, and that the slightest separation
admitted anywhere logically carries disunion remediless and
complete, I cannot help suspecting that the palpable weak places in
the intellectual reasonings they use are protected from their own
criticism by a mystical feeling that, logic or no logic, absolute
Oneness must somehow at any cost be true. Oneness overcomes MORAL
separateness at any rate. In the passion of love we have the mystic
germ of what might mean a total union of all sentient life. This
mystical germ wakes up in us on hearing the monistic utterances,
acknowledges their authority, and assigns to intellectual
considerations a secondary place.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">I will dwell no longer on these religious and moral aspects of
the question in this lecture. When I come to my final lecture there
will be something more to say.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Leave then out of consideration for the moment the authority
which mystical insights may be conjectured eventually to possess;
treat the problem of the One and the Many in a purely intellectual
way; and we see clearly enough where pragmatism stands. With her
criterion of the practical differences that theories make, we see
that she must equally abjure absolute monism and absolute
pluralism. The world is one just so far as its parts hang together
by any definite connexion. It is many just so far as any definite
connexion fails to obtain. And finally it is growing more and more
unified by those systems of connexion at least which human energy
keeps framing as time goes on.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">It is possible to imagine alternative universes to the one we
know, in which the most various grades and types of union should be
embodied. Thus the lowest grade of universe would be a world of
mere WITHNESS, of which the parts were only strung together by the
conjunction 'and.' Such a universe is even now the collection of
our several inner lives. The spaces and times of your imagination,
the objects and events of your day-dreams are not only more or less
incoherent inter se, but are wholly out of definite relation with
the similar contents of anyone else's mind. Our various reveries
now as we sit here compenetrate each other idly without influencing
or interfering. They coexist, but in no order and in no receptacle,
being the nearest approach to an absolute 'many' that we can
conceive. We cannot even imagine any reason why they SHOULD be
known all together, and we can imagine even less, if they were
known together, how they could be known as one systematic
whole.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But add our sensations and bodily actions, and the union mounts
to a much higher grade. Our audita et visa and our acts fall into
those receptacles of time and space in which each event finds its
date and place. They form 'things' and are of 'kinds' too, and can
be classed. Yet we can imagine a world of things and of kinds in
which the causal interactions with which we are so familiar should
not exist. Everything there might be inert towards everything else,
and refuse to propagate its influence. Or gross mechanical
influences might pass, but no chemical action. Such worlds would be
far less unified than ours. Again there might be complete
physico-chemical interaction, but no minds; or minds, but
altogether private ones, with no social life; or social life
limited to acquaintance, but no love; or love, but no customs or
institutions that should systematize it. No one of these grades of
universe would be absolutely irrational or disintegrated, inferior
tho it might appear when looked at from the higher grades. For
instance, if our minds should ever become 'telepathically'
connected, so that we knew immediately, or could under certain
conditions know immediately, each what the other was thinking, the
world we now live in would appear to the thinkers in that world to
have been of an inferior grade.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">With the whole of past eternity open for our conjectures to
range in, it may be lawful to wonder whether the various kinds of
union now realized in the universe that we inhabit may not possibly
have been successively evolved after the fashion in which we now
see human systems evolving in consequence of human needs. If such
an hypothesis were legitimate, total oneness would appear at the
end of things rather than at their origin. In other words the
notion of the 'Absolute' would have to be replaced by that of the
'Ultimate.' The two notions would have the same content--the
maximally unified content of fact, namely--but their time-relations
would be positively reversed. [Footnote: Compare on the Ultimate,
Mr. Schiller's essay "Activity and Substance," in his book entitled
Humanism, p. 204.]</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">After discussing the unity of the universe in this pragmatic
way, you ought to see why I said in my second lecture, borrowing
the word from my friend G. Papini, that pragmatism tends to
UNSTIFFEN all our theories. The world's oneness has generally been
affirmed abstractly only, and as if anyone who questioned it must
be an idiot. The temper of monists has been so vehement, as almost
at times to be convulsive; and this way of holding a doctrine does
not easily go with reasonable discussion and the drawing of
distinctions. The theory of the Absolute, in particular, has had to
be an article of faith, affirmed dogmatically and exclusively. The
One and All, first in the order of being and of knowing, logically
necessary itself, and uniting all lesser things in the bonds of
mutual necessity, how could it allow of any mitigation of its inner
rigidity? The slightest suspicion of pluralism, the minutest wiggle
of independence of any one of its parts from the control of the
totality, would ruin it. Absolute unity brooks no degrees--as well
might you claim absolute purity for a glass of water because it
contains but a single little cholera-germ. The independence,
however infinitesimal, of a part, however small, would be to the
Absolute as fatal as a cholera-germ.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Pluralism on the other hand has no need of this dogmatic
rigoristic temper. Provided you grant SOME separation among things,
some tremor of independence, some free play of parts on one
another, some real novelty or chance, however minute, she is amply
satisfied, and will allow you any amount, however great, of real
union. How much of union there may be is a question that she thinks
can only be decided empirically. The amount may be enormous,
colossal; but absolute monism is shattered if, along with all the
union, there has to be granted the slightest modicum, the most
incipient nascency, or the most residual trace, of a separation
that is not 'overcome.'</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Pragmatism, pending the final empirical ascertainment of just
what the balance of union and disunion among things may be, must
obviously range herself upon the pluralistic side. Some day, she
admits, even total union, with one knower, one origin, and a
universe consolidated in every conceivable way, may turn out to be
the most acceptable of all hypotheses. Meanwhile the opposite
hypothesis, of a world imperfectly unified still, and perhaps
always to remain so, must be sincerely entertained. This latter
hypothesis is pluralism's doctrine. Since absolute monism forbids
its being even considered seriously, branding it as irrational from
the start, it is clear that pragmatism must turn its back on
absolute monism, and follow pluralism's more empirical path.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">This leaves us with the common-sense world, in which we find
things partly joined and partly disjoined. 'Things,' then, and
their 'conjunctions'--what do such words mean, pragmatically
handled? In my next lecture, I will apply the pragmatic method to
the stage of philosophizing known as Common Sense.</div>
<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="wikisource_Lecture_V:_Pragmatism_and_Common_Sense">Lecture V: Pragmatism
and Common Sense</span></h2>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">In the last lecture we turned ourselves from the usual way of
talking of the universe's oneness as a principle, sublime in all
its blankness, towards a study of the special kinds of union which
the universe enfolds. We found many of these to coexist with kinds
of separation equally real. "How far am I verified?" is the
question which each kind of union and each kind of separation asks
us here, so as good pragmatists we have to turn our face towards
experience, towards 'facts.'</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Absolute oneness remains, but only as an hypothesis, and that
hypothesis is reduced nowadays to that of an omniscient knower who
sees all things without exception as forming one single systematic
fact. But the knower in question may still be conceived either as
an Absolute or as an Ultimate; and over against the hypothesis of
him in either form the counter-hypothesis that the widest field of
knowledge that ever was or will be still contains some ignorance,
may be legitimately held. Some bits of information always may
escape.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">This is the hypothesis of NOETIC PLURALISM, which monists
consider so absurd. Since we are bound to treat it as respectfully
as noetic monism, until the facts shall have tipped the beam, we
find that our pragmatism, tho originally nothing but a method, has
forced us to be friendly to the pluralistic view. It MAY be that
some parts of the world are connected so loosely with some other
parts as to be strung along by nothing but the copula AND. They
might even come and go without those other parts suffering any
internal change. This pluralistic view, of a world of ADDITIVE
constitution, is one that pragmatism is unable to rule out from
serious consideration. But this view leads one to the farther
hypothesis that the actual world, instead of being complete
'eternally,' as the monists assure us, may be eternally incomplete,
and at all times subject to addition or liable to loss.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">It IS at any rate incomplete in one respect, and flagrantly so.
The very fact that we debate this question shows that our KNOWLEDGE
is incomplete at present and subject to addition. In respect of the
knowledge it contains the world does genuinely change and grow.
Some general remarks on the way in which our knowledge completes
itself-- when it does complete itself--will lead us very
conveniently into our subject for this lecture, which is 'Common
Sense.'</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">To begin with, our knowledge grows IN SPOTS. The spots may be
large or small, but the knowledge never grows all over: some old
knowledge always remains what it was. Your knowledge of pragmatism,
let us suppose, is growing now. Later, its growth may involve
considerable modification of opinions which you previously held to
be true. But such modifications are apt to be gradual. To take the
nearest possible example, consider these lectures of mine. What you
first gain from them is probably a small amount of new information,
a few new definitions, or distinctions, or points of view. But
while these special ideas are being added, the rest of your
knowledge stands still, and only gradually will you 'line up' your
previous opinions with the novelties I am trying to instil, and
modify to some slight degree their mass.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">You listen to me now, I suppose, with certain prepossessions as
to my competency, and these affect your reception of what I say,
but were I suddenly to break off lecturing, and to begin to sing
'We won't go home till morning' in a rich baritone voice, not only
would that new fact be added to your stock, but it would oblige you
to define me differently, and that might alter your opinion of the
pragmatic philosophy, and in general bring about a rearrangement of
a number of your ideas. Your mind in such processes is strained,
and sometimes painfully so, between its older beliefs and the
novelties which experience brings along.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Our minds thus grow in spots; and like grease-spots, the spots
spread. But we let them spread as little as possible: we keep
unaltered as much of our old knowledge, as many of our old
prejudices and beliefs, as we can. We patch and tinker more than we
renew. The novelty soaks in; it stains the ancient mass; but it is
also tinged by what absorbs it. Our past apperceives and co-
operates; and in the new equilibrium in which each step forward in
the process of learning terminates, it happens relatively seldom
that the new fact is added RAW. More usually it is embedded cooked,
as one might say, or stewed down in the sauce of the old.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">New truths thus are resultants of new experiences and of old
truths combined and mutually modifying one another. And since this
is the case in the changes of opinion of to-day, there is no reason
to assume that it has not been so at all times. It follows that
very ancient modes of thought may have survived through all the
later changes in men's opinions. The most primitive ways of
thinking may not yet be wholly expunged. Like our five fingers, our
ear-bones, our rudimentary caudal appendage, or our other
'vestigial' peculiarities, they may remain as indelible tokens of
events in our race-history. Our ancestors may at certain moments
have struck into ways of thinking which they might conceivably not
have found. But once they did so, and after the fact, the
inheritance continues. When you begin a piece of music in a certain
key, you must keep the key to the end. You may alter your house ad
libitum, but the ground- plan of the first architect persists--you
can make great changes, but you cannot change a Gothic church into
a Doric temple. You may rinse and rinse the bottle, but you can't
get the taste of the medicine or whiskey that first filled it
wholly out.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">My thesis now is this, that OUR FUNDAMENTAL WAYS OF THINKING
ABOUT THINGS ARE DISCOVERIES OF EXCEEDINGLY REMOTE ANCESTORS, WHICH
HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PRESERVE THEMSELVES THROUGHOUT THE EXPERIENCE OF
ALL SUBSEQUENT TIME. They form one great stage of equilibrium in
the human mind's development, the stage of common sense. Other
stages have grafted themselves upon this stage, but have never
succeeded in displacing it. Let us consider this common-sense stage
first, as if it might be final.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">In practical talk, a man's common sense means his good judgment,
his freedom from excentricity, his GUMPTION, to use the vernacular
word. In philosophy it means something entirely different, it means
his use of certain intellectual forms or categories of thought.
Were we lobsters, or bees, it might be that our organization would
have led to our using quite different modes from these of
apprehending our experiences. It MIGHT be too (we cannot
dogmatically deny this) that such categories, unimaginable by us
to-day, would have proved on the whole as serviceable for handling
our experiences mentally as those which we actually use.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">If this sounds paradoxical to anyone, let him think of
analytical geometry. The identical figures which Euclid defined by
intrinsic relations were defined by Descartes by the relations of
their points to adventitious co-ordinates, the result being an
absolutely different and vastly more potent way of handling curves.
All our conceptions are what the Germans call denkmittel, means by
which we handle facts by thinking them. Experience merely as such
doesn't come ticketed and labeled, we have first to discover what
it is. Kant speaks of it as being in its first intention a gewuehl
der erscheinungen, a rhapsodie der wahrnehmungen, a mere motley
which we have to unify by our wits. What we usually do is first to
frame some system of concepts mentally classified, serialized, or
connected in some intellectual way, and then to use this as a tally
by which we 'keep tab' on the impressions that present themselves.
When each is referred to some possible place in the conceptual
system, it is thereby 'understood.' This notion of parallel
'manifolds' with their elements standing reciprocally in
'one-to-one relations,' is proving so convenient nowadays in
mathematics and logic as to supersede more and more the older
classificatory conceptions. There are many conceptual systems of
this sort; and the sense manifold is also such a system. Find a
one-to-one relation for your sense-impressions ANYWHERE among the
concepts, and in so far forth you rationalize the impressions. But
obviously you can rationalize them by using various conceptual
systems.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The old common-sense way of rationalizing them is by a set of
concepts of which the most important are these:</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Thing;</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The same or different;</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Kinds;</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Minds;</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Bodies;</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">One Time;</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">One Space;</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Subjects and attributes;</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Causal influences;</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The fancied;</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The real.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">We are now so familiar with the order that these notions have
woven for us out of the everlasting weather of our perceptions that
we find it hard to realize how little of a fixed routine the
perceptions follow when taken by themselves. The word weather is a
good one to use here. In Boston, for example, the weather has
almost no routine, the only law being that if you have had any
weather for two days, you will probably but not certainly have
another weather on the third. Weather-experience as it thus comes
to Boston, is discontinuous and chaotic. In point of temperature,
of wind, rain or sunshine, it MAY change three times a day. But the
Washington weather-bureau intellectualizes this disorder by making
each successive bit of Boston weather EPISODIC. It refers it to its
place and moment in a continental cyclone, on the history of which
the local changes everywhere are strung as beads are strung upon a
cord.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Now it seems almost certain that young children and the inferior
animals take all their experiences very much as uninstructed
Bostonians take their weather. They know no more of time or space
as world-receptacles, or of permanent subjects and changing
predicates, or of causes, or kinds, or thoughts, or things, than
our common people know of continental cyclones. A baby's rattle
drops out of his hand, but the baby looks not for it. It has 'gone
out' for him, as a candle-flame goes out; and it comes back, when
you replace it in his hand, as the flame comes back when relit. The
idea of its being a 'thing,' whose permanent existence by itself he
might interpolate between its successive apparitions has evidently
not occurred to him. It is the same with dogs. Out of sight, out of
mind, with them. It is pretty evident that they have no GENERAL
tendency to interpolate 'things.' Let me quote here a passage from
my colleague G. Santayana's book.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">"If a dog, while sniffing about contentedly, sees afar off his
master arriving after long absence...the poor brute asks for no
reason why his master went, why he has come again, why he should be
loved, or why presently while lying at his feet you forget him and
begin to grunt and dream of the chase--all that is an utter
mystery, utterly unconsidered. Such experience has variety,
scenery, and a certain vital rhythm; its story might be told in
dithyrambic verse. It moves wholly by inspiration; every event is
providential, every act unpremeditated. Absolute freedom and
absolute helplessness have met together: you depend wholly on
divine favour, yet that unfathomable agency is not distinguishable
from your own life. ...[But] the figures even of that disordered
drama have their exits and their entrances; and their cues can be
gradually discovered by a being capable of fixing his attention and
retaining the order of events. ...In proportion as such
understanding advances each moment of experience becomes
consequential and prophetic of the rest. The calm places in life
are filled with power and its spasms with resource. No emotion can
overwhelm the mind, for of none is the basis or issue wholly
hidden; no event can disconcert it altogether, because it sees
beyond. Means can be looked for to escape from the worst
predicament; and whereas each moment had been formerly filled with
nothing but its own adventure and surprised emotion, each now makes
room for the lesson of what went before and surmises what may be
the plot of the whole."[Footnote: The Life of Reason: Reason in
Common Sense, 1905, p. 59.]</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Even to-day science and philosophy are still laboriously trying
to part fancies from realities in our experience; and in primitive
times they made only the most incipient distinctions in this line.
Men believed whatever they thought with any liveliness, and they
mixed their dreams with their realities inextricably. The
categories of 'thought' and 'things' are indispensable
here--instead of being realities we now call certain experiences
only 'thoughts.' There is not a category, among those enumerated,
of which we may not imagine the use to have thus originated
historically and only gradually spread.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">That one Time which we all believe in and in which each event
has its definite date, that one Space in which each thing has its
position, these abstract notions unify the world incomparably; but
in their finished shape as concepts how different they are from the
loose unordered time-and-space experiences of natural men!
Everything that happens to us brings its own duration and
extension, and both are vaguely surrounded by a marginal 'more'
that runs into the duration and extension of the next thing that
comes. But we soon lose all our definite bearings; and not only do
our children make no distinction between yesterday and the day
before yesterday, the whole past being churned up together, but we
adults still do so whenever the times are large. It is the same
with spaces. On a map I can distinctly see the relation of London,
Constantinople, and Pekin to the place where I am; in reality I
utterly fail to FEEL the facts which the map symbolizes. The
directions and distances are vague, confused and mixed. Cosmic
space and cosmic time, so far from being the intuitions that Kant
said they were, are constructions as patently artificial as any
that science can show. The great majority of the human race never
use these notions, but live in plural times and spaces,
interpenetrant and DURCHEINANDER.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Permanent 'things' again; the 'same' thing and its various
'appearances' and 'alterations'; the different 'kinds' of thing;
with the 'kind' used finally as a 'predicate,' of which the thing
remains the 'subject'--what a straightening of the tangle of our
experience's immediate flux and sensible variety does this list of
terms suggest! And it is only the smallest part of his experience's
flux that anyone actually does straighten out by applying to it
these conceptual instruments. Out of them all our lowest ancestors
probably used only, and then most vaguely and inaccurately, the
notion of 'the same again.' But even then if you had asked them
whether the same were a 'thing' that had endured throughout the
unseen interval, they would probably have been at a loss, and would
have said that they had never asked that question, or considered
matters in that light.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Kinds, and sameness of kind--what colossally useful DENKMITTEL
for finding our way among the many! The manyness might conceivably
have been absolute. Experiences might have all been singulars, no
one of them occurring twice. In such a world logic would have had
no application; for kind and sameness of kind are logic's only
instruments. Once we know that whatever is of a kind is also of
that kind's kind, we can travel through the universe as if with
seven- league boots. Brutes surely never use these abstractions,
and civilized men use them in most various amounts.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Causal influence, again! This, if anything, seems to have been
an antediluvian conception; for we find primitive men thinking that
almost everything is significant and can exert influence of some
sort. The search for the more definite influences seems to have
started in the question: "Who, or what, is to blame?"--for any
illness, namely, or disaster, or untoward thing. From this centre
the search for causal influences has spread. Hume and 'Science'
together have tried to eliminate the whole notion of influence,
substituting the entirely different DENKMITTEL of 'law.' But law is
a comparatively recent invention, and influence reigns supreme in
the older realm of common sense.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The 'possible,' as something less than the actual and more than
the wholly unreal, is another of these magisterial notions of
common sense. Criticize them as you may, they persist; and we fly
back to them the moment critical pressure is relaxed. 'Self,'
'body,' in the substantial or metaphysical sense--no one escapes
subjection to THOSE forms of thought. In practice, the common-sense
DENKMITTEL are uniformly victorious. Everyone, however instructed,
still thinks of a 'thing' in the common-sense way, as a permanent
unit-subject that 'supports' its attributes interchangeably. No one
stably or sincerely uses the more critical notion, of a group of
sense- qualities united by a law. With these categories in our
hand, we make our plans and plot together, and connect all the
remoter parts of experience with what lies before our eyes. Our
later and more critical philosophies are mere fads and fancies
compared with this natural mother-tongue of thought.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Common sense appears thus as a perfectly definite stage in our
understanding of things, a stage that satisfies in an
extraordinarily successful way the purposes for which we think.
'Things' do exist, even when we do not see them. Their 'kinds' also
exist. Their 'qualities' are what they act by, and are what we act
on; and these also exist. These lamps shed their quality of light
on every object in this room. We intercept IT on its way whenever
we hold up an opaque screen. It is the very sound that my lips emit
that travels into your ears. It is the sensible heat of the fire
that migrates into the water in which we boil an egg; and we can
change the heat into coolness by dropping in a lump of ice. At this
stage of philosophy all non-European men without exception have
remained. It suffices for all the necessary practical ends of life;
and, among our own race even, it is only the highly sophisticated
specimens, the minds debauched by learning, as Berkeley calls them,
who have ever even suspected common sense of not being absolutely
true.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But when we look back, and speculate as to how the common-sense
categories may have achieved their wonderful supremacy, no reason
appears why it may not have been by a process just like that by
which the conceptions due to Democritus, Berkeley, or Darwin,
achieved their similar triumphs in more recent times. In other
words, they may have been successfully DISCOVERED by prehistoric
geniuses whose names the night of antiquity has covered up; they
may have been verified by the immediate facts of experience which
they first fitted; and then from fact to fact and from man to man
they may have SPREAD, until all language rested on them and we are
now incapable of thinking naturally in any other terms. Such a view
would only follow the rule that has proved elsewhere so fertile, of
assuming the vast and remote to conform to the laws of formation
that we can observe at work in the small and near.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">For all utilitarian practical purposes these conceptions amply
suffice; but that they began at special points of discovery and
only gradually spread from one thing to another, seems proved by
the exceedingly dubious limits of their application to-day. We
assume for certain purposes one 'objective' Time that AEQUABILITER
FLUIT, but we don't livingly believe in or realize any such
equally-flowing time. 'Space' is a less vague notion; but 'things,'
what are they? Is a constellation properly a thing? or an army? or
is an ENS RATIONIS such as space or justice a thing? Is a knife
whose handle and blade are changed the 'same'? Is the 'changeling,'
whom Locke so seriously discusses, of the human 'kind'? Is
'telepathy' a 'fancy' or a 'fact'? The moment you pass beyond the
practical use of these categories (a use usually suggested
sufficiently by the circumstances of the special case) to a merely
curious or speculative way of thinking, you find it impossible to
say within just what limits of fact any one of them shall
apply.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The peripatetic philosophy, obeying rationalist propensities,
has tried to eternalize the common-sense categories by treating
them very technically and articulately. A 'thing' for instance is a
being, or ENS. An ENS is a subject in which qualities 'inhere.' A
subject is a substance. Substances are of kinds, and kinds are
definite in number, and discrete. These distinctions are
fundamental and eternal. As terms of DISCOURSE they are indeed
magnificently useful, but what they mean, apart from their use in
steering our discourse to profitable issues, does not appear. If
you ask a scholastic philosopher what a substance may be in itself,
apart from its being the support of attributes, he simply says that
your intellect knows perfectly what the word means.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But what the intellect knows clearly is only the word itself and
its steering function. So it comes about that intellects SIBI
PERMISSI, intellects only curious and idle, have forsaken the
common-sense level for what in general terms may be called the
'critical' level of thought. Not merely SUCH intellects
either--your Humes and Berkeleys and Hegels; but practical
observers of facts, your Galileos, Daltons, Faradays, have found it
impossible to treat the NAIFS sense-termini of common sense as
ultimately real. As common sense interpolates her constant 'things'
between our intermittent sensations, so science EXTRApolates her
world of 'primary' qualities, her atoms, her ether, her magnetic
fields, and the like, beyond the common-sense world. The 'things'
are now invisible impalpable things; and the old visible
common-sense things are supposed to result from the mixture of
these invisibles. Or else the whole NAIF conception of thing gets
superseded, and a thing's name is interpreted as denoting only the
law or REGEL DER VERBINDUNG by which certain of our sensations
habitually succeed or coexist.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Science and critical philosophy thus burst the bounds of common
sense. With science NAIF realism ceases: 'Secondary' qualities
become unreal; primary ones alone remain. With critical philosophy,
havoc is made of everything. The common-sense categories one and
all cease to represent anything in the way of BEING; they are but
sublime tricks of human thought, our ways of escaping bewilderment
in the midst of sensation's irremediable flow.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But the scientific tendency in critical thought, tho inspired at
first by purely intellectual motives, has opened an entirely
unexpected range of practical utilities to our astonished view.
