A sniper is a highly trained marksman who shoots targets from concealed positions or distances exceeding the capabilities of regular personnel. Snipers typically have specialized training and distinct high-precision rifles.
In addition to marksmanship, military snipers are also trained in camouflage, field craft, infiltration, reconnaissance and observation. Snipers are especially effective when deployed within the urban terrain of urban warfare.
The term sniper was first attested in 1824 in the sense of the word "sharpshooter". The verb "to snipe" originated in the 1770s among soldiers in British India where a hunter skilled enough to kill the elusive snipe was dubbed a "sniper".
During the American Civil War, the common term used in the United States was "skirmisher". Throughout history armies have used skirmishers to break up enemy formations and to thwart the enemy from flanking the main body of their attack force. They were deployed individually on the extremes of the moving army primarily to scout for the possibility of an enemy ambush. Consequently, a "skirmish" denotes a clash of small scope between these forces. In general, a skirmish was a limited combat, involving troops other than those of the main body. The term "sniper" was not in widespread use in the United States until after the American Civil War.
Different countries have different military doctrines regarding snipers in military units, settings, and tactics. Generally, a sniper's primary function in warfare is to provide detailed reconnaissance from a concealed position and, if necessary, to reduce the enemy's fighting ability by striking at high value targets (especially officers, communication and other personnel) and in the process pinning down and demoralizing the enemy.
Military snipers from the US, UK, and other countries that adopt their military doctrine are typically deployed in two-man sniper teams consisting of a shooter and spotter. A common practice is for a shooter and a spotter to take turns in order to avoid eye fatigue. In most recent combat operations occurring in large densely populated towns such as Fallujah, Iraq, two teams would be deployed together to increase their security and effectiveness in an urban environment. German doctrine of largely independent snipers and emphasis on concealment developed during the Second World War have been most influential on modern sniper tactics, currently used throughout Western militaries (examples are specialized camouflage clothing, concealment in terrain and emphasis on coup d'œil).
Typical sniper missions include reconnaissance and surveillance, target marking for air-strikes, counter-sniper, killing enemy commanders, selecting targets of opportunity, and even destruction of military equipment, which tend to require use of rifles in the larger calibers such as the .50 BMG, like the Barrett M82, McMillan Tac-50, and Denel NTW-20. Snipers have increasingly been demonstrated as being useful by US and UK forces in the recent Iraq campaign in a fire support role to cover the movement of infantry, especially in urban areas.
The first British sniper unit began life as Lovat Scouts, a Scottish Highland regiment that earned high praise during the Second Boer War (1899-1902). The unit was formed by Lord Lovat and reported to an American, Major Frederick Russell Burnham, the British Army Chief of Scouts under Lord Roberts. Burnham fittingly described these scouts as "half wolf and half jackrabbit." Just like their Boer opponents, they were well practiced in the arts of marksmanship, field craft, and military tactics. They were also the first known military unit to wear a ghillie suit. They were skilled woodsmen but also practitioners of discretion: "He who shoots and runs away, lives to shoot another day." After the war, this regiment went on to formally become the British Army's first sniper unit, then better known as sharpshooters.
During World War I, snipers appeared as deadly sharpshooters in the trenches. At the start of the war, only Imperial Germany had troops that were issued scoped sniper rifles. Although sharpshooters existed on all sides, the Germans specially equipped some of their soldiers with scoped rifles that could pick off enemy soldiers showing their heads out of their trench. At first the French and British believed such hits to be coincidental hits, until the German scoped rifles were discovered. During World War I, the Germans received a reputation for the deadliness and efficiency of their snipers, partly because of the high-quality lenses the Germans could manufacture.
Soon the British army began to train their own snipers in specialized sniper schools. Major Hesketh Hesketh-Prichard was given formal permission to begin sniper training in 1915, and founded the First Army School of Sniping, Observation, and Scouting at Linghem in France in 1916. In 1920, he wrote his account of his war time activities in the critically-acclaimed Sniping in France (full-text available on Wikisource), which is still referenced by modern authors on the subject. Hesketh-Prichard developed many techniques in sniping, including the use of spotting scopes and working in pairs, and using Kim's Game to train observational skills. Both British and German sniper teams operated in pairs, with one sniper and one spotter. On the Eastern Front, Imperial Russia never introduced specialized sharpshooters or snipers, allowing the German snipers to pick off their targets without danger from counter-snipers.
