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Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
Opium harvesters3.jpg
Governments of opium-producing Parties are required to "purchase and take physical possession of such crops as soon as possible" after harvest to prevent diversion into the illicit market.
Signed
Location
March 30, 1961
New York City
Effective
Condition
December 13, 1964[1]
40 ratifications
Parties 180[2]

The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs is an international treaty to prohibit production and supply of specific (nominally narcotic) drugs and of drugs with similar effects except under licence for specific purposes, such as medical treatment and research. As noted below, its major effects included updating the Paris Convention of 13 July 1931 to include the vast number of synthetic opioids invented in the intervening 30 years and a mechanism for more easily including new ones. From 1931 to 1961 most of the families of synthetic opioids had been developed, including drugs in whatever way related to methadone, pethidine, morphinans and dextromoramide & related drugs; research on fentanyls and piritramide were also nearing fruition at this point.

Earlier treaties had only controlled opium, coca, and derivatives such as morphine, heroin and cocaine. The Single Convention, adopted in 1961, consolidated those treaties and broadened their scope to include cannabis and drugs whose effects are similar to those of the drugs specified. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the World Health Organization were empowered to add, remove, and transfer drugs among the treaty's four Schedules of controlled substances. The International Narcotics Control Board was put in charge of administering controls on drug production, international trade, and dispensation. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) was delegated the Board's day-to-day work of monitoring the situation in each country and working with national authorities to ensure compliance with the Single Convention. This treaty has since been supplemented by the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, which controls LSD, Ecstasy, and other psychoactive pharmaceuticals, and the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which strengthens provisions against money laundering and other drug-related offenses.

Contents

Influence on domestic legislation

Since the Single Convention is not self-executing, Parties must pass laws to carry out its provisions. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime works with countries' legislatures to ensure compliance. As a result, most of the national drug statutes in the UNODC's legal library share a high degree of conformity with the Single Convention and its supplementary treaties, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.

Russian Minister of Interior Affairs Boris Gryzlov told the State Duma that "total prohibition" of illicit drug use was "not the government's own initiative...but rather the result of our responsibility to implement the UN drug conventions of 1961, 1971, and 1988."

The Single Convention has been extremely influential in standardizing national drug control laws. In particular, the United States' Controlled Substances Act of 1970 and the United Kingdom's Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 were designed to fulfill treaty obligations. Both Acts include analogous schemes of drug Scheduling, along with similar procedures for adding, removing, and transferring drugs among the Schedules. The Controlled Substances Act follows the Single Convention's lead in granting a public health authority a central role in drug Scheduling decisions. It also includes a provision mandating that federal authorities control all drugs of abuse at least as strictly as required by the Single Convention(21 U.S.C. § 811(d)).

As of January 2005, the Single Convention had 180 Parties.

History

The League of Nations adopted several drug control treaties prior to World War II specifying uniform controls on addictive drugs such as cocaine, opium, and its derivatives. However, the lists of substances to be controlled were fixed in the treaties' text; consequently, the conventions had to periodically be amended or superseded by new treaties in order to keep up with advances in chemistry. The cumbersome process of conference and state-by-state ratification could take decades.[3]

A Canadian Senate committee report notes, "The work of consolidating the existing international drug control treaties into one instrument began in 1948, but it was 1961 before an acceptable third draft was ready."[4] That year, the UN Economic and Social Council convened a plenipotentiary conference of 73 nations for the adoption of a single convention on narcotic drugs. Canadian William B. McAllister, Q.C., notes that the participating states organized themselves into five distinct caucuses:[5]

  • Organic states group: As producers of the organic raw materials for most of the global drug supply, these countries had been the traditional focus of international drug control efforts. They were open to socio-cultural drug use, having lived with it for centuries. While India, Turkey, Pakistan and Burma took the lead, the group also included the coca-producing states of Indonesia and the Andean region of South America, the opium- and cannabis-producing countries of South and Southeast Asia, and the cannabis-producing states in the Horn of Africa. They favored weak controls because existing restrictions on production and export had directly affected large segments of their domestic population and industry. They supported national control efforts based on local conditions and were wary of strong international control bodies under the UN. Although essentially powerless to fight the prohibition philosophy directly, they effectively forced a compromise by working together to dilute the treaty language with exceptions, loopholes and deferrals. They also sought development aid to compensate for losses caused by strict controls.
  • Manufacturing states group: This group included primarily Western industrialized nations, the key players being the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland, the Netherlands, West Germany, and Japan. Having no cultural affinity for organic drug use and being faced with the effects that drug abuse was having on their citizens, they advocated very stringent controls on the production of organic raw materials and on illicit trafficking. As the principal manufacturers of synthetic psychotropics, and backed by a determined industry lobby, they forcefully opposed undue restrictions on medical research or the production and distribution of manufactured drugs. They favored strong supranational control bodies as long as they continued to exercise de facto control over such bodies. According to W.B. McAllister's Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, their strategy was essentially to "shift as much of the regulatory burden as possible to the raw-material-producing states while retaining as much of their own freedom as possible."
  • Strict control group: These were essentially non-producing and non-manufacturing states with no direct economic stake in the drug trade. The key members were France, Sweden, Brazil, and the Republic of China. Most of the states in this group were culturally opposed to drug use and suffered from abuse problems. They favored restricting drug use to medical and scientific purposes and were willing to sacrifice a degree of national sovereignty to ensure the effectiveness of supranational control bodies. They were forced to moderate their demands in order to secure the widest possible agreement.
  • Weak control group: This group was led by the Soviet Union and often included its allies in Europe, Asia and Africa. They considered drug control a purely internal issue and adamantly opposed any intrusion on national sovereignty, such as independent inspections. With little interest in the drug trade and minimal domestic abuse problems, they refused to give any supranational body excessive power, especially over internal decision-making.
  • Neutral group: This was a diverse group including most of the African countries, Central America, sub-Andean South America, Luxembourg and the Vatican. They had no strong interest in the issue apart from ensuring their own access to sufficient drug supplies. Some voted with political blocs, others were willing to trade votes, and others were truly neutral and could go either way on the control issue depending on the persuasive power of the arguments presented. In general, they supported compromise with a view to obtaining the broadest possible agreement.

These competing interests, after more than eight weeks of negotiations, finally produced a compromise treaty. Several controls were watered down; for instance, the proposed mandatory embargoes on nations failing to comply with the treaty became recommendatory. The 1953 New York Opium Protocol, which had not yet entered into force, limited opium production to seven countries; the Single Convention lifted that restriction, but instituted other regulations and put the International Narcotics Control Board in charge of monitoring their enforcement. A compromise was also struck that allowed heroin and some other drugs classified as particularly dangerous to escape absolute prohibition.[6]

The Single Convention created four Schedules of controlled substances and a process for adding new substances to the Schedules without amending the treaty. The Schedules were designed to have significantly stricter regulations than the two drug "Groups" established by predecessor treaties. For the first time, cannabis was added to the list of internationally controlled drugs. In fact, regulations on the cannabis plant – as well as the opium poppy, the coca bush, poppy straw and cannabis leaves – were embedded in the text of the treaty, making it impossible to deregulate them through the normal Scheduling process. A 1962 issue of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs' Bulletin on Narcotics proudly announced that "after a definite transitional period, all non-medical use of narcotic drugs, such as opium smoking, opium eating, consumption of cannabis (hashish, marijuana) and chewing of coca leaves, will be outlawed everywhere. This is a goal which workers in international narcotics control all over the world have striven to achieve for half a century."[7]

An August 3, 1962 Economic and Social Council resolution ordered the issuance of the Commentary on the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.[8] The legal commentary was created by the United Nations Secretary-General's staff (specifically, Adolf Lande, former Secretary of the Permanent Central Narcotics Board and Drug Supervisory Body), operating under a mandate to give "an interpretation of the provisions of the Convention in the light of the relevant conference proceedings and other material."[9] The Commentary contains the Single Convention's legislative history and is an invaluable aid to interpreting the treaty.

The Single Convention was the first international treaty to prohibit cannabis.

The Single Convention entered into force on December 13, 1964, having met Article 41's requirement of 40 ratifications. As of January 1, 2005, 180 states were Parties to the treaty.[10] Others, such as Cambodia, have committed to becoming Parties.[11]

On May 21, 1971, the UN Economic and Social Council called a conference of plenipotentiaries to consider amendments to the Single Convention. The conference met at the United Nations Office at Geneva from March 6 to March 24, 1972, producing the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. The amendments entered into force on August 8, 1975.[12]

On November 11, 1990, mechanisms for enforcing the Single Convention were expanded significantly by the entry into force of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which had been signed at Vienna on December 20, 1988. The Preamble to this treaty acknowledges the inadequacy of the Single Convention's controls to stop "steadily increasing inroads into various social groups made by illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances". The new treaty focuses on stopping organized crime by providing for international cooperation in apprehending and convicting gangsters and starving them of funds through forfeiture, asset freezing, and other methods. It also establishes a system for placing precursors to Scheduled drugs under international control. Some non-Parties to the Single Convention, such as Andorra, belong to this treaty and thus are still under the international drug control regime.

Medical and other drug uses

Parties are required to phase out the traditional practice of coca leaf chewing.
Under Article 37, "Any drugs, substances and equipment used in or intended for the commission of any of the offenses . . . shall be liable to seizure and confiscation."

The Single Convention repeatedly affirms the importance of medical use of controlled substances. The Preamble notes that "the medical use of narcotic drugs continues to be indispensable for the relief of pain and suffering and that adequate provision must be made to ensure the availability of narcotic drugs for such purposes". Articles 1, 2, 4, 9, 12, 19, and 49 contain provisions relating to "medical and scientific" use of controlled substances. In almost all cases, parties are permitted to allow dispensation and use of controlled substances under a prescription, subject to record-keeping requirements and other restrictions.

The Single Convention unambiguously condemns drug addiction, however, stating that "addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is fraught with social and economic danger to mankind". It takes a prohibitionist approach to the problem of drug addiction, attempting to stop all non-medical, non-scientific use of narcotic drugs. Article 4 requires nations to limit use and possession of drugs to medicinal and scientific purposes. Article 49 allows countries to phase out coca leaf chewing, opium smoking, and other traditional drug uses gradually, but provides that "the use of cannabis for other than medical and scientific purposes must be discontinued as soon as possible."

The discontinuation of these prohibited uses is intended to be achieved by cutting off supply. Rather than calling on nations to prosecute drug users, the treaty focuses on traffickers and producers. As of March 2005, 116 drugs were controlled under the Single Convention.

Penal provisions

Article 36 requires Parties to criminalize "cultivation, production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, possession, offering, offering for sale, distribution, purchase, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, importation and exportation of drugs contrary to the provisions of this Convention," as well as "[i]ntentional participation in, conspiracy to commit and attempts to commit, any of such offences, and preparatory acts and financial operations in connexion with the offences referred to in this article".

The Article also provides for extradition of drug offenders, although a Party has a right to refuse to extradite a suspect if "competent authorities consider that the offense is not sufficiently serious." A 1971 amendment to the Article grants nations the discretion to substitute "treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration" for criminal penalties if the offender is a drug abuser. A loophole in the Single Convention is that it requires Parties to place anti-drug laws on the books, but does not clearly mandate their enforcement, except in the case of drug cultivation.[13]

Drug enforcement varies widely between nations. Many European countries, including the United Kingdom, Germany, and, most famously, the Netherlands, do not prosecute all petty drug offenses. Dutch coffee shops are allowed to sell small amounts of cannabis to consumers. However, the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport's report, Drugs Policy in the Netherlands, notes that large-scale "[p]roduction and trafficking are dealt with severely under the criminal law, in accordance with the UN Single Convention. Each year the Public Prosecutions Department deals with an average of 10,000 cases involving infringements of the Opium Act."[14] Some of the most severe penalties for drug trafficking are handed down in certain Asian countries, such as Malaysia, which mandate capital punishment for offenses involving amounts over a certain threshold. Singapore mandates the death penalty for trafficking in 15 g (half an ounce) of heroin, 30 g of cocaine or 500 g of cannabis.[15] Most nations, such as France and the United States, find a middle ground, imposing a spectrum of sanctions ranging from probation to life imprisonment for drug offenses.

The Single Convention's penal provisions frequently begin with clauses such as "Subject to its constitutional limitations, each Party shall . . ." Thus, if a nation's constitution prohibited instituting the criminal penalties called for by the Single Convention, those provisions would not be binding on that country. However, Professor Cindy Fazey's A Growing Market: The Domestic Cultivation of Cannabis points out, "Whilst this strategy may be practical politics for some countries, critics will ask why it has taken almost half a century to discover that the UN conventions conflict with a constitutional principle. The argument is particularly difficult to deploy for countries like Britain, where constitutional principles are not formalized or codified to any significant degree." However the current move in Switzerland to enshrine cannabis decriminalization in the national constitution by popular initiative could profit from this rule.

Possession for personal use

Different nations have drawn different conclusions as to whether the treaty requires criminalization of drug possession for personal use.

