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The U.S. government's Strategic Computing Initiative funded research into advanced computer hardware and artificial intelligence from 1983 to 1993. The initiative was designed to support all the various projects that were required to develop machine intelligence in a ten year time frame, from chip design and manufacture, computer architecture to artificial intelligence software. The department of defense spent a total of $1 billion on the project.[1]

The inspiration for the program was Japan's fifth generation computer project, an enormous initiative that set aside billions for research into computing and artificial intelligence. As with Sputnik in 1959, the American government saw the Japenese project as a challenge to its technological dominance.[2 ] The British government also funded a program of their own around the same time, known as Alvey, and a consortium of U.S. companies funded another similar project, the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation.[3][4 ]

The goal of SCI, and of these other contemporary projects, was nothing less than full machine intelligence (known in the 21st century as "strong AI"). "The machine envisioned by SC", according to Alex Roland and Philip Shiman, "would run ten billion instructions per second to see, hear, speak, and think like a human. The degree of integration required would rival that achieved by the human brain, the most complex instrument known to man."[5]

The initiative was conceived as an integrated program, similar to the Apollo moon program,[5] where diifferent subsystems would be created by various companies and academic projects and all of them would be brought together into a single integrated system. Alex Roland and Philip Shiman write "While most research programs entail tactics or strategy, SC boasted grand strategy, a master plan for an entire campaign."[1]

The project was funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and directed by the Information Processing Technology Office (IPTO). By 1985 it had spent $100 million and 92 projects were underway at 60 institutions, half in industry, half in universities and government labs.[2 ] Robert Kahn, who directed IPTO in those years, provided the project with its early leadership and inspiration.[6]

By the late 80s, it became apparent the project would not succeed in creating machine intelligence at the levels that had been hoped for. Insiders in the program cited problems in communication, organization and integration.[7 ] When Jack Schwarz ascended to the leadership of IPTO in 1987, he cut funding to artificial intelligence research (the software component) "deeply and brutally", "eviscerating" the program (writes Pamela McCorduck).[7 ] Schwarz felt that DARPA should focus its funding only on those technologies which showed the most promise. In his words, DARPA should "surf", rather than "dog paddle", and he felt strongly AI was not "the next wave".[7 ]

Although the program failed to produce machine intelligence at the levels that had been hoped for,[1] it did help to advance the state of the art of computer hardware to a considerable degree. On the software side, the initiative funded development of the Dynamic Analysis and Replanning Tool, a program that handled logistics using artificial intelligence techniques. This was a huge success, saving the Department of Defense billions during Desert Storm.[4 ]

The project was superseded in the 1990s by the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative and then by the Advanced Simulation and Computing Program. These later programs did not include artificial general intelligence as a goal, but instead focussed on supercomputing for large scale simulation, such as atomic bomb simulations.

See also


  1. ^ a b c Roland & Shiman 2002, p. 2.
  2. ^ a b McCorduck 2004, pp. 426–429.
  3. ^ Crevier 1993, p. 240.
  4. ^ a b Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 25.
  5. ^ a b Roland & Shiman 2002, p. 4.
  6. ^ Roland & Shiman 2002, p. 7.
  7. ^ a b c McCorduck 2004, pp. 430–431.




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