Ramzi Binalshibh: Wikis

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Ramzi Binalshibh
Ramzibinalshibh2.jpg
Born May 1, 1972 (1972-05-01) (age 37)[1]
Ghayl Bawazir, Yemen
Detained at CIA black sites, Guantanamo
ISN 10013
Charge(s) Charged before a military commission, not yet convicted or acquitted

Ramzi Binalshibh (Arabic: رمزي بن الشيبة‎, Ramzī bin ash-Shībh; also transliterated as Ramzi bin ash-Shibh or Ramzi bin ash-Shaibah; born May 1, 1972),[2] is a detainee at Guantanamo Bay. In the mid-late 1990s, Binalshibh moved to Hamburg as a student where he soon became close friends with Mohammed Atta, Ziad Jarrah and Marwan al-Shehhi. Together, they became the masterminds of the September 11th Attacks. He was the only one out of the four who failed to obtain a US Visa and therefore acted as a go-between for Atta, Jarrah, al-Shehhi and the other hijackers, passing on information from key al-Qaeda figures regarding details such as targets and wire transfers. After the attacks, Binalshibh was the first to be publicly identified as the "20th hijacker," of whom there were several individuals thought to have consecutively been tasked to fill out the single missing slot among the four terrorist teams.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence described him as a "key facilitator for the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001."[3]

Contents

Early life

Ramzi Binalshibh was born in the Yemini province of Hadhramaut.[3][4] When he was young, his family moved to a working class neighborhood in the capital, Sana'a.[5] In 1987, his father died and he was then cared for by his older brother, Ahmed, and his mother.[5] In 1987, while still in high school, Binalshibh worked part-time as a clerk for the International Bank of Yemen.[6] He continued working there until 1995.[1]

Binalshibh applied for a U.S. visa in 1995, but his request was denied.[1] He then went to Germany, where he requested political asylum, claiming that he was a political refugee from Sudan. He lived in Hamburg until 1997 when the judge refused his asylum request.[1] Binalshibh returned to the Hadramaut region of Yemen, but a short while later Binalshibh received a German visa under his real name.[1] While he was in Germany, Binalshibh used the name Ramzi Omar. In 1997, Binalshibh met Mohamed Atta, the leader of the Hamburg cell, at a mosque.[7] For two years, Atta and Binalshibh were roommates in Germany.[7]

Al Qaeda training

In late 1999, Binalshibh traveled to Kandahar in Afghanistan, where he received training at Al Qaeda camps, and met others involved in planning the September 11, 2001 attacks.[7]

Attempts to come to the United States

Original plans for the 9/11 attacks called for Binalshibh to be one of the hijacker pilots, along with three other members of the Hamburg cell, including Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah.[8] From Hamburg, Binalshibh applied to take flight training in the United States. At that time, he also applied to Aviation Language Services, which provides language training for student pilots.[9] Binalshibh applied for an entry visa to the United States, four times, and was refused each time. He made visa applications in Germany on May 17, 2000, and again in June, on September 16, and October 25, 2000.[2][9] According to the 9/11 Commission, this refusal of a visa was motivated by general concern by U.S. officials that people from Yemen would illegally overstay their visit and seek work in the United States. His friend, Zakariyah Essabar, was also denied visas. After he failed to enter the United States, Binalshibh took on more of a "coordinator" role in the plot, and a link between Atta in the United States and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in Afghanistan.[10][11]

Connections to 9/11 attacks

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Saeed al-Ghamdi

According to al-Jazeera reporter Yosri Fouda's documentary Top Secret: The Road to September 11, three weeks prior to the attacks Saeed al-Ghamdi is believed to have used the name "Abdul Rahman" to message Binalshibh (who was posing as a girlfriend) online, where he messaged

"The first semester commences in three weeks. Two high schools and two universities. ... This summer will surely be hot ...19 certificates for private education and four exams. Regards to the professor. Goodbye."

This was said to be a reference to two military targets and two civilian, 19 hijackers.[12]

Mohamed Atta

Similarly, Binalshibh later said that Mohammed Atta had phoned him on the morning of August 29.