It is unclear whether or not the treaty requires criminalization of drug possession for personal use. The treaty's language is ambiguous, and a ruling by the International Court of Justice would probably be required to settle the matter decisively. However, several commissions have attempted to tackle the question. With the exception of the Le Dain Commission, most have found that states are allowed to legalize possession for personal use.

The Canadian Le Dain Commission of Inquiry into the Non-Medical Use of Drugs' 1972 report cites circumstantial evidence suggesting that states must prohibit possession for personal use:[16]

It has generally been assumed that "possession" in Article 36 includes possession for use as well as possession for the purpose of trafficking. This is a reasonable inference from the terms of Article 4, which obliges the parties "to limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of drugs." There is also Article 33, which provides that "The Parties shall not permit the possession of drugs except under legal authority." [...] On the face of Article 26 it would not be unreasonable to argue that what is contemplated is possession for the purpose of trafficking rather than possession for use, and that the requirements of the article are satisfied if the former kind of possession is made a penal offense. The prevailing view, however, is that the word "possession" in Article 36 includes simple possession for use.

However, LeDain himself concludes

The costs to a significant number of individuals, the majority of whom are young people, and to society generally, of a policy of prohibition of simple possession are not justified by the potential for harm of cannabis and the additional influence which such a policy is likely to have upon perception of harm, demand and availability. We, therefore, recommend the repeal of the prohibition against the simple possession of cannabis.[17]

The Canadian Department of National Health and Welfare's 1979 report, The Single Convention and Its Implications for Canadian Cannabis Policy, counters with circumstantial evidence to the contrary:[18]

The substantive argument in support of simple possession falling outside the scope of Article 36 is founded on the assumption that it is intended to insure a penal response to the problem of illicit trafficking rather than to punish drug users who do not participate in the traffic. (See United Nations, 1973:112; Noll, 1977:44–45) The Third Draft of the Single Convention, which served as the working document for the 1961 Plenipotentiary Conference, contained a paragraph identical to that which now appears as Article 36, subparagraph 1(a). This paragraph was included in a chapter entitled Measures Against Illicit Traffickers, but the format by which the Third Draft was divided into chapters was not transferred to the Single Convention, and this, apparently, is the sole reason why this chapter heading, along with all others, was deleted. (See United Nations, 1973:112) Article 36 is still located in that part of the Convention concerned with the illicit trade, sandwiched between Article 35 (Action Against the Illicit Traffic) and Article 37 (Seizure and Confiscation). In addition, it should be noted that the word "use," suggesting personal consumption rather than trafficking, appears in conjunction with "possession" in Article 4 (which pertains to non-penal "general obligations"), but not in the penal provisions of Article 36.

The Sackville Commission of South Australia concluded in 1978 that:

. . . the Convention does not require signatories to make either use or possession for personal use punishable offenses ... This is because ‘use’ is not specifically covered by Article 36 and the term ‘possession’ in that Article and elsewhere can be read as confined to possession for the purpose of dealing".

The American National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse reached a similar conclusion in 1972, finding "that the word 'possession' in Article 36 refers not to possession for personal use but to Possession as a link in illicit trafficking."

The Canadian Department of National Health and Welfare report cites the Commentary itself in backing up its interpretation:[19]

The official Commentary on the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961, as prepared by the office of the U.N. Secretary-General, adopts a permissive interpretation of possession in Article 36. It notes that whether or not the possession of drugs (including prohibited forms of cannabis) for personal use requires the imposition of penal sanctions is a question which may be answered differently in different countries. Further, the Commentary notes that parties which interpret Article 36 as requiring a punitive legal response to simple possession, may undoubtedly choose not to provide for imprisonment of persons found in such possession, but to impose only minor penalties such as fines or even censure (since possession of a small quantity of drugs for personal consumption may be held not to be a serious offense under article 36... and only a serious offense is liable to adequate punishment particularly by imprisonment or other penalties of deprivation of liberty.

The Bulletin on Narcotics attempted to tackle the question in 1977:[20]

Since some confusion and misunderstanding had existed in the past and some instances still persist in respect of the legal position laid down in the international treaties concerning the relationship between penal sanctions and drug abuse, some clarifying remarks are called for. These were already offered at the XIth International Congress on Penal Law. 5 They were reiterated at the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. 6 The international treaties in no way insist on harsh penal sanctions with regard to drug abuse, as is sometimes alleged by persons criticising the international drug control system; the treaties are much more subtle and flexible than sometimes interpreted.
First of all, Article 4 of the Single Convention contains the general obligations for Parties to this Convention to "take such legislative and administrative measures as may be necessary, subject to the provisions of this Convention, to limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of drugs." From the contents of this provision it is clear that use of drugs and their possession for personal consumption has also to be limited by legislation and administrative measures exclusively to medical and scientific purposes. Consequently, "legalization" of drugs in the sense of making them freely available for non-medical and non-scientific purposes-as it is sometimes demanded by public mass media and even experts in discussions on the subject-is without any doubt excluded and unacceptable under the present international drug control system as established by the international treaties. The question, however, remains whether Parties are obliged by the international treaties to apply penal sanctions for unauthorized use and unauthorized possession of drugs for personal consumption. It is on this point that confusion still exists and clarification is needed.
It is a fact that "use" (or "personal consumption") is not enumerated amongst the punishable offences in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 36 of the Single Convention. Although, as mentioned above, Parties are required to limit the use of drugs exclusively to medical and scientific purposes, the Single Convention does not require them to attain the goal by providing penal sanctions for unauthorized "use" or "personal consumption" of drugs.
Unauthorized "possession" of drugs is mentioned in paragraph 1 of Article 36, but from the context it is clear that, as stated in the Official Commentary by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, "possession" of drugs for personal consumption is not to be considered a "punishable offence" by a Party to the Single Convention. The whole international drug control system envisages in its penal provisions the illicit traffic in drugs; this also holds true for the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention and for the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. As there is no obligation to provide penal sanctions for "use" in the sense of personal consumption and "possession" of drugs for personal consumption, any criticism levelled against the international drug control system by protagonists in favour of the so-called "liberalization" or decriminalization or "de-penalization" of use and possession of drugs for personal consumption is quite beside the point.

Schedules of drugs

The Single Convention's Schedules of drugs range from most restrictive to least restrictive, in this order: Schedule IV, Schedule I, Schedule II, Schedule III. The list of drugs initially controlled was annexed to the treaty. Article 3 states that in order for a drug to be placed in a Schedule, the World Health Organization must make the findings required for that Schedule, to wit:

  • Schedule I – The substance is liable to similar abuse and productive of similar ill effects as the drugs already in Schedule I or Schedule II, or is convertible into a drug.
  • Schedule II – The substance is liable to similar abuse and productive of similar ill effects as the drugs already in Schedule I or Schedule II, or is convertible into a drug.
  • Schedule III – The preparation, because of the substances which it contains, is not liable to abuse and cannot produce ill effects; and the drug therein is not readily recoverable.
  • Schedule IV – The drug, which is already in Schedule I, is particularly liable to abuse and to produce ill effects, and such liability is not offset by substantial therapeutic advantages.

Schedule I, according to the Commentary, is the category of drugs whose control provisions "constitute the standard regime under the Single Convention."[21] The principal features of that regime are:

  • Limitation to medical and scientific purposes of all phases of narcotics trade (manufacture, domestic trade, both wholesale and retail, and international trade) in, and of the possession and use of, drugs;
  • Requirement of governmental authorization (licensing or state ownership) of participation in any phase of the narcotics trade and of a specific authorization (import and export authorization) of each individual international transaction;
  • Obligation of all participants in the narcotics trade to keep detailed records of their transactions in drugs;
  • Requirement of a medical prescription for the supply or dispensation of drugs to individuals;
  • A system of limiting the quantities of drugs available, by manufacture or import or both, in each country and territory, to those needed for medical and scientific purposes.

Schedule II drugs are regulated only slightly less strictly than Schedule I drugs. The Commentary confirms, "Drugs in Schedule II are subject to the same measures of control as drugs in Schedule I, with only a few exceptions":[22]

  • The drugs are not subject to the provisions of Article 30, paragraphs 2 and 5, as regards the retail trade.
  • Governments are thus not bound to prevent the accumulation of drugs in Schedule II in the possession of retail distributors, in excess of the quantities required for the normal conduct of business.
  • Medical prescriptions for the supply or dispensation of these drugs to individuals are not obligatory.
  • Such drugs are also exempted from the provision – which in fact is no more than a suggestion – concerning the use of official prescription forms in the shape of counterfoil books issued by the competent governmental authorities or by authorized professional associations.
  • Parties to the Single Convention need not require that the label under which a drug in Schedule II is offered for sale in the retail trade show the exact content by weight or percentage.

Schedule III "contains preparations which enjoy a privileged position under the Single Convention, i.e. are subject to a less strict regime than other Preparations," according to the Commentary.[23] Specifically:

  • Government authorizations are not required for each import or export of preparations in Schedule III. The import certificate and export authorization system laid down in Article 31, paragraphs 4 to 15, which governs the international transactions in drugs and their preparations, does not apply to the preparations in Schedule III.
  • The only estimates and statistical returns that a Party need furnish to the INCB in reference to Schedule III preparations are estimates of the quantities of drugs to be utilized for the compounding of preparations in Schedule III, and information on the amounts of drugs actually so used.

Schedule IV is the category of drugs, such as heroin, that are considered to have "particularly dangerous properties" in comparison to other drugs (alcohol is left unregulated). According to Article 2, "The drugs in Schedule IV shall also be included in Schedule I and subject to all measures of control applicable to drugs in the latter Schedule" as well as whatever "special measures of control"; each Party deems necessary. This is in contrast to the U.S. Controlled Substances Act, which has five Schedules ranging from Schedule I (most restrictive) to Schedule V (least restrictive), and the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, which has four Schedules ranging for Schedule I (most restrictive) to Schedule IV (least restrictive).

Under certain circumstances, Parties are required to limit Schedule IV drugs to research purposes only:

(b) A Party shall, if in its opinion the prevailing conditions in its country render it the most appropriate means of protecting the public health and welfare, prohibit the production, manufacture, export and import of, trade in, possession or use of any such drug except for amounts which may be necessary for medical and scientific research only, including clinical trials therewith to be conducted under or subject to the direct supervision and control of the Party.

The Commentary explains two situations in which this provision would apply:

For a considerable period of time - and still at the time of writing - there has been no significant diversion of legally manufactured drugs from legal trade into illicit channels; but if a Government were unable to prevent such a diversion of drugs in Schedule IV, a situation would arise in which the measures of prohibition mentioned in subparagraph (b) would be "the most appropriate means of protecting the public health and welfare". Whether this was or was not the case would be left to the judgement of the Party concerned whose bona fide opinion on this matter could not be challenged by any other Party.
Another situation in which measures of prohibition would be "appropriate" for the protection of public health and welfare might exist where the members of the medical profession administered or prescribed drugs in Schedule IV in an unduly extensive way, and other less radical measures, such as warnings by public authorities, professional associations or manufacturers, were ineffective. It may however be assumed that such a situation could rarely if ever arise.

The Commentary notes that "Whether the prohibition of drugs in Schedule IV (Cannabis and cannabis resin, desomorphine, heroin, ketobemidone) should be mandatory or only recommended was a controversial question at the Plenipotentiary Conference." The provision adopted represents "a compromise which leaves prohibition to the judgement, though theoretically not to the discretion, of each Party." The Parties are required to act in good faith in making this decision, or else they will be in violation of the treaty.

Power structure

The UN General Assembly elects nations to the 54-member ECOSOC, which in turn elects countries to the 53-member Commission on Narcotic Drugs and individuals to the 13-member International Narcotics Control Board.

The Single Convention gives the UN Economic and Social Council's Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) power to add or delete drugs from the Schedules, in accordance with the World Health Organization's findings and recommendations. Any Party to the treaty may request an amendment to the Schedules, or request a review of the Commission's decision. The Economic and Social Council is the only body that has power to confirm, alter, or reverse the CND's scheduling decisions. The United Nations General Assembly can approve or modify any CND decision, except for scheduling decisions.

The CND's annual meeting serves as a forum for nations to debate drug policy. At the 2005 meeting, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia and Iran rallied in opposition to the UN's zero-tolerance approach in international drug policy. Their appeal was vetoed by the United States, while the United Kingdom delegation remained reticent.[24] Meanwhile, U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy Director John Walters clashed with United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa on the issue of needle exchange programs. Walters advocated strict prohibition, while Costa opined, "We must not deny these addicts any genuine opportunities to remain HIV-negative."[25]

The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) is mandated by Article 9 of the Single Convention to "endeavour to limit the cultivation, production, manufacture and use of drugs to an adequate amount required for medical and scientific purposes, to ensure their availability for such purposes and to prevent illicit cultivation, production and manufacture of, and illicit trafficking in and use of, drugs." The INCB administers the estimate system, which limits each nation's annual production of controlled substances to the estimated amounts needed for medical and scientific purposes.