Galileo gave us accurate clocks and accurate artillery-practice;
the chemists flood us with new medicines and dye-stuffs; Ampere and
Faraday have endowed us with the New York subway and with Marconi
telegrams. The hypothetical things that such men have invented,
defined as they have defined them, are showing an extraordinary
fertility in consequences verifiable by sense. Our logic can deduce
from them a consequence due under certain conditions, we can then
bring about the conditions, and presto, the consequence is there
before our eyes. The scope of the practical control of nature newly
put into our hand by scientific ways of thinking vastly exceeds the
scope of the old control grounded on common sense. Its rate of
increase accelerates so that no one can trace the limit; one may
even fear that the BEING of man may be crushed by his own powers,
that his fixed nature as an organism may not prove adequate to
stand the strain of the ever increasingly tremendous functions,
almost divine creative functions, which his intellect will more and
more enable him to wield. He may drown in his wealth like a child
in a bath-tub, who has turned on the water and who cannot turn it
off.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The philosophic stage of criticism, much more thorough in its
negations than the scientific stage, so far gives us no new range
of practical power. Locke, Hume, Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, have all
been utterly sterile, so far as shedding any light on the details
of nature goes, and I can think of no invention or discovery that
can be directly traced to anything in their peculiar thought, for
neither with Berkeley's tar-water nor with Kant's nebular
hypothesis had their respective philosophic tenets anything to do.
The satisfactions they yield to their disciples are intellectual,
not practical; and even then we have to confess that there is a
large minus-side to the account.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">There are thus at least three well-characterized levels, stages
or types of thought about the world we live in, and the notions of
one stage have one kind of merit, those of another stage another
kind. It is impossible, however, to say that any stage as yet in
sight is absolutely more TRUE than any other. Common sense is the
more CONSOLIDATED stage, because it got its innings first, and made
all language into its ally. Whether it or science be the more
AUGUST stage may be left to private judgment. But neither
consolidation nor augustness are decisive marks of truth. If common
sense were true, why should science have had to brand the secondary
qualities, to which our world owes all its living interest, as
false, and to invent an invisible world of points and curves and
mathematical equations instead? Why should it have needed to
transform causes and activities into laws of 'functional
variation'? Vainly did scholasticism, common sense's
college-trained younger sister, seek to stereotype the forms the
human family had always talked with, to make them definite and fix
them for eternity. Substantial forms (in other words our secondary
qualities) hardly outlasted the year of our Lord 1600. People were
already tired of them then; and Galileo, and Descartes, with his
'new philosophy,' gave them only a little later their coup de
grace.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But now if the new kinds of scientific 'thing,' the corpuscular
and etheric world, were essentially more 'true,' why should they
have excited so much criticism within the body of science itself?
Scientific logicians are saying on every hand that these entities
and their determinations, however definitely conceived, should not
be held for literally real. It is AS IF they existed; but in
reality they are like co-ordinates or logarithms, only artificial
short-cuts for taking us from one part to another of experience's
flux. We can cipher fruitfully with them; they serve us
wonderfully; but we must not be their dupes.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">There is no RINGING conclusion possible when we compare these
types of thinking, with a view to telling which is the more
absolutely true. Their naturalness, their intellectual economy,
their fruitfulness for practice, all start up as distinct tests of
their veracity, and as a result we get confused. Common sense is
BETTER for one sphere of life, science for another, philosophic
criticism for a third; but whether either be TRUER absolutely,
Heaven only knows. Just now, if I understand the matter rightly, we
are witnessing a curious reversion to the common-sense way of
looking at physical nature, in the philosophy of science favored by
such men as Mach, Ostwald and Duhem. According to these teachers no
hypothesis is truer than any other in the sense of being a more
literal copy of reality. They are all but ways of talking on our
part, to be compared solely from the point of view of their USE.
The only literally true thing is REALITY; and the only reality we
know is, for these logicians, sensible reality, the flux of our
sensations and emotions as they pass. 'Energy' is the collective
name (according to Ostwald) for the sensations just as they present
themselves (the movement, heat, magnetic pull, or light, or
whatever it may be) when they are measured in certain ways. So
measuring them, we are enabled to describe the correlated changes
which they show us, in formulas matchless for their simplicity and
fruitfulness for human use. They are sovereign triumphs of economy
in thought.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">No one can fail to admire the 'energetic' philosophy. But the
hypersensible entities, the corpuscles and vibrations, hold their
own with most physicists and chemists, in spite of its appeal. It
seems too economical to be all-sufficient. Profusion, not economy,
may after all be reality's key-note.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">I am dealing here with highly technical matters, hardly suitable
for popular lecturing, and in which my own competence is small. All
the better for my conclusion, however, which at this point is this.
The whole notion of truth, which naturally and without reflexion we
assume to mean the simple duplication by the mind of a ready-made
and given reality, proves hard to understand clearly. There is no
simple test available for adjudicating offhand between the divers
types of thought that claim to possess it. Common sense, common
science or corpuscular philosophy, ultra-critical science, or
energetics, and critical or idealistic philosophy, all seem
insufficiently true in some regard and leave some dissatisfaction.
It is evident that the conflict of these so widely differing
systems obliges us to overhaul the very idea of truth, for at
present we have no definite notion of what the word may mean. I
shall face that task in my next lecture, and will add but a few
words, in finishing the present one.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">There are only two points that I wish you to retain from the
present lecture. The first one relates to common sense. We have
seen reason to suspect it, to suspect that in spite of their being
so venerable, of their being so universally used and built into the
very structure of language, its categories may after all be only a
collection of extraordinarily successful hypotheses (historically
discovered or invented by single men, but gradually communicated,
and used by everybody) by which our forefathers have from time
immemorial unified and straightened the discontinuity of their
immediate experiences, and put themselves into an equilibrium with
the surface of nature so satisfactory for ordinary practical
purposes that it certainly would have lasted forever, but for the
excessive intellectual vivacity of Democritus, Archimedes, Galileo,
Berkeley, and other excentric geniuses whom the example of such men
inflamed. Retain, I pray you, this suspicion about common
sense.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The other point is this. Ought not the existence of the various
types of thinking which we have reviewed, each so splendid for
certain purposes, yet all conflicting still, and neither one of
them able to support a claim of absolute veracity, to awaken a
presumption favorable to the pragmatistic view that all our
theories are INSTRUMENTAL, are mental modes of ADAPTATION to
reality, rather than revelations or gnostic answers to some
divinely instituted world-enigma? I expressed this view as clearly
as I could in the second of these lectures. Certainly the
restlessness of the actual theoretic situation, the value for some
purposes of each thought- level, and the inability of either to
expel the others decisively, suggest this pragmatistic view, which
I hope that the next lectures may soon make entirely convincing.
May there not after all be a possible ambiguity in truth?</div>
<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="wikisource_Lecture_VI:_Pragmatism_27s_Conception_of_Truth">Lecture VI:
Pragmatism's Conception of Truth</span></h2>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">When Clerk Maxwell was a child it is written that he had a mania
for having everything explained to him, and that when people put
him off with vague verbal accounts of any phenomenon he would
interrupt them impatiently by saying, "Yes; but I want you to tell
me the PARTICULAR GO of it!" Had his question been about truth,
only a pragmatist could have told him the particular go of it. I
believe that our contemporary pragmatists, especially Messrs.
Schiller and Dewey, have given the only tenable account of this
subject. It is a very ticklish subject, sending subtle rootlets
into all kinds of crannies, and hard to treat in the sketchy way
that alone befits a public lecture. But the Schiller-Dewey view of
truth has been so ferociously attacked by rationalistic
philosophers, and so abominably misunderstood, that here, if
anywhere, is the point where a clear and simple statement should be
made.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">I fully expect to see the pragmatist view of truth run through
the classic stages of a theory's career. First, you know, a new
theory is attacked as absurd; then it is admitted to be true, but
obvious and insignificant; finally it is seen to be so important
that its adversaries claim that they themselves discovered it. Our
doctrine of truth is at present in the first of these three stages,
with symptoms of the second stage having begun in certain quarters.
I wish that this lecture might help it beyond the first stage in
the eyes of many of you.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Truth, as any dictionary will tell you, is a property of certain
of our ideas. It means their 'agreement,' as falsity means their
disagreement, with 'reality.' Pragmatists and intellectualists both
accept this definition as a matter of course. They begin to quarrel
only after the question is raised as to what may precisely be meant
by the term 'agreement,' and what by the term 'reality,' when
reality is taken as something for our ideas to agree with.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">In answering these questions the pragmatists are more analytic
and painstaking, the intellectualists more offhand and
irreflective. The popular notion is that a true idea must copy its
reality. Like other popular views, this one follows the analogy of
the most usual experience. Our true ideas of sensible things do
indeed copy them. Shut your eyes and think of yonder clock on the
wall, and you get just such a true picture or copy of its dial. But
your idea of its 'works' (unless you are a clock-maker) is much
less of a copy, yet it passes muster, for it in no way clashes with
the reality. Even tho it should shrink to the mere word 'works,'
that word still serves you truly; and when you speak of the
'time-keeping function' of the clock, or of its spring's
'elasticity,' it is hard to see exactly what your ideas can
copy.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">You perceive that there is a problem here. Where our ideas
cannot copy definitely their object, what does agreement with that
object mean? Some idealists seem to say that they are true whenever
they are what God means that we ought to think about that object.
Others hold the copy-view all through, and speak as if our ideas
possessed truth just in proportion as they approach to being copies
of the Absolute's eternal way of thinking.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">These views, you see, invite pragmatistic discussion. But the
great assumption of the intellectualists is that truth means
essentially an inert static relation. When you've got your true
idea of anything, there's an end of the matter. You're in
possession; you KNOW; you have fulfilled your thinking destiny. You
are where you ought to be mentally; you have obeyed your
categorical imperative; and nothing more need follow on that climax
of your rational destiny. Epistemologically you are in stable
equilibrium.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Pragmatism, on the other hand, asks its usual question. "Grant
an idea or belief to be true," it says, "what concrete difference
will its being true make in anyone's actual life? How will the
truth be realized? What experiences will be different from those
which would obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is the
truth's cash-value in experiential terms?"</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The moment pragmatism asks this question, it sees the answer:
TRUE IDEAS ARE THOSE THAT WE CAN ASSIMILATE, VALIDATE, CORROBORATE
AND VERIFY. FALSE IDEAS ARE THOSE THAT WE CANNOT. That is the
practical difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that,
therefore, is the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is
known-as.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">This thesis is what I have to defend. The truth of an idea is
not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth HAPPENS to an idea.
It BECOMES true, is MADE true by events. Its verity is in fact an
event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its
veri-FICATION. Its validity is the process of its valid-ATION.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But what do the words verification and validation themselves
pragmatically mean? They again signify certain practical
consequences of the verified and validated idea. It is hard to find
any one phrase that characterizes these consequences better than
the ordinary agreement-formula--just such consequences being what
we have in mind whenever we say that our ideas 'agree' with
reality. They lead us, namely, through the acts and other ideas
which they instigate, into or up to, or towards, other parts of
experience with which we feel all the while-such feeling being
among our potentialities--that the original ideas remain in
agreement. The connexions and transitions come to us from point to
point as being progressive, harmonious, satisfactory. This function
of agreeable leading is what we mean by an idea's verification.
Such an account is vague and it sounds at first quite trivial, but
it has results which it will take the rest of my hour to
explain.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Let me begin by reminding you of the fact that the possession of
true thoughts means everywhere the possession of invaluable
instruments of action; and that our duty to gain truth, so far from
being a blank command from out of the blue, or a 'stunt' self-
imposed by our intellect, can account for itself by excellent
practical reasons.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The importance to human life of having true beliefs about
matters of fact is a thing too notorious. We live in a world of
realities that can be infinitely useful or infinitely harmful.
Ideas that tell us which of them to expect count as the true ideas
in all this primary sphere of verification, and the pursuit of such
ideas is a primary human duty. The possession of truth, so far from
being here an end in itself, is only a preliminary means towards
other vital satisfactions. If I am lost in the woods and starved,
and find what looks like a cow-path, it is of the utmost importance
that I should think of a human habitation at the end of it, for if
I do so and follow it, I save myself. The true thought is useful
here because the house which is its object is useful. The practical
value of true ideas is thus primarily derived from the practical
importance of their objects to us. Their objects are, indeed, not
important at all times. I may on another occasion have no use for
the house; and then my idea of it, however verifiable, will be
practically irrelevant, and had better remain latent. Yet since
almost any object may some day become temporarily important, the
advantage of having a general stock of extra truths, of ideas that
shall be true of merely possible situations, is obvious. We store
such extra truths away in our memories, and with the overflow we
fill our books of reference. Whenever such an extra truth becomes
practically relevant to one of our emergencies, it passes from
cold-storage to do work in the world, and our belief in it grows
active. You can say of it then either that 'it is useful because it
is true' or that 'it is true because it is useful.' Both these
phrases mean exactly the same thing, namely that here is an idea
that gets fulfilled and can be verified. True is the name for
whatever idea starts the verification-process, useful is the name
for its completed function in experience. True ideas would never
have been singled out as such, would never have acquired a
class-name, least of all a name suggesting value, unless they had
been useful from the outset in this way.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">From this simple cue pragmatism gets her general notion of truth
as something essentially bound up with the way in which one moment
in our experience may lead us towards other moments which it will
be worth while to have been led to. Primarily, and on the
common-sense level, the truth of a state of mind means this
function of A LEADING THAT IS WORTH WHILE. When a moment in our
experience, of any kind whatever, inspires us with a thought that
is true, that means that sooner or later we dip by that thought's
guidance into the particulars of experience again and make
advantageous connexion with them. This is a vague enough statement,
but I beg you to retain it, for it is essential.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Our experience meanwhile is all shot through with regularities.
One bit of it can warn us to get ready for another bit, can
'intend' or be 'significant of' that remoter object. The object's
advent is the significance's verification. Truth, in these cases,
meaning nothing but eventual verification, is manifestly
incompatible with waywardness on our part. Woe to him whose beliefs
play fast and loose with the order which realities follow in his
experience: they will lead him nowhere or else make false
connexions.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">By 'realities' or 'objects' here, we mean either things of
common sense, sensibly present, or else common-sense relations,
such as dates, places, distances, kinds, activities. Following our
mental image of a house along the cow-path, we actually come to see
the house; we get the image's full verification. SUCH SIMPLY AND
FULLY VERIFIED LEADINGS ARE CERTAINLY THE ORIGINALS AND PROTOTYPES
OF THE TRUTH-PROCESS. Experience offers indeed other forms of
truth- process, but they are all conceivable as being primary
verifications arrested, multiplied or substituted one for
another.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Take, for instance, yonder object on the wall. You and I
consider it to be a 'clock,' altho no one of us has seen the hidden
works that make it one. We let our notion pass for true without
attempting to verify. If truths mean verification-process
essentially, ought we then to call such unverified truths as this
abortive? No, for they form the overwhelmingly large number of the
truths we live by. Indirect as well as direct verifications pass
muster. Where circumstantial evidence is sufficient, we can go
without eye- witnessing. Just as we here assume Japan to exist
without ever having been there, because it WORKS to do so,
everything we know conspiring with the belief, and nothing
interfering, so we assume that thing to be a clock. We USE it as a
clock, regulating the length of our lecture by it. The verification
of the assumption here means its leading to no frustration or
contradiction. VerifiABILITY of wheels and weights and pendulum is
as good as verification. For one truth-process completed there are
a million in our lives that function in this state of nascency.
They turn us TOWARDS direct verification; lead us into the
SURROUNDINGS of the objects they envisage; and then, if everything
runs on harmoniously, we are so sure that verification is possible
that we omit it, and are usually justified by all that happens.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Truth lives, in fact, for the most part on a credit system. Our
thoughts and beliefs 'pass,' so long as nothing challenges them,
just as bank-notes pass so long as nobody refuses them. But this
all points to direct face-to-face verifications somewhere, without
which the fabric of truth collapses like a financial system with no
cash- basis whatever. You accept my verification of one thing, I
yours of another. We trade on each other's truth. But beliefs
verified concretely by SOMEBODY are the posts of the whole
superstructure.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Another great reason--beside economy of time--for waiving
complete verification in the usual business of life is that all
things exist in kinds and not singly. Our world is found once for
all to have that peculiarity. So that when we have once directly
verified our ideas about one specimen of a kind, we consider
ourselves free to apply them to other specimens without
verification. A mind that habitually discerns the kind of thing
before it, and acts by the law of the kind immediately, without
pausing to verify, will be a 'true' mind in ninety-nine out of a
hundred emergencies, proved so by its conduct fitting everything it
meets, and getting no refutation.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">INDIRECTLY OR ONLY POTENTIALLY VERIFYING PROCESSES MAY THUS BE
TRUE AS WELL AS FULL VERIFICATION-PROCESSES. They work as true
processes would work, give us the same advantages, and claim our
recognition for the same reasons. All this on the common-sense
level of, matters of fact, which we are alone considering.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But matters of fact are not our only stock in trade. RELATIONS
AMONG PURELY MENTAL IDEAS form another sphere where true and false
beliefs obtain, and here the beliefs are absolute, or
unconditional. When they are true they bear the name either of
definitions or of principles. It is either a principle or a
definition that 1 and 1 make 2, that 2 and 1 make 3, and so on;
that white differs less from gray than it does from black; that
when the cause begins to act the effect also commences. Such
propositions hold of all possible 'ones,' of all conceivable
'whites' and 'grays' and 'causes.' The objects here are mental
objects. Their relations are perceptually obvious at a glance, and
no sense-verification is necessary. Moreover, once true, always
true, of those same mental objects. Truth here has an 'eternal'
character. If you can find a concrete thing anywhere that is 'one'
or 'white' or 'gray,' or an 'effect,' then your principles will
everlastingly apply to it. It is but a case of ascertaining the
kind, and then applying the law of its kind to the particular
object. You are sure to get truth if you can but name the kind
rightly, for your mental relations hold good of everything of that
kind without exception. If you then, nevertheless, failed to get
truth concretely, you would say that you had classed your real
objects wrongly.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">In this realm of mental relations, truth again is an affair of
leading. We relate one abstract idea with another, framing in the
end great systems of logical and mathematical truth, under the
respective terms of which the sensible facts of experience
eventually arrange themselves, so that our eternal truths hold good
of realities also. This marriage of fact and theory is endlessly
fertile. What we say is here already true in advance of special
verification, IF WE HAVE SUBSUMED OUR OBJECTS RIGHTLY. Our ready-
made ideal framework for all sorts of possible objects follows from
the very structure of our thinking. We can no more play fast and
loose with these abstract relations than we can do so with our
sense-experiences. They coerce us; we must treat them consistently,
whether or not we like the results. The rules of addition apply to
our debts as rigorously as to our assets. The hundredth decimal of
pi, the ratio of the circumference to its diameter, is
predetermined ideally now, tho no one may have computed it. If we
should ever need the figure in our dealings with an actual circle
we should need to have it given rightly, calculated by the usual
rules; for it is the same kind of truth that those rules elsewhere
calculate.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Between the coercions of the sensible order and those of the
ideal order, our mind is thus wedged tightly. Our ideas must agree
with realities, be such realities concrete or abstract, be they
facts or be they principles, under penalty of endless inconsistency
and frustration. So far, intellectualists can raise no protest.