The British did use paper mache figures painted to resemble soldiers to draw sniper fire. Some were equipped with rubber surgical tubing so the dummy could "smoke" a cigarette and thus appear realistic. Holes punched in the dummy by enemy sniper bullets then could be used for triangulation purposes to determine the position of the enemy sniper, who thus could be attacked with artillery fire.
During World War II, snipers reappeared as important factors on the battlefield. During the interbellum, most nations dropped their specialized sniper units, notably the Germans who had such a reputation during World War I. However, during the Spanish Civil War, the effectiveness and dangers of snipers once again came to the fore. The only nation that had specially trained sniper units during the 1930s was the Soviet Union. Soviet snipers were trained in their skills as marksmen, in using the terrain to hide themselves from the enemy and the ability to work alongside regular forces. This made the Soviet sniper training focus more on "normal" combat situations than those of other nations. During the 1940 campaigns of Germany, it appeared that lone, well hidden snipers could halt the German advance for a significant amount of time. For example during the close-in on Dunkirk, British snipers were able to significantly delay German infantry trying to reach Dunkirk. This prompted the British to once again upscale their training of specialized sniper units. British snipers were trained in the obvious marksmanship skills and taught to blend in with the environment, often by using special headgear that concealed them. However, the British Army offered sniper training exclusively to officers and non-commissioned officers, which reduced their effectiveness considerably.
One of the best known battles involving snipers, and also the battle that made the Germans reinstate their specialized sniper training, was the Battle of Stalingrad. Their defensive position inside a city filled with rubble meant that Soviet snipers were able to inflict significant casualties on the German Wehrmacht. Because of the urban nature of fighting, snipers were very hard to spot and seriously dented the morale of the German attackers. The best known of these snipers was probably Vasily Zaytsev, immortalized in the book and subsequent film Enemy At The Gates. Though German sharpshooters appeared spontaneously, often armed with captured scoped Mosin-Nagant rifles, Germany re-established its own sniping school and set out to reclaim its reputation of the First World War. Germany drastically increased the number of snipers per unit. German training emphasized shooting at long-range targets to deliver a feeling of insecurity to the enemy, the ability to creep up on enemies and remain hidden with enemies nearby, plus especially good camouflaging. Germany evolved the most efficient ways of camouflaging, both by using the environment (branches etc.) and by the development of specially designed, reversible camouflage clothing. German snipers were also issued with special shovels and knives to create the best possible hiding places and shelters. As they had done during the First World War, German snipers also changed location after a few shots to further reduce their chances of being spotted. They were also issued the highest-quality scopes available.
In the United States armed forces, sniper training was only very elementary and focused on being able to hit targets over long distances. Snipers were required to be able to hit a body over 400 meters away, and a head over 200 meters away. There was almost no concern with the ability to blend into the environment. Sniper training also varied from place to place, resulting in a wide range of qualities of snipers. The main reason the US did not extend their training beyond long-range shooting was the limited deployment of US soldiers until the Normandy Invasion. During the campaigns in North Africa and Italy, most fighting occurred in arid and mountainous regions where limited concealment was possible, in contrast to Western and Central Europe.
This resulted in disastrous effects in Normandy and the campaign in Western Europe where they encountered well trained German snipers. In Normandy, German snipers remained hidden in the dense vegetation and were able to encircle American units, firing at them from all sides. The American and British forces were surprised by how near the German snipers could safely come and attack them, as well as by their ability to hit targets over long distances. A notable mistake made by the green American soldiers was to lie down and wait when targeted by German snipers, thus allowing the snipers to pick them off one after another. German snipers often infiltrated Allied lines and sometimes when the frontlines moved, they fought from their sniping positions and withheld their surrender until their rations and munitions were exhausted. After World War II, many elements of German sniper training and doctrine were copied by other countries.