"He said, 'A friend of mine gave me a puzzle and I want you to help me out.' I said to him, 'Is this the time for puzzles, Mohammed?' He said, 'Yes, I know, but no one else but you could help me.' He said, 'Two sticks, a dash and cake with a stick down. What is it?' I said, 'Did you wake me up just to tell me this?' As it turns out, two sticks is the number 11. A dash is a dash. And cake with a stick down is the number nine. And that was September 11.[13]

Ziad Jarrah

In August 2000, Ziad Jarrah attempted to enroll Binalshibh in a Florida flight school.[2]

Marwan al-Shehhi

Binalshibh sent money via wire transfer on September 25, 2000 to Marwan al-Shehhi in Florida.[2]

Zacarias Moussaoui

In August 2001, Binalshibh sent approximately $14,000 to Zacarias Moussaoui, using the alias Ahad Sabet,[14] a few days after receiving transfer of $15,000 from Hashim Abdulrahman in the United Arab Emirates.[2]

20th hijacker?

Binalshibh was the first to be publicly identified as the "20th hijacker", of whom there were several individuals, including Essabar, who were thought to have consecutively been tasked to fill out the single missing slot among the four terrorist teams. The one spot was never filled, and consequently United Flight 93 ended up short by one hijacker, which is believed to have led in part to the success of the passenger revolt, and which in turn resulted in the crash of the plane into the ground near Shanksville, Pennsylvania.

Travel

London

Binalshibh traveled to London for approximately a week in December 2000, from Hamburg.[2]

Videos

After January 14, 2002 Binalshibh was found to be among five suspected al-Qaeda members delivering what United States Attorney General John Ashcroft described as "martyrdom messages from suicide terrorists" on five discovered videos. NBC News said that the five videos had been recorded after the September 11 attacks.

On September 8, 2006, al-Qaeda released a video that shows Osama bin Laden and some of the 9/11 hijackers. The tape identifies Binalshibh as the "coordinator of the 9/11 attacks" in its own English subtitles.[15] The video goes on to show Binalshibh and other hijackers training in kickboxing as well as disarming and concealing weapons at a terrorist training camp in or near Kandahar, Afghanistan.[15][16]

FBI Most Wanted Terrorist List

On January 17, 2002 the FBI published the first Most Wanted Terrorists Seeking Information list (now known as the FBI's "Seeking Information - War on Terrorism" list), in order to profile the five wanted terrorists about whom very little was known, but who were suspected of plotting additional terrorist attacks in martyrdom operations.[17] (see current version displaying photos of five terrorists on the remaining martyrdom videos FBI list, as of June 2006)[18]

Ramzi Binalshibh was one of the four known names among the five. The other three are still featured in compiled video clips, in order of appearance, Muhammad Sa'id Ali Hasan, Abd al-Rahim, and Khalid Ibn Muhammad al-Juhani.[19][20][21] The fifth was identified a week later as Abderraouf Jdey, alias: Al-Rauf bin al-Habib bin Yousef al-Jiddi.

Ashcroft said the five videotapes, shown by the FBI without sound, had been recovered from the rubble of the home of Mohammad Atef outside of Kabul, Afghanistan. Ashcroft called upon people worldwide to help "identify, locate and incapacitate terrorists who are suspected of planning additional attacks against innocent civilians." "These men could be anywhere in the world", he said. The sound was left out to guard against the possibility that the messages contained signals for other terrorists. Ashcroft added that an analysis of the audio suggested "the men may be trained and prepared to commit future suicide terrorist acts." Ashcroft said not much was known about any of them except Binalshibh.

Other attacks

Ramzi Binalshibh is also suspected to be involved in the attack on 2000 USS Cole bombing, and the 2002 Ghriba synagogue bombing in Tunisia.[7]

Capture and detention

Binalshibh was captured in Pakistan on September 11, 2002, after a gun battle in Karachi with the Pakistani ISI and the CIA's Special Activities Division.[22] On September 14, 2002 he was subsequently turned over to the United States, which transferred him to an undisclosed location for interrogation.[23] His profile was removed from the FBI Seeking Information wanted list by October 17, 2002.[24]

Binalshibh remained a prisoner of the U.S., at an undisclosed CIA-led location, until September 2006. On September 6, 2006 U.S. President George W. Bush announced that Binalshibh and other CIA held prisoners had been transferred to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Binalshibh is also wanted by German courts where he shared a Hamburg apartment with Mohammed Atta, the suspected ringleader of the September 11 hijackers. However, Germany has deferred a request for extradition pending resolution of Binalshibh's legal status by the United States.