They can only say that we have barely touched the skin of the
matter.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Realities mean, then, either concrete facts, or abstract kinds
of things and relations perceived intuitively between them. They
furthermore and thirdly mean, as things that new ideas of ours must
no less take account of, the whole body of other truths already in
our possession. But what now does 'agreement' with such three-fold
realities mean?--to use again the definition that is current.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Here it is that pragmatism and intellectualism begin to part
company. Primarily, no doubt, to agree means to copy, but we saw
that the mere word 'clock' would do instead of a mental picture of
its works, and that of many realities our ideas can only be symbols
and not copies. 'Past time,' 'power,' 'spontaneity'--how can our
mind copy such realities?</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">To 'agree' in the widest sense with a reality, CAN ONLY MEAN TO
BE GUIDED EITHER STRAIGHT UP TO IT OR INTO ITS SURROUNDINGS, OR TO
BE PUT INTO SUCH WORKING TOUCH WITH IT AS TO HANDLE EITHER IT OR
SOMETHING CONNECTED WITH IT BETTER THAN IF WE DISAGREED. Better
either intellectually or practically! And often agreement will only
mean the negative fact that nothing contradictory from the quarter
of that reality comes to interfere with the way in which our ideas
guide us elsewhere. To copy a reality is, indeed, one very
important way of agreeing with it, but it is far from being
essential. The essential thing is the process of being guided. Any
idea that helps us to DEAL, whether practically or intellectually,
with either the reality or its belongings, that doesn't entangle
our progress in frustrations, that FITS, in fact, and adapts our
life to the reality's whole setting, will agree sufficiently to
meet the requirement. It will hold true of that reality.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Thus, NAMES are just as 'true' or 'false' as definite mental
pictures are. They set up similar verification-processes, and lead
to fully equivalent practical results.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">All human thinking gets discursified; we exchange ideas; we lend
and borrow verifications, get them from one another by means of
social intercourse. All truth thus gets verbally built out, stored
up, and made available for everyone. Hence, we must TALK
consistently just as we must THINK consistently: for both in talk
and thought we deal with kinds. Names are arbitrary, but once
understood they must be kept to. We mustn't now call Abel 'Cain' or
Cain 'Abel.' If we do, we ungear ourselves from the whole book of
Genesis, and from all its connexions with the universe of speech
and fact down to the present time. We throw ourselves out of
whatever truth that entire system of speech and fact may
embody.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The overwhelming majority of our true ideas admit of no direct
or face-to-face verification-those of past history, for example, as
of Cain and Abel. The stream of time can be remounted only
verbally, or verified indirectly by the present prolongations or
effects of what the past harbored. Yet if they agree with these
verbalities and effects, we can know that our ideas of the past are
true. AS TRUE AS PAST TIME ITSELF WAS, so true was Julius Caesar,
so true were antediluvian monsters, all in their proper dates and
settings. That past time itself was, is guaranteed by its coherence
with everything that's present. True as the present is, the past
was also.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Agreement thus turns out to be essentially an affair of
leading-- leading that is useful because it is into quarters that
contain objects that are important. True ideas lead us into useful
verbal and conceptual quarters as well as directly up to useful
sensible termini. They lead to consistency, stability and flowing
human intercourse. They lead away from excentricity and isolation,
from foiled and barren thinking. The untrammeled flowing of the
leading- process, its general freedom from clash and contradiction,
passes for its indirect verification; but all roads lead to Rome,
and in the end and eventually, all true processes must lead to the
face of directly verifying sensible experiences SOMEWHERE, which
somebody's ideas have copied.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Such is the large loose way in which the pragmatist interprets
the word agreement. He treats it altogether practically. He lets it
cover any process of conduction from a present idea to a future
terminus, provided only it run prosperously. It is only thus that
'scientific' ideas, flying as they do beyond common sense, can be
said to agree with their realities. It is, as I have already said,
as if reality were made of ether, atoms or electrons, but we
mustn't think so literally. The term 'energy' doesn't even pretend
to stand for anything 'objective.' It is only a way of measuring
the surface of phenomena so as to string their changes on a simple
formula.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Yet in the choice of these man-made formulas we cannot be
capricious with impunity any more than we can be capricious on the
common-sense practical level. We must find a theory that will WORK;
and that means something extremely difficult; for our theory must
mediate between all previous truths and certain new experiences. It
must derange common sense and previous belief as little as
possible, and it must lead to some sensible terminus or other that
can be verified exactly. To 'work' means both these things; and the
squeeze is so tight that there is little loose play for any
hypothesis. Our theories are wedged and controlled as nothing else
is. Yet sometimes alternative theoretic formulas are equally
compatible with all the truths we know, and then we choose between
them for subjective reasons. We choose the kind of theory to which
we are already partial; we follow 'elegance' or 'economy.' Clerk
Maxwell somewhere says it would be "poor scientific taste" to
choose the more complicated of two equally well-evidenced
conceptions; and you will all agree with him. Truth in science is
what gives us the maximum possible sum of satisfactions, taste
included, but consistency both with previous truth and with novel
fact is always the most imperious claimant.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">I have led you through a very sandy desert. But now, if I may be
allowed so vulgar an expression, we begin to taste the milk in the
cocoanut. Our rationalist critics here discharge their batteries
upon us, and to reply to them will take us out from all this
dryness into full sight of a momentous philosophical
alternative.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Our account of truth is an account of truths in the plural, of
processes of leading, realized in rebus, and having only this
quality in common, that they PAY. They pay by guiding us into or
towards some part of a system that dips at numerous points into
sense-percepts, which we may copy mentally or not, but with which
at any rate we are now in the kind of commerce vaguely designated
as verification. Truth for us is simply a collective name for
verification-processes, just as health, wealth, strength, etc., are
names for other processes connected with life, and also pursued
because it pays to pursue them. Truth is MADE, just as health,
wealth and strength are made, in the course of experience.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Here rationalism is instantaneously up in arms against us. I can
imagine a rationalist to talk as follows:</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">"Truth is not made," he will say; "it absolutely obtains, being
a unique relation that does not wait upon any process, but shoots
straight over the head of experience, and hits its reality every
time. Our belief that yon thing on the wall is a clock is true
already, altho no one in the whole history of the world should
verify it. The bare quality of standing in that transcendent
relation is what makes any thought true that possesses it, whether
or not there be verification. You pragmatists put the cart before
the horse in making truth's being reside in verification-processes.
These are merely signs of its being, merely our lame ways of
ascertaining after the fact, which of our ideas already has
possessed the wondrous quality. The quality itself is timeless,
like all essences and natures. Thoughts partake of it directly, as
they partake of falsity or of irrelevancy. It can't be analyzed
away into pragmatic consequences."</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The whole plausibility of this rationalist tirade is due to the
fact to which we have already paid so much attention. In our world,
namely, abounding as it does in things of similar kinds and
similarly associated, one verification serves for others of its
kind, and one great use of knowing things is to be led not so much
to them as to their associates, especially to human talk about
them. The quality of truth, obtaining ante rem, pragmatically
means, then, the fact that in such a world innumerable ideas work
better by their indirect or possible than by their direct and
actual verification. Truth ante rem means only verifiability, then;
or else it is a case of the stock rationalist trick of treating the
NAME of a concrete phenomenal reality as an independent prior
entity, and placing it behind the reality as its explanation.
Professor Mach quotes somewhere an epigram of Lessing's:</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Sagt Hanschen Schlau zu Vetter Fritz, "Wie kommt es, Vetter
Fritzen, Dass grad' die Reichsten in der Welt, Das meiste Geld
besitzen?"</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Hanschen Schlau here treats the principle 'wealth' as something
distinct from the facts denoted by the man's being rich. It
antedates them; the facts become only a sort of secondary
coincidence with the rich man's essential nature.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">In the case of 'wealth' we all see the fallacy. We know that
wealth is but a name for concrete processes that certain men's
lives play a part in, and not a natural excellence found in Messrs.
Rockefeller and Carnegie, but not in the rest of us.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Like wealth, health also lives in rebus. It is a name for
processes, as digestion, circulation, sleep, etc., that go on
happily, tho in this instance we are more inclined to think of it
as a principle and to say the man digests and sleeps so well
BECAUSE he is so healthy.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">With 'strength' we are, I think, more rationalistic still, and
decidedly inclined to treat it as an excellence pre-existing in the
man and explanatory of the herculean performances of his
muscles.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">With 'truth' most people go over the border entirely, and treat
the rationalistic account as self-evident. But really all these
words in TH are exactly similar. Truth exists ante rem just as much
and as little as the other things do.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The scholastics, following Aristotle, made much of the
distinction between habit and act. Health in actu means, among
other things, good sleeping and digesting. But a healthy man need
not always be sleeping, or always digesting, any more than a
wealthy man need be always handling money, or a strong man always
lifting weights. All such qualities sink to the status of 'habits'
between their times of exercise; and similarly truth becomes a
habit of certain of our ideas and beliefs in their intervals of
rest from their verifying activities. But those activities are the
root of the whole matter, and the condition of there being any
habit to exist in the intervals.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">'The true,' to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the
way of our thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in
the way of our behaving. Expedient in almost any fashion; and
expedient in the long run and on the whole of course; for what
meets expediently all the experience in sight won't necessarily
meet all farther experiences equally satisfactorily. Experience, as
we know, has ways of BOILING OVER, and making us correct our
present formulas.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The 'absolutely' true, meaning what no farther experience will
ever alter, is that ideal vanishing-point towards which we imagine
that all our temporary truths will some day converge. It runs on
all fours with the perfectly wise man, and with the absolutely
complete experience; and, if these ideals are ever realized, they
will all be realized together. Meanwhile we have to live to-day by
what truth we can get to-day, and be ready to-morrow to call it
falsehood. Ptolemaic astronomy, euclidean space, aristotelian
logic, scholastic metaphysics, were expedient for centuries, but
human experience has boiled over those limits, and we now call
these things only relatively true, or true within those borders of
experience. 'Absolutely' they are false; for we know that those
limits were casual, and might have been transcended by past
theorists just as they are by present thinkers.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">When new experiences lead to retrospective judgments, using the
past tense, what these judgments utter WAS true, even tho no past
thinker had been led there. We live forwards, a Danish thinker has
said, but we understand backwards. The present sheds a backward
light on the world's previous processes. They may have been
truth-processes for the actors in them. They are not so for one who
knows the later revelations of the story.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">This regulative notion of a potential better truth to be
established later, possibly to be established some day absolutely,
and having powers of retroactive legislation, turns its face, like
all pragmatist notions, towards concreteness of fact, and towards
the future. Like the half-truths, the absolute truth will have to
be MADE, made as a relation incidental to the growth of a mass of
verification-experience, to which the half-true ideas are all along
contributing their quota.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">I have already insisted on the fact that truth is made largely
out of previous truths. Men's beliefs at any time are so much
experience funded. But the beliefs are themselves parts of the sum
total of the world's experience, and become matter, therefore, for
the next day's funding operations. So far as reality means
experienceable reality, both it and the truths men gain about it
are everlastingly in process of mutation-mutation towards a
definite goal, it may be--but still mutation.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Mathematicians can solve problems with two variables. On the
Newtonian theory, for instance, acceleration varies with distance,
but distance also varies with acceleration. In the realm of truth-
processes facts come independently and determine our beliefs
provisionally. But these beliefs make us act, and as fast as they
do so, they bring into sight or into existence new facts which re-
determine the beliefs accordingly. So the whole coil and ball of
truth, as it rolls up, is the product of a double influence. Truths
emerge from facts; but they dip forward into facts again and add to
them; which facts again create or reveal new truth (the word is
indifferent) and so on indefinitely. The 'facts' themselves
meanwhile are not TRUE. They simply ARE. Truth is the function of
the beliefs that start and terminate among them.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The case is like a snowball's growth, due as it is to the
distribution of the snow on the one hand, and to the successive
pushes of the boys on the other, with these factors co-determining
each other incessantly.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The most fateful point of difference between being a rationalist
and being a pragmatist is now fully in sight. Experience is in
mutation, and our psychological ascertainments of truth are in
mutation--so much rationalism will allow; but never that either
reality itself or truth itself is mutable. Reality stands complete
and ready-made from all eternity, rationalism insists, and the
agreement of our ideas with it is that unique unanalyzable virtue
in them of which she has already told us. As that intrinsic
excellence, their truth has nothing to do with our experiences. It
adds nothing to the content of experience. It makes no difference
to reality itself; it is supervenient, inert, static, a reflexion
merely. It doesn't EXIST, it HOLDS or OBTAINS, it belongs to
another dimension from that of either facts or fact-relations,
belongs, in short, to the epistemological dimension--and with that
big word rationalism closes the discussion.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Thus, just as pragmatism faces forward to the future, so does
rationalism here again face backward to a past eternity. True to
her inveterate habit, rationalism reverts to 'principles,' and
thinks that when an abstraction once is named, we own an oracular
solution.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The tremendous pregnancy in the way of consequences for life of
this radical difference of outlook will only become apparent in my
later lectures. I wish meanwhile to close this lecture by showing
that rationalism's sublimity does not save it from inanity.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">When, namely, you ask rationalists, instead of accusing
pragmatism of desecrating the notion of truth, to define it
themselves by saying exactly what THEY understand by it, the only
positive attempts I can think of are these two:</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">1. "Truth is just the system of propositions which have an un-
conditional claim to be recognized as valid." [Footnote: A. E.
Taylor, <a href="/The_Philosophical_Review"
title="The Philosophical Review">Philosophical Review</a>, vol.
xiv, p. 288.]</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">2. Truth is a name for all those judgments which we find
ourselves under obligation to make by a kind of imperative duty.
[Footnote: H. Rickert, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntniss, chapter on
'Die Urtheilsnothwendigkeit.']</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The first thing that strikes one in such definitions is their
unutterable triviality. They are absolutely true, of course, but
absolutely insignificant until you handle them pragmatically. What
do you mean by 'claim' here, and what do you mean by 'duty'? As
summary names for the concrete reasons why thinking in true ways is
overwhelmingly expedient and good for mortal men, it is all right
to talk of claims on reality's part to be agreed with, and of
obligations on our part to agree. We feel both the claims and the
obligations, and we feel them for just those reasons.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But the rationalists who talk of claim and obligation EXPRESSLY
SAY THAT THEY HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH OUR PRACTICAL INTERESTS OR
PERSONAL REASONS. Our reasons for agreeing are psychological facts,
they say, relative to each thinker, and to the accidents of his
life. They are his evidence merely, they are no part of the life of
truth itself. That life transacts itself in a purely logical or
epistemological, as distinguished from a psychological, dimension,
and its claims antedate and exceed all personal motivations
whatsoever. Tho neither man nor God should ever ascertain truth,
the word would still have to be defined as that which OUGHT to be
ascertained and recognized.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">There never was a more exquisite example of an idea abstracted
from the concretes of experience and then used to oppose and negate
what it was abstracted from.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Philosophy and common life abound in similar instances. The
'sentimentalist fallacy' is to shed tears over abstract justice and
generosity, beauty, etc., and never to know these qualities when
you meet them in the street, because there the circumstances make
them vulgar. Thus I read in the privately printed biography of an
eminently rationalistic mind: "It was strange that with such
admiration for beauty in the abstract, my brother had no enthusiasm
for fine architecture, for beautiful painting, or for flowers." And
in almost the last philosophic work I have read, I find such
passages as the following: "Justice is ideal, solely ideal. Reason
conceives that it ought to exist, but experience shows that it can-
not. ... Truth, which ought to be, cannot be. ... Reason is
deformed by experience. As soon as reason enters experience, it
becomes contrary to reason."</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The rationalist's fallacy here is exactly like the
sentimentalist's. Both extract a quality from the muddy particulars
of experience, and find it so pure when extracted that they
contrast it with each and all its muddy instances as an opposite
and higher nature. All the while it is THEIR nature. It is the
nature of truths to be validated, verified. It pays for our ideas
to be validated. Our obligation to seek truth is part of our
general obligation to do what pays. The payments true ideas bring
are the sole why of our duty to follow them.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Identical whys exist in the case of wealth and health. Truth
makes no other kind of claim and imposes no other kind of ought
than health and wealth do. All these claims are conditional; the
concrete benefits we gain are what we mean by calling the pursuit a
duty. In the case of truth, untrue beliefs work as perniciously in
the long run as true beliefs work beneficially. Talking abstractly,
the quality 'true' may thus be said to grow absolutely precious,
and the quality 'untrue' absolutely damnable: the one may be called
good, the other bad, unconditionally. We ought to think the true,
we ought to shun the false, imperatively.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But if we treat all this abstraction literally and oppose it to
its mother soil in experience, see what a preposterous position we
work ourselves into.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">We cannot then take a step forward in our actual thinking. When
shall I acknowledge this truth and when that? Shall the
acknowledgment be loud?--or silent? If sometimes loud, sometimes
silent, which NOW? When may a truth go into cold-storage in the
encyclopedia? and when shall it come out for battle? Must I
constantly be repeating the truth 'twice two are four' because of
its eternal claim on recognition? or is it sometimes irrelevant?
Must my thoughts dwell night and day on my personal sins and
blemishes, because I truly have them?--or may I sink and ignore
them in order to be a decent social unit, and not a mass of morbid
melancholy and apology?</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">It is quite evident that our obligation to acknowledge truth, so
far from being unconditional, is tremendously conditioned. Truth
with a big T, and in the singular, claims abstractly to be
recognized, of course; but concrete truths in the plural need be
recognized only when their recognition is expedient. A truth must
always be preferred to a falsehood when both relate to the
situation; but when neither does, truth is as little of a duty as
falsehood. If you ask me what o'clock it is and I tell you that I
live at 95 Irving Street, my answer may indeed be true, but you
don't see why it is my duty to give it. A false address would be as
much to the purpose.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">With this admission that there are conditions that limit the
application of the abstract imperative, THE PRAGMATISTIC TREATMENT
OF TRUTH SWEEPS BACK UPON US IN ITS FULNESS. Our duty to agree with
reality is seen to be grounded in a perfect jungle of concrete
expediencies.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">When Berkeley had explained what people meant by matter, people
thought that he denied matter's existence. When Messrs. Schiller
and Dewey now explain what people mean by truth, they are accused
of denying ITS existence. These pragmatists destroy all objective
standards, critics say, and put foolishness and wisdom on one
level. A favorite formula for describing Mr. Schiller's doctrines
and mine is that we are persons who think that by saying whatever
you find it pleasant to say and calling it truth you fulfil every
pragmatistic requirement.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">I leave it to you to judge whether this be not an impudent
slander. Pent in, as the pragmatist more than anyone else sees
himself to be, between the whole body of funded truths squeezed
from the past and the coercions of the world of sense about him,
who so well as he feels the immense pressure of objective control
under which our minds perform their operations? If anyone imagines
that this law is lax, let him keep its commandment one day, says
Emerson. We have heard much of late of the uses of the imagination
in science. It is high time to urge the use of a little imagination
in philosophy. The unwillingness of some of our critics to read any
but the silliest of possible meanings into our statements is as
discreditable to their imaginations as anything I know in recent
philosophic history. Schiller says the true is that which 'works.'
Thereupon he is treated as one who limits verification to the
lowest material utilities. Dewey says truth is what gives
'satisfaction.' He is treated as one who believes in calling
everything true which, if it were true, would be pleasant.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Our critics certainly need more imagination of realities. I have
honestly tried to stretch my own imagination and to read the best
possible meaning into the rationalist conception, but I have to
confess that it still completely baffles me. The notion of a
reality calling on us to 'agree' with it, and that for no reasons,
but simply because its claim is 'unconditional' or 'transcendent,'
is one that I can make neither head nor tail of. I try to imagine
myself as the sole reality in the world, and then to imagine what
more I would 'claim' if I were allowed to. If you suggest the
possibility of my claiming that a mind should come into being from
out of the void inane and stand and COPY me, I can indeed imagine
what the copying might mean, but I can conjure up no motive. What
good it would do me to be copied, or what good it would do that
mind to copy me, if farther consequences are expressly and in
principle ruled out as motives for the claim (as they are by our
rationalist authorities) I cannot fathom. When the Irishman's
admirers ran him along to the place of banquet in a sedan chair
with no bottom, he said, "Faith, if it wasn't for the honor of the
thing, I might as well have come on foot." So here: but for the
honor of the thing, I might as well have remained uncopied. Copying
is one genuine mode of knowing (which for some strange reason our
contemporary transcendentalists seem to be tumbling over each other
to repudiate); but when we get beyond copying, and fall back on
unnamed forms of agreeing that are expressly denied to be either
copyings or leadings or fittings, or any other processes
pragmatically definable, the WHAT of the 'agreement' claimed
becomes as unintelligible as the why of it. Neither content nor
motive can be imagine for it. It is an absolutely meaningless
abstraction. [Footnote: I am not forgetting that Professor Rickert
long ago gave up the whole notion of truth being founded on
agreement with reality. Reality, according to him, is whatever
agrees with truth, and truth is founded solely on our primal duty.
This fantastic flight, together with Mr. Joachim's candid
confession of failure in his book The Nature of Truth, seems to me
to mark the bankruptcy of rationalism when dealing with this
subject. Rickert deals with part of the pragmatistic position under
the head of what he calls 'Relativismus.' I cannot discuss his text
here. Suffice it to say that his argumentation in that chapter is
so feeble as to seem almost incredible in so generally able a
writer.]</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Surely in this field of truth it is the pragmatists and not the
rationalists who are the more genuine defenders of the universe's
rationality.</div>
<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="wikisource_Lecture_VII:_Pragmatism_and_Humanism">Lecture VII: Pragmatism
and Humanism</span></h2>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">What hardens the heart of everyone I approach with the view of
truth sketched in my last lecture is that typical idol of the
tribe, the notion of THE Truth, conceived as the one answer,
determinate and complete, to the one fixed enigma which the world
is believed to propound. For popular tradition, it is all the
better if the answer be oracular, so as itself to awaken wonder as
an enigma of the second order, veiling rather than revealing what
its profundities are supposed to contain. All the great single-word
answers to the world's riddle, such as God, the One, Reason, Law,
Spirit, Matter, Nature, Polarity, the Dialectic Process, the Idea,
the Self, the Oversoul, draw the admiration that men have lavished
on them from this oracular role. By amateurs in philosophy and
professionals alike, the universe is represented as a queer sort of
petrified sphinx whose appeal to man consists in a monotonous
challenge to his divining powers. THE Truth: what a perfect idol of
the rationalistic mind! I read in an old letter--from a gifted
friend who died too young--these words: "In everything, in science,
art, morals and religion, there MUST be one system that is right
and EVERY other wrong." How characteristic of the enthusiasm of a
certain stage of youth! At twenty-one we rise to such a challenge
and expect to find the system. It never occurs to most of us even
later that the question 'what is THE truth?' is no real question
(being irrelative to all conditions) and that the whole notion of
THE truth is an abstraction from the fact of truths in the plural,
a mere useful summarizing phrase like THE Latin Language or THE
Law.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Common-law judges sometimes talk about the law, and
school-masters talk about the latin tongue, in a way to make their
hearers think they mean entities pre-existent to the decisions or
to the words and syntax, determining them unequivocally and
requiring them to obey. But the slightest exercise of reflexion
makes us see that, instead of being principles of this kind, both
law and latin are results. Distinctions between the lawful and the
unlawful in conduct, or between the correct and incorrect in
speech, have grown up incidentally among the interactions of men's
experiences in detail; and in no other way do distinctions between
the true and the false in belief ever grow up. Truth grafts itself
on previous truth, modifying it in the process, just as idiom
grafts itself on previous idiom, and law on previous law. Given
previous law and a novel case, and the judge will twist them into
fresh law. Previous idiom; new slang or metaphor or oddity that
hits the public taste:--and presto, a new idiom is made. Previous
truth; fresh facts:--and our mind finds a new truth.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">All the while, however, we pretend that the eternal is
unrolling, that the one previous justice, grammar or truth is
simply fulgurating, and not being made. But imagine a youth in the
courtroom trying cases with his abstract notion of 'the' law, or a
censor of speech let loose among the theatres with his idea of
'the' mother-tongue, or a professor setting up to lecture on the
actual universe with his rationalistic notion of 'the Truth' with a
big T, and what progress do they make? Truth, law, and language
fairly boil away from them at the least touch of novel fact. These
things MAKE THEMSELVES as we go. Our rights, wrongs, prohibitions,
penalties, words, forms, idioms, beliefs, are so many new creations
that add themselves as fast as history proceeds. Far from being
antecedent principles that animate the process, law, language,
truth are but abstract names for its results.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Laws and languages at any rate are thus seen to be man-made:
things. Mr. Schiller applies the analogy to beliefs, and proposes
the name of 'Humanism' for the doctrine that to an unascertainable
extent our truths are man-made products too. Human motives sharpen
all our questions, human satisfactions lurk in all our answers, all
our formulas have a human twist. This element is so inextricable in
the products that Mr. Schiller sometimes seems almost to leave it
an open question whether there be anything else. "The world," he
says, "is essentially [u lambda nu], it is what we make of it. It
is fruitless to define it by what it originally was or by what it
is apart from us; it IS what is made of it. Hence ... the world is
PLASTIC." [Footnote: Personal Idealism, p. 60.] He adds that we can
learn the limits of the plasticity only by trying, and that we
ought to start as if it were wholly plastic, acting methodically on
that assumption, and stopping only when we are decisively
rebuked.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">This is Mr. Schiller's butt-end-foremost statement of the
humanist position, and it has exposed him to severe attack. I mean
to defend the humanist position in this lecture, so I will
insinuate a few remarks at this point.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Mr. Schiller admits as emphatically as anyone the presence of
resisting factors in every actual experience of truth-making, of
which the new-made special truth must take account, and with which
it has perforce to 'agree.' All our truths are beliefs about
'Reality'; and in any particular belief the reality acts as
something independent, as a thing FOUND, not manufactured. Let me
here recall a bit of my last lecture.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">'REALITY' IS IN GENERAL WHAT TRUTHS HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF;
[Footnote: Mr. Taylor in his Elements of Metaphysics uses this
excellent pragmatic definition.] and the FIRST part of reality from
this point of view is the flux of our sensations. Sensations are
forced upon us, coming we know not whence. Over their nature,
order, and quantity we have as good as no control. THEY are neither
true nor false; they simply ARE. It is only what we say about them,
only the names we give them, our theories of their source and
nature and remote relations, that may be true or not.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The SECOND part of reality, as something that our beliefs must
also obediently take account of, is the RELATIONS that obtain
between our sensations or between their copies in our minds. This
part falls into two sub-parts: 1) the relations that are mutable
and accidental, as those of date and place; and 2) those that are
fixed and essential because they are grounded on the inner natures
of their terms--such as likeness and unlikeness. Both sorts of
relation are matters of immediate perception. Both are 'facts.' But
it is the latter kind of fact that forms the more important
sub-part of reality for our theories of knowledge. Inner relations
namely are 'eternal,' are perceived whenever their sensible terms
are compared; and of them our thought--mathematical and logical
thought, so- called--must eternally take account.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The THIRD part of reality, additional to these perceptions (tho
largely based upon them), is the PREVIOUS TRUTHS of which every new
inquiry takes account. This third part is a much less obdurately
resisting factor: it often ends by giving way. In speaking of these
three portions of reality as at all times controlling our belief's
formation, I am only reminding you of what we heard in our last
hour.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Now however fixed these elements of reality may be, we still
have a certain freedom in our dealings with them. Take our
sensations. THAT they are is undoubtedly beyond our control; but
WHICH we attend to, note, and make emphatic in our conclusions
depends on our own interests; and, according as we lay the emphasis
here or there, quite different formulations of truth result. We
read the same facts differently. 'Waterloo,' with the same fixed
details, spells a 'victory' for an englishman; for a frenchman it
spells a 'defeat.' So, for an optimist philosopher the universe
spells victory, for a pessimist, defeat.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">What we say about reality thus depends on the perspective into
which we throw it. The THAT of it is its own; but the WHAT depends
on the WHICH; and the which depends on US. Both the sensational and
the relational parts of reality are dumb: they say absolutely
nothing about themselves. We it is who have to speak for them. This
dumbness of sensations has led such intellectualists as T.H. Green
and Edward Caird to shove them almost beyond the pale of
philosophic recognition, but pragmatists refuse to go so far. A
sensation is rather like a client who has given his case to a
lawyer and then has passively to listen in the courtroom to
whatever account of his affairs, pleasant or unpleasant, the lawyer
finds it most expedient to give.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Hence, even in the field of sensation, our minds exert a certain
arbitrary choice. By our inclusions and omissions we trace the
field's extent; by our emphasis we mark its foreground and its
background; by our order we read it in this direction or in that.