In the Pacific War, the Empire of Japan also trained snipers. In the jungles of Asia and the Pacific Islands, snipers posed a serious threat to the British, Australian, Canadian and US troops. Japanese snipers were specially trained to use the environment to conceal themselves. Japanese snipers used foliage on their uniforms and dug well-concealed hide-outs that were often connected with small trenches. There was no need for long range accuracy, because most combat in the jungle took place within a few hundred meters. Japanese snipers were known for their patience and ability to remain hidden for long periods. They almost never left their carefully camouflaged hiding spots. This meant that whenever a sniper was in the area, the location of the sniper could be determined after the sniper had fired a few shots. The Allies also used their own snipers in the Pacific, notably the US Marines, who used M1903 Springfield rifles.
Some common sniper rifles used during the Second World War include: the Soviet M1891/30 Mosin Nagant and, to a lesser extent, the SVT-40; the German Mauser Karabiner 98k and Gewehr 43; the British Lee-Enfield No. 4; the Japanese Arisaka 97; the American M1903 Springfield and M1 Garand; to a lesser extent, the Italians trained few snipers and supplied them with a scoped Carcano Model 1891.
The longest range recorded for a sniper kill currently stands at 2,430 meters (2,657 yd, or 1.51 miles), accomplished by Master Corporal Rob Furlong, a sniper from Newfoundland, Canada, in March 2002 during the war in Afghanistan. Furlong made this record-breaking kill while he was participating in Operation Anaconda. He was a member of the 3rd Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI). To make the kill, he used a .50 caliber BMG (12.7 mm) McMillan TAC-50 bolt-action rifle. Utilizing a ballistic calculator, it is possible to reproduce the trajectory and time-in-flight of such a ranged shot. With a nominal muzzle velocity of 823 metres (2,700 ft) per second for the Hornady 750 gr A-MAX projectile, and an estimated ballistic coefficient of 1.05, such a shot fired at the estimated altitude of 9,000 feet (2,700 m) for the Shah-i-Kot Valley would have taken 3.92 seconds to reach the target, and drop 155.8 feet (47.5 m) during flight. Also note at such a long range, even a light breeze of 20 kilometres (12 mi) per hour would have blown the bullet off target by 20.8 feet (6.3 m).
The previous record was held by U.S. Marine sniper Carlos Hathcock in February 1967 during the Vietnam War, at a distance of more than 2,347 yards (2,146 m) using a scope-mounted Browning M2 .50 machine gun. By contrast, much of the U.S./Coalition urban sniping in support of operations in Iraq is at much shorter ranges, although in one notable incident on April 3, 2003, Corporals Matt and Sam Hughes, a two-man sniper team of the Royal Marines, armed with L96 sniper rifles each killed targets at a range of about 860 metres (941 yd) with shots that, due to strong wind, had to be “fire[d] exactly 17 meters (56 ft) to the left of the target for the bullet to bend in the wind.”
During Operation Enduring Freedom, Spanish Navy Marine snipers shot cables hanging from the mast to the bridge of the North Korean freighter So San, smuggling Scud missiles through the waters of Socotra Island. These cables were preventing it from being boarded by fast rope for an arms inspection. The shots were made at a range of 400 yards (370 m), with rough sea, from the deck of SPS Navarra (F85), and the Marines were armed with Barrett M95 rifles.
During Operation Harekate Yolo in Afghanistan, one Norwegian sniper of the 2nd Battalion, aiming from a trench, hit a Taliban insurgent from a distance of 1,380 meters, using 12.7 mm multi-purpose ammunition.
Law enforcement snipers, also commonly called police snipers, and military snipers differ in many ways, including their areas of operation and tactics. A police sharpshooter is part of a police operation and usually takes part in relatively short missions. Police forces typically deploy such sharpshooters in hostage scenarios. This differs from a military sniper, who operates as part of a larger army, engaged in warfare. Sometimes as part of a SWAT team, police snipers are deployed alongside negotiators and an assault team trained for close quarters combat. As policemen, they are trained to shoot only as a last resort, when there is a direct threat to life; the police sharpshooter has a well-known rule: "Be prepared to take a life to save a life." Police snipers typically operate at much shorter ranges than military snipers, generally under 100 metres (109 yd) and sometimes even less than 50 metres (55 yd). Both types of snipers do make difficult shots under pressure, and often perform one shot kills.
