| 14th | Top Mauritius-related topics |
| Accident summary | |
|---|---|
| Date | 28 November 1987 |
| Type | In-flight fire (cause undetermined) |
| Site | Indian Ocean (off Mauritius) 19°10′30″S 59°38′0″E / 19.175°S 59.633333°ECoordinates: 19°10′30″S 59°38′0″E / 19.175°S 59.633333°E |
| Passengers | 140 |
| Crew | 19 |
| Injuries | 0 |
| Fatalities | 159 |
| Survivors | 0 |
| Aircraft type | Boeing 747-244B Combi |
| Aircraft name | Helderberg |
| Operator | South African Airways |
| Tail number | ZS-SAS |
| Flight origin | Chiang Kai Shek International Airport, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China |
| 1st stopover | Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam International Airport, Mauritius |
| Destination | Jan Smuts Airport, Johannesburg, South Africa (final) |
South African Airways Flight 295 was a commercial flight that suffered a catastrophic in-flight fire and crashed into the Indian Ocean near Mauritius on 28 November 1987, killing everyone on board.[1] An extensive salvage operation was mounted in order to try to recover the flight data recorders, one of which was successfully recovered from a depth of 4,900 metres (16,100 ft)—the deepest successful salvage operation ever conducted.[2] The flight prompted conspiracy theories that the South African government was using the aircraft to smuggle arms. However, the actual cause of the fire was never determined.
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Flight 295, a Boeing 747-244B Combi, registered ZS-SAS, delivered in 1980, called the Helderberg and flying in the aircraft livery and colours of South African Airways, took off from Chiang Kai Shek International Airport (now known as Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport), on a flight to Johannesburg via Mauritius. Dawie Uys served as the captain of the crashed flight.[3]
The Boeing 747-244B Combi is a variant of the aircraft that permits the mixing of passengers and airfreight on the same deck according to load factors on any given route. Flight 295 had 140 passengers and six pallets of cargo on the main deck. The master waybills stated that 47,000 kilograms (100,000 lb) of baggage and cargo were loaded on the plane.[4] A Taiwanese customs official performed a surprise inspection of some of the cargo; he did not find any cargo that could be characterized as suspicious.[4]
At some point during the flight, a fire developed in the cargo section on the main deck. The crew's checklist advised the crew to initiate recirculation of the air in the cabin and to open the cabin doors to let toxic gases out of the aircraft. However, the checklist operated under the assumption that the fire had been extinguished.[4] Since the fire was probably never extinguished prior to impact, the recirculation fed smoke and toxic gases to passengers, and the opening of the door allowed in oxygen that fed the fire.[4] A crew member went into the cargo hold to try to fight the fire, but he left behind a charged fire extinguisher either because he could not access the fire, or because it was too hot to stay in the hold. Investigators later found molten metal on the fire extinguisher.[4]
The following communication was recorded with Mauritius air traffic control:[5]
| Transcript of communication with Mauritius air traffic control | ||
|---|---|---|
| Time | Speaker | Dialog |
| 23:48:51 | 295 | Eh, Mauritius, Mauritius, Springbok Two Niner Five |
| 23:49:00 | ATC | Springbok Two Nine Five, eh, Mauritius, eh, good morning, eh, go ahead |
| 23:49:07 | 295 | Eh, good morning, we have, eh, a smoke, eh, eh, problem and we're doing emergency descent to level one five, eh, one four zero |
| 23:49:18 | ATC | Confirm you wish to descend to flight level one four zero |
| 23:49 20 | 295 | Ja, we have already commenced, an, due to a smoke problem in the aeroplane |
| 23:49:25 | ATC | Eh, roger, you are clear to descend immediately to flight level one four zero |
| 23:49:30 | 295 | Roger, we will appreciate if you can alert, an, fire, ehp, ehp eh, eh |
| 23:49:40 | ATC | Do you wish to, eh, do you request a full emergency? |