We receive in short the block of marble, but we carve the statue
ourselves.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">This applies to the 'eternal' parts of reality as well: we
shuffle our perceptions of intrinsic relation and arrange them just
as freely. We read them in one serial order or another, class them
in this way or in that, treat one or the other as more fundamental,
until our beliefs about them form those bodies of truth known as
logics, geometries, or arithmetics, in each and all of which the
form and order in which the whole is cast is flagrantly
man-made.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Thus, to say nothing of the new FACTS which men add to the
matter of reality by the acts of their own lives, they have already
impressed their mental forms on that whole third of reality which I
have called 'previous truths.' Every hour brings its new percepts,
its own facts of sensation and relation, to be truly taken account
of; but the whole of our PAST dealings with such facts is already
funded in the previous truths. It is therefore only the smallest
and recentest fraction of the first two parts of reality that comes
to us without the human touch, and that fraction has immediately to
become humanized in the sense of being squared, assimilated, or in
some way adapted, to the humanized mass already there. As a matter
of fact we can hardly take in an impression at all, in the absence
of a pre-conception of what impressions there may possibly be.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">When we talk of reality 'independent' of human thinking, then,
it seems a thing very hard to find. It reduces to the notion of
what is just entering into experience, and yet to be named, or else
to some imagined aboriginal presence in experience, before any
belief about the presence had arisen, before any human conception
had been applied. It is what is absolutely dumb and evanescent, the
merely ideal limit of our minds. We may glimpse it, but we never
grasp it; what we grasp is always some substitute for it which
previous human thinking has peptonized and cooked for our
consumption. If so vulgar an expression were allowed us, we might
say that wherever we find it, it has been already FAKED. This is
what Mr. Schiller has in mind when he calls independent reality a
mere unresisting [u lambda nu], which IS only to be made over by
us.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">That is Mr. Schiller's belief about the sensible core of
reality. We 'encounter' it (in Mr. Bradley's words) but don't
possess it. Superficially this sounds like Kant's view; but between
categories fulminated before nature began, and categories gradually
forming themselves in nature's presence, the whole chasm between
rationalism and empiricism yawns. To the genuine 'Kantianer'
Schiller will always be to Kant as a satyr to Hyperion.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Other pragmatists may reach more positive beliefs about the
sensible core of reality. They may think to get at it in its
independent nature, by peeling off the successive man-made
wrappings. They may make theories that tell us where it comes from
and all about it; and if these theories work satisfactorily they
will be true. The transcendental idealists say there is no core,
the finally completed wrapping being reality and truth in one.
Scholasticism still teaches that the core is 'matter.' Professor
Bergson, Heymans, Strong, and others, believe in the core and
bravely try to define it. Messrs. Dewey and Schiller treat it as a
'limit.' Which is the truer of all these diverse accounts, or of
others comparable with them, unless it be the one that finally
proves the most satisfactory? On the one hand there will stand
reality, on the other an account of it which proves impossible to
better or to alter. If the impossibility prove permanent, the truth
of the account will be absolute. Other content of truth than this I
can find nowhere. If the anti-pragmatists have any other meaning,
let them for heaven's sake reveal it, let them grant us access to
it!</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Not BEING reality, but only our belief ABOUT reality, it will
contain human elements, but these will KNOW the non-human element,
in the only sense in which there can be knowledge of anything. Does
the river make its banks, or do the banks make the river? Does a
man walk with his right leg or with his left leg more essentially?
Just as impossible may it be to separate the real from the human
factors in the growth of our cognitive experience.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Let this stand as a first brief indication of the humanistic
position. Does it seem paradoxical? If so, I will try to make it
plausible by a few illustrations, which will lead to a fuller
acquaintance with the subject.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">In many familiar objects everyone will recognize the human
element. We conceive a given reality in this way or in that, to
suit our purpose, and the reality passively submits to the
conception. You can take the number 27 as the cube of 3, or as the
product of 3 and 9, or as 26 PLUS 1, or 100 MINUS 73, or in
countless other ways, of which one will be just as true as another.
You can take a chessboard as black squares on a white ground, or as
white squares on a black ground, and neither conception is a false
one. You can treat the adjoined figure [Figure of a 'Star of
David'] as a star, as two big triangles crossing each other, as a
hexagon with legs set up on its angles, as six equal triangles
hanging together by their tips, etc. All these treatments are true
treatments--the sensible THAT upon the paper resists no one of
them. You can say of a line that it runs east, or you can say that
it runs west, and the line per se accepts both descriptions without
rebelling at the inconsistency.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">We carve out groups of stars in the heavens, and call them
constellations, and the stars patiently suffer us to do so--tho if
they knew what we were doing, some of them might feel much
surprised at the partners we had given them. We name the same
constellation diversely, as Charles's Wain, the Great Bear, or the
Dipper. None of the names will be false, and one will be as true as
another, for all are applicable.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">In all these cases we humanly make an addition to some sensible
reality, and that reality tolerates the addition. All the additions
'agree' with the reality; they fit it, while they build it out. No
one of them is false. Which may be treated as the more true,
depends altogether on the human use of it. If the 27 is a number of
dollars which I find in a drawer where I had left 28, it is 28
minus 1. If it is the number of inches in a shelf which I wish to
insert into a cupboard 26 inches wide, it is 26 plus 1. If I wish
to ennoble the heavens by the constellations I see there,
'Charles's Wain' would be more true than 'Dipper.' My friend
Frederick Myers was humorously indignant that that prodigious
star-group should remind us Americans of nothing but a culinary
utensil.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">What shall we call a THING anyhow? It seems quite arbitrary, for
we carve out everything, just as we carve out constellations, to
suit our human purposes. For me, this whole 'audience' is one
thing, which grows now restless, now attentive. I have no use at
present for its individual units, so I don't consider them. So of
an 'army,' of a 'nation.' But in your own eyes, ladies and
gentlemen, to call you 'audience' is an accidental way of taking
you. The permanently real things for you are your individual
persons. To an anatomist, again, those persons are but organisms,
and the real things are the organs. Not the organs, so much as
their constituent cells, say the histologists; not the cells, but
their molecules, say in turn the chemists.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">We break the flux of sensible reality into things, then, at our
will. We create the subjects of our true as well as of our false
propositions.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">We create the predicates also. Many of the predicates of things
express only the relations of the things to us and to our feelings.
Such predicates of course are human additions. Caesar crossed the
Rubicon, and was a menace to Rome's freedom. He is also an American
school-room pest, made into one by the reaction of our schoolboys
on his writings. The added predicate is as true of him as the
earlier ones.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">You see how naturally one comes to the humanistic principle: you
can't weed out the human contribution. Our nouns and adjectives are
all humanized heirlooms, and in the theories we build them into,
the inner order and arrangement is wholly dictated by human
considerations, intellectual consistency being one of them.
Mathematics and logic themselves are fermenting with human
rearrangements; physics, astronomy and biology follow massive cues
of preference. We plunge forward into the field of fresh experience
with the beliefs our ancestors and we have made already; these
determine what we notice; what we notice determines what we do;
what we do again determines what we experience; so from one thing
to another, altho the stubborn fact remains that there IS a
sensible flux, what is true of it seems from first to last to be
largely a matter of our own creation.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">We build the flux out inevitably. The great question is: does
it, with our additions, rise or fall in value? Are the additions
WORTHY or UNWORTHY? Suppose a universe composed of seven stars, and
nothing else but three human witnesses and their critic. One
witness names the stars 'Great Bear'; one calls them 'Charles's
Wain'; one calls them the 'Dipper.' Which human addition has made
the best universe of the given stellar material? If Frederick Myers
were the critic, he would have no hesitation in 'turning-down' the
American witness.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a href="/Author:Rudolf_Hermann_Lotze"
title="Author:Rudolf Hermann Lotze">Lotze</a> has in several places
made a deep suggestion. We naively assume, he says, a relation
between reality and our minds which may be just the opposite of the
true one. Reality, we naturally think, stands ready-made and
complete, and our intellects supervene with the one simple duty of
describing it as it is already. But may not our descriptions, Lotze
asks, be themselves important additions to reality? And may not
previous reality itself be there, far less for the purpose of
reappearing unaltered in our knowledge, than for the very purpose
of stimulating our minds to such additions as shall enhance the
universe's total value. "Die erhohung des vorgefundenen daseins" is
a phrase used by Professor Eucken somewhere, which reminds one of
this suggestion by the great Lotze.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">It is identically our pragmatistic conception. In our cognitive
as well as in our active life we are creative. We ADD, both to the
subject and to the predicate part of reality. The world stands
really malleable, waiting to receive its final touches at our
hands. Like the kingdom of heaven, it suffers human violence
willingly. Man ENGENDERS truths upon it.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">No one can deny that such a role would add both to our dignity
and to our responsibility as thinkers. To some of us it proves a
most inspiring notion. Signer Papini, the leader of italian
pragmatism, grows fairly dithyrambic over the view that it opens,
of man's divinely-creative functions.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The import of the difference between pragmatism and rationalism
is now in sight throughout its whole extent. The essential contrast
is that for rationalism reality is ready-made and complete from all
eternity, while for pragmatism it is still in the making, and
awaits part of its complexion from the future. On the one side the
universe is absolutely secure, on the other it is still pursuing
its adventures.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">We have got into rather deep water with this humanistic view,
and it is no wonder that misunderstanding gathers round it. It is
accused of being a doctrine of caprice. Mr. Bradley, for example,
says that a humanist, if he understood his own doctrine, would have
to "hold any end however perverted to be rational if I insist on it
personally, and any idea however mad to be the truth if only some
one is resolved that he will have it so." The humanist view of
'reality,' as something resisting, yet malleable, which controls
our thinking as an energy that must be taken 'account' of
incessantly (tho not necessarily merely COPIED) is evidently a
difficult one to introduce to novices. The situation reminds me of
one that I have personally gone through. I once wrote an essay on
our right to believe, which I unluckily called the WILL to Believe.
All the critics, neglecting the essay, pounced upon the title.
Psychologically it was impossible, morally it was iniquitous. The
"will to deceive," the "will to make-believe," were wittily
proposed as substitutes for it.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">THE ALTERNATIVE BETWEEN PRAGMATISM AND RATIONALISM, IN THE SHAPE
IN WHICH WE NOW HAVE IT BEFORE US, IS NO LONGER A QUESTION IN THE
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE, IT CONCERNS THE STRUCTURE OF THE UNIVERSE
ITSELF.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">On the pragmatist side we have only one edition of the universe,
unfinished, growing in all sorts of places, especially in the
places where thinking beings are at work.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">On the rationalist side we have a universe in many editions, one
real one, the infinite folio, or edition de luxe, eternally
complete; and then the various finite editions, full of false
readings, distorted and mutilated each in its own way.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">So the rival metaphysical hypotheses of pluralism and monism
here come back upon us. I will develope their differences during
the remainder of our hour.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">And first let me say that it is impossible not to see a
temperamental difference at work in the choice of sides. The
rationalist mind, radically taken, is of a doctrinaire and
authoritative complexion: the phrase 'must be' is ever on its lips.
The belly-band of its universe must be tight. A radical pragmatist
on the other hand is a happy-go-lucky anarchistic sort of creature.
If he had to live in a tub like Diogenes he wouldn't mind at all if
the hoops were loose and the staves let in the sun.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Now the idea of this loose universe affects your typical
rationalists in much the same way as 'freedom of the press' might
affect a veteran official in the russian bureau of censorship; or
as 'simplified spelling' might affect an elderly schoolmistress. It
affects him as the swarm of protestant sects affects a papist
onlooker. It appears as backboneless and devoid of principle as
'opportunism' in politics appears to an old-fashioned french
legitimist, or to a fanatical believer in the divine right of the
people.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">For pluralistic pragmatism, truth grows up inside of all the
finite experiences. They lean on each other, but the whole of them,
if such a whole there be, leans on nothing. All 'homes' are in
finite experience; finite experience as such is homeless. Nothing
outside of the flux secures the issue of it. It can hope salvation
only from its own intrinsic promises and potencies.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">To rationalists this describes a tramp and vagrant world, adrift
in space, with neither elephant nor tortoise to plant the sole of
its foot upon. It is a set of stars hurled into heaven without even
a centre of gravity to pull against. In other spheres of life it is
true that we have got used to living in a state of relative
insecurity. The authority of 'the State,' and that of an absolute
'moral law,' have resolved themselves into expediencies, and holy
church has resolved itself into 'meeting-houses.' Not so as yet
within the philosophic class-rooms. A universe with such as US
contributing to create its truth, a world delivered to OUR
opportunisms and OUR private judgments! Home-rule for Ireland would
be a millennium in comparison. We're no more fit for such a part
than the Filipinos are 'fit for self-government.' Such a world
would not be RESPECTABLE, philosophically. It is a trunk without a
tag, a dog without a collar, in the eyes of most professors of
philosophy.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">What then would tighten this loose universe, according to the
professors?</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Something to support the finite many, to tie it to, to unify and
anchor it. Something unexposed to accident, something eternal and
unalterable. The mutable in experience must be founded on
immutability. Behind our de facto world, our world in act, there
must be a de jure duplicate fixed and previous, with all that can
happen here already there in posse, every drop of blood, every
smallest item, appointed and provided, stamped and branded, without
chance of variation. The negatives that haunt our ideals here below
must be themselves negated in the absolutely Real. This alone makes
the universe solid. This is the resting deep. We live upon the
stormy surface; but with this our anchor holds, for it grapples
rocky bottom. This is Wordsworth's "central peace subsisting at the
heart of endless agitation." This is Vivekananda's mystical One of
which I read to you. This is Reality with the big R, reality that
makes the timeless claim, reality to which defeat can't happen.
This is what the men of principles, and in general all the men whom
I called tender-minded in my first lecture, think themselves
obliged to postulate.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">And this, exactly this, is what the tough-minded of that lecture
find themselves moved to call a piece of perverse abstraction-
worship. The tough-minded are the men whose alpha and omega are
FACTS. Behind the bare phenomenal facts, as my tough-minded old
friend Chauncey Wright, the great Harvard empiricist of my youth,
used to say, there is NOTHING. When a rationalist insists that
behind the facts there is the GROUND of the facts, the POSSIBILITY
of the facts, the tougher empiricists accuse him of taking the mere
name and nature of a fact and clapping it behind the fact as a
duplicate entity to make it possible. That such sham grounds are
often invoked is notorious. At a surgical operation I heard a
bystander ask a doctor why the patient breathed so deeply. "Because
ether is a respiratory stimulant," the doctor answered. "Ah!" said
the questioner, as if relieved by the explanation. But this is like
saying that cyanide of potassium kills because it is a 'poison,' or
that it is so cold to-night because it is 'winter,' or that we have
five fingers because we are 'pentadactyls.' These are but names for
the facts, taken from the facts, and then treated as previous and
explanatory. The tender-minded notion of an absolute reality is,
according to the radically tough-minded, framed on just this
pattern. It is but our summarizing name for the whole spread-out
and strung-along mass of phenomena, treated as if it were a
different entity, both one and previous.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">You see how differently people take things. The world we live in
exists diffused and distributed, in the form of an indefinitely
numerous lot of eaches, coherent in all sorts of ways and degrees;
and the tough-minded are perfectly willing to keep them at that
valuation. They can stand that kind of world, their temper being
well adapted to its insecurity. Not so the tender-minded party.
They must back the world we find ourselves born into by "another
and a better" world in which the eaches form an All and the All a
One that logically presupposes, co-implicates, and secures each
EACH without exception.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Must we as pragmatists be radically tough-minded? or can we
treat the absolute edition of the world as a legitimate hypothesis?
It is certainly legitimate, for it is thinkable, whether we take it
in its abstract or in its concrete shape.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">By taking it abstractly I mean placing it behind our finite life
as we place the word 'winter' behind to-night's cold weather.
'Winter' is only the name for a certain number of days which we
find generally characterized by cold weather, but it guarantees
nothing in that line, for our thermometer to-morrow may soar into
the 70's. Nevertheless the word is a useful one to plunge forward
with into the stream of our experience. It cuts off certain
probabilities and sets up others: you can put away your straw-hats;
you can unpack your arctics. It is a summary of things to look for.
It names a part of nature's habits, and gets you ready for their
continuation. It is a definite instrument abstracted from
experience, a conceptual reality that you must take account of, and
which reflects you totally back into sensible realities. The
pragmatist is the last person to deny the reality of such
abstractions. They are so much past experience funded.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But taking the absolute edition of the world concretely means a
different hypothesis. Rationalists take it concretely and OPPOSE it
to the world's finite editions. They give it a particular nature.
It is perfect, finished. Everything known there is known along with
everything else; here, where ignorance reigns, far otherwise. If
there is want there, there also is the satisfaction provided. Here
all is process; that world is timeless. Possibilities obtain in our
world; in the absolute world, where all that is NOT is from
eternity impossible, and all that IS is necessary, the category of
possibility has no application. In this world crimes and horrors
are regrettable. In that totalized world regret obtains not, for
"the existence of ill in the temporal order is the very condition
of the perfection of the eternal order."</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Once more, either hypothesis is legitimate in pragmatist eyes,
for either has its uses. Abstractly, or taken like the word winter,
as a memorandum of past experience that orients us towards the
future, the notion of the absolute world is indispensable.
Concretely taken, it is also indispensable, at least to certain
minds, for it determines them religiously, being often a thing to
change their lives by, and by changing their lives, to change
whatever in the outer order depends on them.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">We cannot therefore methodically join the tough minds in their
rejection of the whole notion of a world beyond our finite
experience. One misunderstanding of pragmatism is to identify it
with positivistic tough-mindedness, to suppose that it scorns every
rationalistic notion as so much jabber and gesticulation, that it
loves intellectual anarchy as such and prefers a sort of wolf-world
absolutely unpent and wild and without a master or a collar to any
philosophic class-room product, whatsoever. I have said so much in
these lectures against the over-tender forms of rationalism, that I
am prepared for some misunderstanding here, but I confess that the
amount of it that I have found in this very audience surprises me,
for I have simultaneously defended rationalistic hypotheses so far
as these re-direct you fruitfully into experience.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">For instance I receive this morning this question on a
post-card: "Is a pragmatist necessarily a complete materialist and
agnostic?" One of my oldest friends, who ought to know me better,
writes me a letter that accuses the pragmatism I am recommending,
of shutting out all wider metaphysical views and condemning us to
the most terre-a-terre naturalism. Let me read you some extracts
from it.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">"It seems to me," my friend writes, "that the pragmatic
objection to pragmatism lies in the fact that it might accentuate
the narrowness of narrow minds.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">"Your call to the rejection of the namby-pamby and the
wishy-washy is of course inspiring. But although it is salutary and
stimulating to be told that one should be responsible for the
immediate issues and bearings of his words and thoughts, I decline
to be deprived of the pleasure and profit of dwelling also on
remoter bearings and issues, and it is the TENDENCY of pragmatism
to refuse this privilege.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">"In short, it seems to me that the limitations, or rather the
dangers, of the pragmatic tendency, are analogous to those which
beset the unwary followers of the 'natural sciences.' Chemistry and
physics are eminently pragmatic and many of their devotees, smugly
content with the data that their weights and measures furnish, feel
an infinite pity and disdain for all students of philosophy and
meta-physics, whomsoever. And of course everything can be
expressed- -after a fashion, and 'theoretically'--in terms of
chemistry and physics, that is, EVERYTHING EXCEPT THE VITAL
PRINCIPLE OF THE WHOLE, and that, they say, there is no pragmatic
use in trying to express; it has no bearings--FOR THEM. I for my
part refuse to be persuaded that we cannot look beyond the obvious
pluralism of the naturalist and the pragmatist to a logical unity
in which they take no interest."</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">How is such a conception of the pragmatism I am advocating
possible, after my first and second lectures? I have all along been
offering it expressly as a mediator between tough-mindedness and
tender- mindedness. If the notion of a world ante rem, whether
taken abstractly like the word winter, or concretely as the
hypothesis of an Absolute, can be shown to have any consequences
whatever for our life, it has a meaning. If the meaning works, it
will have SOME truth that ought to be held to through all possible
reformulations, for pragmatism.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The absolutistic hypothesis, that perfection is eternal,
aboriginal, and most real, has a perfectly definite meaning, and it
works religiously. To examine how, will be the subject of my next
and final lecture.</div>
<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="wikisource_Lecture_VIII:_Pragmatism_and_Religion">Lecture VIII: Pragmatism
and Religion</span></h2>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">At the close of the last lecture I reminded you of the first
one, in which I had opposed tough-mindedness to tender-mindedness
and recommended pragmatism as their mediator. Tough-mindedness
positively rejects tender-mindedness's hypothesis of an eternal
perfect edition of the universe coexisting with our finite
experience.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">On pragmatic principles we cannot reject any hypothesis if
consequences useful to life flow from it. Universal conceptions, as
things to take account of, may be as real for pragmatism as
particular sensations are. They have indeed no meaning and no
reality if they have no use. But if they have any use they have
that amount of meaning. And the meaning will be true if the use
squares well with life's other uses.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Well, the use of the Absolute is proved by the whole course of
men's religious history. The eternal arms are then beneath.