Police units which are unprepared for tactical operations may rely on a specialized SWAT tactical team, which may have a dedicated sniper team member. Some police sniper operations begin with military assistance. Police snipers placed in vantage points, such as high buildings, can provide security for events.
The need for specialized training for police sharpshooters was made apparent in 1972 during the Munich massacre when the German police could not deploy specialized personnel or equipment during the standoff at the airport in the closing phase of the crisis, and consequently all of the Israeli hostages were killed. The German police only had regular police who were selected if they did hunting as a hobby. While the German army did have snipers in 1972, the use of snipers of the German army in the scenario was impossible due to the German constitution's explicit prohibition of the use of the military in domestic matters. This situation was later addressed with the founding of the specialized police counter-terrorist unit GSG 9. In one high-profile incident, a SWAT sniper in Columbus, Ohio prevented a suicide by shooting a revolver out of the individual's hand, leaving him unharmed.
Military sniper training aims to teach a high degree of proficiency in camouflage and concealment, stalking, observation and map reading as well as precision marksmanship under various operational conditions. Trainees typically shoot thousands of rounds over a number of weeks, while learning these core skills.
Snipers are trained to squeeze the trigger straight back with the ball of their finger, to avoid jerking the gun sideways. The most accurate position is prone, with a sandbag supporting the stock, and the stock's cheek-piece against the cheek. In the field, a bipod can be used instead. Sometimes a sling is wrapped around the weak arm (or both) to reduce stock movement. Some doctrines train a sniper to breathe deeply before shooting, then hold their lungs empty while they line up and take their shot. Some go further, teaching their snipers to shoot between heartbeats to minimize barrel motion.
The key to sniping is accuracy, which applies to both the weapon and the shooter. The weapon should be able to consistently place shots within high tolerances. The sniper in turn must utilize the weapon to accurately place shots under varying conditions.
A sniper must have the ability to accurately estimate the various factors that influence a bullet's trajectory and point of impact such as: range to the target, wind direction, wind velocity, altitude and elevation of the sniper and the target and ambient temperature. Mistakes in estimation compound over distance and can decrease lethality or cause a shot to miss completely.
Snipers zero their weapons at a target range or in the field. This is the process of adjusting the scope so that the bullet's points-of-impact is at the point-of-aim (centre of scope or scope's cross-hairs) for a specific distance. A rifle and scope should retain its zero as long as possible under all conditions to reduce the need to re-zero during missions.
A sandbag can serve as a useful platform for shooting a sniper rifle, although any soft surface such as a rucksack will steady a rifle and contribute to consistency. In particular, bipods help when firing from a prone position, and enable the firing position to be sustained for an extended period of time. Many police and military sniper rifles come equipped with an adjustable bipod. Makeshift bipods can also be constructed from items such as tree branches or ski poles.
Accuracy and Range also depends on the cartridge used:
|Cartridge||Maximum effective range|
|7.62x51mm (.308 Winchester)||800–1,000 m|
|7.62x54mm R||800–1,000 m|
|7 mm Remington Magnum||900–1,100 m|
|.300 Winchester Magnum||900–1,200 m|
|.338 Lapua Magnum||1,300–1,600 m|
|.50 BMG (12.7x99mm NATO)|
|12.7x108mm (Russian)||1,500–2,000 m|
|.408 Chey Tac||> 2,400 m|
Servicemen volunteer for sniper training and are accepted on the basis of their aptitude as perceived by their commanders. Military snipers may be trained as forward air controllers (FACs) to direct air strikes or forward observers (FOs) to direct artillery or mortar fire.
The range to the target is measured or estimated as precisely as conditions permit and correct range estimation becomes absolutely critical at long ranges, because a bullet travels with a curved trajectory and the sniper must compensate for this by aiming higher at longer distances. If the exact distance is not known the sniper may compensate incorrectly and the bullet path may be too high or low. As an example, for a typical military sniping cartridge such as 7.62 × 51 mm NATO (.308 Winchester) M118 Special Ball round this difference (or “drop”) from 700 to 800 metres (770–870 yd) is 200 millimetres (7.9 in). This means that if the sniper incorrectly estimated the distance as 700 meters when the target was in fact 800 meters away, the bullet will be 200 millimeters lower than expected by the time it reaches the target.