Article 21 provides that "the total of the quantities of each drug manufactured and imported by any country or territory in any one year shall not exceed the sum of" the quantity:

  • Consumed, within the limit of the relevant estimate, for medical and scientific purposes;
  • Used, within the limit of the relevant estimate, for the manufacture of other drugs, of preparations in Schedule Ill, and of substances not covered by this Convention;
  • Exported;
  • Added to the stock for the purpose of bringing that stock up to the level specified in the relevant estimate; and
  • Acquired within the limit of the relevant estimate for special purposes.

Article 21 bis, added to the treaty by a 1971 amendment, gives the INCB more enforcement power by allowing it to deduct from a nation's production quota of cannabis, opium, and coca the amounts it determines have been produced within that nation and introduced into the illicit traffic. This could happen as a result of failing to control either illicit production or diversion of licitly produced opium to illicit purposes.[26] In this way, the INCB can essentially punish a narcotics-exporting nation that does not control its illicit traffic by imposing an economic sanction on its medicinal narcotics industry.

The Single Convention exerts power even over those nations that have not ratified it. The International Narcotics Board states:[27]

The fact that the system generally works well is mainly due to the estimates system that covers all countries whether or not parties to the Convention. Countries are under an obligation not to exceed the amounts of the estimates confirmed or established by the INCB.

Article 14 authorizes the INCB to recommend an embargo on imports and exports of drugs from any noncompliant nations. The INCB can also issue reports critical of noncompliant nations, and forward those reports to all Parties. This happened when the United Kingdom reclassified cannabis from Class B to class C, eliminating the threat of arrest for possession.[28] See Cannabis reclassification in the United Kingdom.

The most controversial decisions of the INCB are those in which it assumes the power to interpret the Single Convention. Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Spain continue to experiment with medically supervised injection rooms, despite the INCB's objections that the Single Convention's allowance of "scientific purposes" is limited to clinical trials of pharmaceutical grade drugs and not public health interventions.[29] These European nations have more leverage to disregard the Board's decisions because they are not dependent on licit psychoactive drug exports (which are regulated by the Board). As international lawyer Bill Bush notes, "Because of the Tasmanian opium poppy industry, Australia is more vulnerable to political pressure than, say, Germany."[30]

The INCB is an outspoken opponent of drug legalization. Its 2002 report rejects a common argument for drug reform, stating, "Persons in favour of legalizing illicit drug use argue that drug abusers should not have their basic rights violated; however, it does not seem to have occurred to those persons that drug abusers themselves violate the basic rights of their own family members and society." The report dismisses concerns that drug control conflicts with principles of limited government and self-determination, arguing, "States have a moral and legal responsibility to protect drug abusers from further self-destruction." The report takes a majoritarian view of the situation, declaring, "Governments must respect the view of the majority of lawful citizens; and those citizens are against illicit drug use."[31]

Article 48 designates the International Court of Justice as the arbiter of disputes about the interpretation or application of the Single Convention, if mediation, negotiation, and other forms of alternative dispute resolution fail.

Limitation of scope

The Single Convention allows only drugs with morphine-like, cocaine-like, and cannabis-like effects to be added to the Schedules. The strength of the drug is not relevant; only the similarity of its effects to the substances already controlled. For instance, etorphine and acetorphine were considered sufficiently morphine-like to fall under the treaty's scope, although they are many times more potent than morphine. However, according to the Commentary:[32]

The Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations ruled, in an opinion given to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs at its twenty-third session, that barbiturates, tranquillizers and amphetamines were outside the scope of the Single Convention. It pointed out that there was an understanding at all stages of the drafting of the Single Convention, in particular at the Plenipotentiary Conference of 1961 which adopted that treaty, that the Convention was not applicable to these three types of substances, although the effects of amphetamines have some degree of similarity to cocaine, and those of barbiturates and tranquillizers to morphine.

Since cannabis is a hallucinogen (although some dispute this), the Commentary speculates that mescaline, psilocybin, tetrahydrocannabinol, and LSD could have been considered sufficiently cannabis-like to be regulated under the Single Convention; however, it opines, "It appears that the fact that the potent hallucinogenics whose abuse has spread in recent years have not been brought under international narcotics control does not result from legal reasons, but rather from the view of Governments that a regime different from that offered by the Single Convention would be more adequate." That different regime was instituted by the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. The Convention on Psychotropic Drugs' scope can include any drug not already under international control if the World Health Organization finds that:

  • The substance has the capacity to produce "[a] state of dependence" AND "[c]entral nervous system stimulation or depression, resulting in hallucinations or disturbances in motor function or thinking or behaviour or perception or mood"; or
  • The substance has the capacity to produce similar abuse and similar ill effects as LSD or one of the other controlled substances enumerated in Convention; or
  • There is sufficient evidence that the substance is being or is likely to be abused so as to constitute a public health and social problem warranting the placing of the substance under international control.

The reason for sharply limiting the scope of Single Convention to a few types of drugs while letting the Convention on Psychotropic Drugs cover the rest was concern for the interests of industry. Professor Cindy Fazey's The Mechanics and Dynamics of the UN System for International Drug Control explains, "It should be noted that concerted efforts by drug manufacturing nations and the pharmaceutical industry ensured that the controls on psychotropics in the 1971 treaty were considerably looser than those applied to organic drugs in the Single Convention."[33]

A March 24, 2003 European Parliament committee report noted the disparity in how drugs are regulated under the two treaties:[34]

The 1971 Convention, which closely resembles the Single Convention, establishes an international control which is clearly less rigorous for the so-called 'psychotropic' substances, generally produced by the pharmaceutical industry. . . The parallel existence of the Single Convention and the 1971 Convention have led to certain illogical effects such as the fact that a plant (cannabis) containing at most 3% of a principal element is dealt with more severely than the pure substance at 100% (tetrahydrocannabinol or THC).

For this reason, the European Parliament, Transnational Radical Party, and other organizations have proposed removing cannabis and other drugs from the Single Convention and scheduling them under the Convention on Psychotropic Substances.[35]

Furthermore, the provisions of the Single Convention regarding the national supply and demand of opium to make morphine contribute to the global shortage of essential poppy-based pain relief medicines. According to the Convention, governments can only request raw poppy materials according to the amount of poppy-based medicines used in the two preceding years. Consequently, in countries where underprescription is chronic due to the high prices of morphine and lack of availability and medical training in the prescription of poppy-based drugs, it is impossible to demand enough raw poppy materials from the INCB, as the Convention's regulating body, to meet the country's pain relief needs. As such, 77% of the world's poppy-based medicine supplies are used by only six countries (See: Fischer, B J. Rehm, and T Culbert, “Opium based medicines: a mapping of global supply, demand and needs” in Spivack D. (ed.) Feasibility Study on Opium Licensing in Afghanistan, Kabul, 2005. p.85–86. [36]). Many critics of the Convention cite this as one of its primary limitations and the World Health Organisation is currently attempting to increase prescription of poppy-based drugs and to help governments of emerging countries in particular alter their internal regulations to be able to demand poppy-based medicines according to the Convention's provisions (see the WHO "Assuring Availability of Opioid Analgesics for Palliative Care"[37]). The Senlis Council, a European drug policy thinktank, proposes creating a second-tier supply system that would complement the existing system without altering the balance of its relatively closed supply and demand system. The Council, who support licensing poppy cultivation in Afghanistan to create Afghan morphine, believe the opium supply in this country could go a long way to easing the pain relief needs of sufferers in emerging countries by producing a cheap poppy-based medicine solution (see [The Senlis Council]: "Poppy for Medicine."[38]

Regulation of cannabis

Articles 23 and 28 of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs require cannabis-producing nations to have a government agency that controls cultivation.

Cultivation

The Single Convention places the same restrictions on cannabis cultivation that it does on opium cultivation. Article 23 and Article 28 require each Party to establish a government agency to control cultivation. Cultivators must deliver their total crop to the agency, which must purchase and take physical possession of them within four months after the end of harvest. The agency then has the exclusive right of "importing, exporting, wholesale trading and maintaining stocks other than those held by manufacturers."

In the United States, the National Institute on Drug Abuse fulfills that function. NIDA administers a contract with the University of Mississippi to grow a 1.5 acre (6,000 m²) crop of cannabis every other year; that supply comprises the only licit source of cannabis for medical and research purposes in the United States.[39] Similarly, in 2000, Prairie Plant Systems was awarded a five-year contract to grow cannabis in the Flin Flon mine for Health Canada, that nation's licit cannabis cultivation authority.[40]

Article 28 specifically excludes industrial hemp from these regulations, stating, "This Convention shall not apply to the cultivation of the cannabis plant exclusively for industrial purposes (fibre and seed) or horticultural purposes." Hemp-growing countries include China, Romania, France, Germany, Netherlands, England, and Hungary.[41] Hemp cultivation is theoretically legal in the United States, but tight Drug Enforcement Administration restrictions would likely make it unprofitable.

Rescheduling proposals

There is some controversy over whether cannabis is "particularly liable to abuse and to produce ill effects" and whether that "liability is not offset by substantial therapeutic advantages," as required by Schedule IV criteria. In particular, the discovery of the cannabinoid receptor system in the late 1980s revolutionized scientific understanding of cannabis' effects, and much anecdotal evidence has come to light about the drug's medical uses. The Canadian Senate committee's report notes,[42]

At the U.S.’s insistence, cannabis was placed under the heaviest control regime in the Convention, Schedule IV. The argument for placing cannabis in this category was that it was widely abused. The WHO later found that cannabis could have medical applications after all, but the structure was already in place and no international action has since been taken to correct this anomaly.

The Commentary points out the theoretical possibility of removing cannabis from Schedule IV:[43]

Those who question the particularly harmful character of cannabis and cannabis resin may hold that the Technical Committee of the Plenipotentiary Conference was under its own criteria not justified in placing these drugs in Schedule IV; but the approval of the Committee's action by the Plenipotentiary Conference places this inclusion beyond any legal doubt. Should the results of the intensive research which is at the time of this writing being undertaken on the effects of these two drugs so warrant, they could be deleted from Schedule IV, and these two drugs, as well as extracts and tinctures of cannabis, could be transferred from Schedule I to Schedule II.

Cindy Fazey, former Chief of Demand Reduction for the United Nations Drug Control Programme, has pointed out that it would be nearly impossible to loosen international cannabis regulations. Even if the Commission on Narcotic Drugs removed cannabis from Schedule IV of the Single Convention, prohibitions against the plant would remain imbedded in Article 28 and other parts of the treaty. Fazey cited amendment of the Articles and state-by-state denunciation as two theoretical possibilities for changing cannabis' international legal status, while pointing out that both face substantial barriers.[44] See Cannabis reform at the international level.

In a 2002 interview, INCB President Philip O. Emafo condemned European cannabis decriminalization measures:[45]

It is possible that the cannabis being used in Europe may not be the same species that is used in developing countries and that is causing untold health hazards to the young people who are finding themselves in hospitals for treatment. Therefore, the INCB's concern is that cannabis use should be restricted to medical and scientific purposes, if there are any. Countries who are party to the Single Convention need to respect the provisions of the conventions and restrict the use of drugs listed in Schedules I to IV to strictly medical and scientific purposes.

However, the European Parliament's Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs issued a report on March 24, 2003 criticizing the Single Convention's scheduling regime:[46]

These schedules show that the main criterion for the classification of a substance is its medical use. In view of the principle according to which the only licit uses is those for medical or scientific purposes (art. 4), plants or substances deprived of this purpose are automatically considered as particularly dangerous. Such is the case for cannabis and cannabis resin which are classified with heroin in group IV for the sole reason that they lack therapeutic value. A reason which is in any event disputable, since cannabis could have numerous medical uses.

There have been several lawsuits over whether cannabis' Schedule IV status under the Single Convention requires total prohibition at the national level. In 1970, the U.S. Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act to implement the UN treaty, placing marijuana into Schedule I on the advice of Assistant Secretary of Health Roger O. Egeberg. His letter to Harley O. Staggers, Chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, indicates that the classification was intended to be provisional[47]:

Some question has been raised whether the use of the plant itself produces "severe psychological or physical dependence" as required by a schedule I or even schedule II criterion. Since there is still a considerable void in our knowledge of the plant and effects of the active drug contained in it, our recommendation is that marijuana be retained within schedule I at least until the completion of certain studies now underway to resolve the issue."

The reference to "certain studies" is to the then-forthcoming National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse. In 1972, the Commission released a report favoring decriminalization of marijuana. The Richard Nixon administration took no action to implement the recommendation, however. In 1972, the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws filed a rescheduling petition under provisions of the Act. The government declined to initiate proceedings on the basis of their interpretation of U.S. treaty commitments. A federal Court ruled against the government and ordered them to process the petition (NORML v. Ingersoll 497 F.2d 654 (1974)). The government continued to rely on treaty commitments in their interpretation of scheduling related issues concerning the NORML petition, leading to another lawsuit (NORML v. DEA 559 F.2d 735 (1977)). In this decision, the Court made clear that the Act requires a full scientific and medical evaluation and the fulfillment of the rescheduling process before treaty commitments can be evaluated. See Removal of cannabis from Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act.