Remember Vivekananda's use of the Atman: it is indeed not a
scientific use, for we can make no particular deductions from it.
It is emotional and spiritual altogether.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">It is always best to discuss things by the help of concrete
examples. Let me read therefore some of those verses entitled "To
You" by Walt Whitman--"You" of course meaning the reader or hearer
of the poem whosoever he or she may be.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Whoever you are, now I place my hand upon you, that you be my
poem;<br />
I whisper with my lips close to your ear,<br />
I have loved many women and men, but I love none better than
you.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><br />
O I have been dilatory and dumb;<br />
I should have made my way straight to you long ago;<br />
I should have blabb'd nothing but you, I should have chanted
nothing but you.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><br />
I will leave all, and come and make the hymns of you;<br />
None have understood you, but I understand you;<br />
None have done justice to you--you have not done justice to
yourself;<br />
None but have found you imperfect--I only find no imperfection in
you.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><br />
O I could sing such grandeurs and glories about you!<br />
You have not known what you are--you have slumber'd upon yourself
all your life;<br />
What you have done returns already in mockeries.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><br />
But the mockeries are not you;<br />
Underneath them, and within them, I see you lurk;<br />
I pursue you where none else has pursued you;<br />
Silence, the desk, the flippant expression, the night, the<br />
accustom'd routine, if these conceal you from others, or from<br />
yourself, they do not conceal you from me;<br />
The shaved face, the unsteady eye, the impure complexion, if
these<br />
balk others, they do not balk me,<br />
The pert apparel, the deform'd attitude, drunkenness, greed,<br />
premature death, all these I part aside.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><br />
There is no endowment in man or woman that is not tallied in
you;<br />
There is no virtue, no beauty, in man or woman, but as good is in
you;<br />
No pluck, no endurance in others, but as good is in you;<br />
No pleasure waiting for others, but an equal pleasure waits for
you.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><br />
Whoever you are! claim your own at any hazard!<br />
These shows of the east and west are tame, compared to you;<br />
These immense meadows--these interminable rivers--you are
immense<br />
and interminable as they;<br />
You are he or she who is master or mistress over them,<br />
Master or mistress in your own right over Nature, elements,
pain,<br />
passion, dissolution.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><br />
The hopples fall from your ankles--you find an unfailing
sufficiency;<br />
Old or young, male or female, rude, low, rejected by the
rest,<br />
whatever you are promulges itself;<br />
Through birth, life, death, burial, the means are provided, nothing
is scanted;<br />
Through angers, losses, ambition, ignorance, ennui, what you are
picks its way.<br />
</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><br />
Verily a fine and moving poem, in any case, but there are two ways
of taking it, both useful.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">One is the monistic way, the mystical way of pure cosmic
emotion. The glories and grandeurs, they are yours absolutely, even
in the midst of your defacements. Whatever may happen to you,
whatever you may appear to be, inwardly you are safe. Look back,
LIE back, on your true principle of being! This is the famous way
of quietism, of indifferentism. Its enemies compare it to a
spiritual opium. Yet pragmatism must respect this way, for it has
massive historic vindication.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But pragmatism sees another way to be respected also, the
pluralistic way of interpreting the poem. The you so glorified, to
which the hymn is sung, may mean your better possibilities
phenomenally taken, or the specific redemptive effects even of your
failures, upon yourself or others. It may mean your loyalty to the
possibilities of others whom you admire and love so, that you are
willing to accept your own poor life, for it is that glory's
partner. You can at least appreciate, applaud, furnish the
audience, of so brave a total world. Forget the low in yourself,
then, think only of the high. Identify your life therewith; then,
through angers, losses, ignorance, ennui, whatever you thus make
yourself, whatever you thus most deeply are, picks its way.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">In either way of taking the poem, it encourages fidelity to
ourselves. Both ways satisfy; both sanctify the human flux. Both
paint the portrait of the YOU on a gold-background. But the
background of the first way is the static One, while in the second
way it means possibles in the plural, genuine possibles, and it has
all the restlessness of that conception.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Noble enough is either way of reading the poem; but plainly the
pluralistic way agrees with the pragmatic temper best, for it
immediately suggests an infinitely larger number of the details of
future experience to our mind. It sets definite activities in us at
work. Altho this second way seems prosaic and earthborn in
comparison with the first way, yet no one can accuse it of tough-
mindedness in any brutal sense of the term. Yet if, as pragmatists,
you should positively set up the second way AGAINST the first way,
you would very likely be misunderstood. You would be accused of
denying nobler conceptions, and of being an ally of
tough-mindedness in the worst sense.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">You remember the letter from a member of this audience from
which I read some extracts at our previous meeting. Let me read you
an additional extract now. It shows a vagueness in realizing the
alternatives before us which I think is very widespread.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">"I believe," writes my friend and correspondent, "in pluralism;
I believe that in our search for truth we leap from one floating
cake of ice to another, on an infinite sea, and that by each of our
acts we make new truths possible and old ones impossible; I believe
that each man is responsible for making the universe better, and
that if he does not do this it will be in so far left undone.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">"Yet at the same time I am willing to endure that my children
should be incurably sick and suffering (as they are not) and I
myself stupid and yet with brains enough to see my stupidity, only
on one condition, namely, that through the construction, in
imagination and by reasoning, of a RATIONAL UNITY OF ALL THINGS, I
can conceive my acts and my thoughts and my troubles as
SUPPLEMENTED: BY ALL THE OTHER PHENOMENA OF THE WORLD, AND AS
FORMING--WHEN THUS SUPPLEMENTED--A SCHEME WHICH I APPROVE AND ADOPT
AS MY I OWN; and for my part I refuse to be persuaded that we
cannot look beyond the obvious pluralism of the naturalist and
pragmatist to a logical unity in which they take no interest or
stock."</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Such a fine expression of personal faith warms the heart of the
hearer. But how much does it clear his philosophic head? Does the
writer consistently favor the monistic, or the pluralistic,
interpretation of the world's poem? His troubles become atoned for
WHEN THUS SUPPLEMENTED, he says, supplemented, that is, by all the
remedies that THE OTHER PHENOMENA may supply. Obviously here the
writer faces forward into the particulars of experience, which he
interprets in a pluralistic-melioristic way.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But he believes himself to face backward. He speaks of what he
calls the rational UNITY of things, when all the while he really
means their possible empirical UNIFICATION. He supposes at the same
time that the pragmatist, because he criticizes rationalism's
abstract One, is cut off from the consolation of believing in the
saving possibilities of the concrete many. He fails in short to
distinguish between taking the world's perfection as a necessary
principle, and taking it only as a possible terminus ad quem.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">I regard the writer of this letter as a genuine pragmatist, but
as a pragmatist sans le savoir. He appears to me as one of that
numerous class of philosophic amateurs whom I spoke of in my first
lecture, as wishing to have all the good things going, without
being too careful as to how they agree or disagree. "Rational unity
of all things" is so inspiring a formula, that he brandishes it
offhand, and abstractly accuses pluralism of conflicting with it
(for the bare names do conflict), altho concretely he means by it
just the pragmatistically unified and ameliorated world. Most of us
remain in this essential vagueness, and it is well that we should;
but in the interest of clear-headedness it is well that some of us
should go farther, so I will try now to focus a little more
discriminatingly on this particular religious point.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Is then this you of yous, this absolutely real world, this unity
that yields the moral inspiration and has the religious value, to
be taken monistically or pluralistically? Is it ante rem or in
rebus? Is it a principle or an end, an absolute or an ultimate, a
first or a last? Does it make you look forward or lie back? It is
certainly worth while not to clump the two things together, for if
discriminated, they have decidedly diverse meanings for life.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Please observe that the whole dilemma revolves pragmatically
about the notion of the world's possibilities. Intellectually,
rationalism invokes its absolute principle of unity as a ground of
possibility for the many facts. Emotionally, it sees it as a
container and limiter of possibilities, a guarantee that the upshot
shall be good. Taken in this way, the absolute makes all good
things certain, and all bad things impossible (in the eternal,
namely), and may be said to transmute the entire category of
possibility into categories more secure. One sees at this point
that the great religious difference lies between the men who insist
that the world MUST AND SHALL BE, and those who are contented with
believing that the world MAY BE, saved. The whole clash of
rationalistic and empiricist religion is thus over the validity of
possibility. It is necessary therefore to begin by focusing upon
that word. What may the word 'possible' definitely mean?</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">To unreflecting men the possible means a sort of third estate of
being, less real than existence, more real than non-existence, a
twilight realm, a hybrid status, a limbo into which and out of
which realities ever and anon are made to pass. Such a conception
is of course too vague and nondescript to satisfy us. Here, as
elsewhere, the only way to extract a term's meaning is to use the
pragmatic method on it. When you say that a thing is possible, what
difference does it make?</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">It makes at least this difference that if anyone calls it
impossible you can contradict him, if anyone calls it actual you
can contradict HIM, and if anyone calls it necessary you can
contradict him too. But these privileges of contradiction don't
amount to much. When you say a thing is possible, does not that
make some farther difference in terms of actual fact?</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">It makes at least this negative difference that if the statement
be true, it follows that there is nothing extant capable of
preventing the possible thing. The absence of real grounds of
interference may thus be said to make things not impossible,
possible therefore in the bare or abstract sense.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But most possibles are not bare, they are concretely grounded,
or well-grounded, as we say. What does this mean pragmatically? It
means, not only that there are no preventive conditions present,
but that some of the conditions of production of the possible thing
actually are here. Thus a concretely possible chicken means: (1)
that the idea of chicken contains no essential self-contradiction;
(2) that no boys, skunks, or other enemies are about; and (3) that
at least an actual egg exists. Possible chicken means actual egg--
plus actual sitting hen, or incubator, or what not. As the actual
conditions approach completeness the chicken becomes a better-and-
better-grounded possibility. When the conditions are entirely
complete, it ceases to be a possibility, and turns into an actual
fact.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Let us apply this notion to the salvation of the world. What
does it pragmatically mean to say that this is possible? It means
that some of the conditions of the world's deliverance do actually
exist. The more of them there are existent, the fewer preventing
conditions you can find, the better-grounded is the salvation's
possibility, the more PROBABLE does the fact of the deliverance
become.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">So much for our preliminary look at possibility.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Now it would contradict the very spirit of life to say that our
minds must be indifferent and neutral in questions like that of the
world's salvation. Anyone who pretends to be neutral writes himself
down here as a fool and a sham. We all do wish to minimize the
insecurity of the universe; we are and ought to be unhappy when we
regard it as exposed to every enemy and open to every life-
destroying draft. Nevertheless there are unhappy men who think the
salvation of the world impossible. Theirs is the doctrine known as
pessimism.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Optimism in turn would be the doctrine that thinks the world's
salvation inevitable.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Midway between the two there stands what may be called the
doctrine of meliorism, tho it has hitherto figured less as a
doctrine than as an attitude in human affairs. Optimism has always
been the regnant DOCTRINE in european philosophy. Pessimism was
only recently introduced by Schopenhauer and counts few systematic
defenders as yet. Meliorism treats salvation as neither inevitable
nor impossible. It treats it as a possibility, which becomes more
and more of a probability the more numerous the actual conditions
of salvation become.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">It is clear that pragmatism must incline towards meliorism. Some
conditions of the world's salvation are actually extant, and she
cannot possibly close her eyes to this fact: and should the
residual conditions come, salvation would become an accomplished
reality. Naturally the terms I use here are exceedingly summary.
You may interpret the word 'salvation' in any way you like, and
make it as diffuse and distributive, or as climacteric and integral
a phenomenon as you please.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Take, for example, any one of us in this room with the ideals
which he cherishes, and is willing to live and work for. Every such
ideal realized will be one moment in the world's salvation. But
these particular ideals are not bare abstract possibilities. They
are grounded, they are LIVE possibilities, for we are their live
champions and pledges, and if the complementary conditions come and
add themselves, our ideals will become actual things. What now are
the complementary conditions? They are first such a mixture of
things as will in the fulness of time give us a chance, a gap that
we can spring into, and, finally, OUR ACT.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Does our act then CREATE the world's salvation so far as it
makes room for itself, so far as it leaps into the gap? Does it
create, not the whole world's salvation of course, but just so much
of this as itself covers of the world's extent?</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Here I take the bull by the horns, and in spite of the whole
crew of rationalists and monists, of whatever brand they be, I ask
WHY NOT? Our acts, our turning-places, where we seem to ourselves
to make ourselves and grow, are the parts of the world to which we
are closest, the parts of which our knowledge is the most intimate
and complete. Why should we not take them at their face-value? Why
may they not be the actual turning-places and growing-places which
they seem to be, of the world--why not the workshop of being, where
we catch fact in the making, so that nowhere may the world grow in
any other kind of way than this?</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Irrational! we are told. How can new being come in local spots
and patches which add themselves or stay away at random,
independently of the rest? There must be a reason for our acts, and
where in the last resort can any reason be looked for save in the
material pressure or the logical compulsion of the total nature of
the world? There can be but one real agent of growth, or seeming
growth, anywhere, and that agent is the integral world itself. It
may grow all-over, if growth there be, but that single parts should
grow per se is irrational.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But if one talks of rationality and of reasons for things, and
insists that they can't just come in spots, what KIND of a reason
can there ultimately be why anything should come at all? Talk of
logic and necessity and categories and the absolute and the
contents of the whole philosophical machine-shop as you will, the
only REAL reason I can think of why anything should ever come is
that someone wishes it to be here. It is DEMANDED, demanded, it may
be, to give relief to no matter how small a fraction of the world's
mass. This is living reason, and compared with it material causes
and logical necessities are spectral things.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">In short the only fully rational world would be the world of
wishing-caps, the world of telepathy, where every desire is
fulfilled instanter, without having to consider or placate
surrounding or intermediate powers. This is the Absolute's own
world. He calls upon the phenomenal world to be, and it IS, exactly
as he calls for it, no other condition being required. In our
world, the wishes of the individual are only one condition. Other
individuals are there with other wishes and they must be
propitiated first. So Being grows under all sorts of resistances in
this world of the many, and, from compromise to compromise, only
gets organized gradually into what may be called secondarily
rational shape. We approach the wishing-cap type of organization
only in a few departments of life. We want water and we turn a
faucet. We want a kodak-picture and we press a button. We want
information and we telephone. We want to travel and we buy a
ticket. In these and similar cases, we hardly need to do more than
the wishing--the world is rationally organized to do the rest.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But this talk of rationality is a parenthesis and a digression.
What we were discussing was the idea of a world growing not
integrally but piecemeal by the contributions of its several parts.
Take the hypothesis seriously and as a live one. Suppose that the
world's author put the case to you before creation, saying: "I am
going to make a world not certain to be saved, a world the
perfection of which shall be conditional merely, the condition
being that each several agent does its own 'level best.' I offer
you the chance of taking part in such a world. Its safety, you see,
is unwarranted. It is a real adventure, with real danger, yet it
may win through. It is a social scheme of co-operative work
genuinely to be done. Will you join the procession? Will you trust
yourself and trust the other agents enough to face the risk?"</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Should you in all seriousness, if participation in such a world
were proposed to you, feel bound to reject it as not safe enough?
Would you say that, rather than be part and parcel of so
fundamentally pluralistic and irrational a universe, you preferred
to relapse into the slumber of nonentity from which you had been
momentarily aroused by the tempter's voice?</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Of course if you are normally constituted, you would do nothing
of the sort. There is a healthy-minded buoyancy in most of us which
such a universe would exactly fit. We would therefore accept the
offer--"Top! und schlag auf schlag!" It would be just like the
world we practically live in; and loyalty to our old nurse Nature
would forbid us to say no. The world proposed would seem 'rational'
to us in the most living way.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Most of us, I say, would therefore welcome the proposition and
add our fiat to the fiat of the creator. Yet perhaps some would
not; for there are morbid minds in every human collection, and to
them the prospect of a universe with only a fighting chance of
safety would probably make no appeal. There are moments of
discouragement in us all, when we are sick of self and tired of
vainly striving. Our own life breaks down, and we fall into the
attitude of the prodigal son. We mistrust the chances of things. We
want a universe where we can just give up, fall on our father's
neck, and be absorbed into the absolute life as a drop of water
melts into the river or the sea.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">The peace and rest, the security desiderated at such moments is
security against the bewildering accidents of so much finite
experience. Nirvana means safety from this everlasting round of
adventures of which the world of sense consists. The hindoo and the
buddhist, for this is essentially their attitude, are simply
afraid, afraid of more experience, afraid of life.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">And to men of this complexion, religious monism comes with its
consoling words: "All is needed and essential--even you with your
sick soul and heart. All are one with God, and with God all is
well. The everlasting arms are beneath, whether in the world of
finite appearances you seem to fail or to succeed." There can be no
doubt that when men are reduced to their last sick extremity
absolutism is the only saving scheme. Pluralistic moralism simply
makes their teeth chatter, it refrigerates the very heart within
their breast.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">So we see concretely two types of religion in sharp contrast.
Using our old terms of comparison, we may say that the absolutistic
scheme appeals to the tender-minded while the pluralistic scheme
appeals to the tough. Many persons would refuse to call the
pluralistic scheme religious at all. They would call it moralistic,
and would apply the word religious to the monistic scheme alone.
Religion in the sense of self-surrender, and moralism in the sense
of self-sufficingness, have been pitted against each other as
incompatibles frequently enough in the history of human
thought.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">We stand here before the final question of philosophy. I said in
my fourth lecture that I believed the monistic-pluralistic
alternative to be the deepest and most pregnant question that our
minds can frame. Can it be that the disjunction is a final one?
that only one side can be true? Are a pluralism and monism genuine
incompatibles? So that, if the world were really pluralistically
constituted, if it really existed distributively and were made up
of a lot of eaches, it could only be saved piecemeal and de facto
as the result of their behavior, and its epic history in no wise
short-circuited by some essential oneness in which the severalness
were already 'taken up' beforehand and eternally 'overcome'? If
this were so, we should have to choose one philosophy or the other.
We could not say 'yes, yes' to both alternatives. There would have
to be a 'no' in our relations with the possible. We should confess
an ultimate disappointment: we could not remain healthy-minded and
sick-minded in one indivisible act.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Of course as human beings we can be healthy minds on one day and
sick souls on the next; and as amateur dabblers in philosophy we
may perhaps be allowed to call ourselves monistic pluralists, or
free- will determinists, or whatever else may occur to us of a
reconciling kind. But as philosophers aiming at clearness and
consistency, and feeling the pragmatistic need of squaring truth
with truth, the question is forced upon us of frankly adopting
either the tender or the robustious type of thought. In particular
THIS query has always come home to me: May not the claims of
tender-mindedness go too far? May not the notion of a world already
saved in toto anyhow, be too saccharine to stand? May not religious
optimism be too idyllic? Must ALL be saved? Is NO price to be paid
in the work of salvation? Is the last word sweet? Is all 'yes, yes'
in the universe? Doesn't the fact of 'no' stand at the very core of
life? Doesn't the very 'seriousness' that we attribute to life mean
that ineluctable noes and losses form a part of it, that there are
genuine sacrifices somewhere, and that something permanently
drastic and bitter always remains at the bottom of its cup?</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">I can not speak officially as a pragmatist here; all I can say
is that my own pragmatism offers no objection to my taking sides
with this more moralistic view, and giving up the claim of total
reconciliation. The possibility of this is involved in the
pragmatistic willingness to treat pluralism as a serious
hypothesis. In the end it is our faith and not our logic that
decides such questions, and I deny the right of any pretended logic
to veto my own faith. I find myself willing to take the universe to
be really dangerous and adventurous, without therefore backing out
and crying 'no play.' I am willing to think that the prodigal-son
attitude, open to us as it is in many vicissitudes, is not the
right and final attitude towards the whole of life. I am willing
that there should be real losses and real losers, and no total
preservation of all that is. I can believe in the ideal as an
ultimate, not as an origin, and as an extract, not the whole. When
the cup is poured off, the dregs are left behind forever, but the
possibility of what is poured off is sweet enough to accept.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">As a matter of fact countless human imaginations live in this
moralistic and epic kind of a universe, and find its disseminated
and strung-along successes sufficient for their rational needs.
There is a finely translated epigram in the greek anthology which
admirably expresses this state of mind, this acceptance of loss as
unatoned for, even tho the lost element might be one's self:</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">"A shipwrecked sailor, buried on this coast, Bids you set sail.
Full many a gallant bark, when we were lost, Weathered the
gale."</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">Those puritans who answered 'yes' to the question: Are you
willing to be damned for God's glory? were in this objective and
magnanimous condition of mind. The way of escape from evil on this
system is NOT by getting it 'aufgehoben,' or preserved in the whole
as an element essential but 'overcome.' It is by dropping it out
altogether, throwing it overboard and getting beyond it, helping to
make a universe that shall forget its very place and name.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">It is then perfectly possible to accept sincerely a drastic kind
of a universe from which the element of 'seriousness' is not to be
expelled. Whoso does so is, it seems to me, a genuine pragmatist.