Laser rangefinders may be used, but are not preferred on the battlefield because a laser can be seen by both the sender and the receiver. One useful method is comparing the height of the target (or nearby objects) to their size on the mil dot scope, or taking a known distance and using some sort of measure (utility poles, fence posts) to determine the additional distance. The average human head is 150 millimeters (5.9 in) in width, average human shoulders are 500 millimeters (20 in) apart and the average distance from a person's pelvis to the top of their head is 1,000 millimeters (39 in).
To determine the range to a target without a laser rangefinder, the sniper may use the mil dot reticle on a scope to accurately find the range. Mil dots are used like a slide rule to measure the height of a target, and if the height is known, the range can be as well. The height of the target (in yards) ×1000, divided by the height of the target (in mils), gives the range in yards. This is only in general, however, as both scope magnification (7×, 40×) and mil dot spacing change. The USMC standard is that 1 mil (that is, 1 milliradian) equals 3.438 MOA (minute of arc, or, equivalently, minute of angle), while the US Army standard is 3.6 MOA, chosen so as to give a diameter of 1 yard at a distance of 1000 yards (or equivalently, a diameter of 1 meter at a range of 1 kilometer.) Many commercial manufacturers use 3.5, splitting the difference, since it is easier to work with.
Explanation: 1 MIL = 1 milli-radian. That is, 1 MIL = 1x10^-3 radian. But, 10^-3 rad x (360 deg/ (2 x Pi) radians) = 0.0573 degrees. Now, 1 MOA = 1/60 degree = 0.01667 degrees. Hence, there are 0.0573/0.01667 = 3.43775 MOA per MIL, where MIL is defined as a milli-radian. On the other hand, defining a mil-dot by the US Army way, to equate it to 1-yard (1 m) at 1,000 yards (1,000 m), means the Army's mil-dot is approximately 3.6 MOA.
At longer ranges, bullet drop plays a significant role in targeting. The effect can be estimated from a chart which may be memorized or taped to the rifle, although some scopes come with Bullet Drop Compensator (BDC) systems that only require the range be dialed in. These are tuned to both a specific class of rifle and specific ammunition. It must be noted that every bullet type and load will have different ballistics. .308 Federal 175 grain (11.3 g) BTHP match shoots at 2,600 ft/s (790 m/s). Zeroed at 100 yards (100 m), a 16.2 MOA adjustment would have to be made to hit a target at 600 yards (500 m). If the same bullet was shot with 168 grain (10.9 g), a 17.1 MOA adjustment would be necessary.
Shooting uphill or downhill is confusing for many because gravity does not act perpendicular to the direction the bullet is traveling. Thus, gravity must be divided into its component vectors. Only the fraction of gravity equal to the cosine of the angle of fire with respect to the horizon affects the rate of fall of the bullet, with the remained adding or subtracting negligible velocity to the bullet along its trajectory. To find the correct zero, the sniper multiplies the actual distance to the range by this fraction and aims as if the target were that distance away. For example, a sniper who observes a target 500 meters away at a 45-degree angle downhill would multiply the range by the cosine of 45 degrees, which is 0.707. The resulting distance will be 353 meters. This number is also equal to the horizontal distance to the target. All other values, such as windage, time-to-target, impact velocity, and energy will be calculated based on the actual range of 500 meters.
Windage which also plays a significant role, the effect increasing with wind speed or the distance of the shot. The slant of visible convections near the ground can be used to estimate crosswinds, and correct the point of aim. Recently, a small device known as a cosine indicator has been developed. This device is clamped to the tubular body of the telescopic sight, and gives an indicative readout in numerical form as the rifle is aimed up or down at the target. This is translated into a figure used to compute the horizontal range to the target.
All adjustments for range, wind, and elevation can be performed by aiming off the target, called "holding over" or Kentucky windage. Alternately, the scope can be adjusted so that the point of aim is changed to compensate for these factors, sometimes referred to as "dialing in". The shooter must remember to return the scope to zeroed position. Adjusting the scope allows for more accurate shots, because the cross-hairs can be aligned with the target more accurately, but the sniper must know exactly what differences the changes will have on the point-of-impact at each target range.