Combatant Status Review

Initially the Bush administration asserted they could withhold the protections of the Geneva Conventions from captives in the War on Terror, while critics argued the Conventions obligated the United States to conduct competent tribunals to determine the status of prisoners.[25] Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted Combatant Status Review Tribunals, to determine whether the captives met the new definition of an "enemy combatant".

Detainees do not have the right to a lawyer before the CSRTs or to access the evidence against them. The CSRTs are not bound by the rules of evidence that would apply in court, and the government’s evidence is presumed to be “genuine and accurate.”[26]

From July 2004 through March 2005, a CSRT was convened to make a determination whether each captive had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Ramzi Binalshibh was among the one-third of prisoners for whom there was no indication they chose to participate in their tribunals.[27]

In the landmark case Boumediene v. Bush, the U.S. Supreme Court found that CSRTs are not an adequate substitute for the constitutional right to challenge one's detention in court, in part because they do not have the power to order detainees released.[28] The Court also found that "there is considerable risk of error in the tribunal’s findings of fact."[29]

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for the tribunal, listing the alleged facts that led to his detainment. His memo accused him of the following:

[30]

The transcript for Guantanamo captive 10013 was eight pages long. It said that he choose not to attend to his Tribunal. The first two pages of the transcript were consumed with the Tribunal's officers swearing oaths, and the reading out of the Tribunal mandate and authority.

Personal Representative interviews with the captive

The Tribunal's President then called on the captive's Personal Representative to explain his efforts to explain the captive's right to be present at his Tribunal.

Personal Representative interviews with the captive
February 9, 2007
  • Purpose of the meeting was to present the official notification that a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was being scheduled.
  • Captive stated he would not attend the Tribunal.
  • Captive stated he would not meet again with the Personal Representative or the translator.
February 13, 2007
  • Purpose of the meeting was to present the Unclassified Summary, containing the summary of the unclassified allegations, to the captive.
  • Captive chose not to leave his cell to attend the interview.
February 16, 2007
  • Purpose of the meeting was to present the Unclassified Summary to the captive.
  • Captive chose not to leave his cell to attend the interview.
March 5, 2007
  • Purpose of the meeting was to present the Unclassified Summary to the captive.
  • Captive chose not to leave his cell to attend the interview.

Allegations

The allegations prepared for the first 558 captives whose status was examined by Combatant Status Review Tribunals, between August 2004 and January 2005, were all broken into two sections — the allegations that established a connection to terrorism, and the allegations that established hostile activity. The allegations were always numbered, and were generally only one or two sentences in length.

The allegations that Ramzi Binalshib would have faced, during his Tribunal, were:

"On the morning of 11 September 2001, four airliners traveling over the United States were hijacked. The flights hijacked were: American Airlines Flight 11, United Airlines Flight 175, American Airlines Flight 77, and United Airlines Flight 93. At approximately 8:46 a.m., American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center, resulting in the collapse of the tower at approximately 10:25 a.m. At approximately 9:03 a.m., United Airlines Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center, resulting in the collapse of the tower at approximately 9:55 a.m. At approximately 9:37., American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the southwest side of the Pentagon in Arlington Virginia. At approximately 10:03 a.m. United Airlines Flight 93 crashed in Stoney Creek Township Pennsylvania. These crashed and subsequent damage to the World Trade Center and the Pentagon resulted in the deaths of 2972 persons in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania.
"According to court transcripts and evidence from United States v. Zacarias Moussaoui, the detainee was closely associated with three of the hijackers responsible for the "9/11" attacks, Mohammed Atta (Atta), Marwan Al-Shehhi (Al-Shehhi) and Ziad Jarrah while they lived in Hamburg, Germany during the late 1990's and early 2000. The detainee, Atta and Al-Shehhi are know to have lived at or frequented on particular address during the same time period, 54 Marienstrasse, Hamburg, Germany 21073.
"Airline and immigration records indicate that from November 1999 through February 2000, the detainee, Mohammed Atta, Marwan Al-Shehhi and Ziad Jarrah all traveled from Germany to Pakistan.
"Sayf al-Adl is a senior al Qaida military commander with a long-term relationship with Usama bin Laden, Sayf al-Adl's role in the organization has been as a trainer, military leader, and key member of Usama bin Laden's security detail.
"The diary of Sayf al-Adl was recovered during a raid in Saudi Arabia in 2004. The diary details the detainee's involvement in the 11 September 2001 terrorist plot and subsequent attack. The detainee is listed as a "highly professional jihadist" along with "9/11 hijackers", Mohammed Atta and Ziad Jarrah. The diary states that the three were briefed on an operation involving aircraft by Abu Hafs, a senior al Qaida planner. The detainee, Mohammed Atta, and Ziad Jarrah subsequently met with Usama bin Laden about the plan. Following the meeting, al Qaida began arrangements for the detainee, Mohammed Atta and Ziad Jarrah to receive pilot training. The detainee handled administrative details for the "9/11 hijackers" while they were in the United States and the detainee served as an al Qaida Europe based liaison.
"The detainee was identified in a video tape of potential suicide operatives.
"The detainee attempted to obtain a United States visa on four occasions from May 2000 to November 2000 for the purpose of attending flight school in the United States. Each application was rejected by [sic] United States Department of State.
"The detainee attempted to enroll in the Florida Flight Training School, where 9/11 hijacker Ziad Jarrah was a student. The detainee put down a 2,350 United States dollars [sic] deposit for flight training.
"Ziad Jarrah repeatedly attempted to assist the detainee's travel to the United States and enrollment in the Florida flight training center.
"The detainee attempted to enroll at the [sic] Florida-based aviation language school.
"The detainee, while in Germany, wired 9/11 hijacker Marwan Al-Shehi, who was in the United States 2708.33 [sic] United States dollars [sic] on 13 June 2000 via moneygram.
"The detainee, while in Germany, wired 9/11 hijacker Marwan Al-Shehhi, who was in the United States) [sic] 1760.61 [sic] United States dollars on 26 July 2000 via Western Union.
"The detainee, while in Germany, wired 9/11 hijacker Marwan Al-Shehhi who was in the United States) [sic] 4,118.13 [sic] United States dollars on 25 September 2000 via Western Union.
"In June 2002, the detainee was personally interviewed by Yosri Fouda, an investigative journalist for Al-Jazeera television. The interview took place over the course of 48 hours in Karachi, Pakistan. Also present at the meeting was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, a senior al Qaida planner. Fouda conducted the interview in person with both the detainee and KSM. The detainee and KSM detailed how the 9/11 attacks were planned and executed during the course of the interview. KSM identified the detainee as the coordinator of the 9/11 attacks. The detainee displayed items he claimed were "souvenirs" of the 9/11 attacks. The items included: an air navigation map of the American eastern seaboard, flight simulator CD-Roms and Boeing manuals and a flight instruction book the detainee claimed had 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta's handwritten notes. The detainee stated Mohamed Atta left them in the Hamburg, Germany, apartment he shared with the detainee. The detainee stated that he later met with Atta in July, 2001 in Madrid, Spain, to finalize the operational details of the 9/11 plot. The detainee stated he received a phone call on 29 August 2001 from Atta that gave the date fro the 9/11 attacks. After learning this, the detainee ordered active al Qaida cells in Europe and elsewhere to evacuate and then he fled to Pakistan.
"An unsigned letter found at the detainee's point of capture, and addressed to the detainee, asks follow on questions related to the detainee's Al-Jazeera interview detailing the 9/11 attacks.
"An article from the London Sunday Times published on 8 September 2002 listed excerpts from a 112 page document entitled "The Reality of the New Crusaders' War". The detainee passed the document to Al-Jazeera Yosri Fouda with a request for the document to be translated into English and entered into the Library of Congress. According to the London Sunday Times the document is al Qaida's written attempt to justify the 9/11 attacks through Islamic teaching.
"The London Sunday Times article published on 8 September 2002 listed excerpts from "The Reality of the New Crusaders' War" which contained statements from Taliban leader Mullah Mohamed Omar and Usama bin Laden which encourages jihad in service of the ousted Taliban regime.
"The detainee was captured in a safe house. Items also recovered at the safe house at the time of the detainee's capture were high explosives, sheet explosives, a large quantity of improvised detonation devices, passports for Usama bin Laden's family members, a handwritten note to a senior al Qaida operative, identification cards for a senior al Qaida operative, identification cards for Ahmad Ibrahim Al-Haznawi, a 9/11 hijacker, and contact information for several known al Qaida operatives.
"Documents captured in a raid of a separate al Qaida safe house were identical to documents captured alnong with the detainee. The documents included training manuals, security information and combat related subjects.
"Letters and personal effect of a senior al Qaida operative were discovered in the safe house where the detainee was arrested.
"Letters found at the detainee's point of capture detailed a plan to egress Pakistan with forged identification. This plan was in conjunction with a senior al Qaida operative.
"A letter captured on an al Qaida courier detailed a senior al Qaida operative's instructions to the detainee to identify operatives to send to the United States or United Kingdom.
"The detainee wired approximately 15,000 United States dollars to Zacharias Moussaoui while Moussaoui was enrolled in pilot training."