Cannabis leaves (as opposed to buds) are a special case. The Canadian Health Protection Branch's Cannabis Control Policy: A Discussion Paper found that, while the Single Convention requires nations to take measures against the misuse of, and illicit traffic in, cannabis buds, a ban is not required on licit production, distribution, and use of the leaves.[48]

The Single Convention defines "cannabis" as the flowering or fruiting tops of the cannabis plant (excluding the seeds and leaves when not accompanied by the tops) from which the resin has not been extracted. (Art. 1, s-para. 1(b)) It is generally accepted that this definition permits the legalization of the leaves of the cannabis plant, provided that they are not accompanied by the flowering or fruiting tops. However, uncertainty arises by virtue of paragraph 3 of Article 28 which requires parties to the Convention to "adopt such measures as may be necessary to prevent the misuse of, and illicit traffic in, the leaves of the cannabis plant." In summary, it appears that parties are not obliged to prohibit the production, distribution and use of the leaves (since they are not drugs, as defined the Convention), although they must take necessary, although unspecified, measures to prevent their misuse and diversion to the illicit trade.

Related treaties

Predecessor treaties

Article 44 provided that the Single Convention's entry into force terminated several predecessor treaties, including:

Supplementary treaties

The Single Convention is supplemented by two other major drug control treaties:

See also

External links

Footnotes

  1. ^ http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaty_adherence.html
  2. ^ http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaty_adherence.html
  3. ^ http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/bulletin/bulletin_1954-01-01_1_page002.html
  4. ^ http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/ille-e/rep-e/repfinalvol3-e.htm
  5. ^ http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/ille-e/rep-e/repfinalvol3-e.htm
  6. ^ http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/bulletin/bulletin_1962-01-01_1_page007.html
  7. ^ http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/bulletin/bulletin_1962-01-01_1_page007.html
  8. ^ http://www.drugtext.org/library/legal/treat/commentary/
  9. ^ http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/resolution_1962-08-03_4.html
  10. ^ http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaty_adherence.html
  11. ^ http://www.hri.org/docs/USSD-INCSR/95/Financial/Chapter03.html
  12. ^ http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaty_adherence.html
  13. ^ http://www.drugtext.org/library/legal/treat/1971commentary/article12.htm
  14. ^ http://www.taima.org/nl/nl_uk.htm
  15. ^ http://www.singapore-window.org/sw02/020412re.htm
  16. ^ http://www.cfdp.ca/sen1841.htm
  17. ^ http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/Library/studies/ledain/ldc6a.htm
  18. ^ http://www.cfdp.ca/canrep/appendix_a.htm
  19. ^ http://www.cfdp.ca/canrep/appendix_a.htm
  20. ^ http://www.unodc.org/unodc/bulletin/bulletin_1977-01-01_4_page004.html
  21. ^ http://www.drugtext.org/library/legal/treat/commentary/
  22. ^ http://www.drugtext.org/library/legal/treat/commentary/
  23. ^ http://www.drugtext.org/library/legal/treat/commentary/
  24. ^ http://www.sundayherald.com/48329
  25. ^ http://www.advocate.com/news_detail.asp?id=3482
  26. ^ http://www.drugtext.org/library/legal/treat/1971commentary/article11.htm
  27. ^ http://www.incb.org/e/role/menu.htm
  28. ^ http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/280/roadtovienna.shtml
  29. ^ http://www.ffdlr.org.au/commentary/Single%20convention.htm
  30. ^ http://www.ffdlr.org.au/commentary/Single%20convention.htm
  31. ^ http://www.incb.org/e/ind_ar.htm
  32. ^ http://www.drugtext.org/library/legal/treat/commentary/article03.htm
  33. ^ http://www.forward-thinking-on-drugs.org/review1.html
  34. ^ http://www.chanvre-info.ch/info/en/article602.html
  35. ^ http://servizi.radicalparty.org/documents/index.php?func=detail&par=213
  36. ^ http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/008_publication
  37. ^ http://www.euro.who.int/document/e76503.pdf
  38. ^ http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/events/London_event_on_afghanistan/documents/poppy_medicine_technical_dossier
  39. ^ http://www.nida.nih.gov/about/organization/nacda/marijuanastatement.html
  40. ^ http://mediresource.sympatico.ca/health_news_detail.asp?channel_id=28&news_id=1138
  41. ^ http://www.saunabucks.com/hemp2/hemp-cultivation.html
  42. ^ http://www.drugtext.org/library/reports/cancan/vol3/repfinalvol3-e/css/repfinalvol3-e_31.htm
  43. ^ http://www.drugtext.org/library/legal/treat/commentary/
  44. ^ http://www.fuoriluogo.it/arretrati/2003/apr_17_en.htm
  45. ^ http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/newsletter_2002-12-31_1_page004.html
  46. ^ http://www.chanvre-info.ch/info/en/article602.html
  47. ^ Jon Gettman (May 13, 1999). "Science And The End Of Marijuana Prohibition". MarijuanaNews.com. http://www.marijuananews.com/marijuananews/cowan/science_and_the_end_of_marijuana.htm. Retrieved 2007-04-28.   Text originally presented at the 12th International Conference on Drug Policy Reform.
  48. ^ http://www.cfdp.ca/canrep/appendix_a.htm

References


Source material

Up to date as of January 22, 2010

From Wikisource

Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs is the international treaty against illicit manufacture and trafficking of narcotic drugs that forms the bedrock of the global drug control regime.Excerpted from Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs on Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

As amended by the 1972 protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961.

Contents

PREAMBLE

The Parties,

Concerned with the health and welfare of mankind,

Recognizing that the medical use of narcotic drugs continues to be indispensable for the relief of pain and suffering and that adequate provision must be made to ensure the availability of narcotic drugs for such purposes,

Recognizing that addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is fraught with social and economic danger to mankind,

Conscious of their duty to prevent and combat this evil,

Considering that effective measures against abuse of narcotic drugs require co-ordinated and universal action,

Understanding that such universal action calls for international co-operation guided by the same principles and aimed at common objectives,

Acknowledging the competence of the United Nations in the field of narcotics control and desirous that the international organs concerned should be within the framework of that Organization,

Desiring to conclude a generally acceptable international convention replacing existing treaties on narcotic drugs, limiting such drugs to medical and scientific use, and providing for continuous international co-operation and control for the achievement of such aims and objectives,

Article 1: DEFINITIONS

1. Except where otherwise expressly indicated or where the context otherwise requires, the following definitions shall apply throughout the Convention:

(a) "Board" means the International Narcotics Control Board,

(b) "Cannabis" means the flowering or fruiting tops of the cannabis plant (excluding the seeds and leaves when not accompanied by the tops) from which the resin has not been extracted, by whatever name they may be designated.

(c) "Cannabis plant" means any plant of the genus Cannabis,

(d) "Cannabis resin" means the separated resin, whether crude or purified, obtained from the cannabis plant.

(e) "Coca bush" means the plant of any species of the genus Erythroxylon.

(f) "Coca leaf" means the leaf of the coca bush except a leaf from which all ecgonine, cocaine and any other ecgonine alkaloids have been removed.

(g) "Commission" means the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the Council.

(h) "Council" means the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

(i) "Cultivation" means the cultivation of the opium poppy, coca bush or cannabis plant.

(j) "Drug" means any of the substances in Schedules I and II, whether natural or synthetic.

(k) "General Assembly" means the General Assembly of the United Nations.

(l) "Illicit traffic" means cultivation or trafficking in drugs contrary to the provisions of this Convention.

(m) "Import" and "export" mean in their respective connotations the physical transfer of drugs from one State to another State, or from one territory to another territory of the same State.

(n) "Manufacture" means all processes, other than production, by which drugs may be obtained and includes refining as well as the transformation of drugs into other drugs.

(o) "Medicinal opium" means opium which has undergone the processes necessary to adapt it for medicinal use.

(p) "Opium" means the coagulated juice of the opium poppy.

(q) "Opium poppy" means the plant of the species Papaver somniferum L.

(r) "Poppy straw" means all parts (except the seeds) of the opium poppy, after mowing.

(s) "Preparation" means a mixture, solid or liquid, containing a drug.

(t) "Production" means the separation of opium, coca leaves, cannabis and cannabis resin from the plants from which they are obtained.

(u) "Schedule I", "Schedule II", "Schedule III" and "Schedule IV" mean the correspondingly numbered list of drugs or preparations annexed to this Convention, as amended from time to time in accordance with article 3.

(v) "Secretary-General" means the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

(w) "Special stocks" means the amounts of drugs held in a country or territory by the Government of such country or territory for special government purposes and to meet exceptional circumstances; and the expression "special purposes" shall be construed accordingly.

(x) "Stocks" means the amounts of drugs held in a country or territory and intended for:

(i) Consumption in the country or territory for medical and scientific purposes,

(ii) Utilization in the country or territory for the manufacture of drugs and other substances, or

(iii) Export; but does not include the amounts of drugs held in the country or territory,

(iv) By retail pharmacists or other authorized retail distributors and by institutions or qualified persons in the duly authorized exercise of therapeutic or scientific functions, or

(v) As "special stocks".

(y) "Territory" means any part of a State which is treated as a separate entity for the application of the system of import certificates and export authorizations provided for in article 31. This definition shall not apply to the term "territory" as used in articles 42 and 46.

2. For the purposes of this Convention a drug shall be regarded as "consumed" when it has been supplied to any person or enterprise for retail distribution, medical use or scientific research; and "consumption" shall be construed accordingly.

Article 2: SUBSTANCES UNDER CONTROL

1. Except as to measures of control which are limited to specified drugs, the drugs in Schedule I are subject to all measures of control applicable to drugs under this Convention and in particular to those prescribed in article 4 (c), 19, 20, 21, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 and 37.

2. The drugs in Schedule II are subject to the same measures of control as drugs in Schedule I with the exception of the measures prescribed in article 30, paragraphs 2 and 5, in respect of the retail trade.

3. Preparations other than those in Schedule III are subject to the same measures of control as the drugs which they contain, but estimates (article 19) and statistics (article 20) distinct from those dealing with these drugs shall not be required in the case of such preparations, and article 29, paragraph 2 (c) and article 30, paragraph 1 (b) (ii) need not apply.

4. Preparations in Schedule III are subject to the same measures of control as preparations containing drugs in Schedule II except that article 31, paragraphs 1 (b) and 3 to 15 and, as regards their acquisition and retail distribution, article 34, paragraph (b), need not apply, and that for the purpose of estimates (article 19) and statistics (article 20) the information required shall be restricted to the quantities of drugs used in the manufacture of such preparations.

5. The drugs in Schedule IV shall also be included in Schedule I and subject to all measures of control applicable to drugs in the latter Schedule, and in addition thereto:

(a) A Party shall adopt any special measures of control which in its opinion are necessary having regard to the particularly dangerous properties of a drug so included; and

(b) A Party shall, if in its opinion the prevailing conditions in its country render it the most appropriate means of protecting the public health and welfare, prohibit the production, manufacture, export and import of, trade in, possession or use of any such drug except for amounts which may be necessary for medical and scientific research only, including clinical trials therewith to be conducted under or subject to the direct supervision and control of the Party.

6. In addition to the measures of control applicable to all drugs in Schedule I, opium is subject to the provisions of article 19, paragraph 1, subparagraph (f), and of articles 21 bis, 23 and 24, the coca leaf to those of articles 26 and 27 and cannabis to those of article 28.

7. The opium poppy, the coca bush, the cannabis plant, poppy straw and cannabis leaves are subject to the control measures prescribed in article 19, paragraph 1, subparagraph (e), article 20, paragraph 1, subparagraph (g), article 21 bis and in articles 22 to 24; 22, 26 and 27; 22 and 28; 25; and 28, respectively.

8. The Parties shall use their best endeavours to apply to substances which do not fall under this Convention, but which may be used in the illicit manufacture of drugs, such measures of supervision as may be practicable.

9. Parties are not required to apply the provisions of this Convention to drugs which are commonly used in industry for other than medical or scientific purposes, provided that:

(a) They ensure by appropriate methods of denaturing or by other means that the drugs so used are not liable to be abused or have ill effects (article 3, paragraph 3) and that the harmful substances cannot in practice be recovered; and

(b) They include in the statistical information (article 20) furnished by them the amount of each drug so used.

Article 3: CHANGES IN THE SCOPE OF CONTROL

1. Where a Party or the World Health Organization has information which in its opinion may require an amendment to any of the Schedules, it shall notify the Secretary-General and furnish him with the information in support of the notification.

2. The Secretary-General shall transmit such notification, and any information which he considers relevant, to the Parties, to the Commission, and, where the notification is made by a Party, to the World Health Organization.