For moving targets, the point-of-aim is ahead of the target in the direction of movement. Known as "leading" the target, the amount of "lead" depends on the speed and angle of the target's movement as well as the distance to the target. For this technique, holding over is the preferred method. Anticipating the behavior of the target is necessary to accurately place the shot.
The term "hide site" refers to a covered and concealed position in which a sniper and his team will conduct surveillance and/or fire from. A hide is to give the shooter good visibility of the surrounding area, good cover from enemy fire, and to conceal and camouflage the sniper.
The main purpose of ghillie suits and hide sites are to break up the outline of a person with a rifle.
Concealed Fox holes are also commonly used in woodland areas to conceal a sniper but still enable him to see from a safe position.
Shot placement varies considerably with the type of sniper being discussed. Military snipers, who generally do not engage targets at less than 300 m (330 yd), usually attempt body shots, aiming at the chest. These shots depend on tissue damage, organ trauma, and blood loss to make the kill.
Police snipers who generally engage at much shorter distances may attempt more precise shot at particular parts of body or particular devices: in one event in 2007 in Marseille, a GIPN sniper took a shot from 80 m (87 yd) at the pistol of a policeman threatening to commit suicide, destroying the weapon and preventing him from killing himself. Less lethal shots (at arms or legs) may also be taken at criminals to sap their will to fight or reduce their mobility.
In a high-risk or instant-death hostage situation, police snipers may take head shots to ensure an instant kill. The snipers aim for the "apricot", or the medulla oblongata, located inside the head, a part of the brain that controls involuntary movement that lies at the base of the skull. Some ballistics and neurological researchers have argued that severing the spinal cord at an area near the second cervical vertebra is actually achieved, usually having the same effect of preventing voluntary motor activity, but the debate on the matter remains largely academic at present.
Snipers can target personnel or materiel, but most often they target the most important enemy personnel such as officers or specialists (e.g. communications operators) so as to cause maximum disruption to enemy operations. Other personnel they might target include those who pose an immediate threat to the sniper, like dog handlers, who are often employed in a search for snipers. A sniper identifies officers by their appearance and behavior such as symbols of rank, talking to radio operators, sitting as a passenger in a car, having military servants, binoculars/map cases or talking and moving position more frequently. If possible, snipers shoot in descending order by rank, or if rank is unavailable, they shoot to disrupt communications.
Since most kills in modern warfare are by crew-served weapons, reconnaissance is one of the most effective uses of snipers. They use their aerobic conditioning, infiltration skills and excellent long-distance observation equipment and tactics to approach and observe the enemy. In this role, their rules of engagement let them engage only high value targets of opportunity.
Some rifles, such as the Denel NTW-20 are designed for a purely anti-materiel (AM) role, e.g. shooting turbine disks of parked aircraft, missile guidance packages, expensive optics, and the bearings, tubes or wave guides of radar sets. A sniper equipped with the correct rifle can target radar dishes, water containers, the engines of vehicles, and any number of other targets. Other rifles, such as the .50 caliber rifles produced by Barrett and McMillan are not designed exclusively as AM rifles, but are often employed in such a way, providing the range and power needed for AM applications in a lightweight package compared to most traditional AM rifles. Other calibers, such as the .408 Cheyenne Tactical and the .338 Lapua Magnum are designed to be capable of limited AM application, but are ideally suited as long range anti-personnel rounds.
Often in situations with multiple targets, snipers use relocation. After firing a few shots from a certain position, snipers move unseen to another location before the enemy can determine where he or she is and mount a counter-attack. Snipers will frequently use this tactic to their advantage, creating an atmosphere of chaos and confusion.
As sniper rifles are often extremely powerful and consequently loud, it is common for snipers to use a technique known as sound masking. This tactic, in the hands of a highly skilled marksman, can be used as a substitute for a noise suppressor. Very loud sounds in the environment, such as artillery shells air bursting or claps of thunder, can often mask the sound of the shot. This technique is frequently used in clandestine operations and infiltration tactics.
Due to the unexpected aspect of sniper fire, high lethality of aimed shots and frustration at the inability to locate and attack snipers, sniper tactics have a significant effect on morale. Extensive use of sniper tactics can be used as a psychological strategy in order to induce constant stress in opposing forces.