The Department of Defense announced on August 9, 2007 that all fourteen of the "high-value detainees" who had been transferred to Guantanamo from the CIA's black sites, had been officially classified as "enemy combatants".[31] Although judges Peter Brownback and Keith J. Allred had ruled two months earlier that only "illegal enemy combatants" could face military commissions, the Department of Defense waived the qualifier and said that all fourteen men could now face charges before Guantanamo military commissions.[32 ][33 ]

Habeas petition

On June 12, 2008 the United States Supreme Court ruled, in Boumediene v. Bush, that the Military Commissions Act could not remove the right for Guantanamo captives to access the US Federal Court system.

The first 22 captives had their habeas petitions re-initiated in August 2008. [34] Ramzi Bin AlShibh's habeas corpus petition was filed August 29, 2008.

Guantanamo commission

Binalshibh and four other captives classified as high value detainees (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi, Ali Abd al-Aziz Ali and Walid Bin Attash) were charged in Guantanamo military commissions in Spring 2008. The men triggered controversy when they announced that they did not want US-appointed attorneys and they planned to boycott their commissions. The military commissions, authorized by President George W. Bush, did not permit suspects to forgo legal representation, to act as their own attorneys, or to boycott their commissions. The later commissions, authorized by the Military Commissions Act of 2006, did authorized suspects to serve as their own attorneys.

The other four men did eventually agree to attend their commissions. Binalshibh, however, has continued to try refuse to attend. His appointed attorneys had expressed concern that he had refused to meet with them, and since the location of camp 6, where the high value detainees are held is so secret even military attorneys are not allowed to travel there to visit him. The men are hooded when they travel from the camp to their commission, and his attorney offered to allow herself to be hooded. This offer was turned down.

The judge presiding over the commission's pre-trial motions ordered Binalshibh and al-Hawsawi to undergo mental competency hearings. On December 8, 2008, Mohammed told the judge that he and the other four indictees wished to confess and plead guilty; however, the plea would be delayed until after the competency hearings for Binalshibh and al-Hawsawi, so that all five men could make their plea together.[35]

Transfer to the USA

On August 31, 2009 Corrections One, a trade journal for the prison industry, speculated that "Ramzi Bin al Shibh" was one of ten captives they speculated might be moved to a maximum security prison in Standish, Michigan.[36 ]