| 23:49:48 | 295 | Okay Joe, kan jy...vir ons (Okay Joe can you...for us) |
| 23:49:51 | ATC | Springbok Two Nine Five, Plaisance |
| 23:49:54 | 295 | Sorry, go ahead |
| 23:49:56 | ATC | Do you, eh, request a full emergency please, a full emergency? |
| 23:50:00 | 295 | Affirmative, that's Charlie Charlie |
| 23:50:02 | ATC | Roger, I declare a full emergency, roger |
| 23:50:04 | 295 | Thank |
| 23:50:40 | ATC | Springbok Two Nine Five, Plaisance |
| 23:50:44 | 295 | Eh, go ahead |
| 23:50:46 | ATC | Request your actual position please and your DME distance? |
| 23:50:51 | 295 | Eh, we haven't got the DME yet |
| 23:50:55 | ATC | Eh, roger and your actual position please. |
| 23:51:00 | 295 | Eh, say again |
| 23:51:02 | ATC | Your actual position |
| 23:51:08 | 295 | Now we've lost a lot of electrics, we haven't got anything on the on the aircraft now |
| 23:51:12 | ATC | Eh, roger, I declare a full emergency immediately |
| 23:51:15 | 295 | Affirmative |
| 23:51:18 | ATC | Roger |
| 23:52:19 | ATC | Eh, Springbok Two Nine Five, do you have an Echo Tango Alfa Plaisance please? |
| 23:52:30 | ATC | Springbok Two Nine Five, Plaisance |
| 23:52:32 | 295 | Ja, Plaisance |
| 23:52:33 | ATC | Do you have an Echo Tango Alfa Plaisance please? |
| 23:52:36 | 295 | Ja, eh, zero zero, eh eh eh three zero |
| 23:52:40 | ATC | Roger, zero zero three zero, thank you |
| 23:52:50 | 295 | Hey Joe, shut down the oxygen left |
| 23:52:52 | ATC | Sorry, say again please |
| 00:01:34 | 295 | Unintelligible transmission |
| 00:01:36 | 295 | Unintelligible transmission |
| 00:01:45 | 295 | Unintelligble transmission |
| 00:01:57 | 295 | Unintelligble transmission |
| 00:02:10 | 295 | Unintelligble transmission |
| 00:02:14 | 295 | Unintelligble transmission |
| 00:02:25 | 295 | Carrier wave only |
| 00:02:38 | 295 | Eh Plaisance, Springbok Two Nine Five, do (did) you copy? |
| 00:02:41 | ATC | Eh negative, Two Nine Five, say again please, say again |
| 00:02:43 | 295 | We're now sixty five miles |
| 00:02:45 | ATC | Confirm sixty five miles |
| 00:02:47 | 295 | Ja, affirmative Charlie Charlie3. Clearance and weather info |
| 00:02:50 | ATC | Eh, Roger, Springbok eh Two Nine Five, eh re you're recleared flight level five zero. Recleared flight level five zero |
| 00:02:58 | 295 | Roger, five zero |
| 00:03:00 | ATC | And, Springbok Two Nine Five copy actual weather Plaisance Copy actual weather Plaisance. The wind one one zero degrees zero five knots. The visibility above one zero kilometres. And we have a precipitation in sight to the north. Clouds, five oktas one six zero zero, one okta five thousand feet. Temperature is twenty two, two two. And the QNH one zero one eight hectopascals, one zero one eight over |
| 00:03:28 | 295 | Roger, one zero one eight |
| 00:03:31 | ATC | Affirmative, eh and both runways available if you wish |
| 00:03:43 | ATC | And two nine five, I request pilot's intention |
| 00:03:46 | 295 | Eh, we'd like to track in eh, on eh one three |
| 00:03:51 | ATC | Confirm runway one four |
| 00:03:54 | 295 | Charlie Charlie |
| 00:03:56 | ATC | Affirmative and you're cleared, eh direct to Foxtrot Foxtrot. You report approaching five zero |
| 00:04:02 | 295 | Kay |
| 00:08:00 | ATC | Two Nine Five, Plaisance |
| 00:08:11 | ATC | Springbok Two Nine Five, Plaisance |
| 00:08:35 | ATC | Springbok Two Nine Five Plaisance (No answer) |

The Helderberg was initially unable to inform Mauritian air traffic control of its position, and when it did, it reported an incorrect location that caused the subsequent search to be concentrated too close to Mauritius. By the time the first surface debris was located 12 hours after impact, it had drifted considerably from the impact location. Oil slicks and eight bodies showing signs of extreme trauma appeared in the water.[4] All 140 passengers and 19 crew on the manifest were killed.
The United States Navy sent P-3 Orion aircraft from Diego Garcia, which were used to conduct immediate search and rescue operations in conjunction with the French Navy.[6]
The pingers in the flight data recorders were not designed for deep ocean use, and could therefore also not be used to locate the wreckage.