One may note that by many aspects (constant threat, high "per event" lethality, inability to strike back), the psychological impact imposed by snipers is quite similar to those of landmines, booby-traps, and IEDs.
Historically, captured snipers are often summarily executed. This happened during World War I and also during World War II. As a result, if a sniper is in imminent danger of capture, he may discard any items which might indicate his status as a sniper. The risk of captured snipers being summarily executed is explicitly referred to in Chapter 6 of US Army doctrine document FM 3-060.11 entitled 'SNIPER AND COUNTERSNIPER TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES':
Historically, units that suffered heavy and continual casualties from urban sniper fire and were frustrated by their inability to strike back effectively often have become enraged. Such units may overreact and violate the laws of land warfare concerning the treatment of captured snipers. This tendency is magnified if the unit has been under the intense stress of urban combat for an extended time. It is vital that commanders and leaders at all levels understand the law of land warfare and also understand the psychological pressures of urban warfare. It requires strong leadership and great moral strength to prevent soldiers from releasing their anger and frustration on captured snipers or civilians suspected of sniping at them.
The negative reputation of snipers can be traced back to the American Revolution, when American "Marksmen" would intentionally target British officers, an act considered uncivilized by the British Army at the time (this reputation would be cemented during the Battle of Saratoga, when Benedict Arnold allegedly ordered his marksmen to target British General Simon Fraser, an act that would win the battle and French support). However, the British side used specially selected sharpshooters as well, often German mercenaries.
To demoralize enemy troops, snipers can follow predictable patterns. During the 26th of July Movement in the Cuban Revolution, the revolutionaries led by Fidel Castro always killed the foremost man in a group of President Batista's soldiers. Realizing this, none of Batista's men would walk first, as it was suicidal. This effectively decreased the army's willingness to search for rebel bases in the mountains. An alternative approach to this psychological process is to kill the second man in the row, leading to the psychological effect that nobody would want to follow the "leader".
The phrase "one shot, one kill" has gained notoriety in popular culture as a glorification of the "sniper mystique." The phrase embodies the sniper's tactics and philosophy of stealth and efficiency. The term may mean that single round should be fired, avoiding unnecessary firing (since every shot fired by a sniper can assist the enemy in locating the sniper). As well, every shot should be accurately placed, in order to kill or severely wound the victim. Whether the phrase actually reflects reality is of course subject to debate, but it has been widely used in literature and movies.
The occurrence of sniper warfare has led to the evolution of many counter-sniper tactics in modern military strategies. These aim to reduce the damage caused by a sniper to an army, which can often be harmful to both fighting capabilities and morale.
The risk of damage to a chain of command can be reduced by removing/concealing features which would otherwise indicate an officer's rank. Armies nowadays tend to avoid saluting officers in the field and eliminate rank insignia on BDUs. Officers can seek maximum cover before revealing themselves as good candidates for sniping through actions like reading maps and using radios.
Friendly snipers can be used to hunt the enemy sniper. Besides direct observation, defending forces can use other techniques. These include calculating the trajectory of a bullet by triangulation. Traditionally, triangulation of a sniper's position was done manually, though radar-based technology has recently become available. Once located, the defenders can try to approach the sniper from cover and overwhelm him. The United States military is funding a project known as RedOwl, which uses laser and acoustic sensors to determine the exact direction from which a sniper round has been fired.
The more shots a sniper fires, the more chances the defenders have to locate him, so they often try to draw fire, sometimes by offering a helmet slightly out of concealment. A tactic successfully employed in the Winter War by the Finns is known as "Kylmä-Kalle" (Cold Charlie). They used a shop mannequin or other doll dressed as a tempting target, like an officer. The doll was then presented as if it were a real man sloppily covering himself. Usually, Soviet snipers were unable to resist the temptation of an apparently easy kill. Once the angle where the bullet came from was determined, a shot of a large calibre gun such as a Lahti L-39 "Norsupyssy" ("Elephant rifle") anti-tank rifle was shot at the sniper's direction to eliminate him.