References

  1. ^ a b c d e "9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 5". National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. 2004. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch5.htm.  
  2. ^ a b c d e f Indictment of Zacarias Moussaoui, with supporting conspirators, Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Mustafa al-Hawsawi. Filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
  3. ^ a b "Detainee Biographies" (PDF). Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Archived from the original on date=2009-08-31. http://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.odni.gov%2Fannouncements%2Fcontent%2FDetaineeBiographies.pdf+&date=2009-08-31.  
  4. ^ McDermott, Terry (2005). Perfect Soldiers. Harper. pp. 39.  
  5. ^ a b McDermott, Terry (2005). Perfect Soldiers. Harper. pp. 41.  
  6. ^ McDermott, Terry (2005). Perfect Soldiers. Harper. pp. 42.  
  7. ^ a b c d "Ramzi Binalshibh: al-Qaeda suspect". BBC. September 14, 2002. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2257456.stm.  
  8. ^ McDermott, Terry (2005). Perfect Soldiers. Harper.  
  9. ^ a b Zacarias Moussauoi v. the United States, trial testimony on March 7, 2006.
  10. ^ "Al-Jazeera reporter speaks on terrorist plans". Lateline / ABC (Australia). September 30, 2002. http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/stories/s689774.htm.  
  11. ^ "The Mastermind". CBS News. March 5, 2003. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/10/09/60II/main524947.shtml.  
  12. ^ http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/09/12/alqaeda.911.claim/index.html
  13. ^ http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0209/14/smn.09.html
  14. ^ "Motion: 9/11 conspiracy suspect may have used ID of Arizona doctor". CNN. August 7, 2002. http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/08/07/inv.moussaoui.stolen.id/index.html.  
  15. ^ a b "Video shows Osama and killers". New York Daily News. 09-08-06. http://www.nydailynews.com/front/story/450616p-379142c.html.  
  16. ^ "Al-Qa'ida releases film showing Bin Laden with the hijackers". Belfast Telegraph. 09-08-06. http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/story.jsp?story=705570.  
  17. ^ Most Wanted Terrorists Seeking Information, January 17, 2002, (dead link)
  18. ^ Martyrdom Messages/video, Seeking Information Alert video clips published by the FBI January 17, 2002, and photos of remaining 5 terrorists, FBI archival after September 2002
  19. ^ FBI Seeking Information - War on Terrorism, Martyrdom Messages/video Seeking Information Alert, VIDEO 2 minutes 11 seconds, mpg (29.1 mb)
  20. ^ FBI Seeking Information - War on Terrorism, Martyrdom Messages/video Seeking Information Alert, VIDEO 2 minutes 11 seconds, rm (229 kb - stream)
  21. ^ FBI Seeking Information - War on Terrorism, Martyrdom Messages/video Seeking Information Alert, VIDEO 2 minutes 11 seconds, asf (371 kb - stream)
  22. ^ ^ http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/17/AR2007121702151.html
  23. ^ "Binalshibh to go to third country for questioning". CNN. September 17, 2002. http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/09/16/alqaeda.pakistan/.  
  24. ^ FBI Seeking Information archive, Internet Archive Wayback Machine, October 17, 2002
  25. ^ "Q&A: What next for Guantanamo prisoners?". BBC News. 2002-01-21. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1773140.stm. Retrieved 2008-11-24.   mirror
  26. ^ Elsea, Jennifer K. (July 20, 2005). "Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: Report for Congress" (PDF). Congressional Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22173.pdf. Retrieved 2007-11-10.  
  27. ^ OARDEC, Index to Transcripts of Detainee Testimony and Documents Submitted by Detainees at Combatant Status Review Tribunals Held at Guantanamo Between July 2004 and March 2005, September 4, 2007
  28. ^ "Boumediene v. Bush". June 12, 2008. http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/06-1195.ZO.html. "... the procedural protections afforded to the detainees in the CSRT hearings ... fall well short of the procedures and adversarial mechanisms that would eliminate the need for habeas corpus review."  
  29. ^ "Boumediene v. Bush". June 12, 2008. http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/06-1195.ZO.html.  
  30. ^ Redacted transcript (.pdf), from Ramzi Binalshibh's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 1-8, March 9, 2007
  31. ^ Lolita C. Baldur (Thursday, August 9, 2007). "Pentagon: 14 Guantanamo Suspects Are Now Combatants". Time magazine. http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1651680,00.html.   mirror
  32. ^ Sergeant Sara Wood (June 4, 2007). "Charges Dismissed Against Canadian at Guantanamo". Department of Defense. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=46281. Retrieved 2007-06-07.  
  33. ^ Sergeant Sara Wood (June 4, 2007). "Judge Dismisses Charges Against Second Guantanamo Detainee". Department of Defense. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=46288. Retrieved 2007-06-07.  
  34. ^ "Amended and Other Factual Returns Filed -- August 2008" (PDF). United States Department of Justice. 2008-08-29. http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/table-on-returns-8-29-08.pdf. Retrieved 2008-09-11.  
  35. ^ "Top 9/11 suspects to plead guilty". BBC News. December 8, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7770856.stm. Retrieved December 8, 2008.  
  36. ^ Kathryn Lynch-Morin (2009-08-31). "Profile of 10 U.S.-bound Gitmo detainees". Corrections One. Archived from the original on 2009-09-01. http://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.correctionsone.com%2Fnews%2F1879631-Profile-of-10-U-S-bound-Gitmo-detainees%2F&date=2009-09-01. Retrieved 2009-08-02.  

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