He is willing to live on a scheme of uncertified possibilities
which he trusts; willing to pay with his own person, if need be,
for the realization of the ideals which he frames.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">What now actually ARE the other forces which he trusts to
co-operate with him, in a universe of such a type? They are at
least his fellow men, in the stage of being which our actual
universe has reached. But are there not superhuman forces also,
such as religious men of the pluralistic type we have been
considering have always believed in? Their words may have sounded
monistic when they said "there is no God but God"; but the original
polytheism of mankind has only imperfectly and vaguely sublimated
itself into monotheism, and monotheism itself, so far as it was
religious and not a scheme of class-room instruction for the
metaphysicians, has always viewed God as but one helper, primus
inter pares, in the midst of all the shapers of the great world's
fate.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">I fear that my previous lectures, confined as they have been to
human and humanistic aspects, may have left the impression on many
of you that pragmatism means methodically to leave the superhuman
out. I have shown small respect indeed for the Absolute, and I have
until this moment spoken of no other superhuman hypothesis but
that. But I trust that you see sufficiently that the Absolute has
nothing but its superhumanness in common with the theistic God. On
pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works
satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true. Now
whatever its residual difficulties may be, experience shows that it
certainly does work, and that the problem is to build it out and
determine it, so that it will combine satisfactorily with all the
other working truths. I cannot start upon a whole theology at the
end of this last lecture; but when I tell you that I have written a
book on men's religious experience, which on the whole has been
regarded as making for the reality of God, you will perhaps exempt
my own pragmatism from the charge of being an atheistic system. I
firmly disbelieve, myself, that our human experience is the highest
form of experience extant in the universe. I believe rather that we
stand in much the same relation to the whole of the universe as our
canine and feline pets do to the whole of human life. They inhabit
our drawing-rooms and libraries. They take part in scenes of whose
significance they have no inkling. They are merely tangent to
curves of history the beginnings and ends and forms of which pass
wholly beyond their ken. So we are tangents to the wider life of
things. But, just as many of the dog's and cat's ideals coincide
with our ideals, and the dogs and cats have daily living proof of
the fact, so we may well believe, on the proofs that religious
experience affords, that higher powers exist and are at work to
save the world on ideal lines similar to our own.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">You see that pragmatism can be called religious, if you allow
that religion can be pluralistic or merely melioristic in type. But
whether you will finally put up with that type of religion or not
is a question that only you yourself can decide. Pragmatism has to
postpone dogmatic answer, for we do not yet know certainly which
type of religion is going to work best in the long run. The various
overbeliefs of men, their several faith-ventures, are in fact what
are needed to bring the evidence in. You will probably make your
own ventures severally. If radically tough, the hurly-burly of the
sensible facts of nature will be enough for you, and you will need
no religion at all. If radically tender, you will take up with the
more monistic form of religion: the pluralistic form, with its
reliance on possibilities that are not necessities, will not seem
to afford you security enough.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">But if you are neither tough nor tender in an extreme and
radical sense, but mixed as most of us are, it may seem to you that
the type of pluralistic and moralistic religion that I have offered
is as good a religious synthesis as you are likely to find. Between
the two extremes of crude naturalism on the one hand and
transcendental absolutism on the other, you may find that what I
take the liberty of calling the pragmatistic or melioristic type of
theism is exactly what you require.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><br />
The End of</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">PRAGMATISM</div>
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<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__341" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="341"><strong>PRAGMATISM,</strong> in <a href="/Philosophy"
title="Philosophy">philosophy</a>, etymologically a theory or
method of dealing with real things (Gr.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="341"><a href="#citable__341"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Pragmatism then, in this twentieth-century version, is another name for the operational theory of scientific method, and is closely linked to logical empiricism.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="341"><a href="#citable__341"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>This method draws on the pragmatic philosophy of John Dewey and recommends an experimental approach to solving moral problems in clinical practice.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="341"><a href="#citable__341"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The theories of metaphysicians on these lofty themes he regards as personal postulates which, in so far as they cannot be subjected to the pragmatic method, must remain open questions.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<em>7rp&yµara:</em> cf.
7rpayµaTuais, versed in affairs). "Pragmatic," as here employed. is
not used in the common colloquial sense of "pragmatical," <em>i.e.
"</em> fussy and positive," nor in the historical sense, as in "<a
href="/Pragmatic_Sanction" title="Pragmatic Sanction">Pragmatic
Sanction</a>," of "relating to affairs of state," but in the sense
of practical or efficient. <a name="citable__339" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="339">2 Pragmatism, as a general philosophic
doctrine or mental attitude, can only be understood as part of a
reaction against the intellectualistic <a href="/Speculation"
title="Speculation">speculation</a> which has characterized most of
modern <a href="/Metaphysics" title="Metaphysics">metaphysics</a>.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="339"><a href="#citable__339"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>He wrote, "I say without hesitation that a part, a very large part, of the activities carried on today in evangelical circles are not only influenced by pragmatism but almost completely controlled by it."</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>But Does It Work?</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.biblebb.com/files/MAC/pragmatism.htm">www.biblebb.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="339"><a href="#citable__339"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Pragmatism therefore lacks those basic characteristics which one has the right to expect of a philosophical doctrine.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="339"><a href="#citable__339"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Wagner, like most in the church growth movement, claims that the "consecrated pragmatism" he advocates does not allow compromise of doctrine or ethics.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>But Does It Work?</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.biblebb.com/files/MAC/pragmatism.htm">www.biblebb.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__129" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="129">It arises from a general awakening to the fact that the growth of
our psychological and biological knowledge must profoundly
transform the traditional <a href="/Epistemology"
title="Epistemology">epistemology</a>.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="129"><a href="#citable__129"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>It would seem, however, that if our inference genuinely had imparted new knowledge, the event must be merely psychological; for how can any process or event perturb, or add to, the completed totality of truth in itself?</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="129"><a href="#citable__129"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>In order to be clear about the content of a concept or hypothesis, we must reflect upon its role in determining what we should do in the light of our desires and our background knowledge.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__49" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="49">It follows that "pragmatic"
lines of thought may originate from a multiplicity of
considerations and in a variety of contexts.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="49"><a href="#citable__49"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Both Deweyan pragmatism and interactive constructivism believe that in order to be open-minded to the originality of learners and to facilitate real learning experiences, educators must be attentive to the multiple and often complex contexts of their learners' experiences.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="49"><a href="#citable__49"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>So far from regarding Thought as a self-centred, self-enclosed activity, Pragmatism insists upon replacing it in its context among the other functions of life, and in measuring its value by its effect upon them.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="49"><a href="#citable__49"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>If we want a detailed formulation of pragmatism, we must go back to Peirce's original formulation, although we must also be mindful that the differences between the pragmatisms of Peirce and James may be greater than James acknowledged.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__164" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="164">These, however, may be
conveniently classified under four main heads - psychological,
logical, ethical and religious - and the history of the subject
shows that all these have contributed to the development of
pragmatism.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="164"><a href="#citable__164"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>This convenient assumption, however, ultimately necessitates an abstraction from meaning, though Formal Logic does not avow this openly.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="164"><a href="#citable__164"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>But a critically-minded man will urge against it that _'certainty' is a subjective and psychological criterion_, and that no one has been able to devise a method for distinguishing the alleged logical from the undeniable psychological certainty.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="164"><a href="#citable__164"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>However, their pragmatic attitudes toward experience and history diverge radically from Hegel's absolutism and dialectical method: Peirce was sharply critical of Hegel's logic and deficiency in mathematics, although he shared with Josiah Royce sympathy for Hegel's spiritual monism: .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__109" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="109">1. Psychologically, pragmatism starts from the efficacy and
allpervasiveness of mental activity, and points out that interest,
attention, selection, purpose, <a href="/Bias"
title="Bias">bias</a>, desire, emotion, <a href="/Satisfaction"
title="Satisfaction">satisfaction</a>, &c., colour and control
all our cognitive processes.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="109"><a href="#citable__109"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Although we will not be able to explicate all the diverse and complex theoretical perspectives contained in both approaches, we will at least try to give you an impression of how pragmatism and constructivism might mutually enrich each other from our point of view.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="109"><a href="#citable__109"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>For James and Dewey, this holds of all our concepts and theories: we treat them as instruments, as artefacts to be judged by how well they achieve their intended purpose.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="109"><a href="#citable__109"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The _summum bonum_, or supreme good, will then be the ideal of the harmonious satisfaction of all purposes.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__93" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="93">It insists that all thought is
personal and purposive and that "pure"' thought is a figment.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="93"><a href="#citable__93"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>But this is not possible in pragmatist doctrine, since it holds that individual judgements are at the root of all human thought: no purely individual judgement could ever become an objective truth.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__142" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="142">A
judgment which is not prompted by motives and inspired by interest,
which has not for its aim the satisfaction of a cognitive purpose,
is psychologically impossible, and it is, therefore, mistaken to
construct a <a href="/Logic" title="Logic">logic</a> which
abstracts from all these facts.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="142"><a href="#citable__142"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>All these ideas are mistaken.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="142"><a href="#citable__142"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The _summum bonum_, or supreme good, will then be the ideal of the harmonious satisfaction of all purposes.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="142"><a href="#citable__142"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>All three are psychologically very real to those who believe in them, but logically they succumb to the assaults of a scepticism which infers from the fact that no 'truths' are absolute that all may reasonably be overthrown.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__39" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="39">Nor is the presence of such
non-intellectual factors in thinking necessarily deleterious: at
any rate they are ineradicable.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="39"><a href="#citable__39"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>This does not mean that they have a new, non-Platonic set of answers to Platonic questions to offer, but rather that they do not think we should ask those questions any more.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Richard Rorty's Platonists, Positivists, and Pragmatists</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="39"><a href="#citable__39"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Furthermore, intellectual individualism does not necessarily imply, as James seems to think, that everyone may arbitrarily believe what he wishes to believe.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="39"><a href="#citable__39"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>They noted that several non-structural factors interact with pragmatic transfer , ...</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>interlanguage</c_title></em> <c_date>18 September 2009 14:12 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.gxnu.edu.cn/Personal/szliu/pragmatic_transfer.html">www.gxnu.edu.cn</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
Truths are always on one side
matters of belief, and beliefs are ultimately rules for action. <a name="citable__352" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="352">The
whole functioning of our mental apparatus is directed upon yielding
the right response to the stimulations of the environment, and is
valuable if and in so far as it does this.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="352"><a href="#citable__352"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>May they not have been purposive responses to the stimulation of environment?</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="352"><a href="#citable__352"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>So far from regarding Thought as a self-centred, self-enclosed activity, Pragmatism insists upon replacing it in its context among the other functions of life, and in measuring its value by its effect upon them.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="352"><a href="#citable__352"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>If, then, this _absolute_ coherence be insisted on, this test condemns our whole knowledge; if not, it remains formal, and fails to recognize any distinctions of value in the claims which can be systematized.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__326" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="326">The "psychologicm" thus
introduced into logic amounts to a systematic protest against the
notion of a dehumanized thought and the study of logic in <a
href="/Abstraction" title="Abstraction">abstraction</a> from actual
psychic process.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="326"><a href="#citable__326"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>It is essentially a reform of Logic, which protests against a Logic that has become so formal as to abstract from meaning altogether.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="326"><a href="#citable__326"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Thus, for Pragmatism _every thought is an act_ with a person behind it, who is responsible for launching it into the world of fact.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="326"><a href="#citable__326"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Thus, a systematic network of natural 'laws' is slowly knit together, and chaos visibly transforms itself into scientific order.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__358" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="358">2. In its logical aspect pragmatism originates in a criticism of
fundamental conceptions like "truth," "error," "fact" 2 <em>The New
English Dictionary</em> quotes for nine distinct senses of the
word, of which the philosophic is the eighth.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="358"><a href="#citable__358"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>It is not pragmatic in any positive sense of the word.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title> Apollo Feedback: On Energy Pragmatism: Yes, No, But : Apollo Alliance</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://apolloalliance.org/feedback/apollo-feedback-on-energy-pragmatism-yes-no-but/">apolloalliance.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="358"><a href="#citable__358"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>For a confirmation of this doctrine Pragmatism appeals to the history of scientific truth, which has shown a continuous correction of 'truths,' which were re-valued as 'errors,' as better statements for them became available.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="358"><a href="#citable__358"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>First, the philosophical writings of a leading pragmatist like C. S. Peirce are concerned with and defend theories of truth and reality that are not merely procedural, behavioristic, transitional, or conceptual.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__348" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="348">The seven earlier
ones are all more or less obsolescent, and their very number shows
that the meaning of the word was very vague.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="348"><a href="#citable__348"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>For it is clear that words which may be used ambiguously may on occasion leave no doubt as to their meaning, while conversely all may become 'ambiguous' in a context.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="348"><a href="#citable__348"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Then you have Venezuela pulling out of two trade pacts very recently, the Andean Community on one hand which is with its other Andean nations, and that obviously has created all kinds of friction and strong words from one president to another.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Transcript of an IMF Book Forum -- Pragmatisn: Latin America's New 'Ism'?</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2006/tr060523.htm">www.imf.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="348"><a href="#citable__348"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Dewey is very clear about what it means that we - as observers, participants and agents - can never foresee all potential consequences or implications of our observations, participations and actions.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block">and "reality," the current accounts of which it finds untenable
or unmeaning. <a name="citable__400" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="400">"Truth," for example, cannot be defined as the
agreement or correspondence of thought with "reality," for how can
thought determine whether it correctly "copies" what transcends
it ?</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="400"><a href="#citable__400"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The oldest and commonest definition of a 'truth' which is given is that it is 'the correspondence of a thought to reality.'</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="400"><a href="#citable__400"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>He starts with no preconceptions as to what truth must mean, whether it exists or not; he is content to watch how _de facto_ claims to truth get themselves validated in experience.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="400"><a href="#citable__400"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Such a universally held conception of truth must correspond to something real.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__199" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="199">Nor can our truth be a copy of a transcendent and
absolute truth (Dewey).</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="199"><a href="#citable__199"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>But already Dewey had realized that even in the hard sciences there are no absolute truths.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__342" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="342">If it be asked, therefore, what such
phrases mean, it is found that their meaning is really defined by
their use.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="342"><a href="#citable__342"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>"Within the limits of context found in any valid inquiry, ‘reality' thus means the confirmed outcome, actual or potential, of the inquiry that is undertaken."</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="342"><a href="#citable__342"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Meaning, therefore, cannot be depersonalized; if meanings are depersonalized, they cease to be real, and become verbal.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="342"><a href="#citable__342"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The means they used was to take objective reality as their object, since it must necessarily be the same for all men, given its independence from the observing subject.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__143" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="143">The real difference between two conceptions lies in
their application, in the different consequences for the purposes
of life which their acceptance carries.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="143"><a href="#citable__143"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Its truth will then depend upon those consequences being fruitful for life in general, and in particular for the purpose behind the particular inquiry in which it arose.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="143"><a href="#citable__143"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Each one experiences life from a different angle than anybody else, and consequently has something distinctive to give others if he can turn his experiences into ideas and pass them on to others."</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="143"><a href="#citable__143"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Uexküll viewed it differently: animals construct their own space by establishing relationships between meaning-carriers (i.e., signs).</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Umwelt-theory</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://home.comcast.net/%7Esharov/biosem/txt/umwelt.html">home.comcast.net</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__396" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="396">When no such "practical"
difference can be found, conceptions are identical; when they will
not "work," <em>i.e.</em> when they thwart the purpose which
demanded them, they are false; when they are inapplicable they are
unmeaning (A. Sidgwick).</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="396"><a href="#citable__396"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>For James and Dewey, this holds of all our concepts and theories: we treat them as instruments, as artefacts to be judged by how well they achieve their intended purpose.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="396"><a href="#citable__396"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>While no direct evidence of pragmatic transfer from the L1 was found, significant differences were found between L1 and L2 in utterance lengths, ...</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>interlanguage</c_title></em> <c_date>18 September 2009 14:12 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.gxnu.edu.cn/Personal/szliu/pragmatic_transfer.html">www.gxnu.edu.cn</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="396"><a href="#citable__396"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>However, we could not do what we ought to do if duty contained no attraction for individuals or if they found nothing satisfying in it.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__75" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="75">Hence the "principle of Peirce" may be
formulated as being that "every truth has practical consequences,
and these are the test of its truth."</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="75"><a href="#citable__75"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>A philosophical movement or system having various forms, but generally stressing practical consequences as constituting the essential criterion in determining meaning, truth or value.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title> Apollo Feedback: On Energy Pragmatism: Yes, No, But : Apollo Alliance</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://apolloalliance.org/feedback/apollo-feedback-on-energy-pragmatism-yes-no-but/">apolloalliance.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="75"><a href="#citable__75"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>We do not test these vocabularies by seeing whether they enable us to discover truths or by showing that they can be read off the nature of reality.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="75"><a href="#citable__75"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Hence we tend to believe that speculation and its value are variable and that consequently, truth, too, is variable.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__232" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="232">It is clear that this (z)
implicitly considers truth as a value, and so connects it with the
conception of good, and (2) openly raises the question - What is
truth, and how is it to be distinguished from error ?</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="232"><a href="#citable__232"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>This raises the question of the validity of valuations.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="232"><a href="#citable__232"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>For a confirmation of this doctrine Pragmatism appeals to the history of scientific truth, which has shown a continuous correction of 'truths,' which were re-valued as 'errors,' as better statements for them became available.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="232"><a href="#citable__232"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Nor can it understand, either the existence of error or the meaning of truth, or the means of distinguishing between them.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
This
accordingly becomes the central problem of pragmatism. This same
issue also arises independently out of the breakdown or
rationalistic theories of knowledge (F. H. <a href="/Bradley"
title="Bradley">Bradley</a>, H. H. Joachim). <a name="citable__71" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="71">Logical analysis,
after assuming that truth is independent and not of our making, has
to confess that all logical operations involve an apparently
arbitrary interference with their data (Bradley).</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="71"><a href="#citable__71"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>We 'make' truth in conformity with our needs.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="71"><a href="#citable__71"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>But Apollo is making a place for itself in all of this and I think there are candidates out there from top to bottom who would use such well researched analysis.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title> Apollo Feedback: On Energy Pragmatism: Yes, No, But : Apollo Alliance</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://apolloalliance.org/feedback/apollo-feedback-on-energy-pragmatism-yes-no-but/">apolloalliance.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="71"><a href="#citable__71"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>We select the rules upon which we go, and we select the 'facts' by which we claim to support our rules, stripping them of all the 'irrelevant' details involved by their position in the flux of happenings.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__107" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="107">Again, it assumes
an ideal of truth which turns out to be humanly unattainable and
incompatible with the existence of error, an d an ideal of science
which no human science can be conceived as attaining.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="107"><a href="#citable__107"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Nor can it understand, either the existence of error or the meaning of truth, or the means of distinguishing between them.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="107"><a href="#citable__107"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>For if no one can assume that he has it, all _human_ truth is, in fact, such as the relativist asserted, and scepticism is just as inevitable as before.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="107"><a href="#citable__107"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>But this is not possible in pragmatist doctrine, since it holds that individual judgements are at the root of all human thought: no purely individual judgement could ever become an objective truth.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__408" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="408">The obvious
way of avoiding the <a href="/Scepticism"
title="Scepticism">scepticism</a> into which <a href="/Rationalism"
title="Rationalism">rationalism</a> is thus driven is to revise the
assumptions about the nature and postulates of truth which <a
href="/Lead_%28disambiguation%29"
title="Lead (disambiguation)">lead</a> to it.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="408"><a href="#citable__408"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The sceptic's sneer, that the shifting systems of philosophy illustrate only the changing fashions of a great illusion about man's capacity for truth, plunges dogmatism into a 'Dilemma,' from which it can emerge only by finding a way of discriminating a 'truth' from an 'error,' and so solving the 'problem of Truth and Error.'</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="408"><a href="#citable__408"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>A 'postulate' thus differs essentially from the '_a priori_ truth' by its dependence upon the will, by its being the product of a free choice.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="408"><a href="#citable__408"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>So if there is any lesson coming from Chile it is: forget about the models, forget about the paradigms, and maybe avoid the straight jacket that will put you into corners.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Transcript of an IMF Book Forum -- Pragmatisn: Latin America's New 'Ism'?</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2006/tr060523.htm">www.imf.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__104" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="104">3. The ethical affinities of pragmatism spring from the <a
href="/Perception" title="Perception">perception</a> that all
knowing is referred to a purpose.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="104"><a href="#citable__104"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>"By their fruits, ye shall know them" was Peirce's epitome of the pragmatic logic of ethical judgments.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__227" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="227">This at once renders it "useful,"
<em>i.e.</em> a means to an end or "good."</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="227"><a href="#citable__227"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>"A habit means an ability to use natural conditions as means to ends.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="227"><a href="#citable__227"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>In their most general aspect we classify all objects as 'good' and 'bad,' according as they are ends to be pursued or avoided, or means which further or frustrate the pursuit of ends.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__169" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="169">Completely "useless"
knowledge becomes impossible, though the uses of knowledge may
still vary greatly in character, in directness, and in the extent
and force of their appeal to different minds.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="169"><a href="#citable__169"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>For it is clear that words which may be used ambiguously may on occasion leave no doubt as to their meaning, while conversely all may become 'ambiguous' in a context.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="169"><a href="#citable__169"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>But absolute truth may still be reverenced as an ideal, to save us from the scepticism to which a complete relativity of truth would lead.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="169"><a href="#citable__169"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The Protagorean dictum that _Man is the measure of all things_ assures him that _his_ knowledge may become adequate to _his_ reality, and that the value of truths and the differences between truth and error also are susceptible of estimation.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__40" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="40">This relation to a
"good" must not, however, be construed as a doctrine of <a
href="/Ethics" title="Ethics">ethics</a> in the narrower sense; nor
is its "<a href="/Utilitarianism"
title="Utilitarianism">utilitarianism</a>" to be confused with the
<a href="/Hedonism" title="Hedonism">hedonism</a> of the British
associationists.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="40"><a href="#citable__40"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>However, these facts, which the pragmatists sense only vaguely, must be restored to their true meaning.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="40"><a href="#citable__40"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Above all, however, we must indicate the abstract nature of their argument, since it clashes with the general orientation, which they claim is empirical, of their doctrine.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__80" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="80">"Useful" means "good for an (any) end," and the
"good" which the "true" claims must be understood as cognitive.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="80"><a href="#citable__80"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The means they used was to take objective reality as their object, since it must necessarily be the same for all men, given its independence from the observing subject.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="80"><a href="#citable__80"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>He starts with no preconceptions as to what truth must mean, whether it exists or not; he is content to watch how _de facto_ claims to truth get themselves validated in experience.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="80"><a href="#citable__80"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>In their most general aspect we classify all objects as 'good' and 'bad,' according as they are ends to be pursued or avoided, or means which further or frustrate the pursuit of ends.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
But
cognitive "good" and moral "good" are brought into close connexion,
as species of teleological "good" and contributory to "the Good."