3. Where a notification relates to a substance not already in Schedule I or in Schedule II,

(i) The Parties shall examine in the light of the available information the possibility of the provisional application to the substance of an measures of control applicable to drugs in Schedule I;

(ii) Pending its decision as provided in subparagraph (iii) of this paragraph, the Commission may decide that the Parties apply provisionally to that substance all measures of control applicable to drugs in Schedule I. The Parties shall apply such measures provisionally to the substance in question;

(iii) If the World Health Organization finds that the substance is liable to similar abuse and productive of similar ill effects as the drugs in Schedule I or Schedule II or is convertible into a drug, it shall communicate that finding to the Commission which may, in accordance with the recommendation of the World Health Organization, decide that the substance shall be added to Schedule I or Schedule II.

4. If the World Health Organization finds that a preparation because of the substances which it contains is not liable to abuse and cannot produce ill effects (paragraph 3) and that the drug therein is not readily recoverable, the Commission may, in accordance with the recommendation of the World Health Organization, add that preparation to Schedule III.

5. If the World Health Organization finds that a drug in Schedule I is particularly liable to abuse and to produce ill effects (paragraph 3) and that such liability is not offset by substantial therapeutic advantages not possessed by substances other than drugs in Schedule IV, the Commission may, in accordance with the recommendation of the World Health Organization, place that drug in Schedule IV.

6. Where a notification relates to a drug already in Schedule I or Schedule II or to a preparation in Schedule III, the Commission, apart from the measure provided for in paragraph 5, may, in accordance with the recommendation of the World Health Organization, amend any of the Schedules by:

(a) Transferring a drug from Schedule I to Schedule II or from Schedule II to Schedule I; or

(b) Deleting a drug or a preparation as the case may be, from a Schedule.

7. Any decision of the Commission taken pursuant to this article shall be communicated by the Secretary-General to all States Members of the United Nations, to non-member States Parties to this Convention, to the World Health Organization and to the Board. Such decision shall become effective with respect to each Party on the date of its receipt of such communication, and the Parties shall thereupon take such action as may be required under this Convention.

8.(a) The decisions of the Commission amending any of the Schedules shall be subject to review by the Council upon the request of any Party filed within ninety days from receipt of notification of the decision. The request for review shall be sent to the Secretary-General together with all relevant information upon which the request for review is based;

(b) The Secretary-General shall transmit copies of the request for review and relevant information to the Commission, the World Health Organization and to all the Parties inviting them to submit comments within ninety days. All comments received shall be submitted to the Council for consideration;

(c) The Council may confirm, alter or reverse the decision of the Commission, and the decision of the Council shall be final. Notification of the Council's decision shall be transmitted to all States Members of the United Nations, to non-member States Parties to this Convention, to the Commission, to the World Health Organization, and to the Board;

(d) During pendency of the review the original decision of the Commission shall remain in effect.

9. Decisions of the Commission taken in accordance with this article shall not be subject to the review procedure provided for in article 7.

Article 4: GENERAL OBLIGATIONS

The parties shall take such legislative and administrative measures as may be necessary:

(a) To give effect to and carry out the provisions of this Convention within their own territories;

(b) To co-operate with other States in the execution of the provisions of this Convention; and

(c) Subject to the provisions of this Convention, to limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of drugs.

Article 5: THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL ORGANS

The Parties, recognizing the competence of the United Nations with respect to the international control of drugs, agree to entrust to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the Economic and Social Council, and to the International Narcotics Control Board, the functions respectively assigned to them under this Convention.

Article 6: EXPENSES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL ORGANS

The expenses of the Commission and the Board will be borne by the United Nations in such manner as shall be decided by the General Assembly. The Parties which are not Members of the United Nations shall contribute to these expenses such amounts as the General Assembly finds equitable and assess from time to time after consultation with the Governments of these Parties.

Article 7: REVIEW OF DECISIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION

Except for decisions under article 3, each decision or recommendation adopted by the Commission pursuant to the provisions of this Convention shall be subject to approval or modification by the Council or the General Assembly in the same way as other decisions or recommendations of the Commission.

Article 8: FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION

The Commission is authorized to consider all matters pertaining to the aims of this Convention, and in particular:

(a) To amend the Schedules in accordance with article 3;

(b) To call the attention of the Board to any matters which may be relevant to the functions of the Board;

(c) To make recommendations for the implementation of the aims and provisions of this Convention, including programmes of scientific research and the exchange of information of a scientific or technical nature; and

(d) To draw the attention of non-parties to decisions and recommendations which it adopts under this Convention, with a view to their considering taking action in accordance therewith.

Article 9: COMPOSITION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE BOARD

1. The Board shall consist of thirteen members to be elected by the Council as follows:

(a) Three members with medical, pharmacological or pharmaceutical experience from a list of at least five persons nominated by the World Health Organization; and

(b) Ten members from a list of persons nominated by the Members of the United Nations and by Parties which are not Members of the United Nations.

2. Members of the Board shall be persons who, by their competence, impartiality and disinterestedness, will command general confidence. During their term of office they shall not hold any position or engage in any activity which would be liable to impair their impartiality in the exercise of their functions. The Council shall, in consultation with the Board, make all arrangements necessary to ensure the full technical independence of the Board in carrying out its functions.

3. The Council, with due regard to the principle of equitable geographic representation, shall give consideration to the importance of including on the Board, in equitable proportion, persons possessing a knowledge of the drug situation in the producing, manufacturing, and consuming countries, and connected with such countries.

4. The Board, in co-operation with Governments, and subject to the terms of this Convention, shall endeavour to limit the cultivation, production, manufacture and use of drugs to an adequate amount required for medical and scientific purposes, to ensure their availability for such purposes and to prevent illicit cultivation, production and manufacture of, and illicit trafficking in and use of, drugs.

5. All measures taken by the Board under this Convention shall be those most consistent with the intent to further the co-operation of Governments with the Board and to provide the mechanism for a continuing dialogue between Governments and the Board which will lend assistance to and facilitate effective national action to attain the aims of this Convention.

Article 10: TERMS OF OFFICE AND REMUNERATION OF MEMBERS OF THE BOARD

1. The members of the Board shall serve for a period of five years, and may be re-elected.

2. The term of office of each member of the Board shall end on the eve of the first meeting of the Board which his successor shall be entitled to attend.

3. A member of the Board who has failed to attend three consecutive sessions shall be deemed to have resigned.

4. The Council, on the recommendation of the Board, may dismiss a member of the Board who has ceased to fulfil the conditions required for membership by paragraph 2 of article 9. Such recommendation shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members of the Board.

5. Where a vacancy occurs on the Board during the term of office of a member, the Council shall fill such vacancy as soon as possible and in accordance with the applicable provisions of article 9, by electing another member for the remainder of the term.

6. The members of the Board shall receive an adequate remuneration as determined by the General Assembly.

Article 11: RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE BOARD

1. The Board shall elect its own President and such other officers as it may consider necessary and shall adopt its rules of procedure.

2. The Board shall meet as often as, in its opinion, may be necessary for the proper discharge of its functions, but shall hold at least two sessions in each calendar year.

3. The quorum necessary at meetings of the Board shall consist of eight members.

Article 12: ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTIMATE SYSTEM

1. The Board shall fix the date or dates by which, and the manner in which, the estimates as provided in article 19 shall be furnished and shall prescribe the forms therefor.

2. The Board shall, in respect of countries and territories to which this Convention does not apply, request the Governments concerned to furnish estimates in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

3. If any State fails to furnish estimates in respect of any of its territories by the date specified, the Board shall, as far as possible, establish the estimates. The Board in establishing such estimates shall to the extent practicable do so in co-operation with the Government concerned.

4. The Board shall examine the estimates, including supplementary estimates, and, except as regards requirements for special purposes, may require such information as it considers necessary in respect of any country or territory on behalf of which an estimate has been furnished, in order to complete the estimate or to explain any statement contained therein.

5. The Board, with a view to limiting the use and distribution of drugs to an adequate amount required for medical and scientific purposes and to ensuring their availability for such purposes, shall as expeditiously as possible confirm the estimates, including supplementary estimates, or, with the consent of the Government concerned, may amend such estimates. In case of a disagreement between the Government and the Board, the latter shall have the right to establish, communicate and publish its own estimates, including supplementary estimates.

6. In addition to the reports mentioned in article 15, the Board shall, at such times as it shall determine but at least annually, issue such information on the estimates as in its opinion will facilitate the carrying out of this Convention.

Article 13: ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATISTICAL RETURNS SYSTEM

1. The Board shall determine the manner and form in which statistical returns shall be furnished as provided in article 20 and shall prescribe the forms therefor.

2. The Board shall examine the returns with a view to determining whether a Party or any other State has complied with the provisions of this Convention.

3. The Board may require such further information as it considers necessary to complete or explain the information contained in such statistical returns.

4. It shall not be within the competence of the Board to question or express an opinion on statistical information respecting drugs required for special purposes.

Article 14: MEASURES BY THE BOARD TO ENSURE THE EXECUTION OF PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION

1. (a) If, on the basis of its examination of information submitted by Governments to the Board under the provisions of this Convention, or of information communicated by United Nations organs or by specialized agencies or, provided that they are approved by the Commission on the Board's recommendation, by either other intergovernmental organizations or international non-governmental organizations which have direct competence in the subject matter and which are in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council under Article 71 of the Charter of the United Nations or which enjoy a similar status by special agreement with the Council, the Board has objective reasons to believe that the aims of this Convention are being seriously endangered by reason of the failure of any Party, country or territory to carry out the provisions of this Convention, the Board shall have the right to propose to the Government concerned the opening of consultations or to request it to furnish explanations. If, without any failure in implementing the provisions of the Convention, a Party or a country or territory has become, or if there exists evidence of a serious risk that it may become, or if there exists evidence of a serious risk that it may become, an important centre of illicit cultivation, production or manufacture of, or traffic in or consumption of drugs, the Board has the right to propose to the Government concerned the opening of consultations. Subject to the right of the Board to call the attention of the Parties, the Council and the Commission to the matter referred to in subparagraph (d) below, the Board shall treat as confidential a request for information and an explanation by a Government or a proposal for consultations and the consultations held with a Government under this subparagraph.

(b) After taking action under subparagraph (a) above, the Board, if satisfied that it is necessary to do so, may call upon the Government concerned to adopt such remedial measures as shall seem under the circumstances to be necessary for the execution of the provisions of this Convention.

(c) The Board may, if it thinks such action necessary for the purpose of assessing a matter referred to in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, propose to the Government concerned that a study of the matter be carried out in its territory by such means as the Government deems appropriate. If the Government concerned decides to undertake this study, it may request the Board to make available the expertise and the services of one or more persons with the requisite competence to assist the officials of the Government in the proposed study. The person or persons whom the Board intends to make available shall be subject to the approval of the Government. The modalities of this study and the time-limit within which the study has to be completed shall be determined by consultation between the Government and the Board. The Government shall communicate to the Board the results of the study and shall indicate the remedial measures that it considers necessary to take.

(d) If the Boards finds that the Government concerned has failed to give satisfactory explanations when called upon to do so under subparagraph (a) above, or has failed to adopt any remedial measures which it has been called upon to take under subparagraph (b) above, or that there is a serious situation that needs co-operative action at the international level with a view to remedying , it may call the attention of the Parties, the Council and the Commission to the matter. The Board shall so act if the aims of this Convention are being seriously endangered and it has not been possible to resolve the matter satisfactorily in any other way. It shall also so act if it finds that there is a serious situation that needs co-operative action at the international level with a view to remedying it and that bringing such a situation to the notice of the Parties, the Council and the Commission is the most appropriate method of facilitating such co-operative action; after considering the reports of the Board, and of the Commission if available on the matter, the Council may draw the attention of the General Assembly to the matter.

2. The Board, when calling the attention of the Parties, the Council and the Commission to a matter in accordance with paragraph 1 (d) above, may, if it is satisfied that such a course is necessary, recommend to Parties that they stop the import of drugs, the export of drugs, or both, from or to the country or territory concerned, either for a designated period or until the Board shall be satisfied as to the situation in that country or territory. The State concerned may bring the matter before the Council.

3. The Board shall have the right to publish a report on any matter dealt with under the provisions of this article, and communicate it to the Council, which shall forward it to all Parties. If the Board publishes in this report a decision taken under this article or any information relating thereto, it shall also publish therein the views of the Government concerned if the latter so requests.

4. If in any case a decision of the Board which is published under this article is not unanimous, the views of the minority shall be stated.

5. Any State shall be invited to be represented at a meeting of the Board at which a question directly interesting it is considered under this article.

6. Decisions of the Board under this article shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the whole number of the Board.

Article 14 bis: TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

In cases which it considers appropriate and either in addition or as an alternative to measures set forth in article 14, paragraphs 1 and 2, the Board, with the agreement of the Government concerned, may recommend to the competent United Nations organs and to the specialized agencies that technical or financial assistance, or both, be provided to the Government in support of its efforts to carry out its obligations under this Convention, including those set out or referred to in articles 2, 35, 38 and 38 bis.