Other tactics include directing artillery or mortar fire onto suspected sniper positions, the use of smoke screens, and placing tripwire-operated munitions, mines, or other booby-traps near suspected sniper positions. Even dummy trip-wires can be placed to inconvenience sniper movement. Where anti-personnel mines are unavailable, it is possible to improvise booby-traps by connecting trip-wires to hand grenades, smoke grenades or flares. Even though these may not kill the sniper, they will reveal his location. Booby-trap devices should be placed close to likely sniper hides or along the probable routes used into and out of the sniper's work area. Knowledge of sniper field craft will assist in this task.
One very old counter-sniper tactic is to tie rags onto bushes or similar items in a danger area. The rags flutter in the breeze creating random movements in the corner of the sniper's eye, which they find distracting. The main virtue of this tactic is that it is easy to use; however, it is unlikely to prevent a skilled sniper from selecting targets, and may in fact provide a sniper with additional information about the wind near the target.
The use of canine units was also very successful, especially during the Vietnam War. A trained dog can easily determine the direction of the sniper from the sound of the bullet and will lie down with his head aiming at the sniper to give his handler the direction of the firing.
The use of sniping (in the sense of shooting at relatively long range from a concealed position) to murder came to public attention in a number of sensational U.S. cases, including the Austin sniper incident of 1966, the John F. Kennedy assassination, and the Beltway sniper attacks of late 2002. However, these incidents usually do not involve the range or skill of military snipers; in all three cases the perpetrators had U.S. military training, but in other specialties. News reports will often (inaccurately) use the term sniper to describe anyone shooting with a rifle at another person.
Sniping has also been used in asymmetric warfare situations, for example in the Northern Ireland Troubles, where in 1972, the bloodiest year of the conflict, the majority of the soldiers killed were shot by concealed IRA riflemen. There were also some instances in the early 1990s of British soldiers and RUC personnel being shot with .50 caliber Barrett rifles by sniper teams collectively known as the South Armagh sniper. In Northern Ireland, in addition to the uses listed above, a sniper was quite often a form of bait called a "come-on", whereby the sniper's position would be made obvious to a British patrol so as to draw them into an ambush in their attempt to close with the sniper.
The sniper is particularly suited to combat environments where one side is at a disadvantage. A careful sniping strategy can use a few individuals and resources to thwart the movement or other progress of a much better equipped or larger force. Because of this perceived difference in force size, the sniping attacks may be viewed as the act of a few persons to terrorize (earning the moniker 'terrorists') a much larger, regular force — regardless of the size of the force the snipers are attached to. These perceptions stem from the precept that sniping, while effective in specific instances, is much more effective as a broadly deployed psychological attack (see elsewhere in article).
In the war between Bosnian Muslim, Croatian forces, and Bosnian Serbs in the early 1990s, Serbian snipers in Sarajevo used sniping as a terror tool by shooting at any person, whether military or civilian, adult or child. These snipers would be classified as war criminals for deliberately targeting non-combatants.
Snipers are less likely to be treated mercifully if captured by the enemy. The rationale for this is that ordinary soldiers shoot at each other at 'equal opportunity' whilst snipers take their time in tracking and killing individual targets in a methodical fashion with a relatively low risk of retaliation.
In 2003, the U.S.-led multinational coalition composed of primarily U.S. and U.K. troops occupied Iraq and attempted to establish a new government in the country. However, shortly after the initial invasion, violence against coalition forces and among various sectarian groups led to asymmetric warfare with the Iraqi insurgency and civil war between many Sunni and Shia Iraqis.
Through November 2005, when the Pentagon had last reported a sniper fatality, the Army had attributed 28 of 2,100 U.S. deaths to enemy snipers. More recently, since 2006, insurgent snipers such as "Juba" have caused problems for American troops. Claims have been made that Juba have shot up to 37 American soldiers in Iraq as of October 2006.
In 2006, training materials obtained by U.S. intelligence showed that snipers fighting in Iraq were urged to single out and attack engineers, medics, and chaplains on the theory that those casualties would demoralize entire enemy units. Among the training materials, there included an insurgent sniper training manual that was posted on the Internet. Among its tips for shooting U.S. troops, there read: "Killing doctors and chaplains is suggested as a means of psychological warfare."