<a name="citable__91" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="91">Thus only the generic, not the specific, difference between them is
abolished.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="91"><a href="#citable__91"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>These differences appear not only in the specific disciplines but also in philosophy.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="91"><a href="#citable__91"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>This general antithesis between the 'good' and the 'bad' has numerous specific forms, applicable to different departments of human activity.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="91"><a href="#citable__91"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>This principle holds that we can only adopt something as an aim when we are able to recognize that it has been achieved: it must thus make a practical difference whether a proposition is true or not.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__51" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="51">The "true" becomes a sort of <em>value,</em> like the
beautiful and the (moral) good.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="51"><a href="#citable__51"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The general theory of values comprehends not only the legal and ethical ideas of "right" and "good" but also the logical grounds of aesthetic judgment, thus pursuing in greater detail the analysis of the ancient ideals of the true, the good, and the beautiful.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="51"><a href="#citable__51"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>It can be assumed that truth, like reason and morality, will always retain this character of being a higher value.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="51"><a href="#citable__51"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>We should value them because the deliberative democratic method is more likely to give us true or right or justified answers to our questions.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__407" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="407">Moreover, since the "real" is the
object of the "true," and can be distinguished from the "unreal"
only by developing superior value in the process of <a
href="/Cognition" title="Cognition">cognition</a> which arrives at
it, the notions of "reality" and "fact" also turn out to be
disguised forms of value.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="407"><a href="#citable__407"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Moreover, to the 'real world which our choice has built out of the chaos of 'appearances' we may hypothetically add 'infernal' and 'heavenly' regions.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="407"><a href="#citable__407"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Positivism accepts only one true reality.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Umwelt-theory</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://home.comcast.net/%7Esharov/biosem/txt/umwelt.html">home.comcast.net</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="407"><a href="#citable__407"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>How is it that a proposition which is felt to be 'true' so often turns out to be erroneous?</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__336" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="336">Thus the <a href="/Dualism"
title="Dualism">dualism</a> between judgments of fact and judgments
of value disappears: whatever "facts" we recognize are seen to be
relative to the complex of human purposes to which they are
revealed.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="336"><a href="#citable__336"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>[G] Apparently he is not concerned to help men to discriminate between 'judgments' and 'opinions,' or even to show that true 'judgments' do in fact occur.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="336"><a href="#citable__336"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Pragmatism, which levels everything, deprives itself of the means of making this interpretation by failing to recognise the duality that exists between the mentality which results from individual experiences and that which results from collective experiences.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="336"><a href="#citable__336"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>But whether they are right or wrong, valuable or not, real reasoning from 'facts' can never be a 'formally valid' process.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__397" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="397">It should further be noted that pragmatism conceives
"practice" very widely: it includes everything related to the
control of experience.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="397"><a href="#citable__397"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Pragmatism, which levels everything, deprives itself of the means of making this interpretation by failing to recognise the duality that exists between the mentality which results from individual experiences and that which results from collective experiences.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="397"><a href="#citable__397"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>But even if it tried to engage in practical action (of a very general nature, be it noted) with regard to human problems, it has never claimed to have any effect with regard to action or things.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="397"><a href="#citable__397"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>It will also be evident that each alleged historical example of pragmatism shows a wide variety of individual ways of resolving these problems, especially when we include the outer fringe of those calling their very personal effusions "pragmatic."</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__28" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="28">The dualism, therefore, between "practice"
and "theory" also vanishes; a "theory" unrelated to practice
(however indirectly) is simply an illusion.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="28"><a href="#citable__28"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>A sharp separation of theory and practice, however, is reflected in Kant's distinction between ethical and "pragmatic" rules.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__404" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="404">Lastly it may be
pointed out that, as asserting the efficacy of thought and the
reality of choice, pragmatism involves a real, though determinable,
indetermination in the course of events.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="404"><a href="#citable__404"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Moreover, to the 'real world which our choice has built out of the chaos of 'appearances' we may hypothetically add 'infernal' and 'heavenly' regions.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="404"><a href="#citable__404"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>We must now examine pragmatism as a doctrine which claims that thought and reality are heterogeneous.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="404"><a href="#citable__404"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>For, granting that it is the intent of every thought to correspond with reality, we must yet inquire how the alleged correspondence is to be made out.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__208" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="208">4. Pragmatism has very distinctly a connexion with religion,
because it explains, and to some extent justifies, the
faithattitude or will to believe, and those who study the <a
href="/Psychology" title="Psychology">psychology</a> of religion
cannot but be impressed with the pragmatic nature of this attitude.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="208"><a href="#citable__208"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>All three are psychologically very real to those who believe in them, but logically they succumb to the assaults of a scepticism which infers from the fact that no 'truths' are absolute that all may reasonably be overthrown.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="208"><a href="#citable__208"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>And yet you have these electorates that are voting either massively or to some extent for very radical, antiestablishment figures.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Transcript of an IMF Book Forum -- Pragmatisn: Latin America's New 'Ism'?</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2006/tr060523.htm">www.imf.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="208"><a href="#citable__208"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The influence of discourse and pragmatic transfer in cross-cultural encounters has received very little consideration in studies on the construct ...</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>interlanguage</c_title></em> <c_date>18 September 2009 14:12 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.gxnu.edu.cn/Personal/szliu/pragmatic_transfer.html">www.gxnu.edu.cn</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__20" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="20">If the whole of a man's <a href="/Personality"
title="Personality">personality</a> goes to the making of the truth
he accepts, it is clear that his beliefs are not matters of "pure
reason," and that his passional and volitional nature must
contribute to them and cannot validly be excluded.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="20"><a href="#citable__20"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>This pressure that truth is seen as exercising on minds is itself a symbol that must be interpreted, even if we refuse to make of truth something absolute and extra-human.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="20"><a href="#citable__20"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>It is clear both that such 'truths' must be a monopoly of Intellectualism, and also that they do allow every man to believe whatever he wishes, provided only that he boldly claims 'self-evidence' for his idiosyncrasy.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="20"><a href="#citable__20"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>And once this volitional interference with 'pure perception' is shown to be indispensable, it must be allowed to be legitimate.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__77" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="77">His religion
also is ultimately a vital attitude which rests on his interests
and on his choices between alternatives which are real for him.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="77"><a href="#citable__77"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>In short, when the processes of discriminating between 'dreams' and 'reality' are considered, all these distinctions will ultimately be found to be judgments of value.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__260" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="260">It
is not however asserted that his mere willing to believe is a proof
of the truth of what he wishes to believe, any more than a will to
disbelieve justifies disbelief.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="260"><a href="#citable__260"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>In our truth claims we need language games even if in our primary experience there is always more than language.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="260"><a href="#citable__260"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>"Praxis" occurs often in their theory of truth; it is the title of a philosophical periodical in Yugoslavia, edited by more liberal Marxists than in the USSR or Red China.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="260"><a href="#citable__260"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>We thereby hope to show more clearly than Dewey the ambivalent process of constructing truth claims and the limitedness of interpretive communities.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__419" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="419">His will to believe merely
recognizes that choice is necessary and implies risk, and puts him
in a position to obtain verification (or disproof).</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="419"><a href="#citable__419"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The forces that religions and myths believe that they recognise in mythological creations are not mere illusions, but forces which are collective in origin.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__78" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="78">The pragmatic
claim for religion, therefore, is that to those who will take the
first step and will to believe an encouraging amount of the
appropriate verifications accrues.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="78"><a href="#citable__78"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Combinational services—The pragmatic first step.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>interlanguage</c_title></em> <c_date>18 September 2009 14:12 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.gxnu.edu.cn/Personal/szliu/pragmatic_transfer.html">www.gxnu.edu.cn</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="78"><a href="#citable__78"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Pragmatism therefore lacks those basic characteristics which one has the right to expect of a philosophical doctrine.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="78"><a href="#citable__78"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>He claimed, about twenty years later, that these two articles were the first formulations of his variety of pragmatism (although that term does not appear in either paper).</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__44" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="44">It is further pointed out that
this procedure is quite consonant with the practice of science with
regard to its axioms.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="44"><a href="#citable__44"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>James proposed to solve the problem by pointing out that which answer is correct depends on what you ‘practically mean’ by ‘going round’.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">plato.stanford.edu</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__225" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="225">Originally these are always postulates which
have to be assumed before they can be proved, and thus in a way
"make" the evidence which confirms them.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="225"><a href="#citable__225"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The problem is thus that of how thought has been able to fix itself in this way and, so to speak, to make itself impersonal, and not of how it has become generalised.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="225"><a href="#citable__225"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>All that follows is that _something_ has to be assumed before experience proves it.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="225"><a href="#citable__225"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The theories of metaphysicians on these lofty themes he regards as personal postulates which, in so far as they cannot be subjected to the pragmatic method, must remain open questions.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
Scientific and religious
verification therefore, though superficially distinct, are alike in
kind.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__391" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="391">The <em>pragmatic doctrine of truth,</em> which it is now
possible to outline, results from a convergence of the above lines
of argument.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="391"><a href="#citable__391"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>For a confirmation of this doctrine Pragmatism appeals to the history of scientific truth, which has shown a continuous correction of 'truths,' which were re-valued as 'errors,' as better statements for them became available.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="391"><a href="#citable__391"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>But this is not possible in pragmatist doctrine, since it holds that individual judgements are at the root of all human thought: no purely individual judgement could ever become an objective truth.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="391"><a href="#citable__391"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>We must now examine pragmatism as a doctrine which claims that thought and reality are heterogeneous.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__100" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="100">Because truth is a value and vitally valuable, and all
meaning depends on its context and its relation to us, there cannot
be any abstract "absolute" truth disconnected from all human
purposes.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="100"><a href="#citable__100"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>For if truth is absolute and not relative, it is all or nothing.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="100"><a href="#citable__100"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Until there is absolute agreement, there cannot be absolute truth.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="100"><a href="#citable__100"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>If there is absolute truth, who has it?</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__95" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="95">Because all truth is primarily a claim which may turn out
to be false, it has to be tested.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="95"><a href="#citable__95"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>It can do nothing to assuage the conflict of opinions which all claim truth with equal confidence.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="95"><a href="#citable__95"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>You may want to pass a new bill that guarantees a transfer for all of you legislators that voted yes to this bill because come 2009 you will also be out of a job.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatic Plato</c_title></em> <c_date>18 September 2009 14:12 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://pragmaticplato.blogspot.com/">pragmaticplato.blogspot.com</a> [Source type: General]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="95"><a href="#citable__95"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The Pragmatic Method of observing the consequences readily suggests the means of discriminating between truth and error, of sifting values and of testing claims.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__4" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="4">To test it is to try to
distinguish between truth and falsity, and to answer the question -
What renders the claim of a judgment to be true, really true?</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="4"><a href="#citable__4"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>But truth existed before science; and to answer the question properly, we must also consider pre-scientific and non-scientific truths such as mythologies .</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="4"><a href="#citable__4"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The Cologne program distinguishes between reality and the real (cf.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="4"><a href="#citable__4"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>We should value them because the deliberative democratic method is more likely to give us true or right or justified answers to our questions.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__409" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="409">Now
such testing, though it varies greatly in different departments of
knowledge, is always effected by the consequences to which the
claim leads when acted on.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="409"><a href="#citable__409"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>There is a Moh's scale of hardness, based on the results of such laboratory testing of different substances, from which it becomes predictable which substance can penetrate or scratch others.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="409"><a href="#citable__409"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The Pragmatic Method of observing the consequences readily suggests the means of discriminating between truth and error, of sifting values and of testing claims.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="409"><a href="#citable__409"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The test of how good or bad a new law is becomes a matter of predicting the social consequences or public effects of enacting and enforcing the proposed law.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__264" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="264">Only if they are "good" is the claim
validated and the reasoning judged to be "right": only if they are
tested does the theory of truth become intelligible and that of
error explicable.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="264"><a href="#citable__264"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>But intelligent furthering of culture demands that we take some of them off, that we inspect them critically to see what they are made of and what wearing them does to us" (LW 1:40).</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="264"><a href="#citable__264"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>He starts with no preconceptions as to what truth must mean, whether it exists or not; he is content to watch how _de facto_ claims to truth get themselves validated in experience.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="264"><a href="#citable__264"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>In other words, however much a 'truth' has been validated, it is always possible to test it further.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__196" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="196">If, therefore, a logic fails to employ the
pragmatic test, it is doomed to remain purely formal, and the
possibility of applying its doctrines to actual knowing, and their
real validity, remain in doubt.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="196"><a href="#citable__196"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>"Within the limits of context found in any valid inquiry, ‘reality' thus means the confirmed outcome, actual or potential, of the inquiry that is undertaken."</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="196"><a href="#citable__196"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>But this is not possible in pragmatist doctrine, since it holds that individual judgements are at the root of all human thought: no purely individual judgement could ever become an objective truth.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="196"><a href="#citable__196"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>For the notion of a really ('materially') true judgment which someone has chosen, made, and tested, there is substituted that of a formally valid proposition, and in the end Logic gets so involved in the study of 'validity' that it puts aside altogether all real tests of truth, and becomes a game with verbal symbols which is entirely irrelevant to scientific thinking.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__292" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="292">By applying the pragmatic test on
the other hand, it is possible to describe how truths are developed
and errors corrected, and how in general old truths are adjusted to
new situations.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="292"><a href="#citable__292"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>For a confirmation of this doctrine Pragmatism appeals to the history of scientific truth, which has shown a continuous correction of 'truths,' which were re-valued as 'errors,' as better statements for them became available.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="292"><a href="#citable__292"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>In contrast to rationalism, pragmatism sees clearly that error does not lie on one side and truth on the other, but that in reality truths and errors are mixed, the latter having often been moments in the evolution of truth.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="292"><a href="#citable__292"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>In other words, however much a 'truth' has been validated, it is always possible to test it further.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__310" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="310">This "making of truth" is conceived as making for
greater satisfaction and greater control of experience.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="310"><a href="#citable__310"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>This is what explains the impression of resistance, the sense of something greater than the individual, which we experience in the presence of truth, and which provides the indispensable basis of objectivity.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
It renders
the truth of any time relative to the knowledge of the time, and
precludes the notion of any rigid, static or incorrigible truth.
<a name="citable__72" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="72">Thus truth is continually being made and re-made.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="72"><a href="#citable__72"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>For a confirmation of this doctrine Pragmatism appeals to the history of scientific truth, which has shown a continuous correction of 'truths,' which were re-valued as 'errors,' as better statements for them became available.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="72"><a href="#citable__72"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Thus, once again, we find that an account of truth-claim is being foisted on us in place of a description of truth-testing.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="72"><a href="#citable__72"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>A 'postulate' thus differs essentially from the '_a priori_ truth' by its dependence upon the will, by its being the product of a free choice.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__113" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="113">If the new truth
seems to be such that our cognitive purposes would have been better
served by it than they were by the truth we had at the time, it is
antedated and said to have been "true all along."</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="113"><a href="#citable__113"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>It would seem, however, that if our inference genuinely had imparted new knowledge, the event must be merely psychological; for how can any process or event perturb, or add to, the completed totality of truth in itself?</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="113"><a href="#citable__113"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>True, practical knowledge is not absolute; but if it is enough to live by, is it not better to live by it than to be lured on to perish in the deserts of Scepticism by the _mirage_ of an absolute truth not humanly attainable?</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="113"><a href="#citable__113"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>True, no truth and no reality are wholly 'objective,' in the sense of wholly indifferent to our action; but to say that the human and 'subjective' factor in all knowledge must be taken into account does not preclude our apprehending and measuring an 'objective' world as real as, and more knowable than, any other theory can offer.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__102" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="102">If an old truth
is improved upon, it is revalued as "false."</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="102"><a href="#citable__102"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Pragmatism alleges that reality has changed; but does this mean that old truths become false?</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__345" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="345">To this double process
there is no actual end, but ideally an "absolute" truth (or system
of truths) would be a truth which would be adequate to every
purpose.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="345"><a href="#citable__345"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>If there is absolute truth, who has it?</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="345"><a href="#citable__345"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>We'd have no choice but to prosecute, to avoid being dragged into an international legal process that would be damaging to our relations with allies and our image abroad.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Obama and Pragmatism: Thinking Through Values | Robert Reich's Blog</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/robert_reich/2009/05/obama-and-pragmatism-thinking.php">tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="345"><a href="#citable__345"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>There is absolutely no way that nuclear energy can ever be environmentally safe or economically viable.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title> Apollo Feedback: On Energy Pragmatism: Yes, No, But : Apollo Alliance</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://apolloalliance.org/feedback/apollo-feedback-on-energy-pragmatism-yes-no-but/">apolloalliance.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__163" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="163">Extensions of pragmatism in a variety of directions readily
suggest themselves, and indeed only the doctrine of truth in the
above sketch can be treated as strictly indispensable.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="163"><a href="#citable__163"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>For a confirmation of this doctrine Pragmatism appeals to the history of scientific truth, which has shown a continuous correction of 'truths,' which were re-valued as 'errors,' as better statements for them became available.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="163"><a href="#citable__163"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Interactive constructivism agrees with pragmatism that truth claims are not only necessary for science, but appear in all fields of social life.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="163"><a href="#citable__163"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The Pragmatic Method of observing the consequences readily suggests the means of discriminating between truth and error, of sifting values and of testing claims.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__125" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="125">If however
the logical method of pragmatism is critically applied to all the
sciences, many doctrines will be cut out which have little or no
"pragmatic value."</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="125"><a href="#citable__125"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>But a critically-minded man will urge against it that _'certainty' is a subjective and psychological criterion_, and that no one has been able to devise a method for distinguishing the alleged logical from the undeniable psychological certainty.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="125"><a href="#citable__125"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>For a confirmation of this doctrine Pragmatism appeals to the history of scientific truth, which has shown a continuous correction of 'truths,' which were re-valued as 'errors,' as better statements for them became available.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="125"><a href="#citable__125"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Again, in his last chapter, James criticized the doctrine of Spencer that all the principles of thought, all its general truths and axioms, were derived from impressions of the external world.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
This <a href="/All-Round_Athletics"
title="All-Round Athletics">all-round</a> application of the
pragmatic method has received the name of "<a href="/Humanism"
title="Humanism">humanism</a>." It expressly refers itself to the
maxim of <a href="/Protagoras" title="Protagoras">Protagoras</a>
that "man is the measure of all things," and is best conceived as a
protest against the assumption that logic can treat thought in
abstraction from its psychological context and the personality of
the knower, <em>i.e.</em> that knowledge can be dehumanized. To
arbitrary and unverifiable metaphysical speculation, and to forms
of "<a href="/Absolutism" title="Absolutism">absolutism</a>" which
have lost touch with human interests, this humanism is particularly
destructive. <a name="citable__271" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="271">It emphasizes still more than pragmatism the personal
aspect of all knowing and its contribution to the "making of
reality" which necessarily accompanies the making of truth.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="271"><a href="#citable__271"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Pragmatism said that we make reality.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="271"><a href="#citable__271"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Interactive constructivism agrees with pragmatism that truth claims are not only necessary for science, but appear in all fields of social life.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="271"><a href="#citable__271"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Its ambition, as James says, is to 'make the truth more supple'.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__276" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="276">But it
also goes on to raise the question whether the making of reality
for our knowledge does not, in view of the essentially practical
nature of knowledge, imply also a real making of reality by us, and
so throw light upon the whole <a href="/Genesis"
title="Genesis">genesis</a> of reality.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="276"><a href="#citable__276"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>But pragmatism does not imply that knowledge is impossible.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism and Umwelt-theory</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://home.comcast.net/%7Esharov/biosem/txt/umwelt.html">home.comcast.net</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="276"><a href="#citable__276"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>But this is not all, and not even the real question, which is whether, with a given problem , there is room for a plurality of mental attitudes all of which in a sense are justified.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="276"><a href="#citable__276"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>As critics of our existing educational systems we must insist in posing the question whether those who have are ready to share with those who have not.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__209" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="209">In this direction
pragmatism may ultimately lead to a number of metaphysics, each of
which will represent a personal guess at a final <a
href="/Synthesis" title="Synthesis">synthesis</a> of experience,
while remaining essentially undogmatic and improvable.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="209"><a href="#citable__209"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Such direct transfer from Cantonese to English may lead to different pragmatic ...</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>interlanguage</c_title></em> <c_date>18 September 2009 14:12 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.gxnu.edu.cn/Personal/szliu/pragmatic_transfer.html">www.gxnu.edu.cn</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="209"><a href="#citable__209"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Doing phase is similar to the JE group in the data and that sometimes they may experience pragmatic transfer from their native language.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>interlanguage</c_title></em> <c_date>18 September 2009 14:12 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.gxnu.edu.cn/Personal/szliu/pragmatic_transfer.html">www.gxnu.edu.cn</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="209"><a href="#citable__209"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>To the degree in which we remain open to the real in our experiences, we may use these events as cornerstones around which new constructions, deconstructions and reconstructions of reality can be built.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__32" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="32">The great
variety and impermanence of metaphysical systems in the past thus
find their explanation: they were all along what they are now
recognized as being, viz.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="32"><a href="#citable__32"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The main points I was making, which you glossed over, is that all people should be paying taxes in proportion to the benefits they receive from living in the USA, and people who have more spendable income and thus receive greater benefit from living in the USA should be paying more to support the system they are benefitting from.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Obama and Pragmatism: Thinking Through Values | Robert Reich's Blog</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/robert_reich/2009/05/obama-and-pragmatism-thinking.php">tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="32"><a href="#citable__32"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>In aesthetic objects, that is in all immediately enjoyed and suffered things, in things directly possessed, they thus speak for themselves."</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="32"><a href="#citable__32"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Thus the primitive form of any reality is a concentration of all kinds of energies, undivided in the sense that they are only various aspects of one and the same thing.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
personal efflorescences provoked by a
totality of experiences which differed in each case.</div>
<div style="margin: 1.12em 0; display:block"><a name="citable__258" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="258">As regards the history and bibliography of pragmatism, the term
was first invented by C. S. Peirce in discussions with <a
href="/William_James" title="William James">William James</a> at <a
href="/Harvard_University" title="Harvard University">Harvard
University</a>, and its meaning was expounded by him in an article
on "How to make our Ideas clear" in the <em>Popular Science
Monthly</em> for January 1878. The pragmatic test of truth was
referred to by <a href="/James_%28disambiguation%29"
title="James (disambiguation)">James</a> in his <em>Will to
Believe</em> (1896, p.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="258"><a href="#citable__258"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>We 'make' truth in conformity with our needs.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/durkheim.htm">www.marxists.org</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="258"><a href="#citable__258"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Certainly Charles S. Peirce and William James (who credited Peirce in 1897 with inventing the doctrine) had divergent ideas in their "pragmatic" theories of truth.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="258"><a href="#citable__258"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>James's pragmatism was as unfinished as his open universe.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
124, in a paper first published in 1881).