Article 15: REPORTS OF THE BOARD

1. The Board shall prepare an annual report on its work and such additional reports as it considers necessary containing also an analysis of the estimates and statistical information at its disposal, and, in appropriate cases, an account of the explanations, if any, given by or required of Governments, together with any observations and recommendations which the Board desires to make. These reports shall be submitted to the Council through the Commission, which may make such comments as it sees fit.

2. The reports shall be communicated to the Parties and subsequently published by the Secretary-General. The Parties shall permit their unrestricted distribution.

Article 16: SECRETARIAT

The secretariat services of the Commission and the Board shall be furnished by the Secretary-General. In particular, the Secretary of the Board shall be appointed by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Board.

Article 17: SPECIAL ADMINISTRATION

The Parties shall maintain a special administration for the purpose of applying the provisions of this Convention.

Article 18: INFORMATION TO BE FURNISHED BY PARTIES TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. The Parties shall furnish to the Secretary-General such information as the Commission may request as being necessary for the performance of its functions, and in particular:

(a) An annual report on the working of the Convention within each of their territories;

(b) The text of all laws and regulations from time to time promulgated in order to give effect to this Convention;

(c) Such particulars as the Commission shall determine concerning cases of illicit traffic, including particulars of each case of illicit traffic discovered which may be of importance, because of the light thrown on the source from which drugs are obtained for the illicit traffic, or because of quantities involved or the method employed by illicit traffickers; and

(d) The names and addresses of the governmental authorities empowered to issue export and import authorizations or certificates.

2. Parties shall furnish the information referred to in the preceding paragraph in such manner and by such dates and use such forms as the Commission may request.

Article 19: ESTIMATES OF DRUG REQUIREMENTS

1. The Parties shall furnish to the Board each year for each of their territories, in the manner and form prescribed by the Board, estimates on forms supplied by it in respect of the following matters:

(a) Quantities of drugs to be consumed for medical and scientific purposes;

(b) Quantities of drugs to be utilized for the manufacture of other drugs, of preparations in Schedule III, and of substances not covered by this Convention;

(c) Stocks of drugs to be held as at 31 December of the year to which the estimates relate;

(d) Quantities of drugs necessary for addition to special stocks;

(e) The area (in hectares) and the geographical location of land to be used for the cultivation of the opium poppy;

(f) Approximate quantity of opium to be produced;

(g) The number of industrial establishments which will manufacture synthetic drugs; and

(h) The quantities of synthetic drugs to be manufactured by each of the establishments referred to in the preceding subparagraph.

2. (a) Subject to the deductions referred to in paragraph 3 of article 21, the total of the estimates for each territory and each drug except opium and synthetic drugs shall consist of the sum of the amounts specified under subparagraphs (a), (b) and (d) of paragraph 1 of this article, with the addition of any amount required to bring the actual stocks on hand at 31 December of the preceding year to the level estimated as provided in subparagraph (c) of paragraph 1.

(b) Subject to the deductions referred to in paragraph 3 of article 21 regarding imports and in paragraph 2 of article 21 bis, the total of the estimates for opium for each territory shall consist either of the sum of the amounts specified under subparagraphs (a), (b) and (d) of paragraph 1 of this article, with the addition of any amount required to bring the actual stocks on hand at December of the preceding year to the level estimated as provided in subparagraph(c) of paragraph 1, or of the amount specified under subparagraph (f) of paragraph 1 of this article, whichever is higher.

(c) Subject to the deductions referred to in paragraph 3 of article 21, the total of the estimates for each territory for each synthetic drug shall consist either of the sum of the amounts specified under subparagraphs (a), (b) and (d) of paragraph 1 of this article, with the addition of any amount required to bring the actual stocks on hand at 31 December of the preceding year to the level estimated as provided in subparagraph (c) of paragraph 1, or of the sum of the amounts specified under subparagraph (h) of paragraph 1 of this article, whichever is higher.

(d) The estimates furnished under the preceding subparagraphs of this paragraph shall be appropriately modified to take into account any quantity seized and thereafter released for licit use as well as any quantity taken from special stocks for the requirements of the civilian population.

3. Any State may during the year furnish supplementary estimates with an explanation of the circumstances necessitating such estimates.

4. The Parties shall inform the Board of the method used for determining quantities shown in the estimates and of any changes in the said method.

5. Subject to the deductions referred to in paragraph 3 of article 21, and account being taken where appropriate of the provisions of article 21 bis, the estimates shall not be exceeded.

Article 20: STATISTICAL RETURNS TO BE FURNISHED TO THE BOARD

1. The Parties shall furnish to the Board for each of their territories, in the manner and form prescribed by the Board, statistical returns on forms supplied by it in respect of the following matters:

(a) Production or manufacture of drugs;

(b) Utilization of drugs for the manufacture of other drugs, of preparations in Schedule III and of substances not covered by this Convention, and utilization of poppy straw for the manufacture of drugs;

(c) Consumption of drugs;

(d) Imports and exports of drugs and poppy straw;

(e) Seizures of drugs and disposal thereof;

(f) Stocks of drugs as at 31 December of the year to which the returns relate; and

(g) Ascertainable area of cultivation of the opium poppy.

2. (a) The statistical returns in respect of the matters referred to in paragraph 1, except subparagraph (d), shall be prepared annually and shall be furnished to the Board not later than 30 June following the year to which they relate.

(b) The statistical returns in respect to the matters referred to in subparagraph (d) of paragraph 1 shall be prepared quarterly and shall be furnished to the Board within one month after the end of the quarter to which they relate.

3. The Parties are not required to furnish statistical returns respecting special stocks, but shall furnish separately returns respecting drugs imported into or procured within the country or territory for special purposes, as well as quantities of drugs withdrawn from special stocks to meet the requirements of the civilian population.

Article 21: LIMITATION OF MANUFACTURE AND IMPORTATION

1. The total of the quantities of each drug manufactured and imported by any country or territory in any one year shall not exceed the sum of the following:

(a) The quantity consumed, within the limit of the relevant estimate, for medical and scientific purposes;

(b) The quantity used, within the limit of the relevant estimate, for the manufacture of other drugs, of preparations in Schedule Ill, and of substances not covered by this Convention;

(c) The quantity exported;

(d) The quantity added to the stock for the purpose of bringing that stock up to the level specified in the relevant estimate; and

(e) The quantity acquired within the limit of the relevant estimate for special purposes.

2. From the sum of the quantities specified in paragraph 1 there shall be deducted any quantity that has been seized and released for licit use, as well as any quantity taken from special stocks for the requirements of the civilian population.

3. If the Board finds that the quantity manufactured and imported in any one year exceeds the sum of the quantities specified in paragraph 1, less any deductions required under paragraph 2 of this article, any excess so established and remaining at the end of the year shall, in the following year, be deducted from the quantity to be manufactured or imported and from the total of the estimates as defined in paragraph 2 of article 19.

4. (a) If it appears from the statistical returns on imports or exports (article 20) that the quantity exported to any country or territory exceeds the total of the estimates for that country or territory, as defined in paragraph 2 of article 19, with the addition of the amounts shown to have been exported, and after deduction of any excess as established in paragraph 3 of this article, the Board may notify this fact to States which, in the opinion of the Board, should be so informed;

(b) On receipt of such a notification, Parties shall not during the year in question authorize any further exports of the drug concerned to that country or territory, except:

(i) In the event of a supplementary estimate being furnished for that country or territory in respect both of any quantity over-imported and of the additional quantity required, or

(ii) In exceptional cases where the export, in the opinion of the Government of the exporting country, is essential for the treatment of the sick.

Article 21 bis: LIMITATION OF PRODUCTION OF OPIUM

1. The production of opium by any country or territory shall be organized and controlled in such manner as to ensure that, as far as possible, the quantity produced in any one year shall not exceed the estimate of opium to be produced as established under paragraph 1 (f) of article 19.

2. If the Board finds on the basis of information at its disposal in accordance with the provisions of this Convention that a Party which has submitted an estimate under paragraph 1 (f) of article 19 has not limited opium produced within its borders to licit purposes in accordance with relevant estimates and that a significant amount of opium produced, whether licitly or illicitly, within the borders of such a Party, has been introduced into the illicit traffic, it may, after studying the explanations of the Party concerned, which shall be submitted to it within one month after notification of the finding in question, decide to deduct all, or a portion, of such an amount from the quantity to be produced and from the total of the estimates as defined in paragraph 2 (b) of article 19 for the next year in which such a deduction can be technically accomplished, taking into account the season of the year and contractual commitments to export opium. This decision shall take effect ninety days after the Party concerned is notified thereof.

3. After notifying the Party concerned of the decision it has taken under paragraph 2 above with regard to a deduction, the Board shall consult with that Party in order to resolve the situation satisfactorily.

4. If the situation is not satisfactorily resolved, the Board may utilize the provisions of article 14 where appropriate.

5. In taking its decision with regard to a deduction under paragraph 2 above, the Board shall take into account not only all relevant circumstances including those giving rise to the illicit traffic problem referred to in paragraph 2 above, but also any relevant new control measures which may have been adopted by the Party.

Article 22: SPECIAL PROVISION APPLICABLE TO CULTIVATION

1. Whenever the prevailing conditions in the country or a territory of a Party render the prohibition of the cultivation of the opium poppy, the coca bush or the cannabis plant the most suitable measure, in its opinion, for protecting the public health and welfare and preventing the diversion of drugs into the illicit traffic, the Party concerned shall prohibit cultivation.

2. A Party prohibiting cultivation of the opium poppy or the cannabis plant shall take appropriate measures to seize any plants illicitly cultivated and to destroy them, except for small quantities required by the Party for scientific or research purposes.

Article 23: NATIONAL OPIUM AGENCIES

1. A Party that permits the cultivation of the opium poppy for the production of opium shall establish, if it has not already done so, and maintain, one or more government agencies (hereafter in this article referred to as the Agency) to carry out the functions required under this article.

2. Each such Party shall apply the following provisions to the cultivation of the opium poppy for the production of opium and to opium;

(a) The Agency shall designate the areas in which, and the plots of land on which, cultivation of the opium poppy for the purpose of producing opium shall be permitted.

(b) Only cultivators licensed by the Agency shall be authorized to engage in such cultivation.

(c) Each licence shall specify the extent of the land on which the cultivation is permitted.

(d) All cultivators of the opium poppy shall be required to deliver their total crops of opium to the Agency. The Agency shall purchase and take physical possession of such crops as soon as possible, but not later than four months after the end of the harvest.

(e) The Agency shall, in respect of opium, have the exclusive right of importing, exporting, wholesale trading and maintaining stocks other than those held by manufacturers of opium alkaloids, medicinal opium or opium preparations. Parties need not extend this exclusive right to medicinal opium and opium preparations.

3. The governmental functions referred to in paragraph 2 shall be discharged by a single government agency if the constitution of the Party concerned permits it.

Article 24: LIMITATION ON PRODUCTION OF OPIUM FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE

1. (a) If any Party intends to initiate the production of opium or to increase existing production, it shall take account of the prevailing world need for opium in accordance with the estimates thereof published by the Board so that the production of opium by such Party does not result in overproduction of opium in the world.

(b) A Party shall not permit the production of opium or increase the existing production thereof if in its opinion such production or increased production in its territory may result in illicit traffic in opium.

2. (a) Subject to paragraph 1, where a Party which as of 1 January 1961 was not producing opium for export desires to export opium which it produces, in amounts not exceeding five tons annually, it shall notify the Board, furnishing with such notification information regarding:

(i) The controls in force as required by this Convention respecting the opium to be produced and exported; and

(ii) The name of the country or countries to which it expects to export such opium; and the Board may either approve such notification or may recommend to the Party that it not engage in the production of opium for export.

(b) Where a Party other than a Party referred to in paragraph 3 desires to produce opium for export in amounts exceeding five tons annually, it shall notify the Council, furnishing with such notification relevant information including:

(i) The estimated amounts to be produced for export;

(ii) The controls existing or proposed respecting the opium to be produced;

(iii) The name of the country or countries to which it expects to export such opium; and the Council shall either approve the notification or may recommend to the Party that it not engage in the production of opium for export.

3. Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 2, a Party that during ten years immediately prior to 1 January 1961 exported opium which such country produced may continue to export opium which it produces.

4. (a) A Party shall not import opium from any country or territory except opium produced in the territory of:

(i) A Party referred to in paragraph 3;

(ii) A Party that has notified the Board as provided in subparagraph (a) of paragraph 2; or

(iii) A Party that has received the approval of the Council as provided in subparagraph (b) of paragraph 2.

(b) Notwithstanding subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, a Party may import opium produced by any country which produced and exported opium during the ten years prior to 1 January 1961 if such country has established and maintains a national control organ or agency for the purposes set out in article 23 and has in force an effective means of ensuring that the opium it produces is not diverted into the illicit traffic.

5. The provisions of this article do not prevent a Party:

(a) From producing opium sufficient for its own requirements; or

(b) From exporting opium seized in the illicit traffic, to another Party in accordance with the requirements of this Convention.