Rennie Van Zyl, the head South African investigator, examined three wristwatches from the baggage recovered from the surface; two of the watches were still running according to Taiwan time. Van Zyl found the approximate time of impact from the stopped watch. The aircraft crashed around three minutes after the last communication with air traffic control.[4] Immediately after the crash, the press and public opinion suspected that terrorism brought down the Helderberg.South African Airways was perceived as representing the South African apartheid government as the airline was government-owned, and airline offices around the world had been vandalized.[4] Experts searched for indicators of an explosion on the initial pieces of wreckage discovered, such as surface pitting, impact cavities and spatter cavities caused by white hot fragments from explosive devices that strike and melt metal alloys found in aircraft structures. Experts found none of this evidence.[4] The investigators drew blood samples from bodies and found that the bodies had soot in their tracheae.[4]
The South African Navy sent the SAS Tafelberg and the SAS Jim Fouche to assist in the recovery of debris and remains.[7] The ocean tugs John Ross and Wolraad Woltemade also attended the scene, along with the Department of Environment Affairs vessels RS Africana and RS Sonne[8]
The South Africans searched unsuccessfully with sonar for the wreckage for two months before abandoning the search on 8 January 1988 when the pingers were known to have stopped transmitting.[8] Steadfast Oceaneering, a specialist deep ocean recovery company in the USA, was therefore contracted to find the site and recover the cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder.[9] The search area is described as being comparable in size to that of the Titanic, with the water at 5,000 metres (16,000 ft) being considerably deeper. However the wreckage was found within two days of the sonar search of the area commencing.[10]
Three debris fields were found: 19°10′30″S 59°38′0″E / 19.175°S 59.633333°E, 19°9′53″S 59°38′32″E / 19.16472°S 59.64222°E and 19°9′15″S 59°37′25″E / 19.15417°S 59.62361°E. These locations are 1.5, 2.3 and 2.5 km apart, which suggested that the fuselage broke up before impact.[citation needed] The cockpit voice recorder was eventually salvaged successfully from record depth of 4,900 metres (16,100 ft), but the flight data recorder was never found.[citation needed]
Van Zyl took the voice recorder to the National Transportation Safety Board in Washington, DC, to show his goodwill and to ensure neutral observers.[4] Van Zyl believes that if he kept the CVR in South Africa he could have been accused of covering up the truth.[4] At the NTSB, Van Zyl felt frustration that the degraded CVR, which had been in the deep ocean for a year, did not initially yield any useful information. At the 25 minute mark Van Zyl felt very frustrated.[4] Around 28 minutes into the recording the CVR indicated that the fire alarm sounded. Fourteen seconds after the fire alarm, the circuit breakers began to pop. Investigators believe that around 80 circuit breakers failed. The CVR cable failed 81 seconds after the alarm. The recording revealed the extent of the fire.[4]
Van Zyl discovered that the front-right pallet was the "seat" of the fire. The manifest said that pallet mostly comprised computers in polystyrene packaging. The investigators said that the localized fire likely came in contact with the packaging and produced gases that accumulated near the ceiling. They also said that gases ignited into a flash fire that affected the entire cargo hold. The cargo fire of Flight 295 did not burn lower than one meter above the cargo floor. The walls and ceiling of the cargo hold received severe fire damage. Van Zyl ended his investigation without discovering why the fire started.[4]
The crash was the first fire incident on the 747 Combi and one of few fires on widebody aircraft. Fred Bereswill, the investigator from Boeing, characterized the Flight 295 fire as significant for this reason.[4]
An official commission of inquiry was chaired by Judge Cecil Margo.[11] The official report determined that while the Helderberg was over the Indian Ocean, a fire had occurred in the main deck cargo hold, originating in the front right-hand cargo pallet. This led to the loss of the airliner. The reason for the loss was not specified, but two possibilities were detailed in the official report: Firstly, that the crew became incapacitated due to smoke penetration into the cockpit. Secondly, that the fire weakened the structure and the tail separated leading to impact with the ocean.[citation needed]
The manufacturer is quoted in the report as having "contested" any scenario that involved a break-up of the aircraft and thus the commission did no more than mention the two possible scenarios in its final report as incidental to the primary cause of the accident.[citation needed]
The commission determined that the primary cause of the loss was because fire detection and suppression facilities in class B cargo bays (the type used aboard the 747-200 Combi) were inadequate. The accident alerted aviation authorities worldwide to the fact that the regulations regarding class B bays had lagged far behind the growth in capacity of such cargo bays. The exact source of ignition was never determined, but sufficient evidence was found to confirm that the fire had burned for some time and that it might have caused structural damage.[citation needed]
In January 1992, the journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society reported that the inquiry into the inflight fire that destroyed SAA Flight 295 might be reopened because the airline had confirmed that its passenger jets had carried cargo for Armscor, a South African arms agency. The RAeS journal, Aerospace, asserted: "It is known that the crew and passengers were overcome by a maindeck cargo fire, and the ignition of missile rocket fuel is one cause now under suspicion."[12] However, no action was taken to reopen the inquiry, and this might have spawned a number of conspiracy theories concerning the nature of the cargo that caused the fire as well as doubts about the outcome of the initial inquiry.[13] Examples of such theories include:
The television show Carte Blanche dedicated an investigation into a number of these allegations.[15]
A South African government chemist examined a microscopic particle on the nylon netting next to the front-right pallet on Flight 295. The chemist found that the airflow patterns on the iron suggested that it traveled at a high velocity while in a molten state; therefore the fire on Flight 295 may have not been a flash fire triggered by packaging.[citation needed] Fred Bereswill, the investigator from Boeing, said that this would suggest that the source of the fire would have had properties like a sparkler, with the source including its own oxidizing agent. A British fire and explosion analyst examined the exterior skin of the aircraft which had been located above the pallet; the analyst found that the skin became as hot as 300 degrees Celsius. Bereswill said that it would be difficult for a fire to burn through the skin of an aircraft in-flight because of the cool airflow outside of the aircraft.[4]
Dr. David Klatzow, a forensic consultant, said that the fire likely involved substances that would not normally be carried on a passenger aircraft and that the fire was not likely a wood, cardboard, or plastic fire.[4]
Members of the South African public believed that the South African government placed military weapons on its passenger aircraft. South Africa was fighting a war with Angola and was under an arms embargo at the time; the South African government therefore had to buy arms clandestinely. The public believed a conspiracy theory put forward that stated that South Africa used its passenger aircraft to smuggle arms. Klatzow claimed that a rocket system placed in the cargo hold started the fire, and that such a rocket would be unstable and could self-ignite due to vibration or movement.[4]
In 1996, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, established by the post-apartheid South African Government, investigated apartheid era incidents. In particular, this incident was investigated to determine if there was any truth behind the conspiracy theories that the Margo Commission had covered up or missed any evidence that might implicate the previous government.[13]
In 1998, the commission concluded that nothing listed in the cargo manifest could have caused the fire. Debora Patta, an investigative journalist, said that the commission believed that "something untoward" occurred.[4] The commission's final report asked the Attorney General's Office to investigate the fire; the office never made any further investigations. Klatzow said that the commission "exposed the improbabilities" of the 1980s South African Government investigation position.[4] Van Zyl said that the cause could never be definitively determined unless a responsible individual would say so and present proof that he was not creating a hoax. Patta said that the likely reason why the Attorney General's Office did not continue the investigation is that doing so would be too costly.[4]
Barry Strauch of the NTSB visited Boeing's headquarters to inquire about the Combi's design. Boeing's fire test in the Combi models did not accurately match the conditions of the Helderberg's cargo hold; in accordance with federal U.S. rules, the Boeing test involved setting a bale of tobacco leaves ablaze. The fire stayed within the cargo hold. The air in the passenger cabin was designed to have a higher pressure than cargo area hold, so if a crew member opened the door to the cargo hold, the air from the passenger cabin would flow into the cargo hold, stopping any smoke or gases from exiting through the door.[4]
Investigators created a new test involving a cargo hold with conditions similar to the conditions of Flight 295; the plastic covers and extra pallets provided fuel for the fire, which would spread quickly before generating enough smoke to activate smoke alarms. The hotter flame achieved in the new test heated the air in the cargo hold. This heated air was more highly pressured, which overcame the pressure differential between the cargo hold and the passenger cabin. When the door between the passenger and cargo holds was open, smoke and gases flowed into the passenger cabin.[4]
The test proved to the investigators that the design of the Boeing 747 Combi did not provide enough protection to the passengers. After the accident South African Airways discontinued use of the Combi. The Federal Aviation Administration created new standards for the use of the Combi. Complying with these new standards would have required substantial weight increases, which made the 747 Combi economically non-viable.[4]
| Nationality | Passengers | Crew | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | 0 | 2 | |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | |
| 2 | 0 | 2 | |
| 47 | 0 | 47 | |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | |
| 2 | 0 | 2 | |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | |
| 52 | 19 | 71 | |
| 30 | 0 | 30 | |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | |
| Total | 140 | 19 | 159 |
Republic of China authorities stated that 58 passengers began flying in Taipei, including 30 R.O.C. citizens, 19 South Africans, 3 Japanese, two Mauritians, one Dane, one Dutch, one British, and one West German. The other passengers transferred from other flights arriving in Taipei, and as such their nationalities were not known to R.O.C. authorities.[17]
At least two passengers died of smoke inhalation.[4]
Mayday (also known as Air Emergency and Air Crash Investigation) aired an episode titled "Fanning the Flames" (outside of Canada it aired as "Cargo Conspiracy" and "Mystery Fire") which documents the crash.
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