The validity of the argument from consequences and the connexion of
truth with what "works" was asserted a propos of A. J. Balfour's
<em>Foundations of Belief</em> by A. <a href="/Seth"
title="Seth">Seth</a> Pringle-Pattison in his <em>Man's Place in
Cosmos</em> (1897, p. 307). <a name="citable__368" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="368">But the word "pragmatism" itself first
occurs in <a href="/Print" title="Print">print</a> in 1898, in
James's pamphlet on <em>Theoretical Conceptions and Practical
Results,</em> and again in his <em>Varieties of Religious
Experience</em> (1902, P. 444).</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="368"><a href="#citable__368"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Varieties of religious experience.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="368"><a href="#citable__368"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The pragmatic notion that _Truth is practical_ closes the artificial gulf between the theoretic and the practical side of life, and assigns to truth a biological function and vital value.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="368"><a href="#citable__368"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>First: what role did James's volume play in the development of the Pragmatic movement?; second: how powerful a force was that movement within American academic philosophy?</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
It was rapidly taken up, first by
W. Caldwell in <em>Mind</em> (1900, new series, No. 36), and by F.
C. S. Schiller in <em>Personal <a href="/Idealism"
title="Idealism">Idealism</a></em> (1902). <a name="citable__363" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="363">James himself at first
developed chiefly the psychological and ethical aspect.: of the
doctrine in his epoch-making <em>Principles of Psychology</em>
(1890) and his <em>Will to Believe.</em> The application to logic,
therefore, was mainly made by his followers, John Dewey and his
pupils, in the <em><a href="/Chicago" title="Chicago">Chicago</a>
Decennial Publications</em> and especially in their <em>Studies in
Logical Theory</em> (1903), where, however, the term used is
"instrumentalism," and by F. C. S. Schiller, in "Axioms as
Postulates" (in <em>Personal Idealism,</em> ed.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="363"><a href="#citable__363"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Bergson's Creative Evolution (1907) was Lamarckian, however, and was not compatible with James's defense of August Weismann's refutation of the Lamarckian theory of the inheritance of acquired characters.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="363"><a href="#citable__363"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>However, James admitted Wright's influence on his own scientific approach in the preface to the Principles of Psychology (1890), the forerunner of nearly all of James's ideas as developed in his later formulations of his doctrines of the will to believe, of "radical empiricism," and of pluralism --- the three major components of his variety of pragmatism and of his general philosophy.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="363"><a href="#citable__363"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>The critics had simply failed to see that verification by experience is just as integral a part of voluntaristic procedure as experimental postulation, and that James himself had from the first asserted this.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__304" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="304">H. Sturt, 1902), in
<em>Humanism</em> (1903), in which that term was proposed for the
extensions of pragmatism, in <em>Studies in Humanism</em> (1907),
and in <em><a href="/Plato" title="Plato">Plato</a> or
Protagoras</em> (1908).</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="304"><a href="#citable__304"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>In terms of strategy for passing your energy plan (which I mostly love), I would describe the trade-off that I understand you propose, not as “pragmatism” but as “pacification”.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title> Apollo Feedback: On Energy Pragmatism: Yes, No, But : Apollo Alliance</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://apolloalliance.org/feedback/apollo-feedback-on-energy-pragmatism-yes-no-but/">apolloalliance.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="304"><a href="#citable__304"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Jackson, D. (1967): Pragmatics of human communication: A study of interactional patterns, pathologies, & paradoxes..</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>HF UNI Koeln - Lehr- und Lernforschung (Dewey Center) the idea behind </c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.hf.uni-koeln.de/dewey/31679">www.hf.uni-koeln.de</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="304"><a href="#citable__304"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>According to G. H. Mead and John Dewey, what is not pragmatic in Plato and Aristotle is their belief that nature, especially human nature, was essentially fixed in its eternal features.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__96" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="96">All these logical and philosophic
developments were popularly expounded by James in his
<em>Pragmatism</em> (1907), followed by <em>A Pluralistic
Universe</em> (1908) and <em>The Meaning of Truth</em> (1909).</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="96"><a href="#citable__96"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>James's pragmatism was as unfinished as his open universe.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="96"><a href="#citable__96"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>A philosophical movement or system having various forms, but generally stressing practical consequences as constituting the essential criterion in determining meaning, truth or value.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title> Apollo Feedback: On Energy Pragmatism: Yes, No, But : Apollo Alliance</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://apolloalliance.org/feedback/apollo-feedback-on-energy-pragmatism-yes-no-but/">apolloalliance.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="96"><a href="#citable__96"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>I specifically address Talisse’s worries that Deweyan pragmatism cannot be pluralist in the right kind of (Rawlsian) way and that Deweyan pragmatism is philosophically too insular.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
H.
H. Bawden's <em>The Principles of Pragmatism</em> (1910) is a
popular sketch. <a name="citable__338" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="338">Alfred Sidgwick's logical writings, especially his
<em>Distinction</em> (1892) and <em>The Use of Words in
Argument</em> (1901), represent an independent development.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="338"><a href="#citable__338"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>What is the use of a logic which (1) cannot effect the capital distinction of all thought, that between the true and the false?</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
For the
religious applications see G. Tyrrell (<em>Lex orandi,</em> 1903,
<em>Lex credendi,</em> 1906). <a name="citable__38" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="38">Among critical writers on the
pragmatic side may be mentioned H. Sturt (<em>Idola theatri,</em>
1906), and H. V. Knox (<em>Mind,</em> new series, No.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="38"><a href="#citable__38"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>But a critically-minded man will urge against it that _'certainty' is a subjective and psychological criterion_, and that no one has been able to devise a method for distinguishing the alleged logical from the undeniable psychological certainty.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="38"><a href="#citable__38"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>A very full historical account of pragmatism with a comprehensive bibliography is H. S. Thayer's Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism (Indianapolis and New York, 1968).</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="38"><a href="#citable__38"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>HENRY STURT: _Idola Theatri, a Criticism of Oxford Thought and Thinkers from the Standpoint of Personal Idealism_, 1906.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by D.L. Murray - Full Text Free Book</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.fullbooks.com/Pragmatism.html">www.fullbooks.com</a> [Source type: Original source]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
54). <a name="citable__315" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="315">There is
already a large controversial literature in the philosophic
journals, and two critical works appeared in 1909: J. B. Pratt,
<em>What is Pragmatism?</em> (1909), and A. Schinz,
<em>Anti-Pragmatism(1909).</em> Outside the English-writing world,
identical or kindred tendencies are represented in <a
href="/France" title="France">France</a> by Leroy, Poincare,
Bergson, Milhaud, Blondel, Duhem, Wilbois, Pradines; in <a
href="/Germany" title="Germany">Germany</a> by Mach, Ostwald,
Simmel, <a href="/Jerusalem" title="Jerusalem">Jerusalem</a>,
Goldscheid, Jacoby; in <a href="/Italy" title="Italy">Italy</a> by
Papini, Prezzolini, Vailati, Troiano.</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="315"><a href="#citable__315"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Bergson's form of pragmatism only tenuously merits that label (which he did not adopt for his philosophy); his metaphysical and spiritualistic theory of action bears all the marks of the fin-de-sile anti-scientisme which appears in his criticism of the analytical, conceptual, abstract, and static modes of scientific understanding.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="315"><a href="#citable__315"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Yet there was a stormy, philosophical controversy over so-called Pirandellism; Pirandello's relativism was criticized by followers of Benedetto Croce, Italy's dominating metaphysician of the absolutistic Hegelian type against which the Leonardo group led by Papini, had led a rebellion in the first decade of the century.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="315"><a href="#citable__315"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>He claimed, about twenty years later, that these two articles were the first formulations of his variety of pragmatism (although that term does not appear in either paper).</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__94" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="94">In addition there are numbers
of partial pragmatists, <em>e.g.</em> G. Santayana (<em>The Life of
Reason,</em> 1905).</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="94"><a href="#citable__94"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>George Santayana, The Life of Reason , 5 vols.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="94"><a href="#citable__94"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Santayana's chapter on "How Thought is Practical" in the first volume of his Life of Reason (5 vols., 1905-06) is far from making him a pragmatist.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<a name="citable__52" class="citable__local-anchor">.</a><span class='citationPopup' rel="52">Various anticipations of pragmatism in the
history of philosophy are noted in Schiller's <em>Plato or
Protagoras ?</em> (1908).</span><span class="citable__li" citable_id="52"><a href="#citable__52"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Peirce's metaphysical writings contain a speculative, idealistic version of pragmatism which he called "pragmaticism" in order to disassociate his philosophy from the pragmatisms of William James and James's disciple F. C. S. Schiller.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="52"><a href="#citable__52"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>It is well known that classifications of sciences vary with each new period in the history of science, but such classifications are a clue to the cultural role and value of various sciences and the philosophy of each period.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Pragmatism by Philip Wiener in Dictionary of the History of Ideas</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm">www.pragmatism.org</a> [Source type: FILTERED WITH BAYES]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
<span class="citable__li" citable_id="52"><a href="#citable__52"><strong>^</strong></a> <c_txt>Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism (review) Rucker, Darnell, 1921- Journal of the History of Philosophy , Volume 8, Number 2, April 1970 , pp.</c_txt><div style="padding-left: 10px"><small><c_src><ul><li> <em><c_title>Project MUSE - Subject Browse</c_title></em> <c_date>7 January 2010 23:023 UTC</c_date> <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/subject_browse?subtopic=Pragmatism.">muse.jhu.edu</a> [Source type: Academic]</li></ul></c_src></small></div><br></span>
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<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"><tr><td valign="top" nowrap bgcolor="white"><nobr><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/spacer.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/tick-green-8x11.gif" align="bottom" title = "This page is marked authoritative because it has been included for <B>90%</B> of the life of the Wikipedia article."> </nobr></td><td><a href="http://www.newcriterion.com/archive/16/nov97/menand.htm" title=". Review in The New Criterion. November 1997.<br><br><A HREF=http://www.newcriterion.com/archive/16/nov97/menand.htm>http://www.newcriterion.com/archive/16/nov97/menand.htm</A>">''Vulgar Rortyism''</a> - The New Criterion</td></tr></table>
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<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"><tr><td valign="top" nowrap bgcolor="white"><nobr><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/spacer.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/tick-green-8x11.gif" align="bottom" title = "This page is marked authoritative because it has been included for <B>90%</B> of the life of the Wikipedia article."> </nobr></td><td><a href="http://neopragmatism.org" title="<TABLE STYLE='font-size: 12;'><TR><TD VALIGN='TOP'>•</TD><TD>In my view, Neo<B>pragmatism</B> or Linguistic <B>Pragmatism</B> may be traced largely to Richard Rorty.</TD></TR><TR><TD VALIGN='TOP'>&bull</TD><TD>This "linguistic turn" strategy aims to avoid what Rorty sees as the essentialisms ("truth," "reality," "experience") still extant in classical <B>pragmatism</B>.</TD></TR><TR><TD VALIGN='TOP'>&bull</TD><TD>Linguistic <B>pragmatism</B> revises <B>pragmatism</B> in three basic moves.</TD></TR></TABLE><BR><A HREF=http://neopragmatism.org>http://neopragmatism.org</A>">Neopragmatism.org</a> - Neopragmatism Home Page</td></tr></table>
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<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"><tr><td valign="top" nowrap bgcolor="white"><nobr><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/spacer.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/tick-green-8x11.gif" align="bottom" title = "This page is marked authoritative because it has been included for <B>90%</B> of the life of the Wikipedia article."> </nobr></td><td><a href="http://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html" title="In repudiating such a boundary I espouse a more thorough <B>pragmatism</B>.<br><br><A HREF=http://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html>http://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html</A>">''Two Dogmas of Empiricism''</a> - Two Dogmas of Empiricism</td></tr></table>
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<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"><tr><td valign="top" nowrap bgcolor="white"><nobr><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/spacer.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/tick-green-8x11.gif" align="bottom" title = "This page is marked authoritative because it has been included for <B>90%</B> of the life of the Wikipedia article."> </nobr></td><td><a href="http://www.iep.utm.edu" title="<A HREF=http://www.iep.utm.edu>http://www.iep.utm.edu</A>">Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a> - The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy - IEP</td></tr></table>
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<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"><tr><td valign="top" nowrap bgcolor="white"><nobr><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/spacer.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/tick-green-8x11.gif" align="bottom" title = "This page is marked authoritative because it has been included for <B>90%</B> of the life of the Wikipedia article."> </nobr></td><td><a href="http://davidhildebrand.org/articles/hildebrand_neopragmatist.pdf" title=". Southwest Philosophy Review Vol. 19, no. 1. January, 2003.<br><br><A HREF=http://davidhildebrand.org/articles/hildebrand_neopragmatist.pdf>http://davidhildebrand.org/articles/hildebrand_neopragmatist.pdf</A>">''The Neopragmatist Turn''</a></td></tr></table>
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<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"><tr><td valign="top" nowrap bgcolor="white"><nobr><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/spacer.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/tick-green-8x11.gif" align="bottom" title = "This page is marked authoritative because it has been included for <B>90%</B> of the life of the Wikipedia article."> </nobr></td><td><a href="http://falcon.jmu.edu/~omearawm/ph101willtobelieve.html" title=". 1896.<br><br><A HREF=http://falcon.jmu.edu/~omearawm/ph101willtobelieve.html>http://falcon.jmu.edu/~omearawm/ph101willtobelieve.html</A>">''The Will to Believe''</a></td></tr></table>
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<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"><tr><td valign="top" nowrap bgcolor="white"><nobr><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/spacer.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/tick-green-8x11.gif" align="bottom" title = "This page is marked authoritative because it has been included for <B>90%</B> of the life of the Wikipedia article."> </nobr></td><td><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu" title="<A HREF=http://plato.stanford.edu>http://plato.stanford.edu</A>">Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a> - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</td></tr></table>
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<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"><tr><td valign="top" nowrap bgcolor="white"><nobr><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/spacer.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/tick-green-8x11.gif" align="bottom" title = "This page is marked authoritative because it has been included for <B>90%</B> of the life of the Wikipedia article."> </nobr></td><td><a href="http://www.crvp.org/book/Series01/I-11/chapter_i.htm" title="<TABLE STYLE='font-size: 12;'><TR><TD VALIGN='TOP'>•</TD><TD>The aim of this study is not to give a systematic or historical exposition of <B>pragmatism</B> in comparison to other philosophies, but to focus on a central theme, which it has developed and of which has been the prime philosophical representative.</TD></TR><TR><TD VALIGN='TOP'>&bull</TD><TD>This theme will show its revolutionary impact in the field of ethics, and the difficulty in placing <B>pragmatism</B> among the `isms'.</TD></TR><TR><TD VALIGN='TOP'>&bull</TD><TD>The revolution of <B>pragmatism</B> entered as a burst of fresh air into a musty library;</TD></TR></TABLE><BR><A HREF=http://www.crvp.org/book/Series01/I-11/chapter_i.htm>http://www.crvp.org/book/Series01/I-11/chapter_i.htm</A>">''Pragmatic Tests and Ethical Insights''</a></td></tr></table>
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<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"><tr><td valign="top" nowrap bgcolor="white"><nobr><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/spacer.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/tick-green-8x11.gif" align="bottom" title = "This page is marked authoritative because it has been included for <B>90%</B> of the life of the Wikipedia article."> </nobr></td><td><a href="http://spartan.ac.brocku.ca/~lward/Dewey/Dewey_1910b/Dewey_1910_06.html" title="(chapter)<br><br><A HREF=http://spartan.ac.brocku.ca/~lward/Dewey/Dewey_1910b/Dewey_1910_06.html>http://spartan.ac.brocku.ca/~lward/Dewey/Dewey_1910b/Dewey_1910_06.html</A>">A short catechism concerning truth</a> - Robert Throop and Lloyd Gordon Ward: Mead Project 2.0</td></tr></table>
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<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"><tr><td valign="top" nowrap bgcolor="white"><nobr><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/spacer.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/tick-green-8x11.gif" align="bottom" title = "This page is marked authoritative because it has been included for <B>90%</B> of the life of the Wikipedia article."> </nobr></td><td><a href="http://spartan.ac.brocku.ca/~lward/Dewey/Dewey_1910b/Dewey_1910_toc.html" title=".1910.<br><br><A HREF=http://spartan.ac.brocku.ca/~lward/Dewey/Dewey_1910b/Dewey_1910_toc.html>http://spartan.ac.brocku.ca/~lward/Dewey/Dewey_1910b/Dewey_1910_toc.html</A>">''The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays''</a> - Robert Throop and Lloyd Gordon Ward: Mead Project 2.0</td></tr></table>
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<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"><tr><td valign="top" nowrap bgcolor="white"><nobr><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/spacer.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/tick-green-8x11.gif" align="bottom" title = "This page is marked authoritative because it has been included for <B>90%</B> of the life of the Wikipedia article."> </nobr></td><td><a href="http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/postmod.tru.htm" title=".1998.<br><br><A HREF=http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/postmod.tru.htm>http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/postmod.tru.htm</A>">Postmodernism and Truth</a></td></tr></table>
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<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"><tr><td valign="top" nowrap bgcolor="white"><nobr><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/spacer.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/tick-green-8x11.gif" align="bottom" title = "This page is marked authoritative because it has been included for <B>85%</B> of the life of the Wikipedia article."> </nobr></td><td><a href="http://www.peircesociety.org/transactions.html" title="Named after the founder of American <B>Pragmatism</B> but all types of American thought are covered from the Colonial period to the recent past.<br><br><A HREF=http://www.peircesociety.org/transactions.html>http://www.peircesociety.org/transactions.html</A>">Transactions of the Charles S. Pierce Society</a> - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society</td></tr></table>
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<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"><tr><td valign="top" nowrap bgcolor="white"><nobr><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/spacer.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/tick-green-8x11.gif" align="bottom" title = "This page is marked authoritative because it has been included for <B>85%</B> of the life of the Wikipedia article."> </nobr></td><td><a href="http://williamjamesstudies.press.uiuc.edu" title="<A HREF=http://williamjamesstudies.press.uiuc.edu>http://williamjamesstudies.press.uiuc.edu</A>">William James Studies</a> - William James Studies | Home</td></tr></table>
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<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"><tr><td valign="top" nowrap bgcolor="white"><nobr><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/spacer.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/tick-green-8x11.gif" align="bottom" title = "This page is marked authoritative because it has been included for <B>75%</B> of the life of the Wikipedia article."> </nobr></td><td><a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GlrEbffVVjM" title=""A short film about the pragmatist revival"/a<br><br><A HREF=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GlrEbffVVjM>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GlrEbffVVjM</A>">A short film about the pragmatist revival</a> - YouTube - Broadcast Yourself.</td></tr></table>
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<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"><tr><td valign="top" nowrap bgcolor="white"><nobr><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/spacer.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/tick-green-8x11.gif" align="bottom" title = "This page is marked authoritative because it has been included for <B>68%</B> of the life of the Wikipedia article."> </nobr></td><td><a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/history/inourtime/inourtime_20051117.shtml" title="<TABLE STYLE='font-size: 12;'><TR><TD VALIGN='TOP'>•</TD><TD>But how did <B>Pragmatism</B> harness the huge scientific leap forward that had come with Charles Darwin's ideas on evolution?</TD></TR><TR><TD VALIGN='TOP'>&bull</TD><TD>Did <B>Pragmatism</B> influence the economic and political ascendancy of America in the early 20th century?</TD></TR></TABLE><BR><A HREF=http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/history/inourtime/inourtime_20051117.shtml>http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/history/inourtime/inourtime_20051117.shtml</A>">BBC Radio 4's In Our Time programme on Pragmatism</a> - BBC - Radio 4 In Our Time - Pragmatism</td></tr></table>
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<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"><tr><td valign="top" nowrap bgcolor="white"><nobr><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/spacer.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/tick-green-8x11.gif" align="bottom" title = "This page is marked authoritative because it has been included for <B>63%</B> of the life of the Wikipedia article."> </nobr></td><td><a href="http://www.hno.harvard.edu/gazette/2004/02.26/15-menand.html" title="<TABLE STYLE='font-size: 12;'><TR><TD VALIGN='TOP'>•</TD><TD>If so, perhaps he meant it ironically, for <B>pragmatism</B>, the philosophy to which it gave birth, is the very opposite of metaphysics.</TD></TR><TR><TD VALIGN='TOP'>&bull</TD><TD>According to Menand, the two greatest influences on <B>pragmatism</B> were the Civil War and Darwin's "Origin of Species."</TD></TR><TR><TD VALIGN='TOP'>&bull</TD><TD><B>Pragmatism</B> was perfectly suited to the expansive, industrialized America that surged into being after the Civil War ended, "an America run by former Union generals who pushed the country into modernity....</TD></TR></TABLE><BR><A HREF=http://www.hno.harvard.edu/gazette/2004/02.26/15-menand.html>http://www.hno.harvard.edu/gazette/2004/02.26/15-menand.html</A>">Harvard Gazette: Menand brings pragmatists of the Metaphysical Club to life</a></td></tr></table>
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<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"><tr><td valign="top" nowrap bgcolor="white"><nobr><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/spacer.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"> </nobr></td><td><a href="http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/shaw2.htm" title="At the same time, James' <B>pragmatism</B> retains its<br><br><A HREF=http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/shaw2.htm>http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/shaw2.htm</A>">"William James and Yogaacaara philosophy: A comparative inquiry"</a> - William James and Yogaacaara philosophy: A comparative inquiry</td></tr></table>
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<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"><tr><td valign="top" nowrap bgcolor="white"><nobr><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/spacer.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"> </nobr></td><td><a href="http://www.unm.edu/~rhayes/pragmatism.pdf" title="<A HREF=http://www.unm.edu/~rhayes/pragmatism.pdf>http://www.unm.edu/~rhayes/pragmatism.pdf</A>">"Did Buddhism Anticipate Pragmatism?" (pdf)</a></td></tr></table>
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<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"><tr><td valign="top" nowrap bgcolor="white"><nobr><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/spacer.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"> </nobr></td><td><a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0742521745" title="Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.<br><br><A HREF=http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0742521745>http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0742521745</A>">''From Nature to Experience: The American Search for Cultural Authority''</a> - Amazon.com: From Nature to Experience: The American Search for Cultural Authority (American Intellectual Culture): Roger Lundin: Books</td></tr></table>
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<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"><tr><td valign="top" nowrap bgcolor="white"><nobr><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/spacer.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"> </nobr></td><td><a href="http://newadvent.org/cathen/12333b.htm" title="<TABLE STYLE='font-size: 12;'><TR><TD VALIGN='TOP'>•</TD><TD><B>Pragmatism</B>, as a tendency in philosophy, signifies the insistence on usefulness or practical consequences as a test of truth.</TD></TR><TR><TD VALIGN='TOP'>&bull</TD><TD>In its positive phase, therefore, <B>Pragmatism</B> sets up as the standard of truth some non-rational test, such as action, satisfaction of needs, realization in conduct, the possibility of being lived, and judges reality by this norm to the exclusion of all others.</TD></TR><TR><TD VALIGN='TOP'>&bull</TD><TD>Although the Pragmatists themselves proclaim that <B>Pragmatism</B> is but a new name for old ways of thinking, they are not agreed as to the immediate sources of the Pragmatic movement.</TD></TR></TABLE><BR><A HREF=http://newadvent.org/cathen/12333b.htm>http://newadvent.org/cathen/12333b.htm</A>">Eprint</a> - CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Pragmatism</td></tr></table>
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<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"><tr><td valign="top" nowrap bgcolor="white"><nobr><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/spacer.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"> </nobr></td><td><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12333b.htm" title="<TABLE STYLE='font-size: 12;'><TR><TD VALIGN='TOP'>•</TD><TD><B>Pragmatism</B>, as a tendency in philosophy, signifies the insistence on usefulness or practical consequences as a test of truth.</TD></TR><TR><TD VALIGN='TOP'>&bull</TD><TD>In its positive phase, therefore, <B>Pragmatism</B> sets up as the standard of truth some non-rational test, such as action, satisfaction of needs, realization in conduct, the possibility of being lived, and judges reality by this norm to the exclusion of all others.</TD></TR><TR><TD VALIGN='TOP'>&bull</TD><TD>Although the Pragmatists themselves proclaim that <B>Pragmatism</B> is but a new name for old ways of thinking, they are not agreed as to the immediate sources of the Pragmatic movement.</TD></TR></TABLE><BR><A HREF=http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12333b.htm>http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12333b.htm</A>">Catholic encyclopedia article on subject</a> - CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Pragmatism</td></tr></table>
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<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" hspace="0" vspace="0"><tr><td valign="top" nowrap bgcolor="white"><nobr><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/spacer.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"><img src="images/external_links_revision_history/square2-8x11.gif" align="bottom" width="8" height="11"> </nobr></td><td><a href="http://www.observacionesfilosoficas.net/rorty.htm" title="<A HREF=http://www.observacionesfilosoficas.net/rorty.htm>http://www.observacionesfilosoficas.net/rorty.htm</A>">Rorty: pragmatismo, ironismo liberal y solidaridad | Dr. Adolfo Vasquez Rocca | Revista Observaciones Filosoficas | in spanish</a> - Revista Observaciones Filosóficas - Rorty: pragmatismo, ironismo liberal y solidaridad</td></tr></table>
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<span class="core-uptodate">Up to date as of August 19, 2010</span>
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<a href="/Outline_of_philosophy">Outline of philosophy</a>
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<a href="/Philosophy_of_information">Philosophy of information</a>
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