Article 25: CONTROL OF POPPY STRAW

1. A Party that permits the cultivation of the opium poppy for purposes other than the production of opium shall take all measures necessary to ensure:

(a) That opium is not produced from such opium poppies; and

(b) That the manufacture of drugs from poppy straw is adequately controlled.

2. The Parties shall apply to poppy straw the system of import certificates and export authorizations as provided in article 31, paragraphs 4 to 15.

3. The Parties shall furnish statistical information on the import and export of poppy straw as required for drugs under article 20, paragraphs 1 (d) and 2 (b).

Article 26: THE COCA BUSH AND COCA LEAVES

1. If a Party permits the cultivation of the coca bush, it shall apply thereto and to coca leaves the system of controls as provided in article 23 respecting the control of the opium poppy, but as regards paragraph 2 (d) of that article, the requirements imposed on the Agency therein referred to shall be only to take physical possession of the crops as soon as possible after the end of the harvest.

2. The Parties shall so far as possible enforce the uprooting of all coca bushes which grow wild. They shall destroy the coca bushes if illegally cultivated.

Article 27: ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO COCA LEAVES

1. The Parties may permit the use of coca leaves for the preparation of a flavouring agent, which shall not contain any alkaloids, and, to the extent necessary for such use, may permit the production, import, export, trade in and possession of such leaves.

2. The Parties shall furnish separately estimates (article 19) and statistical information (article 20) in respect of coca leaves for preparation of the flavouring agent, except to the extent that the same coca leaves are used for the extraction of alkaloids and the flavouring agent, and so explained in the estimates and statistical information.

Article 28: CONTROL OF CANNABIS

1. If a Party permits the cultivation of the cannabis plant for the production of cannabis or cannabis resin, it shall apply thereto the system of controls as provided in article 23 respecting the control of the opium poppy.

2. This Convention shall not apply to the cultivation of the cannabis plant exclusively for industrial purposes (fibre and seed) or horticultural purposes.

3. The Parties shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to prevent the misuse of, and illicit traffic in, the leaves of the cannabis plant.

Article 29: MANUFACTURE

1. The Parties shall require that the manufacture of drugs be under licence except where such manufacture is carried out by a State enterprise or State enterprises.

2. The Parties shall:

(a) Control all persons and enterprises carrying on or engaged in the manufacture of drugs;

(b) Control under licence the establishments and premises in which such manufacture may take place; and

(c) Require that licensed manufacturers of drugs obtain periodical permits specifying the kinds and amounts of drugs which they shall be entitled to manufacture. A periodical permit, however, need not be required for preparations.

3. The Parties shall prevent the accumulation, in the possession of drug manufacturers, of quantities of drugs and poppy straw in excess of those required for the normal conduct of business, having regard to the prevailing market conditions.

Article 30: TRADE AND DISTRIBUTION

1. (a) The Parties shall require that the trade in and distribution of drugs be under licence except where such trade or distribution is carried out by a State enterprise or State enterprises.

(b) The Parties shall:

(i) Control all persons and enterprises carrying on or engaged in the trade in or distribution of drugs;

(ii) Control under licence the establishments and premises in which such trade or distribution may take place. The requirement of licensing need not apply to preparations.

(c) The provisions of subparagraphs (a) and (b) relating to licensing need not apply to persons duly authorized to perform and while performing therapeutic or scientific functions.

2. The Parties shall also:

(a) Prevent the accumulation in the possession of traders, distributors, State enterprises or duly authorized persons referred to above, of quantities of drugs and poppy straw in excess of those required for the normal conduct of business, having regard to the prevailing market conditions; and

(b) (i) Require medical prescriptions for the supply or dispensation of drugs to individuals. This requirement need not apply to such drugs as individuals may lawfully obtain, use, dispense or administer in connexion with their duly authorized therapeutic functions; and

(ii) If the Parties deem these measures necessary or desirable, require that prescriptions for drugs in Schedule 1 should be written on officials forms to be issued in the form of counterfoil books by the competent governmental authorities or by authorized professional associations.

3. It is desirable that Parties require that written or printed offers of drugs, advertisements of every kind or descriptive literature relating to drugs and used for commercial purposes, interior wrappings of packages containing drugs, and labels under which drugs are offered for sale indicate the international non-proprietary name communicated by the World Health Organization.

4. If a Party considers such measure necessary or desirable, it shall require that the inner package containing a drug or wrapping thereof shall bear a clearly visible double red band. The exterior wrapping of the package in which such drug is contained shall not bear a double red band.

5. A Party shall require that the label under which a drug is offered for sale show the exact drug content by weight or percentage. This requirement of label information need not apply to a drug dispensed to an individual on medical prescription.

6. The provisions of paragraphs 2 and 5 need not apply to the retail trade in or retail distribution of drugs in Schedule II.

Article 31: SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE

1. The Parties shall not knowingly permit the export of drugs to any country or territory except:

(a) In accordance with the laws and regulations of that country or territory; and

(b) Within the limits of the total of the estimates for that country or territory, as defined in paragraph 2 of article 19, with the addition of the amounts intended to be re-exported.

2. The Parties shall exercise in free ports and zones the same supervision and control as in other parts of their territories, provided, however, that they may apply more drastic measures.

3. The Parties shall:

(a) Control under licence the import and export of drugs except where such import or export is carried out by a State enterprise or enterprises;

(b) Control all persons and enterprises carrying on or engaged in such import or export.

4. (a) Every Party permitting the import or export of drugs shall require a separate import or export authorization to be obtained for each such import or export whether it consists of one or more drugs.

(b) Such authorization shall state the name of the drug, the international non-proprietary name if any, the quantity to be imported or exported, and the name and address of the importer and exporter, and shall specify the period within which the importation or exportation must be effected.

(c) The export authorization shall also state the number and date of the import certificate (paragraph 5) and the authority by whom it has been issued.

(d) The import authorization may allow an importation in more than one consignment.

5. Before issuing an export authorization the Parties shall require an import certificate, issued by the competent authorities of the importing country or territory and certifying that the importation of the drug or drugs referred to therein, is approved and such certificate shall be produced by the person or establishment applying for the export authorization. The Parties shall follow as closely as may be practicable the form of import certificate approved by the Commission.

6. A copy of the export authorization shall accompany each consignment, and the Government issuing the export authorization shall send a copy to the Government of the importing country or territory.

7. (a) The Government of the importing country or territory, when the importation has been effected or when the period fixed for the importation has expired, shall return the export authorization, with an endorsement to that effect, to the Government of the exporting country or territory.

(b) The endorsement shall specify the amount actually imported.

(c) If a lesser quantity than that specified in the export authorization is actually exported, the quantity actually exported shall be stated by the competent authorities on the export authorization and on any official copy thereof.

8. Exports of consignments to a post office box, or to a bank to the account of a Party other than the Party named in the export authorization, shall be prohibited.

9. Exports of consignments to a bonded warehouse are prohibited unless the Government of the importing country certifies on the import certificate, produced by the person or establishment applying for the export authorization, that it has approved the importation for the purpose of being placed in a bonded warehouse. In such case the export authorization shall specify that the consignment is exported for such purpose. Each withdrawal from the bonded warehouse shall require a permit from the authorities having jurisdiction over the warehouse and, in the case of a foreign destination shall be treated as if it were a new export within the meaning of this Convention.

10. Consignments of drugs entering or leaving the territory of a Party not accompanied by an export authorization shall be detained by the competent authorities.

11. A Party shall not permit any drugs consigned to another country to pass through its territory, whether or not the consignment is removed from the conveyance in which it is carried, unless a copy of the export authorization for such consignment is produced to the competent authorities of such Party.

12. The competent authorities of any country or territory through which a consignment of drugs is permitted to pass shall take all due measures to prevent the diversion of the consignment to a destination other than that named in the accompanying copy of the export authorization unless the Government of that country or territory through which the consignment is passing authorizes the diversion. The Government of the country or territory of transit shall treat any requested diversion as if the diversion were an export from the country or territory of transit to the country or territory of new destination. If the diversion is authorized, the provisions of paragraph 7 (a) and (b) shall also apply between the country or territory of transit and the country or territory which originally exported the consignment.

13. No consignment of drugs while in transit, or whilst being stored in a bonded warehouse, may be subjected to any process which would change the nature of the drugs in question. The packing may not be altered without the permission of the competent authorities.

14. The provisions of paragraphs 11 to 13 relating to the passage of drugs through the territory of a Party do not apply where the consignment in question is transported by aircraft which does not land in the country or territory of transit. If the aircraft lands in any such country or territory, those provisions shah be applied so far as circumstances require.

15. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to the provisions of any international agreements which limit the control which may be exercised by any of the Parties over drugs in transit.

16. Nothing in this article other than paragraphs 1 (a) and 2 need apply in the case of preparations in Schedule III.

Article 32: SPECIAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE CARRIAGE OF DRUGS IN FIRST-AID KITS OF SHIPS OR AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC

1. The international carriage by ships or aircraft of such limited amounts of drugs as may be needed during their journey or voyage for first-aid purposes or emergency cases shall not be considered to be import, export or passage through a country within the meaning of this Convention.

2. Appropriate safeguards shall be taken by the country of registry to prevent the improper use of the drugs referred to in paragraph 1 or their diversion for illicit purposes. The Commission, in consultation with the appropriate international organizations, shall recommend such safeguards.

3. Drugs carried by ships or aircraft in accordance with paragraph 1 shall be subject to the laws, regulations, permits and licences of the country of registry, without prejudice to any rights of the competent local authorities to

carry out cheeks, inspections and other control measures on board ships or aircraft. The administration of such drugs in the case of emergency shall not be considered a violation of the requirements of article 30, paragraph 2 (b).

Article 33: POSSESSION OF DRUGS

The Parties shall not permit the possession of drugs except under legal authority.

Article 34: MEASURES OF SUPERVISION AND INSPECTION

The Parties shall require:

(a) That all persons who obtain licences as provided in accordance with this Convention, or who have managerial or supervisory positions in a State enterprise established in accordance with this Convention, shall have adequate qualifications for the effective and faithful execution of the provisions of such laws and regulations as are enacted in pursuance thereof; and

(b) That governmental authorities, manufacturers, traders, scientists, scientific institutions and hospitals keep such records as will show the quantities of each drug manufactured and of each individual acquisition and disposal of drugs. Such records shall respectively be preserved for a period of not less than two years. Where counterfoil books (article 30, paragraph 2 (b)) of official prescriptions are used, such books including the counterfoils shall also be kept for a period of not less than two years.

Article 35: ACTION AGAINST THE ILLICIT TRAFFIC

Having due regard to their constitutional, legal and administrative systems, the Parties shall:

(a) Make arrangements at the national level for co-ordination of preventive and repressive action against the illicit traffic; to this end they may usefully designate an appropriate agency responsible for such co-ordination;

(b) Assist each other in the campaign against the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs;

(c) Co-operate closely with each other and with the competent international organizations of which they are members with a view to maintaining a co-ordinated campaign against the illicit traffic;

(d) Ensure that international co-operation between the appropriate agencies be conducted in an expeditious manner; and

(e) Ensure that where legal papers are transmitted internationally for the purposes of a prosecution, the transmittal be effected in an expeditious manner to the bodies designated by the Parties; this requirement shall be without prejudice to the right of a Party to require that legal papers be sent to it through the diplomatic channel;

(f) Furnish, if they deem it appropriate, to the Board and the Commission through the Secretary-General, in addition to information required by article 18, information relating to illicit drug activity within their borders, including information on illicit cultivation, production, manufacture and use of, and on illicit trafficking in, drugs; and

(g) Furnish the information referred to in the preceding paragraph as far as possible in such manner and by such dates as the Board may request; if requested by a Party, the Board may offer its advice to it in furnishing the information and in endeavouring to reduce the illicit drug activity within the borders of that Party.

Article 36: PENAL PROVISIONS

1. (a) Subject to its constitutional limitations, each Party shall adopt such measures as will ensure that cultivation, production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, possession, offering, offering for sale, distribution, purchase, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, importation and exportation of drugs contrary to the provisions of this Convention, and any other action which in the opinion of such Party may be contrary to the provisions of this Convention, shall be punishable offences when committed intentionally, and that serious offences shall be liable to adequate punishment particularly by imprisonment or other penalties of deprivation of liberty.

(b) Notwithstanding the preceding subparagraph, when abusers of drugs have committed such offences, the Parties may provide, either as an alternative to conviction or punishment or in addition to conviction or punishment, that such abusers shall undergo measures of treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration in conformity with paragraph 1 of article 38.

2. Subject to the constitutional limitations of a Party, its legal system and domestic law,

(a) (i) Each of the offences enumerated in paragraph 1, if committed in different countries, shall be considered as a distinct offence;

(ii) Intentional participation in, conspiracy to commit and attempts to commit, any of such offences, and preparatory acts and financial operations in connexion with the offences referred to in this article, shall be punishable offences as provided in paragraph 1;

(iii) Foreign convictions for such offences shall be taken into account for the purpose of establishing recidivism; and

(iv) Serious offences heretofore referred to committed either by nationals or by foreigners shall be prosecuted by the Party in whose territory the offence was committed, or by the Party in whose territory the offender is found if extradition is not acceptable in conformity with the law of the Party to which application is made, and if such offender has not already been prosecuted and judgement given.

(b) (i) Each of the offences enumerated in paragraphs 1 and 2 (a) (ii) of this article shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable offence in any extradition treaty existing between Parties. Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them.

(ii) If a Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another Party with which it has no extradition treaty, it may at its option consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of the offences enumerated in paragraphs 1 and 2 (a) (ii) of this article. Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested Party.

(iii) Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize the offences enumerated in paragraphs 1 and 2 (a) (ii) of this article as extraditable offences between themselves, subject to the conditions provided by the law of the requested Party.

(iv) Extradition shall be granted in conformity with the law of the Party to which application is made, and, notwithstanding subparagraphs(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) of this paragraph, the Party shall have the right to refuse to grant the extradition in cases where the competent authorities consider that the offence is not sufficiently serious.

3. The provisions of this article shall be subject to the provisions of the criminal law of the Party concerned on questions of jurisdiction.

4. Nothing contained in this article shall affect the principle that the offences to which it refers shall be defined, prosecuted and punished in conformity with the domestic law of a Party.

Article 37: SEIZURE AND CONFISCATION

Any drugs, substances and equipment used in or intended for the commission of any of the offences, referred to in article 36, shall be liable to seizure and confiscation.

Article 38: MEASURES AGAINST THE ABUSE OF DRUGS

1. The Parties shall give special attention to and take all practicable measures for the prevention of abuse of drugs and for the early identification, treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration of the persons involved and shall co-ordinate their efforts to these ends.

2. The Parties shall as far as possible promote the training of personnel in the treatment, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration of abusers of drugs.

3. The Parties shall take all practicable measures to assist persons whose work so requires to gain an understanding of the problems of abuse of drugs and of its prevention, and shall also promote such understanding among the general public if there is a risk that abuse of drugs will become widespread.

Article 38 bis: AGREEMENTS ON REGIONAL CENTRES

If a Party considers it desirable as part of its action against the illicit traffic in drugs, having due regard to its constitutional, legal and administrative systems, and, if it so desires, with the technical advice of the Board or the specialized agencies, it shall promote the establishment, in consultation with other interested Parties in the region, of agreements which contemplate the development of regional centres for scientific research and education to combat the problems resulting from the illicit use of and traffic in drugs.

Article 39: APPLICATION OF STRICTER NATIONAL CONTROL MEASURES THAN THOSE REQUIRED BY THIS CONVENTION

Notwithstanding anything contained in this Convention, a Party shall not be, or be deemed to be, precluded from adopting measures of control more strict or severe than those provided by this Convention and in particular from requiring that Preparations in Schedule III or drugs in Schedule II be subject to all or such of the measures of control applicable to drugs in Schedule I as in its opinion is necessary or desirable for the protection of the public health or welfare.

Article 40: LANGUAGES OF THE CONVENTION AND PROCEDURE FOR SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION AND ACCESSION

1. This Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be open for signature until 1 August 1961 on behalf of any Member of the United Nations, of any non-member State which is a Party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice or member of a specialized agency of the United Nations, and also of any other State which the Council may invite to become a Party.

2. This Convention is subject to ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General.

3. This Convention shall be open after 1 August 1961 for accession by the States referred to in paragraph 1. The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General.

Article 41: ENTRY INTO FORCE

1. This Convention shall come into force on the thirtieth day following the date on which the fortieth instrument of ratification or accession is deposited in accordance with article 40.

2. In respect of any other State depositing an instrument of ratification or accession after the date of deposit of the said fortieth instrument, this Convention shall come into force on the thirtieth day after the deposit by that State of its instrument of ratification or accession.

Article 42: TERRITORIAL APPLICATION

This Convention shall apply to all non-metropolitan territories for the international relations of which any Party is responsible, except where the previous consent of such a territory is required by the Constitution of the Party or of the territory concerned, or required by custom. In such case the Party shall endeavour to secure the needed consent of the territory within the shortest period possible, and when that consent is obtained the Party shall notify the Secretary-General. This Convention shall apply to the territory or territories named in such notification from the date of its receipt by the Secretary-General. In those cases where the previous consent of the non-metropolitan territory is not required, the Party concerned shall, at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare the non-metropolitan territory or territories to which this Convention applies.

Article 43: TERRITORIES FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARTICLES 19, 20, 21 AND 31

1. Any Party may notify the Secretary-General that, for the purposes of articles 19, 20, 21 and 31, one of its territories is divided into two or more territories, or that two or more of its territories are consolidated into a single territory.

2. Two or more Parties may notify the Secretary-General that, as the result of the establishment of a customs union between them, those Parties constitute a single territory for the purposes of articles 19, 20, 21 and 31.

3. Any notification under paragraph 1 or 2 above shall take effect on 1 January of the year following the year in which the notification was made.

Article 44: TERMINATION OF PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL TREATIES

1. The provisions of this Convention, upon its coming into force, shall, as between Parties hereto, terminate and replace the provisions of the following treaties:

(a) International Opium Convention, signed at The Hague on 23 January 1912;

(b) Agreement concerning the Manufacture of, Internal Trade in and Use of Prepared Opium, signed at Geneva on 11 February 1925;

(c) International Opium Convention, signed at Geneva on 19 February 1925;

(d) Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, signed at Geneva on 13 July 193 1;

(e) Agreement for the Control of Opium Smoking in the Far East, signed at Bangkok on 27 November 193 1;

(f) Protocol signed at Lake Success on 11 December 1946, amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on Narcotic Drugs concluded at The Hague on 23 January 1912, at Geneva on 11 February 1925 and 19 February 1925 and 13 July 193 1, at Bangkok on 27 November 1931 and at Geneva on 26 June 1936, except as it affects the last-named Convention;

(g) The Conventions and Agreements referred to in subparagraphs (a) to (e) as amended by the Protocol of 1946 referred to in subparagraph (f);

(h) Protocol signed at Paris on 19 November 1948 Bringing under International Control Drugs outside the Scope of the Convention of 13 July 1931 for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, as Amended by the Protocol signed at Lake Success on 11 December 1946;

(i) Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of Opium, signed at New York on 23 June 1953, should that Protocol have come into force.

2. Upon the coming into force of this Convention, article 9 of the Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, signed at Geneva on 26 June 1936, shall, between the Parties thereto which are also Parties to this Convention, be terminated, and shall be replaced by paragraph 2 (b) of article 36 of this Convention; provided that such a Party may by notification to the Secretary-General continue in force the said article 9.

Article 45: TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

1. The functions of the Board provided for in article 9 shall, as from the date of the coming into force of this Convention (article 41, paragraph 1), be provisionally carried out by the Permanent Central Board constituted under chapter VI of the Convention referred to in article 44 (c) as amended, and by the Supervisory Body constituted under chapter 11 of the Convention referred to in article 44 (d) as amended, as such functions may respectively require.

2. The Council shall fix the date on which the new Board referred to in article 9 shall enter upon its duties. As from that date that Board shall, with respect to the States Parties to the treaties enumerated in article 44 which are not Parties to this Convention, undertake the functions of the Permanent Central Board and of the Supervisory Body referred to in paragraph 1.

Article 46: DENUNCIATION

1. After the expiry of two years from the date of the coming into force of this Convention (article 41, paragraph 1) any Party may, on its own behalf or on behalf of a territory for which it has international responsibility, and which has withdrawn its consent given in accordance with article 42, denounce this Convention by an instrument in writing deposited with the Secretary-General.

2. The denunciation, if received by the Secretary-General on or before the first day of July in any year, shall take effect on the first day of January in the succeeding year, and, if received after the first day of July, shall take effect as if it had been received on or before the first day of July in the succeeding year.

3. This Convention shall be terminated if, as a result of denunciations made in accordance with paragraph 1, the conditions for its coming into force as laid down in article 41, paragraph 1, cease to exist.

Article 47: AMENDMENTS

1. Any Party may propose an amendment to this Convention. The text of any such amendment and the reasons therefor shall be communicated to the Secretary-General who shall communicate them to the Parties and to the Council. The Council may decide either:

(a) That a conference shall be called in accordance with Article 62, paragraphs, of the Charter of the United Nations to consider the proposed amendment; or

(b) That the Parties shall be asked whether they accept the proposed amendment and also asked to submit to the Council any comments on the proposal.

2. If a proposed amendment circulated under paragraph 1 (b) of this article has not been rejected by any Party within eighteen months after it has been circulated, it shall thereupon enter into force. If, however, a proposed amendment is rejected by any Party, the Council may decide, in the light of comments received from Parties, whether a conference shall be called to consider such amendment.

Article 48: DISPUTES

1. If there should arise between two or more Parties a dispute relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention, the said Parties shall consult together with a view to the settlement of the dispute by negotiation, investigation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, recourse to regional bodies, judicial process or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. Any such dispute which cannot be settled in the manner prescribed shall be referred to the International Court of Justice for decision.

Article 49: TRANSITIONAL RESERVATIONS

1. A Party may at the time of signature, ratification or accession reserve the right to permit temporarily in any one of its territories:

(a) The quasi-medical use of opium;

(b) Opium smoking;

(c) Coca leaf chewing;

(d) The use of cannabis, cannabis resin, extracts and tinctures of cannabis for non-medical purposes; and

(e) The production and manufacture of and trade in the drugs referred to under (a) to (d) for the purposes mentioned therein.

2. The reservations under paragraph 1 shall be subject to the following restrictions:

(a) The activities mentioned in paragraph 1 may be authorized only to the extent that they were traditional in the territories in respect of which the reservation is made, and were there permitted on 1 January 1961.

(b) No export of the drugs referred to in paragraph 1 for the purposes mentioned therein may be permitted to a non-party or to a territory to which this Convention does not apply under article 42.

(c) Only such persons may be permitted to smoke opium as were registered by the competent authorities to this effect on 1 January 1964.

(d) The quasi-medical use of opium must be abolished within 15 years from the coming into force of this Convention as provided in paragraph 1 of article 41.

(e) Coca leaf chewing must be abolished within twenty-five years from the coming into force of this Convention as provided in paragraph 1 of article 41.

(f) The use of cannabis for other than medical and scientific purposes must be discontinued as soon as possible but in any case within twenty-five years from the coming into force of this Convention as provided in paragraph 1 of article 41.

(g) The production and manufacture of and trade in the drugs referred to in paragraph 1 for any of the uses mentioned therein must be reduced and finally abolished simultaneously with the reduction and abolition of such uses.

3. A Party making a reservation under paragraph 1 shall:

(a) Include in the annual report to be furnished to the Secretary-General, in accordance with article 18, paragraph 1 (a), an account of the progress made in the preceding year towards the abolition of the use, production, manufacture or trade referred to under paragraph 1; and

(b) Furnish to the Board separate estimates (article 19) and statistical returns (article 20) in respect of the reserved activities in the manner and form prescribed by the Board.

4. (a) If a Party which makes a reservation under paragraph 1 fails to furnish:

(i) The report referred to in paragraph 3 (a) within six months after the end of the year to which the information relates;

(ii) The estimates referred to in paragraph 3 (b) within three months after the date fixed for that purpose by the Board in accordance with article 12, paragraph 1;

(iii) The statistics referred to in paragraph 3 (b) within three months after the date on which they are due in accordance with article 20, paragraph 2

the Board or the Secretary-General, as the case may be, shall send to the Party concerned a notification of the delay, and shall request such information within a period of three months after the receipt of that notification.

(b) If the Party fails to comply within this period with the request of the Board or the Secretary-General, the reservation in question made under paragraph 1 shall cease to be effective,

5. A State which has made reservations may at any time by notification in writing withdraw all or part of its reservations.

Article 50: OTHER RESERVATIONS

1. No reservations other than those made in accordance with article 49 or with the following paragraphs shall be permitted.

2. Any State may at the time of signature, ratification or accession make reservations in respect of the following provisions of this Convention:

Article 12, paragraphs 2 and 3; article 13, paragraph 2; article 14, paragraphs 1 and 2; article 31, paragraph 1 (b) and article 48.

3. A State which desires to become a Party but wishes to be authorized to make reservations other than those made in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article or with article 49 may inform the Secretary-General of such intention. Unless by the end of twelve months after the date of the Secretary-General's communication of the reservation concerned, this reservation has been objected to by one third of the States that have ratified or acceded to this Convention before the end of that period, it shall be deemed to be permitted, it being understood however that States which have objected to the reservation need not assume towards the reserving State any legal obligation under this Convention which is affected by the reservation.

4. A State which has made reservations may at any time by notification in writing withdraw all or part of its reservations.

Article 51: NOTIFICATIONS

The Secretary-General shall notify to all the States referred to in paragraph 1 of article 40:

(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions in accordance with article 40;

(b) The date upon which this Convention enters into force in accordance with article 41;

(c) Denunciations in accordance with article 46; and

(d) Declarations and notifications under articles 42, 43, 47, 49 and 50.








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